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
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THE CONTEMPORARY REVIEW



THE COURSES OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

I HAVE been bold in my title; and, in order to convey a distinct idea, have promised what I cannot do more than most imperfectly perform.

My paper is a paper for the day. We live in a time when the interest in religious thought, or in thought concerning religion, is diffused over an area unusually wide, but also when the aspect of such thought is singularly multiform and confused. It defies all attempts at reduction to an unity, and recalls the Ovidian account of chaos :—

“ Nulli sua forma manebat,
Obstabatque aliis aliud, quia corpore in uno
Frigida pugnabant calida, humentia siccis,
Mollia cum duris, sine pondere habentia pondus.”*

At every point there start into action multitudes of aimless or erratic forces, crossing and jostling one another, and refusing not only to be governed, but even to be classified. Any attempt to group them, however slightly and however roughly, if not hopeless, is daring; but, as they act upon us all by attraction and repulsion, we are all concerned in knowing what we can of their nature and direction; and an initial effort, however feeble, may lead the way to more comprehensive and accurate performances.

I shall endeavour, therefore, to indicate in a rude manner what seem to be in our day the principal currents of thought concerning religion; and as, in a matter of this kind, the effect can

* Ov. Metam. i. 17.

hardly be well considered without the cause, I also hope in a future paper briefly to touch the question, how and why these currents have been put into their present sharp and unordered motion.

The channels in which they mainly run, according to my view, are five. But this Punjaub differs from the Punjaub known to geography, in that its rivers do not converge, although for certain purposes and between certain points they, or some of them, may run parallel. Neither do they, like Po and his tributaries, sweep from the hill into the plain to find their rest;* but, for the time at least, the farther they run, they seem to brawl the more.

My rude map will not reach beyond the borders of Christendom. There are those who seem to think that, as of old, wise men will come to us from the East, and give us instruction upon thoughts and things. It will be time enough to examine into these speculations, as to any practical value they may possess, when we shall have been favoured with a far clearer view, than we now possess, of the true moral and spiritual interior of the vast regions of the rising sun. We may thus, and then, form some idea of the relations both between their theoretical and their actual religion, and between their beliefs and their personal and social practice; and we may be able in some degree to estimate their capacity for bearing the searching strain of a transition from a stagnant to a vivid and active condition of secular life. At present we seem to be, for the most part, in the dark on these capital questions, and where, as in the case of Islam, we have a few rays of light, the prospect of any help to be drawn from such a quarter is far from encouraging.

Provisionally, then, I set out with the assumption that in handling this question for Christendom, we are touching it at its very heart. The Christian thought, the Christian tradition, the Christian society, are the great, the imperial thought, tradition, and society of this earth. It is from Christendom outwards that power and influence radiate, not towards it and into it that they flow. There seems to be one point at least on the surface of the earth—namely, among the negro races of West Africa—where Mahometanism gains ground upon Christianity; but that assuredly is not the seat of government from whence will issue the *fiats* of the future, to direct the destinies of mankind.

Yet other remarks I must prefix. One is apologetic, another admonitory. First, I admit that many writers, many minds and characters, such for example as Mr. J. S. Mill, and such as the school of Paulus, and such as many of those now called Broad-Churchmen, will not fall *clean* into any one of the five divisions, but will lie between two, or will range over, and partake the

* Danto Div. Comm. v. 98.

notes of several. This must happen in all classifications of thought, more or less; and here probably more rather than less, for the distinctions are complex, and the operation difficult. Secondly, my aim is to exhibit principles, as contradistinguished from opinions. Let it not be supposed that these always go together, any more than sons are always like their parents. Principles are, indeed, the fathers of opinions; and they will ultimately be able to assert the parentage by determining the lineaments of the descendants. Men, individually and in series, commonly know their own opinions, but are often ignorant of their own principles. Yet in the long run it is the principles that govern; and the opinions must go to the wall. But this is a work of time; in many cases a work of much time. With some men, nothing less than life suffices for it, and with some life itself is not sufficient. A notable historic instance of the distinction is to be found in those English Puritans of the seventeenth century, who rejected in block the authority of creeds, tests, and formularies. Their opinions were either Calvinistic, or at the least Evangelical. After three or four generations it was found that, retaining the title of Presbyterians, the congregations had as a rule become Unitarian; and yet that they remained in possession of buildings, and other endowments, given by Trinitarian believers. Upon a case of this character arose the well-known suit of Lady Hewley's charity. Sir Lancelot Shadwell, who decided it, knew well that every hair of Lady Hewley's head would have stood on end, had she known what manner of gospel her funds were to be used to support; and he decided that they could only be employed in general conformity with her opinions. Satisfied with a first view of the case, the public applauded the judgment; and it has not been reversed. But the parties in possession of the endowments were not to be dislodged by the artillery of such pleas. They appealed to Parliament. They showed that their Puritan forefathers had instructed them to discard all intermediate authorities; and to interpret Scripture for themselves, to the best of their ability. It would indeed have been intolerable if those, who taught the rejection of such authority when it was ancient and widely spread, should, in their own persons, have reconstituted it, all recent and raw, as a bond upon conscience. The Unitarians contended that they had obeyed the lesson they were taught, and that it was not their fault if the result of their fidelity was that they differed from their teachers. Parliament dived into the question, which the Bench had only skimmed, and confirmed the title of the parties in possession.

And again. As men may hold different opinions under the shelter of the same principle, so they may have the same opinions while they are governed by principles distinct or opposite. No

man was in principle more opposed to the Church of Rome than the late Mr. Henry Drummond. But he expressed in the House of Commons a conception of the Eucharistic sacrifice so lofty, as must have satisfied a divine of the Latin Church. Again, the doctrine of Transubstantiation was received in the thirteenth century on the authority of a Papal Council; but it is probable that many of the "Old Catholics," who have renounced the dominion, may still agree in the tenet.

I think it will be found that these remarks will explain the cases already indicated of persons who do not fall into any of the five classes. They are I think, chiefly, either the indolent, who take up at a venture with narrow and fragmentary glimpses of the domain of religious thought, or the lovers of the picturesque, who are governed by exterior colour and other superficial signs; or they are writers in a state of transition, who have received the shock which has driven them from their original base, but have not yet found a region suited to restore to them their equilibrium, a fluid of the same specific gravity with themselves.

I take no notice of the system termed Erastian. It can hardly, as far as I see, be called a system of or concerning religious thought at all. Its centre of gravity is not within the religious precinct. The most violent Ultramontane, the most determined Agnostic, may alike make excellent Erastians, according to the varieties of time and circumstance. If we follow the Erastian idea, it does not matter what God we worship, or how we worship Him, provided we derive both belief and worship from the civil ruler, or hold them subject to his orders. Many most respectable persons have been, or have thought themselves to be, Erastians; but the system, in the developments of which it is capable, is among the most debased ever known to man.

"Non ragioniam di lui; ma guarda, e passa."

Lastly, it is plain that a Chart of Religion, such as I am endeavouring to present in outline, has reference to the *Ecclesia docens*, rather than to the *Ecclesia discens*; to the scientific or speculative basis of the respective systems, and the few who deal with it, not to their development in general life and practice, a subject far too difficult and invidious for me to consider.

I may now set out the five main schools or systems, which are constituted as follows. We have:—

- I. Those who accept the Papal monarchy: or the Ultramontane school.
- II. Those who, rejecting the Papal monarchy, believe in the visibility of the Church: or the Historical school.
- III. Those who, rejecting the Papal monarchy and the visibility of the Church, believe in the great central dogmas of the

Christian system, the Trinity and the Incarnation. These will be here termed the Protestant Evangelical school.

IV. Those who, professedly rejecting all known expressions of dogma, are nevertheless believers in a moral Governor of the Universe, and in a state of probation for mankind, whether annexing or not annexing to this belief any of the particulars of the Christian system, either doctrinal or moral. These I denominate the Theistic school.

V. The Negative school. Negative, that is to say, as to thought which can be called religious in the most usual sense. Under this head I am obliged to place a number of schemes, of which the adherents may resent the collocation. They are so placed on the ground that they agree in denying categorically, or else in declining to recognize or affirm, the reign of a moral Governor or Providence, and the existence of a state of discipline or probation. To this aggregate seem to belong—

- | | |
|-----------------|------------------------|
| 1. Scepticism. | 5. (Revived) Paganism. |
| 2. Atheism. | 6. Materialism. |
| 3. Agnosticism. | 7. Pantheism. |
| 4. Secularism. | 8. Positivism. |

I.

Of these five main divisions, the first is much before any one of the others in material extension. Its ostensible numbers may nearly equal those of the second and the third taken together. The fourth and the fifth are made up of votaries who are scattered and isolated; or whose creed is unavowed; or who, if they exist in communities at all, exist only in such minute communities as to be but specks in the general prospect.

The Ultramontane system has also the great advantage, for working purposes of by far the most elastic, the most closely knit, and the most highly centralized organization.

Again, it derives its origin by an unbroken succession from Christ and His apostles. No more imposing title can well be conceived; yet it naturally has no conclusive weight with such as remember or believe that a theistic system, given by the Almighty to our first progenitors, passed, in the classic times, and in like manner, through far more fundamental transformations. It was by a series of insensible deviations, and without the shock of any one revolutionary change, that in a long course of ages, after a pure beginning, there were built up many forms of religion, which, at the period of the Advent, had come to be in the main both foul and false. The allegation may possibly be made that the traditions, as well as the personal succession, of the Latin Church, are unbroken. But this will of course be denied by those

who regard the Council of 1870 as having imported at a stroke a fundamental change into the articles of the Christian faith. To the vast numerical majority, however, the Roman authorities seem to have succeeded in recommending the proposition, and the claim passes popularly current.

This singular system, receiving the Sacred Scriptures, and nominally attaching a high authority to the witness of tradition, holds both in subjection to such construction as may be placed upon them from time to time, either by an assemblage of Bishops, together with certain other high functionaries, which derives its authority from the Pope, or by the Pope himself, when he thinks fit to take upon himself the office. It is true that he is said to take advice; but he is the sole judge what advice he shall ask, and whether he shall follow it. It is true that whatever he promulgates as an article of faith he declares to have been contained in the original revelation; but by his vision alone can the question be determined whether it is there or not. To the common eye it seems as if many articles of Christian belief had at the first been written in invisible ink, and as if the Pope alone assumed the office of putting the paper to the fire, and exhibiting these novel antiquities to the gaze of an admiring world. With regard, however, to matters of discipline and government, he is not restrained even by the profession of following antiquity. The Christian community under him is organized like an army, of which each order is in strict subjection to every order that is above it. A thousand bishops are its generals; some two hundred thousand clergy are its subordinate officers; the laity are its proletarians. The auxiliary forces of this great military establishment are the monastic orders. And they differ from the auxiliaries of other armies in that they have a yet stricter discipline, and a more complete dependence on the head, than the ordinary soldiery. Of these four ranks in the hierarchy, two things may be asserted unconditionally: that no rights belong to the laity, and that all right resides in the Pope. All other rights but his are provisional only, and are called rights only by way of accommodation, for they are withdrawable at will. The rights of laymen as against priests, of priests as against bishops, of bishops as against the Pope, depend entirely upon his judgment, or his pleasure, whichever he may think fit to call it. To all commands issued by and from him, under this system, with a demand for absolute obedience, an absolute obedience is due.

To the charm of an unbroken continuity, to the majesty of an immense mass, to the energy of a closely serried organization, the system now justly called Papalism or Vaticanism adds another and a more legitimate source of strength. It undeniably contains within itself a large portion of the individual religious life of Christendom. The faith, the hope, the charity, which it was the

office of the Gospel to engender, flourish within this precinct in the hearts of millions upon millions, who feel little, and know less, of its extreme claims, and of their constantly progressive development. Many beautiful and many noble characters grow up within it. Moreover, the babes and sucklings of the Gospel, the poor, the weak, the uninstructed, the simple souls who in tranquil spheres give the heart and will to God, and whose shaded path is not scorched by the burning questions of human thought and life, these persons are probably in the Roman Church by no means worse than they would be under other Christian systems. They swell the mass of the main body; obey the word of command when it reaches them; and they help to supply the resources by which a vast machinery is kept in motion.

Yet once more. The Papal host has reason to congratulate itself on the compliments it receives from its extremest opponents, when they are contrasted with the scorn which those opponents feel for all that lies between. Thus E. von Hartmann, the chief living oracle of German Pantheism, says it is with an honourable spirit of consistency (*Consequenz*) that "Catholicism" has, after a long slumber, declared war to the knife against modern culture and the highest acquisitions of the recent mental development;* and he observes that, while he utterly denounces the mummy-like effete and religious incapacity of Ultramontaniam, still "it ought to feel flattered by my recognizing in it the legitimate champion of historical Christianity, and denoting its measures against modern culture as the last effort of that system at self-preservation."† Accordingly his most severe denunciations are reserved for "Liberal Protestantism," his next neighbour, even as the loudest thunders of the Vatican are issued to proclaim the iniquities of "Liberal Catholics."‡

I shall recite more briefly the besetting causes of weakness in the Ultramontane system. These I take to be principally: (1) its hostility to mental freedom at large; (2) its incompatibility with the thought and movement of modern civilization; (3) its pretensions against the State; (4) its pretensions against parental and conjugal rights; (5) its jealousy, abated in some quarters, of the free circulation and use of the Holy Scripture; (6) the *de facto* alienation of the educated mind of the countries in which it prevails; (7) its detrimental effects on the comparative strength and morality of the States in which it has sway; (8) its tendency to sap veracity in the individual mind. If this charge were thought harsh, I could refer for a much stronger statement to the works of the late Mr.

* *Der Selbstversetzung des Christenthums*, p. 15 (Berlin, 1874).

† *Ibid.* Vorwort, p. x.

‡ The latest specimen may be seen in a Pastoral of Bishop Bourget, of Montreal, the hero of the remarkable and rather famous Guibord case. Published in the *Montreal Weekly Witness* of Feb. 10, 1876.

Simpson, himself a convert to the Roman system from the English Church.

II.

Next in order to the Ultramontane school comes a school which may perhaps best be designated as Historical; because, without, holding that all, which has been, has been right, it regards the general consent of Christendom, honestly examined and sufficiently ascertained, as a leading auxiliary to the individual reason in the search for religious truth. To this belong those "Liberal Catholics" who have just been mentioned, and who, unlike the "Old Catholics," remain externally in the Latin communion, bravely and generously hoping against hope, under conditions which must ensure to them a highly uncomfortable existence. Their position appears to be substantially identical with that of a portion of the Protestants of the sixteenth century, who in perfectly good faith believed that they were maintaining the true system of Christianity as attested by Scripture and sacred history, but who had to uphold this as their own conviction in the teeth of the constituted tribunals of the Latin Church. The appeal now made, indeed, is from the Council of the Vatican to a Council lawfully conducted; but the right of appeal is denied by the living authority, and appears therefore, now that that authority has given a final utterance on the dogma of Infallibility, to rest on the ultimate groundwork of private judgment. The question here, however, is not so much their ecclesiastical position, as their form of religious thought, and their proper place in the general scheme or chart. Few they may be, and isolated they certainly are. But they are essentially in sympathy with many who do not wear the same badge with themselves, in short with all who, rejecting the Papal monarchy, adhere to the ancient dogma formulated in the Creeds, and who believe that our Lord, and His Apostles acting under His authority, founded a society with a promise of visible perpetuity, and with a commission to preach the Gospel and administer the sacraments. That Gospel is the faith once delivered to the saints; and, while some of these believers would admit that the Church may err, they would all agree in holding that she cannot err fatally or finally, and that the pledge of her vitality, if not of her health, is unconditional; unconditional, however, not to any or to every part, but to the whole, as a whole. They would agree that she is divinely kept in the possession of all essential truth. They would agree in accepting those declarations of it, which proceeded, now between twelve and fifteen centuries ago, from her as one united body, acting in lawful councils, which received their final seal from the general acceptance of the faithful. They would recognize no final authority subordinate to that of the united Church; and would plead for a reasonable and free acceptance of

that authority on the part of the individual Christian. Or, if these propositions lead us too far into detail, they believe in an historical Church, constitutional rather than despotic, with its faith long ago immutably, and to all appearance adequately, defined; and they are not to be induced by the pretext of development to allow palpable innovations to take their place beside the truths acknowledged through fifty generations.

If to those, who are thus minded, I give the title of historical, it is because they seem to conform to the essential type of Christianity as it was exhibited under the Apostolical, the Episcopal, and the Patriarchal system; and because they do not tamper in practice with that traditional testimony, of which in theory they admit the real validity and weight, and the great utility in conjunction with the appeal of the Church to Holy Scripture.

This, in its essential outlines, is the system which constitutes the scientific basis of the Eastern or Orthodox Churches. I do not speak of the defects, faults, and abuses, which doubtless abound in them, as in one shape or another they do in every religious body; but of the ultimate grounds, which, when put on their defence, they would assume as the warrant of what is essential to their system.

Great, without doubt, is in every case the interval between the written theory and the practice of ecclesiastical bodies. The difference is scarcely less between their authorized doctrine, in the proper sense, which they hold as of obligation, and the developments which that doctrine receives through the unchecked or little checked predominance of the prevailing bias in the works of individual writers, and in the popular tradition. It is with the former only that I have here to do. Inasmuch, however, as few or none of them are judged among us (in my opinion) so superficially and harshly as the Churches of the East, I would observe, on their behalf, that they know nothing of four great conflicts, which more than ever distract the Latin Church as a whole: conflict between the Church and the State; conflict between the Church and the Scripture; conflict between the Church and the family; conflict between the Church, and modern culture, science, and civilization.

While the largest numerical following of this scheme of belief is to be found in the Eastern Churches, a recurrence to the outline, by which I have described it, will show that it includes, together with the so-called Liberal Catholics whom the Papal Court regards as the parasitic vermin of its Church, and the Old Catholics whom it has succeeded in visibly expelling, the classical theology of the English Church. This may be said to form one of its wings. The standard books and the recognized writers, that express the theological mind of Anglicanism, proceed throughout on the assertion, or the assumption, that the Church is a visible society or congre-

gation; and her leaders and episcopal rulers preserved with an unfailing strictness the succession of Bishops, at a time, and under circumstances, when the policy of the hour would have recommended their treating it as a matter of indifference. This proposition is by no means weakened by the fact that in most or many cases they made large allowance for the position of the Protestants of the Continent. Their position was then, to a great extent, undefined and provisional, and was capable of being regarded as, to a great extent, representing, with respect to government and order, a case of necessity. The changes made in England during the sixteenth century as to tenets and usages, they treat as having been within the competence of the local Church which accepted them,—used as never having been condemned by a legitimate authority; and they fear lest the general rejection of tradition should really mean contempt of history. These principles are treated by many who view them from an exterior standing point, for example by Lord Macaulay, as “the crotchets of the High Church party.” But it is an established fact of history that “The High Church party” is but another name, rough perhaps, but true, for the influence which has moulded the theology of the English Church, or rather of the Anglican Churches, from the reign of Queen Elizabeth down to the present hour.

Among non-episcopal Protestants, a small portion of the German divines are, perhaps, alone in sympathy with the system here described. As a recent, yet not too recent, specimen of this class, I would mention Rothe.* But in other times the description would have included many of the weightiest names of Protestantism, such as Casaubon and Grotius, and, towering even over these, the great Leibnitz.

The strength of this system lies generally, first in its hold upon antiquity, and in the authority and consent of the earlier Christian writers, known as fathers, every one of whom holds the visibility and teaching office of the Church, while it is only the wrenching of a word here and there from a very few of their works into forced prominence and isolation, that can bring any one of them so much as upon speaking terms with the Papal monarchy. At this point a distinction must be taken between East and West. Oppression and poverty have thrown the Churches of the East into a defensive attitude, and have of necessity limited the range of learning, and condemned them specially to the evils of stagnation. But their doctrinal continuity is not liable to the challenge which impeaches that of the Roman Church. In old times they appear as Protestant, in the most legitimate and historic sense of the word, against the innovations of the Papal supremacy, and of interpola-

* *Anfänge der Christlichen Kirche.* Wittenberg, 1837.

tion in the Creed of Nice and Constantinople. At the present day, they are the most determined and the most dreaded of the antagonists to the Vatican Council. In the West, this scheme of religion has rested on learning and weight rather than on numbers and organization. But its respect for history and mental freedom, and the general moderation of its views of ecclesiastical power, had, at any rate down to our own day, sensibly mitigated the violent asperities of the Roman system: and, under an Anglican form, have in some way enabled it to maintain, and in recent times even to strengthen, its hold upon a large portion of the most active and the most self-asserting among all the nations of the Old World. Lastly, the scheme has the advantage that it is not the mere profession of a school and a system on paper or in the brain; but is firmly, though variously, incorporated in the authentic documents, and historical traditions, of large ecclesiastical bodies, great limbs of Christendom.

If such be the strength of the second among my five schemes when impartially viewed, it has likewise marks of weakness properly its own. Its adherents, while they teach that Christians ought to be united in the visible organization of the Church, are *de facto* severed one from another, as well as (most of them) from the largest portion of the Christian world. What is still worse, in a merely popular sense—and it is only in the popular sense that I now presume to speak of strength or weakness—is, that it lies essentially in a mean: that it accepts the basis of religious belief in much the same fashion as we have all to accept those of Providential guidance and moral duty in practical life. It acknowledges the authority of the Church, but cannot, so to speak, lay its finger on any means whereby that authority can at any given moment be fully and finally exercised. It allows Holy Scripture to be supreme in matters of faith, but it interposes more or less of an interpretative sense, in controverted subjects, between the Divine Word and the individual mind. What men like most in religion is simplicity and directness. But this method does not speak with the directness or simplicity of either of its neighbour systems: whereof one directs inquiries straight to the priest, the bishop, and the Pope; and the other promises a private and personal infallibility which is to follow the pious exercise of the mind upon the Divine Word. The same thing happens to them in a great religious crisis, as to the moderate shades of opinion in times of revolutionary excitement. They are apt to disappear like the Presbyterians before Cromwell, or like Lafayette before the Gironde, which was, in its turn, to give place to the Terror. The most sharply defined propositions are those, which most relieve the understanding by satisfying the emotional part of our nature. Both on this side and on that the stammering lips are silenced;

and adherents are individually liable, as experience has shown, to be hustled into the opposite camps, where such propositions are the watchwords of the rival hosts.

III.

The third to be noticed of the great powers* on the map of religious thought and feeling is that which I have made bold to term the Protestant Evangelical. For the pure and simple name Protestant is now largely and loosely used; sometimes even by men who, themselves believing nothing, nevertheless want countenance for their ends from among those who believe something, and who trust for this to the charm that still invests the early stages of its career, and associates it with a battle manfully fought for freedom against oppression and abuse. To fasten down its sense, the affix "Evangelical" may suffice. The phrase, thus enlarged, comprehends all who, rejecting the Papal monarchy, either reject, or at least do not accept, the doctrine of a Catholic Church, visible and historical; and who, without always proceeding to an abstract repudiation of all aid from authority or tradition, are on behalf of human freedom extremely jealous of such aid, and disposed rather to rely on the simple contact of the individual mind with the Divine Word. Such is their negative side. But they adhere to nearly all the great affirmations of the Creeds. They believe strongly, if not scientifically, in revelation, inspiration, prophecy; in the dispensation of God manifest in the flesh; in an atoning Sacrifice for the sin of the world; in a converting and sanctifying Spirit; in short, they accept with fulness, in parts perhaps with crude exaggerations, what are termed the doctrines of grace. It is evident that we have here the very heart of the great Christian tradition, even if that heart be not encased in the well-knit skeleton of a dogmatic and ecclesiastical system, such as is maintained in principle by the ancient Churches. It is also surely evident to the unprejudiced mind that we have here a true incorporation of Christian belief to some extent in institutions, and to a yet larger extent in life and character. And this scheme may claim without doubt, not less truly than those which have gone before, to be a tree bearing fruit. It has framed large communities. It has formed Christian nations; or at least, has not un-formed them. It has sustained an experience of ten generations of men. It may be that it does not generate largely the

* A remarkable effort has been made to incorporate the idea which I have described as the basis of this Third Division, in what was known as the Surrey Chapel. It was originally founded for the Rev. Rowland Hill, and now, under the ministry of the Rev. Newman Hall, the congregation is about to migrate to a larger and more stately building. The scheme rests upon a "Schedule of Doctrines," which excludes the visible Church as an historical institution or polity, but requires dogmatic belief of the character stated in the text; and it does not require, or include, connection with any particular persuasion of professing Christians.

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most refined forms of religion, or much of the very highest spirituality; but he would be a bold man who should attempt to fasten on it any clearly marked and palpable inferiority of moral results as compared with those of other Christian schemes. I do not enter on the disputable question of the claim it would probably advance to a marked superiority. My object is to establish on its behalf that it has to a great extent made good its ground in the world of Christian fact: that it cannot be put out of the way by any expedient or figure of controversy, such as that it is a branch torn from the stem, with a life only derivative and provisional. Open to criticism it is, as may easily be shown: but it is one great factor of the Christian system as it now exists in the world. It is eminently outspoken, and tells of its own weaknesses as freely as of its victories or merits: it rallies millions and scores of millions to its standard: and while it entirely harmonizes with the movement of modern civilization, it exhibits its seal in the work of all works, namely, in uniting the human soul to Christ.

The phrase I have employed would at the period of the Reformation have correctly described, with insignificant exceptions, the Reformed communities of the Continent. Now, in the nineteenth century, I apprehend it can only be considered to represent a party, larger or smaller, in each of those communions: a party, of which the numerical strength is hard to estimate even by conjecture. In the United Kingdom, however, it may claim nearly the entire body of Presbyterians and Nonconformists under their various denominations. Moreover, that section of the Church of England which is termed the Evangelical or Low Church, not now very large, but still active and zealous, seems in great measure to belong to it. Of the English-speaking population in the New World, that is to say, in the United States and the British Colonies, which may be roughly taken at fifty millions, it may claim perhaps as many as thirty for its own; nor does any portion of the entire group seem to be endowed with greater vigour than this, which has grown up in new soil and far from the possibly chilling shadow of National Establishments of religion.

On its popular and working side, in its pastoral and missionary energy, in the almost unrestrained freedom of its movements, the group is strong. Nor need it suffer greatly from the reproach of severances in outward communion, when it is considered that the particular forms of religious organization are, in its view, matters of comparative indifference, and that the intermixture of ministerial offices, so incongruous and unseemly where enjoined principles draw the line of demarcation, is for its respective sections nothing else than a fostering and cheering sign of brotherly good-will. Its weakness is on the side of thought. This is the form of the Christian idea, which, and which alone, accepts the responsibility

of upholding the main part of the dogmatic system of the first ages, but renounces, for fear of ulterior consequences, the immense assistance which its argument on the text and *corpus* of the sacred books derives from the living development, through so many ages, of the Christian system, and the continuous assent of the Church to one and the same faith. It is burdened with the necessities of an exclusive scheme; for it not only denounces as desertion from the faith the abandonment of the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ, but likewise, in some of its sections, it interpolates new essentials of its own, such as personal assurance, particular election, final perseverance, and peculiar conceptions respecting the atonement of Christ and the doctrine of justification. In respect of this last, it has often ascribed to faith the character and efficacy of a work, seemingly not even aware that it was thereby cutting from beneath its feet the famous *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiæ*. It has a logical difficulty in ridding itself of such excrescences; seeing that the excrescence and that to which it clings grow out of one and the same soil, as they are received upon one and the same warrant, whether it be that of a favourite religious teacher, or of a personal illumination. Most of all, it has very severely suffered from the recent assaults on the *corpus* of Scripture, which it had received simply as a self-attested volume; and on its verbal inspiration, a question which has never offered so serious a dilemma to those who are content to take their stand on the ancient constitution of the Church, and to allow its witnessing and teaching office. Grounding itself with rather rigid exclusiveness upon the canon of the Bible, it is obliged to protest against the government and many of the doctrines of the Church at the very epoch when that canon was made up. Its repudiations are so considerable, and so far-reaching, that there remains hardly any adequate standing ground for the defence of that which it is not less decidedly set upon retaining. It is therefore, as might be expected, a school poor as yet in the literature of Church history, of dogmatic theology, and of philosophic thought. Its own annals, from the sixteenth century downwards, supply abundant proof of its lying open at many points to the largest disintegration. This disintegration is not, as in the last case, personal and atomic. It is not the mere occasional departure of individual deserters: it is the decrepitude and decadence of organic laws. Even now amidst its many excellences there are signs that danger is at hand. Indeed, were it not for the ground of hope, ever furnished by true piety and zeal, it seems hard to assign any limit to the future range of the destructive principle. Even the evanescence of Calvinistic crudities, once required as the very quintessence of the Gospel, may excite misgiving in the minds of friendly though extraneous observers, when they reflect that no higher or other authority,

than that which these crudities have enjoyed, is allowed to the highest and most central verities of the ancient creeds.

IV.

We now pass away by a great stride into the region of Theism. We have quitted the zone, in which all alike adore the name and person of the Messiah; in which Scripture is supreme; in which is recognized a supernatural, as well as a providential order; in which religion is authoritative and obligatory, and based on an objective standard. We have entered a zone in which the subjective instinct, the need or appetite of man for religion, is regarded as its title, and as its measure: in which, as far as religion is concerned (not, I presume, in other matters), truth is mainly that which a man troweth: and in which the individual, growing towards maturity, instead of accepting and using the tradition of his fathers until his adult faculties see ground to question it, is rather warned against such acceptance, as enhancing the difficulties of impartial choice. We are here commonly introduced, at least in theory, to a new mode of training. In things touching his bodily and his intelligent life, the youth is indeed allowed to profit by the vast capital, which has been accumulated by the labour and experience of his race. But, in respect to the world unseen, and to its Author, he must not be imbued with prejudice; there is no such thing as established or presumptive truth of which he can avail himself; he is doomed, or counselled, to begin anew. What he attains, as it began with his infancy, so it will die with his death. He inherited from no one, and no one will inherit from him.

In making this transition, I confess to feeling a great change of climate. It is not simply that certain tenets have been dropped. The mental attitude, the method of knowledge, have been changed. Under the three former systems, that method was traditional and continuous: it is here independent, and simply renewable upon a lease to each man for his life.

Such a sketch is, I think, conformable to the theory of modern Theism, and such is its goal or final standing point in practice. But this is not the whole picture. It is time to show its positive side. It recognizes one Almighty Governor of the world; and, if it has scruples about calling Him a Person, yet conscious of Him as one who will deal with us, and with whom we have to deal, as persons deal with one another, this Almighty Being has placed us under discipline in the world: and will in some real and effective manner bring it about that the good shall be happy, and that those who do evil shall surely suffer for it. These are truths of the utmost value in themselves. Nay, who shall

say that, were the great disease of the moral world less virulent than it is, they would not, of themselves, supply it with a sufficient medicine? But further, most of the Theists have come to be such, not by a rejection of Christianity, but by a declension from it: and in quitting their ancient home, they have carried away with them a portion, sometimes a large portion, of the furniture: a deep personal reverence for the person of the Saviour, and a warm adhesion to the greater part at least of His moral teaching: nay, even, as for example in the writings of Mr. Martineau, a devout recognition of its higher spiritual aims.

There may be observed, however, on the part of this school of teachers, not exclusively but specially, a disposition to recommend their system by associating it with what is called universalism, or the doctrine that all human, or more properly all created being, however averse and remote it may now be from God, shall at some future time be brought into conformity and consequent felicity. There can be no doubt of the predisposition of very many to fall in with a notion of this kind. It gives the sort of pleasure which we may conceive to attend the removal of a strongly-constructed bit from the mouth of a restive horse. But it propounds a belief; and an affirmative proposition must have for its foundation something more solid than a mere sense of relief. In order that a scheme of this kind may attain to weight and authority, as distinguished from mere popularity, it seems requisite that some effort should be made, I will not say to support it from Scripture or tradition, but to establish for it a place among the recognized principles of natural religion; to sustain it by analogies and presumptions from human experience, and from the observation of life, character, and the scheme of things under which we live. When, by a solid use of the methods of Butler, it shall have been shown that a scheme of this kind takes hold of and fits into the moral government of the world, and the natural working of the human conscience, then indeed some progress will have been made towards obtaining a hearing for its claim to be accounted an article of religion. But till that time comes, it will not perhaps be a source to its advocates of great intellectual or moral strength.

Now, we have no right whatever to impute bad faith to the profession of the Unitarians and others, that they cannot and will not part with the name of Christians; that they are the true professors of a reformed Christianity; and that they have effected with thoroughness and consistency that reduction of it to the form of its original promulgation by its illustrious Teacher, which, in the sixteenth century, others were either too timid, or not enough enlightened, to effect.

Since the time of Belsham, considerable changes seem to have

taken place in the scheme of Unitarianism. At the present day it probably includes much variety of religious thought. But I am not aware that it has abandoned the claim to be the best representative of the primitive Gospel as it was delivered by Christ Himself.

The Jews, who, taken together are a rather large community, have hitherto believed themselves the stewards of an unfulfilled Redemption. But it seems that a portion at least of them are now disposed to resolve their expected Messiah into a typical personage, prefiguring the blessings of civilization. It may be doubted whether such a modification as is thus indicated would greatly add to the moral force of Judaism, or make its alliance more valuable to the scheme which I am endeavouring to sketch.

Now, since it was the doctrine of the Incarnation which gave to Love, as a practical power, its place in religion, so we might suppose that, upon the denial of that doctrine, that seraph would unfold its wings and quit the shrine it had so long warmed and blessed. But it is not so. Whatever be the cause, devotion and fervour still reside, possibly it should be said still linger, within this precinct of somewhat chill abstractions. There are within it many men not only irreproachable in life, but excellent; and many who have written both in this country and on the Continent with no less power than earnestness, in defence of the foundations of the belief which they retain. Such are, for example, Professor Frohschammer in Germany and M. Laveleye in Belgium: while in this country, without pretending to exhaust the list, I would pay a debt of honour and respect to Mr. Martineau, Mr. Greg, Dr. Carpenter, and Mr. Jevons. See, for example, Mr. Greg's last edition of the "Creed of Christendom;" Dr. Carpenter's address to the British Association at Bristol; the remarkable chapter with which Mr. Jevons has closed his work on Scientific Method; and, most recent of all, the powerful productions contributed to this *REVIEW*, in which Mr. Martineau has exhibited the "theologic conception" of the great Causal Will, as the "inmost nucleus of dynamic thought."*

The truth is, that the school consists not of a nation or tribe, with its promiscuous and often coarse materials, but of select individuals, scattered here and there, and connected by little more than coincident opinion. They are generally men exempt from such temptations as distress entails, and fortified with such restraints as culture can supply. It is not extravagantly charitable to suppose that a portion of them at least may be such as, from a happy moral, as well as mental constitution, have never felt in themselves the need of the severer and more efficacious control supplied by the doctrines of the Christian Church. In this sense, under the

* *March No.*, pp. 531, 546.

conditions of our human state, goodness itself may be a snare. In any attempt, however, to estimate the system as a system, it must be recollected that the moral standard of individuals is fixed not alone, and sometimes not principally, by their personal convictions, but by the principles, the traditions, and the habits of the society in which they live, and below which it is a point of honour, as well as of duty, not to sink. A religious system is only then truly tested, when it is set to reform and to train, on a territory of its own, great masses of mankind.

Still we should not hastily be led by antagonism of opinion to estimate lightly the influence which a school, limited like this in numbers, may exercise on the future. For, if they are not rulers, they rule those who are. They belong to the class of thinkers and teachers; and it is from within this circle, always, and even in the largest organizations, a narrow one, that go forth the influences which one by one form the minds of men, and in their aggregate determine the course of affairs, the fate of institutions, and the happiness of the human race. What for one I fear is that, contrary to their own intentions, while the aggregate result of the destructive part of their operations may be large, in their positive and constructive teaching, tried on a large scale, they will greatly fail.

It is not their numerical weakness alone which impresses me with the fear that, if once belief were reduced to the dimensions allowed by this class of teachers, its attenuated residue would fall an easy prey to the destroyer. It is partly because the scheme has never been able to endure the test of practice in great communities. The only large monotheism known to historic times is that of Mahomet; and, without wishing to judge that system harshly, I presume that none regard it as competent to fill the vacuum which would be left by the crumbling away of historical Christianity. The general monotheism, which many inquirers, and most Christians, trace in the most primitive times, did not live long enough to stamp even so much as a clear footprint on the ground of history. The monotheism of the Hebrews lived, upon a narrow and secluded area, a fluctuating chequered life, and apparently owed that life to aids altogether exceptional. The monotheism of the philosophic schools was little more than a declamation and a dream. Let us listen for a moment to Macaulay on the old philosophers:—

“God the uncreated, the incomprehensible, the invisible, attracted few worshippers. A philosopher might admire so noble a conception; but the crowd turned away in disgust from words which presented no image to their minds. It was before Deity embodied in a human form, walking among men, partaking of their infirmities, leaning on their bosoms, weeping over their graves, slumbering in the manger, bleeding on the cross, that

the prejudices of the Synagogue, and the doubts of the Academy, and the pride of the Portico, and the fasces of the Lictor, and the swords of thirty legions, were humbled in the dust."*

This system then is dry, abstract, unattractive, without a way to the general heart. And surely there are yet graver and more conclusive reasons why it should, in its sickly revival, add another failure to those which have hitherto marked, and indeed formed, its annals. It is intellectually charged with burdens which it cannot bear. We live, as men, in a labyrinth of problems, and of moral problems, from which there is no escape permitted us. The prevalence of pain and sin, the limitations of free will, approximating sometimes to its virtual extinction, the mysterious laws of interdependence, the indeterminateness for most men of the discipline of life, the cross purposes that seem at so many points to traverse the dispensations of an Almighty benevolence, can only be encountered by a large, an almost immeasurable, suspension of judgment. Solution for them we have none. But a scheme came eighteen hundred years ago into the world, which is an earnest and harbinger of solution: which has banished from the earth, or frightened into the darkness, many of the foulest monsters that laid waste humanity; which has restored woman to her place in the natural order; which has set up the law of right against the rule of force; which has proclaimed, and in many great particulars enforced, the canon of mutual love; which has opened from within sources of strength for poverty and weakness, and put a bit in the mouth and a bridle on the neck of pride. In a word, this scheme, by mitigating the present pressure of one and all of these tremendous problems, has entitled itself to be heard when it assures us that a day will come, in which we shall know as we are known, and when their pressure shall no longer baffle the strong intellects and characters among us, nor drive the weaker even to despair. Meantime no man, save by his own wilful fault, is the worse for the Advent of Christ, while at least many are the better. Then, in shedding upon us the substance of so many gifts, and the earnest of so many more, it has done nothing to aggravate such burdens of the soul as it did not remove. For adventitious, forced, and artificial theories of particular men, times, and places, it cannot be held responsible. Judged by its own authentic and universal documents, it is a remedial, an alleviating scheme. It is a singular puzzle of psychology to comprehend how men can reject its aids, bounteous even if limited, and thus doom themselves to face with crippled resources the whole host of the enemy. For, as Theists, they have, to make all the admissions, to do battle with all the objections which appear to lie against the established provision

* Essay on Milton. Essays, i. 22.

for the government of the world; but they deprive themselves of the invaluable title to appeal either to the benevolent doctrines of historical Christianity, or to the noble, if only partial, results that it has wrought.

But it is now time to set out upon the last stage of our journey.

V.

I need not repeat the catalogue of schemes which appear to fall under my fifth and last head, and which have been given on a former page.

It is a social truism that to tell A he is like B in most cases offends him; and to tell B he is like A commonly has the same effect. I fear the classifications thus far attempted may have a similar consequence, and with more reason; for we are bound to think well of our beliefs, but not of our countenances. Still less acceptable may possibly be the bracketing, in which no less than eight systems will now be presented to view. Let me as far as may be anticipate and forego displeasure by stating anew that the principle of classification is negative; and that the common tie of the systems now to be named together is that they do not acknowledge, or leave space for, a personal government and personal Governor of the world, in the sense in which these phrases have recently been defined. Religion, in its popular and usual sense, they seem by a necessity of their systems to renounce; but to say that they all renounce it in its sense of a binding tie to something which is external to themselves, is beyond my proposition, and beyond my intention. Hartmann, in the work I have already referred to, gives us what he thinks a religion, to replace departing Christianity, under the name of Pantheism: Strauss offers us the worship of the *Universum* in his *Alte und Neue Glaube*: Comte claims to produce a more perfect apparatus in the Religion of Humanity. This profession is one which I may be unable to distinguish from an hallucination, but I am far from presuming to pronounce or believe it an imposture. But more than this: in the individual case, it may not be an hallucination at all. To many an ancient Stoic the image of virtue, to many a Peripatetic the constitution and law of his own nature as it had been analysed and described by Aristotle, may have constituted in a greater or a less degree an object of true reverence and worship, a restraint upon tendencies to evil, an encouragement to endeavours after good, nay, even a consolation in adversity and suffering, and a resource on the approach of death. In many a modern speculator images like these, nay, and systems far less rational than these, may at this moment live and open, or at the worst live without

closing, the same fountains of good influence. But, as in wines, it is one question what mode of composition will produce a commodity drinkable in the country of origin, and what further provision may be requisite in order that the product may bear a sea voyage without turning into vinegar, so, in the matter of belief, select individuals may subsist on a poor, thin, sodden, and attenuated diet, which would simply starve the multitude. Schemes, then, may suffice for the moral wants of a few intellectual and cultivated men, which cannot be propagated, and cannot be transmitted; which cannot bear the wear and tear of constant re-delivery; which cannot meet the countless and ever-shifting exigencies of our nature taken at large; which cannot do the rough work of the world. The colours, that will endure through the term of a butterfly's existence, would not avail to carry the works of Titian down from generation to generation and century to century. Think of twelve agnostics, or twelve pantheists, or twelve materialists, setting out from some modern Jerusalem to do the work of the twelve Apostles!

But, whatever the systems in question may seem to me to threaten in their eventual results, I desire to avoid even the appearance of charging the professors of them, as such, with mental or moral lawlessness. I am not unmindful of the saying of an eminent Presbyterian, Dr. Norman Macleod, that many an opponent of dogma is nearer to God than many an orthodox believer, or of the words of Laertes on the dead Ophelia and the priest:—

“A ministering angel shall my sister be,
When thou liest howling.”*

I shall not attempt to include in this paper, which has already perhaps exceeded its legitimate boundaries, any incisive sketch of these several systems, or to pass, indeed, greatly beyond the province of a dictionary.

By the Sceptic, I understand one who, under the pressure either of intellectual or of moral difficulties, presented to him in the scheme of Revelation and Providence, makes that suspense of judgment, in regard to the unseen, universal, which the believer in Christ, or in some form of religion, may admit as partially warrantable; and who consequently, by conviction in part, and in part by habit, allows the influence of the unseen upon his mind to sink to zero. This outline would leave a broad distinction between the sceptic proper, and the questioner who is in good faith and with a practical aim searching for an answer to his questions; though the two may be agreed at the moment in their stopping short of all affirmative conclusions.

* *Hamlet*, v. i.

By the Atheist I understand the man who not only holds off, like the sceptic, from the affirmative, but who drives himself, or is driven, to the negative assertion in regard either to the whole Unseen, or to the existence of God.

By the Agnostic, again, is signified one who formulates into a proposition the universal doubt of the sceptic; agreeing with him, in that he declines to predicate the non-existence of the objects of religion, but agreeing with the atheist in so far as that he removes them, by a dogma, from the sphere open and possible to human knowledge, either absolute or practical.

Then comes the Secularist. Him I understand to stop short of the three former schools, in that he does not of necessity assert anything but the positive and exclusive claims of the purposes, the enjoyments, and the needs, presented to us in the world of sight and experience. He does not require in principle even the universal suspense of scepticism; but, putting the two worlds into two scales of value, he finds that the one weighs much, the other either nothing, or nothing that can be appreciated. At the utmost he is like a chemist who, in a testing analysis, after putting into percentages all that he can measure, if he finds something behind so minute as to refuse any quantitative estimate, calls it by the name of "trace."*

Next of kin to the secularist would be the professor of what I have described as a revived Paganism. I would rather have termed it Hellenism, were it not that there lies and breathes in the world of fact another Hellenism, with a superior title to the name. This scheme evokes from the distant past what at any rate once was an historical reality, and held through ages the place, and presented to the eye the shell, of a religion, for communities of men who have profoundly marked the records of our race. It may perhaps be called secularism glorified. It asserted, or assumed, not only the exclusive claims of this life, but the all-sufficiency of the life on behalf of which these claims were made. It was plainly a religion for Dives and not for Lazarus; a religion, of which it was a first necessity that the mass of the community should be slaves to do the hard rough work of life, and should be excluded from its scope; and of which it was an undoubted result to make the nominally free woman, as a rule, the virtual slave of the free man. But its great distinction was that it was a reality, and not a simple speculation. It trained men boldly, and com-

* The following paragraph is from the prospectus of a weekly periodical:—"The *Secularist* is an exponent of that philosophy of life termed Secularism, which deprecates the old policy of sacrificing the certain welfare of humanity on earth to the merely possible and altogether unknown requirements of a life beyond the grave; which concentrates human attention on the life which now is, instead of upon a dubious life to come; which declares Science to be the only available Providence of man; which repudiates groundless faith and accepts the sole guide of reason; and makes conduciveness to human welfare the criterion of right and wrong."

pletely, in all the organs of the flesh and of the mind, and taught them to live as statesmen, soldiers, citizens, scholars, philosophers, epicures, and sensualists. It had, too, its schisms and its heresies; an Aristophanes with a scheme more masculine, an Alcibiades with one more effeminate. It had likewise a copious phantasmagoria of deities; a hierarchy above, represented in the every-day world by a priesthood without force either social or moral, yet supplying a portion of the grandeur required by the splendid and elaborate art-life of the people, and perhaps still partially serving the purpose of the legislator, by imposing the restraint of terror upon the lower passions of the vulgar. To the masses of men, this system did not absolutely prohibit religion; a religion idolatrous in form, but not on that account wholly without value. To the educated life of the free citizen, the prohibition was as complete as it could be made; and the spectacle of that life in the classical age of Greece can hardly be satisfactory to those, who teach that we have, in the inborn craving of the human heart for religion as a part of its necessary sustenance, a guarantee for the conservation of all that is essential to it as a power, and as an instrument of our discipline. This, then, I dismiss as the religion of "the sufficiency of life;" with a debased worship appended to it for the ignorant, but with no religating, no binding power, between the educated man on the one side, and anything beyond the framework of the visible world on the other. Such a scheme as this could not but end in utter selfishness and degeneracy; still we must not forget, how long it takes our wayward and inconsequent race to work out the last results of its principles; and, so long as men were only on the way to moral ruin, there was space and scope for much patriotism, much honour, and even much love.

Materialism finds in matter the base and source of all that is. Perhaps this is properly and strictly a doctrine of philosophy rather than one touching religion. I am too slightly possessed of the real laws and limits of the conception to speak with confidence: but I do not at present see the answer to the following proposition. In our actual world we have presented to us objects and powers simply material; and we have also presented to us objects and powers *including* what is wholly different in fashion and operation from matter. If, then, upon a materialistic basis we can have "Hamlet" and "Macbeth," the works of Aristotle, the *Divina Commedia*, the Imitation of Christ, the Gospels and Epistles, there may in the unseen world possibly be reared, on this same basis, all that theology has taught us. And thus materialism would join hands with orthodoxy. Such may be the scheme from one point of view. In common use, and in what is perhaps the most consistent use, I am afraid the phrase is appropriated by those who desire to express, in a form the most crude and crass,

the exclusion of Deity from the world and the mind of man, and from the government of his life; and the eventual descent into matter of all that now idly seems to our eyes to be above it. Such a materialism is the special danger of comfortable and money-making times. The multiplication of the appliances of material and worldly life, and the increased command of them through the ever-mounting aggregate of wealth in the favoured sections of society, silently but steadily tend to enfeeble in our minds the sense of dependence, and to efface the kindred sense of sin. On the other hand they are as steadily increasing the avenues of desire, and enhancing the absorbing effect of enjoyment. With this comes the deadening of the higher conception of existence, and the disposition to accept the lower, and the lowest, one.

A candidate in greater favour for the place, which it is supposed Christianity and Theism are about to vacate, is Pantheism. Meeting it often in its negative and polemical aspects, I am not so well aware from what source to draw an authentic statement of its positive character. It sins, perhaps, in ambiguity of definition, more than any of the other symbols adopted to designate a scheme of religion. It may be understood to conceive of God as the centre of the system, by will and might, penetrating and pervading all Being to its outermost circumference, and immanent in each thing and each organism, in proportion to its constitution, capacity, and end. Or, this moral centre of all life and power may be resolved into the negative centre of the circle in mathematics, the point which hath position but not parts, and whose imagined gravitating power is but a name for the sum of forces not its own, which happen to find at that point their maximum, and which give it accordingly a conventional entity to denote in concentration what exists only in diffusion. In the former of these two senses, I am by no means sure that Dante is not a Pantheist. For he thus speaks of the Divine will: and by the mouth, too, of a spirit in bliss:—

“In la sua volontade è nostra pace:
Ella è quel mare, al qual tutto si muove,
O ch' Ella cria, o che Natura face.”*

In this sense Pantheism is, or may be, the highest Christianity. But in the other sense of the phrase, the conception of God is diluted, not enlarged; the visible creation, which is called His robe, is a robe laid upon a lay figure; all by which He indicates a will, all by which He governs, all by which He inspires the awe, reverence, and love that cluster round a person; all that places

* Div. Comm., Parad. c. 111.

THE COURSES OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

us in personal relation to Him, and makes personal dealings with Him possible, is disintegrated and held in solution, and can no more fulfil its proper function than the copper which is dissolved in acid can before precipitation serve the purpose of a die.*

There now remains of this formidable octave only the subject of Comtism or Positivism, or, as it might be called, Humanism. In a general view, it seems to improve upon Pantheism, by bringing into the account certain assets, which Pantheism does not stoop to notice, namely, the vast roll of the life and experience of the great human past, summed into an unit. In human characters aggregate or select, it sees, or thinks it sees, a noble picture; in human achievement, a large accumulation of moral and social, as well as material capital: in the one a fit and capable object to move the veneration, and thus mould the moral being of the race; in the other, the means and appliances needful for continued progress in the future career. When this system is viewed from the standing ground of belief, nothing can redeem it from the charge of that great initial act of destruction, in which it partakes with the seven competitors: yet there is, one would think, much of faith and of chivalry in this constructive effort; and some sympathy will be felt for a gallant endeavour to build up a working substitute for the old belief, and to efface the Ichabod written on the tablets of a deserted shrine.

Several of the schemes, which I have presumed to arrange in this fifth division, are, in the mouths of their more selfish and vulgar professors, mere names to cover the abandonment of all religion; sometimes, perhaps, even of much moral obligation. With regard to the rest, I think it important to dwell upon the observation that they are, from one cause or another, exceptional and not ordinary men—men so conditioned that the relation between belief and life in their case affords no indication whatever of the consequences with which a like state as to belief, becoming widely prevalent, and in a measure permanent, would be followed among the mass of men. They are, for example, *rari nantes*; for though their aggregate number, in the circle of men devoted to intellectual pursuits, may be at this moment large, the number of those whose witness agrees together, who are (so to speak) in any positive sense of the same communion, is small; and small sects of opinion, not emboldened by wide and general countenance, do not rapidly develop, even in their own consciousness, the extreme consequences that their schemes would produce in practice. From many motives, good as well as inferior, they are content to

* The various possible senses of Pantheism are set out with clearness at the opening of Mr. Hunt's First Chapter in his Essay on the subject (Longmans, 1866). Of Mr. Hunt's proposition that personality involves limitation (p. 341) I have never yet seen a proof.

breathe the moral atmosphere of the community around them, are governed by its traditions and its fashions, and wear its habiliments, which they oftentimes mistake for the work of their own hands. Again, they are men whose life is absorbed in intellectual pursuits, and who are saved by the high interest of their profession or their function from the mischiefs left to idle hands and idle minds, cursed as these so often are with unbounded means and opportunities of indulgence. Once more: I lately ventured, in this REVIEW, to propound an opinion comforting to some, and not offensive, I hope, to any, that in some cases the disposition to undervalue, or retrench, or even abandon the old Christian belief, may be due to a composition happier than the average in the amount or energy of its tendencies to evil, and a consequent insensibility to the real need both of restraining and of renovating powers for the true work of life. While conscious, however, of no disposition to restrict admissions of this kind, but rather willing to enlarge them, I earnestly protest against the inference, in whatever shape, that no other fruits than such as are known to be reaped from the isolated and depressed existence of these schemes would follow upon their general adoption. Let me repeat it: I should as readily admit it to be possible that the life and health of an entire community could be sustained upon a dietary framed on the scale that has sufficed in those very singular cases, occasionally to be met with, of persons who are able to live, and in a manner thrive, on an incredibly small amount of aliment, and who seem already to have passed into an existence half-ethereal.

When dealing with the four first departments of this rude chart of religious thought, I have in each case attempted to indicate some of the special sources of their weakness and of their strength respectively. In regard to the fifth, I postpone any such attempt, as it would lead me into a general consideration of the causes which have recently brought about, and which are still stimulating, a great movement of disintegration in the religious domain. The patience of the reader has been too severely taxed already to allow of my entering on a new field of discussion. I therefore leave for the present as it stands this multitudinous array of dislocated, and to a great extent conflicting, force; sensible that it may wear in some eyes the appearance of an attempt to describe the field, and the eve, of the Battle of Armageddon.

W. E. GLADSTONE.



PERSIA IN 1876.

HERE we have everything as from Nature," said the eldest son of the Shah to the present writer, early in the current year. We were in Ispahan, the chief commercial city of Persia, of which the prince is governor, and his remark was *à propos* of the absence of railways and other modes of internal communication which are common in civilized States. Nature has not richly endowed Persia with navigable rivers, and man has not made canals or roads. The prince's father is called "Zil-ullah" (Shadow of God), and he "Zil-i-Sultán" (Shadow of the King), so that the Prince-Governor of Ispahan is the Shadow of the Shade of God, as Persian titles go. And how do the princes of Persia act up to this high calling? They are reputed, by those who are in a position to know the facts of government, to be very skilful and ingenious in forcing contributions to the revenue of the State. The Zil-i-Sultán, though only twenty-six years of age, has a high reputation of this sort, and has already been governor of two of the most important divisions of Persia. A prince whom we met with, is said to have lately fitted, with successful result, a huge pair of trousers filled with snow upon a man who declined to pay a large demand, in the season when the thermometer stands for months below zero. Every governor seems to be more or less an expert in cruel punishments. A predecessor of the Zil-i-Sultán in the government of Shiraz recently punished highway robbers by fixing them neck-deep in cylinders of brickwork. He

then poured a sort of plaster of Paris around their naked bodies, which set hard long before the miserable wretches died of congestion and starvation.

But the government of Persia is oppressive as well as cruel. The Shah himself is not unpopular, and is believed to have at heart the welfare of his subjects. His Majesty recently issued an order that a "Box of Justice" should be fixed in a prominent place in all the large towns, for the reception of petitions, which were to be forwarded direct to himself; but the oppressors found means to thwart this innocent plan, by setting a watch over the boxes, and over those who wished to send petitions. Thrice the amount of the English Premier's salary, or twice that of the President of the United States, does not satisfy men of the first official rank in Persia. And while the commander-in-chief and all the high functionaries of State plunge their greedy hands thus deep into the miserable revenue, forced—often at the bayonet's point—from the poorest of peasants, the soldiery are not seldom marauders, with the excuse that they cannot obtain their pay from the Government. We were frequent visitors at the morning parades in Tehran, where European drill-instructors vainly laboured. The Persian soldiers are fine in *physique*, though they look rather awkward in European hats, tunics, and trousers. But they are very deficient in drill, and the reason is obvious. No soldier comes to parade who can obtain work in the town; and the consequence is that the *personnel* of each skeleton regiment is changed every morning, and the unhappy drill-instructor has never before him the same body of men. But this immunity from service must, of course, be paid for, and the absent privates devote a portion of their earnings to their officers, who, from the colonel to the corporal, divide the fund contributed in respect of this temporary desertion. From the officers and the middle class of State officials a somewhat intricate method of plunder is adopted. Their pay, although appropriated from the revenue, is withheld, and, after repeated applications, they are told that the minister will advance the sum with a deduction to cover his personal risk. The offer is generally accepted, and the gains of the higher functionaries from this line of conduct are said to be not inconsiderable.

It is unquestionable that the Persian people believe their rulers to be capable of any crimes, and especially of any sort of venality in the misappropriation of public money. The prince to whom we have referred, though eldest son of the Shah, is not the Crown Prince. The mother of the Governor of Ispahan was not a princess, and for this reason has been passed over; and the son of his Majesty's favourite, the Governor of Tabriz, enjoys that position.

all the soldiery that the Crown Prince had caused his wife to be strangled in his presence. The report was untrue; it had origin in the fact that the prince's aunt had lately sent a second wife to her illustrious nephew in Tabriz, and the anger and grief of the first wife on seeing the new arrival had been magnified into her death. When the Prime Minister returned with his Sovereign from England, he was so unpopular that the Shah only saved his clever servant by depriving Houssein Khan of the title of Sadr Asem. His execution by the bow-string was talked of. The Minister of Public Works is said to double his estimates and to retain the surplus for himself, after silencing those whose mouths must be stopped. At a Persian dinner in Ispahan, our near neighbour was a khan who farmed the customs of all the south. Some of the company said that he had begun life as a robber, and that his greatest success in that line had been in connection with a royal caravan. Of himself he said, "When I had £40 I thought myself the richest man in the world; now I never talk about money." But his neighbours on the floor, where the Persian dinner is served, had no similar objection. They laughed as they told how he had become immensely rich by making poor traders pay customs duties twice or even thrice upon the same articles, and how he would have been far richer if it were not that he is occasionally summoned to Tehran and threatened with "the sticks" if he does not make a handsome addition to the sum he has to pay yearly into the Treasury. The frequent robberies of the messengers of the British Embassy carrying despatches and letters overland from Tehran to Trebizond have been the subject of much talk, and people wag their heads and say that this happens because the Persian authorities like to read Mr. Thomson's letters to Lord Derby and the replies of the Foreign Office. It is universally believed that a little money will mitigate, and that much money will obviate, the punishment of crime. That every governor and every one in his service may commit offences with impunity, no one seems to doubt. It matters little, in forming our judgment as to the social condition of Persia, whether these reports are true or false. They are not all true; they may all be false, and yet the tacit, unastonished acceptance of them as true by the populace, implies that they have at least the common flavour of the ordinary fruits of Persian government.

Justice is certainly an accident in Persia. The perpetrator of foul and malicious murder may have his sentence remitted if he can obtain sufficient "blood money" to overcome the desire of the victim's friends for his execution. The creditors of the peasants and of the small traders are generally soldiers, for these only feel sure of the requisite power to recover their loans. The latter well knows that if he does not repay the soldier, his

house, or his store in the bazaar, will be plundered of all that is worth taking by a gang of military money-lenders. In one part of our long ride from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf we were attended by an officer of the road-guard and some half-dozen of his men. For days these people accompanied our caravan, by order of the governor of the province we were traversing. We observed that whenever they approached a flock of goats or sheep, the officer with one or two men rode towards the herd, and that soon afterwards one of the flock was following at our heels. The officer sold animals thus obtained in every town we passed, and pocketed the proceeds of the transaction, which we have no doubt was highway robbery. In answer to our demand for an explanation of his conduct, which we threatened to report to the governor, he replied that he had lent the herdsmen money and was only taking security for repayment. But this cloak for his probably criminal conduct was seemingly transparent to his giggling followers, who perhaps had received some small share in the gains of these robberies by men whose immediate duty was to protect us and our baggage from robbers. Walking one day through the narrow and filthy streets of Ispahan with the only English resident, we met with two native complainants. The first, a Jew, said that the house of his brother, a silversmith, had been broken into and plundered by the servants of the governor, with the plea that they wanted to carry the tradesman before the prince to answer a case in which money was claimed from him by a Persian. The second was a henna-dyed follower of Islam, who informed us that a Persian, with whom our companion was well acquainted, and who, though the son of a moollah, was known for "broad" views, had been summoned before the prince and bidden in friendly language (for he had lived on such terms with the governor) to abandon the wearing of trousers of European pattern as offensive, upon one of his descent, to the Sheik-ul-Islam. The man, eager to obey the wish of his illustrious friend, departed and quickly reappeared in orthodox costume. "Go," said the gratified prince, "to the sheik, and show him how quickly you have, at my request, conformed to his desire." The man went, but immediately upon reaching the presence of the religious authority, who is an ecclesiastical judge *ex officio*, he was seized and, without pretence of trial, sentenced to "one hundred sticks." The Englishman at once undertook inquiry into the truth of this story. He found that no exaggeration had been made, and that the sufferer had been so punished that for weeks he would be unable to put his feet to the ground. In Persia, death or "the sticks" is the commonest punishment. The man, in the latter case, is laid on the ground, and after his **ankles are passed through** **lockings are removed, his** **and** **which**

is held by two men at nearly the length of his legs from the ground, and by them turned until his ankles are so tightly secured that no writhing of his back can unplace them. Near him are laid the precise number of sticks to which he is sentenced. These are lithe switches five or six feet long, and rather more than half-an-inch thick in the centre. Two experts, who usually wear scarlet coats bound with black, then take their places near the beam, each armed with a stick, with which they in turn belabour the soles of the feet until the stick is broken too short for use. In the case above referred to the beating was continued until the hundred sticks were reduced to this condition. The prince was annoyed at the severe punishment of his friend, but his Royal Highness had to bear it, for in Persia, unless stirred to unwonted effort, the Shah's government is far less powerful than the chief priests of Islam.

We had signal proof of this at Koom, one of the two holy cities of Persia, where the Prophet's word is so far respected, that although wine and arrack are everywhere else exhibited, none can be had in Koom or Meshed. We had letters to the governor of Koom, both from the British Embassy and from the Shah's Prime Minister. He enjoys princely rank, he is the husband of the Shah's daughter, and the possessor of a magnificent income—all in consequence of his Majesty's contrition for decreeing the execution of his father, the great Amir-el-Nizâm, whose memory is cherished as that of a most able, just, and patriotic minister. The governor, who bears the imposing title of Itizad-ul-Dowleh (Grandeur of the State), his wife having in like manner received from her Imperial father the appellation of "Glory of the State," kindly sent ten ferashes, or servants, to conduct us through the town and to show us the sights of Koom. He intimated that we might look upon the shrine of Fatima, sister of the Imâm Reza, which is the holiest of holies in this sacred city. We visited the Mesjid-i-Juma, the oldest mosque in Koom, and the tomb of Feth-Ali Shah; but when we approached the mosque of Fatima, whose richly gilded cupola shines afar, there stood in the entrance a group of moollahs and dervishes who declared we should not enter, and threatened to call the fanatical populace to support them if the governor's servants attempted, as they seemed disposed, to force a passage. In sight of such opposition we at once ordered them to retire, and everywhere we found the same insuperable objection to any entry of the mosques used for public worship, although in India, in Turkey, and in Egypt nothing is more easy, upon payment of backshish and on condition of observing the cleanly habit of changing shoes at the door.

As to the Shah himself, he is admitted to be desirous of improvement, but universally described as fearful of exhibiting

power in the right direction. He in the highest place sets an example of encouraging the offer of presents to the greatest possible extent, and there can be no doubt that, down to the meanest of his subjects, the Persians labour to follow him. His ministers are said to be zealous in keeping him as much as possible away from Tehran for the better execution of their personal projects. Last year it was reported that his Majesty would make a progress to the south of his dominions, and immediately an order was issued prohibiting the export of grain from Bushire and Bunder Abbas, as it might be required for the Imperial cavalcade. But the people of Shiraz knew, so it is said, how to deal with the Royal intentions. They collected a large sum and sent it to Tehran, with a request that his Majesty would be graciously pleased to stay at home. *Pishkish*, the equivalent of *backshish*, appears to be the chief desire of every modern Persian. If he himself gives a present—and generally on entering a town the prince-governor sent us some hundreds of oranges, dates, and sweetmeats, arranged in plates set out upon huge metal trays, which were borne on the heads of African slaves—we cannot convince ourselves that the spirit of “hoping for nothing again” is within him. We arrived in Tehran during the fast Ramazan, when Mahometans are apt to be ill-tempered as well as hungry towards sunset, and every evening, when the gun was fired which signals to the faithful that they may eat, the Sefr Salar (Commander-in-Chief) entertained a regiment at dinner. Two lines of thick carpet were laid equidistant from the centre of the street, in the principal thoroughfare within the *arg* or citadel of Tehran. This was the seat of the guests. For the officers there was spread a white cloth between the carpets, and a little adornment was attempted in the way of bouquets placed between the lighted candles protected with Russian bell glasses, which shone like glowworms down the long street. The adjutant-general of the Persian army, one of the stoutest and most courteous men whom we met with, asked us to join the soldiers at least in taking fruit and a cup of tea. At the same time a story was circulating with reference to this Jehungur Khan, which, if not correct, is at least curiously illustrative of Persian government. It was said that some one of the courtiers who owed him a grudge had told the Shah that he (the adjutant-general) had saved 8,000 tomans out of a work in hand, and that he wished to present them to his Majesty. The King-of-Kings graciously signified his willingness to accept, and Jehungur Khan had to produce the money, which he had not saved.

Whether the people are responsible for their government, or whether the matter is contrariwise, we will not now attempt to determine. But when the ways of justice are not blind—are

rather dark, and are trodden in secrecy by irresponsible and unreported officers or by turbaned priests; when on the part of those who rule there is the example of covetousness, corruption, and unbridled violence; when all are liable upon slender evidence to cruel punishments or even a terrible death, is it wonderful that the people occasionally reflect the vices of their government? Nor, with rare exceptions, do the few Europeans in Persia offer them a much better example. They are friendly towards each other, and to travellers most hospitable and attentive, but they often lapse into Persian modes of dealing with their servants, and nothing is more common than to hear a European resident declare that no one can get on in Persia without "the sticks." Sir Justin Sheil, a former Minister at Tehran, had, they say, his house always well managed because "he used the sticks freely." We saw an Englishman beat a drunken servant most unmercifully with a heavy horsewhip. It did not make the man sober, yet his sense of shame was so deep that he galloped away from the caravan, rocking fearfully in his saddle. When, some hours afterwards, we met him at the *chupparkoneh* or post-house where we were to pass the night, he said to his master that he would rather anything had happened than thus to have been beaten in the presence of his fellow-servants and of those in attendance upon us. For ourselves we feel bound to say that in riding through Persia in the line of its greatest length, with the disadvantage of ignorance of the language and with native servants who could speak no tongue but Persian, men who well knew that we should not beat them, we had never to complain of misconduct or disobedience.

We have made these preliminary remarks upon the government of the country, because the system of misrule which the Shah and his Minister, however willing, appear incompetent to reform, explains so much of what is seen in Persia apart from the natural features of the country and the incidence of external politics. There is no security for life or property. The annals of the present and of the past dynasty are full of warning for a well-disposed ruler who attempts the path of radical reform. The offspring of polygamous matrimony watch with malignant jealousy the Shah's selection of an inheritor of his throne, while the fortunate heir learns from the family traditions that it is prudent to put out the eyes if not to extinguish the life of half-brothers who may pretend to rivalry with himself. The mind of the Shah may at any time be poisoned against his minister, and the gossips say that the existence of the present very able and intelligent Minister of Foreign Affairs would have been sacrificed if it had not been represented that the wearer of the Grand Cross of the Star of India was a privileged person. The system of taxation is one of the most onerous that can be imagined, and its burden is placed

with blighting incidence wholly upon the producing classes. For each ploughing bullock, the poor peasant pays nearly the value of the animal yearly. He contributes of his produce, he pays for every date-tree, he is subject to a poll-tax; now and then he is called upon to protect his village against an attack by robbers, and in case of defeat must submit to be spoiled of any portable property he possesses. If there is a highway robbery within the boundaries of his village, he must pay his share of the losses incurred, which it is not at all certain will ever reach the empty pocket of the plundered man. He can never calculate the amount of his taxation, for while the governor of this year may be lenient, his successor next year will be rapacious. As a rule the governors purchase their office, and sometimes, over and above the sum which they are obliged to return as revenue, make annual presents to the Shah. To repay themselves for this outlay they ravage the district with taxation; and a governor is successful or not from his own point of view, in reference to the sum, in excess of the assessed amount, which he or his vizier (for the greater governors rarely do this work themselves) can force from the peasants and from the traders in the bazaars of the towns. We were unable to present the letter which the Sadr Azem had given us to the Governor of Bushire, because a few days before our arrival his Excellency had started with a large number of soldiers upon a tax-gathering expedition. The crown of a most iniquitous system is the exemption of the moollahs, and in fact of all who are not engaged in trade, commerce, or agriculture.

It follows from this system that men hoard money to the utmost of their power, and conceal their riches as far as their tastes permit; that reproductive expenditure is restricted to a minimum; and that this is declining every year as the demand for foreign goods increases and the balance of trade is augmented against Persia. Already the gold coinage has virtually disappeared. The common talk of the bazaars is of tomans, but the traveller may spend a hundred thousand without ever seeing one. And now, year by year, the silver *kerans*, which with the copper *shihees* form the currency of Persia, are passing away in millions to pay the balance of trade which if native production were encouraged might so easily be discharged by exports of wheat, cotton, wool, and opium. The value of the specie exported from Bushire, the chief port of Persia, in 1873, is reported by Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, to have been Rs. 1,053,396. When the American War of Secession so greatly raised the price of cotton, there was for some years a considerable export from Persia; but now that American cotton is once more cheap and plentiful, it is falling off, and production is further checked by the heavy export duty, but a share of which the Persian treasury. We

have already referred to the khan who farms the customs of Southern Persia. For the privilege of collecting as much as he could get under this head in the port of Bushire for the year 1872, this person paid 32,000 tomans or about £12,800. None but his dependents are employed in obtaining the revenue; there is no interference of any sort by employes of the Government, and no returns or reports are required of any of his transactions. It is worthy mild language which the British Resident uses in reference to this monstrous abuse of fiscal authority, when he writes to the Indian Government that "the system is felt to be inconvenient by traders."

One cannot ride twenty miles in any part of Persia, other than upon the Salt Desert or the mountain-tops, without seeing ruined villages and broken watercourses, bounded by fields which have relapsed to infertility; nor can one often travel the same distance without observing many traces of neglected subterranean wealth. Silver, copper, coal, and probably precious stones, are lying hidden in the hills, while in more than one of the plains there are springs of petroleum. Baron Reuter and his friends think, or thought, that Persia was ready for railways. But who will invest money in mining, in the exploitation of petroleum, or in railways, under such a system of government as that which holds sway in Persia? Who that knows Persia would not fear lest even the smallest success, following upon a large and irremovable investment, would be immediately followed by some quibble as to the validity of the concession, some demand for an ever-increasing share of the profits? The first requirement of Persia is a strong and equitable government. In this respect there is a notable difference between the Russian provinces upon the Caspian, which were formerly Persian, and the dominions of the Shah. Within fifty miles of Bushire the ground is saturated with petroleum, and streams run foul and oily with the same natural wealth, yet no man regards it. Englishmen have made negotiations, but have retired terrified by the rapacious demands for *pishtish* advanced by governors and government. It is quite otherwise in the Russian provinces upon the Caspian. There, at Baku, an immense and increasing industry has arisen, and all day long carts loaded with barrels of petroleum rumble towards the port. The engines of every steamship upon the Caspian are driven by the fire of the dregs of petroleum, at a cost greatly less than that of coal. The furnaces of the vessels which conveyed us from north to south of that sea had each a tap so arranged as to pour out a small stream of muddy oil, and this, on being lighted, was distributed in glaring fire over all the furnace by a jet of steam which operated just beneath the mouth of the tap. The captain of one vessel stated that whereas the cost of coal had

been about eighteen roubles per hour, petroleum cost only one and a half roubles for an equal time. The same lack of enterprise, consequent as we believe chiefly upon the want of security, and the export of the money which should be employed in productive works at home, is killing the once extensive silk trade of Northern Persia, a suicide to which, however, the Russian tariff is accessory. Mr. Churchill, the British Consul at Resht, has stated in a recent report to Lord Derby, that the value of the silk produced in the Persian province of Ghilan has fallen in a few years from £700,000 to £104,000.

Persia, as might be expected, is Russianized in the north and Anglicized in the south, at least so far as this, that from Enzelli, the place of landing on the shores of the Caspian, to Tehran, the foreign coin most appreciated is the gold imperial of Russia, while at Bushire and Bunder Abbas, on the Persian Gulf, the rupee is universally acceptable. It is probably more profitable to possess influence in the north than in the south. The north of Persia is not only by far the richest part of the country, but virtually it possesses no other outlet than through the custom-houses of Russia; and it would be strange if these very fertile provinces of Persia did not continually excite the cupidity of that great Power. It is notorious that the conquests of Russia in Asia add nothing whatever to the wealth of the empire. On the contrary, her recent annexations demand the costly occupation of much barren territory. The Caspian Sea is a Russian lake. Except Persia, there is no other Power which holds a foot of its shores; and by the Treaty of Gulistan, it was arranged that none but the Russian flag should be hoisted in that sea. Russia has constructed at Baku a naval station, which forms a most advantageous base of operations; and upon a mud-bank, close to the land at the south-east corner, almost within sight of the Persian town of Astrabad, she has founded another station, which is known as the island of Ashurade. From the southern shore of the mouth of the river Astara to the southern bank of the Attrek, the coast is without dispute the territory of the Shah—a sea-board abundantly watered with rain, and capable of producing tea, sugar, rice, silk, and fruits, in quantities unsurpassable by any other equal area of the world. And except as the Russian territory approaches that of Persia, there is no part of the shores of the Caspian which from natural fertility would repay the cost of government. From Astrachkan to the Astara on one side, and to the Attrek on the other, the country may be described as barren steppe, of which Russia has far too much for the welfare of her exchequer.

Russian influence is predominant at Tehran, probably because of the irremovable fear that upon the slightest provocation Russia would possess her provinces, which, against the naval

as well as military force that she could bring to bear, are practically defenceless. The provinces of Azerbaijan, Ghilan, Mazanderan, and Astrabad will probably become Russian if ever there is a partition of Persia; and if Russian ambition does not extend to the Persian capital, their conquest would be the more easy, because upon the southern confines of these rich provinces the Elburz mountains run from east to west, in which the lowest pass is not less than 6,000 feet above the level of the Caspian. That which is most extraordinary in the formation of Persia, and which accounts for its extremes of climate, is this elevation, which is about the same in the south as in the north. The low land upon the Caspian is far more extensive and productive than that upon the Persian Gulf; but within a hundred miles from the northern water, and sixty miles from the southern water, the caravan tracks (for there are no roads) rise by very rugged paths to a height which, for the intervening 800 miles, is never less than 2,900 feet, and of which the average level exceeds 5,000 feet, some of the mountains rising to nearly 20,000 feet. While Resht is not 100 feet above the sea-level, Tehran is 4,200 feet, Isfahan 4,700 feet, and Shiraz 4,750 feet. During our journey from the first to the last of these three chief towns of Persia, we were obliged to cross three chains of mountains at heights varying from 7,000 to nearly 9,000 feet.

Persia has been described, and is often spoken of, as a desert varied with oases. Yet this is but partially true, for an oasis, such as those we have visited in the African Sahara, is formed by the natural outflow of water, whereas the green lands of Persia are for the most part the result of artificial irrigation, which, if there were sufficient water—if the winter flow were preserved for use in spring and summer—might be extended to much of the adjacent land with equally remunerative results. Persia is rather a country of plains divided by mountains, the uneven outlines of which are always upon the horizon, and it is unquestionable that, if there were proper works and the utmost conservation of water in the mountains, a vastly increased area might be profitably cultivated. Persia would then lose the character of desert, which, however, is truly applied to much of the land in the centre and north-east, where the plains are covered with salts, of which the surrounding mountains are in large part composed.

Travellers who have followed the rugged tracks which are the only roads across the Himalayas, who have had experience of the mountain-paths of Greece and Spain, are of opinion that there is no road in the world so difficult as that between Shiraz and Bushire, the only route by which importations from England reach the interior of Persia. The distance between these two towns cannot be more than 190 miles, yet we found it as much as we could do to

ride with our baggage-mules in twelve days from one to the other. The entry of English goods to Persia, and the export of corn, cattle, wool, and other products of that country, have been rendered much more easy by the construction of the Suez Canal, but as regards the market for our manufactures we shall be beaten back to the coast by Russia, unless some better road is opened for the conveyance of goods to Ispahan, the central town of Persia. Russia has a great advantage over us in this respect from the north, and the bazaars of Tehran are chiefly supplied with Russian manufactures. The proposal, which was noised as being the first large work to be undertaken upon the concession to Baron Reuter, to construct a railway from Resht to Tehran, would if carried out have facilitated most obviously the entry of Russian goods, and have enabled Russia to command the trade, not of Tehran only, but of Ispahan and probably of Shiraz. Of all Powers, Russia is the most ungenerous in her tariffs. She forces her wretched hardware and inferior cottons upon her subjects and her near neighbours of the semi-barbarous sort, to the complete exclusion of the superior goods which England could furnish; the north gate of Persia is absolutely in her keeping, and the proposal to carry her commerce to the chief towns of Persia by a railway to be constructed with English gold, implied either great ignorance of the nature and consequences of the work, or an astounding confidence in the unselfish disposition of British capitalists. Moreover, we have never been able, in passing over the ground, to see what security could be obtained, for expenditure in this direction. There can be no doubt that Russia would be grateful to any foreign capitalists who would make a railway from the Caspian Sea to Tehran and Ispahan, but this would hardly diminish any desire she may have to possess the rich northern provinces of Persia; and it is undeniable that she may take them at any moment she pleases to put forth her hand: there is nothing but the Persian army to withstand her, and the railway, besides promoting her commerce, would render the military occupation of North Persia less costly and more secure. For English interests it is very necessary to improve the means of communication in the south; and the best scheme we have met with is that which was in January last pressed, though without any success, upon the Shah's Government, by Mr. Mackenzie, a British merchant resident at Bagdad. The united waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates flow past the Turkish town of Bussorah into the Persian Gulf. At right angles to this great stream, and opposite the town of Bussorah, the Persian river Karoon contributes its flow, the junction being at the town of Mahommerah, the taking of which was the only considerable achievement of the British expedition. Messrs. Outram in

1856. At Shuster, nearly half-way between Mahommerah and Ispahan, the Karoon is navigable by steamboats drawing four feet of water, and Mr. Mackenzie, who has lately been over the whole route, reports that the passage of mules from Ispahan to Shuster would be far more easy than upon the very difficult path between Bushire and Shiraz. The path by which English goods must be carried on mules, camels, or donkeys from Bushire to Ispahan is not less than 470 miles in length, whereas from Shuster to the central city of Persia the distance would be less than 270 miles. Mr. Mackenzie, probably the first Englishman who has passed over this unfrequented road, found the Bakhtiari tribes inhabiting the region better than their reputation, which is that of marauding gipsies. He reports that they are hospitable, obliging, and free from caste prejudices. Mr. Mackenzie says of the tribes between Ispahan and Shuster, "They evinced no objection to eat out of the same dish with me, smoking the kaseon too at all times after me." He found the Bakhtiari people "ignorant of the division of time or of distances. Generally," he says, "they know of two other nations only, the Farangi [a term equivalent to "Gentiles," but generally employed in describing the English] and the Russ. To the latter they appear to give precedence, as I was at more than one place asked whether the Emperor of Russia was not the Shah-in-Shah. They are a happy and contented people, entirely under the control of one chief, the Eelkhanie, whose authority alone they acknowledge." Mr. Mackenzie's proposal was that the Shah's Government should concede to his firm, that of Messrs. Gray, Dawes, & Co., of London, permission to put steam vessels on the Karoon, and these gentlemen have informed Lord Derby that if the British Government would give them a subsidy of £4,000 a year they would undertake to run a steamer monthly from Shuster to Mahommerah and back. From the latter town, the vessels of the British India Steam Navigation Company, of which the firm above mentioned are agents, run to Bushire and Bombay, and by the Suez Canal to London. We have no means of judging whether the subsidy is justly calculated, but we know that the Russian Government gives a large subsidy, nominally for carrying the mails, to the line of steamers which call at all the Persian ports of the Caspian, that the British Government adopts a similar policy with regard to the British India Company, and it is hardly doubtful that in both cases this is done with a view of promoting influence and trade in Persia. But English trade is being beaten out of Persia for want of a better entry than by the terrible road from Bushire to Shiraz, and Persia would benefit immensely by having a more ready outlet for her surplus produce. In villages not distant from the Karoon a quarter of wheat may be bought for about four shillings, so that Persia, might hope, if this river were

made available, to reduce the adverse balance of trade which in its constant augmentation threatens the country with ruin. We are not acquainted with the precise language in which the concession was refused, but we have no doubt that the negotiation failed because some people wanted to be paid, and largely paid, for allowing Englishmen to confer gratuitous benefit upon their country. In 1842, when Lieutenant Selby ascended the Karoon river by direction of the East India Company, he concluded his report with the words, "I feel sure the day is not far distant when these rivers will be as well known and traversed as the Indus and Ganges." As to the present condition of British in competition with Russian trade, Messrs. Gray, Dawes, & Co., than whom probably no persons are more competent to form a trustworthy opinion, have written to Lord Derby as follows:—

"Ispahan, the centre of Persian trade, may fairly be taken to be the common ground where Russian and British commerce meet, and until recently the expense of transporting goods to and produce from that point, by the northern and southern routes was nearly the same. Of late years, however, the Russian Government has so far improved the northern facilities that by degrees various articles of commerce (for instance, copper, iron, refined sugar, manufactured hardware, candles, &c.) have been closed to us, and their trade is extending further south [we noticed Russian candles exposed for sale in the bazaars of Shiraz, and even of Bushire], and in some instances we are beaten even at the coast ports. The facilities provided are frequent, cheap, and direct communication to the Caspian, abolition of the transit duties through the Caucasus on goods, *via* Poti and Tiflis, and a resolute insisting upon a prompt settlement of the claims which their traders have against the Persian authorities.

"To compensate for these growing disadvantages we would respectfully urge upon your Lordship's consideration the necessity of adopting some protective measures for our trade in the south, and we would suggest, first, that a British Consul should be placed at Ispahan, and, secondly, that the Shah's Government should concede to us the privilege of placing steamers on the river Kárún to run from Mahommerah and Shuster in connection with the steamers from Bombay and London.

"About fifteen years ago, in the interests of trade, the Government subsidized river steamers to ply between Bussorah and Baghdad; this has resulted in a very large and still increasing trade; the subsidy, we believe, was £4,000 per annum. For the same subsidy, we would be prepared to place a steamer on the Kárún and maintain a monthly service between Shuster and Mahommerah, connecting at Mahommerah with the mail steamers from Bombay, Kurrachee, and London."

Baron Reuter has not yet abandoned Persia, and is still engaged, we believe, in projecting railways, having wisely turned his attention from north to south. If it were possible to obtain money for the construction of a railway in Persia, there can be no doubt that British interests would benefit most by a line from Yezd, through Ispahan, to Shuster, to run in connection with steamboats on the Karoon. But we cannot believe that a railway would be profitable in any part of Persia. The passengers would be but very few, and

it would be extremely difficult to take the goods traffic from the backs of mules at profitable rates. We have sometimes ridden for eight hours between Tehran and Ispahan without meeting a traveller who would have paid to go by rail. For the eight or ten mules and horses which we required we rarely paid more than the value of a shilling a day for each, a sum that included the attendance of muleteers as well as the feeding and stabling of the animals. In his report to Baron Reuter upon improved communications in Persia, Captain St. John, R.E., made the following statement:—

Cost.	PER TON PER MILE.			
	Miles a day.	Maximum.	Minimum.	Average.
By mules, average speed	22	15 <i>d.</i>	3 <i>d.</i>	3 <i>d.</i>
By camels or asses, average speed ...	12	9 <i>d.</i>	2 <i>d.</i>	4 <i>d.</i>

These are low rates, and the muleteer's trade in Persia is one that would die hard. The *charvodar*, as the chief muleteer is called, is accustomed to enormous fatigues, and the class is certainly one of the most honest and worthy in Persia. In the towns, many of the wealthiest people have invested money in mules, and these, too, would look with unfriendly eyes upon the new mode of travelling. But such objections of course wear out. The real question is whether the concession of power to construct and work a railway would be respected, and whether the traffic is, or is likely to become, sufficient to render the undertaking profitable. From all that we have seen during five months in Persia we are inclined to think that the concession would not be respected, especially if the railway were successful, and that there is nowhere in Persia—one of the most sparsely inhabited countries of the world—sufficient traffic to render a railway profitable. And as to the cost of construction, although in the plains the work would be very inexpensive, yet it must be remembered that no two towns can be connected without overcoming great engineering difficulties. Between the chief towns of Persia there are mountains which must be crossed at a height of 6,000 or 8,000 feet, and which are without exception rocky, some of them composed of the hardest stone. These, however, are only such obstacles as English engineers delight in surmounting; the real difficulty is in the want of security, and in the shadowy prospect of remunerative returns.

There is very little intercourse between the chief towns of Persia. Those doorless hovels of mud-brick, covered with a rude cement of mud and straw, which are placed at distances of twenty to thirty miles apart on the road from Resht through Tehran and Ispahan to Shiraz, have but one room, the *balakoneh*, elevated above the noisome yard in which horses and mules are enclosed for the night. In a ride of about fifty days through Persia we

never found, on arriving at a station, this one room already occupied, which is perhaps the strongest evidence that could be afforded of the scarcity of native or foreign travellers. Perchance some bold speculator will in the next budget of bubbles propose to bring out a company for working the Tehran or Ispahan Steam Tramways (Limited), regardless of the fact that it is more than doubtful if a carriage of any sort could make its way through any town in Persia. It is certainly a fact that no carriage can be obtained for hire in any one of the large towns. There is at Tehran a melancholy drive to be had—in a straight line—outside the city, for those who can overcome or are reduced to the *tristesse* of renewing again and again their acquaintance with a dusty path, of which the end is visible at the start. But the few Europeans who have carriages in Tehran do not attempt the impossibility of driving through the mud-built capital of Persia. As to the population of the towns and of the country generally, there exist no trustworthy figures. The population of Tehran is stated to be 85,000, but after passing five weeks in the city, and making acquaintance with nearly every part of it, we are not inclined to believe that much more than half that number of people are ever at any one time to be found in the capital. The Persians do not seem to retain their calculating faculties when numbers rise over one thousand. A son of the Shah told us that his father had five Persian crores of soldiers (2,500,000 men), but, after seeing much more of his father's dominions than he has himself beheld, it would not surprise us to learn that the whole number of men, women, children, and slaves in Persia does not exceed his Royal Highness's estimate of the Persian army. We have never travelled in a country so thinly populated, and in this respect the contrast with India is very striking. Even on the most frequented track in Persia, the mule-path from Tehran to Ispahan, we have ridden eight-and-twenty miles in daylight without seeing a human habitation, or, except the foot-marks upon the road, a trace of man.

One is astonished at the climate and greatly disappointed with the architecture of Persia. From the 3rd of December, when we were approaching Ispahan, to the 5th of February, when at a distance of five stages from Shiraz, we suddenly descended five thousand feet on to the plain of Kazeroon, we travelled over snow more or less deep, and every night during those two months the mercury in our thermometer was below zero. One does not look for frostbite in Ispahan, the city of melons, or to find, for long weeks together, frozen snow in all the narrow ways of Shiraz, the place where the warm lays of Hafiz were composed, in latitude more than twenty degrees south of London. One is surprised to see English attachés skating in Tehran, and a European cutting figures of eight upon frozen pools in the Ispahan river. Yet all

these things may be witnessed during a winter less severe than that of 1875-76. But even the intense cold of the January nights, and the miserable shelter afforded in the *chupparkonehs*, involve far less inconvenience than the same journey in the blazing heat of summer, when travelling through the day is impossible. We suffered more under the sultry sun of October, between Resht and Tehran, than in the frost of January and February. In the summer months, caravans always start about midnight, and get to the end of their day's journey soon after sunrise. In the winter months we never started before sunrise, or rode after sunset. But were it not for avoiding the severe heat or cold, the *chupparkonehs* and caravanserais do not offer attractive shelter. The *chupparkonehs* are always enclosed by a mud-brick wall about fifteen feet high, and secured at night by a strong gate. In the centre is a quadrangle for horses and mules, and round three sides are sheds to protect the animals and their drivers, who all sleep together in winter; on the fourth side, near the gate, there are generally two or three windowless and doorless sheds, plastered with mud inside, having a hole in one corner for a fire-place, which invariably smokes. This, however, seems to be not at all an unpopular arrangement in a country where nothing is so dear as firewood. These two or three apartments are used by native travellers, and it was there that our servants prepared our food. Over the gateway is the single room, the *balakoneh*; the walls are grimy with issues from the fire-place, which is rudely constructed to smoke. As a rule, there are two or three doorways without doors, and sometimes a hole or two intended for windows. If the wood fire smokes, one is glad to have no door until the charred wood is flung outside, and the pure wind of evening has blown the pungent odour from the place. Then the traveller nails up a horse-cloth, or, better still, the canvas door of a military tent, and when the same work has been performed at the other doors and at the windows, and the breeze is thus partially blocked out, the thermometer may possibly in the warmest hours of a January night creep as high as zero. In the caravanserais one has no trouble about windows. Around the large open horse-yard there are a number of dark arches, sometimes with a circular hole in the roof for the outlet of smoke, the fire being usually lighted on the floor in the centre. The end of the arch next the horse-yard is filled with rough masonry, a square doorway being left, in which, if one wishes for privacy or a greater warmth than that of a north wind careering over hundreds of miles of snow, there must be nailed some woven covering from the traveller's baggage. And in Persia this baggage must include everything—his bed and bedding, as well as washing utensils, and carpet or matting to cover the dusty floor of the *balakoneh* or one of the mud caverns on the ground floor, which

may during the previous night have been used as a stable for mules. Every morning he or his servants must take up his bed and fasten it with other things on the back of a mule. On arriving, the apartment is naked, littered with the rubbish of the last occupier, and on going out there is little danger of forgetting any part of his equipage, for he has only to see that the room is stripped bare of everything; there will be no risk of taking aught that does not belong to the traveller. The host has food for horses, but not for men; that must be carried, or obtained in the next village. He presents no bill; one gives "what you please;" but whether this is half-a-keran, or a keran (value 10*d.*), or half-a-dozen kerans, he will hold out both hands placed together to receive the money, and, having obtained it, will look intently at the silver, then show it to the bystanders and ask for more. Light horses, on which one may ride by easy stages over all Persia, may be bought for eight or twelve pounds, and mules to carry two hundredweight each may be hired for the equivalent of a shilling a day. Although we were quite sure they would gallop off on the appearance of robbers, and, indeed, preferred this line of conduct to a fighting policy which would place our lives in most serious danger, we had a guard of mounted soldiers who are well paid with Persian money of the value of 1*s.* 8*d.* a day for each man and horse.

There is not a mosque or a modern edifice in Persia which possesses any considerable architectural beauty, and there is not a public building which is not in some part or in many parts in a state of ruin. Not one of the numerous palaces of the Shah which we visited, not one of the large number of mosques we passed in our wanderings, not a palace of any one of the prince-governors in the provinces can we refer to as an exception. We were honoured by an invitation to occupy the Karaj palace of the Shah, near Tehran; there was no article of furniture in it but a carpet in the central hall, the coloured glass windows of which were sadly broken, and the courtyard cumbered with ruins of the *raz*. The bedroom we occupied had a floor of bad concrete, the dust from which rose in clouds as we crossed the room; there was no appliance whatever for fastening the doors, and the windows were heavily-framed slides of wood which made utter darkness and shut out all ventilation when they were closed. Upon arrival at the palace of the Shah's brother-in-law in Shiraz, we noticed that the frames of the windows over the entrance were hanging out in utter ruin; the pillars of the gateway and many of the ~~columns~~ ^{columns} lay broken on the ground and had lain there during the reigns of many of his predecessors in the government of that ~~most~~ ^{most} province. Yet there is not a more accomplished man in Persia than the "*Firman Firman*," as the Shah has styled Yahia Khan. We can only say that he lives as every one else seems

to live in Persia, without any concern for the exterior of his house, and that he looks upon public buildings, as every one else appears to regard them, with a single eye to whether the walls, or sufficient of them, will stand to outlast his tenure. Sir Lewis Pelly's report to the Bombay Government, with reference to a certain district, is generally true of all Persia:—"A gives to his sub-farmers permission to collect the revenue by force; this is done; next year some of the peasants are fled; some of the land is lying waste. *The country, in brief, is revenued as if the government were to end with the expiry of the governor's lease.*"

In the Shah's palace of Tehran the grandest and most notable apartments are that in which he receives, on the occasion of a *salaam* or *levée*, the diplomatic body and other persons of distinction, and the throne-room in which he sits, upon rare occasions, in motionless majesty, exposed to the homage of the people. The former is between two courtyards of the palace—open spaces, which are made pleasant with tall plane-trees and rectangular walks somewhat roughly paved with marble. In a marble court, through the centre of each of these plantations, there rills a stream of very pure water. The course runs beneath the reception-hall, which is open to the weather on both sides, the roof being there supported by four twisted columns, gilded from capital to pedestal. One mounts to the imperial presence by six painfully high steps, and then enters the hall by an open doorway, close to the west end and just beneath a very large picture, which, somewhere about the centre, contains a full-length portrait of the Emperor of Austria. Beneath this hang a landscape and a sea-piece, evidently purchased from some French gallery; the small tin plate bearing the exhibition number of each still remains in the corner. It is at the opposite end of the room that the "Shadow of God" sits on his heels, or stands to receive the envoys of Europe. There, in the centre, may be seen one of the characteristic feats—probably the greatest art-work—of his Majesty's long reign. It is a two-feet globe, covered with jewels from the north pole to the extremities of the tripod in which the gemmed sphere is placed. The story goes that his Majesty bought—more probably accepted, at all events, was in possession of—a heap of jewels for which he could find no immediate purpose. Nothing could add to the lustre of his crown of diamonds, which is surmounted by the largest ruby we have ever seen, including those of her Majesty and the Emperors of Germany and Russia. He had "the Sea of Light," a diamond in size but little inferior to the British "Mountain of Light." He had coats embroidered with diamonds, with emeralds, with rubies, with pearls, and with garnets; he had jewelled swords and daggers without number—so, possibly because he had his royal mind turned toward travel, he ordered

this globe to be constructed, covered with gems, the over-spreading seas to be of emeralds, and the kingdoms of the world distinguished by jewels of different colour. The Englishman notes with pride that England flashes in diamonds; and a Frenchman may share the feeling, for France glitters illustrious as the British Isles, being set out with the same imperial gems. The dominion of the Shah's great neighbour, the brand-new Empress of India, is marked with amethysts, while Africa blazes against the literally emerald sea, a whole continent of rubies. Near the globe, side by side with a French couch worth perhaps a hundred francs, stands the Shah's throne, which of course is arranged for sitting after the manner of the country. It occupies a space almost as large as Mr. Spurgeon's or Mr. Ward Beecher's pulpit, for the occupants of this throne have occasionally had a *kaleon* or *hookah* of wonderful dimensions with them upon the splendid carpet, which is fringed with tens of thousands of pearls. The bolster, upon which the Shah rests his back or arm, is embroidered with pearls. Behind his head is a "sun" all glittering with jewels, supported at the two corners by birds in plumage of the same most costly material. On the other side of the room, grimy with dust, and horribly incongruous, there is a table, the top inlaid with the beautiful work of Florence, and a model of the Arch of Titus, both gifts from his Holiness the infallible Pope. Near these presents, in a recess, and in a very common wooden frame, is a portrait of Havelock, and, not far off, a timepiece with "running water" and a nodding peacock, a gift from the East India Company. The only means of preventing rain or snow from entering this and the other halls of his Majesty's palace is the hanging of large cotton sheets, covering the sides which are open to the weather.

The other and more public hall is much older, and in its arrangements wholly Persian. The floor is raised about three feet from the pavement of a large oblong courtyard, up the broad paths of which the sons of Iran throng to make salaam before their monarch, who sits upon a high throne built of the alabaster-like greenish marble of Yezd, the wide floor on which the Shah sits being supported upon animals having the same queer resemblance to lions which is noticed in the supporters of the great fountain of the Alhambra. With reference to this likeness and to other points of resemblance both in this palace and in the decorations in some of the more modern palaces of Persia, Major Murdoch Smith, R.E., the accomplished Director of the Indo-Persian Telegraph, has indicated, in a report to the Council of South Kensington Museum, the probability that the Alhambra was designed by Persian architects, and with regard to this supposition has pointed to the statement of Señor Rivadeneyra concerning the existence of a document assigning Rioja in Spain

to Persians as a place of residence. The ceiling of the old reception hall in the Shah's palace is fashioned like the ceilings in the ruins of the famous Oriental palace in Spain, and then covered with pieces of looking-glass, which, if the work were well done and the glass were cleaned, would have a very glittering effect. In face of the Shah's throne, at the extreme end of the courtyard, is a rude mosaic showing, upon the distant wall, how Rustem, the "Arthur" of Persia, destroyed the White Devil.

The public exhibition of the pictorial art in Persia is usually upon walls in coarse fresco or in mosaic made with bricks vitrified and coloured on the outer surface. The gate of the mud-walled enclosure which is called the citadel of Tehran, is adorned with mosaics exhibiting in each panel of the work a fanciful portrait of one of the Shah's rank and file. In drawing he is such as we are accustomed to see from the pencil of children of three or four years old. The features are upon one plan; they have the same form as those of his companions; his moustache is a brick and a-half long; and his black boots are hanging painfully as if in search of some cloud to stand upon. He is an evidence of the lowest condition of art. The ornamentation of the exterior of some of the mosques with these coloured bricks, chiefly of light blue and yellow, is very effective; but we met with no place in which this work was not more or less disfigured by rain, and repair does not seem to be the business of any person or department. The great dome of the Madrassee or mosque school of Ispahan was originally covered with large tiles of beautiful pattern, but more than one-half of this covering has disappeared, and generations have been satisfied to look upon the unsightly bed of the tiling. Of the mud-brick houses of Tehran and other towns, not one in five hundred has even a single room above the ground floor. They are all, or nearly all, quadrangular in plan, and the outer wall, which is plastered with mud and straw, has no window or opening to the streets, except through a single door, which is usually of immense strength and fortified with iron bolts of defying magnitude. There is commonly a tank and some attempt at gardening in the little square around which the rooms of the house are arranged. As a rule, even in the best houses, apartments have no inter-communication, so that inhabitants pass from one room to another only by coming out into the open air. The continuous, unbroken exposure of mud wall—the flat roof, also of mud, laid on reeds and straw, supported by cross-beams, being unseen—gives a most miserable appearance to Persian towns. The Persians are at once in arms against any neighbour who builds a second storey, from which he can overlook their domestic arrangements. Many tales are told of the fierce opposition which this fatal intention on the part of a neighbour has aroused, and as a rule it is not permitted by the

authorities to any one to build so as to overlook another house. The British Embassy, or Mission as it is officially called, has so far taken the local colouring that a fierce paper war and much intrigue has been lately going on to circumvent the wicked and abominable design of the Ottoman Ambassador, who has dared to build an embassy-house in sight of that of Britain, and to add a second floor from which it is possible (with a telescope) to see something of the ladies of the British Embassy if they happened to be walking in the extensive grounds in which are the houses of the secretaries and attachés, as well as the palace of the Minister. The house of the British Envoy is certainly the finest, not excepting the Shah's palace, in Tehran—indeed in all Persia; much more elegant than the abode of the Russian, though according to common report, the Minister of the Czar has greater influence at the Court to which both are accredited.

The charm of travelling in Persia is utterly lost if one weighs all that is met with in the scale of progress. In Persia, passing from the swift, and on the whole, steady career of Western Europe, in the ways of civilization, there appears to be not only an absence of progress, but rather retrogression. That which is truly interesting in Persia is the extended scenery and the outdoor life—for no European sees much of the indoor existence—of the people. Persia is the land of magnificent distances. In summer, the mountains, always in sight, and in many places strongly coloured with the metallic ores which they contain, glow into wondrous beauty in the roselight of the morning sun, and harden into masses of deep purple and black when the clear and pleasant starlight is substituted for that of the blazing sun of Persia. In another season we have seen the plains resembling an Arctic sea, when their apparently perfect level was covered with a dazzling expanse of untrodden snow, and again when the white hills loomed through the blinding storm like the icebergs of polar regions. Wherever the people are seen, their presence adds to the charm of the landscape. The men are handsome and picturesque in their costumes of blue or white cotton, with here and there one in red or yellow. They wear skull-caps of felt, turbaned with cotton or silk of every colour. The food of the lower classes is generally composed of bread—thin flabby cakes baked on the outside of a conical chimney, which they occasionally soak in a warm mess of sourmilk—grapes, melons, and pomegranates, which are produced in nearly all the provinces of Persia in great abundance. In the towns, the traveller recognizes in the people the characters of the tales in the "Arabian Nights." There is the handsome, stalwart porter, with panting breast exposed and darkly sunburnt skin, scratching his shaved head, ready for any new summons, including that of the mysterious lady, the mistress of the equally mysterious house,

wherein he may be murdered or enriched, killed and buried like a dog, or clad in splendid robes, as is the good pleasure of the genii. There is the merchant from Bagdad, wearing the respectable marks of a pilgrim, and saluted in virtue of his journey to Mecca by all men as "Hadji;" his green or white turban is spotless and ample; from his shoulders hangs a cloak of fine cloth, gold-braided, and his tunic of purple or green is bound with a costly sash, in which probably the case containing his materials for writing is thrust like a dagger. Everywhere is seen the priest or mollah, riding, with nothing of meekness in his face, a white donkey, his dress proclaiming him to be a member of the caste which is strongest in Persia. There are no old men, for those whose beards are white with age have been transformed into unnatural youth by dyeing the hair deep red with henna. Their hands and feet are coloured with the same preparation, and they sit smoking a *kaleen*, or reading the Koran upon the front planks of their stall in the cool bazaar, without any more apparent interest in their business than if it were a mere cloak for the supernatural concerns of their active life. Even without aid from the genii, there are always present in Persia two mysteries, which no doubt will serve to transmit, so long as they exist, the ideas of the "Arabian Nights." These are the veiled lady and the walled-up house into which no outside eye can penetrate. No *giaour* can see even the eyes of a Persian woman of the middle and superior classes. She moves through the streets or bazaars on her white donkey or on foot, in perfect disguise. Even her husband would not know her. She is covered from head to foot in the loose *chudder* of indigo, or black-dyed cotton; over her face a long white veil is tied across the *chudder* where that envelope covers all but the visage. The legs are hidden in loose trousers of cotton of the same colour, which are not worn in the house. The only opening in the face-veil is a small bar of embroidered work before the eyes, which enables her to see her path and the quality of the goods she is buying in the bazaar. But in all her outdoor life she is a moving mystery. She may be young or old, white or black, fair or ugly, on a mission of sin or upon an errand of charity; no one knows who she is as she shuffles along upon shoes which are difficult to keep on her feet as the upper leather ends far before the heel. She raises at some mud-walled house an iron knocker upon a door like that of a fortification, is admitted, the door is closed, and what goes on within that house, what is the fate of the women, the children, and the slaves, no one can know; there is no window from which they can communicate with the outer world; it is a despotism within a despotism. Each of these walled houses is the seat of a despotic sovereignty established and confirmed by the greatest power in Persia—that of the Koran.

The religion of the Persians—of the Shiah sect of Mahommedans—gives no supernatural attributes to the Shah. He is the “Shadow of God” (*Zil-ullah*), not infallible in his government, but because he is charged with the duty of ruling in strict accordance with the scriptures of Mahommed. To their faithfulness in regard to this false standard of life, to the abuses and excesses of the purely personal and irresponsible government to which their lives and honour and property are always exposed, we must ascribe the miserable condition of the Persian people. While other nations of the world are progressing, Persia is declining, because ignorance and sensuality, and the rapacious habits of despotism, are there established by the priesthood and confirmed by the Government in every province; and the mosque school, which has no higher standard than writing and the ability to read half-a-dozen verses from the Koran, is for the people the highest mark of education.

In the Persian Church there is only one important schism, and that is troublesome to the priests of Islam, rather from the fanatical devotion of its partisans than from the number of the followers of Bāb—the Bābis, who in August, 1852, attempted to assassinate the Shah. The baffled criminals on this occasion were put to death with the cruelty which the offences of this sect always meet with. Lighted candles were inserted in slits cut in their living bodies, and after lingering long in agony they were hewn to pieces with hatchets. In Persia, true to the principles of the Koran, the theory of punishment is that, not the State, but the relatives of the victim, must have vengeance on the actual or would-be murderers; and in allegiance to this principle the Shah’s steward or chamberlain executed, on his Majesty’s behalf, and with his own hand, one of the conspirators. Bāb, who set himself up to be the prophet of the nineteenth century, was the son of a grocer at Shiraz. He had been executed at Tabriz two years before his followers attempted to murder the Shah. In his execution, he all but achieved a “miracle.” The bullets of the firing party before whom he stood for execution did not seriously injure his body, but the cords which bound him to a stake were severed; in the smoke of the firing he escaped and concealed himself, most unluckily, in a guard-house, where he was soon discovered and dragged to death. Had Bāb been more fortunate in his place of hiding, it is probable that the soldiers who shot at him, and half the people of Persia, would have become Bābis on the strength of so obvious a “miracle.” In succession to this imposture, there is now a man named Behar imprisoned in Arabia by the Turkish Government, who, saying that Bāb was his forerunner, gives himself out to be God the Father. He has, in this monstrous and absurd language, addressed several of the Powers, as Mahommed did how they neglect his presence upon

earth; and it is a fact that this miserable delusion has found believers and followers even among the well-to-do classes in Isfahan, where, however, such opinions must be kept secret, for heterodoxy in Persia is punishable with death.

Of modern literature we have found nothing worthy of remark. There is one periodical publication, the *Gazette of Tehran*, to which all officials and aspirants to office are constrained to subscribe, and which we believe is seen by nobody else. The glowing writings of Hafiz, and the sententious pages of Sadi, both of Shiraz, are the much-read classics of Persia. We visited the tombs of these celebrated poets in gardens near Shiraz. Hafiz died in 1338, but it was long after his death that the splendid block of marble which now covers his remains was placed in its present position. On the surface are carved, in the beautiful letters of the Persian alphabet, two of the poet's odes, which it is difficult to render into English. The one in the centre is thus translated:—

"Proclaim the glad news of oneness with thee, that above this transitory life I may be lifted immortal. A bird of paradise am I, and my heart's desire is to fly to thee, away from the traps and temptations of this world. If thou shouldst deign in thy great mercy to call me thy faithful servant, how joyously would I take leave of the mean concerns and the miserable vanities of this mortal existence.

"From the bright vapours which surround thy throne, pour out upon me a flood of the graces of thy goodness, before I am carried away like the sand of the desert.

"Come hither, O my loved ones, to my tomb, with wine and song, and possibly at the sound of your cheerful voices, and the music of your melody, I may cease from slumber and rise from the dead.

"Though I am aged and weak, do thou, if it be but for one night, fold me in thine arms, so that on the morrow I shall wake at thy side—renewed with the bloom and vigour of youth.

"Come forth and show thyself, O type of all good, so that Hafiz may say farewell to this life and to this lower world."

The wisdom of the Sheik Sadi of Shiraz, who was born about 1194 A.D., is the pride of all Persians who can read his works, of which the chief are the "*Bustan*" and the "*Gulistan*." In the early pages of the latter work we find this truly Persian estimate of the kingly office—

"A king is the Shadow of God, and a shadow should be the likeness of its principal; the disposition of the subject is not capable of good unless it be restrained by the sword of the sovereign; any good behaviour that is observed in this world springs from the justice of princes, and that monarch's will can never be just whose judgment is based in wickedness."

In another place he entreats the favour of his sovereign for his work, and woos him to this mood by styling his Majesty—

"The asylum of the world, shadow of omnipotence, ray of gracious providence, treasury of the age, refuge of the faith, the invincible conqueror

of his foes, arm of triumphant fortune, luminary of resplendent religion, most illustrious of mankind, glory of orthodoxy, Saad, son of the mighty Atabak, all-powerful emperor, ruler over the necks of the people, lord paramount of Arabia, monarch of sea and land, successor of Solomon, Mozuffer-u'd deen," &c.

But when Sadi gets clear of the gauds, the glitter, and the terrors of despotic sovereignty, he becomes more independent. He says—

"Be undefiled in thy integrity, O brother, and fear nobody. Washermen beat none but dirty clothes against a stone."

"I swear it were equal to the torments of hell to enter into paradise through the intervention of a neighbour."

The principal charm of Sadi's writing lies perhaps in the thoughtful wit of his utterances. To a story of a stingy merchant he adds—

"If in place of a loaf of bread the round sun had been in his wallet, nobody would have seen daylight in this world till the day of judgment."

"The money of the miser comes out of the earth when he himself goes into it."

The fable of a stupid man is thus concluded—

"Were they to take the ass of Jesus to Mecca, on his return from that pilgrimage he would still be an ass."

These two passages are truly Mahomedan—


"To advance an opinion contrary to the word of the king were to imbrue our hands in our own blood; indeed, were he to say, 'This day is night,' it would be our duty to respond, 'Lo! there are the moon and the seven stars.'"

"Whenever thy hand can reach it, tear out thy foe's brain, for such an opportunity washes away anger from the mind."

The works of these writers will not pass away; they are safely enshrined in letters which are frequently reprinted. We should be glad if we had the same confidence that the remains of the tombs and halls and palaces of Cyrus, of Darius, and of Xerxes, which adorn the road from Ispahan to Shiraz, were equally assured against injury and neglect. The inscription near the reputed tomb of Cyrus, "I am Cyrus the king, the Achæmenian," and the sharp, clear writings upon several pedestals among the splendid ruins of Persepolis, on which those who can may read in three languages, "Darius the great king, it is he who executed this work;" and in another part, "Xerxes the great king, son of Darius the Achæmenian;" these and similar evidence give immense interest to ruins which no one seems to examine or to protect. The soil of the rock which rises behind Persepolis has been washed for ages upon the ruins, upon exquisitely chiselled stones, which, after a life of nearly 2,400 years, are in their bas-reliefs clear as the work of the present century. What treasures

of history may not lie concealed beneath those mounds of earth which, in these ancient halls, rise high enough to conceal one-half the figure of a king, and to cut off from the traveller's sight the legs of many a winged bull? The finest staircase in the world, the most nobly planned and executed, is that leading from the plain through which flows the classic Araxes, or the Bendemeer of "Lalla Rookh," to the platform of Persepolis. We have no space to do justice to these ruins, of which Persians are so careless. In the pedigree of architecture they are clearly next in descent to the buildings of Nineveh, which in many points they resemble. They form a most important and interesting part of the tangible evidence which gives to Asia as well as to Egypt and to Greece their respective shares in the perfection of classic architecture. But it would be rash to hope that under a Mahomedan Government they will ever be as carefully protected as are the remains of these buildings which were erected about the same time upon the Acropolis of Athens.

ARTHUR ARNOLD.



THE DRAMA.

THE history of the drama is a striking illustration of the vitality which may be present in things constantly supposed to be moribund. No institution has been more frequently at death's door; none has been more unceasingly alive. It has suffered every vicissitude which can fall upon human things. It has been persecuted from without and it has languished from within. It has been dying of a plethora and of an atrophy. It has been crushed by rulers who have feared the truth of its reflection or the bitterness of its mockery. The institution which gave birth to the drama has often, terrified at the strength and independent growth of the stage, turned and attempted like Saturn to devour its own offspring. There have been many times when this attempt has so far succeeded that the dramatic art has been forced to hide itself from the public eye, to wear rags for regalia and to exchange the brilliancy of the stage for the darkness of hovels. But through all these periods of darkness it has succeeded in keeping alight the sacred fire which was concealed, not extinguished. There is in human nature an imitative instinct which is so strong that it must find a recognized expression; and when once the dramatic art was discovered as the highest form which this instinct could assume, it became impossible either by force or persuasion to convince the world that the overthrow of one of its most cherished arts was a necessary and desirable sacrifice. The existence of this dramatic instinct

can hardly call for any proof; but if any such is wanted one need only pass some time in a nursery or playground of children. There one will soon observe that the children's games assume a mimetic form. They grow tired of being bounded by their own individualities; they say to each other, "Let you be a Vizier and I a Sultan;" they play at being pirates, brigands, soldiers, anything but themselves. Thus they escape for a time from the narrow sphere in which their life is passed; they cease to be children who must presently be called back to dinner or to lessons; they become beings of limitless desires and powers, and in so doing they experience the same kind of pleasure which they afterwards derive from dramatic representations. As the infancy of nations is not unlike that of individuals, one finds that in all countries the growth of the higher forms of the drama is developed from the establishment of merely imitative rites. The religion of each country has been the immediate cause of these rites, as it has been found that the devoutness of the people has been much assisted when with that is associated the gratification of the mimetic instinct. Thus in Greece the origin of the drama can be traced to the choral rites of Dionysus, which Arian first reduced to that order which was the first step towards the formation of a national drama.

Thus in modern times the drama of Spain, which has had a remarkable influence over that of other nations, was an offshoot of the Church. There is this striking difference between the Spanish and other national stages, that while elsewhere the growth of the drama has ever gone hand in hand with its detachment from the service of its parent, in Spain it has clung so close to that parent that the genius of Spain's great dramatist, Calderon, found its fullest development in plays of a strictly religious nature. It is curious that the first play recorded as having been performed in Spain—an allegorical or moral piece by the Marquis de Villena—was, with all the rest of his writings, burnt after his death on account of its dangerous tendencies. But this is a rare instance of the intolerance which has been common enough elsewhere, expressing itself in Spain. There have been occasions where the mysterious antipathy which the drama has often excited in the minds of Governments has asserted itself; as when under Philip IV. the Council of Castile proposed that on the reopening of the theatres, closed for Court mournings, the plays performed should be limited to examples of edifying lives and deaths, without any interest of love; should in fact be reduced to a series of acted tracts; and that the works of Lope de Vega should be entirely banished from the stage. Fortunately the proposal was as repugnant to the King as its carrying out would have been to the public.

it had asserted its supremacy in England. But that the establishment of the classical drama in France was in great measure owing to the clever policy of Richelieu, who saw that the limits which it imposed upon writers would serve his ends, it would seem strange that a people so keen-witted, so full of dramatic instinct as the French, should have pinned their faith upon so mistaken a dramatic creed. There is no doubt something to be said in favour of adherence to the classic drama. While it imposes most useless restrictions, it also conveys a certain majesty and grandeur, which is easily lost when the classical restrictions are removed, and in which there is much virtue. But it is an acknowledged fact that a virtue when enforced loses half its merit. And it is somewhat strange that after the political force which compelled respect for the classical rules had passed away the mere force of tradition should have availed to keep it alive. One would think that the French quickness of perception would have seen that to transplant the drama of Greece into modern times was as vain as to expect the bees of Hymettus to hive in the Palais Royal. The Grecian drama was ever closely allied with the creed of the country; and as that creed imagined an invincible and remorseless fate which overhung all the actions of mankind, the emotions aroused by a representation of such actions must lose in interest when the belief in that fate has disappeared. The drama whose characters are always within the grasp of this fate, so that do what they will, combat as they may with their passions, breast as they may the storm of circumstance, and struggle with their evil star, their efforts are always bounded by the grim power waiting in the background to overwhelm them—this drama cannot but be wanting to modern eyes and ears in the sense of poetical justice. This sense demands that if a man bears himself nobly in adversity he shall not lose all the reward of his heroism, because a curse has been pronounced upon his race by the gods. And the more immediate interference of the deities employed in the classical French drama was strongly with the human interest. Take, for instance, one of the finest specimens of this drama, the "Phédre" of Racine. The part of Phédre in this play is the one which probably taxes the powers of a tragic actress more than any other, and the reason is not far to seek. The moving power which urges Phédre on in her miserable career is not a merely human passion: she is impelled, in spite of herself, by the gods, and the knowledge of this fact, known to herself as well as to any one, disarms, or rather destroys, the spectator's sympathies and antipathies at the outset: he feels that he is watching the actions of a creature moved not by a passion from within, which she may wrestle with and vanquish, but by a force from without against which all her efforts must be vain. To succeed in so far overcoming this

impression that the spectator shall be moved by the emotion of Phédre, shall place himself with her under the influence of a power in which he has no belief, is what can be accomplished only by the highest dramatic force. The actress has not only, as in the romantic drama, to impress the audience with a belief in a passion and a circumstance, which, however extravagant, is yet conceivable. She has to carry them with her into an impossible region, and make them sympathize not only with a simulated emotion but with a forgotten creed. Such a feat was performed not very many years ago by Rachel, and has been accomplished in these days by Mlle. Sarah Bernhardt.

The crime of Othello or of Lady Macbeth is understood by those who see it represented. It arises from a conflict of human passions, which results in the triumph of evil over good, and it carries with it a protest and a warning. That of Phédre bears no such fruit, and awakens no such comprehension, for it is useless to struggle with the inevitable. The same difficulty which lies in the way of stirring the heart by the character of classical drama opposes itself also to arousing interest by its events. The speech of Thérémène in Racine's tragedy is full of grandeur and fire. It describes in moving yet stately terms the unfortunate fate of a hero; but this fate being caused by the special intervention of Neptune, who having listened to one form of prayer will hear nothing of an amended version, is incredible; and failing to carry conviction to the minds of an audience, may fail also to touch their hearts. The fact that in the face of all these difficulties the company whose privilege it is to represent the works of Racine upon the French stage can still impress its hearers with a sense of their force and beauty, is no mean tribute to the powers of the actors.

In England, from the time when the drama—which had before moved with an awkward progress like that of a youth between boyhood and manhood—developed into the full strength of Shakespeare and the writers of his time, down to the reign of Charles I., it was at a height of power which it has never since attained. During this period indeed, as during all others, there were writers who were admired at the time as tragic poets, and whom a better judgment remembers only as compilers of extravagant bombast.

The existence of war is ever destructive to the well-being of the arts, and especially of the dramatic art, whose province it is to supply by fictions the absence of real turmoil and passion; and as war is the most dramatic of human events, the most striking in its contrasts, the most sudden and comprehensive in its reverses
 triumph—
 every man is playing a part in this drama
 and glories of the stage are no longer

wanted. This fact may partly account for the entire absence of the drama among two classes of mankind—the Jews and the followers of Mohammed. There was this also in the case of the Jews to prevent any desire for the establishment of a drama among them, that the drama in other nations was closely connected with the performance of religious rites, and that the Semitic mind turned with horror from these rites and everything that had a part in them. However that may be, the threatening and the presence of war in England went far to drag down the drama from the height which it had reached. Added to this the Puritans had long been inveighing against the existence of the drama, and they were not slow to seize an opportunity for converting the pride of dissent into the glory of persecution.

The temporary suppression of the theatre was not the worst evil which the fanaticism of the Puritans worked: it led later, as most unwise suppressions do, to an extravagant revulsion. The tone of the Court of the Restoration helped to foster the exaggerated freedom to which the drama not unnaturally rushed after a long period of bondage. The faults of the French school were imported without its merits, and a mixture of license and formality took possession of the stage. The province of the drama is to "show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure." And doubtless the stage at this time fulfilled that office, in reflecting accurately the manners and morals of the time. But it could not "show virtue her own feature," for there was no virtue to show, and probably the patrons of the stage found their vanity amused by the copy of their own vices and follies, and in no way learnt that their way of life was objectionable. Schlegel observes of this period of the English drama, "It was no longer an English national but a London comedy. The whole nearly turns on fashionable love-suits and fashionable raillery: the love affairs are either disgusting or insipid, and the raillery is always puerile and devoid of humour. These comic writers may have accurately hit the tone of their time; in this they did their duty, but they have reared a lamentable memorial of their age." He goes on to speak of the extreme license of incident and dialogue found in these comedies, and remarks that "Beaumont and Fletcher portrayed a vigorous though irregular nature; but nothing can be more repulsive than rude depravity coupled with claims to higher refinement." In strong contrast to the license which prevailed under Charles II. was a temporary victory gained by the classical over the romantic drama, in the eighteenth century. The age grew so picky that after Addison had reformed the English language, had measured all its movements and set it to certain tunes and times, no one could imagine that there was any merit

in authors who had dared to write before his rules were acknowledged, who had exercised a power which obeyed no law save that of truth to nature, and displayed a strength which would not be bounded by the limits of a chill decorum. Most of the best critics of this time aspired to exercise a criticism which, from the classical point of view, should be perfect, and there arose an impression that once this perfection of criticism was reached, the production of great literary and dramatic works must of necessity follow. It was supposed that a writer who had imbibed the spirit of the classical rules enough to comply with them exactly could do no wrong. He might build a sonnet or a tragedy just as a carpenter does a house, by the square. The question proposed to each other by the coffee-house critics, upon any new production upon the stage, was always "What would Aristotle say to this?"

The sage whose dogmas in physical science had been found untenable was considered infallible in laying down rules for the drama. No one any longer believed that all salts were more easily soluble in cold than in hot water, or that human beings alone of all animals grew grey in age; but everybody believed in the certainty of Aristotle's receipts for a moving tragedy or a laughter-moving comedy. So it came to be considered that the dramatist's true business was to compose his play according to certain cut-and-dried rules and limits, and Shakespeare was spoken of by the critics with a kind of tolerant compassion. The opinion of him which Hume has set on record in his *English History* was but the expression of what had been felt long before:—

"If Shakespeare be considered as a man born in a rude age, and educated in the lowest manner, without any instruction from books or from the world, he may be regarded as a prodigy. If represented as a poet capable of furnishing a proper entertainment to a refined or intelligent audience, we must abate much of this eulogy. A striking peculiarity of sentiment adapted to a single character he frequently hits, as it were, by inspiration, but a reasonable propriety of thought he cannot for any time uphold. Nervous and picturesque expressions, as well as descriptions, abound in him, but it is in vain we look for purity or simplicity of diction."

This wonderful piece of criticism, which it is now difficult to believe was representative of any time, contained nothing which had not been said before, in various ways better or not so well. Hume's name has preserved his opinion, and the work in which he expressed his opinion has handed it down to posterity to be stared at like a fly in amber. Goldsmith's estimate of the great dramatist was no higher than Hume's. Mr. Primrose, in the "*Vicar of Wakefield*," meeting with a player, asks him who are the theatrical writers most in vogue at the moment. "Who are the modern Otways and Drydens?" "I

fact, sir," cried the player, "few of our modern dramatists would think themselves much honoured by being compared with the writers you mention. Dryden's and Rowe's manner are quite out of fashion; our taste has gone back a whole century. Fletcher, Ben Jonson, and all the plays of Shakespeare are the only ones that go down." "How," cried I, "is it possible the present age can be pleased with that antiquated dialect, that obsolete humour, those overcharged characters, which abound in the works you mention?" And Goldsmith aimed a most unconscious bit of satire at himself when he classed the importance of Shakespeare together with that of taste and the musical glasses. It is not surprising that the age which despised Shakespeare should exalt such writers as Hill, Philip, and Havard, and gravely set up the one as a warning, the others as models. Essays which affected to consider poetry and dramatic writing in its highest sense classed together "Garriick, Shakespeare, Cumberland, and some other writers of later renown." The "Provoked Husband" is compared with some of the finest efforts of Shakespeare in comedy. "Othello" and "George Barnwell," "Hamlet" and the "Battle of Hexham," are tossed together in the same category, whence the critic may select examples of a "barbarous taste" or of "unexceptional writing," according as Shakespeare or Lillo is the subject of his discussion.

It is natural enough that plays written all upon the same model should all resemble each other. Accordingly we find that the only difference between the characters in different

all composed by the same rule is discovered in their
The king has the same form of bluster, the lover the
of complaint, the warrior the same talk of helmets
and death and victory. Anger or pain is expressed
and "Oh," and tortures, darts, and flames are the

instruments by which the struggle of a great soul

The poetry of these plays consists in a clumsy meta-

characters construct with infinite pains at settled

end of an act six or eight lines of verse are ex-

personage who is last left upon the stage, and the

is to draw a lengthy parallel between two

circumstances and to laboriously liken things

from one to the other. In this fashion Carlos, in

affirming one of the severest trials
he can be put, thus expresses

"With pain suppress'd
Oh impetuous sway,
A tear even lies away
The Greek renown! I
Now in his wound,
I out his tortured soul,
His blood and died;"

and in a fashion little different, Lord Grizzle, in "Tom Thumb," exclaims :

"Tom Thumb shall feel the vengeance he has raised.
So when two dogs are fighting in the streets,
With a third dog one of the two dogs meets,
With angry tooth he bites him to the bone,
And this dog smarts for what that dog has done."

Nicholas Rowe, in his preface to the play of "Jane Shore," announced an intended imitation of Shakespeare, and at the same time apologized for it if, in consequence, "the verse should not charm the ear." For the verse of Shakespeare which he thought so little calculated to "charm the ear," he substituted such stuff as this spoken by Lord Guildford :—

"I have a thought, but wherefore said I one?
I have a thousand thoughts all up in arms,
Like populous towns disturbed at dead of night,
That, raised in darkness, bustle to and fro
As if their business were to make confusion."

The metaphor here is, to say the least, striking. First the speaker has one thought; then the one grows into a thousand; then the thousand are all in arms; and finally they change from a thousand warriors to a thousand towns full of people—and in that character bustle to and fro in the darkness. Possibly the writer of the lines may have observed that a confused metaphor was common enough in Shakespeare, and imagined that in this passage he at once imitated and improved what he announced as in some sort his model.

But his imitation of Shakespeare consists in truth in the employment of a few Shakespearean words, and a versification a thought less dreary than Rowe's usual manner. He makes the Duke of Glo'ster swear by holy Paul and talk of ambling on a gossip's message, and is then satisfied that he has written like Shakespeare.

It was partly the reaction from the regulated stiffness and coldness of what was called the classical drama which led to the general acceptance of a very different kind of theatrical entertainment. To the languid circulation succeeded a riotous pulsation. The stately heroes who moved with a chill dignity, as though fearing to disarrange the folds of their togas, were replaced by bandits who stalked fiercely in plumed hats and careless mantle; by spectres who glided grimly across the scene; and by demons who sprang from the bottomless pit through trapdoors. The solemn company of classical figures was ousted by the motley rout of melodrama. The term just employed is one that has been used in many incorrect senses, and one to which it is difficult to assign a definite meaning. But, it may be said, melodrama does not differ from tragedy in that it deals with surprising incident—with stabbing, poisoning, and intriguing; for all this is frequently

crowded into one of Shakespeare's plays, which yet remains a tragedy. But it differs in this, that in melodrama the action is so sudden and rapid as to leave no space for the equal development of passion and motive. The mental does not keep pace with the physical struggle. There is no adequate prologue of passion to lead up to the daring leap or the gallant rescue which concludes a scene. The effects are produced for their own sake, and not as the result of a sustained conflict of circumstance and feeling. A blind man might sit at the representation of a tragedy and follow it very well, while he would understand nothing of a melodrama. It was no bad satire, though an unconscious one, upon the tendency of melodrama, which was conveyed by Richardson, the showman, in his version of the "School for Scandal," when at the fall of the screen he had blue and red fire blazed at the wings. In the class of melodrama may be included Kotzebue's "Pizarro," Sheridan's version of which became so popular in England, as well as "The Stranger," and other pieces of the same school—a school which had a baneful influence upon the drama, the power of which is yet asserting itself.

The stage was presently lighted by a finer radiance than the glitter and glare of melodrama. The influence of the play-writer, and of the actor who interprets his thought, must always act and react upon each other. When the poetic and histrionic talent are found rising together, it is a good day for the drama. Fortunately for the stage, its boards have at times been trodden by actors who, besides possessing the executive skill which is a necessary part of their business, have been impressed with a high sense of their calling; who have considered the obligations which their profession involves to others, as well as the personal triumphs which it brings to themselves. The influence of such actors is not bounded by the walls of the theatre where their talent is displayed; the echoes of their voices are carried beyond there, to reach and stir the hearts of poets. Such actors as these were the Kembles; but in their days the play-writer's art had not yet recovered from the long sickness into which it had fallen, and there was no response from the poet to the actor's appeal. Such an actor was Macready, and he was more fortunate in his time. Such men as Knowles, Talfourd, Sheil, Lord Lytton, and greater poets than these, who are happily still among us, were induced to clothe their thought and passion in a dramatic form. While such writers of the time were contributing their efforts to the elevation of the drama, no labour was spared by the actor, Shakespeare with fitting dignity, called upon to illustrate as poet and the player. to frame the play, as a

fine setting is given to a rich jewel: not as a specious casket which may distract attention from the unworthiness of the thing which it holds. Nor was the modesty of nature overstepped by an attempt to press nature unchanged into the service of art. There can indeed be no greater blunder than that of trying to make up for the want of reality in emotion upon the stage by the reality of mechanical appliances or trivial details: it is a venture which defeats its own object. There is so much in a stage play necessarily unlike actual life that the attempt to imitate conventional realities can only remind an audience by its incongruity that it is but a play which is being represented. In real life a man in a state of violent emotion will eat his dinner, or put on his boots mechanically, without losing his emotion. If he is represented as doing so upon the stage, the outward action will seem out of keeping with the passion within, and the dramatic effect will be ruined. So in the case of scenic appliances. The object of scenery is to help the spectator's imagination to sympathy with the play, to suggest ideas of beauty or of horror; too close a copy of actual objects will only break the illusion.

Unfortunately the so-called emendations upon Shakespeare of the eighteenth-century critics and playwrights could not be entirely rejected. They had indeed become so closely interwoven with the original that at an earlier time Schiller, an ardent reader of Shakespeare, writing his "Robbers," borrowed whole speeches from Colley Cibber's "Richard" instead of Shakespeare's, and thought, like Prometheus, to steal fire from heaven while he was really picking the brains of a poor wretch who had nothing to spare.

Since, as before, the disappearance of Kean and the Kembles, and of Macready after them, there has been an outcry raised upon the degeneracy of the drama in England, sometimes with apparently good reason, sometimes with none. A great change in the aspect of the theatre was worked by the revolution occasioned by the overthrow of the privileges attached to the patent theatres, the establishment of which had no doubt led to some bad as well as to many good results. These present days of the English stage have at least an advantage over some which have gone before them, in that the genius of Shakespeare has been recognized, if not constantly, at least from time to time. The extraneous charm of a foreign accent, or of splendid scenic effect, has sometimes been found necessary to command the public attention to the beauties of the dramatist; but that it has been even so commanded is a good sign. At this day we may congratulate ourselves that an actor capable of expressing the poet's thought has proved that the
 finely interpreted
 or the empty coats

are ready to witness that thought
 the
 the carpenter

The drama of France, which has had a considerable effect upon that of England, went through vicissitudes no less remarkable than our own. But whereas in England the spiritual arm has generally been raised for the oppression of the stage, in France this has been the effort of the temporal power. It has been more to the ministers of princes that the fear of the drama has appealed than to the delegates of the Church. At times, indeed, the stage in France has raised the wrath of the priests and stirred it to action. Thus after the first representation of "*Tartuffe*," which the people received with acclamation, the Church appealed to the King to forbid its repetition. The appeal was granted, but Molière made a counter petition, which resulted in the reversal of the King's decision. Unfortunately, on the reproduction of "*Tartuffe*" the King was absent in Flanders, and in the middle of the performance, in consequence of a despatch from the temporary Government, the lights of the theatre were suddenly extinguished and audience and actors dismissed. There was for a long period a violent hatred of the actor's profession entertained by the priesthood in France—so violent, indeed, that until some twenty years ago there was in existence an excommunicative decree against comedians. The refusal of Christian burial to the celebrated actress, Mlle. Adrienne le Cœur, has been contrasted by Voltaire, in some fine verses, with the honoured funeral of Mrs. Oldfield in Westminster Abbey; and the interment in the sixteenth century of Lope de Rueda, the Spanish poet and actor, in the Cathedral of Cordova, was attended by extraordinary pomp. This was an honour the more remarkable as the Spaniards of those days believed actors to be children of the devil. Rueda's influence and popularity had indeed been enormous, but he seems to have left the Spanish theatre in no very happy condition, to judge from what Cervantes says of it in "*Don Quixote*":—

"Comedy, according to Tully, ought to be a mirror of human life, a pattern of manners, and an image of truth; while the comedies now represented are mirrors of vanity, patterns of folly, and pictures of license. Plays are likewise now written to gain the admiration of the vulgar and ignorant people, and bring them to the theatre. All of which is to the prejudice of truth, the discredit of history, and even the disgrace of our Spanish wits."

Every one will be struck by the resemblance which this passage suggests to the discourse of Hamlet to the players. Cervantes himself devoted not a little of his daring genius to the drama. In one of his earlier plays he represents a roistering soldier, who gains his living by begging for souls in Purgatory, and sometimes getting drunk on the proceeds. It is no great wonder that Cervantes was hated by the priests.

There is no history of the national drama of Spain to equal,

either in interest or authority, the description given of it by Cervantes in his preface to his own comedies :—

“Some days ago I took part in a conversation with some friends on the subject of comedies and things pertaining to them. It was discussed with so much subtlety and learning that they came well nigh to perfection. They spoke also of him who first of all in Spain drew comedy from her swaddling-clothes, gave her an habitation, and decked her in pomp and magnificence. I, as the eldest of those who were present, told how that I remembered seeing the great Lope de Rueda, a man as famous in acting as he was in understanding. He was born at Seville, and by trade a gold-beater. He was admirable in pastoral poetry, and in this quality, nor then nor now, has there been found his equal. Although, being then a child, I could not judge of the excellencies of his verses, there still abide in my memory some which I perceive, in this my riper age, to be worthy of all praise. (But that it would be a little out of place in this preface I could reproduce here one or two which would bear witness to what I say.)

“In the time of this celebrated Spaniard all the furniture of a comedian was carried in a bag, and consisted of four white coats of skins, trimmed with gilt leather, four braids, as many wigs, and four crooks, more or less. The comedies were mere colloquies like eclogues, between two or three shepherds and a shepherdess. These were embellished and prolonged by two or three interludes, now by a negress, now by a ruffian, now by a fool, and now by a Biscayno. These four parts, and many others, did Lope make with the greatest excellence and truth imaginable. In those days there was no stage machinery—no combats of Moors with Christians on foot or on horseback. They had no figure which arose, or appeared to rise, from out the centre of the earth, through a trap-door of the stage, and that was formed of four benches, with some four or six boards placed upon them, and raised about four palms above the ground. One did not then see angels or souls descending from heaven in clouds. The ornament of the stage was an old rug suspended by cords from one side to the other, by which was formed the tiring-room. Behind it were the musicians, who sang, without guitar, from ancient ballad. Lope de Rueda died—and, for the good and famous man he was, they buried him in Cordova, where he fell on sleep, in the cathedral, between the two choirs, where also was interred that famous clown, Luis Lopez. Naharro, a native of Toledo, succeeded Lope de Rueda, who was celebrated in the character of the ruffianly coward. He increased somewhat more the decoration of comedy, and exchanged the bag for chests and trunks; the orchestra, which before sang behind the rug, he introduced into the theatre; he abolished the beards of the comedians, for till then no one acted without a false beard. It was his will that all should act with unmasked batteries, excepting such as took the parts of old men, or those which demanded a change of visage. He invented scenery, devised clouds, thunder, lightnings, combats, and battles. But none of these attained the sublime height in which we find them now—this is true, and none can contradict me—and here I may be allowed to trespass the bounds of mine own modesty, when we see acted in the theatres of Madrid ‘The Commerce of Algiers,’ which I wrote, ‘The Destruction of Numancia,’ and ‘The Naval Engagement,’ when I ventured to reduce comedy from five to three acts. I was the first to show, or rather I was the first who represented, the imaginations and secret workings of the soul, producing on the stage images of morality with the general ~~an~~ ^{applause of the audience.} About that time I wrote from ~~two~~ ^{comedies, which were all acted without} any offerings of ~~a~~ ^{an} their course without whistling, ^{her things to}

occupy me. I abandoned the pen and the drama, and immediately afterwards appeared that prodigy of nature, the great Lope de Vega, who bore away the sceptre of comedy, subjugated and brought beneath his sway all the comedians, filled the world with his own dramas, happily conceived, and well wrought out, and so humorous, that those which he has written may not be contained in ten thousand leaves, and all (which is most wonderful to tell) he has seen acted, or at least been assured that they were. If all those, and they are many, who wished to follow his steps and share his glory were to write their works together, they would not have written the half of what he alone has composed. But not for this—since God gives not all things to all men—must we omit to mention with esteem the works of Doctor Ramon, which were the greater after those of the great Lope. Highly, likewise, must we esteem the ingenious intrigues of the licentiate Miguel Sanches, the modesty of Doctor Mira de Mescua, a signal honour to our nation, the discretion and variety of conceit of Canon Tarraga, the gentleness and sweetness of Don Guillen de Castro, the brilliancy of Aguilar, the pomp, the pageantry, the show, and splendour of the comedies of Luis Velez de Guevara, and those in provincial jargon, born of the subtle wit of Don Antonio de Galarza, and those which give such promise of the traps and subtle tricks of love by Gaspar de Avilar, all of whom, and many others, have helped the great Lope in raising up this vast and stately fabric.”*

The opposition of the Church in France to the drama did not, as in England, spring from a Puritanical belief in the inherent viciousness of the stage. It was political, and arose from a fear of diminution of present power. The satirical dramatists of France were from the time of the Moralities bold in their attacks upon the vices of bishops and archbishops, and these attacks were delivered before the Court by comedians who knew well how to give them all their point, and who were in a manner regarded as spokesmen of the King. As is seen from the story of “Tartuffe,” just told, Louis XIV. was, until the reign of Mme. de Maintenon and her bigotry, by no means ill disposed to listen to these satires, and the knowledge of this was not likely to increase the love of the priests for the players. As during two important epochs of French history the prime ministers of France were Cardinals of the Church, it is natural that the authority exercised over the stage should, while proceeding from the Church, be mainly of a political nature. The greater of these two Cardinals, Richelieu, extended a great deal of encouragement to the stage after his fashion—that is, he treated it as a schoolmaster does a boy when he says to him, “You may have a holiday. Go and play; amuse yourself how and as much as you like; only mind you don’t go out of bounds, and take care that I don’t hear you making a noise.” The Cardinal found that so long as it was his submissive pupil the stage might be of some political service to him. Moreover, he designed that it should serve to reflect his own personal glory. As is well known, he was afflicted with a belief that being a great

* For this translation of a little-known passage in Cervantes I am indebted to my friend Mr. A. J. Duffield.

minister, his real vocation was to be a great poet and dramatist. Under the spell of this delusion he wrote plays which assuredly nothing but the terror of his name could have placed upon the stage. The violence of his envy at the success of Corneille's "Cid" gave occasion to Boileau to write this happy distich:—

"En vain contre le Cid un ministre se ligue
Tout Paris pour Chimène a les yeux de Rodrigue."

The contest between the classical and romantic drama in France was both more sustained and fiercer than elsewhere. The jealousy entertained of anything like theatrical liberty by the Government in France from early times was the cause of the hold which the imitation of the ancient theatre took upon the country. In the narrow limits of these imitations the authorities discovered safety, and the people whose dramatic tastes were not allowed to be gratified in any other way were glad to welcome the only form of drama which was vouchsafed to them. The first play of the classical school which followed upon the moralities and the *sottises* was "Cléopâtre Captive," a tragedy in five acts, with choruses written by Etienne Jodelle, *seigneur* of Limodin, in the reign of Henry II. From the time of Jodelle down to that of Corneille, the character of the French stage remained unchanged. There was no vehicle for the poet's thought admitted save the Alexandrine verse; and it was supposed that the dignity of the drama would be injured unless its characters were either Greek, Roman, or Mussulman. There was, indeed, once acted a prose tragedy of Sophonisba, and in the latter half of the sixteenth century prose comedies came somewhat into vogue. Fronton, a Jesuit father, attempted a tragedy on the subject of Joan of Arc, but met with no success. Alexandre Hardy, a writer who produced no less than twelve hundred dramatic pieces, attempted to strike out a new line in presenting tragi-comedies, one of which he took from a tale of Cervantes. Had he translated one of the plays of Cervantes he might, perhaps, have obtained a better result; but as he had no touch of the Spanish poet's genius, his mere borrowing of a plot from him availed him nothing. The impress of the classical world became so firmly marked upon the French drama that it was not till Corneille had produced six comedies and one tragedy after the antique pattern that he dared give expression to his romantic tendencies in the "Cid." In this his own genius found a starting point in the imitation of two Spanish dramatists, Guillen de Castro and Diamante.

The public gave every possible sign of their approval to the new style which Corneille attempted to introduce; but it did not meet with equal favour from the Academy, which in those days meant the Court; and to the Court the dramatist was forced to submit.

Consequently, Corneille found himself obliged to confine his departure from classical rules to the regions of comedy. Here he was again indebted to a Spanish original, his fine comedy "Le Menteur" being taken from "La Verdad Sospechosa," a play long attributed to Lope de Vega, whose reputation attracted to itself all unowned plays, as in our time that of Sydney Smith did all nameless pieces of wit. The original of "Le Menteur" was in truth the work of Alarcon, and as the play not only keeps the stage in France, but is well known in England through a very coarsely handled adaptation by Foote, it is only fair that the credit of it should be given where it is due. Foote's version, called the "Liar," loses a great deal of the wit and all the finer elements of the French piece. Dramatists of his time were quite as clever as those of a later one in managing to evaporate all the essence of foreign pieces in the process of transmutation. Looking at the very fine comedy of "Le Menteur," one cannot but regret that Corneille did not oftener turn from the frowns of Melpomene to the smiles of Thalia. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that a strict canon of the Academy was a marked separation between tragedy and comedy. A writer possessing a genius of such a compass as Corneille's, which, fitted and inclined to deal with both sides of human event and character, is restricted to the treatment of one only at a time, will find it easier to keep comedy out of his tragedies than to banish pathos from his comedy. Indeed, the comedy can hardly exist without an undercurrent of deeper feeling; when that is removed, the remaining elements will be found to belong rather to farce than to comedy. Corneille, therefore, with the ambition for a seat in the Academy constantly before him, was content to confine his efforts mainly to the antique tragedy. He was, however, not only comic himself in some instances; he was also the cause of comedy in others. The first pieces of Molière, lively and funny enough, were founded first upon the mechanical humour of the Italian farces, then upon the Spanish comedy of intrigue. It was Corneille's influence which first led him to enter upon the comedy of character where he afterwards became so great. "I am much indebted," he writes to Boileau, "to 'Le Menteur.' When it was first performed I had already a wish to write, but was in doubt as to what it should be. My ideas were still confused, but this piece determined them. In short, but for the appearance of 'Le Menteur,' though I should no doubt have written comedies of intrigue, like 'L'Etourdi' or 'Le Dépit Amoureux,' I should perhaps never have written 'Le Misan-

not only through the medium of Corneille that Molière
 and to the Spanish stage; in his later compositions he
 borrowed directly from it.

The disadvantages of the method under which Racine worked, and the grandeur with which in spite of that he informed his pieces, have been already mentioned. Long after Corneille's time and his, French tragedy continued to run in the same narrow groove, the classical model was ever held in so solemn a veneration that everything which departed from it was held to be by that fact unworthy. Shakespeare's "Hamlet" was described by Voltaire as the dream of a drunken savage with some flashes of beautiful thought. The version of this work written by Ducis, in which the part of Hamlet was played by Talma, was scrupulously lopped of what were termed the barbarisms of the original. The presence of the ghost upon the stage was considered an outrage upon taste and dramatic art. As the spectre's warning was in some sort necessary to the plot of the play, he was permitted to leave the secrets of his prison-house in order to appear to Hamlet in dreams, which he relates to his friend Morceste, the Horatio of the French play. This device seems puerile enough. The genius of Talma, however, triumphed over the playwright's constraints; it is said by those who saw it, that the awe and terror conveyed in Talma's aspect as he rushed upon the stage after one of his dreams was as impressive as Garrick's terror at the actual sight of the ghost.

It was long before anything like Shakespeare, in his habit as he lived, could recommend itself to the French stage; long before Alfred de Musset, in his beautiful poem "*La Nuit d'Octobre*," could venture to class together *Les Sonnets de Pétrarque et le Chant des Oiseaux*, *Michel Ange et les Arts*, *Shakespeare et la Nature*. A violent battle had before this to be fought between the romantic and the classical drama. Something towards sweeping away antiquated notions in dramatic as in other matters was done by the terrible storm of the Revolution. Seeing the ancient system of politics overthrown, men thought that that of art might possibly have no surer foundation. The new or romantic school of the drama began to develop itself, and to war with the tenacious habit of the old or classical school. One of the earliest and best-gifted cultivators of the romantic school was M. Nepomucène Lemercier. In his drama of "*Pinto*," which was first produced in the month Germinal of the eighth year of the Republic, M. Lemercier unfolded the whole romantic system, exhibiting a striking variety of character and incident, and mingling comic with grave situations with an audacious freedom. For these innovations much credit is due to M. Lemercier, although in spite of them the play of "*Pinto*" is ineffably dull.

In 1829 a romantic drama of considerable importance, "*Henri III. et sa Cour*," by Alexandre Dumas, was produced at the Théâtre Français. It is well worth remark that Dumas was first led to write for the stage by the arrival in Paris of an English

company of actors. He gives in his memoirs a lively picture of the impression made upon him by this circumstance. "I had never read," he writes, "a single piece of a foreign theatre. They announced 'Hamlet.' I knew only that of Ducis. I went to see that of Shakspeare. It was this which I sought, which was wanting to my existence; it was these players forgetting that they were on a stage: it was this life of fiction becoming actual by the power of art; it was this reality of word and gesture which made of actors human beings, with their virtues, their passions, and their weaknesses, and not stilted heroes, impassive, declamatory, and sententious. I saw Romeo, Virginius, Shylock, William Tell, Othello; I saw Macready, Kean, and Young; I read, I devoured the library of the foreign stage, and I saw that in the world of the theatre all sprung from Shakspeare, as in the real world all springs from the sun. I saw that none could be compared to him, for he was as dramatic as Corneille, as comic as Molière, as original as Calderon, as thoughtful as Goethe, as passionate as Schiller. I saw that his works alone included as many types as the works of all other writers. I saw, indeed, that in the power of creation Shakspeare came next to God. From that time my vocation was determined."

That with the enthusiasm aroused by Shakspeare and the English actors, Dumas, who was then a clerk under the Government, set himself to work, first to read the plays of other nations, and then to write plays for his own; and thus France owes some of its most brilliant dramatic writings to the visit of an English company of players. It was directly indebted also to an English writer of romance for the production of "Henri III. et sa Cour," the plot of which, as Dumas says, was founded upon two passages in French chronicles and a scene from Sir Walter Scott. The play had a great success; it was opposed, to a certain extent, by the upholders of the classical school; but their enmity to this piece was the very extravagance of love compared to what they felt for Victor Hugo's plays. Dumas' drama was romantic, but it was in prose; and it did not attempt the mingling of comedy and tragedy, which was so obnoxious to the classical faction as early as the days of Sir Philip Sidney, and which is found in many of Hugo's pieces. Thus it was not till the year 1830, when Hugo's "Hernani" was produced at the Théâtre Français, that the war of the romantic and the classical drama reached a climax which resulted in the assured victory of the former.

* There is no finer passage than this to be found in all the works of Dumas, a writer too seldom rated, in England at least, at his proper worth. The vast quantity produced by his swift pen has given a false impression of his talents: he is generally considered as a writer who frittered his powers away in too constantly exercising them. Yet, in everything that he wrote there is something of the sacred fire; and his plays are models of dramatic construction and fine perception of character.

In putting this great drama before the public the author, who was only twenty-eight years old at the time of its creation, had to dread not only the opposition of the critics without the theatre, he had also to encounter the prejudice of those who had been trained to the classical school within it. Over difficulties in the theatre and outside of it, however, M. Hugo's genius finally triumphed, but not without a violent combat. The play on its first night was received with little disapproval and much acclamation. But from the second representation to the forty-fifth and last at that time, the theatre became an arena in which the partisans of two great factions nightly contended. The disturbance was hardly less than that of the O.P. riots in England. The excitement was as great and the parties as distinctly marked by their costume as in a battle or a University boat race.

To the respectable attire of the ancients was opposed the disordered hair and the startling garments of the young followers of Hugo. In the van of battle the celebrated red waistcoat of Théophile Gautier shone like the oriflamme. The advocates of the old and new dramatic school displayed as much fervour and bitterness as has been seen in other countries exhibited by rival parties in politics and religion.

The rage awakened by the writer, who dared to depart from the rules which must be perfect because they had existed so long, went so far that the poet received anonymous letters threatening him with death unless his abominable play were withdrawn. On the other hand the devotion of the poet's followers was as great as his enemies' hatred. Two students learned that letters had threatened him with death as the penalty of his daring, and they accompanied him as an escort from the theatre to his house every night that his play was performed. The editor of the *Courier Français* said to Victor Hugo, "There are two men in France who are thoroughly hated, M. de Polignac and you." Duels were fought on the subject of "Hernani," and a corporal of dragoons, who died at Vannes, desired in his will that on his tomb might be inscribed "Ci gît qui crut à M. Victor Hugo." But the great battle was won.

Eight years later, when the piece was reproduced, two spectators, who had been present at its first performances, conversed as they left the theatre. One said "It is no wonder that the play succeeds, he has changed every line of it." "You are mistaken," replied the other, "he has changed not the play but the public." There was another dramatic poet of the romantic school in France, whose works will live as long as M. Hugo's—Alfred de Musset. His genius is less comprehensive, but it is as penetrating. In his plays, which he calls comedies,

he has the art of concentrating a singular tragic force. In one speech, sometimes in one line, he lays bare a whole lifetime of anguish. The passion of his dramas does not grow and develop itself by degrees, it strikes and withers like a storm of lightning in the midst of a summer day. The brilliancy of the comedy which plays upon the surface of his tragic power is unrivalled. It is curious that in the works of this romantic dramatist there is a certain resemblance to the ancient classical models in this—that he always conveys the idea of a fate overriding the actions of men, waiting its own time to overwhelm them. His poetry is of so delicate a fibre that the least rough handling destroys its beauty, and his works could hardly be successfully played anywhere but at the Français, where the finest talent and the most careful training are found in combination. The French comedy had no such difficulties as the struggles between the classical and romantic school to contend with. But it had, and it has, other dangers which work from within, and are therefore more subtle and more dangerous than those which lie without. There are some striking remarks made by a very great critic upon the French comedy of a former period. The object of these comedies, he observes, is no longer life, but society. "That perpetual negotiation between conflicting vanities which never ends in a sincere treaty of peace—the embroidered dress, the hat under the arm, and the sword by the side—essentially belong to them, and the whole of the characterization is limited to the folly of the men and the coquetry of the women. The insipid uniformity of these pictures was unfortunately too often seasoned by the corruption of moral principles, which, especially after the age of Louis XIV. till the middle of the century under the regency and Louis XV., it became the fashion openly to avow. In this period the favourite of the women, the *homme à bonnes fortunes*, who, in a tone of satiety, boasts of the multitude of his conquests too easily achieved, was not a character invented by the comic writers, but an accurate portrait from real life, as is proved by many memoirs of the last century even down to those of a Bésenval. We are disgusted at the unrivalled sensuality of the love intrigues of the Grecian comedy, but the Greeks would have thought the intrigues with married women in the French comedy entered into merely from giddy vanity, much more disgusting. If in the constant ridicule of marriage by the *petits maîtres*, and in their moral scepticism, especially with regard to women, the poets merely intended to censure a prevailing depravity, the picture is not therefore the less dangerous. The great or fashionable world, which in point of numbers is the small, but which considers itself as alone of any importance, can hardly be improved by it, and the

example is but too seductive for the other classes from the brilliancy with which the characters are surrounded. But in so far as comedy is concerned, this deadening corruption is by no means entertaining and in many pieces in which fools of quality give the tone, as in the 'Chevalier à la mode' of Dancourt, for instance, the picture of complete moral dissoluteness, which though true is both unpoetical and unnatural, is not only wearisome in the extreme but most decidedly disgusting." So writes Schlegel of the French comedy of the past time, and so might he write, with a difference, of that of the present day. The embroidered dress, the hat under the arm, and the sword by the side, have vanished, but the folly of the men and the coquetry of the women remain as the staple of the play. It is true also that marriage is no longer ridiculed, but it is assumed that marriage laws exist only to be broken, and the most popular writer of comedy, or of comedy-drama in France, Alexandre Dumas, *ils*, contends that his plays are all admirably moral. And they are so in this sense, that when analyzed the picture which they present of vice and its consequences is revolting. But the mass of the public who fill a theatre do not care to analyze. They do not pierce beneath the surface: they come to be amused, and they depart with the immediate impression of what has amused them in their minds. The constancy with which a theme is put before them cannot but lead them in the end to believe in its constant and pervading existence. When an author who has power enough to make his writings lifelike, even if they were not informed with life by the perfection of acting, presents to an audience always the same aspect of human affairs, they are induced at last to believe that aspect to be the true one. The author shows them a never-varying picture of men whose honour is baseness, and women whose strength is vice: and the public become disciples to his creed. In one of this writer's successful plays the man who is set up as a type of honour among others who are supposed to be far below him, is so placed that he must either betray a woman's secret or see his friend rush into a disgraceful marriage. In this position he not only warns his friend, a course which may be justified, but subsequently makes sport of the woman's humiliation. And it is after this that his friend says—speaking to the girl whom he is to marry—"Vous épousez le plus honnête homme que je connais." The moral objection to this kind of play is not the only one: the want of relief to the unpleasant side of nature found in most of them occasions them to be, as Burton said King William III. was not a laughing hyphen. There is another school of comedy-drama now in fashion wherein the pernicious influence of Kotzebue, already spoken of, may be remarked. Of this school Octave Feuillet may be said to be the leader. He delights as did Kotzebue and

his followers, in appealing to the best feelings of his audience in the cause of crime. Pity and charity are invoked, love in its most seductive colours becomes an advocate for degradation. The inconsistencies of human nature are carefully adduced, the worst are painted, as being at the same time the best of people. Their better inclinations are brought into high relief, and their evil deeds are veiled in a compassionate darkness. The fact that sorrow and sin go together is so arranged that the attention is riveted on the grief that follows, forgetting the crime that goes before. The writer delights in ambiguous deeds, bordering on vice and virtue, and having a foot in the dominions of each. He argues that men may pursue a course of crime and yet be unaffected by guilt—that they may in fact touch pitch and not be defiled.

The women who play the chief parts in his plays are mysterious compounds of the highest good and the deepest evil. Their minds are of so noble a cast that they must not be judged by ordinary standards. They attain to a point of grandeur which human beings cannot as a rule approach; and by a new law of morality the height which they reach is to be measured by the depth to which they fall. M. Feuillet's own description of one such character may serve as a type for all of them. She is a woman who deliberately wins a man's love from his wife, is tempted to poison the wife, but thinks better of it, and poisons herself. "She," we are told, "resembles a star escaped from its orbit. She deals to-day with heroism, to-morrow with crime." This see-sawing between good and evil is infinitely more dangerous than the hard brutality of the Dumas school. It is a natural temptation to the vain to rank themselves with these brilliant but eccentric stars.

Although it is upon the French stage that this kind of play is best exhibited, it is unjust to give to the French all the discredit of its popularity. Such plays are transferred to the German stage, and they are well received whenever they are represented in England. The only reproach that can be fairly brought against the French dramatists is that they have more skill and invention than those of other nations, and understand better the art of presenting dangerous subjects in a vivid and attractive form, and surrounding them with a quasi-poetical atmosphere.

Whatever faults may exist in the dramatic literature of France, there is no doubt that the French stage, so far as acting is concerned, holds a place far above others. The reason of this is partly to be found in the greater force with which the mimetic instinct is developed in the French nation. The advantage given by this is helped by the fact that in France, as in Germany, the art of the actor is considered as of an importance equal to that of

other arts. That such a privilege should anywhere be denied to it seems unreasonable. Other arts are encouraged and supported, it may be supposed, for their educational value, for the force with which they appeal to the minds and feelings of those who look upon their productions. It is strange that no such support should be given to that one which makes an appeal more immediate and direct than any other.


In all other arts some previous training is necessary, not only to the artist but to those who behold his work. There are many men born with no love for music or for painting; there is hardly one who does not turn with instinctive delight to acting. A cantata, a picture, a statue, may be long in carrying their meaning to the mind; a fine dramatic speech, finely delivered, goes straight to the heart even of the most untaught. To a large mass of people who are the special object of public benevolence and care the theatre is the only amusement that does not by its very nature savour of vice, or lead indirectly to it. That, this being so, the theatre might become a strong influence for good over a large body of people can hardly be doubted. That no attempt to use this influence should be made is surely an evil thing. The foolish prejudice which for a long time existed in this country against the actor's profession is now a thing of the past, and so far a great step has been taken in the interest of the stage.

One more great step is necessary before the drama can be raised to the place which it ought to occupy as a high form of art and a powerful means of education. The position of the actor is more difficult than is that of the follower of any other artistic calling. His services are in many ways greater, and his reward in many ways less. There are thousands to whom but for him the poet's thought would never be borne. He is the Prometheus who catches fire from heaven and spreads its warmth and brightness over earth. The mental and physical labour involved in his task are enormous. There is some truth in the saying of a great French actress, Madame Talma, that the player's art includes something of the knowledge necessary for every other art. His perception of the outward effects of passion must be keen and carefully trained; his knowledge of its inward working must be profound and must be a subject of constant reflection. He should teach himself to nicely appreciate the images of beauty or of terror with which the other arts present him. When the results of his study and his labour are given to the world his reward is, it is true, immediate, but it is not enduring. The effect of his art is concentrated into a brief space, and so is its impress. The light of his genius is as brilliant as that of a meteor, and as transitory. When he is gone the productions of his mind can only be recorded by traditions, which are, at

their best, but the shadow of the man. His name and his influence may live, but his works cannot. To those artists whose works remain after them, and serve as a triumph and a tribute, even if there be no other, every encouragement, every support is given. Why should not as much be done for the actor, whose creations are so much the very essence of himself that they vanish with him, and of whom it can be recorded only by the words of others that he was

"Great when he played
In England's noble drama, and the still
House wept or loud applauded, as its heart
He wrought, and with imperious passion swayed
The reins of the full theatre at will" ?

WALTER HERRIES POLLOCK.



ON OUR PRESENT SYSTEM OF ELEMENTARY EDUCATION.

THE number of children in our Elementary Schools is now 2,500,000, and is continuously increasing. I need not, however, occupy a line or a moment in dwelling on the importance of securing for the children in our elementary schools the best system of education; whatever other differences of opinion there may be, on this point at least all will be agreed. Nevertheless, though we have heard a great deal about the statistics of the subject—the number of schools and scholars,* and the difficulties of giving religious instruction in the present divided state of public opinion on theological questions—there has been comparatively little discussion with reference to the nature and character of the secular teaching.

In the code of last year Lord Sandon introduced several new provisions. These were decided improvements, which I am the more anxious to acknowledge, as it seems to me that on some points the code is still open to criticism. I trust therefore that in dwelling on these I shall not give the impression that I undervalue the important improvements which Lord Sandon has introduced.

I am anxious, however, to bring forward some reasons which make me apprehensive that the present code, though on the

* For instance, Sir J. Kay Shuttleworth's interesting article in the last number of *Review*.

whole a decided improvement, will, in some respects, have an unfortunate effect on elementary education.

The revised code of 1861 introduced an improved system of payment by results, which indeed, having regard to the increased amount of Government aid, had become almost a necessity; but it was open to the objection that it recognized proficiency in reading, writing, and arithmetic only, and thus tended greatly to discourage all other subjects.

We have to thank Mr. Forster for many eminent services to the cause of education; and if some are disposed to complain of him for being too conciliatory to Conservatives, it is only fair to remember that to this very fact we are perhaps indebted for a better educational measure than might otherwise have been possible. But however this may be, Mr. Forster has the merit of having introduced a system of payment for history, geography, and some other branches of knowledge, the choice of which was left to the school boards or committees, subject to arrangement with the school inspectors. Nevertheless, the maximum grant allowed being 15s. a head, and good schools being able to obtain this without any grant for the so-called extra subjects, it is not surprising that out of the whole number of children in elementary schools, only 62,000 passed in any extra subject, and only 26,474 in more than one.

Lord Sandon has endeavoured to remedy this, but the present code is, it seems to me, open to the grave objection that it regulates too minutely the system of education, thus weakening the school boards and committees, and greatly checking those improvements which experience would suggest, and which, beginning in a few schools, would gradually become general. Thus, by article 19c, it is provided that the classes from which the children are examined in Standards II.—VI. should "pass a creditable examination in grammar, history (political), geography, and plain needlework, or in any two of these subjects." Now it is obvious that if two subjects are thus made compulsory, all others are practically excluded. We have already seen that out of all England only 26,474 children passed last year in two subjects, and we may be sure that the number who will pass in three must be quite insignificant.

Under these circumstances, the list of specific subjects, and the mode in which they are to be taught, become no doubt less important; nevertheless, on both of these points the code is, I think, open to objection. There are some other minor considerations, but these are the principal questions to which I am anxious to call attention.

It cannot, I think, be denied that by making history, political geography, and grammar, or to speak more correctly, two of

them, compulsory subjects, all others are practically excluded, and the managers of schools deprived of the power of selection which they previously exercised.

Nothing, however, but the most absolute unanimity of opinion amongst those qualified to judge, could justify such a course, which moreover would, under such circumstances, be unnecessary. So far, however, from this being the case, there is still so much difference as to the best system of education, that it is very undesirable to lay down cast-iron rules of this kind, and thus to stereotype a system which, after all, may prove to be by no means the best.

No doubt the great majority of schools have selected history, geography, or grammar; but some on the other hand have made a different choice. The Committee of Council, indeed, say that "a fair proportion of scholars take up other branches of study." Well then, if they themselves admit that the school boards have acted with judgment, that in their opinion the different subjects have been judiciously chosen, why take away a power which has been so wisely exercised?

I am anxious at the outset to deny that I wish to render the school examinations any more difficult, or to introduce profound subjects, above the comprehension of children. The very reverse is the case, and one of my main objections to our present system is that it is above the children in many respects, and that there is no sufficient element of reality in it—it has no connection with their every-day life, or the common objects around them.

One of the so-called specific subjects is domestic economy. This is defined on p. 164 as follows: "Food and its preparation. Clothing and materials. The dwelling; warming, cleaning, and ventilation. Rules for health; the management of sickness. Cottage income, expenditure, and savings." Surely this is all very sensible and appropriate, but it can only be taken up after history, geography, and grammar, or two of them; and even then is restricted to girls. Why should not boys, also, be allowed to learn about food and clothing? Are not cleanliness and ventilation as necessary for men as for women? Are boys never ill? men never improvident? Surely there might be advantage, and could be no evil, in allowing boys, as well as girls, to be instructed in these humble, yet most important subjects.

Why should so decided a preference be given to grammar? English grammar, as it is ordinarily taught in elementary schools, seems to me of very doubtful value. Moreover, the power of speaking grammatically is more a matter of practice and tact, than of tuition. I do not wish to undervalue grammar, with reference to language, but would say in the words of George Herbert:—

"Who cannot dress it well, want wit, not words."

Savages, indeed, often possess a very complicated grammar, which they use most correctly; and what we call the bad grammar of the less well-educated classes, is often a matter not so much of ignorance, as of local idiom. Moreover, grammar is not generally interesting to children, and this is a point, the importance of which we are, it seems to me, very far from appreciating. In venturing, however, to express these doubts regarding grammar, it will of course be understood that I am only speaking with reference to elementary schools.

As regards history, again, though it is doubtless one of the most important branches of human knowledge, still, as generally taught with a view to the government grant, it seems to combine the respective disadvantages of the multiplication table and the Newgate Calendar, being little better than a list of dates and battles, enlivened by murders and other crimes, with a sprinkling of entertaining stories, most of which are now no longer regarded as authentic, and which we are taught first to believe and afterwards to disbelieve.

We have all heard the proverb, "Happy the nation which has no history." And if this proverb is not equally true of the child who has no history to learn, this at least may be said, that ordinary history is misleading in this respect—that it dwells on periods of war and bloodshed, passing over almost without comment that peaceful progress which brings about the development of nations; for the real condition of a people depends more upon their wisdom in peace than on their success in war.

Let us take the case of Scotch children. The younger and by far the more numerous classes have, under the present code, to study the period from the time of Robert the Bruce to the union of the two crowns.

The history of Scotland during this period, as treated in any of the condensed histories, consists mainly of the long and bloody struggle with England, varied by feuds between the great Scotch clans and nobles.

Of course wars and battles cannot be omitted; it would be as base and ungrateful, as it would be impossible, to exclude Wallace and Bruce from Scotch history. English children, as well as Scotch, thrill with interest as they follow the adventures of Bruce, and burn at the melancholy end of Wallace. It is only when wars and dates are made almost the sole constituents of history, and when history itself is used to exclude other not less important branches of education, that some protest seems to be necessary.

I will take, for instance, MacArthur's "History of Scotland," which was specially prepared for the use of schools, and which is edited by no less eminent an authority than Mr. Freeman.

The part in question begins on page 45, where we have the execution of Wallace, "who was hanged, drawn, and quartered, according to the barbarous practice which was then coming into use in England."

In the following page (46) we have the murder of Red Comyn by Bruce in the church of the Grey Friars.

On page 47 the execution of such of the murderers as could be captured.

P. 48.—The struggles of Bruce.

P. 49.—The Herrying of Buchan and the invasion of Scotland by Edward.

P. 50.—The battle of Bannockburn.

P. 51.—Murder in cold blood of the English garrison in Douglas Castle.

P. 52.—Summary of preceding struggles.

P. 53.—Battle of the Chapter of Mitton.

P. 54.—A general description of border raids.

P. 55.—Intense hatred of everything English and alliance with France.

P. 56.—Death of Black Douglas in a skirmish with the Moors.

P. 57.—Edward Balliol's invasion and battle of Duplin.

P. 58.—Battle of Halidon Hill and that of Neville's Cross.

P. 59.—English inroad known as Burnt Candlemass.

P. 60.—The raid of Otterburn.

P. 61.—Chevy Chase.

P. 62.—Murder of the Wolf of Badenoch and the clan battle near Perth.

P. 63.—Battle of Homildon.

P. 64.—Battle of Harlaw.

P. 65.—Battle of Beaugé and great slaughter of the Scots at the battle of Verncuil.

P. 66.—Burning of John Reseby and his books on a charge of heresy.

P. 67.—Struggle of James I. and his barons.

P. 68.—Treacherous execution of various Highland chieftains.

P. 69.—Murder of King James.

P. 70.—This is a very curious page. There is neither a battle, an execution, nor a murder mentioned in it.

P. 71.—Execution of the murderers of King James.

P. 72.—Judicial murder of William Douglas and his brother.

P. 73.—Murder of MacLellan and Douglas.

P. 74.—Murder of Douglas and battle of Arkinholm.

P. 75.—Siege and destruction of Roxburgh.

P. 76.—Execution of Alexander, son of the Earl of Arran.

P. 77.—Suspected poisoning of the Earl of Mar by King James.

P. 78.—Slaughter of Cochrane and other favourites of King James.

P. 79.—Battle of Sauchieburn and murder of King James.

P. 80.—English intrigues and Highland feuds.

P. 81.—Revolt of Donald Dhu and storming of Carrick Fergus.

P. 82.—Battle of Flodden.

P. 83.—Execution of Lord Home and his brother

P. 84.—Brawls of the Hamiltons and Douglasses.

P. 85.—Storming of Jedburgh.

P. 86.—Execution of John Armstrong and border troubles.

P. 87.—Execution of Lady Glamis, the Master of Forbes, and James Hamilton; war with England.

P. 88.—Battle of Solway Moss.

P. 89.—Intrigues with Henry VIII. and first English invasion.

P. 90.—Second English invasion under Hertford, who appeared just at harvest time “at the head of a motley host, swelled by half-savage Irish and by foreign hirelings, and repeated the wild work of the year before. The invaders attacked and plundered the religious houses. The ruins of Kelso, Melrose, Dryburgh, Roxburgh, and Coldingham still bear witness to their zeal in carrying out the orders of their master. Towns, manors, churches, and between two and three hundred villages were left in ashes behind them. All this misery was wantonly inflicted without winning for Henry a foot of ground or a single new subject.”

P. 91.—Third English invasion; battle of Pinkie.

P. 92.—Murder of Cardinal Beaton.

And so on. In this case I have purposely chosen a history which, as might naturally be expected from Mr. Freeman, is written with the utmost fairness as between England and Scotland. There are others, however, of a very different character. The following extracts are from a History of the country, by Rev. J. Mackenzie, forming a part of “Nelson’s School Series,” and, as we are told, especially adapted for the young. Speaking of the state of things in Wallace’s time the reverend gentleman says :—

“Wasted by the ravages of war, the country suffers miserably from famine. The English lord it insolently and cruelly over us, taking by force whatever they want—beating, wounding, and killing if the owners resist.”

Further on :—

“The English governor took a vile revenge. He seized the wife of Wallace, and had her put to death.”

Then :—

“The English laid a horrid trap for the formidable warrior. They pretended to treat about a peace. Wallace, and a number of the Scottish

lords who had joined him, were invited to a council at the town of Ayr. Thither they went in all knightly faith and trust. The council was to be held in a large wooden building outside the town. Without the building everything looked fair and honest. Inside a large number of soldiers had been secretly stationed. Ropes with running nooses were attached to the rafters. Sir Reginald Crawford, the uncle of Wallace, was the first to enter the infamous trap."

* * * * *

After the capture of Wallace :—

"He was immediately conducted, heavily ironed, to London, where the fierce King waited impatiently for his blood. They put him through a mock trial, and condemned him to die a traitor's death. With his hands chained behind his back, he was dragged on a hurdle to the foot of a high gallows in Smithfield. They hung him up, but cut him down alive. Then they cut out his bowels, and burned them before his face. His head was struck off by the hangman's axe, and his body quartered. The head was set on a pole on London Bridge. His right arm was fixed above the bridge at Newcastle; his left was exposed at Berwick; the right limb was sent to Perth, and the left to Aberdeen. Edward had achieved the object which, for fifteen years—ever since the little maid of Norway died—he had pursued with such deep cunning and such merciless perseverance. Scotland, her freedom crushed, her champion slaughtered, and his body 'hewed as a carcase fit for hounds,' was all his own. Yes; for six months!"

A little later, describing the state of Scotland during the time of Bruce, he says :—

"Scotland was now in a condition such as might turn even a coward's blood to flame. English soldiers kept every castle and town; English sheriffs and other officers exercised a tyrannical mastery in every district. So rapacious, haughty, and spiteful were they, that men's lives were a misery to them to bear. The wives and daughters of Scotsmen were insulted foully; and if any man resented it, an occasion was quickly found for his destruction. If any Scotsman possessed a good horse or hound, or anything else that he valued, some Englishman would seize it; and if the owner resisted, he paid for it with his lands or his life. Many good knights were hanged like felons, on the shallowest pretext or none. The land was full of bitter wrong and shameful scorn."

And speaking of Bruce, he adds :—

"If Providence had not given us that man, Scotland at this day would have been another Ireland."

But if it is so important that Scotch children should be taught to hate the English, why should English children be denied the corresponding advantage of hating the Scotch?

It may indeed be said that if we impress so carefully on the minds of some Scotch children the bloody struggles which took place between England and Scotland, or rather between the kings and barons of the two countries, on the other we bring before the children, in Standards V. and VI., the great progress made by

both since they have been happily united. Unfortunately, however, out of 196,000 children in Scotland who were last year qualified to come up for examination only 12,000 were presented in these latter Standards. Mr. Moseley, in one of his excellent reports to the Education Department, mentions that he had met with many English children who thought that Scotchmen were black. I fear that under our existing system many Scotch children will be educated into the same view as regards the English.

I do not wish to disguise my own opinion that such teaching as that contained in Mr. Mackenzie's history is positively mischievous; but I have no desire to overstate my case, and all I need ask is whether such training is undeniably better than any other. No doubt it may be said that these accounts of wars and battles, of treachery and murders are to a certain extent softened by time and distance. This I fully admit; but from that very fact they lose much of the power they would otherwise possess in an educational point of view. The air of unreality which pervades our whole system is one of its greatest drawbacks. So far from preparing the children for the great battle of life, our schools seem calculated to carry them into another, a dimmer and a duller world: not indeed a fairy-land by any means, but one crowded by difficult abstractions and vague shadows; where the mind is wearied by dates and tables; the conscience seared by crime none the less objectionable because it is gilded by rank; and where the imagination has no more energetic stimulant than the dates of rulers who are mere names, and the names of distant countries to them almost as shadowy as clouds.

If, however, amongst those best qualified to judge there were a general opinion that history, geography, and grammar were not only the best, but the *only* suitable subjects, the case would be very different. But this is not so. There are still great differences on the subject.

Perhaps there have never been more successful village schools than those of Dean Dawes and Mr. Henslow.

In Mr. Henslow's hands botany proved a most excellent subject. This would be no sufficient reason for insisting on its general adoption; but it shows how greatly the interest of a subject depends upon the teacher.

Dean Dawes's school at King's Somborne was the subject of a special report to the Education Department by Mr. Moseley, and to what does Mr. Moseley principally attribute the excellence of the school?

"That feature," he says, "in the King's Somborne school, which constitutes probably its greatest excellence, and to which Mr. Dawes attributes chiefly its influence with the agricultural population around him, is

the union of instruction in a few simple principles of natural science, applicable to things familiar to the children's daily observation—with everything else usually taught in a National School."

Dean Dawes himself, in his excellent "*Suggestive Hints on Secular Instruction in Schools*," dwells most forcibly on the great value of elementary science as a means of education.

"In no way," he says, "can the teachers in our higher class of elementary schools give such a character of usefulness to their instruction, as by qualifying themselves to teach in these subjects; introducing simple and easy experiments, which illustrate the things happening before their eyes every day, and convey convictions with them the moment they are seen and explained. It is a great mistake to suppose that boys of twelve and thirteen years of age cannot understand elementary knowledge of this kind, when brought before them by experiment."*

As regards Mr. Henslow's school, and the botanical instruction so successfully carried on there, Dr. Hooker gave some very interesting evidence before the Public School Commission. Lord Clarendon asked him as to Mr. Henslow's method of instruction:—

"Invariably," said Dr. Hooker, "he made it practical. He made it an objective study. The children were taught to know the plants and to pull them to pieces, and to give their proper names to those parts, to indicate the relation of those parts to one another, and to find out the relation of one plant to another by the knowledge thus obtained."

Lord Clarendon continued—

"Those were children, you say, generally from eight to twelve?—Yes, and up to fourteen.

"And they learnt it readily?—Readily and voluntarily, entirely.

"And were interested in it?—Extremely interested in it. They were exceedingly fond of it.

"Do you happen to know whether Professor Henslow thought that the study of botany developed the faculties of the mind, and that it taught these boys to think; and do you know whether he perceived any improvement in their mental faculties from that?—Yes; he used to think it was the most important agent that could be employed, for cultivating their faculties of observation, and for strengthening their reasoning powers.

"He really thought that he had arrived at a practical result?—Undoubtedly, and so did every one who visited the school or the parish.

"These were children of quite the lower class?—The labouring agricultural class.

"So that the intellectual success of this objective study was beyond question?—Beyond question."

Dr. Hooker went on to say that a child might very well begin natural history at eight or nine years old.

On the same subject Professor Faraday gave also some striking evidence:—

"At my juvenile lectures at Christmas times, I have never found a child too young to understand intelligently what I told him.

* Dawes' *Suggestive Hints*, 198.

"I never yet found a boy who was not able to understand a simple explanation, and to enjoy the point of an experiment."

And (speaking, however, mainly with reference to Public Schools) he adds—

"That the natural knowledge, which has been given to the world in such abundance during the last fifty years, I may say, should remain untouched, and that no sufficient attempt should be made to convey it to the young mind growing up and obtaining its first views of these things, is to me a matter so strange that I find it difficult to understand."

In the year 1868, the House of Commons appointed a committee to consider the present state of scientific instruction in this country. This committee, after taking a great deal of evidence, reported that the opportunities of acquiring a knowledge of elementary science in the National Schools on the Continent are far greater than in this country; and added that the witnesses they examined concurred in considering "that nothing less will suffice here if we are to maintain our position in the van of industrial nations." They recommended therefore, that elementary instruction "in the phenomena of nature," should be introduced into our National Schools.

Again, the Royal Commission so ably presided over by the Duke of Devonshire have reported that in their opinion instruction in the elements of natural science should be made an essential part of the course of instruction in elementary schools. Such lessons, they add, should be devoid of technicality, and confined to such facts as can be brought under the direct observation of the children, the principal object being to give the children an intelligent idea of the more prominent natural phenomena by which they are surrounded.

For the present purpose no evidence can, however, be more important than that of the school inspectors themselves. Now without going beyond last year's Education Report, it will be seen that they have very great doubts—to say no more—on the subject. As regards grammar, for instance, Mr. Blakiston says, "Grammar, as usually taught, seems to me utterly wearisome and unprofitable." Mr. Routledge says he does not underrate its importance, but he disputes "its claim to be treated as the most suitable subject for children, with all its intricacies and subtle refinements." Several other inspectors also express similar views, and so far as I could find, but few of the inspectors expressed themselves distinctly in favour of grammar. So far then from there being any strong and general testimony in favour of grammar, the evidence is rather the other way.

Passing on to history, Mr. Cornish gives as the result of his experience, that this subject has been taught "with very unsatisfactory results;" Mr. Pickard reports that it is taught in many of

the schools under his inspection, "but not with good results;" Mr. Routledge, as the result of his experience tells us that—

"As to the usefulness of teaching detached periods of history, where time is so short, I have my doubts. Scarcely any child remains at school long enough to get more than a very vague notion of history, and it is such a wide and varied subject that a 'century' without any notice of preceding and succeeding events is not very profitable."

Moreover it is remarkable, as showing how much different departments of Government differ even amongst themselves with reference to the choice of subjects, that there is one which is excluded in England, which has not even a place in the list of specific subjects, while it is in Ireland absolutely obligatory. On all hands it is I believe admitted that the Board of Commissioners in Ireland have exercised great wisdom and judgment in the scheme of education which they have introduced into the National Schools of the sister island. Now one of their obligatory subjects is agriculture, for which they have issued an excellent little manual. The children receive simple explanations of the different kinds of soil—clays, sands, &c.; of the advantages of drainage and manure; of the implements and machines used in agriculture; of the principal crops, and the rotation of crops; and the kinds of cattle and stock. Surely this is a very suitable and practical subject for country schools? and would, I cannot help thinking, be more interesting and important to children than some of our English subjects.

Moreover, I may be permitted to point out that her Majesty's Government is not always consistent with itself in this matter, for it is somewhat remarkable that out of fourteen specific subjects which are included in the Scotch code, no less than five, or more than one-third, are excluded from that of England.

But even if the system adopted by Government were absolutely the best, who will maintain that the system which is best for most schools is necessarily best for all? Surely differences of locality, of district, of situation, are sufficient to negative this view. The Government admit this in principle, because in Northumberland they do not propose that the subjects should be the same as in Roxburghshire. But the differences between England and Scotland are not the only ones!

Very much must depend on the schoolmaster. One master may have special gifts in, or knowledge of some particular subject, which it would be most desirable to utilize.

Again, it is, if I may not say probable, at least possible, that in towns where there are special industries or manufactures, the children in the upper standards might with advantage receive some instruction which would lead up to the occupations of their after-life.

Of course we can never expect that the children in elementary schools can be made profound men of science, but on the other hand it is no less true that they do not become eminent grammarians or historians. No doubt, however, among the 2,500,000 children at present in our schools, there are a certain number, who though they may not be able, like Stephenson and Faraday, Newcomen and Watt, to triumph over all obstacles, yet if they had a first start, would make observations and discoveries of real importance to mankind.

But even if history, grammar, and geography be the best subjects, why should they absorb the whole of the time? The classes affected by the provision are five in number, that is to say, they cover five years of school life, and surely *that* is unreasonable. Even admitting that the favoured subjects should come first, ought not other subjects to come somewhere?

It is, however, doubtless true that it is very undesirable to make continual alterations in the code. Lord Sandon urges that for some time, at least, it ought to be allowed to remain in its present state. I quite admit the force of the argument, but deny that it applies to the present case. If the imposition of any new restrictions or any fresh conditions were suggested, there would be much weight in the objection; but in this case we only wish to restore a power which the local authorities possessed until last year, and which they are admitted to have exercised with sound discretion. Those managers who do not notice the change would not be affected by it, so that it cannot by any possibility lead to inconvenience or confusion.

The second objection is that the pupils in the training colleges are already sufficiently, if not too heavily taxed. I refer to this because it was urged against me in the House of Commons; but it is merely necessary for me to point out that the alterations in the code which I suggest would really require no alteration whatever in the curriculum of the training colleges, nor put any additional strain on the teachers.

It is unnecessary for me to enlarge on the other points to which I have referred. The arguments which apply to the first apply also to the others, and I have, in fact, already been compelled to refer to them incidentally. Why should not the local authorities, acting, as they have done, and would no doubt continue to do, in consultation with her Majesty's inspectors of schools, be permitted to select, in addition to reading, writing, and arithmetic, such other subjects as they may deem best? Why should a subject be compulsory in one part of the United Kingdom and excluded in another? Why should agriculture, for instance, be compulsory in Ireland and forbidden in England? and why should the subjects comprised under the head of domestic economy be restricted to girls?

Then as regards the system of teaching, surely more latitude might well be left to school committees. Take, for instance, the case of botany. The following are the rules laid down by the department:—

“1st year. Characters of the root, stem, leaves, and parts of the flower, illustrated by specimens of common flowering plants.

“2nd year. Structure of wood, bark, and pith. Cells and vessels. Food of plants, and manner in which a plant grows. Functions of the root, leaves, and different parts of the flower.

“3rd year. The comparison of a germ and a moss with a flowering plant. The formation of different kinds of fruits. The structure of a bean, and of a grain of wheat or barley. The phenomena of germination.”

It will be observed that this system differs considerably from that recommended by Dr. Hooker. Still I would not so much criticize the actual proposals as deprecate the institution of fixed rules on such points.

There is, in conclusion, one other argument which I am anxious to bring forward. Every one will certainly admit that centralization is in itself objectionable. Perhaps, however, this is peculiarly the case in matters relating to education. It is most desirable that we should induce the very best men and women to serve on school boards; but in order to secure them we must not interfere with them more than can possibly be avoided. We must leave them a real interest and responsibility; but if all control over the system of education pursued in the school is practically taken out of their hands, we certainly diminish very considerably the interest they would otherwise feel, and thereby tend greatly to impair the efficiency of our schools. A late Minister of Education in France is said to have boasted that when he looked at his watch he could tell what every child in an elementary school was doing at that moment; but surely such centralization is quite contrary to the traditions of our Government and the convictions of Englishmen.

However this may be, every one knows that there are the greatest differences of opinion as to the best system of Education. To many it seems that our present methods rely too much on memory and too little on thought; that they make too much use of books, too little of things; that they sacrifice education to instruction; that they confuse book-learning with real knowledge; that instead of training the mind to act with freedom and judgment, they choke the machinery of the brain with a dry dust of facts, which at best are but committed to memory, instead of becoming a part and parcel of the child.

This is peculiarly the case with the children in our national schools. **I**ate, our main object should be to train,

rather than to teach the child. Suppose a boy leaves one of our village schools at twelve or thirteen. He may know the date of the birth, accession, and death of every one of our Sovereigns from the time of William the Conqueror, he may be able to parse any sentence, he may be invincible at a spelling bee; but if you have given him no intellectual tastes, your school has to him been useless.

There are, however, as I have attempted to show, very different opinions as to how these tastes may best be cultivated and utilized, and under these circumstances it is surely most undesirable to impose one stereotyped system on the whole country. If, on the other hand, with the improved system of payment introduced by Lord Sandon, the power which they hitherto possessed were restored to the school boards and committees, they would be able in certain cases to adapt their schools, or some of them, to local specialities, they would be in a position to avail themselves of any peculiar power on the part of the schoolmaster, and we should gradually ascertain what system does on the whole most tend to develop the moral character and intellectual powers of the children.

Once more let me repeat that I do not wish to make the instruction given in elementary schools more difficult or more abstruse; quite the contrary—my object is to make it more practical, more real, and more lifelike.

At present the education given in our elementary schools is practically limited to the rudiments of arithmetic, outlines of states and names of towns, to grammatical rules, and the series of crimes and accidents which is misnamed history. We should surely endeavour to give the children some information with reference to the beautiful world in which we live, the commoner animals and plants of our woods and fields, some explanations as to the common phenomena of nature, the causes of summer and winter, of the phases of the moon, the nature of the sun and stars, the properties of air and water, the character of soils, some elementary knowledge of light and heat, of the rudiments of mechanics, &c.

Such information—elementary, but not superficial—would be intensely interesting to children, would make them think, and be a valuable addition to the abstract rules of arithmetic, and to the book-learning which now reigns supreme.

I hope I shall not be thought pertinacious in urging these views, but I have done so in the conviction that, without undervaluing our present system of inspection and examination, the real mode of making our elementary schools most conducive to the good of the country is to make them most interesting to the children.


What children know when they leave school is comparatively

unimportant. The real question is whether you have given them a wish for knowledge and the power of acquiring it. That which they have learned will soon be lost if it is not added to. The great thing is to interest them, and make them wish when they leave school to continue their education ; not so much to teach them, as to make them wish to teach themselves. Unfortunately our system of education has too often the very opposite effect ; and under it the acquirement of knowledge becomes an effort rather than a pleasure. I have been goodnaturedly criticized, both in the House of Commons and out of it, as an enthusiast on this subject, but every one who loves children must know how eager they are for information, how they long to understand the facts of nature, how every bird and beast and flower is a wonder and a pleasure to them.

Hitherto I have treated the subject mainly from an utilitarian point of view, and with reference to what studies would be most effective in developing the faculties and intellect of the children. I cannot conclude without a very brief reference to another side of the question. It is impossible to remove the vast difference in wealth and luxury which has existed in all civilized nations between different classes of the community. But the truest happiness and the most real pleasures are, or might be, within the reach of all.

Books cost little, and nature is free to all. Gibbon is said to have declared that he would not exchange the love of reading for all the treasures of India ; Mr. Trevelyan in his charming *Life of Macaulay*, tells us, as is indeed evident enough, that it was "a main element of happiness in one of the happiest lives which it has ever fallen to the lot of a biographer to record." Others, again, prefer the book of Nature to those of Man. Under a wiser system of elementary education the dreary existence of mechanics in towns might be brightened ; the agricultural labourer might have opened to him a new world of interest in his daily pursuits ; and thus lives, monotonous with daily toil, and in the want of interest and variety too often brutalized by coarse indulgence or cruel amusements, might feel the refining influence of beauty and the still more elevating power of truth.

JOHN LUBBOCK.



ON THE REVISION OF THE ENGLISH NEW TESTAMENT.

"Let us pursue the inquiry, not in relation to all ideas, but the multitude of them should confuse us, but let us select a few of those which are reckoned to be the principal ones."—PLATO, Sophist. p. 254.

II.

THE Authorized Version has been for more than two centuries and a half in the hands and minds of the people, and is the result of the joint labours, not only of the translators appointed by King James, but also of many of the best intellects during the preceding eighty or ninety years, which are of all years the most important in the history of English literature. It is hardly conceivable that a work of this kind should be superseded. The version, in all its ramifications, has become a second original; and the difficulty of moving any part of a growth which branches out so widely is like the difficulty which attends the alteration of the alphabet or of the orthography of a language. It becomes a sort of political question, what degree of alteration will be accepted; and there is, besides, the question of good taste—how, in removing inaccuracies and obscurities, to preserve the general tone and colouring of one of the greatest monuments of our language. Considering the excellence and nobleness of the existing version, its general faithfulness and accuracy, its vernacular raciness, its richness and variety of diction, its dignity, freedom, and harmony of style, considering also the extent to which it has become a part of the English mind, it is evident that a new translation could never compete with the old, either in real excellence, so far as the style and impressiveness are concerned, or in popular influence. The preservation of the general form and character of the Authorized Version is therefore a point of wisdom, and, indeed, a practical

necessity. And yet all must wish that the real meaning should be conveyed to the English reader, and there are many places of greater or less importance in which this has been missed. How can the necessary change be made, without either making the improved * version repulsive to those to whom the old is familiar, or, what is equally to be deprecated, breaking the legitimate hold which the English Scriptures have on the minds and affections of the people? Some kind of compromise appears inevitable, not by way of accommodation to religious prejudices, but for the retention of the familiar style and language, and for the harmony of the work; and the nature of the compromise to be adopted should be very carefully weighed, with full consciousness of the real practical object, viz., that the knowledge which the few possess may become the common property of all. It may seem, at first sight, as if there could be no limit to the changes which should be made in rendering every line perfectly accurate and intelligible; but in practice it would soon be found that by aiming at minute exactness more is lost in beauty than is gained in truth, and that the result of such endeavours is less worthy of the great original than is the existing version. It is also to be observed, that of the changes which have been demanded by verbal scholars, some appear to depend on a mistaken notion of exactness, and others are of very slight importance; while it may happen that the scholar who is also a theologian may "strain out the gnat and swallow the camel"—may introduce a great number of small changes, and, in places which have acquired a doctrinal value, may find some ingenious defence of the existing version or of the orthodox text.

Here are two things to be avoided. First, because religion naturally hangs to the past, the mere modernism of a new translation, or of a revision in which the alterations were very numerous, would offend the taste and feeling of the people. The old Bible might be to some extent discredited, but the new Bible would never make its way; and the result would be more harm than good. Secondly, if the attention of the revisers is dissipated over the field of minutiae, it seems to be not impossible that some differences of the greatest moment may escape discussion, or may at least be treated much too lightly, by being placed on a level with insignificant and even imaginary errors. The obvious inference on both these grounds is, that attention should, in the first place, be concentrated on the important passages; and that in a work which is confessedly one of revision, and not of retranslation, only those words should be altered, as a general rule, which are likely to occasion some misconception of the real meaning and teaching of the It is a task like

* The word

that of restoring one of our old cathedrals, in which it is not right to set aside the special knowledge of our own day, and yet it is essential to enter with full sympathy into the spirit of those by whom the fabric was first reared. We wish to give people a more intelligent idea of the Bible, to dispel or modify superstitious fancies which interfere with its true influence and use, but not rudely to disturb the hallowed associations which have grown together with the natural affection of the people for the book which has been called "the religion of Protestants."

The inference is that the most important passages should first be taken in hand.

But what passages are most important? In attempting to determine this, we are met by the theory of verbal inspiration. It is openly or tacitly argued that, if the letter of Scripture is inspired, then every portion is of equal value. This superstitious feeling, combined with the kindred habit of proving doctrines from Scripture, has an influence that is not quite salutary on the idea of revision. For, first, it makes men jealous of a degree of freedom in translation that would be acknowledged as perfectly legitimate in the case of other books; and so impairs the idiomatic tone of the version. Secondly, it lends additional force to the pedantic love of unreal distinctions and refinements in interpretation, by seeming to give a sort of infinite importance to every "jot and tittle" of the sacred writings. And, thirdly, when it comes to be acknowledged that very numerous changes have to be made, in deference to early authorities, in the original text, the spirit that has clung so tenaciously to the traditional readings will now plead that the true text, which is believed to be nearest to the *ipsissima verba* of revelation, must be followed, in any revision, into the minutest detail. Either all must be changed, or none. Thus the prejudices of the theologian reinforce the prejudices of the scholar, and threaten to hinder the kind of revision that is really called for.

But the reviser, who is simply actuated by the desire to bring the real meaning of Scripture nearer to the minds of the people, and to make the knowledge of the few practicably available for the many, will be most interested in removing the errors which are most likely to mislead the reader and to give a false impression of the meaning: (1) as affecting doctrine and Church discipline; (2) as affecting Christian life and practice; (3) as representing the actual teachings of Christ. And here arises a distinction, to which allusion has already been made. The question of doctrine **must** enter into the selection of the kind of passages which **are chiefly** to be considered in revision. But the question **of doctrine** is to be rigidly excluded from the actual work of **translation**. This involves no contradiction. The deeper is our

interest in theology and in the history of doctrine, the more earnestly we shall desire to separate between the question, what was originally meant by Apostles and Evangelists and by the recorded words of Christ, from the further question, what application of that meaning to modern experience and controversy is legitimate. Of course in making any change the reviser ought to be fully alive to the consequences probably involved. But when Revision has once become a public question, it is right that people should clearly know the extent of change in passages affecting doctrine which is required by the truth of fact; and it would be a poor and shuffling policy, in reopening a great subject after 260 years, to trim the work to the level of contemporary popular criticism, which has shifted more than once in a generation. The Biblical critic and interpreter ought of all other men to be most aware that what was once great in his subject has become small, and that what is now whispered in the ear in closets will ere long be proclaimed upon the house-tops.

This canon, then, is to be observed. Attention is chiefly to be directed to those passages which have been thought to relate to the doctrines and discipline of the Church, and to the principles of the Christian life, and which may consequently have been affected by the growth of dogma, or by the course of Church history. Further, the history of the Church and of theology is to be taken into the account in criticizing the existing version of each passage. But in determining the meaning which is finally to be assigned to each, regard is to be had solely to the ideas and circumstances which were present to the mind of the original writers, without deference to Patristic authority or the supposed requirements of dogma, whether Nicene, or Athanasian, or Catholic, or Evangelical, or Calvinist, or Rationalist.

There are some large classes of proposed alterations which will appear unnecessary, if the principles which are here stated should be received.

1. Great fault has been found with the translators for so frequently translating the same word in Greek by different words in English, and for justifying this practice in their preface to the reader : *—

* See, however, Archbishop Trench, on Revision, p. 22 :—"The rule, however theoretically good, is discovered, when the application of it is attempted, to be one which it is wholly impossible to carry out. If this has ever been proposed as an inflexible law, it must have been on the assumption that words in one language cover exactly the same spaces of meaning which other words do in another; that they have exactly the same many-sidedness, the same elasticity, the same power of being applied for or evil, for honour or for shame. But nothing is further from the case. Words are from the great outfield of meanings; but different languages have enclosed them, as chance, or design, or the deeper instincts unconsciously at work are determined; and words in different languages, which are precisely incommensurate with one another, are much rarer than we incuriously

"We have not tied ourselves to an uniformity of phrasing, or an identity of words, as some peradventure would wish that we had done, because they observe that some learned men somewhere have been as exact as they could that way. Truly, that we might not vary from the sense of that which we had translated before, if the word signified the same in both places (for there be some words be not of the same sense everywhere) we were especially careful, and made a conscience according to our duty. But that we should express the same notion in the same particular word: as, for example, if we translate the Hebrew or Greek word once by *purpose*, never to call it *intent*; if onewhere *journeying*, never *travelling*; if onewhere *think*, never *suppose*; if onewhere *pain*, never *ache*; if onewhere *joye*, never *gladness*, &c.; thus to mince the matter, we thought to savour more of curiosity than wisdom, and that rather it would breed scorn in the atheist, than bring profit to the godly reader. For is the kingdom of God become words or syllables? why should we be in bondage to them, if we may be free, use one precisely, when we may use another no less fit as commodiously? We might also be charged (by scoffers) with some unequal dealing towards a great number of good English words. For as it is written of a certain great philosopher, that he should say, that those logs were happy that were made images to be worshipped; for their fellows, as good as they, lay for blocks behind the fire; so if we should say, as it were, unto certain words, 'Stand up higher, have a place in the Bible always,' and to others of like quality, 'Get ye hence, be banished forever,' we might be taxed peradventure with St. James's words, namely, 'To be partial in ourselves and judges of evil thoughts.'"

They have certainly carried this principle or fashion in translation to an extreme. In this they followed Tyndale, who, in his strong desire to give an immediate and vivid impression of the meaning, taxed to the utmost the resources of the vernacular English of which he had so great a command. But, although their course would not be followed by scholars at the present day if the question were one of a new translation, it is not wholly indefensible, and even their quaint ironical reason, "that they might else be charged with unequal dealing," may be understood in a sense which is not altogether irrational. Great writers have instinctively made the composite nature of the English language the occasion of variety of diction. With an increasing abhorrence of tautology, they have learned to veil repetitions by the use of synonymous words. And, as no two words can be exactly identical in all the associations which they suggest, the variety so introduced is not apparent merely, but does really enrich the style. In the Greek of the New Testament, on the other hand, the same word is often found to recur with slight variations of significance, and while there is often no one word in English which perfectly reflects any one of the different shades of meaning, it is hardly ever possible to find one whose changes correspond to the changes in the Greek. Hence to keep to the same word, where there is the slightest difference of meaning, is not to preserve the meaning, but to force the Greek word into a different meaning. The familiar words of Bentley on this subject are still worth quoting:—

“In all tongues whatever, a word of a moral or political signification, containing several complex ideas arbitrarily joined together,* has seldom any corresponding word in any other language which extends to all those ideas : nay, in the same language most moral words, by tract of time and instability of common use, either lose or gain some of their ideas, and have a narrower or larger meaning in one age than another. Physical words, indeed, as *ἥλιος*, *σελήνη*, *θάλασσα*, whose significations are uncompounded and immutable, may be always expressed by sun, moon, sea ; but the other sort ought not and cannot, without great ambiguity and absurdity.”

With respect to this point, the following general rules may be suggested :—

(1.) That word is to be chosen which expresses most nearly the meaning of the original word in the particular context.

(2.) In the case of words having a uniform meaning, especially those approaching to a technical use, regard must be had to the way in which the word has been translated in other passages, and consistency must be maintained so far as this can be reconciled with perspicuity and faithfulness.

(3.) Within the limits of a single passage, verbal references must be as far as possible preserved, and where the same word is intentionally repeated, even in different senses, some attempt should be made to give effect to this.

But (4) this is not always possible. There are passages, especially in the writings of St. Paul, in which verbal correspondences have to be sacrificed in order to give full expression to the subtle gradations of thought.

How much is to be given to each of these considerations where they conflict, is a question which, like many others, must be determined by the translator's tact.

In revising, there is also the further question, whether, when the variation of diction exceeds the limits permitted by these rules, the consequent misconception is sufficiently important to justify change.

For instance, when *αἰώνιος* is translated in successive clauses “everlasting” and “eternal,” the reviser, having in view some recent controversies, may think it worth while to restore the uniformity of the original, whether he choose the Saxon, or (as is more likely) the Latin word. But when *Ἄρειος πάγος* in Acts xvii. 19, 22, is translated both “Areopagus” and “Mars’ hill,” he will remember that he is dealing with a monument of the English language, and will hesitate to deface unnecessarily one of its characteristic features.

There are a few important words whose exact meaning in the New Testament is extremely difficult to define, and which are not consistently represented in the English translation. *Διαθήκη* is sometimes “covenant,” sometimes “testament;” † *καταλλαγή* in

* It is interesting to observe in this passage the influence of the philosophy of Locke.

† “Dispensation” wou'd, in some cases, be a better word than either.

Rom. v. 11 is "atonement," in Rom. xi. 15 "reconciliation;" *παράκλητος* wavers between "Advocate" and "Comforter." The difference of the connection sometimes renders a different translation necessary, and the associations suggested are not everywhere the same. Though some places may be altered for the sake of consistency, others would still remain intractable. The best approach to a solution of this perhaps insoluble difficulty is through the use of the margin.

2. The translators are also accused of the opposite error of obliterating distinctions. And there are a few very obvious instances of this, in which the touch of the reviser will certainly be required. In Rom. iii. 25, the translation, "for the remission of sins that are past," the confusion of *ἀπομιση* "remission," with *παράσι* "passing over," obscures an important point of the Apostle's argument. That is the reason why God manifests forth His righteousness, because formerly He had hidden Himself, and seemed not to observe sin: "the times of that ignorance God winked at, but now commands all men everywhere to repent." There was a moral necessity which made the old dispensation the cause of the new one. God was not willing that men should be for ever ignorant of His true nature. The translation of *ζῷον* (living creature) and *θῆρ*, in the Apocalypse, by the same word "beast," is a great blemish, and one easily removed. And in the eleventh chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, the confusion of "judgment," "condemnation," and "damnation" (although the importance of this may easily be exaggerated), has given so much offence that a new translation of the whole passage may be advisable.

But there are minor distinctions which are often necessarily left out of sight in translation; and it would generally be unwise in the reviser to dwell much on these, especially considering the texture of the original language, and the relation which it bears to the thought. The difference between *μάταιος* "groundless," and *κενός* "without effect," in 1 Cor. xv. 17, 14, was hardly present to the Apostle's mind. He is varying his language, as when in Rom. v. 7, he resumes the words "a righteous man" by an equivalent phrase "the good man." The distinction of *δύναμις* and *ἐξουσία* ("power" and "authority") which the Genevan version strove in some places to establish, is nowhere emphasized, and need not be marked, seeing that both meanings are included in the English "power." The context generally shows what kind of power, whether inherent or delegated, is meant. A similar observation may be made respecting *λατρεύειν* and *προσκυνεῖν* (Acts vii. 42, 43). In such cases the prudent reviser will be sparing of change. A more important distinction, which has sometimes been obliterated, is that between "disobedience" and "unbelief,"

ἀπειθεία and *ἀπιστία*. But, it should be remembered, this was less clearly marked amongst the first Christians than amongst ourselves, though it may be admitted that the translation here bears some traces of the peculiar doctrines of the Reformation.

3. The right method of dealing with obsolete or obsolescent words has been well stated by Archbishop Trench :—

“Where words have become perfectly unintelligible to the great body of those for whom the translation is made, they ought clearly to be exchanged for others. Of these, however, there is hardly one in the New Testament. There is, indeed, in it no inconsiderable amount of archaism, but of a quite different character; words which, while they are felt by our people to be old and unusual, are yet, if I do not deceive myself, perfectly understood by them, by wise and simple, educated and uneducated alike. These, shedding round the sacred volume the reverence of age, removing it from the ignoble associations which will often cleave to the language of the day, should on no account be touched.” (P. 50.)

There are, however, as he remarks, some obsolete uses of words, such as “carriages,” in Acts xxi. 15; the preposition “by,” 1 Cor. iv. 4; “nephews” for “grandchildren,” in 1 Tim. v. 4; “occupy” for “trade,” Luke xix. 13; “by-and-by” for “immediately,” Luke xxi. 9, Mark vi. 25, which are misleading, and should be removed.

4. The translators are frequently accused of being ignorant of the niceties of Greek grammar. It is true that we have attained to a degree of certainty on some minute points, which was impossible for the early scholars. But what is gained in minuteness is sometimes apt to be lost in breadth; and the scholar of the future, if he should carry his minuteness so far as to look into what may be called the “literature” of Mr. Granville Sharp’s rule, and to compare it with a page of the Commentary of Erasmus, or even of Beza, will hardly be impressed with the advance in Greek scholarship which three centuries had produced in England. When Middleton says that Erasmus did not know much Greek, this is not to be taken on his authority. It has, indeed, been customary with English scholars to exalt the learning of Bentley and Porson over that of the sixteenth century. But the first editing of Greek books was a greater work than the emending of them; and, even amongst emendations, a larger proportion of those of Stephens have stood the test of time than of those of Bentley. Winer, in speaking of the New Testament, justly says of Beza and us of these two excellent Greek scholars are more than is commonly supposed, and are, on the whole, the truth than those of many later com-

There are some points about the use of the article, belonging rather to language generally than to Greek in particular, which were regarded as novelties in scholarship at the beginning of the present century (in England); and yet were clearly known, not only to Beza, but to Erasmus, who was, further, aware of the possibility of exceptions to such rules. In this he was in advance of scholars like Middleton. It may be admitted as probable that the habit of commenting in Latin made interpreters sometimes oblivious of the exact force of the Greek aorist, and that some shades of meaning in other tenses were apt to be overlooked. But in applying this remark to Tyndale, who was on a level with the most advanced scholarship of his day, we must take into the account his peculiar genius for perceiving differences of idiom; and it must remain doubtful whether some peculiarities of our version, which have been ascribed to mistranslation, are not rather to be accounted for by the fact that the English idiom is habitually less precise in some things than the Greek. And it may be observed once more, that in the work of revision, the views of the scientific scholar, who (like Plato's minute dialectician, *Sophist.* p. 227) honours all distinctions alike, whether important or not, are to be modified by other considerations.

a. In the omission of particles, the English version has often shown good judgment. The English idiom is neither adversative nor illative in the same degree with the Greek, and, in analyzing the reasoning of the Epistles, it must also be borne in mind that the later Greek is overlaid with particles, and that the form of the language is getting the better of the substance. This has not only affected the idiom of the original in some places, but there are others, in which the particles which Tyndale neglected have since been found to be absent from the earlier MSS.

b. There is no point in the minute verbal criticism of the New Testament which requires more careful treatment than the meanings of the prepositions. How much is to be attributed to Hebrew and Aramaic associations, how much to the peculiar nature of the subject and to thoughts which were otherwise incommunicable, how much to the tendency of the later Greek to analytical modes of expression, how much to the reversion of the declining stock of language to an earlier type, are some of the subtle questions which here call for practical solution. This part of his work will severely test the highest qualities of the reviser, requiring at once the most perfect apprehension of the Hellenistic idiom, and also of the degree in which Scriptural modes of thought and speech can be made appreciable in English. But there will probably remain many places, even amongst those which have been called in question, in which the best practical course in revision will be to leave the present Authorized Version untouched.

c. The assertion of Middleton, that the use of the article in the New Testament corresponds to that of the Attic prose writers, would, in the present day, be generally admitted to be unphilosophical and misleading. And that the rules of classical Greek were not always perfectly observed by Hellenistic peoples, is in effect admitted by Origen, when, in commenting on John i. 1, he says that the Apostle used the article with Hellenic accuracy, Ἑλληνικῇ ἀκριβολογίᾳ. Any interpreter of the New Testament must of course account for the presence or absence of the article in each instance; but, in doing so, he is not, any more than the interpreter of Pindar, to be bound by the rules of Attic prose. The translator has, further, to consider how far the precise shade of meaning which the interpreter has brought out can be expressed in English without injury to the idiomatic texture, and to the proportion and harmony of his work. And, besides all this, the reviser who wishes not to alter the existing version without sufficient cause, will ask himself, Is the change, which would have found place in a new translation, important enough to be necessarily adopted in revision?

Recent scholars have shown more disposition than those of a former generation to adopt the only method which can possibly throw fresh light upon this subject, by studying the New Testament usage within the limits of the New Testament, without reference either to Patristic interpretation or classical usage.* But it should be remembered by them that, since the beginning of the present century, no philological question has been so much influenced in this country by theological controversy. Until suggestions of doctrinal consequences are thrown to the winds, there is no hope that the truth of this matter, which is, after all, a simple one, will be clearly seen.

The question may fairly be raised, whether it would not often have been possible to preserve in the translation something more of the *naïveté* and picturesqueness of the original Greek, by rendering, for example, in John xiii. 5, "the bason" (in which the hands were washed before the meal); in Matt. xiii. 3, "the sower;" Mark x. 25, "the eye of the needle;" *ibid.* iv. 38, "the pillow" (which was part of the furniture of the ship); in Matt. xxvi. 26, "the bread;" in Matt. v. 15, &c., "the bushel," "the candlestick" (or "lamp-stand"); Heb. ix. 19, "the blood of the bulls and goats;" as well as in Matt. v. 1, Luke vi. 12, John vi. 3, "the mountain;" and "the ship" in many passages of the Gospels. But in most, if not all, of these passages, it would be found on trial that to translate in this way is to disregard essential differences of

* This was in fact the course followed by Mr. Granville Sharp. But he was diffident of his own method, and his rules were not accepted until they were confirmed by Patristic authority (Wordsworth's Six Letters) and classical usage (Middleton).

idiom. That is to say, the concrete form of expression which, in the Greek of the New Testament, is perfectly natural, and has a beauty of its own, would, if transplanted to the English version, produce an effect of quaintness and rusticity quite different from the impression which is conveyed by the original words.* For the same reason, it is unnecessary to alter the translation of John iii. 10, "Art thou a master of Israel?" or of John v. 35, "He was a burning and a shining light;" or of Rom. v. 7, "For a good man some would even dare to die;" or of Matt. viii. 12, "There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth."

Where there is any reason to suspect that in omitting the article the translators were dealing unfairly with the original, as in Mark xiv. 69, where, apparently in order to harmonize the narrative (in one point at least) with Matt. xxvi. 69, 71, *ἡ παιδίσκη* is translated "a maid-servant," there should be no hesitation in making the necessary alteration. But the reviser should pause before altering passages, where the translators may really have been guided by their higher sense of the requirements of their own language. It is doubtful whether even Bentley was justified in his criticism of the translation of Rom. v. 15—19, in which *ὁ ἓξ* and *οἱ πολλοί* are rendered "one" and "many." (Cp. 2 Cor. ii. 17.) It does not seem likely that the translators had here any doctrinal bias, for they have omitted the article in similar expressions in quite a different connection; and when the articles are inserted throughout, as in the version of Dean Alford, the effect is far from pleasing, or even clearly intelligible, to the English reader, who rather expects "the one" to be followed by "the other," and is apt to imagine that the same person is meant by "the one" in both places.

With regard to the omission of the article, the once-vaunted rule of Granville Sharp,† that two nouns united under the vinculum of a single article must be attributes of one and the same subject (a rule insisted on by Beza, and in general terms by Erasmus long before), was soon found, first by the candid investigation of Mr. Sharp himself, and afterwards by the superior scholarship of Middleton, to be subject to such serious limitations as to make the whole question somewhat precarious.

The principle of Middleton's concessions (which it has since been found necessary to carry further) amounts to this, that the rule must be assumed to hold, except where the nature of the subject makes it evident that two things or persons are spoken of;

* For instance, to infer from the article in John v. 35 that the object of the Evangelist is to contrast the Baptist with the Saviour—"the lamp that is lighted and shineth" with the "Light of the World"—is surely to introduce, or at least to emphasize, an antithesis that is not equally present in the original.

† Remarks on the Use of the Definitive Article in the Greek Text of the New Testament, containing many New Proofs of the Divinity of Christ, from Passages which are wrongly translated in the Common English Version. (Third edition, 1808; first in 1798.)

in which case the repetition of the article is not absolutely required. But this principle extends to the case of proper names, and of those words expressing titles and attributes which are approaching to the condition of proper names. The application of this remark to Eph. v. 5, and Tit. ii. 13, will be considered afterwards.

d. Another "fault of grammar" with which the translators are charged is the frequent confusion of tenses, and especially of the aorist and perfect. And it is true that there are many passages in which the aorist is translated by the perfect, the perfect by the past, the historical present by the past, and even the present participle by the future. These must certainly be considered in revision. But the reviser (unless his work is to be mechanical) must distinguish between those places in which the translators have clearly mistaken the force of the tense, and those in which they may have been guided by the English idiom. Of what was idiomatic or harmonious in their own language, they will be admitted to have been no mean judges. Now, there is this difference between Greek and English in speaking of past time, that in English the simple preterite or past tense is only used when the time of the action, whether momentary or continuous, is distinctly apprehended: the Greek aorist is often used when the point of time referred to is only known by implication, or, as in the gnomic use, is merely imaginary. Hence, when an act is spoken of absolutely as completed, without distinct reference to the time at which it was done, this is expressed in Greek by the aorist, in English by the perfect tense. Apply this to those passages in St. Paul's writings in which he uses the aorist to describe the work of salvation as ideally summed up in a single act; and it will be found that to substitute the preterite for the perfect tense in our translation is to weaken the sense, by destroying the absoluteness of the expression, and changing the language of ideal certainty into that of a mere chronicle of external facts. For this reason, even in 2 Cor. v. 14, where the transition from the past tense to the *pluperfect* in the English version has certainly perverted the sense, it would be better to substitute the perfect in both parts of the verse. "If one has died for all, then all have died."

A word may here be said in defence of the rendering of τοὺς σωζομένους in Acts ii. 47, "The Lord added to the church daily such as should be saved." This has been thought to have a Predestinarian colouring. It is really due to Tyndale's theory of the Hebraic use of the present participle for the future, which also led him to translate τὸ αἷμα τὸ ἐμὸν τὸ ἐκχυννόμενον "my blood which shall be shed." But, apart from any notion of Hebraism, the use of the present participle to designate a class of persons, without

reference to present time, is not unknown to classical Greek,* and affords the most natural explanation of this verse, as of 1 Cor. i. 18, "The preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness, but unto us which are saved it is the power of God." And in the particular context, it would be difficult to express this meaning otherwise than Tyndale has done.

These remarks may serve to indicate the kind of alterations which are either hurtful or unnecessary, in a revision of the Authorized Version. There still remain some preliminary questions to be disposed of. These are the questions:—(1) of proper names, (2) of division into chapters and verses, (3) of the chapter-headings, (4) of the chronology, (5 and 6) of marginal references and notes, (7) of punctuation, and (8) of the use of italics.

1. Consistency should be observed in the orthography of proper names, when they recur within the limits of the New Testament. The same word is not to be represented in one place by Luke, in another by Lucas—in one place by Marcus, in another by Mark. In choosing between the Anglicized form and that which is nearer to the Greek, the reviser will have to balance between his respect for the spirit of the old translation and the requirements of the modern reader, to whom the idea of differences of times and countries is more familiar than to the Englishman of the seventeenth century. In a few instances, like John, Mary, James—perhaps, also, those of the first three Evangelists—he will find that the English forms have become inseparable from the persons spoken of; in others, he will be inclined to prefer the original, or rather the Latin, spelling—Urbanus, Timotheus.

There is, however, a further question. Is the principle of uniformity to be extended to the whole Bible? Are Old Testament names, when they recur in the Greek of the New Testament, to be retranslated into their Hebrew or Anglicized Hebrew form? There may seem to be a contradiction in deprecating too close an adherence to the Greek idiom, and yet recommending the retention of Grecized proper names, such as Elias, Eliseus, Rachab. But it is one thing to require that nothing shall interfere with the idiomatic purity and freedom of the style, and quite another to suggest that many readers may gain something by being reminded of the great changes that had passed over the East between the Captivity and the coming of Christ. The point is not one of first-rate importance, but it suggests a consideration which has an important bearing on the whole subject. The public for whom the revision is intended is in some respects different from that which Tyndale had in his eye. He worked for the uneducated.

* Plat. Soph. 265 d. τῶν εἰς τὸν ἑκείνῃ χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξαζόντων.

The translator or reviser of the present day has to consider even more carefully the requirements of a people who are in process of education. This is a further development of the principle of Protestantism. The attempt to popularize some of the negative results of criticism was met some years since with the observation that such things were needless for the educated, while to the uneducated they were unintelligible. But such an *abscissio infiniti*, however suited to the age of Spinoza, is totally inapplicable to the present condition of society. Those who are invited to an intelligent study of the English Bible in the present day have many channels of instruction opened to them which to Tyndale's (and Erasmus') ploughman were hopelessly closed. The benefits of the translation must still extend to those who are lowest in the scale of knowledge; but, in forming an estimate of the average reader, account must be taken of the great number of persons who have been partly educated, and also of the fact which we may regret, but cannot ignore, that there is a large and increasing class who in other respects are highly educated, but are ignorant of Greek.

To return from this digression to the question of proper names. Where the difference is such as to occasion serious confusion to the reader (as in Jesus for Joshua, in Heb. iv. 8), or where there is real difficulty in identifying the name (as, perhaps, in Oziab), it would be well to return to the Old Testament form. In others the Greek form should be consistently retained.

2. Is the revised translation to be "without note or comment?" Although favoured by a capricious humour of King James,* experience has shown that it was a wise instinct that prompted this condition for the Authorized Version. A good translation is more permanent than any popular commentary can be. It is true that the Geneva notes were prized by the people; but this was partly because they fell in with the religious temper of the age. A commentary of the seventeenth century (like the pictures which so long enlivened the Apocalypse) would now be felt to be a far greater encumbrance to our Bibles than any errors of translation. And this may teach us the wisdom of giving the revised translation to the public without remark.

The principle of "the Bible without note or comment" should, in one way, be carried further than at present, though there is another way in which it might be carried out less absolutely than is now done in our smaller Bibles.

The Bible is not "without comment," so long as the sense is broken by the division into chapters and verses, and especially while the present headings are allowed to remain.

* His indignation
to have killed his!

King Aza ought

The former objection is easily met, as in our paragraph Bibles, by placing the numbers at the side of the page. The division into paragraphs, which is still necessary for convenient reading, must be left to the discretion of the revisers; unless they follow the *pericopæ* of the earliest MSS.

3. With regard to the chapter-headings, it is to be observed that those which run along the top of each page are of no authority, having been altered in successive issues to suit the paging, while those at the beginning of each chapter contain many questionable interpretations which happened to be current in the Churches of the Reformation. It is enough to quote the headings of the first chapter of Canticles.

"1 The Church's love unto Christ. 5 She confesseth her deformity, 7 and prayeth to be directed to his flock. 8 Christ directeth her to the shepherds' tents: 9 and shewing his love to her, 11 giveth her gracious promises. 12 The Church and Christ congratulate one another."

See also Ps. xciii. and cix. How long must a strain of interpretation which no clergyman would now venture to adopt in preaching to an educated congregation be allowed to impress the minds of simple folk, who read the Bible for themselves? It is time that a running commentary of which these are samples should be removed from the page of Scripture, and that the mind of the reader should not be confused with recent glosses, which have already become obsolete, and yet have acquired the dead weight of tradition.*

If the translation is to have such accessories, the headings of chapters ought to be purely and simply indicative of the literal contents, without any attempt at explanation.

4. There are two other forms of commentary, which from their convenient brevity are admitted into many Bibles that are still supposed to be "without note or comment." These are the dates and marginal references. While various systems of chronology have been successively propounded by learned men, the chronology of Ussher, not inserted in our Bibles until the Oxford folio of 1680, has held its ground, like the Greek Textus Receptus, by a kind of sacred inertia. But the insertion of dates has not the plea of necessity which may be urged for a standard text; and where the question is one of a series of historical events that have been variously arranged by different authorities, to insert one theory amongst many without remark is simply to mislead. The first impression on the eye of the child in reading Scripture is not easily shaken off, and the 4004 at the beginning of our Bibles may have had an incalculable effect in fostering the long quarrel between science and revelation. Do we really mean, in the present state of

* See also Rev. xxii. where what is said of "the prophecy of this book" is applied to "the word of God," by which the translators probably meant the Bible.

knowledge, to base chronology on the lives of the antediluvian patriarchs?

5. The marginal references in the Bible of 1611 were comparatively few and carefully selected, although the selection was tinged, like the chapter-headings, with the mode of interpretation that happened to be current at the time. (See, for instance, the reference to 1 John ii. 18, which is placed against 2 Thess. ii. 9; although Antichrist is not mentioned by St. Paul, and the characteristics of the Man of Sin in the Thessalonians are quite different from those of Antichrist in St. John.) In recent editions the references have become so numerous as to be wholly useless. This error is the more to be regretted because the quotation of parallel passages might be of real value, if they were chosen strictly with a view to the real meaning and correlation of Scripture, so as to mark those portions which are historically connected (by quoting the earlier passages in illustration of the later), and those in which there is some resemblance or analogy of thought or language which throws light upon the nature and significance of both. Thus many of the references in the book of Revelation are of use in showing the basis of the book in ancient prophecies. Those in the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians, in Jude and 2 Peter, mark the close verbal similarity of each pair of writings. And a careful gleaning of the references in Galatians, Romans, and 1 and 2 Corinthians would show the degree of correspondence which exists among the writings of that earlier period of St. Paul's career. If the references in one of Tischendorf's latest critical editions were transferred to an English New Testament, they would be conducive to intelligent study. But the utility of such aid is at best limited, and available to few besides the regular student.

6. If the principle of "the Bible without note or comment" is not to exclude the sparing use of marginal references, there are still stronger reasons for relaxing it in favour of marginal or alternative readings. These are really not of the nature of commentary, but afford the only means of honest translation in places where there is any serious doubt. The very ground on which the Roman Catholics objected to them, that they weakened the authority of interpretation, should be an inducement to maintain them on the part of the Protestant translator, who does not wish to lead men blindfold by authority, but to bring them intelligently nearer to the truth of facts. He will wish that such marginal readings should have place in all Bibles equally, and not in the larger and more expensive ones only. But he will take care that the existence of the margin shall not be made an excuse for defending the prescriptive right of the more orthodox rendering.

On the other hand, the expedient of putting the literal meaning in the margin (where the translation has been somewhat free, with

the letters Gr. (for Greek) prefixed, should be dispensed with, as belonging more properly to commentary than to translation. The information supplied by such jottings is too fragmentary to be of any real use; and all information that is not directly profitable is illusory.


With these two exceptions,—the admission of marginal readings, and of a few marginal references,—everything of the nature of commentary should be excluded. The titles of the books should be translated literally from the earliest MSS.; and where there is an ancient colophon which has no claim to authenticity, but is inseparable from the earliest text, this should be printed, as is done at present, in a smaller and peculiar type.

7. It hardly need be said that the question of punctuation is sometimes of extreme importance (John i. 2; Rom. ix. 5). It is in fact, as regards the Greek, an essential part of the settlement of the text, and as regards the English, an essential part of the rendering. A curious instance of the amount of change that may be made by the transference of a stop, is Lachmann's text of 1 Cor. xiv. 33 (which is in the A. V. "God is not the author of confusion, but of peace, as in all the churches of the saints. Let your women keep silence in the churches") :—"As in all the churches, let the wives of the saints keep silence in your assemblies."

8. Last among these minor accessories comes the use of italics. As there ought to be no words inserted in the translation which are not necessary to represent the meaning of the original, the use of italics is really superfluous. And it is also apt to be deceptive, because no line can really be drawn between those words which have an equivalent in the original and those which have not, even if it were worth while to make such a distinction. Can any reason be assigned, for example, why οὐδείς should be translated "no man" without italics (Matt. xi. 27), while in Luke vi. 38, where δώσωμι is translated "shall men give," *men* is marked as having no equivalent in the original? It may be added, that the italics are a disfigurement to the page, and that the absence of them would be a clear gain to the English reader.

LEWIS CAMPBELL.

(To be continued.)



EVOLUTION AND THE RELIGION OF THE FUTURE.

AMONG the most interesting experiences of my life were the feelings which came over me when, during a ramble in Switzerland, after a toilsome ascent, I found myself standing upon a lofty summit, commanding a magnificent view of the peaks and glaciers of the Alps. Having previously visited the ice-caves, widely separated from each other, through which the glacial streams, emerging into light, flow onward to their distant goal, it was to me intensely interesting to survey the wide expanse of perpetual snow which forms their common origin and to mark the peculiar aspect assumed by each glacier in accordance with the character of the gorge or chasm through which it had descended to the plain.

I will not dwell upon a scene with which most readers are probably familiar, and which I now call to remembrance as presenting some features in common with the mental aspects of the age. Through the indefatigable toil of students in every department of knowledge, an intellectual height has been achieved from which a prospect of transcendent magnificence bursts upon the mental eye. Thus geology reveals the vast antiquity of the earth, and displays the wondrous chain of organic forms from the first appearance of life upon our planet down to the present time. And if we limit our survey to more recent periods, what unexpected affinities display themselves! The Celt of the West is found to be related to the Brahmin of the East, and the various languages of

Europe to have flowed, like the glacial streams, from one primeval source.

The contemplation of this vast progression, governed apparently by immutable law, has given birth to the theory of Evolution, hailed by one school of thinkers as a revelation, dreaded by another as a revolution. Into the details of this theory, with reference to lifeless nature and organic forms, it is not my intention to enter; and in considering its application to the religious phenomena I shall have space only for a very cursory treatment of a vast and most important subject.

The great fact which underlies the theory of Evolution is, that throughout the universe there has been a continual unfolding; that "the present order of things is only a link in a vast connected chain, reaching back to an incalculable past, and forward to an infinite future." It is consequently inferred that, as development invariably continues along the same lines, if we wish to discover, in relation to any particular domain of knowledge, whither the process is tending, we have only to study its direction in the past.

The phenomena of the religious consciousness offer, however, so wide a field of observation that correctly to interpret its history is by no means an easy task; hence views the most divergent as to the religion of the future are put forth by thoughtful men. History and observation alike bear witness to the fact that untutored men in every age and clime, conscious of their own weakness and dependence, are prompted by a mysterious instinct to recognize in the phenomena of nature the manifestations of a Power mightier than themselves, before whom they bow in adoration. Being, however, profoundly ignorant alike as to the mode of His presence and the laws of His action, they embody their conceptions of Deity in forms which, with the progress of knowledge, are found to be out of harmony with the truth of things. Hence, as one form of religion after another has passed away, or is passing away, it is inferred by some thinkers that this process will be continuous; that, though the religious instinct will remain as powerful as ever, nevertheless men, from the limited nature of their faculties, must be content to recognize, in the power before which they bow, the Unknown and the Unknowable.

"We have but to observe," writes one leader of this school, "how there has been, thus far, a decreasing concreteness of the consciousness to which the religious sentiment is related, to infer that hereafter this concreteness will further diminish, leaving behind a substance of consciousness for which there is no adequate form."

This inference is doubtless correct, if reference is made simply to the futile efforts of the human mind to embody in finite symbols its conception of the Infinite. But this process by no means

exhausts the phenomena of our religious consciousness; and the error which has led to this theory of agnosticism in relation to things unseen has, in my judgment, resulted from taking into consideration one line of development only. If the continuous unfolding of the religious sentiment is eventually to issue simply in "the transference of awe from something special and occasional to something universal and unceasing," dropping by the way the sentiments of love, allegiance, and veneration which have gathered round the germinal emotion, the process, I confess, appears to me to be one of retrogression rather than of progression; it is to re-erect in the nineteenth century the altar to the Unknown God of which we read in the first.

To establish the truth of these remarks, and to point out what appear to me to be the true lines of religious development, will be the object of the following paper.

The analogy which subsists between the growth of the individual mind and that of the race has frequently been pointed out, and in no element of our being is it more noteworthy than in the development of the religious sentiment. In Wordsworth's "Prelude," which has been ably expounded by the Rev. Stopford Brooke, we have a wonderful picture of the emotions awakened in the mind of a child by the various phenomena of nature. The poet describes the vague impressions of awe, of wonder, of dim yet delightful fear thus produced, and shows how, in his own experience, these feelings reacted on the forms of nature, till the impressions thus made became like real existences in his soul. Image after image thus became living within him, till eventually he attained to the sense of a vast invisible life external to himself.

This record of the dawn of religion in a human soul is, in my judgment, of peculiar value, as furnishing a miniature of the religious emotions of primeval man, of which we have the record in the religious books of the Hindoos. There we discover the same action and reaction between the human mind and the external world—the same interweaving of emotion with natural phenomena, partially endowed with the attributes of humanity.

It is deeply interesting to learn, from the researches of Max Müller and other scholars, that the highest God was worshipped by the ancestors of the whole Aryan race under the names of Light and Sky; that the progenitors of the Semitic races, before there were Babylonians, Phenicians, Arabians, or Jews, invoked El, the Strong One in Heaven, and Baal, who has been identified with the sun; that among the ancestors of the Turanian nations—the progenitors of the Chinese, Mongolians, Finns, and Lappes—the deity invoked was still the same. It is the deity of the sky.

What a magnificent illustration of the Psalmist's words:—"The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth His handiwork. There is no speech nor language where their voice is not heard. Their line is gone out through all the earth, and their word to the end of the world!"

The religion of nature thus struck deep root into the human soul, yielding nourishment and support to the more spiritual growths which eventually superseded it, a process strikingly illustrated by the mythology and philosophy of Greece. Among the elemental divinities who peopled Olympus, the conception of a Supreme Deity, gradually emerging in clearness and strength, may be traced throughout the whole range of Greek literature. In the Homeric Zeus—the impersonation of the sky—invoked by the poet as "greatest and best," "father of gods and men"—we have the first shadowy form of this conception; while, in the later poets, we find Zeus "enthroned supreme above the powers of nature and the subordinate divinities, ruling in accordance with the principles of everlasting justice."

This conception of the Supreme Deity, as distinguished from and transcending the mythological divinities, culminates in Plato, who, placing himself in direct antagonism to the popular theology, retained a very slight hold upon the polytheistic system. And when eventually that system, like a withered husk, was scattered to the winds, the bright consummate flower of Hellenic thought—the belief in the supreme intelligence, as the eternal cause and ground of phenomena—survived; and the deathless seeds of that Hellenic flower, transmitted through the ages, have never ceased to germinate.

Another striking illustration of the same process is furnished by the exquisite mythos of Demeter and Persephoné, which typified the suspension of vegetation in winter, succeeded by its re-appearance in the spring. Demeter, Mother-Earth, seeks her banished daughter Persephoné, who has been transported into the under-world; hidden for a time in that subterranean region, she is at length restored to upper air, and, in her genial presence, Earth once more gives forth her treasure of fruitage and of flowers. From this meteorological mythos, embodied in the Eleusinian Mysteries, the doctrine of a future life and other spiritual conceptions gradually emancipated themselves; and many of the greatest writers of antiquity bear witness to the profound and beneficial influence exerted by initiation upon the characters of the initiated. Thus through the religion of nature were laid, broad and deep, the foundations of a more spiritual temple, in which many of the noblest heathens felt after the living God, and cherished elevated conceptions of the dignity of human life and its continuance beyond the grave. The immense influence exerted

by the Eleusinian Mysteries in aiding the transition from paganism to Christianity has been pointed out by M. Renan.

In the great religions of the East the process of religious development was accomplished through the agency of exceptional minds, who from time to time appear upon our planet, and who have been truly characterized as "reflecting surfaces for the verities of the unseen and eternal world."

Such among the Persians was Zoroaster, characterized by Mr. Clodd as "a man of mighty mind, who felt that to him was given the message of one who was Lord of all. He was Ahura, the spiritual Mighty One—Mazda, the creator of all. 'I believe thee, O God,' he exclaims, 'to be the best thing of all, the source of light for the world.'" From the teachings of this great reformer has been developed the religion of the Parsees, whose creed is, to fear God, and to live a life of pure thought, pure words, pure deeds. Such was Sakya-Muni, the founder of Buddhism, whose life and teachings have stamped their impress upon so vast an area both of space and time, and who, according to Max Müller, preached the highest morality that was ever taught before the rise of Christianity. Such, too, was Confucius, the great religious reformer of China, who disclaimed the idea of founding a new religion, and, like Sakya-Muni, represented himself as a mere link in a long line of religious teachers.

It is, however, with the religion of the Hebrews, which eventually gave birth to Christianity, that we are the most intimately associated, and which, with the other great religions of the world, bears clearest witness to the truth that through the ages the great Father has been gradually leading His human family by ways which they know not.

The transformation accomplished in the religion of the Persians by Zoroaster was, according to the Old Testament, accomplished in the religion of the Chaldeans by Abraham. Recognizing the law of righteousness within his own soul, and penetrated by the mysterious awe attending that recognition, he felt himself brought into direct relation with a Being external to himself, whose commands, as revealed through these higher intuitions, he felt constrained to obey.

Kant, the great German philosopher, has left a record that the contemplation of two objects awakened within him feelings of profoundest awe; these were the starry heavens above him, and the law of duty in his own soul, thus exhibiting in his individual experience an epitome of the universal experience of the race, as embodied in the great religions of the world. This conception of the Supreme Deity as a righteous God, together with the indissoluble connection between righteousness, as the law of the Eternal, and human well-being, finds expression in many grand

utterances of the Hebrew Scriptures:—"He is the Rock; His work is perfect: for all His ways are judgment: a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is He." "As the whirlwind passeth, so is the wicked no more; but the righteous is an everlasting salvation."

Deeply interesting is it to trace, through the words of seers and prophets, the subsequent development of this fundamental thought, till at length we find them bearing witness to a God, patient and long-suffering, slow to anger and of great mercy, who was leading His people, though they knew it not, to the recognition of everlasting righteousness. "Ever more and more were their hearts thrilled with devout awe as they recognized the protecting shelter of Him in whose presence is fulness of joy. With the recognition of His tenderness came also the sentiment of unfailing trust. 'Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the son of her womb? Yea, she may forget, yet will I not forget thee.'"

But grand as are the conceptions of the Eternal thus set forth by the seers and prophets of Israel, they were associated with a ritualistic system so exclusively national that their application was limited to Jehovah, the God of the Jews. The seer of the captivity had indeed given utterance to more comprehensive views in his prophecy concerning the Messiah:—"It is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel. I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth." Nevertheless as events rolled on, and Judea became subject to the Roman sway, the Jews became possessed by the conception of the Messiah as "a vengeance-working King," who should establish his throne at Jerusalem, and subjugate the nations to his sway, while the very tenacity with which they clung to their national religion brought them into more intense antagonism with surrounding nations.

At this crisis of the world's history there arose one whose soul was pre-eminently "a reflecting surface for the verities of the unseen and eternal world," and upon that spiritual mirror there flashed the glorious vision of the Universal Father, bearing to His whole human family the same relation of paternal love, only, if possible, more inward and spiritual, which Jehovah, as conceived by the highest minds of the nation, bore to the Jews. Of the truth of this conception he had the assurance in the intimate relation which subsisted between his own soul and his Heavenly Father, and the deep sense of joy and peace attending that recognition. The possibility of this perfect union between the Divine and human will, revealed as the condition of man's highest well-being, and manifested in its perfection by Jesus of Nazareth,

constitutes another stage in the religious development of humanity.

Realizing intensely his conception of the Universal Father, his whole soul became possessed by the idea of establishing on earth the Kingdom of Heaven—a human brotherhood the members of which should be united by bonds of filial and fraternal love, and by allegiance to their invisible King. This conception of the universal Fatherhood of God, with its corollary, the brotherhood of men, has changed, and is destined still further to change, the aspect of the world. To us who have lived in the light of this glorious truth, however imperfectly apprehended, it is difficult to apprehend the new life, and power, and freedom, and joy, which must have been awakened by its first promulgation. It was in truth the fountain of living water opening for the healing of the nations; it was the wind from heaven which was to breathe new life into the withered bones of Judaism; while to the Gentiles, groaning under the triple yoke of superstition, despotism, and slavery, it brought the unutterable sense of deliverance which justified the rapturous exclamation of the apostle: “Old things have passed away; behold, all things have become new.”

Let us transport ourselves in imagination to the Rome of Nero, described by Renan as the abomination of desolation. What must have been the feelings of the wretched outcasts who thronged the dark places of that sin-stricken city when they listened to the proclamation of a community in which no distinction was recognized between Jew and Gentile, Roman and barbarian, bond and free—in which they were no longer strangers and exiles, but fellow-citizens with the saints and of the household of God? In token of the reality of the message they found that “slavery was no disqualification for the discharge of Christian functions, whereas, according to Roman law, no public office could be held by a slave.” It was in truth the message of light and life to those that lay in darkness and the shadow of death; and everywhere the spirit of Christian love manifested itself in organizations for the relief of the poor, the cure of the sick, and the mitigation of the horrors of slavery and war. The spirit of philanthropy, introduced as a vital principle into the heathen world, contributed, doubtless, to the rapid triumph of the new religion.

Many influences, to which I can only very briefly allude, favoured the diffusion of Christianity throughout the wide area of the Roman Empire. The general decay of paganism left a craving in the human soul to which the religion of Jesus was well calculated to minister, while the cold but noble morality of the Stoics, though powerless to regenerate the world, doubtless prepared the soil for the reception of the Gospel seed. Accordingly, in spite of occasional outbursts of persecution, the new

religion steadily gained ground, till in the age of Constantine it was so completely in the ascendant that the Emperor judged it for his interest to join its ranks, and with him Christianity ascended the imperial throne.

Not with impunity, however, had it traversed the intervening centuries. Jesus, during his life, had experienced the ordinary lot of most original thinkers, which has been aptly characterized as the solitude of a new idea.

" Amidst his own
A stranger oft, companionless and lone,
God's priest and prophet stands."

Even his most intimate associates were unable to comprehend his lofty conceptions of the Kingdom of Heaven as the reign of light and love, while the gross misinterpretation of his words by his hearers illustrates the saying of the Duke of Argyll: "It seems almost a law that no utterance of original genius can long escape the fate of being travestied and turned to nonsense by those who take it up at second-hand."

Ideas, moreover, are subject to the law which modifies living organisms—namely, that between them and their environment there is perpetual interaction; accordingly, Christianity introduced into a pagan world became in a measure paganized; and so rapidly did this process proceed after its elevation to the imperial throne, that, after the lapse of a few centuries, we behold in the Papacy a marvellous spectacle—a travesty of the grand conception of Jesus—all civilized nations bound into a living unity, not by allegiance to their invisible King, but to an earthly potentate, who claimed to be His vicegerent.

The Roman Catholic Church was in fact a vast ecclesiastical empire, wielding immense power over the nations. "The Pope and his army of ecclesiastics," to quote the words of a recent historian, "held in his hands the strings by which to influence the politics of Europe." But it would be assuredly to misread history were we to ignore the higher elements of pagan thought, by the assimilation of which Christianity, while undergoing profound modification, became, so to speak, the heir of the ages.

The mysticism of the East, the artistic genius and subtle intellectual force of Hellas, the grand organizing power of Rome, these and other rich affluents combined with the religion of the New Testament to form the mighty system embodied in the Papacy. For examples of the baser elements of paganism, also embodied in Catholicism, we have not far to seek. The contrast between the religion of Jesus and the worldly spirit of the Papacy is strikingly illustrated in the famous pamphlet of caricatures, published in 1521, by Lucas Cranach, and characterized by Luther

as "a good book for the laity." On the first page was portrayed Jesus arrayed in simple raiment; on the page opposite, Pope, cardinals, and bishops, assuming lordship over kings; on another page appeared Jesus washing his disciples' feet, in contrast to the Pope presenting his toe to an emperor to be kissed; Jesus driving the money-changers out of the Temple was contrasted with the Pope selling indulgences, with piles of money before him; and so on through the entire life of Jesus. The study of the art and literature of the sixteenth century enables us to understand and to sympathize with the burning indignation which quickened the religious zeal of Luther and his brother Reformers in their revolt against the Papacy, which they regarded as the stronghold of Satan. Through their heroic efforts Christianity was redeemed, in a large measure, from the degrading influences of sacerdotalism, from the worship of the Virgin, the Mass, and other pagan superstitions. The sense of deliverance, the newly acquired privilege of direct communion with the Deity without the intervention of sacrifice or priest, were accompanied by feelings of freedom and of joy, recalling the outburst of enthusiasm which characterized the first promulgation of Christianity.

There is danger, however, lest our sympathy with the noble lives of many of the Reformers, and our gratitude for the emancipation wrought out by them, should blind us, not only to the errors of their own system, but also to some important principles which found shelter under the ancient Church. Thus, in renouncing their allegiance to the infallible Church, the Reformers clung with all the more tenacity to the Bible, as the infallible Word of God; and attaching themselves to the letter rather than to the spirit of Scripture, they in fact intensified the antagonism between science and religion which had unfortunately characterized the ancient Church.

Another fatal error of the Evangelical system is the tendency to exalt faith at the expense of reason and conscience, by attaching special importance to those doctrines, such as eternal torment and vicarious satisfaction, which are most revolting to the common sense and also to the common conscience of mankind. To these and kindred doctrines embodied in the ancient creeds the Reformers and their followers clung with passionate vehemence; and if we would trace to their source the so-called sceptical tendencies of the age, we must, I believe, take into account, not merely the recent freaks of Ultramontaniam and the works of advanced thinkers, but also the popular doctrines of orthodoxy.

A momentous change is, however, at hand. Hitherto the majority of mankind have accepted their religious beliefs on external authority—that either of the Bible or the Church. But

in the light of modern criticism it is discovered that no authority is infallible—that the claims alike of inspiration and tradition must be brought before the bar of reason and conscience, and that upon their verdict the decision as to the true and the good must ultimately rest. “The crisis,” it has been truly said, “though terrible to feeble hearts, fills the strong with hope.” It renews itself from age to age, scattering to the winds all inadequate conceptions, all dogmas and doctrines out of harmony with the truth of things, and which have lost their hold upon the living spirit of the time. “Yet once more I will shake not the earth only but also heaven; that those things which cannot be shaken may remain.” The main battle between science and religion has already been fought and won; the authority of Scripture in scientific matters is repudiated. Science, like a young giant, newly emancipated from thralldom, is girded for its onward march, unimpeded by the venerable mentor by whom his progress has been so long and so fatally retarded.

The creeds also are undergoing a transformation in harmony with the spirit of the age; in many quarters they wear a wan and ghostlike aspect, and some of their fiercest dogmas, such as the eternity of hell-fire, will ere long be regarded as traditions of the past. In support of this assertion I will quote the following words from a discourse published recently by a clergyman of the English Church:—

“The thought is too horrible, the blasphemy too repulsive to dwell upon, the popular creed too unchristian to be calmly borne with; only men do not believe their creeds; we are happily better than our creeds.” “The human heart,” he proceeds, “is too much for us, and refuses to harbour so monstrous a blasphemy; we may repeat the belief with the lips, but the heart loathes and rejects it.”

Meanwhile a voice from the far East tells us that “in every one of the great States of Asia the same transforming process is going on. Not only under the Western civilization of Christianity, but under the Oriental civilization of Confucianism, of Buddhism, of Brahmanism, and of Islamism (and we may add of Judaism also), there now exist forces destructive of supernatural beliefs and exclusive dogmas.” “When the fig-tree putteth forth her leaves we know that summer is nigh,” and so this break-up of traditional beliefs, apparently co-extensive with civilization, may be hailed as the morning-red, heralding the dawn of a new reformation.

At this crisis of the world's history it appears to me to be an object of paramount importance that a just conception should be formed of the spiritual goal towards which humanity is tending, in order that the partisans of progress may be enabled, amid the shifting eddies and currents of opinion, to steer their course in the right direction.

Now, the fundamental truth of religion, embodied in the utterance of Jesus, "Be ye perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect," appears to be this:—That it is given to man not only to apprehend the existence of God, as an objective reality, but also, through the combined action of reason and conscience, to discern His moral attributes. The Supreme Being becomes thus the proper object of our religious affections, conscious harmony with whom constitutes man's highest well-being. Or, to quote the words of our venerable prophet of the nineteenth century—"The universe is not dead, but Godlike and our Father's." A firm hold upon this fundamental truth appears to me to be the one thing needful to calm the unrestfulness of the age; to curb its materialistic tendencies; to impart nobleness and dignity to life; and to stimulate the efforts of the wise and good to build up humanity into a holy temple, in which God may dwell by His Spirit.

"But in what words speak even afar off of the unspeakable?" How tell of the love of God which passeth knowledge? I shall not attempt it, but shall simply express my profound conviction that the grand utterance of the Hebrew sage, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength," constitutes now, as of old, the fundamental law of life, upon the fulfilment of which depends the highest well-being alike of individuals and communities.

So far am I from sympathizing with the purely destructive criticism which, regarding the various forms of religion as essentially false, imagines that a clean sweep must be made of them, in order to promote the onward march of humanity, it is my belief that as with the religions of the past, so with existing Churches and 'sects, when their errors and limitations shall have passed away, they will be found to have elaborated some elements of the religious life, by which the spiritual experience of humanity will eventually be enriched. A full illustration of this subject would demand a comprehensive survey of the religions of the world, but I must content myself with a hasty glance at the leading Churches of Christendom, and we may thus perhaps obtain a few hints as to the essential characteristics of the religion of the future.

These Churches may be distinguished as the Evangelical, the Roman Catholic, and the Free Christian Churches; and looking at the higher characteristics of each, as manifested in their truest representatives, it may, I think, be broadly stated that the first loves God with the whole heart, the second with the whole soul, the third with the whole mind. The Church of the future must love God with heart and soul and mind and strength, and not till these now scattered elements are combined will religion become a mighty power to move the world.

Nobody can have less sympathy than myself with the popular

dogmas of orthodoxy, which, in their grosser forms, have been justly characterized as a hideous caricature of the Gospel. Nevertheless, having had the privilege of intimate friendship with fellow-Christians by whom these dogmas are held with unwavering conviction, I have been astonished to find how their minds seem unconsciously to let drop the more revolting doctrines of the popular creed; how they fasten upon the pure self-sacrificing love of Jesus as the one vital element of their religion. Upon this they dwell with an intensity of conviction which exerts a controlling influence over their whole being, and begets a fervour of love manifesting itself in unwearied service in the cause of suffering humanity. I go further, and assert my deliberate conviction that through the darkness and confusion of the middle ages, when the conception of the one supreme Deity was almost beyond the grasp of human thought, the deification of Jesus, as the highest symbol of the Divinity, was an agency of mighty power in promoting the civilization of the world. The spiritual eye of humanity being thus fixed upon one glorious object, men's minds were united in a common reverence, and have thus been prepared, as the times ripen for the change, to transfer their adoration to his Father and our Father, to his God and our God.

No one, again, can look with a less favourable eye than myself upon the degrading superstitions which prevail in the Roman Catholic Church, or can repudiate with sterner indignation its arrogant claim to infallibility. We have, however, only to glance over the long roll of saintly men and women who have been reared within its pale in order to recognize that it must embody some elements of spiritual life which exert a mighty and controlling power over the human soul. And if from the glorious personages of history we turn to the saints and martyrs portrayed upon the frescoed walls of Italy by such painters as Fra Angelico and Fra Bartolomeo, we find in those countenances, radiant with unspeakable joy, a wonderful embodiment of the peace of God which passeth all understanding; and if we draw near those ideal forms, and question them as to the secret of their inward peace, they answer:—

“We will tell thee of the secret and the way,
If thou wilt obey.
For that one short word enshrineeth all that mortal wit divineth,
How to win strength out of weakness, out of sorrow fearless joy.
Take the yoke and daily wear it; 'tis to those who bravely bear it
Rest without alloy.

This—and this alone is able—stills the longing. For unstable
Is the spirit as the needle trembles till it finds the pole;
Once thy will with God's is blended, then at last the strife is ended,
Raging in the soul.
When the rebel passions hearken to the voice within the soul,
Chanting ever loud or low the strain to which the planets roll;
When the spirit which they bow to, bows itself to one above,
There is peace and love.”

This intense realization of the Divine presence, this spirit of unswerving loyalty to unseen realities, issuing in a single-hearted devotion to duty, though happily by no means confined to the Roman Catholic Church, has shone there with peculiar lustre. The true votaries of that Church, from the devoted missionary to the humble Sister of Charity, have loved, if not always the Lord their God, at least the divine objects of their faith, with their whole soul.

It cannot, however, be denied that, alike by our orthodox and Catholic brethren, the human intellect has been placed under a ban; by the dethronement of reason religion has been withdrawn from wide domains of thought and life, to the neglect of those wider aspects of faith and duty which can alone bring it into harmony with the requirements of the age.

If we now turn to the Free Christian Churches, of whatever denomination, we hail with joy communities which, in their reverence for truth, in their unswerving allegiance to the great principle of religious liberty, may truly be said to worship God with their whole mind. Recognizing, as I do, that intellectual freedom is an essential condition of progress, I cannot doubt that, notwithstanding their numerical inferiority, the Churches which have emancipated themselves from the trammels of bygone creeds are thereby placed in the van of civilization, and that, in holding that position, there is committed to them a mighty and a sacred trust.

In order to bring to a successful issue the great battle which they are called to wage between superstition on the one side and agnosticism on the other, one or two considerations must, in my judgment, be borne in mind.


It must, in the first place, be remembered that men's actions and characters are far more determined by emotion than by knowledge. To take an illustration from the material universe: it is not the light which issues from the sun, but the heat, which melts the glaciers, causes evaporation, and thus maintains the vitality of the universe. The grand motive power of the human soul is love; and consequently, while seeking to undermine the popular creeds of Christendom, we must be careful to offer to the human heart an object which can inspire a love as true and deep as that with which our orthodox brethren cling to the Saviour of the popular theology. Our Heavenly Father has not left Himself without a witness:—in the marvellous beauty of nature, in the majesty of truth, in the grandeur of moral excellence, in the deeper experiences of the individual soul, where the Spirit of God bears witness with our spirit that we are the children of God. If this fail,

“ The pillared firmament is rottenness,
And earth's base built on stubble.”

Again, there is no stronger principle in the human soul than loyalty—the sentiment of allegiance to what is higher than ourselves. Hence the supreme importance of giving prominence to the grand conception of Jesus—of God's kingdom upon earth, as the ideal towards the realization of which we are invited to be fellow-workers with God Himself. The establishment and maintenance of God's kingdom involve the knowledge and observance of the laws which He has implanted in the constitution of the universe, alike in the domains of nature and of life. In the light of this grand ideal the whole range of human activity would be glorified, and the service of God be transmuted into the service of man. The scientific discoverer, the sociologist, the statesman, the philanthropist, each in his sphere, would feel that he was striving to enter into the counsels of the Eternal, and to propound His laws for the guidance of humanity; ever the humblest efforts of duty would be irradiated by the consciousness of the Divine approval and sympathy, and thus all our aspirations and endeavours would tend to the realization of the grand ideal embodied in the poet's words:—

"Come, kingdom of our God!
And make the broad earth thine;
Stretch o'er her land and isles the rod
That flows with grace divine.
Soon may all lands be blest
With fruit from Life's glad tree;
And in its shade like brothers rest,
Sons of one family."

ANNA SWANWICK.



DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS:

A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF MODERN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

II.

THE moment the *Leben Jesu* appeared, even before the second volume was published, there broke out a controversy of the bewildered and stormful sort distinctive of religious panics. Men known and unknown, schools old and new, clergy and laity, every one who could carry a stick or even spring a rattle,* joined in the *melée*. The Prussian Government proposed to place the book under ban, but Neander protested—"Let it be answered by argument, not by authority." The Pietists and High Lutherans hailed it as the *caput mortuum* of the speculative and critical schools, and began the reaction they called revival. The Hegelians, anxious to disown their too radical *confrère*, made a valiant effort to affiliate him to Schleiermacher, but the sons of the divine victoriously vindicated his true descent. And the storm of words did not come alone; more material penalties followed. Strauss was cast out of the university where he had given and tasted the promise of a brilliant career, and had to return to a home which was none of the happiest. His rationalist mother stood loyally by him, but his pietist father held him in horror, turning to unkindest uses the dark rumours and cruel criticisms which filled the air.† Hence came discords that shortened the mother's days, and did not sweeten the son's. He had, too, to teach in the Lyceum at Ludwigsburg—a drudgery not lightened by its contrast with the

* *Das Leben Jesu für das Deutsche Volk*, p. 157.

† *Kleine Schriften*, N. F., p. 265.

congenial work and still more congenial society of Tübingen. Altogether those were evil days, fruitful of bitter memories that would not be forgotten, least of all when the intellect was busied with things religious.

But Strauss was not a man to bear criticism in silence, and his speech now was most characteristic. He replied to his critics by counter criticism, repelled their assault by assailing themselves. He selected from the hosts opposed to him certain men, representatives of various tendencies, and fell on them in the most vigorous way. The selected were Steudel, of Tübingen fame, supernaturalist and traditional theologian; Eschenmayer, philosopher and physician, a believer in animal magnetism, demoniacal possession, and other things ghostly; Wolfgang Menzel, literary critic and mythologist, a layman who acted the severe moralist; Hengstenberg, High Lutheran, standing by the letter of the Scriptures and the creeds; Bruno Bauer, just beginning his changeful career, an orthodox Hegelian, conciliator of knowledge and faith; Ullmann, a theologian, modern ironical, anxious to give to reason the things that are reason's, to faith the things that are faith's.* Strauss' criticism, save in Ullmann's case, to whom he was studiously courteous, spared neither the men nor their writings. Steudel, dolorous, incompetent, was a Pietist permeated with Rationalism, heir to a past he had not mind enough to inherit, or courage to renounce. Eschenmayer was but a succession of ever-repeated incoherences and contradictions. Menzel was a literary Ishmaelite, a critic without insight, who but blundered when he judged. Hengstenberg was full of latent Pantheism, and B. Bauer understood neither Hegel nor theology. Literary amenities seldom distinguish theological controversies, but in this case the truculence was transcendent. Strauss compared his critics to women set a-screaming by the going off of a gun.† Eschenmayer, who had denounced him as the modern

* The replies and counter-criticisms first published in 1837, were in 1841 issued in a collective form under the title: "Streit-Schriften zur Vertheidigung Meiner Schrift über das Leben Jesu und zur Charakteristik der gegenwärtigen Theologie." The replies were in three parts. The first was the answer to Steudel and his school, that of a rational and reasoned supernaturalism, and was certainly a very merciless exposure of the self-illusions it had indulged. The second part contained the reply to Eschenmayer and Menzel. Eschenmayer is best known by his contributing through Schelling to the alliance of Natural and Transcendental Philosophy. He and Strauss met as antagonists on another field—spiritualism, or what would be now so called. Eschenmayer, in a book on "The Conflict between Heaven and Hell," sketched in a distantly Dantesque style the nether regions, where he places those who corrupt and falsify the Word, assail, deny, and blaspheme the Son of Man himself. There, of course, Icarot is sent, and the Mythicists in general, who cry, "Great is the Goddess Idea of Berlin." Strauss thought such superfine imbecile wit laughable where not disgusting (v. Charakter u. Krit. 355, 376). The third part contained answers to Hengstenberg, the Hegelians, and the theologians of the conciliatory school, the men of the *Studien u. Kritiken*. The criticism of the Hegelians is of considerable autobiographical worth, and the letter to Ullmann is most pacific in tone and purport. A positive and constructive part was intended to follow, but it was embodied in the 3rd ed. of the *Leben Jesu*.

† *Leben Jesu*, 2 Aufl. vor.

Isca-riot, guilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost,* was described as no inspired man of God, the Spirit not being given to plagiarism, even from himself,† while his book was characterized as the child, born in lawful wedlock, of theological ignorance and religious intolerance, consecrated by a somnambulating philosophy.‡ Wolfgang Menzel thought his author like the devil, without conscience,§ and Strauss could not read B. Bauer's speculations without feeling as if he were in the witches' kitchen in *Faust*, listening to the clatter of a whole choir of a hundred thousand fools.|| Hengstenberg said the prophecy of Lichtenberg was fulfilled—the world had got so fine as to think the belief in God as ridiculous as the belief in ghosts.¶ Strauss was a man without a heart, or had one like Leviathan**—"as firm as a stone, and hard as a piece of the nether millstone." But, in this case, behind the verbal ferocities was a mind that knew the enemy it faced, and delighted in his absolute antagonism. Hengstenberg thoroughly understood the *Leben Jesu*. To vanquish its speculative Pantheism the old Lutheran theology must be revived, subscription to the confessions, in their literal sense, enforced. To conquer the mythical theory, historical reality must be claimed for the narratives alike of the Old and New Testaments. If it was allowed a foothold in the one, it could not be held out of the other. The spirit of the age was to be met, not by conciliation, but by contradiction. To mediate was to be faithless. The Church, suckled on its old creeds, was to do its old work. The strength given by a narrow aim and definite belief favoured for a while the reaction; but the times proved too strong even for Hengstenberg. Churches, after an intellectual revolution, can as little return to their old confessions as countries after a political can go back to their old constitutions.

The replies Strauss noticed had, with one exception, no permanent worth. Relevant criticism was, indeed, then hardly possible. But two or three attempts at it deserve mention. Tholuck †† not only achieved a brilliant occasional success, but struck Strauss on his weakest point. He argued that the inadequate criticism of the sources made the critical life of Jesus uncritical, left its mythical theory baseless. Strauss flung a scornful complimentary sneer at the high horse of his many-sidedness,‡‡ the jewelled spoils from the ancient and modern classics sprinkled over his pages,§§ but the sting in the sneer did not neutralize the sting in the

* Streitschriften 2, p. 3. Eschenmayer's critique bore the title, "The Isca-riotism of our Day."

† Streitschr. 2, p. 10.

‡ *Leben Jesu*, ii. Band vor. 1 Aufl.

§ Streitschr. 2, p. 3.

|| Streitschr. 2, p. 109.

¶ Ibid. 3, p. 9.

** Ibid. 3, p. 18.

†† *Die Glaubwürdigkeit der Evangel Geschichte*, 1837.

‡‡ *Leben Jesu*, dritte Aufl., vor.

§§ Streitschriften 3, p. 13.

criticism. Alexander Schweitzer,* leader of Schleiermacher's left wing, assailed the dogmatic construction, vindicated the reality and rights of creative personalities in every province of thought and action, but especially the religious. The founder made the religion, not the religion the founder. Individual genius was here as everywhere the creative force. But there were three men who exercised on Strauss a confessedly modifying influence—De Wette, Ullmann, and Neander. De Wette,† the then most authoritative sacred critic, pronounced against his uncritical method and positions, especially as to the Fourth Gospel. Ullmann‡ criticized the mythical theory, analyzed the idea of myth, distinguished its varieties, argued that the Gospels may be histories with mythical elements without being mythical histories. Nor were they our only sources. Paul and the primitive Church had been ignored, but they show a faith rooted in fact. Christ created the Church, not the Church Christ; the seed grew into the plant, not the plant into the seed. Neander§ opposed the historical to the mythical Christ. He was arbitrary and subjective, too anxious to find an ideal and modern in the real and ancient Christ, expected too much from a change of the contra- into the supra-natural. But his work had one pre-eminent quality, was an honest effort, marked by sympathetic insight into the character portrayed, to get face to face with the facts, to construe evangelical as actual history; and so it tended to create in the reader a consciousness of reality that could confront the mythical theory undismayed.

Some points personal to Strauss must now be noticed. He defended his work as a scientific search after truth, and for science there did not exist the holy, but only the true.|| He was not the enemy, but the apologist of the Christian faith, had proved its essence independent of critical inquiries. He had not wished to destroy the faith of the people, only to translate its transcendental matter into a scientific form. Hence he had written for the learned alone. Why not in Latin then?¶ That had been to put new wine into old bottles, with the usual certain result. He did not mean to be unchurched, was thoroughly happy and at home in the Christian religion; could be refreshed in spirit from its old yet perennially young sources.** The critic did not write for edification but for science; and science, while it denied the reality of the facts, affirmed the reality of the faith. Miracles were, but the faith in them was not, unreal. The great point was not the occurrence of the resurrection, but the belief in it.†† He wished the clergy

* Studien u. Kritiken, 1837, pp. 459—510.

† Leben Jesu, dritte Aufl.; vor., Charak. u. Krit. vor.; de Wette, Erklärung des Ev. Johannis, Schlussbetrachtung.

‡ Studien und Krit. 1836, pp. 776 ff.

§ Neander, das Leben Jesu Christi, 1837.

¶ Streitschriften 1, p. 92.

¶ Streitschr. 1, p. 88; 3, p. 132.

** Ibid. 1, p. 9.

†† Ibid. 1 pp. 33—48; 3, p. 41.

to preach Christ, not Schleiermacher and Hegel. But the irenical spirit apparent in these personal apologetics soon became much more pronounced. The *consensus eruditorum*, joined with his present loneliness and cheerless outlook for the future, constrained him into concessions and efforts at conciliation. In his third *Streitschrift* (1837), in the third edition of his *Leben Jesu* (1838), and in the *Zwei Friedliche Blätter* (1839), he successively and increasingly modified the cardinal points of his position, the criticism of the sources, the mythical theory, and the speculative Christology.

In the third edition of the *Leben* the critical attitude to the Fourth Gospel was changed. Strauss confessed that his zeal against the theologians had made him unjust to John; he now doubted his own denials, could as little say John's Gospel is genuine as it is spurious.* And with these doubts as to the sources, the mythical theory could hardly retain its old rigour. Jesus became more historical; his speeches, even the Johannine discourses, more genuine, the latter giving, not the master's *ipsissima verba*, but the ideas they had given to the scholar.† But the less nebulous Jesus grew, the more extraordinary he became; as the range of the unconsciously creative phantasy was limited, the reality of the consciously creative person was increased. While the speculative Christology was allowed to stand, the individual had his rights conceded by Jesus being raised into the world's pre-eminent religious genius, creator of the Church, maker of Christianity, the empirical or real as distinguished from the absolute or ideal Christ. At the head of all world-historical events individuals stood, were the subjectivities through which the absolute substance was realized.‡ In the field of religion, especially where Monotheistic, the grand creative forces had been individuals. And Christianity was the product of a creative individuality. "Certainly this does not again bring Christ into the peculiar Christian sanctuary, but only places him in the chapel of Alexander Severus, where, with Orpheus and Homer, he has to stand beside not only Moses, but also Mahomet, and must not be ashamed of the society of Alexander and Cæsar, Raphael and Mozart." But this disquieting co-ordination was qualified by two considerations: first, religion is not only the highest province in which the divine creative power of genius can be manifested, but is related to the others as centre to circumference. Of the religious genius in a sense quite inapplicable to poet or philosopher can it be said, "God reveals Himself in him." Secondly, as Christianity is the

* *Leben Jesu*, dritte Aufl. vor. p. 5.

† *Ibid.* vol. ii. 740.

‡ *Ibid.*, vol. ii. 770—779. This conciliatory and conclusory chapter embodied the views and modifications of the third *Streitschrift*; and replaced a chapter in the first edition which had given special offence.

highest religion, its author is Supreme in the circle of religious creators.

But this new standpoint received its most perfect expression in the second of the *Zwei Friedliche Blätter*.* This is one of Strauss' most perfect compositions, an irenical soliloquy, a far-off echo of Schleiermacher's *Monologen* and *Reden*, which muffled, as it were, the sigh for peace of a man who was trying to conquer his own worst doubts, and wished to live in friendship with the new culture and the old faith. Culture seemed to him to be not so much hostile as indifferent to faith; and for Christianity to become superfluous was worse than to be vanquished. As a child of the new culture, who had also been a son of the old faith, he could not but seek to reconcile the two, especially as a basis existed in a philosophy which was more Christian than primitive Christianity, conceived God and man as united, not at one or a few points, but everywhere and always. The new spirit could not believe in everlasting rewards and penalties; could be moral without them; needed only an immortality of conscious growth. The resurrection of Christ was an eternal and ideal truth clothed in a form suitable to childhood, but without worth for manhood. His death was no atonement, only the absolute submission of a righteous spirit to God. His works were not miracles, the *miraculum* was only the *mirabile*. The incarnation was incompatible with the nature of God, who could be revealed in a single person as little as the essence of harmony in a single tune. "The only worship—one may lament or praise, but cannot deny it—the only worship which from the religious ruins of the past remains to the cultured mind of to-day, is the worship of genius."† Must, therefore, the doom of Christianity be written? No; Christ descends from the throne of Divine Sonship only to assume the sovereignty of religious genius. Genius redeems and rules the world, saves humanity from ignorance and impotence, and helps it to realize its ideal. Religion is the highest creation of spirit, Christianity the highest religion, and Jesus the supreme genius of the world, who never has been, never can be, either in kind or degree, surpassed. Beyond him no future can go.

"As little as man will ever be without religion, will he be without Christ. For to think to have religion without Christ were no less absurd than to think to enjoy poetry irrespective of Homer, Shakspeare, and their kind. And this Christ, so far as He is inseparable from the highest form of religion, is an historical, not a mythical person, a real individual, no mere symbol."‡

"There is no fear that He will be lost to us, even though we are forced

* *Vergängliches und Bleibendes im Christenthum* (The Transitory and Permanent in Christianity). It was published in 1839 along with a genial and beautiful paper on Justinus Kerner, Strauss' mystic friend, but had first appeared the year before in the *Freikaren*.

† P. 106.

‡ P. 131.

to surrender much that has been hitherto named Christianity. He remains to us and to all the more secure and stable, the less we anxiously hold fast doctrines and opinions which may be to thought an occasion of apostasy. But if Christ remains to us, remains, too, as the highest we know and can conceive in things religious, as He without whose presence in the heart no perfect piety is possible, then there also remains to us in Him the essential truth of Christianity."*

But Strauss' career as the prophet of Christ, the religious genius, was doomed to find sudden pause. His irenical attitude was too full of incompatibilities to be long maintained. The notion that the first could be the most perfect form in religion, or any other creation of spirit, was alien to the Hegelian philosophy as Strauss had construed it. His new conception of Christ involved admissions as to the Gospels fatal alike to the mythical theory and the critical conclusions that made it possible. It was an approach to Schleiermacher, Alexander Schweitzer more than hinting that it was a crib from himself. It was neither an appropriate termination to the old structure, nor a buttress built to support its weakest side, but simply a fragment from a foreign school of architecture planted against the outer wall, a pillar from the florid Gothic cathedral of the Romantics placed at the end of the severe and classic temple of the new philosophy. And the pillar was in a new revolution of thought, coincident with a revulsion of feeling, cast down and thrown out. In the spring of 1839 Strauss suffered a great disappointment. In 1836 an unsuccessful attempt had been made to invite him to a professorship at Zürich; but a second attempt in 1839 succeeded. The election was the work of the Radicals, who were then in power. It alarmed the Church; the clergy roused the people to revolt and political reaction. The story of the struggle that ensued cannot be here told. The drama, so far as it concerns us, was soon played out. The after-play was longer and, for the Radicals, more tragic. In the earlier stages the strife of words was great. The one party argued, the spirit of the age, modern culture, and so forth, demanded the making of a man like Strauss a leader in theology, the most antiquated and superstitious of the sciences. The other party retorted, the man who had dissolved sacred history into myths, denied the cardinal facts of faith, and owned no personal God, was not qualified to teach theology. Strauss strove to assuage the storm, explained, he did not mean "to use the position given him in the university to undermine the established religion," or "to disturb the Church in her faith and worship." He meant to hold himself "within the limits of his scientific vocation" "endeavour to make the fundamental

Christian verities esteemed." But the oil did not smooth the waters, and Strauss soon ceased to pour it. In a letter* to his friends at Zürich he claimed liberty, refused to have his doctrine judged by the agitators, whether those who, under the mantle of piety, did battle for their worldly interests, or the clergy, who were incompetent judges because prejudiced partisans. "Who, when Guttenberg had discovered the art of printing, were his bitterest opponents? They who had hitherto lived by copying. If the copyists had been allowed to outvote the inventor, what had become of printing? Or would railways have existed had the decision rested with the carriers?" But the panic was stronger than either the Radicals or their reasons, and could only be quieted by victory. Strauss had to retire from the chair he never occupied, his only consolation a pension of a thousand francs.

It is useless to speculate as to what might have been had the appointment stood. Strauss had hardly the stuff in him to be an exoteric Conservative while an esoteric Radical. Our modern instincts are against the opinion Augustine attributes to Varro:—"Multa esse vera, quæ non modo vulgo scire non sit utile, sed etiam tametsi falsa sunt, aliter existimare populum expediat."† Last century, indeed, knew more than one professor a Voltaire *privatim*, but a Warburton *publice*. The relations between conviction and expression in our century are—though not what they ought to be—healthier and more honest. Later on, Strauss admired in Reimarus "the martyrdom of silence"‡ which the deist suffered that he might enjoy the fame and emoluments of a Christian. But he himself was saved by the Zürich affair from a similar or worse martyrdom. The preface to the irenical *Blätter* is dated 15th March, 1839, his call to Zürich was cancelled 18th March, and on the 8th August, in the preface to his *Charakteristiken und Kritiken*,§ he withdrew his critical concessions and all they implied. He was in those days caustically compared to a physician who rushed from his house, sword in hand, and assailed the people passing along the street; but who, taking fright at seeing so many done almost to death, retreated within doors, though only to sally forth the next moment, bandages in hand, to bind up his victims.

The recoil carried Strauss behind his earlier position. In 1840

* The letters connected with the Zürich affair throw considerable light on the irenical attitude and mental history of Strauss. I had almost despaired of seeing them, but found them in a very wooden and wearisome little book which I owe to the kindness of a friend:—Boden's *Geschichte der Berufung des Dr. Strauss an die Hochschule von Zürich*. 1840.

† *De Civitate Dei*, lib. iv. c. xxxi.

‡ H.S. Reimarus und Seine Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen verehrer Gottes, p. 6.

§ The volume contains his early essays in three divisions, Theology, Belles Lettres, and the Night-Side of Nature, or Spiritualism. The essay of greatest value is one on Schleiermacher and Daub, marked by genial insight, nice discrimination, grace, and force of style.

the *Leben Jesu* came out in a fourth edition,* purged from everything concessive and irenic; the section on Christ the religious genius omitted, the Fourth Gospel pronounced spurious, its discourses, "free compositions of the Evangelist." In the same year the first volume of Strauss' second great work, the *Glaubenslehre*, saw the light.† Though the later in execution, it had been the earlier in conception. The idea of a new life of Jesus, with the Christian facts translated into transcendental formulæ, was only the child of a prior idea as to a new theology, with the Christian doctrines similarly translated. In the fruitful Berlin period, while studying with the Hegelians—dissatisfied with Marheineke, who simply skimmed the uppermost fat from the dialectical pot in which ecclesiastical dogma had been cooked—he had conceived a work which should analyze all its ingredients and exhibit the processes of combination and dissolution.‡ But between the purpose and the performance many things had happened. His own work had been of the most resultful sort. The once hopeful Hegelian was now an excommunicated man, with every door to preferment bolted against him. The halcyon days of free inquiry within the Church seemed ended. Speculative and critical thought had entered on what seemed a *guerre à outrance*. The critical and evangelical minds were daily becoming more suspicious, less mutually tolerant. Pietism in Württemberg, Confessionalism in Prussia, were growing narrower and more aggressive. The clerical atmosphere was getting too exhausted for progressive spirits to breathe in it. Strauss' friend Märklin had just (autumn 1840) fled from it for life. He had, like our own John Sterling, made a brave struggle to live and work within the Church, but had even more utterly failed. A sweet, patient, earnest spirit, resolutely honest with himself, anxious to make others as honest in faith, morals, and speech; nursed in an old clerical family, educated in the new philosophy, penetrated by the critical spirit—he had gone, with many an element of conflict in him, to be pastor at Calw. Pietism reigned there; colleague, clergy, people for the most part, were Pietists. The old spirit and the new refused to mix. Contact developed antipathy. Pietism hated Märklin. He hated it, wrote against it; was written against, until the inner expansion and outer contraction

* On this edition Strauss used to look back with pleasure as giving the fullest and most adequate expression of his early views. The English translation by Miss Evans, published in three vols. by Chapman (1841), is from this edition. The third edition was also translated into English, but in a second-hand way from the French. It could find no London publisher, but made its appearance at Birmingham.

† Die Christliche Glaubenslehre in ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung und im Kampf mit der modernen Wissenschaft dargestellt (The Doctrines of the Christian Faith exhibited in their Historical Development and in Conflict with Modern Science) 1st vol., 1840; 2nd vol., 1841. The materials used in this work had been collected for the lectures he had intended to deliver as professor at Zürich.

Streitschriften 3, p. 58.

forced him out of Calw and the Church, and sent him back into classical paganism in search of sweet reasonableness and calm manhood. So Strauss had come to see what he and the like-minded had to expect from the Church. The days of Schleiermacher and Hegel were ended; those of Hengstenberg and the modern Julian were at hand.

But if thought within the Church was falling back on an inflexible Conservatism, it was without the Church advancing to a universal Radicalism. Absolute Idealism had been reduced to illusion; Pantheism had glided into Atheism. In 1838 the *Hallischen Jahrbücher* had been founded, and the young Hegelians had rallied round it. Arnold Ruge, Vischer, Feuerbach, Strauss, Zeller, Schwegler, Bruno Bauer, mostly Württembergers, full of enthusiasm, inspired by ideas, determined to abolish the unreasonable in the real, and build up a new world according to the ideals of the new philosophy. Strauss was at first at once the Coryphaeus and Apollo of the young Hegelians. Vischer wrote a loving and admiring notice of him for the first volume of their *Magazine*. His work was model work, showed how in religious thought principles could march to their conclusions fearless of results. But the school had too many restless spirits to live. Certain members first doubted, then denied its first principles. Feuerbach put the dot on the "i" Strauss had found.* He developed the Hegelian subjectivity into the negation of objective reality. Man could not transcend his own nature—could conceive nothing higher. What was called the "absolute" was only the expressed self of the man. God was but the revelation of our own essence. Religion was the relation of man to himself, or his own being; but to it regarded as objective, as another than himself. It was due to the action of two faculties—the imagination and the heart. The imagination read its dark and troubled phantasies into nature and history; the heart made its own needs and wishes general truths. So religion was woven out of illusions, the universal, though perhaps unconscious, hypocrisy.

Everything within and without the man was thus changed when the *Glaubenslehre* came to be written. And the change is everywhere apparent. The five eventful years which had scored themselves so deeply into his spirit make their presence felt all through his book. He is cold, objective as before; but in place of the *naïveté* which had so pleasantly flavoured his earlier work, his later has a pitiless bitterness diffused like a subtle essence through its style. He has come to hate theology, to despise theologians. Before he had meant to save faith by sacrificing its non-essentials, now he adds to the sacrifice the essentials as well. Christian dualism and speculative monism face each other, not as

* Christian Marklin, p. 125.

eternal friends, while formal enemies, but as absolute and irreconcilable foes. The spirit is made at once the Vishnu and the Siva of dogma, creating by the imagination and heart what it was forced by the reason to devour. And so, while a speculative Pantheist, he is the historian and critic of doctrines which are but illusions—

“*Rumores vacui, verbaque inania,
Et par sollicito fabula somnio.*”

The earlier and the later works differ most significantly as to formal principle. In the latter Feuerbach has modified Hegel. Religion cannot now be saved by the distinction of representation and notion. Form and matter are not, as Hegel imagined, separable.* The distinction has for the religious no existence. Religion, speculatively interpreted, is essentially changed. Forms so different as the speculative and religious must have as different contents. The absolute cannot be represented in a relative, only in an absolute form. If, then, religion exist only in the relative and representational form, and that form be inadequate to express the idea, it follows that religion cannot possess the idea or the absolute. The formal thus becomes a material difference, identity in matter impossible without identity in form. Christianity cannot be saved by being represented as the religion of the spirit, whose content is identical with the absolute content of all religion. The stream can never rise above its source. Its specific conceptions are creations of the imagination and heart, but for them the absolute can never exist, only for the reason.† Yet though there is distinction there must be likeness. Religion is the unlettered man's philosophy, philosophy the scientific man's religion. Each can satisfy the needs of the spirit; that in a dark and troubled, this in a calm and peaceful way.‡

This formal principle determined the method of the work. It was critical because historical. “The true criticism of dogma is its history.”§ “Subjective criticism is a water-pipe which any boy can shut off awhile, but criticism, as it completes itself objectively in the course of centuries, rushes onward like an impetuous torrent, which no sluices or dams can hold back.”|| History is criticism, because it describes at once the processes of growth and decay, inquires into their causes, traces both the coming and the going of illusions, shows whence they rise, why they depart, and what elements of ideal truth they leave behind. Dogma has its source in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures. These are by no means homogeneous; hold many heterogeneous ingredients. The old Hebraism was an illogical dualism, recognized an invisible God, Maker, and Master of the world, denied the immortality of man.¶ But Persian

* Glaubenslehre, i. p. 12.

† Ibid. i. p. 17.

‡ Ibid. i. pp. 22—24.

§ Ibid. i. p. 71.

|| Ibid. i. vor. p. x.

¶ Ibid. i. pp. 31 ff.

and Grecian influences modified the ancient faith, created in the bosom of Judaism the conditions that created Christianity. The religion of Jesus was a new state in which the citizens of many foreign cities were naturalized. Thought, starting from his person, made him everywhere and in all things supreme, an eternal, uncreated being, who had come to redeem, and was coming to conquer the world. The Scriptures, the Hebrew as preparatory and prophetic of Christ, the Christian as historical and explanatory, had to be gifted with an authority equal to their divine contents, and so became inspired, infallible. Thought, busied with these contents, produced, as rational or gnostic, heresy, as religious, orthodoxy. Orthodoxy had its growth forced by heresy. The Church, in guarding against private and therefore wrong opinion, definitized and generalized opinions common and therefore held right. The faith had to expand with the claims of the Church. The patristic grew into the scholastic theology. The Bible proved the Church divine and infallible, and the Church the Bible; and on these two the portentous mediæval systems were built. But these systems became intolerable burdens to thought, and precipitated the Reformation. Protestantism repudiated the Church and tradition, but built on Scripture systems that almost mocked the mediæval. Yet intellect had tasted freedom and sighed for more. Thought, both within and without the Church, became rational. Ancient heresies were elaborative, modern disintegrative of dogma. Ancient philosophy constructed, modern pulverized theology. The Socinians arose and simplified the idea of God, the Arminians broadened the authority of man. Both, in defending their positions, had to fall back on reason, and make it an authority co-ordinate with Scripture. Bacon and Descartes founded modern philosophy. It became through Leibnitz a theism; through Spinoza a Pantheism. The first became English Deism, and was demolished by the criticism of Kant. The second, revived by Schelling, elaborated and modified by Hegel, was the now victorious monistic and scientific conception of things. While the old dualism had been essential, the new monism was fatal to the Christian doctrines. To prove them to be in conflict with it was to write out their doom, and the proof was their recent history. Resistance was hopeless. *Fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt.*

The fundamental material thought of the *Glaubenslehre* is a Pantheistic monism. Creation is the evolution of deity, man externalized God. "God is the eternal movement of the universal substance, which, always making itself subject, attains in it objectivity and true reality."* "The personality of God must not be conceived as individual, but as universal personality." "He

* Vol. i. p. 523.

has eternally to cause the other of himself, Nature, to proceed from himself, in order eternally to return into himself as self-conscious spirit.* This monism determines whatever is positive in the work. When the formal principle has dissolved any doctrine, the material evolves its speculative counterpart. The divine attributes become the laws of nature,† Providence the forces immanent in the world.‡ Adam and Christ are “personified abstractions, who must cease to be balanced against each other, and against other men, if they are to be translated into the truth they represent—the concrete idea of Humanity.”§ Humanity is the God-man, bears the attributes the Church ascribed to Christ.¶ Atonement means the reconciliation of Spirit with itself, accomplished by a universal and spiritual process, which has its symbol in the death of Christ.¶ Personal immortality is the last enemy to be destroyed, but it too must go.** The only immortality science can know is realizable here, to become in the midst of the finite one with the infinite, to be eternal in every moment of time.†† With theology gone, what is to become of the Church? A system that has vanquished the old dualism can know but one logical resting-place—absorption of the Church in the State. States have encouraged Pietism, because more anxious to have obedient subjects than good citizens.‡‡ But the State is so progressing as to make the Church more and more superfluous. Art in all its branches is getting every day less religious;§§ science and theology are retiring into opposite camps; theology is now the science of the private and unskilled (*idiotischen, ιδιωτικός*) consciousness; its students are without science. “Theological study, once the means to qualify, is now the surest way to disqualify for the service of the Church. The cobbler’s stool, the counting-house, wherever one is most secure from science, are to-day better academies for the ministry than universities or seminaries. Religious ignoramuses (*idioten*) and self-made theologians, the leaders and exhorters of revival meetings (*Pietistenstunden*) are the clergy of the future.”||| Ignorance is religion, knowledge philosophy. Reconciliation is hopeless. “Therefore let the believer allow the philosopher, as the latter the former, quietly to pursue his own way. We leave to them their faith, if they will leave to us our philosophy; and should the over-saintly succeed in excluding us from their Church, we shall consider this a gain. False attempts at mediation are now done with; only separation of the opposites can lead further.”¶¶

The *Glaubenslehre* was full of unreconciled antitheses. Its

* Vol. i. p. 524.

† Vol. i. p. 613.

‡ Vol. i. p. 67.

§ Vol. ii. pp. 73, 74.

|| Vol. ii. pp. 214, 215.

¶ Vol. ii. pp. 327 ff.

** Vol. ii. pp. 697, 739.

†† Vol. ii. pp. 737, 738.

‡‡ Vol. ii. pp. 619—621.

§§ Vol. ii. pp. 621—624.

|| Vol. ii. p. 625, 626.

¶¶ Vol. i. p. 356.

Pantheism was not logically carried out, was contradicted by its conception of man. Goethe said—

"Hätte Gott mich anders gewollt
So hätte er mich anders gebaut."

But we can here say, if God is what Strauss defines him to be, man cannot be the being Strauss says he is. His theory, too, as to the relation of philosophy and religion is about the least satisfactory possible, leaves an unconquered dualism in the realm of knowledge, divides it into hemispheres, one of *Vorstellungen*, another of *Begriffe*, that can be by no means joined into a whole harmonious sphere. The work stood on principles mixed of iron and miry clay; it missed being great by being too occasional, a mirror that reflected a passing speculative phase of its author's mind and country. It bears everywhere the trace of patient work, but impatient thought—young Hegelianism become conscious of a breach with its master, using his principles not to justify but to condemn the past. History is made to furnish the factors of a metaphysical problem. The objective swings round into subjective criticism. As Mr. Lewes wrote a history of philosophy to prove that a science of metaphysics is impossible, so Strauss wrote his dogmatics to prove that Christian theology has ceased or is ceasing to be. The one saw in metaphysical speculation the pursuit of illusions that but attracted to betray, the other saw in the doctrines of the Church the castles the spirit built in the air before it got a footing in the solid rock of rational and scientific thought. But while each author gained by his assumption the intensity that comes of narrowness of vision, and the directness of aim that looks like strength, each lost in an equal degree the breadth of view which is essential to historical perspective—the insight and oversight possible to the man who studies our seekers after truth as real men in search of real things. The most fallacious speculation is the speculation which uses history to prove its principles and establish its conclusions. Facts made the symbols of *à priori* thought are facts misused, because misconstrued. Strauss' worst faults in all his periods were due to the quality of mind that made him a speculative thinker disguised as an historian. He was always manipulating, making or unmaking, exaggerating or diminishing, facts, that they might become vehicles of his thought. From this cause his *Glaubenslehre* is vitiated throughout. Christianity is judged by principles of a transient speculative mood, and held to be condemned. A small section of negative thinkers is made equal to modern science. He hallooed, not only before he is out of the wood, but before he is well into it. Then he has a curious notion of Christianity. It seems to him to become the more Christian the more doctrinally extensive

it gets. He does not allow himself to imagine that it may die through excess as well as through defect. Hence he holds every increase of its doctrines growth, every decrease decay. But a religion as well as a man may perish through obesity. To reduce a faith may be to purify and strengthen it. The very points Strauss emphasizes as proving the decadence may be made to prove the rejuvenescence of Christianity. The removal of the systems that have been built round the faith need not destroy, may rather tend to disclose it. The history can, therefore, be made to bear another and more natural interpretation than its author's. What he terms its development or upbuilding may be termed its diseased growth, or extinction by parasites; what he explains as dissolution, we may explain as regeneration and resurrection. And his earlier allusion to a Christianity more Christian than the primitive, shows that Strauss himself had had a glimpse of the truth he now conveniently forgot.

From this point Strauss forsook for twenty years the thorny paths of theology. Of these years the first ten were marked by domestic and political events and anxieties; the second by his happiest, because purest, literary work. He was married on the 26th of August, 1842, to Agnes Schebest, an accomplished woman, then well known as a singer, later as an authoress. The marriage was full of promise, which was never fulfilled. Husband and wife had to part without either leaving to the other the memory of a "fair companionship" broken and beautified by death. Of the storms that wrecked his happiness this separation he thought the worst, and he so expresses the thought as to make us feel how happy he had been had his wife been like his mother.* His loss was great. Had he been a happier man he had been a better critic. His hard experiences tended to embitter his irony and sour his humour. He had an eye quick at seeing and a pen graceful at describing the æsthetics of home affection; but, related to it as an artist rather than as a man, he was without the sweeter and serener qualities the enjoyment of it can give. One cannot read certain of his short essays, bathed in the soft light of loving reminiscence, without wishing that a happy home had been to him less of a vision and more of a reality.

His political were no happier than his domestic relations. 1835 was the forerunner of 1848. The speculative radicalism invaded politics and pressed forward to Revolution, while conservatism built dykes against it. On the one hand, root and branch reform in Church and State was advocated; on the other, the cry was raised as to the solidarity of the conservative interests. On the one side, thought became ever more extravagantly negative; the absolute egotism of Max Stirner superseded the humanism of Feuer-

* *Kleine Schriften*, N. F., p. 268.

bach, but only to go down before a less refined materialism. On the other, neo-Lutheranism, guided by Stahl and Hengstenberg, and carrying with it Friedrich Wilhelm IV., became more and more intolerant, averse to the mildest conciliation, hating alike the theology and polity of the moderate and mediating union party. Hence came one of Strauss' happiest literary efforts. He paralleled Julian the Apostate and Friedrich Wilhelm.* The Apostate Emperor was made the mirror of the Evangelical King. His aims, acts, qualities, counsellors, were reflected in those of Julian, and hit off with subtle irony and genial satire. He thus seemed in polity, as in theology, a typical radical, and so was invited by certain electors of Ludwigsburg to stand as a candidate for a seat in the Parliament, which was to meet at Frankfurt.† He failed; the clerical influence, not in the town, but in the rural districts, being too strong for him. Soon after, when the election was urban, he was returned to the Parliament of Würtemberg, but did not long retain his seat. If the clergy opposed his election, the radicals compelled his resignation. While too radical in theology for the former, he was too conservative in politics for the latter. He thought the Government too orthodox to be left unreformed, but did not think the masses ripe for a republic.‡ He proudly laid down the honour the popular vote had given, possibly with the *odi profanum vulgus* intensified.

On his withdrawal from politics the period of his purer literary activity began (1848-60). Its fruits were a series of classical biographies, each more or less representative of the struggle between Religion and Culture, or rather Ecclesiasticism and Humanism. The leader of the series was a Life of the brilliant but unfortunate poet Schubart,§ whose blunt, brave spirit, mirrored in his letters, was shown doing battle against untoward circumstances, professional, domestic, political, and disciplined by a weary imprisonment into patient magnanimity. Then came Christian Märklin,|| a contemporary portrait, with many miniatures and autobiographic details filled in, a picture of the tendencies that had created Strauss, painted from the standpoint of the creature. He next recalled from neglect into notice Nicodemus Frischlin,¶ critic, scholar, poet, patriot, who had taught the past to instruct the present; had offended old by introducing new modes of classical inquiry; had made Paganism revive to rebuke Lutheranism; and had perished while attempting to escape from the prison into which jealousy

* Der Romantiker auf der Throne der Cäsaren, oder Julian der Abtrünnige, 1847.

† The speeches, which are not without autobiographical interest, delivered while on his electioneering tour were afterwards published:—Sechs theologisch-politische Volksreden. 1848.

‡ For his political position see Christian Märklin, Zehntes Kap.

§ Schubart's Leben in seinen Briefen. 1849. 2 vols.

|| Christian Märklin, Ein Lebens- und Charakterbild aus der Gegenwart, 1851. 1 vol.

¶ Leben und Schriften des Dichters und Philologen N. Frischlins, 1855.

had thrown him. The work that followed was the beautiful monograph on Ulrich von Hutten,* knight, scholar, poet, satirist, whose satire consumed rather than scorched what it touched. It was certainly a *Tendenzschrift*, meant to show that, while the Humanists alone could not have accomplished the Reformation, Luther's reign was now ended and Hutten's ought to begin. Humanism was the broad and glittering Rhine at Bingen, needing to be narrowed and chafed by religious enthusiasm into wild strength before it could force its way through the mountains to the sea.† Hutten had united in him the culture of the humanist and the energy of the enthusiast, but it was enthusiasm for freedom, fatherland, and humanity. So his spirit still lives and storms against those "who would plant a new Papacy in the very bosom of Protestantism, the princes who exalt their will into law, the scholars who place circumstances and expediciencies above truth. It burns in us as hate for everything ungenerous, unfree, and untrue, but glows in us as enthusiasm for the honour and greatness of the fatherland."‡ This aim became more manifest in his next work, an edition of Hutten's Dialogues,§ which, like ancient warriors stripped of their rusty mail, and clothed in the modern regimentals of supple and trenchant German, were sent forth to do battle against the Protestantism that had become a Papacy. The preface that introduced the translations pointed their moral. It celebrated with grim humour the semi-jubilee of the *Leben Jesu*,|| and signaled its author's return to his ancient battle-field. The harmonists of science and religion he rated as little better than knaves. Ewald was abused in terms he himself could hardly have surpassed. The old story of the modern classics being non-Christian was re-told. The positions of "The Old Faith and the New" were in part anticipated. It had long been an open secret that men of culture and thought had ceased to believe the Church dogmas. The Apostles' Creed, or the Augsburg Confession, no one acknowledged as an adequate expression of his faith.¶ And as with the laity, so with the clergy, evasions, hypocrisies before others and one's own conscience, were the order of the day. Why not out with the truth? The moral contents of Christianity and the character of its Founder can be held fast, but let all else go. Whether when it is gone we may still be called Christians is a small matter. What's in a name? "This I know, we shall then, and only then, be once more true and honest men, bound to nothing false, and therefore better than hitherto."***

A. M. FAIRBAIRN.


(To be continued.)

* Ulrich von Hutten. 1858. 2 vols.

† Vol. ii. 300.

‡ Vol. ii. p. 367.

§ Gespräche von Ulrich von Hutten, übersetzt und erläutert von D. F. Strauss, Leipzig. 1860. || P. liv. ¶ P. l. ** P. lii.



THE LATEST THEORY ABOUT BACON.

MR. SPEDDING, a professional in things Baconian, having caught me trespassing on his preserves, and finding me resolute not to serve him as under-gamekeeper, wishes to trample upon me as a meddling amateur. I hope to show, however, that even an amateur coming to a subject fresh, may have advantages over a professional who has devoted five-and-twenty years to over-training. Mr. Spedding complains that in the introduction to my edition of Bacon's Essays I have "either overlooked things that appear to him important, or have silently set them aside as irrelevant." The latter is the truer statement. I have not overlooked any of his facts, but I have been forced to set aside as irrelevant a good many facts that were not really facts, but only Mr. Spedding's surmises. Considerations of space—and, as I then thought, of good taste, having regard to my obligations to Mr. Spedding—obliged me then to set them aside "silently." In an introduction dealing with Bacon as a philosopher, a theologian, a politician, and a moralist, it was obviously impossible to say—as I might have said six or seven times in a page—that I did not think Mr. Spedding's facts warranted Mr. Spedding's conclusions, and to give my reasons for so thinking in each case. But instead of being grateful to me for not exposing his errors, Mr. Spedding is ungrateful, and complains of my "silence." In a forthcoming work I trust to make up for past deficiencies and silences, in such a manner as to leave

Mr. Spedding no room for a repetition of his complaints; but meantime, though I am painfully aware that within the limits of this article I cannot do him justice, yet I will ask him to accept these pages as a first instalment of what he wants. Even in these, I hope to convince Mr. Spedding that I have not "overlooked" his facts, and to convince every one except Mr. Spedding that I was justified in "setting them aside as irrelevant." But before proceeding to Mr. Spedding's facts, one word about my much misrepresented "theory."

What Mr. Spedding dignifies with the name of "the latest theory about Bacon" consists simply in calling attention to three points:—

(1). That preoccupation with vast and beneficent schemes may produce an inattention to the rules of morality which, though culpable enough, is somewhat less culpable than simple disregard of them in comparison with one's own interests.

(2). That a man may come to persuade himself that to pursue the good of mankind through science is the substance of virtue, and therefore that anything that advances science is lawful. Substitute for "the good of mankind" the "good of the State," and for "science" "politics," and we have here the exact theory of Machiavelli; and I have shown that in morals Bacon was greatly influenced by Machiavelli. It is in this spirit that a recent impassioned advocate of vivisection declared that "*the pursuit of scientific truth is the highest, and most civilizing, and most compassionate work in which a man can engage.*"

(3). That intellectual faults may lead to immoral actions, particularly where the moral instincts are feeble, and that Bacon's intellectual faults, as seen in his philosophy, are just of the kind that would lead to moral faults. In estimating Bacon's character, his philosophy is not altogether to be left out of account; and so far from there being a great gulf between Bacon in action and Bacon in speculation, they appear to me, on the contrary, closely connected. Bacon's philosophy professes to command nature by obeying her; Bacon as a moralist and a politician appears to me to have attempted to command the world by obeying the world. In philosophy Dr. Fischer lays stress on Bacon's "suppleness" and compliance with nature, never prescribing to her, but following her through all her windings with obsequious observation; in politics and action Hallam lays no less stress on Bacon's "incomparable ductility:" "ductility" in politics and in morals seems to me to correspond naturally with "suppleness" in philosophic speculation. As a philosopher, Bacon's lofty and discursive mind framed vast visions of world-wide discoveries, but in his practical investigations neglected little details, the neglect of which rendered failure inevitable; Bacon as a statesman and moralist seems

to me to have erred in the same way by fixing his mind on colossal plans for benefiting his country and mankind, while neglecting the plain duties that lay before him. The sanguine spirit in philosophy that sustained him through years of expectation—still cheerful, hopeful, confident of ultimate success—appears to me to go hand in hand with that same sanguine spirit which in politics led him to look on James as a Solomon, on himself as Solomon's counsellor and inspirer, and on Villiers as the young and rising spirit who would look up to Bacon as a father, and give the shape of action to the theories of his philosophic statesmanship. Lord Macaulay's theory opposes Bacon the politician to Bacon the philosopher; my modification of his theory attempts to reconcile the two. Lord Macaulay exhibits Bacon as two halves. I have attempted to exhibit him as a whole.

All this, of course, does not excuse Bacon, or assert that he is morally pardonable because he is intellectually admirable. On the contrary, it presupposes a certain initial deadness of moral feeling, an absence of response to the appeals that in ordinary minds stir some chords of unselfish pity, or self-risking gratitude, or sympathetic indignation against wrong, or at least some deterring dread of the Nemesis attending offences against the most ordinary social feeling. Such a character is not to be admired, nor to be excused; it is to be condemned. But before condemning, the judge should have all the facts before him. Now, Mr. Spedding ingeniously tries to make me out guilty at the same time of excessive moral laxity and of excessive severity. I convict Bacon, he says, of all sorts of faults of which he is not guilty, and then let him off on the score of the grandeur of his intellect. I accuse Mr. Spedding of exactly the opposite error. He affects to be very rigid in his moral principles, but in his estimate of actions he is utterly lax. Both faults are, no doubt, serious. If I could be proved to have let off Bacon, as a great genius, for faults for which an ordinary man would be condemned, I should be ready to admit my error.* But of the two, the error attributed to me seems the less dangerous. If I give a paradoxical explanation of the facts, I fail to persuade; but at all events I honestly admit the facts. But Mr. Spedding, with his affected impartial rigour, is likely to do much harm. He does not tamper with principles, but he tampers with facts, so smothering some of them with surmises, commentaries, and

* I must take this opportunity to confess that one sentence (the last) in my Introduction to the Essays is fairly open to the charge of being inconsistent with the tenor of the rest of the Introduction and with the view advocated here. That sentence was not in the original text as seen in proof by Mr. Spedding, but was too hastily inserted under a kind of pressure or gentle coercion exercised by him through the medium of the criticism with which he very kindly favoured me at my request while my work was passing through the press. In a future Edition I hope to have an opportunity of cancelling it. I shall have so much occasion to complain of misrepresentation that I gladly admit here, that Mr. Spedding was perfectly justified in taking advantage of my weak concession to him, to make a most effective peroration to his second Article.

illogical inferences, that the reader, being absolutely dependent upon Mr. Spedding, is led completely astray. I shall now show how little value is to be attached to some of Mr. Spedding's "facts," and will prove, beyond the possibility of dispute, that the real facts of Bacon's life are quite incompatible with Mr. Spedding's theory about Bacon—which is this, that he was a man who "all his life long had thought *more of his duty than his fortune* doing with his heart whatever his hand found to do, *without consideration of reward*" (viii. 284); "all his life long he had been *studying to know and to speak the truth*;" and Mr. Spedding further doubts "whether *there was ever any man whose evidence upon matters of fact may be more absolutely relied on.*"

I.

To the facts then: and, taking Mr. Spedding where he seems to be strongest, let us analyse such of his facts as bear on Bacon's conduct to Essex. In strict accordance with his perfect confidence in Bacon's veracity, Mr. Spedding not only implicitly accepts every statement made by Bacon in his "Apology," but also does not shrink from championing the Report—for which Bacon himself admits that he was responsible as penman—commonly known as "The Declarations of the Treasons of Essex," and described by Lord Clarendon as "a pestilent libel," but by Mr. Spedding as "a narrative strictly and scrupulously veracious." "Nobody," he adds, "has yet attempted to specify any particular untruth expressed or implied in the Government Declaration." This is an intimidating statement; but I shall not shrink from being the first, if I am the first, to attempt to specify some particular untruths expressed or implied in this "veracious narrative;" and I believe Mr. Spedding will have to admit that, at least, some of these are untruths.

1. The Declaration states (II. 247) that it sets down "*the very confessions and testimonies themselves*, word for word taken out of the originals." This is not true. The confessions are garbled, and purposely garbled. There is a letter from Cecil (II. 314) expressly requesting the omission of certain words from the evidence because they would look "too suspicious." Mr. Jardine is quite right in saying that many of the omitted passages (some of which are marked "om." in Coke's or Bacon's handwriting) materially weaken the case against Essex.

2. "So likewise those points of popularity which every man took notice and note of, as his affable gestures, &c., were either *the qualities of a nature disposed to disloyalty*, or the *beginnings and conceptions of that which afterwards grew to shape and form.*"

Contrast this with Bacon's own advice to Essex in 1596: "The

third impression is of a popular reputation ; which, because it is a thing good in itself, being obtained as your Lordship obtaineth it, that is, *bonis artibus* (and besides, well governed, it is one of the best flowers of your greatness both present and to come), it would be handled tenderly. The only way is to quench it *verbis* and not *rebus*: and therefore to take all occasions, to the Queen to *speake* against popularity and popular courses vehemently, and to *say* it in all others: but nevertheless to go on in your honourable commonwealth *business as you do*."

3. "It was strange with what appetite and thirst he did affect and compass the government of Ireland." Untrue. We have Cecil's own testimony that the Earl was unwilling to go. "The cup," said the Secretary, "will hardly pass from him."

4. "He meant besides to engage himself in other journeys that should hinder the prosecution in the North." Not true. He wished to prosecute the journey to the North at once, but was dissuaded by his Council.

5. "He did voluntarily engage himself in an unseasonable and fruitless journey into Munster, a journey never propounded in the council there, never advertised over hither while it was past." Untruth, No. 1 (amplified): The Council had itself "propounded a journey into Leinster," and the journey into Munster was simply an extension of that, arising from the invitation of the President of Munster. Untruth, No. 2: Cecil, the Earl's chief enemy, writing from England, announced to Sir H. Neville in France the intention of Essex to pass into Munster, and announces it without any disapproval. Here are Cecil's own words: "For the time of the year not serving to pass into Ulster (to break the head of the rebellion) till the month of June, within twenty days his Lordship began a journey into Leinster, and from thence *intends* (note *intends*, not *intended*) to pass into Munster, with a purpose to secure those provinces, that thereby the main action of Ulster may be proceeded with, with less distraction."† It is therefore false to say that the journey was "never advertised over hither while it was past."

6. "And with this message (an offer of Tyrone to make Essex the greatest man in England) this examine made the Earl of Essex acquainted before his coming to this examine's house, at that time when this examine was sent to Tyrone [*and the Earl of Essex shook his head at it and gave no certain answer to it*]." By suppressing the expression of Essex's dissent, the Government

* Birch, ii. 394. Abundant proof could be given of this: and Professor Brewer has recently forwarded to me copies of two letters from Essex to Southampton, 1 January, 1599, and from Blount to Essex, 3 January, 1599, which place Essex's unwillingness beyond question. That to Southampton, begins: "Into Ireland I go; the Queen hath irrevocably decreed it, the Council do passionately urge it, and I am tied in my own reputation to use no tergiversation." (lviii. 86.)

† Winwood Memorials, May 23.

untruthfully exaggerated the force of Lee's evidence. And to prevent any cross-examination of Lee (which was allowed to Essex in the case of Sir Ferdinando Gorge) the Government had Lee executed two days before the trial of Essex.

7. "A little before my Lord's coming over into England," a treasonable conversation took place. Not true. A sentence in Blount's confession distinctly states the date: "this was some time before the Earl's journey to the north." But this is suppressed by the Government for the purpose of causing the treasonable conversation in Dublin to appear to have sprung out of an understanding with Tyrone, and to have been immediately acted upon by the return of Essex to England. This is evident from the following passage in the Declaration—"But on the Earl of Essex's part ensued immediately after this parley a strange motion and project, which though no doubt he had harboured in his breast before, yet for anything yet appeareth, he did not utter and break with any in it, before he had been confirmed and justified in his purpose by the combination and correspondence which he found in Tyrone upon their conference." Mr. Spedding himself admits that he is "driven to the conclusion" that the date in the Declaration is wrong.*

8. "Condescending to Blunt's advice to surprise the Court, he did pursue that plot accordingly." Not true. He took six men to court. "Blunt's advice" had been given in an idle conversation six weeks before, which had dropped, and nothing had come of it. But Bacon transposes the date in order, by "a little mixture of a lie," to magnify a few hasty words into a deliberate conspiracy.

9. "The principal article of them (Tyrone's conditions of peace) being that there should be a general restitution of rebels in Ireland to all their lands and possessions that they could pretend any right to before their going out into rebellion." Probably untrue; not proved. The document printed by Mr. Spedding as "Tyrone's Propositions"—"an enclosure, I suppose," he says, in a letter of Cecil's—is demonstrably spurious; and there are no grounds for thinking that Cecil enclosed anything in the letter mentioned by Mr. Spedding. Writing to Neville, on the 18th September—that is, eleven days after the parley between Essex and Tyrone, Cecil does enclose "an abstract of proceedings which my Lord hath held." What the "proceedings" were we do not know, for the enclosure is not preserved; but we do know that Cecil considered them, so far, promising. And that Sir H. Neville was of the same opinion, is clear from his reply—"Your honour hath imparted to me the substance of a parley between the Earl of Essex and Tyrone, for which I must humbly thank you, and beseech God there may

* Even those who are familiar with Mr. Spedding's most determined prejudices may be surprised to hear that he thinks the true date makes the case worse for Essex.

*grow a good conclusion thereof, to her Majesty's quiet and contentment."**

10. In the second confession of Sir Ferdinando Gorge, the Government suppressed a passage stating that on the Tuesday before the insurrection (September 3) no definite plan had been resolved on, but "we brake up and *resolved of nothing*, but referred all to my Lord of Essex himself." In the confessions of Sir John Davies and of Sir Christopher Blount, the Government suppressed similar passages.

To these misstatements we may add those in the "Apology," and also the discrepancies between the "Apology" and certain letters:—

1. Bacon says in the "Apology" that he dissuaded the Earl of Essex by certain arguments from going to Ireland; whereas there is evidence that he, by those very arguments, when correctly represented, encouraged him to go.

2. He declares in the "Apology" that he excused himself to the Queen for absence from the Star Chamber on the ground of illness; whereas an extant letter proves that he excused himself on the ground that his devotion to the Queen's service made him so unpopular with Essex's faction, as to endanger his life.

3. In certain letters written for Essex and Anthony Bacon, he declares that the Queen was unwilling to call Essex to trial. In the "Apology" he states that she was bent upon it, and that he strove vainly to divert her.

4. In the same letters and in others Bacon recognises the existence of dangerous enemies to Essex in attendance on the Queen. In the trial for treason he ignores the existence of such enemies, and accuses Essex of hypocrisy in feigning their existence.

To demonstrate in detail the inaccuracies of the Declaration, would be impossible within the limits of this article; I can only pledge myself to do this hereafter. But it will be quite possible at once to show the misstatements in Bacon's "Apology," and this we will proceed to do. To begin, then, with Bacon's advice to Essex before the Earl set out for Ireland. Bacon would have us believe that he sedulously dissuaded his patron from undertaking that fatal enterprise; and accordingly, with childlike simplicity, Mr. Spedding believes it. "Of the advice," says Mr. Spedding, "which Bacon did in fact give, we must be content with his own report, there being no other record of it," and he then proceeds to quote the "record" from Bacon's "Apology." But Mr. Spedding is mistaken. There is another "record," namely, in one of Bacon's extant letters; and the "record" of the letter contradicts the

* *Winwood Memorials*.—I gladly acknowledge my obligations to Professor Brewer, who supplied me with other cogent arguments demonstrating the spuriousness of this document, when I communicated my suspicions to him.

“record” of the “Apology.” The reader shall have the opportunity of comparing the two “records” :—

Letter.—“Your late note of my silence in your occasions hath made me set down these few and wandering lines, as one that would say somewhat and can say nothing, touching your Lordship’s intended charge for Ireland. But I am at the last point first, *some good spirit leading me to presage success.* For first, looking into the course of God’s providence in things now depending, and calling to consideration how great things God hath done by her Majesty and for her, I collect he hath disposed of this great defection in Ireland, *thereby to give an urgent occasion to the reduction of that whole kingdom—and so the honour countervaieth the adventure.* Of which honour your Lordship is in no small possession, when that her Majesty hath made choice of you (*merely out of her Royal judgment, her affection inclining rather to continue your attendance*), into whose hand and trust to put the commandment and conduct of so great forces.

“And if any man be of opinion *that the nature of the enemy doth extenuate the honour of the service*, being but a rebel and a savage—I differ from him. For I see the justest triumphs that the Romans in their greatness did obtain were of such an enemy as this, that is, people barbarous and not reduced to civility, magnifying a kind of lawless liberty, prodigal in life, *hardened in body, fortified in woods and bogs, and placing both justice and felicity in the sharpness of their swords.* Such were the Germans and the ancient Britons and divers others.”

Apology.—“Touching his going into Ireland, it pleased him expressly and in a set manner to desire mine opinion and counsel. At which time I did not only *dissuade, but protest against his going*: telling him with as much vehemency and asseveration as I could, that absence in that kind *would exulcerate the Queen’s mind*, whereby it would not be possible for him to carry himself so as to give her sufficient contentment. And *because I would omit no argument*, I remember I stood also upon the difficulty of the action: setting before him out of histories that the Irish were such an enemy as *the ancient Gauls or Germans or Britons* were: and we saw how the Romans . . . yet when they came to deal with enemies which placed their *felicity only in liberty and the sharpness of their sword*, and had the natural elemental advantages of *bogs and woods, and hardness of bodies*, they ever found that their hands were full of them: and therefore concluded that going over with such expectation as he did, and through the churlishness of the enterprise not likely to answer, it would mightily *diminish his reputation.* . . . For I did *as plainly see his overthrow chained as it were by destiny to that journey, as it is possible for any man to ground a judgment upon future contingents.*”

The reader will perceive that in writing the “Apology,” Bacon’s memory served him here—as in some other passages to be mentioned below—so badly that he could only remember one or two things that he actually said, and invented a great many other things that he did not say, but afterwards thought he ought to have said. Essex *had* expressly asked his advice, and he *had* given it; moreover, in giving it, he *had* mentioned the “Gauls” and “ancient Britons,” their “woods and bogs,” and the “hardness of their bodies;” but he had brought forward these historical references not to deter Essex, but to encourage him; instead of “seeing his overthrow chained as it were by destiny to that journey,” he had “presaged success;” instead of predicting that

absence would "exulcerate the Queen's mind," he had congratulated Essex that "Her Majesty had made choice of him merely out of her royal judgment, her affection inclining rather to continue his attendance;" instead of predicting that it would "mightily diminish his reputation," he had declared that "the honour countervaileth the adventure."

I do not know how Mr. Spedding can explain these evident contradictions. The only way out of the difficulty that suggests itself to me is to resort to a device once familiar enough in the explanation of legendary and mythological discrepancies and inconsistencies, but now somewhat discredited—it may be called the Lempriere hypothesis. In Lempriere's dictionary, I believe, whenever a mythical personage was found to have been born in two different places, or to have done anything else exposing two different traditions to the charge of being incompatible, the usual solution was to suppose that "there were two persons of that name." And Mr. Spedding may possibly find a solution of the present difficulty in a similar hypothesis. He may suppose that there were *two* discourses on the Irish expedition, both arising from the express request of Essex, and both mentioning the "Romans," the "Gauls" and "ancient Britons," the "bogs and woods," the "sharpness of their swords," and the "hardness of their bodies," but in other respects entirely different, or rather opposite, the one deprecating, the other recommending the expedition to Ireland. The advice might have been given earlier, while the command of the expedition was still an open question: the letter, Mr. Spedding may urge, might have been written later when Essex was definitely appointed past recall. In the desperate condition in which Mr. Spedding must needs be placed if he is to reconcile the "Apology" with the Letters, he may fairly claim all indulgence, and I have no disposition to refuse him, if he desires it, the refuge of the Lempriere hypothesis.* But it is not without other difficulties besides its essential improbability. In the first place, it is not creditable to the memory either of Essex or of Bacon that the "Gauls and ancient Britons" should be thus utilized in the space of a few weeks, for the purpose of deducing opposite conclusions. In the next place, if the letter just quoted was written after Essex's command had been definitely settled, it must have been written between the 15th of March, on which day it was settled, and the 27th of March, on which day Essex set out. Give Mr. Spedding every chance, and suppose the letter was written only a day or two before the Earl set out, say on the 24th

* I hardly like to assert that Mr. Spedding actually adopts this hypothesis; but his remarks (ii. 129) certainly lead to the conclusion that he adopts it: "In reminding him *once more of the dangers which awaited him*, to rouse his ambition to encounter and overcome them, is the task to which Bacon now addresses himself."

of March. Yet in the letter it appears that Essex had *lately* (say a week ago, on the 17th of March) reproached Bacon with being "silent in his occasions." It is clear that such "silence" must have extended over some considerable time, two or three weeks at the least, and therefore it would follow that *for two or three weeks at the least, say from the 1st of March to the 17th, Essex had received no counsel, no advice, no warning from Bacon.* But we have seen that there was *room for counsel up to the 15th*, for up to that time Essex had not definitely received his commission, and on the 1st of March Essex is declared to be "so dissatisfied that it is doubtful whether he will go." It would appear therefore that even according to the Lempriere hypothesis, Bacon instead of protesting "with vehemency and asseveration" at the time when matters were still undecided, and when he might have prevailed on Essex to give up the enterprise—was "*silent in his friend's occasions.*" But how improbable and desperate the Lempriere hypothesis is will be apparent to everybody whose judgment is unbiassed by a determination to prove that Bacon is one who "all his life long had been studying to know and speak the truth."

In the next place, let us ask what part did Bacon play during his friend's imprisonment. He professes in the "Apology" to have strenuously and perseveringly advocated his cause with the Queen. According to his account when he heard that my Lord was come over and that he was committed to his chamber, he *repaired as his duty was to Nonsuch* and "talked with him privately about a quarter of an hour, and he asked mine opinion of the course which was taken with him; I told him, My Lord, *Nubecula est, cito transibit*; it is but a mist," &c. Now, curiously enough, we have a letter from Bacon written, as Mr. Spedding admits, immediately "on hearing that Essex had been committed to his chamber," and it contains this same expression "*Nubecula est,*" &c. At that time Bacon had not seen Essex, but wrote "referring all to some time when I may see your Lordship." Now, as Mr. Spedding well says,* the news that Essex had been confined to his chamber could not reach Bacon in London till Saturday the 29th of September, so that this letter could not be written till that day. But on Monday the 1st October, Essex was committed to the close custody of the Lord Keeper, and from that day for many months saw no one. Bacon himself freely confesses that he never dreamed even of writing to his friend during his nine months' imprisonment, but only "as soon as ever he was at his liberty, whereby I *might without peril of the Queen's indignation write to him.*" It is obvious therefore that if Bacon wrote to Essex on the 29th hoping to see him shortly, either that hope *must have been disappointed*, or it

* Vol. ii. 153.

must have been fulfilled next day, i.e., Sunday the 30th. Now it is certainly possible that what we called just now the Lempriere hypothesis may be true here, viz., that there was first a speech and then a letter, both to the same effect, and both partly in the same words, and that Bacon wrote "*Nubecula est*" on Saturday, and then said it on Sunday. But it seems *à priori* unlikely. However, here again, I will not grudge Mr. Spedding the refuge of the Lempriere hypothesis.

But the demonstrable falsehood on which I shall now touch, may spare us the trouble of dwelling on all the possible or probable falsehoods of the "Apology." In order to quiet the murmurs of the people who were astounded at the Queen's severity to Essex, a Declaration was made on the 29th November in the Star Chamber, of the principal faults laid to the Earl's charge. Now from this proceeding in the Star Chamber Bacon absented himself, and, fairly enough, claims merit for it. "The Queen," he says, "did directly charge me that I was absent that day at the Star Chamber, which was very true: but I alleged some indisposition of body to excuse it." A falsehood comparatively venial, though surely it ought to have been unnecessary. Bacon, as Mr. Spedding himself admits, "was not wanted in his place," and it was only seemly for Essex's most intimate friend, on such an occasion to avoid superfluous presence. But, unfortunately for Bacon's reputation for truthfulness, we have, in a letter extant, the actual excuse sent by him to the Queen for his absence; and it will be found, first, that he did not make illness his excuse, secondly, that he excused himself on grounds the fittest possible to conciliate the Queen to himself, and to exasperate her against Essex. His excuse was simply this, that he durst not serve the Queen against Essex, because the Queen's service was so unpopular: and he insinuates, not obscurely, that the friends of Essex threatened the Queen, as well as himself. Here are his exact words:—

"I most humbly entreat your Majesty, not to impute my absence to any weakness of mind or unworthiness. But I assure your Majesty I do find every beating so strongly upon me, standing as I do (if this be to stand), as it were not strength of mind, but stupidity, not to decline the occasions; except I could do your Majesty more service than I can any ways discern that I am able to do. . . My life hath been threatened and my name libelled, which I count an honour. But these are the practices of those whose despairs are dangerous, but yet not so dangerous as their hopes—or else the devices of some that would put out all your Majesty's lights, and fall on reckoning how many years you have reigned."

Even setting aside the falsehood, can we possibly acquit Bacon here of entirely subordinating the interests and indeed the safety of his friend to his own personal aggrandisement, and to the desire of currying favour with the Queen by showing himself off in the character of her devoted and slandered champion?

Lest it should be said that Bacon was not aware of the mischief he was doing his friend, we may bring forward a sentence from a letter written by him to Lord Henry Howard at the very same time, clearly showing that he knew the mischief these reports and rumours were doing the Earl. "For my part I have deserved better than to have my name subjected to envy, or my life to a ruffian's violence. But I have the privy coat of a good conscience. *I am sure these courses and bruits hurt my Lord more than all.*" Of course they *did* hurt Essex; then why parade them before the Queen? Why to these "bruits" add suspicions of dangerous plots latent beneath the frothy violence of a few of the Earl's noisy partisans? I do not accuse Bacon of so far siding with Cecil as to deliberately attempt to ruin Essex; but I do accuse him of being blind to the interests of his former friend, and keenly alive to his own. And over and above all, there remains the irrefutable charge of falsehood against the man who, according to Mr. Spedding's account, "all his life long had been *studying to know and speak the truth.*"

We pass next to the petty part played by Bacon in the proceedings at York House on the 5th June, 1600, one of the most contemptible actions in Bacon's life.* The Queen, it would seem, finding no charges against Essex serious enough to warrant her in bringing him before the Star Chamber, determined to call the Earl before an informal tribunal where he was to be arraigned not for disloyalty nor for treason, but for contempt and disobedience. In these proceedings it had not been arranged that Bacon should have any part; it had been left open. But Bacon, according to his own account, fearing that he had offended the Queen by his advocacy of Essex, "*and suspecting it also to be a stratagem arising from some particular emulation (i.e., fearing Coke would gain favour while he remained in the background),*" writ to her two or three words of compliment signifying to her Majesty that if she would be pleased to spare me in my Lord of Essex's cause, I should reckon it for one of her highest favours; *but otherwise,*" &c. In accordance with this "*but otherwise,*" Bacon was instructed to "set forth some undutiful carriage of my Lord in giving occasion to a seditious pamphlet, as it was termed, which was dedicated unto him." Let us concede to Bacon's strange notions of gratitude and friendship, that, as one of the Queen's Counsel, having received this task for which he had volunteered, he was bound to handle it as he tells us he did handle it, "not

* Mr. Spedding charges me with not knowing the difference between the proceedings at York House and the final trial for treason. I admit at once that my brief reference to Bacon's conduct here would have justified the charge from any one who did not know, as Mr. Spedding might have known, that I had carefully studied the facts. But my error was one of obscurity, not of ignorance. I assumed that everybody knew the difference, and desiring to be as brief as possible, I expressed myself carelessly.

tenderly." Yet was there any excuse for travelling outside those narrow and prescribed limits, for raking up expressions out of letters from Essex to Egerton, for accusing the Earl of having said that "there was no tempest to the indignation of a passionate prince," for charging Essex with likening the Queen to Pharaoh for the hardness of her heart, because the Earl had said that "the Queen's heart was obdurate"—charges affecting the Earl's personal relations with the Queen, and likely to exasperate her against him far more than more important accusations of formal misconduct? Surely this behaviour is not covered by Bacon's pitiful apology, "I could not avoid that part that was laid upon me!"

But Bacon gives another excuse for his conduct. It was justified, he says, by the intention he had to uphold himself "in credit and strength with the Queen, *the better to be able to do my Lord good services afterwards.*" Let us investigate the truthfulness of this claim. Mr. Spedding declares that "these services (*i.e.*, friendly services of Bacon to Essex) commenced the next day (after the proceedings at York House) in a private conversation with the Queen." But, for this, we have only Bacon's own evidence, and we have seen that unfortunately Bacon managed, whether consciously or not, to make his "private conversations with the Queen" very useful to himself but very injurious to his friend. We shall, therefore, be on safer ground when we pass from Bacon's conversations to Bacon's letters. Mr. Spedding finds proofs of Bacon's zeal in the celerity with which he began his good work for Essex, "the next day," and they "were followed up *shortly after* by a letter to the Earl." Now considering that Essex was released from his keeper on the 5th July, there are no signs of any impatient yearning for intercourse in the fact that Bacon let slip *fifteen* days before he sent to Essex (on the 20th July) the first *letter he had written to his friend during a space of more than eleven months.* Once more, therefore, in the "Apology," Bacon's memory is detected in being conveniently inaccurate, when it enables him to say, "I did also signify my intention to my Lord *as soon as ever he was at his liberty*, whereby I might, without peril of the Queen's indignation, write to him." But Mr. Spedding may reply that although Bacon was released from his keeper on the 5th July, he was not altogether released till afterwards. My answer is that his full release did not take place till the 26th August: so that Bacon cannot have been waiting for that full release in order to write a letter dated the 20th July. It is clear, then, that he could have written on the 6th July, and that he did not write till the 20th. There is, therefore, nothing left for Mr. Spedding but to admit that, whereas Bacon in his "Apology" professed to have written to his friend immediately upon his

release, as a matter of fact he did not write till fifteen days afterwards, and this at a time when the fortunes of Essex were in their very crisis, and when a word from a friend might have changed his destiny.

The "good services" were of a very tortuous nature. They consisted in writing letters in the name of Essex to Anthony Bacon, and in the name of Anthony Bacon to Essex, which letters, being shown by Bacon to the Queen, were to produce a favourable impression upon her. They were certainly most artistically composed, the impassioned antithetical euphuistic prose of Essex being admirably imitated, and Essex being made in the course of one of his letters to request his correspondent to burn it. "You know letters what hurt they have done me, *and therefore make sure of this.*" But the most striking characteristic of these letters is—as the reader will probably be prepared by this time to believe—that they all tend to magnify Bacon himself in the eyes of the Queen. Essex is not forgotten; but Essex stands second and Francis Bacon first. This consideration will explain many discrepancies between those letters and the "Apology." For example, the "Apology" distinctly states that the Queen was bent upon calling Essex to trial, and that he endeavoured to dissuade her:—

"I besought her Majesty to be advised again and again, how she brought the cause into any public question . . . Immediately after, the Queen had thought of a course to have somewhat published in the Star Chamber—which when her Majesty propounded unto me, I was utterly against it. . . . Towards the end of Easter term her Majesty told me that she was determined now for the satisfaction of the world, to proceed against my Lord ad castigationem, et non ad destructionem—whereunto, I said, utterly to divert her, &c. Nevertheless, afterwards it pleased her to make a more solemn matter of the proceeding."

Compare this—than which nothing can be more explicit—with the exactly contradictory statement written by Francis Bacon in the letter supposed to be written to Essex by Anthony Bacon:—

"I do assure your Lordship that my brother Francis Bacon, who is too wise (I think) to be abused, and too honest to abuse, though he be more reserved in all particulars than is needful, yet in generality he hath ever constantly and with asseveration affirmed to me that both those days, that of the Star Chamber and that at my Lord Keeper's, were won from the Queen merely upon necessity and point of honour, against her own inclination."

Letters or "Apology," which are we to believe now? One's head turns round in bewilderment at the subtle complication of deceit within deceit. A little consideration will show, I think, that for once the "Apology" is true and the letter false. When the "Apology" was written, Queen Elizabeth was dead, and there was no motive for denying a truth which would have made her unpopular; but when the letter was written, she was living, and the letter was intended to be read by her: and what could have gratified her

more, and more conciliated her to her faithful Francis Bacon, than to find that her servant had thus shielded her, even in his intercourse with his dearest friends, maintaining "reserve" in all details of her matters, and, even in "generalities," not shrinking from falsehood in her service to deceive his own brother?

And this is the man who, according to Mr. Spedding, "all his life long *had been studying to know and speak the truth!*" And Mr. Spedding adds, "I doubt whether there was *ever any man whose evidence in matters of fact may be more absolutely relied on.*" I know few things more extraordinary than this childlike confidence in Bacon's truthfulness on the part of one who has studied Bacon for five-and-twenty years. For surely, with the exception of Mr. Spedding, no reader of Bacon's Essay on Simulation and Dissimulation ought to be unprepared for Bacon's being untruthful. He gives us fair warning, that we are not to expect him to employ truth where truth is inconvenient. A habit of simulation is no doubt bad; that he admits. But dissimulation is to be "in reasonable use, and a power to feign when there is no remedy." Not that Bacon could willingly resort to the clumsy awkwardness of a direct lie; only once, as far as I know, is he charged with anything approaching to this.* When he simulates, he simulates artistically, with a substantial element of truth, and just the necessary, and no more than the necessary, admixture of falsehood to produce the requisite effect. Sometimes, indeed, we might be disposed to set down some of Bacon's simulations to the score of shortness of memory. For example, when he has written to Lord Keeper Puckering, "There *hath nothing happened* to me in the course of my business more contrary to my expectation than your lordship's failing me and crossing me now in the conclusion,"† and a few days afterwards, remembers "not further of his letter," except that "I hoped your Lordship *would* do me no wrong;" this confusion of the perfect and the future tenses may be fairly accounted for by a versatile memory, habitually erring on the side of recollecting only what is convenient and forgetting what is inconvenient,—though even in that case, such versatility of memory would scarcely be compatible with the eulogium pronounced by Mr. Spedding, that he "doubts whether there was *ever any man whose evidence on matters of fact may be more absolutely relied on.*" But there are too many cases to which this lenient solution will not apply. Here, for example, is a case where Bacon deliberately recommends King James to use "simulation." He advises the King to suggest to the fallen Somerset the possibility that his fortunes may be still resuscitated, and, when the King

* vii. p. 222. "That the Lord Chancellor said unto Sir George Hastings, if he would affirm the giving this hundred pounds, his lordship would and must deny it upon his honour."

† Vol. i. p. 365.

replies that he can hold out no hopes of such resuscitation, this is Bacon's answer, an answer characteristic of the author of the *Essay on Simulation and Dissimulation*: "I am far enough from opinion that the re-integration or resuscitation of Somerset's fortune can ever stand with his Majesty's honour or safety. . . . But yet the *glimmering of that which the King hath done to others, by way of talk to him, cannot hurt, as I conceive.*" Or take another case of a lighter kind, where, however, in two letters, Bacon distinctly contradicts himself. The letter refers to the proposed marriage between Coke's daughter and the brother of Buckingham. In his first letter, Bacon assumes the high tone and dissuades the marriage on the ground of Buckingham's interests alone: "For as for me, as my judgment *is not so weak to think it can do me any hurt,* so my love to ycu is so strong, as I would prefer the good of you and yours before mine own particular." But six weeks afterwards we get at his real motive:—"I did ever fear that this alliance would go near to lose me your Lordship that I hold so dear."* The letters of Bacon teem with such expressions of untruthfulness. Still, in the face of these innumerable refutations, I am quite sure Mr. Spedding will not cease to maintain his paradox that Bacon had been "all his life long studying to know and to speak the truth." Then be it so; but he must be placed under that class of truth-seekers which might be described as "always learning and never able to come to the knowledge" of the art of speaking the truth.†

II.

From Bacon the friend we pass to Bacon the judge. Here Mr. Spedding offers me a rich harvest of surmises very tempting to criticism. When, for example, Mr. Spedding quotes the *Essay on Negotiating* to show that Bacon *may* have thought it better to remonstrate with Buckingham on his interferences, by word of mouth, rather than by letter, I am tempted to quote from the same *Essay*, "Letters are good *when it may serve for a man's justification afterwards to produce his own letter.*" When Mr. Spedding surmises that Bacon *may* not have been so very bad in taking bribes, because, when he succeeded to the Lord Chancellorship, he *may* have found it already worth more than the legitimate £2,790, and it *may* have been even "worth more than £3,000 a year," I am tempted to show from a single page in Bacon's accounts (vi. 327) that whatever Bacon *may* have found it, he *made* it worth to himself no less than £4,160 12s. 10d. in three months. Again when Mr. Spedding surmises that Bacon "*probably* corrected and

* Vol. vi. 242.

† Want of space obliges me to omit all reference to Bacon's conduct at the final trial of Essex.

reformed the practice in some particulars" because in some cases he "*objected* to a gift as being of too great value," it would have been interesting to point out that, in Bacon, such "objections" did not necessarily involve the return of the bribe, but that while Bacon "consulted his duty" in objecting, he could at the same time "consult his fortune" in keeping what he objected to, as when "his Lordship took it and poised it, and said it was too much, and returned"—not the gift of four hundred pounds in gold but—"answer that *Mr. Egerton had not only enriched him, but had laid a tie upon his Lordship to do him favour in all his just causes.*"

But all these matters must be passed by for the present, and we have only space to prove thus much, that on one definite occasion Bacon did, as I have maintained in my Introduction, "receive orders" from Buckingham, and did pervert justice in compliance with these orders.

A bill was filed, May 1617, by a youth not yet twenty-one against his two uncles, one, Dr. Steward by name, being a friend of Buckingham. To the plaintiff (when a child eight years old at the time of his father's death) had been left a legacy of £800, besides a share in his father's property. The rents and profits were to be taken by the executors till the sons should respectively attain the age of twenty. The executors had legacies of £200 a-piece. The executors *mixed the money coming to them as executors and trustees with their own*, and, when the plaintiff attained the age of twenty in March 1617, they disputed his claim to interest on the legacy, stating that they did not know whether they had "made any commodity out of the estate or not." The bill having been filed in May, the matter was brought before the Court on July 17. Bacon heard the argument on the defendant's demurrer to jurisdiction, in person, and overruled the demurrer by ordering the defendants to "answer over to the point of the legacy according to the charge in the bill." The defendants did not "answer over" for three or four months. On October 28, after the plaintiff had complained that the defendants, repeatedly refusing to attend, even when they did attend would not account—the defendants, instead of being punished, were allowed to have a Master who was a "civilian" joined at their request with Master Norton, and were given a week to proceed with their accounts. On November 3, the defendants put in their answer, and—with the full knowledge of the opinion twice implied by orders in the cause—admitting that they have refused to make any allowance for profits from the estate and legacy, they add, by way of reason, "being a thing by law not due to the plaintiff, nor yet in equity, as these defendants verily believe *any man will think that shall be truly informed of this case.*" Upon this Master Norton and the civilian concur in a report

against them. On November 28, the Solicitor-General, appearing for the defendants, was heard by the Court against the report, which, however, the Court confirmed and decreed accordingly. It was still, says Mr. Heath, open to the defendants to ask for a rehearing before the decree was signed, or failing in this, they might have moved for leave to file a Bill of Review. Instead of doing this, they disobeyed the decree and kept out of the way of process. Not till six months after the time for paying the plaintiff did Dr. Steward, when he was at last arrested, desire his objections to be considered. One year after the decree had been pronounced, Dr. Steward, alarmed at the increasing severity of the orders made by the Court to enforce obedience, appeals to Buckingham, who accordingly, December 2, 1618, writes to the Lord Chancellor as follows:—

“My honourable Lord,—I having understood by Dr. Steward, that your Lordship hath made a decree against him in the Chancery, which he thinketh it very hard for him to perform; although I know how unusual it is to your Lordship to make any alterations when things are so far past, yet *in regard I owe him a good turn which I know not how to perform* but this way, I desire your Lordship, if there be any place left for mitigation, your Lordship would shew him what favour you may for my sake in his desires,” &c.

On the following day, December 3, 1618, he writes again:—

“I have written a letter unto your Lordship which will be delivered unto you in behalf of Dr. Steward, and besides have *thought fit to use all freedom with you in that as in other things*. And therefore have thought fit to tell you, that being a man of very good reputation, and a stout man that will not yield to anything wherein he conceiveth any hard course against him, *I should be sorry he should make any complaint against you*. And therefore, if you can advise of any course *how you may be eased of that burden and freed from his complaint, without shew of any fear of him or anything he can say*, I will be ready to join with you for the accomplishment thereof,” &c.

Now I submit, parenthetically, that for a Lord Chancellor to hold office, subject to the condition of tolerating such “freedom” from a royal favourite, is to “grovel,” and that compliance with such a letter justifies me in calling Bacon, as I most emphatically do call him, the “tool of Villiers.” But let that pass. Covering his shame in a postscript, and apologizing for the badness of his writing, as though the whole affair were the merest trifle, the Lord Chancellor replies on December 11:—

“*I forget not your Doctor's matter. I shall speak with him to-day, having received your Lordship's Letter; and what is possible shall be done. I pray you pardon my scribbling in haste.*”

For a Lord Chancellor determined to truckle, much was “possible.” Accordingly Bacon first saw Dr. Steward *privately* to concert measures, and ~~then~~ *then* together, he

made the plaintiff assent to all proceedings under this decree ceasing, on the mere payment into Court of the undisputed sum *without interest*.* By way of preserving an appearance of impartiality and of seeming to leave the question of interest still open, the order (February 22, 1619) ends with the award of a sham commission appointed by both parties to further investigate the disputed points. It is needless to add that not the slightest trace has been found of anything done by this sham commission.

"I do not suppose," says Mr. Heath, "that anything was ever seriously meant by it, *except to 'ease' the Lord Chancellor 'of his burden.'* The plaintiff must have known that to press this commission would be only to throw away more money and incur more vexation, besides making dangerous enemies."

"But," he concludes,

"suppose it was meant in earnest. And then read it in connection with Bacon's solemnly expressed opinions and promises (vi. pp. 187, 191) which he seems to me to have been hitherto observing. The Masters in Chancery were 'reverend men,' trained to their business. Yet he will not leave them without guidance in references, but will 'as one that hath a feeling of his duty and of the case (? ease) of others endeavour to cast his orders into such a mould as may soonest bring the subject to the end of his journey.' See also what he says about making, upon the matter, too many Chancellors. Here, *after reverend Masters, as well as himself the supreme Judge, had considered the matter* and pronounced upon the law and equity of the case, he proposes to refer it again to persons not likely to be so learned; without casting the questions into any mould whatever—not pointing out, that is, any guiding principles whatever, or putting any bounds to their inquiries—and, after all, when these persons shall have certified what, in their judgment, 'law and equity' required in this case, the 'subject' may be no nearer to the 'end of his journey,' for the court is then 'to make such further order as shall be meet'—*i.e.*, may hear all the arguments over again, as before." †

These are the actual facts: now, how does Mr. Spedding deal with them? If the reader will have patience to follow me through a somewhat labyrinthine path, he will be rewarded by arriving at the key to Mr. Spedding's method of Baconian criticism: for nowhere so clearly as here is that method apparent. Having prefaced his analysis with the confident assertion that "he is in a condition to explain the nature of the transaction," and that

* "I say *made*," says Mr. Heath—whose forcible analysis of this case I have utilized, and in part quoted, throughout the whole of this paragraph,—"*because it is certain he would have preferred keeping his decree and enforcing it.*"

† I understand that Mr. Cecil Monro's forthcoming work on Bacon's Chancery Suits arrives, quite independently, at conclusions still more unfavourable to Bacon than Mr. Heath's. Mr. Monro calls attention to the fact that in the order of February 22, the money is paid not to the plaintiff, now of age, but into Court, by reason of some *infirmity* in the plaintiff which made it doubtful whether the plaintiff "were in case to discharge the defendants of the said £900, if it were paid to him." Could the plaintiff be weak in intellect? or could it be that he refused to give the necessary discharge with such passion and absence of self-restraint as enabled his adversaries conveniently to impute "*infirmity*" to him? Had he recovered in the following June, when the order was made to pay over the money to him?

“from the particulars which he is about to give, and which may be relied on as authentic, the moral character of the transaction may be easily inferred”—Mr. Spedding begins with a misstatement: “this (the filing of the bill) was in July, 1617.”* It was not in July, but in May, 1617. He continues: “Bacon referred the case to two Masters in Chancery,—one of them being a civilian;” here Mr. Spedding suppresses the fact that the “civilian” was added *at the express desire of the defendants*. Between the misstatement and the suppression are several omissions which Mr. Heath supplies†:—

“The defendants put in identical ‘answers and demurrers’ on the 25th and 27th of June . . . and Bacon *heard the argument on the demurrer in person*. But the defendants did not appear, which I can only explain to myself as the first step in their course of contumacy.”

The defendants, who had been ordered to “answer over,” repeatedly neglected summonses to attend, and, when they attended, refused to account. This clear contempt was not punished, and the “civilian” was joined with Master Norton at the request of the defendants. All this is omitted by Mr. Spedding. On November 10, 1617, the two Masters, including the “civilian” appointed at the defendants’ request, report against the defendants. “At this stage,” says Mr. Heath, Mr. Spedding would seem “to have been misled by Mr. Gardiner’s short note into imagining that there was no further argument in court, the truth being that 28 November, 1617, the Solicitor-General *having appeared and been heard for the defendants*, the Court confirmed its Report.” All this being omitted by Mr. Spedding,‡ he is now in condition to make a second misstatement; and, accordingly, commenting on the number of contempts of court and the succession of orders made for the purpose of enforcing the obedience of the defendants, from the 29th of January, 1618, to the 28th of November, 1618, he says, “All this had been done *in reliance upon the report of the two Masters in Chancery: for the cause had not been heard in Court*.” Upon the top of this misstatement he now piles a surmise:—

“I conclude that in this case the defendants had put themselves in the wrong” (only) “by *seeking redress the wrong way . . . and that what they really wanted was a rehearing*. And therefore, though the Court was quite right, no doubt, in insisting on obedience, *it does not follow that it was wrong in refusing to reconsider the decree*.”

Mr. Spedding proceeds to remark that—

* vi. p. 442.

† vii. 582.

‡ Of course I do not mean that, here or elsewhere, Mr. Spedding ever deliberately suppresses or omits anything, however unfavourable to Bacon. But I find it impossible to shut my eyes to the fact that Mr. Spedding’s omissions almost always correspond to his prejudices.

"Dr. Steward now made his appeal to Buckingham, to whom his case (as set forth by himself *in that mood of mind*) *may easily have seemed not only to be a very hard one, but to bear very hardly upon Bacon.*"

And, no doubt, if Dr. Steward reported his case in the "same mood of mind" in which Mr. Spedding has reported it, it must have seemed "very hard" indeed. Mr. Spedding continues with a very favourite device of his, implying a statement under cover of hypothesis:—

"If Dr. Steward's story was true, Bacon had relied too much upon the Master's certificate, and in refusing to hear what he had to say against it, was in danger of committing an act of injustice and exposing himself to a just complaint."

On this he bases a defence of Buckingham's second letter: "it was *probably* under this impression that Buckingham . . . took occasion to recur to the subject." Standing on this airy castle of surmises and probabilities, Mr. Spedding now takes a cheerful bird's-eye view of things, and is emboldened to make a third misstatement: "This letter *had* the effect of inducing Bacon to look up the history of the case." I call this a misstatement; Mr. Heath more charitably calls it a "surmise:"—

"This is only your *surmise*," he writes to Mr. Spedding, "against which I will set mine, that the case being of the simplest description, the number of times his attention had been recalled to it by the defendants' contumacies would probably have kept it fresh in his memory."

Not to quarrel about terms, we pass to Mr. Spedding's next device, a very ingenious one indeed. It consists in printing an official document without any attempt at explaining its technicalities: thus Mr. Spedding makes even his very silence eloquent. The document is the new order made by Bacon (February 22, 1619) in compliance with Buckingham's interference. It is called by Mr. Spedding "the following order;" but I observe that Mr. Heath speaks "of the order which you *partially* set out," and I understand from Mr. Monro that his impression is that there is something unofficial and unusual in the tone of the order; but that point I leave for the present. The order begins: "Whereas heretofore upon the report of two of the Masters of this Court *without* having heard any witness or public hearing of the cause in Court, it was ordered," &c. Now, unquestionably, the words I have italicized, *when unexplained*, do leave the reader under the impression that the case had been hastily decided. But Mr. Heath destroys that impression with a word. The rejection of witnesses *was in favour of the defendants* and against the plaintiff, who desired to prove certain intentions by reports of conversations. As for the phrase "no public hearing of the cause;" this, says Mr. Heath, "is

technical: the cause was 'never set down on bill and answer for hearing;' but the only question at issue came before the Court after it had been discussed before the Masters, and no doubt the Solicitor-General had the answer in his brief." But Mr. Spedding, not having investigated these details, nor asked any one else to investigate them for him, before publishing his conclusion, is able to sum up, on the strength of all these surmises, omissions, suppressions, and silences, in a way very satisfactory to himself:—

"Upon the whole it appears that *Bacon had been too hasty** in accepting the report of his officers *and refusing to hear Dr. Steward*; and that, though Buckingham's intervention must be admitted to have been in this instance effectual, *its effect was only to discover an error and prevent an injustice.*"

It is not surprising that, after having published his sixth volume, with all these errors in it, Mr. Spedding should have felt some compunctions. Accordingly, in his seventh volume, Mr. Spedding makes a confession of error in the following words: "In one place I find I have said *a little too much.*" Many authors might perhaps have expressed a confession of this nature somewhat more fully; but we ought to be so glad to find Mr. Spedding confessing anything that we must not be too exacting at first, in the hope that step by step we may lead Mr. Spedding on to confess in time that he has said a great deal "too much" on this and on many other points. Even now, however, Mr. Spedding does not retract his misstatements or supply his omissions, but lays all the blame, not on his want of care and pains, but on his general ignorance of Chancery proceedings. He has "been since informed by one who understands Chancery business, that this is not the true *construction of the facts.*" "If so," continues Mr. Spedding, "the case deserves further investigation by some one better qualified to understand such matters." A foot note informs us that "Mr. Heath" (Mr. Spedding's coadjutor in the editing of Bacon's works, who is specially responsible for the legal portion of them) "has been kind enough to investigate the case." What does Mr. Spedding do now? Does he accept as authoritative the investigation conducted by a specialist at his own request? No, he apparently awaits a still "further," or furthest, investigation to whitewash Bacon's character. Does he retract all his previous misstatements, expressed and implied? He retracts nothing except the one "paragraph in which he stated his conclusion" upon the case of Dr. Steward. In order to give his readers at all events the chance in the seventh volume of ~~seeing that~~

* On this surmise see Mr. Heath's 'hasty' he had no excuse in any previous month that he had drained the Court to make, no petition unanswered. And against the spirit of his own solemn

as they have had in the sixth volume of seeing the false misstatement of the case, does he give Mr. Heath's terribly forcible analysis a prominent place in his text, or at least insert in the text a summary of it, or, if that is not possible, at least inform the reader of the nature of Mr. Heath's conclusions? No, he does nothing of the kind; but having, he says, committed an indiscretion in previously giving an opinion upon legal matters with which he was not acquainted, now after being instructed by some one who is acquainted with them, he refuses to "repeat the indiscretion" of giving another opinion, and effectually secures the great majority of his readers from the danger of being "indiscreet" enough either to give an opinion or to form an opinion, by relegating Mr. Heath's investigation to an Appendix, where nine out of ten of his readers will fail to see it. One would have thought that, if this case really does require "further investigation" the author who has championed Bacon for five-and-twenty years would hardly have ventured to publish his final volume, the last of fourteen, leaving his hero under an uninvestigated charge of perverting justice, unless he could allege that this at least is an isolated case, having no bearing except on Bacon's action in this single matter. But, on the contrary, Mr. Spedding confesses that "it has a material bearing upon the character" of all the letters written by Buckingham for parties interested in cases pending before the Lord Chancellor, and that his "report of the circumstances is not complete enough to form a judgment upon a question of that gravity." It is indeed a question of the greatest gravity, for if Mr. D. D. Heath and Mr. Cecil Monro are right and Mr. Spedding is wrong, then Bacon *definitely perverted justice on one occasion to oblige Buckingham*. And if he did this to comply with *one* letter or *two* letters of Buckingham, there is so far a certain amount of inference that he was *likely to do it*, whenever it might be convenient, in order to comply with any other of those numerous letters which we know to be more numerous than the mere thirty still preserved. And, if this be so, Mr. Spedding has before him the prospect of retracting in a future edition of his work, not merely a "paragraph" containing a conclusion, not merely all the paragraphs containing all the misstatements on Dr. Steward's case, but a vast amount of commentary, inference, and surmise, enough to make up a volume in itself. For the present, however, Mr. Spedding acts with a consistency and a courage that absolutely extort admiration. True to his Baconian method even to the last, Mr. Spedding scorns to surrender to Mr. Heath's irresistible facts,

—

then subsisted between the Chancellor, the King, the room and occasion for the exercise of a good opinion" being apparently in Mr. Spedding's

judgment "the better part of justice" in a Lord Chancellor under James I.), "and too rigid an adherence to rules laid down for the security of justice *might sometimes, perhaps, have endangered justice itself. If he contrived in other cases that the interference should issue in nothing worse than arbitration*" (i.e., a sham arbitration ending and meant to end in nothing, and enforced upon a reluctant plaintiff, compelled to give up a just decree previously pronounced in his favour) "by indifferent parties, *I should not myself suppose that there was much harm done.*"

III.

To pass from Mr. Spedding's distortions of Bacon to Mr. Spedding's distortions of what he is pleased to call "the latest theory about Bacon," may not be interesting to many of my readers. But as I have accused Mr. Spedding of misrepresenting my views, I am bound to spare a few lines for the disagreeable purpose of specifying some grounds for my accusation; and I can promise any one who will take the trouble to glance through this paragraph that it shall contain such a collection of misrepresentations as is rarely found in the literary controversy of our days. Here is the first. Mr. Spedding wishes to make out that I excuse and extenuate Bacon's conduct on the plea that his mind is so "gigantic." "If," says Mr. Spedding, "we ask why such things should be *excusable* in him more than in another, we are told that his soul is so 'gigantic;'" and with a great parade of scrupulous accuracy, having dislocated this single epithet "gigantic" from its context, he quotes for it "p. xlv." Being naturally surprised at finding myself saying precisely the opposite of what I meant to say, I turn to p. xlv., and find the following sentence:—"It was a sin not to be justified, nor excused, nor extenuated, but to be stored up by posterity as an eternal admonition, how easy it is for a *gigantic* soul to make shipwreck," &c. Let me give one more instance in which Mr. Spedding has attributed to me a meaning precisely the opposite of that which I intended. Quoting in inverted commas from two passages in my introduction (pp. lvi. and xcvi.), Mr. Spedding declares that my object is to prove that Bacon *does not* "shake the faith of human kind in human nature." Knowing that my object is nothing of the kind, but rather to show what Bacon was, and how the same qualities may be traced in Bacon's philosophical and moral errors, I turn to the pages referred to, and find there that Bacon (p. xcvi.) "lowered morality and *shook the faith of human kind in human nature* by making himself an ever memorable warning of the compatibility of greatness and weakness," and (p. lvi.) that he *has* "tarnished the reputation of the Bench and *shaken men's confidence in humanity.*" Now. "Mr. Spedding would but have consisted of making me say the exact opposite of what I said, and of making readers, once on their guard, would

at my "theory about Bacon," by putting in a "not" wherever Mr. Spedding leaves it out, and leaving it out wherever he puts it in; but unfortunately he often represents me not as conveying a meaning opposite to my real meaning, but as conveying no meaning at all. Taking once more a single epithet, he makes me, for example, assert that Bacon is "unworldly." So I do, but with very considerable modifications and qualifications, as the following sentence will show:—"A mind unique, extraordinary, *worldly it is true*, but not after the common fashion of worldliness, say rather *unworldly*," and I add, too, "gradually becoming enslaved by the world." I must not complain that Mr. Spedding will not see the irony implied in the phrase "the *vulgar* ties that connect individuals," or in the epithet "petty," applied to the practice of vivisection. That he should appreciate my irony is more, I confess, than I have a right to expect from Mr. Spedding. But I cannot forgive the following suppression:—Attacking my view, that Bacon himself regarded his desertion of science as his principal fault—a view absolutely incontrovertible by any one who believes that Bacon was not a profound hypocrite—Mr. Spedding repeats a prayer of Bacon which I had quoted, but omits *all the words in it bearing on the point to be proved*: "Besides my innumerable sins, I confess before Thee that I am debtor to Thee for the gracious talent of thy gifts and graces," and here Mr. Spedding pulls up with a convenient "&c.," not scrupling for controversial purposes to degrade the most solemn and earnest utterance that ever passed from Bacon's lips into a mere platitude. But Bacon went on to say, and I went on to quote—"which I have neither put into a napkin, nor put it, as I ought, to exchangers where it might have had best profit, *but mispent it in things for which I was least fit, so as I may truly say my soul hath been a stranger in the course of my pilgrimage.*" And Mr. Spedding altogether ignores the other passage confessing "many great errors which I do willingly acknowledge, *and amongst the rest this great one that led the rest, that knowing myself by inward calling to be fitter to hold a book than to play a part, I have led my life in civil causes.*" Not to weary the reader with any more instances of misrepresentation, of which I had collected a list long enough to tire any one's patience, I will conclude with one so singular that it must not be omitted. It turns on a simple English idiom—on the use of the word "to." I had said that Bacon became Chancellor with no other *result* than that of subserving the policy of others. Mr. Spedding is going to represent me as accusing Bacon of accepting the chancellorship with the *desire* of subserving the policy of others. Accordingly, after disembowelling one of my sentences as follows, "He takes his seat on the woolsack, but it is . . . to work, or be worked, like a tool in carrying out not his own, but ~~his~~ policy," he proceeds to remark, "Now that he entered

upon his office without the *desire* to carry out his own policy is not credible." Let me submit the sentence as it stands in my book, and I venture to assert that not one reader of it will hesitate to say that Mr. Spedding has been grossly and unfairly careless in his misinterpretation of it. It runs thus:—

"By making great people 'think how they should be revered by a Lord Chancellor if I were,' Bacon at last takes his seat on the woolsack; but *it is to* 'reverence' indeed; *to* cringe, *to* work or be worked like a tool, in carrying out not his own but another's policy; *to* receive the orders of Villiers, and to fawn and grovel when the Favourite is offended; *to* reverse illegally a just decision upon the Favourite's intercession; and finally *to be degraded* from his high post, without having introduced a single measure for the permanent benefit of the nation; but with the result of having tarnished the reputation of the Bench and shaken men's confidence in humanity."

Can the force of Baconian hallucination go further than this, when a writer, otherwise rational, and deserving the respect of all for patient industry and praiseworthy attempts at scrupulous accuracy, can so far misunderstand the above sentence as to suppose that it describes Bacon as *desiring* "to cringe," "to grovel," "to reverse a just decision," and "*to be degraded from his high post?*" To every one else except Mr. Spedding my meaning, I presume, is not obscure; but knowing as I do that he could not consciously misrepresent me, I am quite sure that it was, and probably still is, obscure to him, and therefore for his sake I will explain my meaning by an illustration. If, then, some future biographer of Mr. Spedding were hereafter to write of him that "after he had acquired a well-merited reputation by the production of an edition likely to remain for many years the standard edition of Bacon's Works and Letters, a very monument of patient and conscientious industry, Mr. Spedding in an evil hour turned to Baconian polemics; but unfortunately it was *to become* polemical in the very worst sense of the word, *to exhibit* hitherto unrevealed capacities for misunderstanding in a manner rarely paralleled among literary controversialists; and *to expose* to the world in all its weakness the hallucination under which he regarded everything directly or indirectly affecting the character of his hero"—if, I say, a sentence of this kind were ever written about Mr. Spedding, I am quite sure even he would understand that no one for a moment intended to insinuate that he *desired* to exhibit these mischievous capacities and to *expose* these strange weaknesses; but merely that **this was the only result** of his efforts in a controversial direction. **This is my last word on Mr. Spedding's misrepresentations of my "theory," which, having no space to v** leave to stand or fall on its **right, that no one shall**

Spedding's criticism, venture to suppose that he knows anything about what I have written from what he may have read in Mr. Spedding's articles. But one word on the unusual tone pervading Mr. Spedding's criticism. In his determination to pick holes where there are no holes, Mr. Spedding occasionally lays himself discreditably open to criticism. To take no more than one instance, Mr. Spedding cannot refrain from a sneer because "in Dr. Abbott's list of the Christian virtues, 'resentment' holds a conspicuous place." Is it possible that a man of Mr. Spedding's education and acquirements can be ignorant that the author of the "Analogy of Religion" long ago set his stamp upon this virtue in his well-known discourse on "Resentment?" I had always supposed that Mr. Spedding's reading extended far beyond the narrow range indicated by academical distinctions and prescribed in old times by that University to which he and I alike belong; but if, as a Cambridge man of long standing, he may claim immunity from the exacting criticism which might demand that a man of culture should know something of the works of Bishop Butler, yet Mr. Spedding is also an honorary Fellow of that great College of which Bacon himself was once a member; and in virtue of that distinction he is bound not to be ignorant of the *dictum* of Dr. Whewell, that "resentment" is "a moral sentiment, given for the repression of injustice." So far am I, therefore, from being ashamed of following Bishop Butler and Dr. Whewell in giving "resentment" a conspicuous place in the list of Christian virtues, that I will frankly confess I entertain this very feeling of "resentment" at the extraordinary unfairness with which Mr. Spedding has conducted his part of this controversy. But the resentment is rather against Mr. Spedding's conduct than against Mr. Spedding. Much deference is owed, and much indulgence may fairly be conceded, to the author who has laid us all under obligations to him by the devoted labours of a quarter of a century; nor is it to be wondered at if the concentration of the attention on one subject during so many years should have slightly impaired the critical faculty and have weakened the judgment of the author. As a collector of facts Mr. Spedding is supreme, and his reputation on these grounds must always stand so high that he ought not to be offended if, when judging of his claim to interpret the facts he has collected, we are obliged to place him below any fairly educated reader of his own great work.

EDWIN A. ABBOTT.

To the Editor of the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

SIR,

I learned with surprise from the article in your April number by the Rev. John Hunt, entitled "Dr. John Henry Newman: a Psychological Study" (p. 764), that I had pronounced definitively upon the comparative weight of the consequences of two secessions from the Church of England, associated respectively with the names of Newman and of John Wesley.

Mr. Hunt has here and elsewhere described what he criticizes without citation or reference, and I had to search for some passage to which he might refer.

I found that, at p. 10 of a Tract on "Vaticanism," I have said of Dr. Newman's secession, "The ecclesiastical historian will perhaps hereafter judge that this secession was a much greater event even than the partial secession of John Wesley." The one event was twenty-five years old, the other a century. The one lay in the field of thought, the other mainly in that of action. I considered that only hereafter could the comparison be made: therefore I referred to it as a task possible "hereafter," and I conjectured the result under cover of a "perhaps." This conjecture, upon a development indicated as not having yet arrived, Mr. Hunt represents as a positive sentence on materials already in full possession.

My present purpose is to correct a misapprehension which has led him into a misstatement.


I remain, Sir,

Your faithful servant,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

WELLINGTON COLLEGE,

April 2nd, 1876.



LORD MACAULAY'S ESSAY ON BACON EXAMINED.

I.

DR. ABBOTT'S dissertation on Bacon's character being prefixed to a book which is likely on other accounts to have a wide circulation, and my name being mentioned in it in a way which might mislead his readers into a belief that his views and mine were to some extent alike,* I thought it expedient to clear myself of the imputation by explaining through a work of equal circulation how widely they differ. As we have succeeded between us in making the fact sufficiently notorious, I have no further occasion to remonstrate; and as I do not find myself convicted by his reply of any material error, I am content to leave the argument as it stands for the consideration of those who care about it. As long as they have their choice between our opposite views, the choice they make is their own affair, not mine.

But the impediment to a true understanding of Bacon's character, as I conceive it, lies with a more formidable adversary than Dr. Abbott—a more attractive and impressive speaker, commanding

* "Though (as I regret to learn from Mr. Spedding, who most kindly and laboriously criticized my proofs) my interpretation of Bacon's character differs widely from his," &c. These words (those included within the parenthesis excepted), were inserted at my request, because the sentence, as it stood in the proof, seemed to me to imply that Dr. Abbott's interpretation did not differ from mine at all; and the words as they stand now, qualified as they are by the parenthesis, still imply that he was not aware of the difference till he learned it from me. If so, it could not have been such a difference as that which he now confesses to have been conscious of all the time, and to have shrunk from mentioning because it would have involved an exposure of my errors; and I am glad on his account, as well as my own, that the truth has come out, and that his opinions are in no farther danger of being imputed to me, or mine to him.

the fuller sympathy of a larger audience. For the last forty years save one, the popular authority on this subject has been Lord Macaulay's article in the *Edinburgh Review*, and it will be so, no doubt, for more than forty years to come. A careful examination of that article when it first appeared did indeed convince me that his judgment had been formed upon a misconception of the facts, and that if it could be seen by the side of a true report of them the general reader himself would hesitate to accept it. It was this conviction that suggested to me the work which I afterwards undertook, believing it to be the necessary foundation of any just opinion upon the questions at issue, and hoping that it might prove sufficient. For I trusted that in another generation, coming to the subject unprejudiced, and resorting for information to the book which contained the greatest quantity in the most convenient form, the questions which are now so much debated would not suggest themselves or be thought to require any answer. But I am told by both sides that what I have done, though it may have been necessary as a preparation, is not enough. From one side I hear that, however it may be in another generation, the men of this generation take their opinions in such matters from Lord Macaulay, whom they have been taught to regard as an undisputed and indisputable authority; that very few of them can be expected to trouble themselves with any collection of Bacon's letters (which they see to be voluminous and suppose to be dull), however conveniently they may be arranged for study; that the charges advanced by Lord Macaulay are explicit, distinct, popular, and plausible, and if not unanswerable deserve to be distinctly answered; and that if the answer can be given in a shape convenient for circulation, it is right that the present generation should have the benefit of it. From the other side I am warned that in imputing these charges to ignorance and prejudice, and assuming that they will fall away of themselves when confronted with a true statement of the case, I take too much for granted, and that I have no right to ignore them on that pretence.

Now if, in order to satisfy the readers of Lord Macaulay that these charges can be answered, and to justify myself for passing so many of them unanswered and unnoticed, it be enough to show that a correct representation of the facts in each case is itself an answer, because it takes away the ground on which in each case the charge rests.—I am prepared to give the required satisfaction.

It will be thought, perhaps, that this is a rash undertaking; for that, of all deficiencies, a deficient knowledge of the facts of history is the last of which Lord Macaulay can be reasonably suspected. But though the knowledge of history which his memory had in charge was enormous, and I have no reason to

suppose that it was generally inaccurate or superficial, a good deal of it must have been of old standing; and old standing, in this case, means early growth. The stores of knowledge which are the result of omnivorous reading from very early youth, laid up in a memory which retains all alike, must include many impressions which represent a very early stage of thought and judgment. The ideas which a man has entertained since he was a child, if he has not had occasion to reconsider and reconstruct them in later life, must still be a child's ideas; and a boy who is perfect in his history of England before he goes to school, and has not the faculty of forgetting, may easily go through life without revising or correcting his first impressions; though they were only those of a boy in the age of faith, believing whatever he found in his book. At what age Lord Macaulay received his first impressions about the people of James I.'s time, I do not know; but it is not likely that he allowed himself to remain long in ignorance of them after he had learned to read. Nor do I know how often or at what stages in his mental growth he had occasion to review them, or whether, when he did review them, it was to reconsider the original impression, or only to refresh and enjoy it; for he may have gone *over* them many times without ever going *into* them again. Thus much, however, I gather from the negative evidence supplied by his "Life and Letters,"—that Bacon's time was never a favourite time with him, and that Bacon himself was not one of his favourite writers. He believed in him, of course, as the reformer of philosophy and one of England's intellectual worthies, and magnified him accordingly with patriotic fervour and great words; but I find no evidence that he took any pleasure or found any profit in reading him. It is true that the "*De Augmentis*" was one of the books which he read on his voyage out to India in 1834,* and that his opinion of Bacon's philosophy, as expounded in the latter half of his article, two years after, was "formed . . . after several very attentive perusals of his greatest works, and after a great deal of thought."† It is true, therefore, that for the purpose of that article he read the "*De Augmentis*," and the two books of the "*Novum Organum*," and probably some of the smaller philosophical works, repeatedly and attentively, in the maturity of his judgment. But what was the consequence? He came to an unexpected conclusion—a conclusion "widely at variance with what Dugald Stewart and Sir James Macintosh had said on the subject," and what he had himself, no doubt, believed on their authority up to that time.† And nowhere else in his "reading accounts" does the name of Bacon appear. Other names appear continually. Most of his favourites

* Trevelyan, i. p. 371.

† Ibid. p. 452.

he seems to have been in the habit of reading over and over again, with ever new and ever growing delight. If Bacon had been one of them, we could hardly fail, with so full a light as is now thrown upon his literary tastes and occupations, to find news of it. On the other hand, if the writings of "Bacon the philosopher," proceeding as they did from "the most exquisitely constructed intellect that had ever been bestowed upon any of the children of men,"* working "under the guidance of an honest ambition, of an enlarged philanthropy, of a sincere love of truth;"† writings "the noblest and most useful of all the works of the human reason,"‡ in virtue of which (ingratitude, servility, sycophancy, avarice, oppression, coldness of heart and meanness of spirit, notwithstanding) "his name will be named with reverence to the latest ages and the remotest ends of the civilized world;"—if writings of this character failed, from whatever cause, to attract him, he was not likely to be much attracted by the writings of "Bacon the lawyer and politician," which he had been taught to regard as nothing better than shameful records of a life in which all the resources of that exquisite intellect were wasted in pursuing the unworthiest ends by the unworthiest means. Accordingly, in speaking to Professor Napier of the first half of his article which treats of Bacon's political career, he says nothing of attentive perusals or thoughtful consideration of evidence. "About the historical and political part there is no great probability that we shall differ in opinion," is his only remark. Indeed, why should they? No Scotch professor or Whig worthy was touched in it, nor was there anything new except the brilliancy of the execution. It was only the old story, repeated with higher rhetorical effect; only the old plate re-touched, with the shadows blackened and the lights whitened; only "the wisest, brightest, meanest of mankind" executed in the most approved style of modern art. And as it involved no question which seemed to call for fresh investigation, while that portion of the works which contained all the evidence was set out in the edition under review in a state of hopeless confusion, it is easy to believe that, if he looked into them at all, he soon put them aside as too troublesome even for him to go through, and fell back upon his early recollections. The two concluding volumes, which contained the "Life," supplied him abundantly with all he wanted; and there is no reason to suppose that he would feel it necessary at that time to refresh his knowledge of Bacon's personal and political career otherwise than by reading those. To me, at any rate, this seems to be the most favourable as well as the most probable supposition that the case allows, and I am not aware of any evidence that cannot be recon-

* *Essays*, ii. p. 349.

† *Ibid.* p. 336.

‡ *Miscellaneous Writings*, i. p. 547.

ciled with it. After reading Lord Macaulay's own "Life and Letters," it is impossible to suspect him of either doing or writing anything which he did not believe at the time to be in the service of truth, virtue, and humanity. But on the other hand, it is impossible not to perceive that he was in the habit of forming, uttering, and acting upon opinions with perfect confidence, which more perfect knowledge did in some cases materially alter, and would no doubt have done so in many others if the knowledge had happened to come. In the living world, the men of whom he thought ill were those whom he had seen only in print, or on the opposite benches in the House of Commons. After he had shaken hands or talked with one of them, there always followed a marked change in his feelings and language. Before he reviewed Mr. Gladstone's work on Church and State, he had happened to make his personal acquaintance at Rome—a sufficient explanation of the personal kindness and respect with which his criticism was tempered, and which was so new a feature in his treatment of a political adversary, as almost to raise a doubt whether it were his. Meeting Mr. Goulburn in a coasting-steamer at Civita Vecchia, he was agreeably surprised to find that he had quite mistaken his character. "I like Goulburn's conversation and manners," he says. "I had a prejudice against him, which, like most prejudices conceived merely on the ground of political differences, yields readily to a little personal intercourse; and this is a man whom I disliked for years without knowing him, and who has probably disliked me with as little reason."† A piece of experience which, by the comment he ends with, appears to have been new. He calls it "a lesson." If he had ever talked with Southey, whose case in this respect was a good deal like his own, he would have seen what a mistake it was to dislike him. And if he had had an opportunity of shaking hands with Sir Robert Peel five years before the day when he was surprised to find himself doing it in the British Museum,‡ he would have contented himself, in April, 1845, with supporting the Maynooth Bill, and abstained from a performance which has always struck me as one of the most unjustifiable into which virtue ever betrayed a man; for I suppose he never felt himself more heroically virtuous, or believed that he was performing a higher moral duty, than when he was holding Sir Robert up to indignation as an example of public immorality, for having during the four years of his administration arrived at sounder views of policy than those with which he entered upon it.

It is the misfortune of historians of the past that the effect of "a little personal intercourse" with the men against whom they

* Trevelyan, ii. p. 41.

‡ Ibid. p. 272.

† Ibid. p. 46.

have "conceived prejudices on grounds of political difference" cannot be tried. And yet in some cases it is certainly possible to acquire by the study of a man's familiar correspondence a truer and more intimate knowledge of his character than comes by the ordinary intercourse of society—as we see it now in Lord Macaulay's own case, whom men who thought a few months ago that they knew him quite well, find with surprise to have been all the while glowing and trembling with beautiful sensibilities, if not living an entire life, of which they had no suspicion. And I cannot help thinking that if, before he resolved to employ "all his wit, his rhetoric, and his learning"* to reinforce the popular judgment which has condemned Bacon to infamy, he had taken a little more pains to procure through his surviving correspondence "a little personal intercourse" with him, he would have remembered that he was a benefactor, and excused himself from the duty of "writing an abusive pamphlet against him after he was in his grave."†

The question, however, with which we are now concerned is not whether his estimate of Bacon's character is just—a question upon which there will always be room for differences of opinion—but whether the facts to which he appeals in justification of it are correctly inferred from the evidence. Long before his review appeared I had myself taken a great deal of pains in studying that evidence. With the single object of finding out what kind of man Bacon really was—for the popular account of him involved difficulties which I could not get over—I had taken the trouble to arrange his letters and speeches in chronological order; had read them in sequence of date and in connection with the business of the time; had tried to make out what he had to do at each conjuncture, and how he did it; when he had to choose between two ways, which way he chose; when he seemed to change his course, whether any change had occurred in the conditions of the case to account for it; and so on. And in this way I had formed a tolerably clear idea of his character and principles of action, which, though at variance with the received opinion, was consistent with itself and with the facts. When I read the review, my first feeling was wonder, how two men looking at the very same words (for it was evident that all the reviewer's information came from the common books) could collect from them two such very different stories. But when I proceeded the next morning to cross-examine the article sentence by sentence, and compare the statements with the evidence, I began to wonder, not how two men could have interpreted it so differently, but how one man could have misinterpreted it so much. I believe now that the

* *Essays*, ii. p. 313.

† *Ibid.* p. 321.

mystery is best explained by supposing that he had not read with attention that portion of the works which contains the evidence, and had not convenient access to the collateral information supplied by other books without which it cannot be properly understood, and of which very little was to be found in the "Life;" which, as "a collection of the materials out of which opinions are formed," he praises so confidently*—not having apparently the least suspicion of its great imperfection in that respect—and seems to have relied upon exclusively. To a person of ordinary reading faculties it is indeed difficult to understand how a man who reads a page at a glance can read one page more carefully than another. But the speed of lightning itself varies with the conducting medium, and I suppose his glance took in more particulars in a page which interested him than in one which did not. However that may be, that in Bacon's letters and writings of business, and in books connected with them, there *are* particulars which he must have overlooked, and that many of these are of material importance to the formation of a just opinion, it is my present business to show; and my difficulty lies in the multitude of them. My collection being much too large to be produced entire, I must choose some principle of selection; and the principle I have chosen is in effect to leave it to himself. At two stages of his narrative—one a little before Bacon began to rise, the other immediately after his fall—he has taken occasion to recapitulate in a few words, by way of peroration, the charges which he holds himself to have established in the preceding pages. I shall begin by setting down these two perorations—when put together they make one—and then proceed to examine the process by which the several charges are made out. If some of them lead me into the discussion of imputations which seem unworthy of notice, it must be remembered that Lord Macaulay thought them grave enough to be set forth as conspicuously, and under the charge of epithets as vigorous, as any in the catalogue.

* His desires were set on things below. Wealth, precedence, titles, patronage, the mace, the seals, the coronet, large houses, fair gardens, rich manors, massy services of plate, gay hangings, curious cabinets, had as great attractions for him as for any of the courtiers who dropped on their knees in the dirt when Elizabeth passed by, and then hastened home to write to the King of Scots that her Grace seemed to be breaking fast. For these objects he had stooped to everything, and endured everything. For these he had sued in the humblest manner, and, when unjustly and ungraciously repulsed, had thanked those who had repulsed him, and had begun to sue again. For these objects, as soon as he found that the smallest show of independence in Parliament was offensive to the Queen, he had abased himself to the dust before her, and implored forgiveness in terms better suited to a convicted thief than to a knight of the shire. For these he joined, and for these he forsook, Lord Essex."†

* *Essays*, ii. p. 280.

† *Ibid.* p. 322

“In a few weeks was signally brought to the test the value of those objects for which Bacon had sullied his integrity, had resigned his independence, had violated the most sacred obligations of friendship and gratitude, had flattered the worthless, had persecuted the innocent, had tampered with judges, had tortured prisoners, had plundered suitors, had wasted on paltry intrigues all the powers of the most exquisitely constructed intellect that has ever been bestowed on any of the children of men.”*

Here we have about fifteen distinct charges; all grave: which I will take in order as they stand.

1. For the first, it is a charge too general to be met except by a general examination of Bacon's whole life, for which I must content myself with referring to my own book, into which I have gathered all the evidence I know of, that seemed worthy of consideration, on both sides. I will only observe here that when it is laid to a man's charge that certain objects have peculiar attractions for him, it is but reasonable to ask for some instance of their attractive force; something that he did which but for them he would have left undone, something that he left undone which but for them he would have done. All the objects enumerated in the first clause were in themselves legitimate objects of desire; being for the most part of real value,—all contributory, though not all essential, to the substantial powers, dignities, comforts, or elegancies of life. I see no harm in his desiring them; and before I accuse him of desiring them more than other things of more value, I must know what other things he sacrificed for them. The first charge must therefore wait till we have examined the others.

2. That “for these objects he had stooped to everything and endured everything” would be an allegation much to the purpose, if “everything” meant anything. But what I want to hear of is *something*. “Stooping” is not necessarily a vice. “Enduring” is probably a virtue. *What* did he stoop to? *What* did he endure?

3. The next clause seems meant to give the answer. But two distinct cases are fused together in it, which I must treat separately. “For these he had sued in the humblest manner.” This is all that relates to the first case. And here again, before I can say whether there was any harm in suing, I must know what he had sued for, and how. It is not meant that he asked Burghley for these things—“wealth, precedence, titles,” &c.—but that, being moved solely by a desire of these things, he asked him for something which he hoped would bring them in time. In the meantime what was it that he asked for? What *was* this suit which comes first into the list to prove that his desires were set on things below?

* *Essays*, ii. p. 349.

Looking back for the reviewer's* own answer to this question, I find that the suit was for "a provision to enable him to devote himself to literature and politics;" that it was made to Lord Burghley, his father's most valued friend and colleague, and to Lady Burghley, his mother's sister; that "his wishes were moderate," and "his hereditary claims upon the administration" so great, that if they did not prevail we are justified in imputing the rejection to jealousy.† Now to sue means only to apply for a favour. That a youth of twenty should apply to his uncle for a favour so reasonable that nothing could justify, and only jealousy explain, the refusal of it, does not imply any stooping; and considering that however reasonable it might be he himself admitted that it was "rare and unaccustomed,"‡ that he should make his application in the "humblest manner"—so long as the humility was consistent with self-respect—was surely in good taste. It is true that in order to qualify his fact for its place in his rhetorical climax, the reviewer does call the application a "*supplication*," and adds that it was "almost servile."§ But "*supplication*" is not the modern English equivalent for the word "suit" as used in the days of Elizabeth, and the epithet must have been suggested by the requirements of style. It cannot have been suggested by anything in either of the two letters which contain all he knew about the suit and its fate—letters printed by Mr. Montagu in full at the foot of the page—out of which I defy any man to pick a single clause that can be made to appear to imply anything more nearly resembling servility than the grateful and affectionate respect of a nephew of twenty for an uncle of sixty. A third letter, written a month later, of which or at least of its date the reviewer was probably unaware,—a letter of thanks—seems to show that the reception of this suit, whatever it was, by the Queen was gracious and encouraging, and that Bacon himself attributed it to Burghley's influence. "To your Lordship, whose recommendation I know right well hath been material to advance her Majesty's good opinion of me, I can be but a bounden servant. So much may I safely promise and purpose to be, seeing public and private bonds vary not, but that my service to God, her Majesty, and your Lordship, draw in a line."|| Perhaps it may have been some vague recollection of this sentence that suggested the idea of servility; though, rightly construed, it means the very opposite.

If the suit in question was partly for help towards a speedier

* Though this article has long been included among Lord Macaulay's "Essays," it would be unfair to treat it as an independent discourse of his own on Bacon's character as a man and a politician. It is a "review," properly so called; meant for an answer to the defence set up for him by Mr. Montagu, and governed throughout both in the choice of topics and the treatment of them by that intention. I shall therefore speak of it hereafter as the "review," and of the writer as the "reviewer."

† Essays, ii. p. 298.

‡ First letter to Burghley, 16 Sept. 1580. L. & L. i. 13.

§ Ibid. p. 299.

|| Ibid. p. 15.

progress through Gray's Inn, it was probably (so far) successful; for Bacon was admitted to be "utter barrister" in June, 1582, after only three years' residence. It appears, however, by a letter to Walsingham that in 1585 it was still in suspense, and that it was for something which would in some way have made it unnecessary for him to follow a course of ordinary practice at the bar.* But whatever it was, and whatever became of it, one thing is clear: as evidence that he valued "wealth, precedence, titles," &c. above their worth, it is absolutely irrelevant and worthless.

4. Let us try the next clause: which, though placed here so as to seem to refer to the same occasion, does really refer to another, which happened six years after.

In 1584 Burghley had brought Bacon into Parliament, where his value was soon found out; and in February, 1585-6, he was admitted at Gray's Inn to sit at the Readers' table, though not yet a Reader himself. But by the regulations then in force "an utter barrister" had to continue "in exercise of learning" for five years before he was permitted to plead in any of the Courts at Westminster or to subscribe any plea. Bacon, having been admitted to the "utter bar" on the 27th of June, 1582, had still more than two years to wait; and if, in default of obtaining his first suit, he was now ready and resolved "to take a course of practice" (as it appears by his letter to Walsingham above mentioned that he was†), he would naturally wish to have his term of probation shortened. In what precise way this was to be done I do not know; but I presume that between Burghley and the Queen means might have been found, and he now submitted to Burghley some proposition with that view. Being, however, by nature bashful, by habit retired and studious, wanting in the "plausible familiarity" which makes a man popular among his equals and inferiors, highly favoured by his superiors, and already known to be engaged in a work which was to prove that the received opinions were wrong, it is not surprising that there were some among his fellow-students "that did misaffect" him. From some of these Burghley heard reports to his nephew's disadvantage, of which he thought it right to inform him; and in so doing alluded to his recent application as in some degree bearing them out. This is what the reviewer (professing to derive all his knowledge of it from the letter which Bacon wrote in answer) has before described as "a testy refusal" accompanied by "a very sharp lecture on his vanity and want of respect for his betters,"‡ and now calls "an unjust and ungracious repulse" which he seems to think Bacon ought not to have "endured." Bacon, however, who saw nothing in it but a piece of good advice kindly meant, had the good sense

and good feeling to treat it accordingly. That his uncle "being hardly informed of him, had taken occasion rather of good advice than of evil opinion thereby," he took as "an undoubted sign of favour;" assured him that he had not meant to be importunate or to ask for any extraordinary distinction, and that what he had heard about his arrogance must have been due to some misunderstanding; but promised to remember the admonition and take more care in future to conduct himself so as not to give cause for any such mistakes.* This was the letter in which he "thanked those who had repulsed him:" a statement which, if Burghley did *repulse* him (which is doubtful), is true, and is the single feature in the reviewer's version of the story which may pass without correction. The *testiness* of the refusal, the *sharpness* of the lecture, the imputation of "want of respect for his *bettors*," are all out of his own head. Bacon's letter is expressly referred to as his only authority, and it is certain that these cannot by any ingenuity be extracted out of it. Whether the expostulation ended with a refusal after all is far from clear. If it did, since the suit was for "an ease in coming within bars," and Bacon became a Bencher before the year was out, it does not seem to have been persevered in. But what if it was? It is not even said that the suit was improper in itself. No reason is given for supposing that there was anything improper in the manner of preferring it. If Burghley repulsed ungraciously a request which he ought to have granted, how does that prove that Bacon's desires were set on things below?

But there is yet one thing more. After thanking those who had repulsed him, "he turned to sue again." And it must certainly be admitted that he not only thanked his uncle for offering him good advice under an erroneous impression that he needed it, but forgave him; continued to acknowledge him as a kinsman, to ask for his help when he wanted it, and to receive gratefully what he had to give. But again I say, what then? Unless he asked for something which he ought not to have wished for, or received something upon conditions to which he ought not to have submitted, why should I suppose that he put too high a value upon the objects he was pursuing,—which, so far as we have yet seen, were only the means of living and working? Why, because he desired and asked for some provision which should save him from waste of time in professional drudgery, am I to suppose that he was ready to sacrifice *everything* for "wealth, precedence, titles," &c.?

5. The next instance is peculiarly unlucky as an illustration of the reviewer's position, but a very good illustration of mine, which is that he was writing without any information on the subject

* "And I hope upon this your Lordship's speech I have entered into those considerations, as my behaviour shall no more deliver me for other than I am."—L. & L. i. p. 59.

beyond what the book he was reviewing supplied to his hand. Mr. Montagu's simple appetite for admiration, finding food in anything that was called Bacon's, and questioning nothing, gave him no motive for searching below the surface. The reviewer, regarding every fact for which he had his victim's authority as good to be used against him, had no motive for inquiring further into the particulars of a story which served him well enough as it was. The true history of the short but important passage in Bacon's parliamentary life here referred to was not very far to seek; but not having been noticed by any of our historians, it could not have been discovered without a little trouble in turning over D'Ewes's Journals (which, though to be found in every historical library in England, may perhaps have been inaccessible at Calcutta), stimulated by a little curiosity to know more about it than can be gathered from the extracts printed by Mr. Montagu. In default of the desire or the means of satisfying such curiosity, the reviewer took these extracts as he found them, and filled in the rest of the story according to his notions of what was probable. If he had been able to consult his D'Ewes he would have found that the other circumstances were irreconcilable with his theory and taken care not to bring forward this example in support of it.

Of Bacon's proceeding in regard to the Triple Subsidy Bill of 1593, when he really took a leading part in a constitutional struggle of considerable importance, a full account will be found in "Letters and Life," i. 212—226. But I must confine myself here to those parts that bear upon the point which it is brought to prove—namely, that Bacon was always ready to sacrifice anything for the sake of Court favour.

Though the history of the proceeding itself is much too long to be repeated here, a complete account of all the reviewer knew about it may be given in a few lines. He found in Montagu's "Life" that in a debate on the 7th of March, 1592-3, "Bacon forcibly represented, as reasons for deferring for six years [*sic*] the payment of the subsidies to which the House had consented, the distresses of the people, the danger of raising public discontent, and the evil of making so bad a precedent for themselves and posterity;" and that "with this speech the Queen was much displeased, and caused her displeasure to be communicated to Bacon both by the Lord Treasurer and the Lord Keeper." Being referred to the notes at the end for further information, he found the report of the speech as given by D'Ewes, and copies of Bacon's letters to the Lord Treasurer and Lord Keeper upon the signification of the Queen's displeasure. So much he knew. If he knew more, he kept the knowledge to himself and made no use of it. But it left something to be explained. If Bacon was always ready to make any sacrifice for Court favour (Q. E. D.), what in-

duced him to oppose the Queen and her ministers on a money bill? He could not have expected any Court favour from that. Well, perhaps not. But though he prized Court favour *above* all other things, it was not the only thing he prized. He was ambitious of popularity as well as place, and tried to secure both. But when he found that in aspiring after popularity he was endangering his chance of place, he basely sacrificed the popularity. Such I conjecture to have been the secret course of the meditation which issued in the following statement:—

“Bacon tried to play a very difficult game in politics. He wished to be at once a favourite at Court and popular with the multitude. . . . Nor indeed did he wholly fail. Once, however, he indulged in a burst of patriotism, which cost him a long and bitter remorse, and which he never ventured to repeat. The Court asked for large subsidies and for speedy payment. The remains of Bacon’s speech breathe all the spirit of the Long Parliament. ‘The gentlemen,’ said he, ‘must sell their plate, the farmers their brass pots ere this will be paid;’”—

and so on, quoting several sentences from the report of the speech; after which, without giving any hint of the occasion for which the subsidies were wanted or any further information concerning the question at issue, he proceeds thus:—

“The Queen and her ministers resented this outbreak of public spirit in the highest manner. Indeed, many an honest member of the House of Commons had for a much smaller matter been sent to the Tower by the proud and hot-blooded Tudors. The young patriot condescended to make the most abject apologies. He adjured the Lord Treasurer to show some favour to his poor servant and ally. He bemoaned himself to the Lord Keeper, in a letter which may keep in countenance the most unmanly of the epistles which Cicero wrote during his banishment. The lesson was not thrown away. Bacon never offended in the same manner again.”*

This is the passage of Bacon’s parliamentary life, according to the reviewer’s own version of it, to which the sentence in his rhetorical recapitulation on which I am now commenting is meant to refer:—

“For these objects, when he found that the smallest show of independence in Parliament was offensive to the Queen, he had abased himself to the dust before her, and implored forgiveness in terms better suited to a convicted thief than to a knight of the shire.”

In another case I might have stayed to ask by what process a burst of patriotism breathing all the spirit of the Long Parliament and bolder than many for which members of the House had been sent to the Tower, has shrunk into “the smallest possible show of independence;” while, on the other hand, an earnest request to the Lord Treasurer to show some favour to his poor servant and ally, and a letter to the Lord Keeper resembling the most unmanly of the epistles written by Cicero during his banishment, have grown into an “abasing of himself to the dust before the

Queen," and an "imploring of forgiveness" in the language of a convicted thief. But in this case such questions are needless; for the truth is that the whole transaction has been misunderstood and misrepresented from beginning to end. There was no attempt to curry favour with the multitude; no burst of patriotism addressed to the popular feeling out of doors; no thought of embarrassing the Government by stinting supplies; nothing, in short, that could have entitled Bacon in the reviewer's eyes to be called a "young patriot:" while on the other hand there was no endeavour to explain away what he had said, no admission that he was sorry for having said it, no hint that he would do otherwise in like circumstances another time; nothing but an assertion that he had given the advice which he thought best for all; that he had given it only because he thought it his duty, and that he was sorry that it had been so misunderstood or misreported as to have offended the Queen. If the reviewer had been able to bestow a *single* "attentive perusal" and a *little* "thought" upon the journals of that session, he would have found—

First. That the occasion of calling the Parliament of 1593 was the discovery of an intrigue between Spain and a party in Scotland, for an invasion of England by land and sea, from north and south, at once. That it was called in order that the Queen "might consult with her subjects for the better withstanding of these intended invasions, which were now greater than were ever heretofore known."

Secondly. That on the 26th of February the whole case was laid before the House by three principal members of the Council, and a select and grave committee moved for "to consider of the dangers of the realm, and of speedy supply and aid to her Majesty." That upon this motion being made Bacon rose *to support it*; the end of his speech being to enforce the necessity of "present consultation and provision of treasure" to prevent "the dangers intended against the realm by the King of Spain, the Pope, and other confederates of the Holy League." That the Committee was appointed accordingly without further discussion, met the same afternoon, and brought up its report the next day, recommending the same grant that had been made by the last Parliament—*which was the largest that had ever been made*—two subsidies and four fifteenths and tenths, payable in four years.

Thirdly. That this report caused no alarm to the popular party, but was agreed to by the House without opposition; another committee being appointed to meet within the same week for the purpose of drawing up the articles and preamble.

Fourthly. That in the meantime, the Court not being satisfied with the amount of the proposed grant, the Commons were invited by the Lords to a
d informed by the Lord Treasurer

that it was not enough: that the Lords could not assent to a grant of less than three subsidies, but desired another conference that they might agree upon the amount. That the substance of this communication having been referred to the House by Sir Robert Cecil, Bacon, who knew what was coming and had had a night to consider, "stood up and made a motion." That his motion was in effect to refuse the invitation. Seeing that for the Lower House to consent to a conference with the Upper for the avowed purpose of discussing the amount of contribution to be voted, would be to abandon one of their understood and ascertained privileges, he advised the House to decline the Lord Treasurer's proposal, and send an answer to this effect: They would consider the question of an increased grant, but could not join with them in discussing it; they would do what was fit, but must proceed in it by themselves apart from their Lordships.

Fifthly. That this motion of Bacon's, though strongly opposed by the Privy Councillors and courtiers, and much debated, was ultimately approved by the House, and an answer sent accordingly.

Sixthly. That the decision was extremely distasteful to the Court and the Lords, who tried hard to get it reversed, and succeeded in obtaining from one of its chief supporters a retraction of his opinion, on the ground that he had misapprehended the question at issue; but failing to overcome the objection of the House to confer "about a subsidy," were obliged to pretend that they never desired it, and to be content with a conference on the usual terms.

Seventhly. That as soon as the communications which they made at this conference (relating as they did solely to the impending dangers) were reported to the House, the Committee of Supply met again, with a general commission to "confer of all matters of remedies." That it was to this Committee—upon a motion for a grant of *three* subsidies, and *six* fifteenths and tenths, payable, the first at a *single* payment in the first year, the second at a *single* payment in the second year, the third at two payments in the third and fourth years—that Bacon made the speech out of which the sentences quoted in the review are selected, but so selected as to give no indication either of the spirit or the purpose of it—either what he wanted to be done or why. That the first four words of this speech, "Mr. Francis Bacon *assented to three subsidies*," announced an intention to *support* the Government in a proposal to lay a tax upon the people greater by one-third than had ever been laid before; an announcement which can hardly be said to "breathe all the spirit of the Long Parliament." That the next eight words (the meaning of which was certainly misapprehended by Mr. Montagu, and for anything that appears to the contrary,

was no better understood by the reviewer himself) defined the parts of the proposal to which he objected; while the three paragraphs following explained the ground of his objection, and the manner in which he wished it modified. That his objection was that whereas it had always been the custom, when subsidies were granted by Parliament, to allow two years for the collection of each, the present proposal made the first two subsidies payable each in one year; so that for the two next years the ordinary rate of taxation would be suddenly *doubled*, an innovation which he thought would prove both difficult and dangerous; difficult because it was doubtful whether the commonalty *could* meet such a demand upon the sudden; dangerous because, even if they could, the shifts to which it would drive them—such as the selling the gentleman's plate and the farmer's brass pots—would cause discontent perilous to loyalty; a danger not to be risked without absolute necessity. That the modification of the proposal which he suggested in order to avoid these difficulties was "a better manner of supply than subsidy," namely, "by levy or imposition when need should most require." The authority for raising the tax might be so conveyed as to leave the Government an option as to the times of collection, and so allow them to proportion the demand to the need, and to refrain from putting on the pressure as long as it could be avoided.

Lastly, he would have found that these objections and proposed amendments, whatever "the multitude would have thought of them" if it had been there, met with no support in the assembly to which they were addressed, for that the proposal of the Government was agreed to in the Committee without a division, and confirmed "by all without any contradiction" in the whole House; therefore that the motive of the proceeding cannot have been to please the popular party within doors: and in fact that the single clause in Bacon's proposition which can be credited with what the reviewer would have called "patriotism" was a provision that it should be so carried as to "appear to be extraordinary," and not become a precedent; for in everything else his object clearly was to enable the Government to raise as much money as the exigency required in the easiest and safest way.

All this he would have found by a cursory perusal of the journals alone. To qualify himself for judging of what followed it would have been necessary to look for the history of it in Bacon's correspondence; which in the condition into which Mr. Montagu had reduced it, would, I own, have been very troublesome.

But before I proceed to this, which is the matter of his next paragraph, it may be worth while to stay a little and consider the case as it stood *at the end of March* *on which that* "burst of patri *was for*

my own part that upon reviewing Bacon's conduct in the matter so far, I find some difficulty in accounting for it; though it is not the kind of difficulty which his conduct is generally supposed to involve. That he should have been rather shy in publicly opposing a proposition of this kind, even if it were one which he did not altogether approve, could not seem strange to any one in the year 1876. But that a young member, whose reputation was not fully made and whose fortune was all to make, should divide his own party upon a question of such deep interest to them, unless he were constrained to do it by some stronger motive than (in our present imperfect knowledge of the affairs of the time) we can discover,—does, according to our modern code of party morals, seem odd. The occasion for these subsidies was confessedly great, worthy, and popular. The difficulty might indeed be considerable; the danger of discontent when they came to be collected probably was serious; and it may be that the measure was on that account really impolitic, and that the Queen would have acted more wisely for her own interest had his suggestion been adopted. But it does not appear that there was any imminent or desperate danger. Such danger as there was he might have thought it his duty to point out; but this he might have done quietly in the committee, and then left it to the Government and the House to settle it for themselves upon their own responsibility. He was not in such a position of authority with the House that his *silence* was to carry the question. He could hardly think therefore that he lay under any imperative duty to go out of his way for the purpose of obstructing a measure upon which his own party were so earnestly bent. It was such a point as a member of the Cabinet might in these days dissent from his colleagues upon, and *in the cabinet* earnestly oppose them; being nevertheless prepared to give up his opposition if outvoted, and go along with them when the matter came before the House. Perhaps the privacy of the House of Commons in those days (which was then really a deliberative assembly) may partly account for it. The matter was (as it were) within the walls of the Council Chamber, and every one might speak his thought. But I cannot help thinking that we must look further for the true secret of it, in some peculiarity of his personal character. A year or two after, the Lord Keeper Puckering had taken offence at something which he had said or written, and Essex writing to pacify him says, “I told your Lordship that this manner of his was only *a natural freedom and plainness* which he had used with me, and in my knowledge with some other of his best friends;”^{*} and this, I suspect, contains the true key of his conduct on this occasion. It was the simplicity and earnestness of the man, and the careless confidence of a good

* L. & L. i. 366

intention, which prompted him to speak out what he thought and felt; presuming that what was uttered so candidly would meet with as candid a construction, what was meant only for the good of all would surely be taken as well-meant. It was the advice which (had he had a right to advise) he would himself have given to the Queen; and (having such a right in the House of Commons) he gave it by way of advice to them. As an approved friend it was his privilege to give a free censure; as a man who had no personal interest in the course he recommended, he could the better recommend it boldly. That a man of so singular a genius should have some singularity of character is but natural; and this I suppose was his. For certainly though he could not but have known that such a course would not be acceptable to the Queen, he does not seem to have been prepared for the degree of displeasure which it brought upon him. And even when the extent of her displeasure was fully known to him, he could not bring himself to make any apology or retractation, or to explain away what he had said.

But this again should be considered apart, as a fresh case. His duty to the House of Commons and to the public has been performed; the offence to his party and to the Queen has been given; his fortunes are in jeopardy. How will he set about to recover the favour which he has lost? The Queen would not allow him access, as she had used to do; and caused the occasion, namely his late speeches in Parliament, to be intimated to him through Burghley. As to the real ground of her displeasure, there could be little doubt. It could not be so much for the single act,—a solitary “burst of patriotism” as the reviewer describes it,—as for the spirit and temper which it manifested. Here was a young courtier who could not be relied on for supporting the measures of the Court; who, however zealous a royalist, nevertheless acknowledged a divided duty; and held himself bound, as a member of Parliament, to stand by his own opinion and follow his own course in opposition to hers, if he could not bring himself to approve it. To be restored to her confidence and favour was not only, from affection and loyalty, a natural wish; but with a view to his own fortunes, which *seemed* to be then upon the point of being made or marred (for a vacancy among the law officers had just occurred, which opened to him a fair way to the place of Solicitor or even Attorney), it was at that moment a prime object. The way to bring about this object was obvious enough. It was to be sought, not by justifying his conduct as enjoined by duty; that would but aggravate the offence;—but by acknowledging it as an error; by explaining it away; by ascribing it to misapprehension; by pretending some secret design to win thereby the confidence of the House, disarm suspicion, and acquire authority there, that he might be the better able to further

her ends afterwards ; in short, by putting some colour upon it that might make her believe he would not do so again, but might be depended upon as an obsequious and manageable supporter. He could hardly have had much difficulty in conveying such an impression, had he really wished it ; he could certainly have no difficulty (conscience apart) in inventing a construction for his conduct tending that way ; and ample time he had for working, seeing that her displeasure lasted at least two years and a half.

Now I do not find that he moved a single inch in this direction. He stood frankly and firmly upon his justification ; refusing to understand upon what ground his conduct (rightly construed) could be considered offensive. His tone and terms were, no doubt, modest and respectful ; of sorrow and discouragement rather than of haughtiness and self-assertion ; but the substance of his answer was remonstrance and expostulation, as of a man who feels that he is injured ; not submission or apology. Read the letter to Burghley, in which the reviewer finds him petitioning for "favour to his poor servant and ally." He is sorry to find that his speech, delivered in discharge of his duty to God, her Majesty, and his country, was offensive. He thinks it must have been misreported or misunderstood ; and, if so, would be glad of an opportunity to explain. If he were suspected of "popularity or opposition" (*i.e.*, of joining the *party* then in opposition and turning demagogue) he had great wrong, for there was nothing in his speech that savoured of party opposition : "the manner of it did most evidently show that he spake simply and only to satisfy his conscience, and *not with any advantage or policy to sway the cause* ; and his terms carried all signification of duty," &c. ; all which was strictly true. But did he retract or explain away anything ? Not a jot. It was true that "whatsoever was above a double subsidy he did wish"—(just as he had wished in 1588, when he himself drew up a clause in the preamble for that purpose)—"for precedent's sake might seem to be extraordinary, and for discontent's sake might not have been levied upon the poorer sort ; though otherwise he wished it as rising," &c. (and though it is true that he says nothing on this occasion about his opposition to the speedy collection, which he alludes to in a letter on the same subject of later date, yet he says nothing to explain away or retract even that). "This was his mind : he confesses it ; and *therefore* he hopes that Burghley will continue him in his own good opinion, and endeavour to draw her Majesty to accept of the simplicity and sincerity of his zeal, and to hold him in her favour," &c.* In other words,—It is true that I opposed the Government proposition ; but I opposed it not out of any ill-will to the Government, but because I thought it impolitic and

* L. & L. i. p. 233.

dangerous; therefore what could I do but oppose it? And therefore the Queen ought to think the better of me for what I did, seeing that I did only what I thought right.

But this was a strain of public morals rather too high for the Queen. That was not the kind of service which would do for her; and her displeasure showed no symptoms of abating.

Seeing then that *she* would not think better of it, did he begin to think better of it himself, and try to show that her displeasure had had the effect of bringing him to a better sense of his duty? There would have been good hope in that, for your strong mind likes nothing so well as to see the reluctant will brought into subjection. But no such thing. He could still be humble, dutiful, and affectionate; but he could not say that he had been in the wrong, or that he could rightly have done anything other than what he did. Read the letter in which the reviewer finds him "bemoaning himself to the Lord Keeper." (It was really, I believe, addressed to the Earl of Essex.) "It was a great grief to him, *joined with marvel*, that her Majesty should retain an hard conceit, &c., &c. It might please her gracious Majesty to think what might be his end in those speeches if it were not duty, and duty alone." (Still not a word about being sorry that he had made them; he is only sorry that *she* should take them so ill.) "And whereas popularity had been objected, he mused what care he should take to please many, who took a course of life to deal with few." (He had nothing to look for from that quarter; his hopes were all from the Queen.) "Her Majesty's particular favour towards him had been such that he esteemed no worldly thing above the comfort to enjoy it, except it were the conscience to deserve it." (What, then, would he give for it? He knew the price well enough.) "He was not so simple but he knew the common beaten way to please." But will he do as he is bid? By no means; the condition is too hard for him. "If the not seconding some particular person's opinion shall be presumption, and to differ upon the manner shall be to impeach the end, it shall teach him"—what? to know better hereafter? to trust her judgment rather than his own? to advise nothing but what she wishes? Not at all. "It shall teach his devotion not to exceed wishes, and those in silence." And this is the nearest approach to submission that he can bring himself to make. He must still *wish* to serve her; but not being able to serve her on such conditions, he can do no more than wish. Nay, he cannot even admit that his jealousy is reasonable; but must still maintain that she is doing injustice to him and injury to her. Hath discouraged as good a heart and as void of self-love."*

Still the jealousy of the Queen was not mitigated; for a year and a half later we find the same cause of offence still uppermost. Burghley, indeed, and Robert Cecil, having known Bacon since he was a boy, and being convinced therefore that his explanation was sincere and that his opposition had been that of a free counsellor, not of an antagonist, appear to have been satisfied and to have wished the Queen to advance him—but she still objected (June, 1595) that same “speech in Parliament.” So here he had one opportunity more of endeavouring to explain his conduct away if he had wished to do so. But still we have the old story—he had nothing to apologize for. “My hope is, that whereas your Lordship told me her Majesty was somewhat gravelled upon the offence she took at my speech in Parliament, your Lordship’s favourable and good word (who hath assured me that for your own part you construe that I spake to the best) will be as a good tide to remove her from that shelf. And it is not unknown to your Lordship that I was the first of the ordinary sort of the Lower House of Parliament that spake for the subsidy; and that which I after spake in difference was but in circumstances of time and manner; which methinks should be no great matter, since there is variety allowed in counsel, as a discord in music, to make it more perfect.”* Still, you see, it is in the spirit of justification, not of apology, that he writes. Not a hint that he would do differently another time upon a similar occasion. He cannot admit that he was himself in the wrong; his anxiety is that the Queen may be brought to understand that he was right. And this, so far as I can learn, is the last we hear of the matter.

Now let any man, setting aside any preconceptions he may have formed as to Bacon’s character, and all modern notions of the indignity of treating queens with respect, endeavour to interpret naturally these words and actions, and then say whether they indicate anything but simplicity, sincerity, and integrity. Had he been the selfish, crafty, time-serving man that the reviewer takes him for, is it not clear that at each successive step throughout this whole action he would have taken a different course?

First, on the question of the conference, he would not have divided the House against his own party.

Secondly, he would at least have taken occasion to retract his opinion when he saw a disposition in the whole House to retract.

Thirdly, on the question of supply (which was the next stage) he would have supported his party instead of them.


He found that the Queen (instead of thanking

* L. & L. p. 361.

her stars that she had so able and so honest a man on her side) resented such independence and withdrew her favour, he would have tried to put it to the account of any motive rather than that of imperative duty which left him no other choice, and to give her assurance that hereafter he would be better advised and understand his duty differently.

Upon each and all of which occasions he took a course so directly opposite to that which would naturally have been taken by a time-serving politician, that one might better cite the story as an instance of a man knowingly and deliberately sacrificing what he knew to be his private interest to what he conceived to be his public duty. This, however, would be going further than I mean to go myself. I think it possible enough that in this case he thought his interest and his duty compatible. Out of his great reverence for the character of the Queen, he may well have given her credit for understanding her own interest better than she seems to have done, and valuing a man all the more highly for such independence. His precept addressed more than twenty years after to Buckingham was, "Rather make able and honest men yours than advance those that are otherwise because they are yours;" and he may have hoped that the Queen would act upon this principle. Be it so. Be it that he thought the reputation of honesty a better means of rising than sycophancy. All I contend is, that it was by honesty and not by sycophancy that he was seeking to rise.

As a proof therefore that he was ready to sacrifice "everything," or indeed anything that he ought not, for favour at Court, this fifth instance fails as completely as the rest. And, so far, I can hardly think that there will be any difference of opinion. It will be said, of course, that these are small matters; and I know that they are meant to tell only as the lower steps in the rhetorical ascent. Still they are meant to count as figures in a series which is to produce its effect by accumulation. They derive their value from their place. In arithmetic, a cipher added at the end multiplies the total value by ten. In rhetoric, an item worth nothing, inserted at the beginning, has an effect of the same kind on the imagination. If these instances are *allowed* to be worth nothing (which I think they must) they ought to be cast out altogether. In another number I will proceed in due order with the others, and if the next seems more to the purpose than these (as no doubt it will to many, having a deep-seated popular prejudice to support it) let it be remembered that it is the first in the list which has proved on examination to be *at all to the purpose*.



TURKEY.

“WE are the best police of the Bosphorus.” The words were spoken with emphasis, as a triumphant and conclusive argument. Nothing more could be required by a foreign visitor to justify the Ottoman rule in Constantinople. The speaker had been a medical student in Paris. His metaphors were made up of the jargon of the hospital. To this all-powerful Grand Vizier of Sultan Abd-ul-Assiz, it was a stroke of luck that the Tsar in nick-naming his country should have called it “Sick Man.” Fuad Pasha felt doubly at home in talking of his master’s empire as a patient. “If you wish to have news of our health,” he continued, “it is not advisable to consult that doctor.” “I know Turkey better than he [the Tsar], and than any one. I have stethoscoped (*auscultée*) it back and front. There is no organic malady, but—*pardonnez-moi*—we have the itch, and no sulphur at hand.”

If Fuad Pasha (whose disciple is now in authority) had an ideal system of government, it was that which a man far greater than he, but with a mind of similar tendencies, had expounded in *Les Idées Napoléoniennes*. To reconstruct the Caliphate, to reform it into a liberal despotism seated upon the heads of a dumb democracy, this was the thought of the great Minister, with whose death is supposed to have departed the glory of the reign of Abd-ul-Assiz. The recent revolution is explained as a reversal of policy of Fuad. Midhat Pasha is hailed as the political radical student of Paris. The new advisers of the

new Sultan will do their best to sustain the opinion, which no doubt they hold, that Turkey is not sick unto death, that, as Fuad said, she has no organic malady. The present writer maintains a contrary opinion, and it is the object of these pages to show that the Turkish Empire has organic disease, and that her incurable malady grows ever more deadly as she is forced by new arterial connections, closer and more closely, into the light of the political ideas and civilization of Western Europe. I shall reduce the pleas for the maintenance of the Turkish Empire to that one plea of expediency upon which the greatest master of Turkish policy, Fuad Pasha, was content to rest its claim—"We are the best police of the Bosphorus"—and I shall show that the validity of this plea is a reproachful testimony to greed and jealousy, and want of true civilization, on the part of the Great Powers of Europe.

The Turkish Power is a Mahomedan theocracy. No law is popularly accepted as valid unless it has religious sanction. The statute-book must run with the Koran. The *fetva* of the Sheik-ul-Islam was needed before any could engage in the dethronement of Abd-ul-Assiz. But we have seen in the history of the Empire that the outward manifestation of this theocratic basis can be suppressed wherever it is likely to be offensive. The co-ordinate authority which the Queen of these realms exercises, by virtue of the Capitulations of 1675, over all who can be called British subjects in Turkey, was "the command" (I quote the words of the Treaty) "of the Emperor and Conqueror of the Earth, achieved with the assistance of the Omnipotent and by the especial Grace of God, We who by Divine Grace, assistance, will, and benevolence, now are the King of Kings of the world, the Prince of Emperors of every age, the Dispenser of Crowns to Monarchs, and the Champion." In less than 200 years a great change was observed in the outward manifestation of the basis of Turkish power in Europe. In the Treaty of 1856 there is no trace of divine authority about the attributes of the Sultan. He is styled simply "Emperor of the Ottomans." This was the work of A'ali and Fuad, the great exemplars of the present time. It is not a final condemnation of the Turkish Power to say that it is theocratic, for this has been the pretence of all powers, and is still the reputed basis of most of the Powers of Europe. In his own dominions, the Tsar is just as much "the Shadow of God" as the Sultan. We must look to the ethics of the religion which is the groundwork of power. Mere forms of speech can be changed, and the language of Paris put into the mouth of the Padishah. Had I been blind, I could have fancied myself at the Tuileries on the 10th May, 1868, when, amid hopes not less extravagant than those which now encircle the utterances of Murad V., his ill-fated

predecessor announced the establishment of the Council of State and of the High Court of Justice. He, the successor of Sultans whose pretensions to divine direction had not been less declared than those of the infallible Pope,—he, who was in fact the Pope of the Sooni Mahommedans, confessed that something was wrong, something rotten in his State, because, said the master of greedy Pashas, from his throne in the Sublime Porte, “if the principles and laws already established had answered to the exigencies of our country and of our people, we ought to have found ourselves to-day in the same rank as the most civilized and best-administered States of Europe.” With this naïve admission of failure, and “with a view to promote the rights of his subjects,” Abd-ul-Assiz, the reformer, pronounced the establishment of the Council of State “whose members are taken from all classes of our subjects without exception.” “Another body,” he continued, “instituted under the name of the High Court of Justice, has been charged to assure justice to our subjects in that which concerns the security of their persons, their honour, and their property.”

No Christian could speak more fairly. Men talked and wrote of Abd-ul-Assiz as they now write and talk of Murad, and assumed then as now, that a man whose youth had passed under oppression and surveillance, to whom education had been denied as dangerous, upon whom continence and frugality had been enforced, would, when he acquired unlimited power and wealth, when he could indulge unchecked the favourite weaknesses of the Prophet, be a lover of liberty and law, a wise and liberal statesman, the husband of one wife, the master of no slaves, and in his private expenditure, the delight of anxious bondholders. It is the inveterate error of the West to suppose that in Turkey figs grow from thistles—that beautiful women are produced by a life in rooms from which the glorious eye of the heavens, as well as the sight of man, is excluded; by walking out of doors in veils which prevent every breath of fresh air; in shoes and upon stones which render exercise a torture, and graceful carriage an impossibility; by a life of inanity, ignorance, and indulgence in unwholesome food. The error is not uncommon nor its cause recondite. Our mistake is that of the dramatists of the Restoration, who, Lord Macaulay says, knew not that “drapery was more alluring than exposure.” The mystery of the East is our delusion, and this, if we face it closely and fairly, especially if we regard it during moments when in the political struggle its veil is disarranged, is, as we shall see, a cover for evils which prefer darkness rather than light, in social life; a despotism with slavery for a domestic institution, and upon the throne of European Turkey, a misrepresentation founded upon force, upheld by oppression of those

beneath it, and by the jealousies of the Powers which are entitled its protectors.

The Turkish Government has ceased to represent itself to Foreign Powers as theocratic, but regarding its subjects this is its truest title. When in 1856 the Sultan appeared, as we have seen, to throw off, in deference to his Christian protectors of the Latin and Anglican Churches, the assumption of divine authority, it was in fact asserted, though in language purely mundane. He is "Emperor of the Ottomans," *i.e.*, of the Othmans, of the followers of the conqueror whose sword Murad has girded on in the Mosque of Ey-yub, the leader in fact of three millions out of twelve millions of people, supreme ruler by no other right than that of possession, as successor of Mahommed in the Caliphate, and of Othman in the empire. Two facts exhibit this most clearly: the Mahommedan is to the Christian population in European Turkey as one to three; but the non-Mahommedan people are excluded from the army (nominally of 700,000 men) by which the Sultan's power is maintained. We have seen the opposite of divine right, that of human representation, propounded in the language of the Tuileries. In its initiation, the Council of State was a scandal, and in existence it has been a means of further enriching the oppressors of the country. The non-Mahommedan population being as three to one, A'ali Pasha, the idol of the Softas, composed a Council which indeed exhibited this proportion, but with the figures reversed—three-fourths of the members being Mussulmans. We are thus brought back to the position in which Grand Viziers, such as Fuad and Midhat, find themselves when, after entering into promises in the French of Paris, they are surrounded with realities in the Arabic of Stamboul. They can make Hatts, of course, but if these surpass the sanctions of the Koran, they rest in the pigeon-holes of the Sublime Porte.

The Government of Turkey is undoubtedly Mahommedan, and the line of our argument leads us now to inquire, What are the inalienable essentials of Mahommedanism? what is its capacity for change, for re-interpretation, in accordance with modern ideas? The position of the Turkish Government, thus representing only one-fourth of the people in the European empire, and claiming sovereignty over other millions in Servia and Roumania, who have successfully repudiated any direct interference by the Sultan in their government, is that of a foreign garrison, the soldiery having no connection with the mass of the people. This government and garrison cohere by force of religious ties. Both are Mahommedan. It was long ago admitted by powerful friends of Turkey, that is to say, by the Governments of England, France, and Italy, that the only safe path for the Empire in the future was by annihilation of this exclusive mode of government; and it was

A'ali Pasha who, in the famous Hatt-y-Humaïoun, promised the overthrow of the Mahommedan system. To make this assurance more certain he consented, on behalf of his master, that the Contracting Powers of 1856 should be made parties to the execution of this Hatt, by a special reference to it in the ninth Article of the Treaty. Of the thirty-five Articles of this Hatt-y-Humaïoun, the most interesting, and from our point of view the only important Articles, have, as Mr. Butler-Johnstone, a friend to the Turkish Power, writes, "remained dead letters." We will take his remarks upon this neglect, because there can be no doubt that he does not overstate the case. Referring to the promises of the Hatt-y-Humaïoun, Mr. Butler-Johnstone says:—

"(a.) There were to be mixed tribunals of justice, codification of the law, translations of the codes into the different languages of the empire, settled modes of procedure: this has been translated as we have seen into mock courts, unpaid judges, arbitrary procedure, and corrupt decisions. (b.) Farming the revenue was to be abolished, and a sounder fiscal system established: nothing of the kind has been done. (c.) A solemn undertaking was entered into to grapple with the evil of corruption: at present the whole administration is corrupt. (d.) Banks were to be established to assist agriculture and come to the aid of commerce: nothing of the sort has been thought of. (e.) Roads, canals, and railroads, were to be pushed forward with vigour, so as to open up the resources of the country: the absence of roads and canals has prevented the relief of a famished population; and as to railroads, the only important line finished was a cloak for a most notorious scandal. (f.) Foreign capital was to be invited and encouraged by every means, so as to develop the great resources of the country: such vexatious obstructions have been placed in the way of foreign capital that it has shunned the country, and men of integrity like Scott Russell and T. Brassey have had all their offers rejected; unless the pashas catch a glimpse of backshish, foreign enterprise is an abomination in their eyes. (g.) Christians were to be admitted into the army on the principle of general equality: nothing of the sort has taken place."

These promises are, in all important points, identical with those made, or to be made, by Murad V. Midhat Pasha is prepared to follow his great predecessors in the political dishonesty of manufacturing imperial edicts, made for show and not for use, which cannot become law in the Turkish Empire, because no law is there held valid which has not the *fetra* of the Sheik-ul-Islam and the support of the clergy. I shall contend that they are made without regard to the basis of Turkish law—the Koran; that they cannot be executed without a complete surrender of Mahommedan principles, involving ultimately an overthrow of the Mahommedan Empire. Observation of Mussulman authority in the three continents has convinced me of the truth of the following opinion, penned by a distinguished upholder of the Mahommedan rule in Turkey:—"Religion in the East," he most truly says, "has not the restricted meaning which it has with us. Everything with them is religious. All those questions which with us would be

termed matters of politics are with the Mahommedans matters of religion. Mahommedanism is, in fact, a religion, a code, and a civil polity, or rather these three things are different aspects of the same idea." Therefore, in order to master the internal springs of the Turkish system we must go to the Koran. Englishmen have been taken to the Koran by blind guides. Attempts, like that of Mr. Bosworth Smith in his "Mohammed and Mohammedanism," have been made to varnish the Koran. Ill-judged as I shall show these to have been, they are not surprising. It is the ever-spreading revolt against certain dogmas of ecclesiastical Christianity that has led to this shallow delight in the Koran, of which the central doctrine is that of the unity of God. The service of the grand mosque, still known to Europe by its Christian name, Santa Sophia, is in its outward aspect lofty and sublime—it is ennobled by a comparison with the mean mummeries of the altars of Seville, or with the farthing tapers and picture-kissings of Moscow. But that is not Mahommedanism; and these things—the wooden dolls of Spain, "Our Ladies" of Montserrat and Atocha, and of this place and that—dolls endowed with revenues, and with sacristans for keepers of their wardrobes; the adored pictures of Moscow, devoid of beauty or of the charm of high and authentic antiquity—nor are these things Christianity. We shall, however, be better able to appreciate the error of these apologists of Mahommedanism when we have glanced at the leading doctrines of Mahommed. The Prophet of Islam was a soldier—the Napoleon of his age. If the great Corsican had lived twelve hundred years before his time, it is probable that *Les Idées Napoléoniennes* would have taken the form of the Suras of the Koran. That was a time when opinion was moulded by conquest, and the sword of Mahommed was never long in its scabbard. He wrote a chapter of the Koran while his cheek streamed with blood from a wound sustained in the battle of Ohud. The Koran encourages Islam to war with the infidels:—

"Fight, therefore, until there be no temptation to idolatry, and the religion be God's."

"Fight for the religion of God against those who fight against you. Kill them wherever ye find them, and turn them out of that whereof they have dispossessed you, for temptation to idolatry is more grievous than slaughter."

"War is enjoined you against the infidels; but this is hateful unto you; yet perchance ye hate a thing which is better for you, and perchance ye love a thing which is worse for you; but God knoweth, and ye know not."*

Of course there is not in ordinary times an active desire to indulge in a crusade against impossible odds; the supreme doctrines of utility are too strong for that. But every Moslem

* Sale's *Al Koran*, chap. ii.

knows that the defeat of heresy by conquest is a cardinal point of Mahommed's teaching. It is no answer to this to allege that the Christianity of the Middle Ages was no better, and to quote the Papal Legate who put the edge of sectarian swords to all throats, with the words, "Kill all; God will know His own."

Yet the error which is latent in this line of argument has to be exposed. It seems to men like Mr. Bosworth Smith, and others, to be a discovery at once most interesting and even startling, that all systems of religion, those established before Christ as well as that of Mahommed, are related. They find not only ideas but laws transmitted—that Christianity is not the Alpha and Omega of religion. Standing in regard to the orthodox interpretation of their own sacred books somewhat in the attitude of the "poor cat i' th' adage," "letting I dare not wait upon I would," they are overjoyed with the delicious *souppes* of irrefragable heterodoxy thus imparted, and in their religious rapture, fail to grasp the utilitarian chain which would lead them link by link to an invaluable test in this comparison. They are not too careful how they deal with their own Bible when "the insuperable dogmatic character" of the Koran is in question. Mr. Butler-Johnstone, who I presume is with Mr. Disraeli "on the side of the angels" in the matter of Evolution, argues that "the inspired character of the Christian sacred books has not prevented progress in religion in Europe, and for this reason—viz., that the inspired writings are sufficiently elastic in expression to admit of progressive developments and interpretations; otherwise religious thought, and with it civilization, would have been strangled in the Christian world. And so it is, and perhaps even more so, with the Koran." These desperate friends of Mahomedan power are blind to facts as well as tendencies. Stretch the doctrines of the Koran to the length they desire, and the religion of Mahommed is gone; strain them politically, so as to establish a true equality of Mahomedan and non-Mahomedan population, and the empire of Othman must pass away. Of course, doctrines of the Koran may be amended by a revised interpretation—that is, some of them. Women need not be condemned to suffer ill-health from want of fresh air, because the Koran tells them "to discover not their ornaments," to conceal their charms from all but certain persons. Upon this matter directly affecting the whole population, there are several interpretations now in sight among Mahomedans. The Persians include the eyes, the Turks do not, and the opinion of high society in Constantinople has ceased to include any part of the face, the only difference from European custom being that whereas the veils of English ladies fall from the head-dress, those of the belles of Stamboul, not less diaphanous, mount from the chin to the nose. The Koran says, "Take in marriage such women as

please you—two, or three, or four, and not more;” but the faithful may enter into temporary connubial arrangements with any number of “those women whom thy right hand shall possess as slaves.” It is this latter provision in one of the earliest of Mahommed’s Suras, or chapters of the Koran, which permits of a deposed Sultan being followed to imprisonment by “fifty-three boats full of women,” and of a Shah arriving in Tehran after a stay at one of his country palaces, followed by eighty *takterawans* loaded with the women of his *anderoon*. But it will be said there is nothing in these words to prevent the spread of monogamy, which is already the established rule of life with many Turks. Nothing whatever; and it is obvious that time tends to encourage it along the line which these apologists will not recognize—the line which runs on for ever through all systems of religion. Wherever Mahommedanism touches a higher civilization, the woman gains individuality, the veil loses opacity, and polygamy is less common. Why? Because civilization is synonymous with individuality, and individuality is both troublesome and costly in the person of dependents. The thinly-veiled beauty of Constantinople has requirements unthought of by the secluded Persian lady, and thus, by the teaching of humanity, the Turk is guided to the equitable law of monogamy. I will even admit that in adopting this rule, it is possible the Moslem does not repudiate the sanctions of the Koran, and that even after a life spent in fidelity to one wife, he does not regard with scorn and contempt the revealed privileges of Mahommed in this matter. “There is nothing in the religion of Islam,” says a writer of the highest authority in a recent article upon “The Situation viewed from Constantinople,” “which can fairly be called adverse to civilization.” I shall abundantly expose the falsity of this proposition; but if the writer had said, “There is nothing in the religion of Islam which can withstand civilization,” I should have agreed with him. It is hard to feel aught but disgust for Christian writers who degrade themselves by penning apologies for the rampant lust of Mahommed. The lowest depths of historical imposture contain nothing so foul as the deliberate admixture by Mahommed of special licence for himself, in regard to polygamy, with sacred principles of justice, in the Koran. It is surely too large a concession for truth, to say that the practice of monogamy, which the apologists rightly declare is extending in Turkey, is consistent with reverence for the man who, because he wished to take for himself the wife of another, and could not gain possession of her by his hand as a slave, put these words into the mouth of the Mahommedan God:—

“O Prophet, we have

wives, unto whom thou hast

given their dower, and also the slaves which thy right hand possesseth of the booty which God hath granted thee, and the daughters of thy uncles and the daughters of thy aunts, both on thy father's side and on thy mother's side, who have fled with thee from Mecca, and any other believing woman if she give herself unto the Prophet, in case the Prophet desireth to take her to wife. This is a peculiar privilege granted unto thee above the rest of true believers. . . . Thou mayst postpone the turn of such of thy wives as thou shalt please. God knoweth whatever is in your hearts, and God is knowing and gracious."

Joe Smith and Brigham Young have not been without success in their humbler way and in more rational times; but it may be fairly doubted if they would have had as large a following had their sacred books contained special privileges of this sort for the leaders of Mormonism. Islam is adverse to civilization; the Koran is not "sufficiently elastic in expression to admit of progressive developments and interpretations" because it is a religion essentially opposed to the progress of humanity. It is a religion of force and of sex. "The true servants of God," says the Koran concerning the Mahomedan heaven, will be rewarded with "delicious fruits, and the virgins of paradise, withholding their countenance from any other than their spouses, having large black eyes and skin like the eggs of an ostrich." The coarse materialism of this and many other passages almost similar in words, is dealt with by Mr. Bosworth Smith in a very shallow argument. It is a hard fact that no higher ideal of supernatural life is given in the Koran, and the grossness of the picture is, we are told, "explained by Mahomedans to be merely Oriental imagery." This might be accepted if the programme of Mahomed's heaven included entertainments for women, if for them there was something more than bare admission. They are not even translated into the "black-eyed virgins" who are to share the fruits and the couches of paradise; for, says the Koran, "We have created the damsels of paradise by a peculiar creation." It is not my purpose to contrast one religion with another; I am not engaged in the defence of Christianity, nor in the needless work of vindicating its superiority to Islam; yet it is with a feeling of offence that I find in Mr. Bosworth Smith's book the heaven of Mahomed contrasted with the heaven of Christ, "where they neither marry nor are given in marriage," and the sensual hereafter of Mahomed condoned with the absurd apology that "a polygamous people could hardly have pictured to themselves a heaven without polygamy." The *raison d'être* of women on earth in the eyes of Mahomedans has been translated so faithfully and truly into their heaven, as to lead many to suppose that the Koran allows no future life to women. But evidently this was not the idea of the dictator of the Koran. He constructed heaven as he observed the earth, and has therefore not

without show of reason been held to have denied the immortality of women, while extolling that of men. If all the "Turcophiles" in the world tug together at the words of the Koran, they cannot be expanded or reasonably interpreted so as to exhibit an equality of divine favour to men and women.

An English school leans to Islam because it is monotheistic; they touch gently on its faults for the sake of its assertion of the unity of God. We should perhaps have fewer exhibitions of the sort if it were generally known that while denying the Godhead of Christ, the Koran accepts his miraculous conception and birth, and, denying that he was crucified, holds to his miracles and acknowledges that those miracles were an exhibition of divine powers. The Pope pays homage to utility rather than to the Catholic religion, in making presents to Sultan and Shah, who believe, in the words of the Koran, that "when God shall say unto Jesus at the last day, 'O Jesus, Son of Mary, hast thou said unto men, "Take me and my mother for two Gods, beside God"?' he shall answer, 'I have not spoken unto them any other than what thou didst command me, namely—Worship God—my Lord and your Lord.'" If we must compare the doctrines of Christ with those of Mahommed, what could show the difference in more glaring light than the dictum of the Koran—"If a man or woman steal, cut off their hands in retribution for that which they have committed; this is an exemplary punishment appointed by God, and God is mighty and wise?" Six months have not passed since I saw a handless man, a victim of this cruel law, in consequence of theft. But it may be said that these things are only on a level with the barbarities of the earlier books of the Bible, to which I suppose the followers of Christ would reply that those books are not Christian. We must recognize the fact that to write upon the history and the inter-influence of religions, in a way to be of permanent value, something more is requisite than is displayed by any of the apologists of Mahomedanism whom we have met with. When Mr. Butler-Johnstone writes of an elastic Bible and of stretching the Koran, towards what line is it that these sacred books are to be strained? If we want to understand whether there is anything in Islam opposed to civilization, we must know what we mean by one and the other. We have seen something of the doctrines of Islam. What then is civilization? If it were merely buying ironclads, laying down telegraph wires, borrowing money upon worthless paper, building a crystal palace, or arming men with breechloaders, I should say, "Islam has done these things." But I take civilization to be, in its briefest meaning, the extension of civil rights; the co-existence of the supremacy of law with the liberty of individuals to develop and employ their faculties, for their utmost happiness and advantage. The sum of

success in this endeavour is ever increasing. We know without shadow of doubt that

“Through the ages one increasing purpose runs;”

and we have in this fact, in the increasing individuality of mankind, in what we call progress or civilization, a test by which to judge the doctrines of religion, whether they be transient or eternal. Of the facts which the history of the world has furnished, no one is more patent than the fact and the method of human progress, in which many religions have been and will be submerged. Mankind is outgrowing or has outgrown the practices of slavery and polygamy which are extolled by the Koran, and which did not seem hateful in the days of Christ. The experiences of life lead to laws of life, which are necessarily more and more concerned with the rights of individuals. Of the Book of Mahommed nothing is left, in the light of the present civilization, but the idea of God, supreme, omnipotent, impersonal. It is not so with the words of Christ: his idea, the brotherhood of mankind, is the banner of the time to come, and gives the largest prospect of progress which eyes can see upon the horizon of humanity.

We started to prove that a Mahommedan government could not perform the promises of the Hatt-y-Humaoun of 1856 without ceasing to be Mahommedan; and this is true because Mahommedanism, as a religious system, cannot admit the followers of other creeds upon terms of equality. It is, as it was in the time of its founder, a religion of fighting men, who acknowledged no right but the might of the sword; its heaven is the reward of fighting men and of none other. The reign of force is still the rule of Mahommedan countries, and progress is slow under the blighting law of the Koran. But the germs of progress, which now assert themselves chiefly in abuse of the reigning authorities, grow quickly where there is contact with European civilization. Fuad Pasha, in Stamboul, was little more a Mahommedan than is the Greek Pasha who represents the Turkish Power with so much sympathy and suavity in London; and if Midhat, the heir of Fuad's ideas, enforces upon Turkey the unfulfilled promises of 1856, Turkey will cease to be Mahommedan. She promised codification of law and independent tribunals of European pattern. How is it possible to put the Koran into a code acceptable to Christians? She promised to admit the whole population into the army on the principle of equality. But this is equivalent to making the army three-fourths non-Mahommedan, a situation in which Mahommedan supremacy in the government could not endure for twenty-four hours.

Turning to the political situation of Turkey, we find her bankrupt in finance, with courts of law described as “markets, not

open markets, but dirty back-door shops, closets for fraud, corners for chicane, and dens where professional brokers meet the judicial staff to job causes and rob suitors." The old, old story about the native nobility of the Turk is of the same sort as Mr. Bosworth Smith's assertion that "an Arab *cannot* ill-treat his horse," which is perhaps as untrue as anything could be. In caravans upon the plains and hills of the Turkish Empire, Arabs are every day driving animals with wounds which would win the compassion of a Spaniard or an Italian, and which in any English town would bring punishment upon the driver. I have lately seen the knees of horses streaming with blood and the quivering muscles exposed, from frequent falls upon the stony plain, and again and again have compelled Arab owners to remove the loads from such distressed animals, which they would not hesitate to urge forward with whips of iron chain. Arab horses are cruelly wounded by bad shoeing, by overloading, and by bad harness. Nothing is more common in the remote parts of the Turkish Empire than to see a man use in riding a sharp-pointed knife as a substitute for a bridle and whip, pricking the animal's neck on the contrary side to that towards which he wishes to direct his course. I know no people so cruel to their horses as the Arabs. Ignorance can ill-treat anything. In Salonica I saw a Turk cauterizing the harness wounds of his mule with a red-hot frying pan which he had borrowed from a cook's shop for the purpose.

It is not entirely owing to the will of the Turkish Government that the peasants or rayahs pay, in the most cruel form of taxation, so large a portion of the revenue. The trade of Turkey is for the most part carried on in the great towns by foreigners, and these are, in the unnatural circumstances of the Empire, exempt from taxation. The policy of Russia, in collecting large amounts of indirect taxation at her ports, appears to some Turkish statesmen the highest wisdom, but the Powers, and England especially, would not approve this mode of raising the revenue. Turks say that consequently there is no other way of reaching the mass of the people but by taxation in kind levied upon their crops. By a monstrous euphemism, the exclusion of the non-Mussulman population from the army is charged to them as "exemption," and they are made to pay about five shillings per man to establish their own degradation. They cannot reap or thrash without the presence of the tax-farmer, and Thessalian peasants have told me that these persons habitually give presents to the military officer of the district, in order that he may turn a deaf ear to the rayah imploring protection against the tax-farmer. At Volo I met with two gentlemen, one of whom, a Frenchman, said that until lately he held his land in the name of a peasant who was sweeping the paths of his garden; that he had attempted to introduce French

labour, but that no foreigners would submit to the exactions of the Turkish soldiers, who had cuffed, and, without notice, had dragged some of his French labourers from their work to cart military stores. As to finance, the new Sultan cannot restore the credit of Turkey. The blunt dishonesty with which the recent repudiation was effected probably displayed the success of General Ignatieff's long intrigues. Three years ago he was reported to have said that the Turkish Empire would not endure for eighteen months. He laboured in the hope of detaching the care of England from her debtor; believing that English interest in Turkey was identical with that of the bondholders; and he was not altogether wrong. I suspect that if there was an end, definite and complete, to the claims of the bondholders upon the Turkish Government, we should hear much less of British sympathy with Mussulman rule. The new Government can undoubtedly soften the act of repudiation and show goodwill to the bondholders by proposing better terms, but they cannot sustain Turkish finance in the old way by feeding deficits with loans; and in face of an aroused and hopeful population, predominant in numbers though they are excluded from the army, they dare not increase the revenue or readjust the abominable and rapacious system of taxation. If every person in England who has a direct or indirect interest in Turkish Securities could be ticketed and his influence eliminated from the political question, we should debate that with a truer measure of its importance. As it is, when we hear the movements of the Powers discussed, we know not whether the speaker is addressing us from his head or from his pocket. British subjects hold Turkish Bonds to the nominal value probably of £100,000,000; and when we presently pass to the consideration of the external circumstances of Turkey, we must not forget the obligations of English policy towards these speculators in the stability of the Turkish Empire. One great matter, that of the order of succession to the throne, has been for the present arranged by a revolution and a suicide. The late Sultan only followed the example of others in desiring to adopt the Western, in place of the Mussulman, order of heirship. This desire was stimulated by the knowledge that according to Mussulman law, his hoards would pass to Murad if his nephew succeeded to the throne. The property of the late Sultan belongs legally to his successor; there was therefore, from the moment of his abdication, never any question as to its destiny. The Sultan can make no will, a regulation which has a salutary object though it is productive of most unwholesome consequences. The rule is established to prevent him from taxing the country and confiscating its wealth for his own enrichment: it has had the effect of making Sultans prodigal to favourites, and of surrounding them with parasites. Abd-ul-Assiz hoarded, and

hoped to change the system : he has failed, and his wealth is now in the hands of Murad. The Khedive has power to leave his vice-regal crown to his son, but in his case there was never the difficulty which opposed the Sultan ; as a subject, he has the power of devise, and will perhaps some day bring about a revolution by the extravagance of his outlay and the magnificence of his family. His vassalage is held by a tie at once weaker and more strong than that which holds the recalcitrant provinces of Turkey, which are non-Mussulman. Yet a great deal too much is made of the Sultan's power as chief of the Sooni division of Mahommedans. He is not regarded as a heaven-born ruler, whose hereditary right is a divine right ; he is rather a chief acclaimed by Church and State whose special function it is to lead the battles of the Crescent against the Cross. I have no doubt whatever that a declaration of independence on the part of Egypt would be thoroughly successful, if the Khedive were secure against attack by the Porte, and from interference by the Powers. Of the fanaticism of the Turks there can be no question. The exercises enjoined by the Prophet, and the rewards he promised, contribute to this end. "What shall be our lot if we die in the fight?" "Paradise," replied Mahommed. "The sun burns us," groaned his fighting men upon the plains of Arabia. "Hell is hotter," was the Prophet's response ; and in order that there should be no doubt about the alternative, he communicated to them, as the mouthpiece of God, a notion of the torments of hell. "Boiling water," says the Koran, "shall be poured on their heads ; their bowels shall be dissolved thereby, and also their skins, and they shall be beaten with maces of iron. As often as they attempt to escape from the anguish of their torments they shall be dragged back again, and the tormentors shall say unto them, 'Taste ye the pain of burning.'"

In the ceremonies of religion, the Mahommedan labours to obtain abstraction. He watches the gyrations of dancing dervishes, or the rockings to-and-fro and the deep shouts of howling dervishes, till these produce the desired effect, and his mind and body reel in unison with the performers. I have lately seen crowds of men and boys rushing through the streets of Persian towns beating their bare breasts for hours till the skin was red and inflamed, intoxicated with this exercise, and with shouting, "Ah! Houssein," on the supposed anniversary of the death of the Prophet's grandson. Men in this condition are ready for bloodshed, or for any act of violence which may be supposed to contribute to the stability of their religion. The Mahommedans of India, of Turkey, and of Egypt revere the authority of the Sultan ; but from many he is a long way off, and no people more quickly learn to accept the inevitable as destiny. Sir Lewis Pelly, when he was Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, saw much of the people of Arabia,

and reported to the Bombay Government that "the Arabs acknowledge the Turks as we do the Thirty-nine Articles, which all accept and none remember." The Sultan's claim to religious authority in the Caliphate is regarded by the Persians, and by all Shi'ahs, as illegal. His Soonite followers accept the four successors of the Prophet as true Caliphs or Imāms, and in recognizing him as head of the orthodox, they admit the descent of this power through the line of Sultans. The Shi'ahs, on the other hand, absolutely reject all claims to the Imāmate other than those of Ali (who married Fatima, the only surviving child of the Prophet) and his descendants. At the present time, the Shi'ahs acknowledge no visible Imām. The three first Imāms of the Shi'ahs, are Ali and his two sons, Hassan and Houssein. The eighth was the very holy Réza, whose shrine at Meshed is always crowded; the twelfth and last, Mehdee, was born A.D. 868, and, according to Shi'ah belief, was taken from the sight of men when he was nine years old. Mehdee is to return to earth some day, bearing with him the complete and perfect Koran, which, according to Shi'ah doctrine, was in the hands of Ali.

The Sooni Mahommedans may always have a Caliph, but they have no competent leaders under whom to fight for the maintenance of the line of Othman; and as long as they are permitted the enjoyment of their religion, no people submit more quietly and quickly to overwhelming force. Even in Europe, Russia has nearly as many Mahommedan as Polish subjects; yet while that vast Empire is excited with hopes of a crusade against the Turks, there is not a whisper of revolt among the hundreds of thousands of Mahommedans who inhabit the banks of the Volga. We, on our part, are told that it is the duty of England to maintain misgovernment,—for that, as I have shown, must be synonymous with Turkish rule in Europe,—because we have 30,000,000 Mahommedan subjects in India, whose fidelity, it is said, rests upon our friendship with the Porte. How is it that these thirty millions are never referred to as a sufficient bulwark against Russia, the implacable foe of the Ottoman Empire? Of course they take an interest in the welfare of the Sultan, and would be glad, if we were engaged in a life or death struggle against Turkey—which is an impossibility—to seize that moment for revolt. As Mahommedans they would rebel at any time if there was a clear prospect of supplanting our Government with Mahommedan rule. But to assert that a settlement of the Eastern question in the only way in which it can be settled, would embarrass our Government in India, is an opinion which the evidence adduced from Hunter's "Mahommedan Subjects" and other authorities does not justify. When the enthronement of the Koran in Europe is ended, it will be accomplished by an exhibition of force, in face of which all

Islam will be dismayed and will acknowledge destiny. Would it not then be more reasonable to suppose that the misfortunes of Mahomedanism in Europe would strengthen the contentment of Indian Mahommedans with the rule of a Power known to be the most tolerant? But the weakness of the Turkish Empire in Europe lies in the fact that three-fourths of the people are non-Mahomedan, and in the fear lest the Ottoman garrison has not strength to resist the non-Mussulmans and their allies. The Turkish army has neither pay nor efficient officers. For a long time, until Europe would bear it no longer, the Turkish forces might be maintained by ravaging provinces of immense fertility, and European officers may be bought, as they have at all times been bought, to wear Turkish swords; but we have seen in the Herzegovina a sample of the spirit of resistance which such a war engenders—a spirit such as was displayed in Greece more than fifty years ago, and such as is ready to blaze out from Belgrade to Adrianople and Salonica. If one were to ask the present Grand Vizier what was the origin of the outbreak, he would refer to the visit of the Emperor of Austria to Dalmatia in May, 1875, and tell how his Majesty there met the Montenegrin Prince and made him colonel of an Austrian regiment. The Vizier would say that Serbia is playing a double game with two of the great Powers—that she encourages Russia in Pan-Slavism, while she looks to Austria to prevent the fruition of Russian hopes, and to ensure her against absorption by the Northern Power. The Servian weakens the Turk by supporting insurrection on his borders; and while coquetting alternately with Russian and Austrian, has his own idea as to the future, in which he sees Belgrade the guard of a Servian or South Slavonic kingdom, including the populations of Bulgaria, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro.

The political movements of Serbia are, it is observed, regulated with military precision. The Tsar's Chancellor lately telegraphed to Prince Milan to keep quiet, and there was calm over all the land, a state of things which entirely supports the description of the Government, given to me on the spot, by the late *doyen* of the Consular body. "The Prince governs," he said, "with a Senate and a House of Representatives, the first being nominated by himself, the second by the chief of his police." In the provinces of Bulgaria and Thessaly, there is great dislike for Turkish rule, but Thessaly will not move without the support of Greece, of whose advances into her borders, with designs of annexation, Thessaly has most unpleasant remembrances. The depredations of Greek bands have led to her being not more attracted to the sceptre of King George than to the wearer of the sword of Othman. As to the Bulgarians, their language, like that of Serbia, is understood by Russians. The recent movement in Bulgaria is

certainly the result of Russian intrigue. For themselves, the Bulgarians have not a settled policy of revolt. As a battle-field, Bulgaria has suffered greatly, and her old men have no happy recollections of Russian invasion. For years they nursed a grievance—their spiritual pastors and masters have been Greek, supplied by the Patriarch of Constantinople from the Phanar quarter of that city, the quarter from whence, owing to the ignorance of the Turks, the working heads of Ottoman bureaucracy have been obtained. It is perhaps for this reason that the Bulgarians have never looked kindly upon the aspirations of Greece to lead the fight against Islam. If there is a general rising, the Bulgarians will not be idle, and probably their leaders have vague ideas of an autonomy something like that of Roumania, under the protection of Russia. They are quite familiar with roubles and copecks, and indeed in the current coin of northern Bulgaria, the Tsar's image is seen as often as the Sultan's cipher. Supposing a Russian army to have landed in Bulgaria and to have the sympathy of the people, the great difficulty of the Turks would be in keeping open communications between the capital and such strongholds as Silistria and Widin. Bulgaria is the best battle-ground in European Turkey. When in former times Russian invaders have approached the Danube, they have passed through the plains of Great Wallachia, which are swamps from November to June, and most unwholesome resting-places in the brief period when they are passable by armies. Who can wonder that, gazing across the Danube, from the flat lands of Wallachia upon the green slopes of Bulgaria, fruitful and healthy, dotted with pleasant villages, they have longed to possess themselves of this fair province? The silver streak of the Danube, half-a-mile wide from the earthworks of Silistria to the Roumanian shore, is in itself a great security, but the strongly fortified hills behind the town have batteries which can sweep the Wallachian plain as they did when the Russians were repulsed in the last war.

Against the ambition of Russia upon the Danube, the Powers erected, at the close of the Crimean War, a barrier as strong as the circumstances permitted. In order to shut her out more completely from the great river, they took from Russia a part of Bessarabia, added it to Moldavia, and, as the United Principalities, neutralized those provinces which are now known under the common name of Roumania. This was done by the Twenty-second Article of the Treaty of 1856:—

“The Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia shall continue to enjoy, under the suzerainty of the Porte, and under the guarantee of the Contracting Powers, the privileges and immunities of which they are in possession. No exclusive protection shall be exercised over them by any of the guaranteeing Powers. There shall be no separate right of interference in their internal affairs.”

This barrier was strengthened in 1866, when the Emperor Napoleon, whose resentment at the proposed elevation of a Hohenzollern Prince in 1870 led to the fatal consequences of Sedan, gave his cordial consent to the installation of a member of the reigning House of Prussia as Prince of the United Principalities. The Cabinet of Lord Palmerston hailed the accession of Prince Charles, who still rules in Jassy and Bucharest. But the Government is not settled; there is always in the political atmosphere a sense of impending change. If in place of between 4,000,000 and 5,000,000 of Roumains of Latin race, speaking a language akin to Italian, the Slavs of Bulgaria had occupied this side of the Danube, the position of Russia would have been greatly strengthened. If Russian Pan-Slavism is ever triumphant, the Roumanians will be, as Americans say, "cornered." But if the Roumains should find the shelter of the Sublime Porte insufficient, they will look to their German Prince, and to their Austrian brothers in Transylvania and Bukovina, to save them from the fatal embrace of the Northern Bear.

The three Emperors have, however, given notice to the world that they arrogate to themselves exclusive power to deal as they please with these provinces and with the guarantees by which their independence is secured. No one will venture to say that if they can agree upon a policy, this is a matter beyond their strength. Their united conduct last year with reference to the Roumanian Treaties of Commerce was a virtual infraction of the Treaty of 1856, an interference not in co-operation with England and France. It was a proceeding which would be very useful as paving the way for access by Russian troops to Bulgaria; and having regard to the obvious meaning of the above-recited Article, such a violation of the territory of the Principalities could hardly be regarded as a more flagrant wrong. The commercial system of Turkey is favourable to free-trade—that of Russia is the rudest protection. The United Principalities were not unwilling to enlarge their revenue by an increase of indirect taxation, and the three Emperors, disregarding their engagement, undertook "interference in the internal affairs" "separate" from their co-signatories, England and France. Nothing could be more clear than the obligations of Prince Charles's Government. The firman from Sultan Abd-ul-Assiz, upon acceptance of which Prince Charles received investiture, contains the following stipulation :—

"You engage, in your own name and in the name of your successors, to consider, as in times past, as binding upon the United Principalities, all the treaties and conventions existing between my Sublime Porte and the other powers in so far as they should not infringe the rights of the United Principalities, settled and recognized by the Acts relating to them; also to maintain and respect the principle that no treaty or convention could be directly concluded by the United Principalities with

Foreign Powers. My Imperial Government will nevertheless not fail to consult the United Principalities upon the dispositions of every treaty or convention which might relate to their laws and commercial regulations."

Those who in face of this agreement could contend that Roumania had a separate right to enter into Commercial Treaties, could have no difficulty in passing a foreign army across the Pruth.

There is no religious persecution in the Turkish Empire more cruel than that which the Jews of Roumania have suffered from members of the Greek Church. These provinces have long been the home of Russian Jews, who formerly fled from Poland to escape conscription and who now get away from Odessa to avoid the more universal law of military service, which follows the example of Germany. I have read in a Bucharest journal a letter from a public officer, inviting three Israelites to quit the area of his jurisdiction, with the alternative of "severe executive measures." It had been determined, this officer said, to have no Jews in his district. This is only one of many false notes of "Christianity" in Turkey. The so-called Christians are often dishonest, not seldom drunken, and, though not inferior to the people of Russia in political capacity, are, in this respect, far beneath the level of any other European people. But theirs are vices and deficiencies such as ages of oppression by a foreign soldiery (the Turks are such to them) would produce anywhere. They have had no instruction, no consolation, except from priests ignorant as themselves, and the worship in their churches appears a debased idolatry in comparison with the grandly simple ritual of the mosques. The extolled virtues of the Turk are those which have ever been exhibited by conquerors in the plenitude of supremacy above millions who toil to make their wealth, such as a foreigner would have seen in the Anglo-Normans eight hundred years ago. In Mahomedan countries, where there is no interference by civilized powers, a convert to Christianity forfeits his property, upon application to the Sheik-ul-Islam by the next of kin. In the present year an Armenian Christian of rank postponed his visit to a royal personage on account of wet weather. I asked him what connection the humidity of the atmosphere had with his intention, and he said that non-Mussulmans were not welcome, the tradition from the times when they were forbidden to walk the streets in wet weather, in order that Islam might avoid the superior power of contamination which their garments acquired by moisture, being not yet quite forgotten. It is not true that intemperance is confined to the non-Mussulman population. I have never seen people drink ardent spirits in such quantities as some Mahomedans of station whom I have met with in travel. A Moslem prince lately asked me why I drank wine—"It does not

nection between "the covenant of circumcision with Abraham" and the shedding of Christ's blood. We may develop and interpret Christ's teaching as universal, for all classes and without distinction of sex. But Mahommedanism is a democracy for men, and not for all men, but only for such as are not slaves, and with these last and lowest, not directly, but by unmistakable reference, the entire sex of women is placed. The religion of Islam is, for this reason alone, incompatible with progress, and must decline as civilization advances. Very urgent reasons are therefore required to sustain a policy having for its prime object the maintenance of Mahommedan power, which, in its supremacy above an overwhelming majority of non-Mussulmans, must needs be transient, and must expire in the moment when these are in full possession of that complete equality to which the Turkish Government has solemnly pledged itself in 1856 and 1876.

It remains for us to consider the separate interests of the Powers. Austria is the nearest. The monarchical greed for territory can perhaps only be understood by those who have nothing else to wish for. The position of Austria is one of great importance. She can pass troops most easily into the disaffected districts; and if the presence of a British fleet in the Black Sea left no opening for Russian attack, except by Roumania, Austria, if she has nothing to fear from Germany, could attack the invaders in flank at terrible disadvantage to Russia. She has gone hand in hand with the Tsar, not willingly, not only because of their original bond of union in the partition of Poland, but more than all from fear lest, to her exclusion, Russia should be the favourite friend of the revolting provinces. Midhat Pasha probably believes that Count Andrassy is playing a double game; that while he satisfies the objections of his compatriot Magyars by disclaiming schemes of annexation, he is hoping and resolved to please his master by the gift of Herzegovina and Bosnia. That Austria dreams of her crown floating down the Danube, saluted from both shores as the emblem of a welcome sovereignty, there can be no doubt; but the dreamer wakes with a start and finds it is not true, as he had seen in a closing vision, that Bismarck is dating orders from the Burg in Vienna, to a German fleet in possession of the port of Trieste. At the end of a visit to Servia, I quitted the uneasy principality in company with the Ban of Croatia, the late Field-marshal Baron Gablenz, who had been sent to Belgrade by the Emperor Francis Joseph on a special mission. To the present writer he freely expressed his opinion that Servia would gladly be united to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, if assured that Servian nationality would be respected and such independence accorded as that of Hungary. I asked this hero of the Dannewërke what he thought of the defences of Belgrade. His opinion was that

modern artillery would soon knock the old fortifications in ruins upon the heads of defenders; yet he admitted that the citadel of Belgrade, standing high upon a point between two rivers overlooking plains of vast extent, had a natural position of great strength.

But the Eastern Question, difficult as it is upon the Baltic, is not less so around the Golden Horn. According to their lights, diplomatists will answer it by reflecting on the assertion of Fuad. Are the Turks "the best police of the Bosphorus?" We have the historical memory of Lord Russell for authority in saying that the Emperor Nicholas once stated to Prince Metternich that he no longer wished to obtain Constantinople for himself; that he was quite ready to see it placed under the Emperor of Austria as a Sovereign in whom he could confide. The Tsar was probably dissembling: he dare not consent before his people to the replacement of the cross upon Santa Sophia by a Prince of the Western Church. Those four cherubim in that grand temple, made headless by order of the Koran—Who is to re-crown with human faces their ancient wings which encircle the noble cupola and to throw down the meaningless rosettes which Islam has substituted? Who shall trace again in glaring gold those crosses upon the walls, which ages of Mahomedan occupation have not entirely obliterated? Who shall readjust the theological compass in this evidently Christian church, of which the orientation towards Jerusalem is so faulty in the eyes of Islam, that the indications of the direction of Mecca stand askew, and the long lines of the vast carpets at unpleasant variance with those of the floor? Constantinople is like no other city: it occupies a peculiar position of command. The naval strength of the power which holds Constantinople must needs be great: but if to the belligerent advantages of the position were added the maritime skill of the northern provinces of Russia, and their project of iron, our road to India might be insecure. Such geographical problems cannot be solved by rude conquest, or by the maintenance of a government which has not true allegiance from the people. I once asked Mr. J. S. Mill with reference to the opposite end of the Mediterranean, what course he would be disposed to advise in the case of Gibraltar. He thought that the exclusive occupation of this natural stronghold by the British, was unjustifiable in its cost to this country, and in the offence it gave to the Spanish nation. His opinion was that places of this sort should be occupied by a small and mixed garrison, with no array of guns, their neutrality being guaranteed in the strongest possible manner.

The general conception of material interests of the English, has led the Government of try to sustain the Turkish Power; and in spite of n of political and financial

promises, that policy appears still to be the most popular. England will condone all the vagaries of the Session, because of Lord Derby's refusal to endorse the Berlin Note. Lord Derby is following the motto of his family. "*Sans changer*," we may read in his speech of 1868 his policy in 1876. In the former year, he said of Turkey in Europe :—

"Trouble is gathering there. It may come quickly or it may be deferred for years ; but come it probably will. Now that is a state of things to which we ought not to shut our eyes. Fifteen years ago we refused to see in time what was then obviously impending, and the result was that to everybody's dissatisfaction we drifted (it was a very happy phrase) into the Crimean War. I do not think that the dangers which threaten the Turkish Empire arise from the same cause now as then. It is rather internal than external peril by which that empire is threatened. No foreign alliance, no European guarantee, can protect a government against financial collapse or against rebellion in its own provinces. In these matters every country must be left to work out its own destiny. But it does not the less follow that the weakness of a great State is a misfortune to all the world, and a misfortune I think even to those races which do not and cannot sympathize very warmly with its own. An indifferent government is better than none. And if I could venture to hope that any words of mine, whether uttered here or elsewhere, would reach those Christian populations of the East, with whom I sincerely sympathize, I should say to them, ' Your aspirations may be natural, but remember this—that anarchy is not progress, and that it is not wise to pull down that for which you have not provided any substitute.' " *

We shall certainly not repeat all the errors of past times. The Sultan is not so respectable a power as he was thought to be three hundred years ago, when Queen Elizabeth was advised, in writing to the " Prince of Believers," to style herself " The Defender of the Faith against other Christian idolaters." The Empress of India, with all her religious difficulties, will make no such mistake. Our Government will not—openly at least—treat Turkey as a defaulting debtor. The words of the Foreign Office in 1871, are very instructive upon that point. Mr. Hammond was then directed to write that " forcible measures, if adopted towards small States, which for the most part are the ones complained of, would subject this country to grievous imputations." We can, if France be with us, or neutral, stop the way even of the allied Emperors into Turkey by the Black Sea, and Russia cannot safely pass through Roumania without leave from Germany. But we must remember that if the three Emperors, already partners in a similar work, are agreed upon a joint operation in Turkey, they have abundant power to execute their design. Lord Derby's policy has appeared most successful ; circumstances helped it, and gave a diplomatic triumph to the British Government. But if this policy, and the language with

* Lord Stanley at Lynn, 14th November, 1868.

which it has been explained and supported by the English Press, should, as is not unlikely, strengthen the three Emperors in their resolve to act together, it will afford them legitimate ground for disclaiming the concurrence of England. Russia may have arranged with Germany for the re-cession of her territory in Bessarabia, and Prince Charles be prepared to surrender the land which was added to Moldavia by the Treaty of Paris. Englishmen should bear in mind the experience of the Foreign Office in 1863, when England addressed Russia and Prussia concerning the ferocious tyranny with which Mouravieff was then suppressing insurrection in Poland. Prince Gortschakoff professed the readiness of his Government to discuss the subject, but only with the two copartitioning Powers, and at last haughtily stated that England had no right of interference with the domestic affairs of the Russian Empire—a reply with which we had to rest content. We seem once more to be committing ourselves to the maintenance of a Government, the supremacy of which can less easily be justified than that of the fallen Governments of Bourbon Naples and of Papal Rome—not because England admires the Sublime Porte, the existence of which has probably cost her in expenditure and bad investments about £10,000,000 a year since 1854; but because, owing to the policy of Russia, England believes the Turks to be “the best police of the Bosphorus.” We must defer the consideration of the separate circumstances of Russia.

ARTHUR ARNOLD.



CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES, POPULAR AND CRITICAL.

IT has often struck me, and I suppose must have struck most other persons of late years, that granting that the Christian history is true, it would not in the least necessarily follow that ordinary men and women have the means of knowing it to be true. Nothing can be more certain to any one who has looked at all carefully into the evidence of the great trial regarding the Tichborne Estates, than that the Claimant to those estates is not Sir Roger Tichborne, and nothing can be much more certain than that he is Arthur Orton; but, as is well known, there are hundreds of thousands of people in this country who, from a curious mixture of plausible but inadequate with thoroughly bad reasons, are quite convinced that a great wrong was done by the verdict given in that case, and that the man who was convicted of perjury is really the missing heir to the estates. Hence a great many people have said, and have said with great plausibility, that the Tichborne case ought to teach us how little true evidences weigh in moulding the belief of the people at large. The majority of the human race, even in the countries which have had much popular teaching, attach, it is observed, a quite fictitious importance to one or two kinds of evidence of no great value, and no importance at all to a whole host of others which it is far more completely beyond the reach of either conscious or unconscious deception to invent or modify. Now is the evidence of the far more distant, the far more important, and the far stranger events

in which the Christian revelation is embodied, so much simpler in kind, founded on so much clearer testimony, and testimony so much less complicated with all sorts of difficult considerations, than the evidence which proves Arthur Orton's fraud, that it can really be brought home to the minds of those who are quite incompetent to sift properly the evidence of the great Tichborne trials? And again, even if it can be shown that the historical problem eighteen centuries old is a simpler one, and more within the grasp of the popular mind, than the great disputed identity question of our own days, is it so *much* simpler that the results of refined investigations of learned men only affect the question as slightly confirming the instincts of popular faith? These surely are questions of the highest importance. We cannot afford to ignore them, or to leave our minds in a haze about them. Not only are the witnesses of the present day with us to be cross-examined, but, as regards the Tichborne case at least, we have had them elaborately cross-examined, and we are able to ask those who complain that the most important part of the evidence was suppressed, why it *was* so suppressed—why the Claimant did not bring forward at the right time evidence which he now asserts to be essential to his case. With regard to the events which are declared to have occurred eighteen hundred years ago, this is of course not possible. We cannot cross-examine the witnesses to them at all. Where they appear to disagree, as they often do, we cannot make out by direct investigation the source of the disagreement. Nor can we by any means assume that all who had anything material to say on either side have given their evidence. Yet the historical character of the events we have to consider is infinitely more important to the human race, and is, to most minds, on a superficial view, decidedly more surprising and less probable, than that of the events to which either party in the late trial asked us to give our credence. If the mass of the people judged wrong with such elaborate help as the courts of law gave them in the latter case, how can we expect them to judge right, without any such assistance, in relation to the marvellous story of Christ's life and resurrection in the former case? I do not think we can answer these questions by saying that the evidence of spiritual things is spiritual, or by any juggle of that kind. If ever there were a plain matter of asserted physical fact, which, whatever its connection with the spiritual world, is not in any sense purely spiritual, it is the asserted fact of our Lord's resurrection from the dead. If any one could prove the charge that we believe that on evidence on which we should refuse to accept any other fact not affecting our spiritual hopes at all, he would, I think, make out his case that our Christian faith rests on no secure grounds. Evidence which is not good enough to prove ordinary events, can hardly be offered in good

faith in proof of extraordinary events. I propose to take the resurrection as the keystone of what I may call the physical miracles of our Lord's life, for I imagine that no one who accepts that as fact would hesitate to accept a great many other miracles along with it, and no one who rejects that, would accept any other miracle of the same kind as having anything like the same amount of evidence.

However, I do not think any reasonable man would dispute any fact less than miraculous, which came to us on the same sort of evidence as our Lord's resurrection. The whole incredulity which has been felt in relation to this statement arises, I imagine, entirely from its supernatural and miraculous character. There is no question of fraud at all, no necessity for disentangling a mass of carefully woven statements such as confused the popular understanding in the Tichborne case. Every sensible man admits at once that the Christian Church believed simply and entirely in Christ's resurrection, and that the only real doubt in the matter is whether that belief was a credulous and ill-founded or a reasonable and well-founded belief. But as it is quite certain that the notion of satisfying modern demands as to evidence had not so much as occurred to the Apostles, who apparently thought it enough to declare that they were all witnesses of their Lord's life, death, and resurrection, without stating in what *sense* they were witnesses, it is by no means easy to get behind the belief which they professed, to the facts on which it was grounded in the minds of the Apostles themselves. Yet a short statement of how the matter really stands, will prove, I think, that, were the fact *not* supernatural, the various inconsistencies as to the evidence of it adduced, would not weigh a jot with any reasonable mind against accepting it. I quite admit that a very different kind of evidence is needed as to a fact which is supernatural; and that the mere external evidence as we have it, without weighty confirmation from important evidence of other kinds, would be very insufficient to warrant our belief in so stupendous a marvel.

I will briefly sum up, then, the state of the external evidence, without concealing or exaggerating anything. Within from eleven to thirteen, or at the most fourteen, years from the Crucifixion—within a less distance of time, that is, than that which separates us from the dispute with America as to the capture of the *Trent*, and much less than that which separates us from the relief of Cawnpore and the fall of Delhi—St. Paul found the belief in the resurrection of our Lord firmly established among the Apostles at Jerusalem, so that he was afterwards able to tell the Corinthians that Christ was buried, and rose again the third day, that he was seen by Peter, then by the twelve (the eleven, I suppose he meant), then by above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the

greater part were then living but some were dead ; then by James, then by all the Apostles, and last of all by himself (in vision). That the resurrection was not only believed, but believed as only those things on their faith in which people recast their whole lives are believed, no one with whom controversy is worth while in the least disputes. If we may trust the account given us by the author of the Acts, of St. Peter's speech in the interval between Christ's final departure and the day of Pentecost, it was held essential, in filling up the place of Judas, to choose one who had "companied" with the Apostles "all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out amongst us, beginning from the baptism of John unto that same day when he was taken up from us," and the especial object of the new choice was that he should be "a witness with us of his resurrection." And again, in the speech on the day of Pentecost, the same Apostle is made to say, "This Jesus hath God raised up, *whereof we all are witnesses.*" In the hardly disputed First Epistle of Peter, we have less explicit but still confirmatory evidence to the same effect, in the words, "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who according to his abundant mercy has begotten us again (*ἀναγεννήσας*) unto a lively hope by the *resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead*"—that is, no doubt, "who has restored us from the state of temporary despair in which we were after his death, to a renewed hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead." Amid the discrepancies which I freely admit in the Gospel accounts of the resurrection, it is notable that St. Paul's statement agrees with that in the third Gospel, that St. Peter was the first Apostle who was a witness of the resurrection, and that *all* the accounts alike agree that Jesus was seen by all the eleven Apostles together, though the Gospel called St. Matthew's only mentions such a meeting in Galilee, while the early fragment appended to St. Mark seems to agree with St. Luke, St. John, the Acts, and apparently St. Paul, in placing the earliest and most important meeting with the eleven Apostles in Jerusalem. It must be frankly admitted, however, that while the Gospel of St. Mark ends with the statement that the sepulchre was found empty, and with a prophecy of a meeting to take place in Galilee,—the addition describing Christ's appearances in Jerusalem being almost certainly of a different though early origin,—none of the extant accounts agree closely either with each other or with St. Paul's later summary of the facts. The first Gospel speaks of no appearance, except to the women, in the neighbourhood of the sepulchre, and of but one meeting with the Apostles "in a mountain in Galilee," and adds, "When they saw him they worshipped him, *but some doubted,*" which reminds us of the story of Thomas's doubts given in the fourth Gospel alone, the scene of which, however, is there expressly

described as being in Jerusalem. The account in the third Gospel is virtually identical with that in the early addition to Mark, recording the appearance to two disciples on their walk to Emmaus, and then to the eleven as they sat at meat, but agreeing with the fourth Gospel in making the first appearance of the risen Christ that seen by Mary Magdalene. The fourth Gospel differs from all the other accounts in describing the first appearance to the assembled Apostles as taking place to ten of them only, Thomas being absent, while only the second, a week later, included all the eleven, and in describing a meeting with seven disciples on the shores of the Lake of Galilee at some later time not defined. Of the appearance to James recorded by St. Paul, we have no other account at all, nor of the appearance to above five hundred brethren at once. I should add that the command to the Apostles recorded in the third Gospel, to stay in Jerusalem till after Pentecost was passed, makes the prediction in the first and second Gospels that the first meeting was to take place in Galilee, and the assertion in the first that it actually did so, still less in harmony with the other narratives.

I think every candid person will admit that this condition of the merely external evidence is not of the kind which any one would wish for the purpose of establishing by direct testimony a very marvellous and unprecedented event. But I think every candid person will also admit that it is just the sort of evidence we might expect if there had been no attempt to take records at the time, a good number of accounts (narrated by different persons) of different appearances in different places, a certain amount of local prepossession in favour of Galilee as the appropriate place for Christ's renewed intercourse with his disciples, and a complete conviction that Christ after his resurrection had been seen so often and by so many persons that there was no real dispute about the matter. As I have said before, the only point on which all accounts agree is, that certainly all the eleven, and if the Acts can be relied on, all the twelve (including Matthias), had been witnesses of the resurrection. Indeed, the earliest tradition shows that it was considered essential for an Apostle to have been a witness of the event. Now, would such evidence as this, with all its discrepancies, be rejected for a moment as to any fact *not* supernatural? I do not think it would. If the same evidence, with the same class of discrepancies in it, were adduced for instance as proof that a man for many years blind recovered his sight on the touch of Christ—an event not necessarily miraculous, but capable of explanation in various other ways—I do not suppose any one would question it, even though one account laid the scene in Galilee and others in Jerusalem, and none of them agreed *very* fully together. So long as it was clear that eleven or

twelve men were declared to have been selected as witnesses of such an event; that they all of them continued to lead a new kind of life expressly founded on this experience; that they had all known the man while he was still blind as well as after his cure; that a great many other witnesses were alleged to have been witnesses of the cure; and that this well-accepted belief in a large and closely-organized body, of which the original eleven or twelve were the nucleus, prevailed widely within from eleven to fourteen years of the event itself, and that the organization had its asserted origin in that event,—I do not imagine any historian of sense would hesitate to accept the fact, though he would regret that it was no longer possible to recover the details. In fact, with an event not supernatural, it would be evidently far the simplest and most natural explanation of the testimony to assume that the fact happened, though under circumstances rendered very doubtful by the discrepancies in the narratives. It is very easy to account for differences in the mode of describing a fact not recorded at the time; it is not very easy to account for the universal belief, very clearly attested, in any society, that eleven or twelve named persons, with a good many other unnamed persons, were witnesses of a very remarkable fact, and made that fact the foundation of their whole subsequent career, on any principle nearly so simple as that it really took place.

However, it is quite true that it is one thing to accept a particular explanation, even of a merely unusual occurrence, as the easiest, and another very different thing to *believe* it in the sense of that unshaken and heartfelt adhesion which we give to the foundation of our whole moral aims. It is quite true that you could not even find a man guilty in a court of law on such evidence only as a historian might yet quite rightly accept as adequate to the probable and even plausible explanation of the facts with which he had to deal. And I do not think we can in any sense be said to believe a fact, as a Christian who builds his whole life upon it ought to believe in the resurrection of Christ, if we do not think it certain enough to satisfy more than the requisitions of a court of law. And I quite admit that we ought to look for very much more evidence of a fact evidently out of the ordinary course of nature than for one which, though unusual, might easily have been consistent with the ordinary course of nature. Are there, then, any important indirect confirmations of this evidence which ought to alter the effect produced upon us by its external discrepancies?

First, there is one point of more importance I think than sceptics are usually willing to assign to it: I mean the certainty that according to every account we have, according to the universal tradition, the assertion of the resurrection was at first received with disbelief and doubt—such is the express statement of each one of the three

Gospels and also that of the early fragment appended to the second Gospel—which disbelief and doubt were certainly turned within a few days into a sort of confidence, and even of enthusiastic assurance, very much exceeding, as far as we can judge, anything which had existed among the Apostles in the lifetime of their Master. Now I quite admit that beliefs which have a great deal that is legendary in them do grow up in the course of years, as the hearts of those who have been laid hold of by a profound affection recover gradually from the first bewilderment and soreness of loss, rally from their dejection, and begin to blend with a certain indistinctness in their memory of the past, dreams and hopes and fancies which that past has produced. But there was no time at all for this kind of idealizing process in the case before us. It is as certain as anything can be that though all was dismay and confusion on the morrow of the crucifixion, yet within two months of the death of Christ the Church in Jerusalem was increasing at a rate at which we have no reason to suppose the number of Christ's disciples ever increased during his lifetime. It is certain too that within at least a still smaller number of weeks the Apostles proceeded in the most business-like manner to fill up the gap caused by the treachery and death of Judas with the avowed purpose of organizing the Church for its new life and victories. There seems to me the greatest possible difficulty in attributing so great and so sudden a change as this to the sort of illusion which a blending of regret and hope and aspiration and superstition produces. Nothing can be clearer than that up to the last moment the Messianic hopes of the Apostles had been of a very earthly kind. "Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom unto Israel?" is the first question attributed to the Apostles *after* the resurrection in the book of the Acts of the Apostles; and whatever may be said of its authenticity as to a miracle, it is surely good evidence as to what the early Church hoped, since it must have been written after many of those hopes had been disappointed if not extinguished, and therefore at a time when the whole tendency would have been to picture the expectations of the Apostles as more in keeping with history than they really were. Now, with such hopes suddenly blasted by the disappearance of the one person in whom they centered, does it seem possible that they would as suddenly have revived without some great substantial and even *physical* stimulus, if I may so express it, to the hopes of the Apostles? If the person of our Lord was admitted by all of them to have reappeared amongst them, no doubt these hopes would have so revived. But without that stimulus, is it conceivable that energetic forward-looking counsels would have begun to prevail within a week or two of the great blow? If it had depended on what the women affirmed, or what an

individual disciple here and there had fancied that he had seen, or on the assertion of two of them walking into the country that a stranger had joined them who disappeared suddenly and unaccountably and whom in the moment of disappearance they recognized as their lost Master, would it not have seemed to them all "as idle tales?" would not there have been, as we are told there was, some Thomas to say, "Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe?" It seems incredible that if the Apostles had no common and united evidence of Christ's resurrection, the new work should have begun with such active confidence, and without affording us any trace of a considerable intermediate period in which a legend would at least have time to grow up. Yet as a matter of fact there is no trace to be found of a period of uneasiness such as a disputed assertion which various of the Apostles were anxious to verify would cause, except the account of the doubt of Thomas, and of its complete satisfaction within a week of the resurrection. Now with the Apostles' evidently vivid desire and expectation of the erection of a physical sovereignty by their Master, and the sudden crushing of that hope, I cannot really believe that anything short of seeing and conversing with him, and receiving his commands to act as they did, could have filled up so soon and so promptly the void caused by his death. If Mary Magdalene thought she had seen him, and one or two others thought they had seen him, and all these visions were mere caprices of a fervent and loving imagination, what should we expect as the result? Why, that there would have been great excitement and much hope, and no agreement as to what ought to be done; that everything would have waited for fuller knowledge and explicit communications from the vanished Messiah; and that, when no such fuller knowledge and clearer communications came, the fraternal organization would gradually have dissolved and been succeeded no doubt by a beautiful legend, but by no clear and unanimous and confident action. Only compare the wonder and doubt and dismay when, Christ being still with them, he merely *talked* of a disgraceful death, with the energy, elasticity, and confidence displayed after it had really happened. For my part I cannot doubt that the best explanation is what it is alleged to have been, that Christ himself returned to his Apostles after his death, and that it was his directing mind, exercising vastly more influence than before in consequence of the evidence that he had overcome death, which gave them the new and powerful impulse.

This seems to me a perfectly sober view, so far, of the evidence bearing on Christ's resurrection. But in discussing it I have hitherto purposely omitted one element which is I think one of



great significance, the repeated prophecy of that event which the Gospels record. I think that the most rationalistic critics are disposed to insist on these prophecies as quite genuine. Indeed, they would find it much less easy to account for the profound subsequent belief, and yet deny the fact, *without* the prophecy than with it. They hold that the prophecy accounts for the expectation, and that the expectation threw the minds of the Apostles into that condition in which imagination passed into belief. For those who accept the resurrection, the prophecy clearly increases the significance without increasing in any degree the difficulties which surround the record of the event, while for those who reject it, the real existence of the prophecy would remove some of the difficulties in explaining the growth of the belief. Certainly the prophecy is deeply embedded in every one of the evangelical narratives, in a manner that renders it hardly possible to give those narratives any credit for good faith at all—which few will deny them—without admitting that the attestation of the whole body of disciples attributed this often reiterated, and at least in the first instance earnestly deprecated, prophecy, to our Lord's lips. There is no language of our Lord's the occasion of which is described with more vivid minuteness than that used by him in repeating this prophecy, with especial solemnity, on the beginning of his last journey to Jerusalem:—

“And they were in the way going up to Jerusalem; and Jesus went before them: and they were amazed, and as they followed they were afraid. And he took again the twelve, and began to tell them what things should happen unto him, saying, Behold, we go up to Jerusalem; and the Son of man shall be delivered unto the chief priests and unto the scribes; and they shall condemn him to death, and shall deliver him to the Gentiles; and they shall mock him, and shall scourge him, and shall spit upon him, and shall kill him: and the third day he shall rise again.”

Evidently there was something unusual, and to the Apostles boding, in the gestures and mien of Christ in setting out thus on his last journey, which fixed the incident in their memories and embodied it in their tradition. The same tradition stated that on Peter's first confession of his belief in Christ as the Son of the living God, this communication was first made, and that Peter then earnestly protested against it, and was immediately rebuked with a sharpness which must have humiliated him. But on this later occasion none of the disciples ventured to protest, though the third evangelist declares that they were still completely unable to understand and believe the saying. Now, if we are to admit, as I think rationalists and supernaturalists will alike admit, that such a prophecy there was, how, if at all, does it bear on the evidence of the fact itself?

To my mind it has a very important bearing on it. Nothing

seems to me to have had more real, or, I will add, more legitimate influence on the popular belief in Christianity than the prophecies of our Lord, and nothing to have received much less attention of late years. And the more stress we lay on the incompleteness and unfinished character of the Gospels—the more frankly we admit that the second Gospel has no ending at all, the first a very abrupt and hurried one, not at all in keeping with the later tradition, and both the third and fourth most fragmentary accounts of the evidence of the resurrection—the less can it be maintained that the Gospels were afterwards so retouched as to make the prophecies accord with the subsequent faith of the Church. I do not think that anything could be weightier testimony to the early preparation and complete freedom from dogmatic purpose of the first and second Gospels, than the absence from them even of those details as to the resurrection which had become already for the Church of St. Paul's time the very alphabet of the Christian faith. Now both these Gospels contain minute prophecies like that of Peter's denial of his knowledge of our Lord, prophecies most unlikely to have been interpolated in later days when Peter was the heart and hope of the Apostolic body, and when, even though his denial might well have been frankly recorded, it would have been impossible for the imagination of the Church to emphasize it by inventing for itself a story of his ardent professions of loyalty and Christ's prevision of his lapse. Nor can any one maintain that either the first or the second Gospel contains an anti-Petrine bias. On the contrary, the second is usually attributed to Peter's own impulse, while the first records at least one instance of Peter's pre-eminent ardour and faith which is given by no other evangelist. This is only a minute matter, and if it stood alone might of course well be attributed to coincidence, but it is of importance so far as it goes, because it is a prophecy which can hardly by any possibility have been imagined after it had been fulfilled, and which evidently impressed itself deeply on the mind of the early Church.

However, it does not stand alone. I do not lay great stress on the prophecy of the crucifixion, deeply as it is ingrained in the Gospel narrative, because I know that it will be said that a very moderate insight into the power against which he was measuring himself, would serve to fill our Lord's mind with a belief in a violent death, and that when it was fulfilled it would be very natural for his disciples quite unconsciously to give his anticipations of that death more detail and speciality than they had really had. But consider only what is involved in the institution of the sacrament of the Last Supper. There again we have, not only the unanimous agreement of the three first Gospels, but the explicit evidence of St. Paul that on the night on which Christ was betrayed, he "took bread:  when he had given thanks, he 

brake, and said, Take, eat; this is my body which is broken for you; this do in remembrance of me. After the same manner also he took the cup, when he had supped, saying, This cup is the new testament in my blood: this do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me." Here, then, was a rite instituted formally and solemnly as a memorial of his death by our Lord, at a time when, though it was the eve of his death, no one with merely human knowledge could have even conjectured with confidence that his death was at hand. The Jews themselves had no power to put to death. Christ had been guilty of nothing likely to stir up the jealousy of the Romans. The clear and steady vision of death which led our Lord to treat the bread he broke as his body, and the wine he was pouring out as his blood given for the world, seems to me as clear a case of supernatural knowledge as history could produce of natural knowledge. And the supernatural vision extends not only to the event anticipated, but to the strange power of the rite thus solemnly instituted. Not only does his death at once follow, as he predicts, but the bread and wine become in some sense or other his body and blood to future centuries:—

"Both Faith and Art have given
To that one hour a life of endless rest,
And still whoe'er would taste the food of Heaven
May to that table come a welcome guest."

The rite thus instituted is in fact the most durable of historical monuments of a steady and lucid prevision of the future—both individual and spiritual—such as assumes a knowledge far deeper than that of men.

I say nothing of the prophecy of Judas's treachery, or in this connection of that of the universal publication of the deed of the woman who anointed Jesus with an alabaster box of ointment, though both were fulfilled, because it is easy to conceive that the first prophecy may have been more or less defined by the unconscious modification of tradition after the event, while the latter may well have caused its own fulfilment; and I wish to exclude all previsions which come under either head. But what is it reasonable to say about the explicit prophecies of the destruction of Jerusalem? I conceive that, at least as regards the first and second Gospels, in which the traditions of the resurrection are so singularly "conspicuous by their absence," it is almost impossible to suppose that these Gospels assumed their present form after the armies of Titus had destroyed Jerusalem. As we have seen, St. Paul found a singularly clear tradition of the appearance of Christ after his death in the Church within at most fourteen years of that death, and from twenty-seven to thirty years before Jerusalem was besieged. Is it credible that Gospels not written at that time

should have contained no account of Christ's appearances in Jerusalem, such as St. Paul and the third and fourth Gospels refer to? Is it credible that if they were subsequently so moulded as to include specific references to the destruction of Jerusalem in accordance with the facts, they should not have received the same kind of moulding to place them in harmony with the current traditions on the much more important point of the resurrection? Yet what is proved is that the second Gospel ends abruptly with the story of the empty sepulchre, while the first huddles up the whole account of Christ's appearances after his death into two or three sentences concerning a meeting between him and his disciples on a "mountain in Galilee." There seems to me no alternative between supposing that the chapter in the second Gospel beginning with, "And as he went out of the temple, one of his disciples saith unto him, Master, see what manner of stones and buildings are here! And Jesus answering said unto him, Seest thou these great buildings? there shall not be left one stone upon another that shall not be thrown down," and the corresponding chapter in the first Gospel, were completed long before the year 70 A.D., and making the impossible supposition that the transcriber of a later tradition, though unconsciously moulding the words of our Lord to suit the known event, would yet have left the most important of all the elements of the Christian story in complete, or almost complete, oblivion.

But there is another consideration which seems to me to render it clear that the prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem, at least as it is given in the first two Gospels, borrows nothing from the actual event; and that is the evident confusion in the mind of those who set it down between that event and a last judgment. Of course it is quite open to the sceptic to say that this confusion was conveyed by our Lord's own language. But then that only vindicates still more positively the prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem from the imputation of being recast after the event. For my own part, I believe the confident and mistaken anticipation of the early Church, that the end of the world was at hand, to have been the source of this confusion, and that there is discernible in these prophecies of our Lord's a very clear though misunderstood teaching that the kingdom of heaven was not to come "with observation," but gradually, and by a silent revolution in the heart of man. Still no one can deny the confusion in our actual narratives between two quite distinct classes of prophecies, one insisting on the early destruction of Jerusalem, and the trials that would await those who were in Judæa at that time, to which class alone I believe the prediction that "that generation would not pass away till all things were fulfilled," applied, and another referring to the final spiritual judgment through which all

men and all earthly institutions must pass. Now, what I want to press is the extraordinary improbability, not to say impossibility, that such a confusion should have been allowed to remain in this narrative, if it had taken its final shape after the destruction of Jerusalem and the suppression of the Jewish revolt, when the Churches were saying within themselves, in the language of the second Epistle ascribed in our version of the New Testament to Peter, "Where is the promise of his coming? for since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation." I think this consideration, no less than the absence of the current traditions as to the resurrection, proves that the prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem was not only given but recorded in the shape which it now takes in our first two Gospels, before the event to which it referred.

The cases I have now adduced are cases of explicit prophecies of individual events. But the truth is that, quite apart from individual events, the whole substance of our Lord's life was as full of compressed prophecy as spring water is of compressed air. I think it is hardly possible to lay too much stress on the ample and even redundant testimony which meets us in all parts of the Gospel to the early and deliberately announced intention of Christ to found an enduring kingdom on materials which were not only not of the stuff of which earthly Governments are made, but the moulder of which did not contemplate, indeed steadily refused to contemplate, conquering within any assigned period the help of earthly Governments for his purpose, or making any alliance of that kind an essential condition of the kingdom which he proclaimed. The Jewish polity was a spiritual polity, but it rested on an organization which wielded all the recognized powers of the State. Christ rejected the idea of availing himself of these means, and declared his purpose to use means so unpromising that, in the human sense, they were hardly means to such an end at all. I never hear without the thrill of a new surprise that calm, strange, and unique prophecy, addressed at the very outset of his short career to a dozen peasants, "Fear not, little flock, it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom," when I remember that a kingdom has really been given to them, though not a kingdom of this world. Nor is this a case of what has often happened—trust in the eventual ascendancy over man of great ideas. It is a case of the selection of special instruments, and of building up a human organization explicitly designed for work of a most laborious and difficult kind. "Follow me," Christ says to one or two couples of fishermen, as they cast their nets into the waters, and mended them on the shores, of the Lake of Galilee, "and I will make you fishers of men." And they *were* made fishers of men, and obviously made so solely by him who

thus chose them from a calling apparently so little qualified to fit them for the hopeless task. It is remarkable enough that by far the greatest of the Apostles—he in whom even human insight might have discerned the elements of marvellous force and moral influence—was not chosen for his work during Christ's earthly life. The "little flock" to whom our Lord announces so early and so peremptorily that they are "not to fear," because it is their "Father's good pleasure to give them the kingdom," are such a "little flock" as no one before ever proposed to make the founders of a new world. Indeed, Christ asserts repeatedly that they are chosen because they are *not* "wise and prudent," because they are "babes," and no doubt because on that very account they are not likely to aim at the construction of an ambitious polity; because they have no sort of influence which would give them authority, even in the little world of Judæa. They are anxiously warned against any kind of striving to acquire earthly dignity. Wealth is even forbidden them. They are promised "the kingdom" in the same breath in which they are told to sell what they have, and provide for themselves bags which wax not old, "a treasure in the heavens which faileth not," in order that "where their treasure is, there may their hearts be also."

Moreover, while the Apostles are forbidden all the ordinary means of binding together a great earthly organization, they are told that they are to be for a long time few and scattered, sowers of division, preachers to people who could not or would not understand. I do not refer to this as in any sense a further indication of prophetic insight, but only as showing how well our Lord understood the conditions of the work which he was imposing on those few and ignorant peasants with the most absolute promises of success. "The harvest truly is plenteous, but the labourers are few." The kingdom is not to be a popular one, in that time at least. Yet the chosen Apostles themselves misunderstand and misinterpret their Master. Peter, after being told that his confession is the rock on which the Church should be built, is spoken of as a tempter and an offence to his Master, as one who savours not of the things which are of God, but those which are of men. John is twice rebuked, once for his revengeful spirit, once for his short-sighted ambition. Judas's treachery is predicted, as I have already noticed. All the twelve are warned that they will fail at the hour of Christ's trial, and that warning, like the more individual prediction addressed to Peter, is certainly most unlikely to have been conceived after the event. In a word, from beginning to end of the Gospels we have evidence which no one could have managed to forge, that Christ deliberately chose materials of which it would have been impossible for any one to build a great organization, unless he could otherwise provide, and

continue to provide, the power by which that organization was to stand. Who can hear the words, "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes," without being impressed with the divine confidence of the purpose which selected what we should have thought the least promising of all materials for the most majestic and enduring of works, and proved their fitness by the history of the ages? The popular belief in Christianity has, I think, much more to do with the vivid impression made by these reiterated and emphatic prophecies, ingrained into the very essence of the Gospel, that a kingdom should be built up out of elements thus humanly hopeless—and of Christ's clear knowledge that they *were* in every human sense hopeless—than with any learned evidences. And for my part, I hold the grounds of this impression to be worth more, even though, or perhaps I ought to say *because*, they are thus open to the gauging of popular feeling, than all the learned evidences put together. Would it not be something incredible that a mere man should profess his intention to establish a spiritual kingdom which shall endure for ever, by the help of a dozen ignorant men, who are warned explicitly that they will not even keep him with them for more than a year or two, who habitually misunderstand his words and mistake his spirit, even while he remains with them, and who are assured that they are destined almost involuntarily to drink of his cup and be baptized with his baptism, in spite of misreading the sort of destiny which that implies, and the kind of glory to which it leads—and then that his mere prophetic guess should be so far fulfilled as the history of Christianity has fulfilled Christ's prediction at this day? Is there not here a vision of what would be to man an impossible future, on the partial realization of which the popular mind is far better able to pass a trustworthy judgment, than is even the most judicial mind to pass judgment on the intricate details of biographic or historic evidence? Take the language as to the likeness of the kingdom of Heaven to a grain of seed "which indeed is *the least of all seeds*, but when it is grown, it is the greatest among the herbs, so that the birds of the air come and lodge in the branches thereof." Could that well have been invented at any time before our Gospels were in existence as a true copy of the growth of the Church? And yet how distinct is its appreciation at once of the minuteness of the germ Christ was planting and of the vastness of its destined growth!

Now, surely the popular impression of these facts as implying that our Lord's knowledge had its roots planted in the very well-springs of the world's history, is, to say the least, as fully justified by reason as any inference, however judicial, from the careful survey of minute historic evidences possibly could be.

The materials of this building are not only intrinsically frail, but it is the Builder himself who selects them *because they are so*, and who yet calmly announces that the building shall outlast the heavens. His own death is to be the signal of defection and despair to his followers, yet it is to be the firm foundation of the eternal structure; and, as a matter of fact, no sooner is his visible hand withdrawn than the living stones run from all quarters of the earth and pile themselves into the Temple of the ages. Is there no real solidity in the conviction of divine power which these evidences produce? It seems to me that, looked at thus, Christ's life was full of the minutest, and what to mere men would be the most improbable, prophecy—the prophecy that he was himself to abandon, within a year or two, so far as any visible help was concerned, the work he had come into the world to do, to hand it over to a number of poor men who were fitted by nothing but attachment to himself, and not all of them by that, for the strange enterprise in which he had embarked them, and yet that, through disappointment and persecution and trial and blood, their enterprise should be fed and watered till it attained its gradually matured and mighty end. The minuter and more individual prophecies which I first cited are of importance only as showing that it was not merely trust in the operation of moral influences on the human heart which constituted Christ's prophetic power; that he saw individual details as well as general results. But in relation to the improbability of the forecast and to the calm certainty of the vision, they seem to me insignificant as compared with the larger prophecies on which I am now dwelling. No doubt it may be, in some sense, said of these that they fulfilled themselves, but not in any sense which detracts in the least from their supernatural character. They could not have fulfilled themselves without containing a true computation of the spiritual force at work in the world to fulfil them, which is as far beyond the reach of insight or human foresight, as to compass a resurrection is beyond the limits of human power.

I must notice one more instance of what is, I think, as strictly supernatural foresight as any I have yet given. That Christ should have understood the personal relation in which his immediate disciples would stand to him was perhaps a mere instance of discernment such as, no doubt, many great men have shown. But that he should deliberately have demanded the same kind of attitude towards himself from all future disciples, as he certainly did, and have gained what he asked in the very act, does seem to me one of the clearest marks of supernatural knowledge of the human heart which could be given. Nothing could be more hazardous than this emphasis laid by any human being—especially one who from the very first preaches lowliness of heart, and predicts the

shortness of his life and the ignominious violence of his end—on himself as the source of an enduring power, and the corner-stone of a divine kingdom. The necessity of loving him, the perpetual fame of her who anointed him for his burial, the grief that will be rightly felt for him when he leaves the earth, the identification of men's duty to each other, even to "the least of these my brethren," with their duty to him, all these are assumptions which run through the whole Gospel quite as strikingly as does the clear knowledge of the frailty of the human materials Christ had chosen, and of the supernatural character of the power by which he intended to vivify those means. Though his kingdom is to be the kingdom of which a little child is the true type, the kingdom in which it is the "meek" who are blessed, in which it is the "poor in spirit" who are to be the rulers, yet in this he is only saying in other words that he is to be the life of it, since it is because he is "meek and lowly in heart" that those who come to him shall find rest for their souls. Whether you choose to say that it is in spite of this humility or because of this humility, yet in either case Christ proclaims himself as the true object of love, and the permanent centre of power throughout the kingdom he proclaims. He not only declares that his departure will be the first legitimate cause of mourning to his followers,—“Can the children of the bride-chamber mourn as long as the bridegroom is with them? but the days will come when the bridegroom shall be taken from them, and then shall they fast,”—but even to all others the love of him is to predominate over all other love. “He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me.” Exclusion from his presence is everywhere treated as that outer darkness where there are weeping and gnashing of teeth. His vision of the spiritual future of untrue men is of men crying to him, “Lord, Lord!” and entreating him to recognize them, to whom he will be compelled to reply, “I never knew you; depart from me, ye that work iniquity.” He justifies with warmth all honour paid to him personally: “The poor ye have always with you, but me ye have not always;” “Verily I say unto you, Wherever this gospel shall be preached in the whole world, there shall also this, which this woman hath done, be told for a memorial of her.” Is not that most hazardous policy for any one not endowed with supernatural knowledge? Consider only what usually comes of self-assertion much less astounding than this in a human being, and yet what actually came of it in our Lord's case. The greatest of the world's teachers make light of themselves. Socrates treats his own death as of no moment. The Jewish prophets never think of treating their own careers as of any significance apart from the message they deliver. And as a rule,

in the world, when a man magnifies himself with gentleness and simplicity, we smile; we may find him loveable, but there is always a little laughter mingled with our love. When he does it arrogantly or imperiously, we are revolted. In either case, the first generation which does not personally know him puts aside his pretensions as irrelevant, if not even fatal to his greatness. But how was it with Christ? The first great follower who had never known him in the flesh, St. Paul, takes up this very note as the key-note of the new world. To him, "to live is Christ, to die is gain." His heart is "hid with Christ in God." His cry is, "Not I, but Christ that worketh in me." He makes his whole religious philosophy turn on the teaching of our Lord that he is the Vine, and his disciples the branches. In the land of the olive St. Paul adapts the image to the husbandry of the olive. Again, Christ is the head, and men the members. And what is true of St. Paul is true of all those in whom the Christian faith has shown its highest genius in subsequent ages. These sayings of Christ as to being himself the centre of human affections and the light of human lives, instead of repelling men, interpret their own highest experience, and seem but the voice of an interior Truth and the assurance of an imperishable joy.

And what is to be said of the value of such verifications of Christ's foresight? If one comes and shows us certain poor instruments with which we all admit that we could have done nothing and could do nothing, and he tells us, "I will do much with them, and ever more and more, and infinitely more after I have disappeared from the earth than during the year or two in which I remain here; and though the secret of my power is humility and self-abnegation, the only sap of that humility is love for me, and the essence of that self-abnegation is life in me;" and if the pledge given is actually redeemed, and redeemed, apparently at all events, by the very means he had pointed out,—if the work he began goes on with infinitely more power after his death than before it, and the whole inspiration of that work turns out to be the personal relation to him which he had proclaimed,—is it irrational for the people to draw the natural inference that the best account to be given of what is happening is that which he gave who told us that it should happen—namely, that it all springs from that hidden life in God which Christ led before he came here, while he was here, and after he was seen here no more? At least if this be not a rational explanation, is there one more rational? Can we not admit that he who foretells a most improbable event is more likely to be informed of the secret principles determining that event, than those who disbelieve and discredit his language? And if *he* cannot tell us what these principles are, how are we to trust those who, if they had been living

when he was here, would have ridiculed his anticipations as false, and condemned his arrogance as impious? It cannot be doubted that the sceptics of to-day would for the most part have been much more sceptics when all that Christ promised was still in the future, and far the greatest and divinest of his works, the work of realizing what he had foretold, was as yet hardly begun. Is it, then, a popular blunder to repudiate the hypotheses of those who must on their own principles have discountenanced Christ's anticipations, if they had lived then, even more superciliously than they now explain away the issue? May we not say that the principles on which it would have been folly to believe what has actually happened, can hardly be so sound as those plain popular principles intelligible to all the world, however little gifted with judicial faculties, on which it would have been from the first impossible *not* to believe it?

As far as I know the only set-off against these considerations is one to which I have already referred—the evidence that Christ really raised in the minds of his disciples that expectation of the very close approach of a universal judgment, of a supernatural close to the existing order of things, which almost all the Christians of the first generation—certainly St. Paul himself—clearly shared. I quite admit that in dealing with the signs of supernatural vision and knowledge we are not at liberty to ignore any single indication of error; and no one can doubt that if our Lord taught his disciples that the end of all things was at hand, we must at once attribute to him a strange mixture of foresight and blindness which it may be impossible for us to reconcile, but which we ought to have the candour to acknowledge. But I find it impossible to study the passages which are supposed to prove that Christ did teach this approaching “end of all things” to his disciples without the inference that he distinguished clearly between two very different visions which they confounded—the vision of the end of the Jewish national life and polity, and that of the spiritual judgment of men according to their works. For instance, the most definite statement of the nearness of what is supposed by many to be a final judgment is in the differently related prophecy which the first Gospel gives thus:—

“For what shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world, and lose his own life? or what shall a man give in exchange for his life? For the Son of man will come in the glory of his Father with his angels; and then he will give to every one according to his works. Verily I say unto you, There be some standing here who shall not taste of death till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom.”

In the second Gospel the parallel passage says, “There be some standing here who shall not taste of death till they see the kingdom of God come in power (*ἐν δυνάμει*);” and in the third it simply runs, “till they see the kingdom of God.” But in all these passages it is certainly implied that those of whom he spoke should

“taste of death” later, though not before the event of which he spoke, and what was promised was that they should have such a pledge of the power of God in their lifetime as should satisfy them that the kingdom of God was really manifested on earth. I suppose the connection with the previous words, which in varied form occur in all three Gospels, to be this: that he who in the poorness of his ambition should work for what was not worth working for, and lose his own true life in doing so, would find out his mistake in the day of spiritual judgment; and then, as if to answer the doubt whether such a day of true judgment should ever come, Christ went on to say that the kingdom of God, whose approach he was teaching, would, in the lifetime of those standing there, be sufficiently manifested to make his divine power clear to them. But this would be *in* their lifetime, not at the close of it. That the prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem is greatly confused with the vision of the spiritual judgment of all things in our narratives, is clear enough, and it is remarkable that two quite distinct statements as to time are jumbled up together in the oddest confusion, “Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass till all these things be fulfilled;” “But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels of heaven, but my Father only.” It is impossible that two such statements could have been made in the closest juxtaposition without a clear distinction between the provisions to which they referred; and it seems to me evident that though the tradition did not preserve that distinction clear, it did preserve the clearest possible traces of it. The gathering of the armies and of the Roman eagles, the slaughter, the famine, the destruction of the city, and the flight into the country—all this is to take place within that generation; and this was what Christ taught to be the end of the old covenant and the beginning of the new, and what he described as the kingdom of God coming with power. But the final judgment with which the disciples certainly confused it, was, apparently almost within the same breath, declared to be absolutely indeterminate and reserved by God amongst the eternal secrets. I do not see how any one can suppose that the two entirely different and almost antithetical forms of speech can refer to the same event, as though the indeterminateness only ranged over a few years, and that what must happen before the generation then living had passed away, was yet hidden, as to its particular year and month, from all foresight except that of God alone. There would be an incredible flatness in saying, “This must all happen within the lifetime of men now living, but the exact moment of it is a secret so deep and mysterious” and has revealed it to no created intelligence whatever”

to foreign to the spirit of our perplexed point of it given

by the evangelists. It is open to no reasonable doubt that he spoke of two events—one explicitly defined, which should be known to be approaching whenever the armies gathered round Jerusalem; the other a spiritual event of far higher importance, but of which the Son of man himself could not designate how near or how far off it might be; yet the first was to be a pledge of the second, and, as it were, the sign to those whom he addressed of that great harvest for which all things were ripening.

That this was Christ's teaching is shown, I think, by all the many parables which indicate the slow and natural growth of the kingdom of God—the parables of the seed germinating into the blade, and the blade into the ear; of the tares and the wheat, which were to grow together till the harvest; of the leaven of meal, which was slowly to leaven the whole lump; of the seed, which was the smallest of all seeds, but was to grow into the greatest of all trees, so that all the birds of the air should come and lodge in the branches of it. And even in the midst of the prophecies which led the disciples to expect so near a close to the secular order of the world, the warning is often repeated that "the end is not yet;" that the Gospel must first be preached to all the nations of the earth; that the time should come when they shall desire to see "one of the days of the Son of man, and shall not see it," and the exhortation to possess their souls in patience is enforced. On the whole, the study of the passages which are supposed to show that Christ really predicted a speedy destruction of the earth, and earthly order of things, seems, while accounting for the error of the early Church on the subject, only to show that the Messianic ideas of the Jews were too deeply rooted to admit of their taking in the sharp distinction, of which there are so many marks in our Lord's language, between the close of the Jewish dispensation with the destruction of the Temple, and that spiritual judgment of all earthly lives and works, to which no date and no scene could be assigned.

Now let me go back to the resurrection, and consider how far this evidence as to the compressed prophetic vision with which Christ's life seems to have been so full, should affect our view of the evidence external and internal bearing upon it; and of course secondarily of the other alleged miracles which preceded and followed it, most of which will certainly and rightly be accepted if the resurrection is accepted, and doubted or denied if the resurrection be doubted or denied. Of course one inference is clear enough. If, as I think is indisputable, Christ distinctly predicted non-miraculous facts, both national and individual—the destruction of Jerusalem, Peter's threefold denial, his own death, the success of the apparently hopeless enterprise of the Apostles—which actually occurred, and some of them in the exact way in


which they occurred, there is very much more reason to believe in the fulfilment of his prediction of the miraculous fact of his resurrection, than there would be without this evidence of his wonderful foreknowledge. In relation to the fulfilment of such prophecies, we stand in a very different position from the Apostles ; we see the vastly larger fulfilment of some which to them were but anticipations. On the other hand they knew, what we can only infer from their own language and demeanour, whether their belief in our Lord's resurrection was firmly based on repeated and indisputable converse with him, or was a doubtful mixture of ecstasies and dreams. But thus much is unquestionable, that prophecies even of non-miraculous events, duly fulfilled, should remove a great deal of the *à priori* incredulity with which we regard the same person's prophecies of a supernatural event. Whatever large insight into the future means, it means something strange enough and to us unintelligible enough, to make us cautious how we dissociate it from power over the future. No reasonable man would hesitate to ascribe far more importance to the prediction of a resurrection from the dead, coming from one who had clearly predicted very unlikely events which had happened, than he would to the same prediction from any other person's lips. I hold then that there is far more reason to believe in the reality of the resurrection than there otherwise would be, on this ground, that it was certainly prophesied at the same time when his death was prophesied, by one several of whose other prophecies, and those of a most remarkable kind, were fulfilled.

And, further, I think there is this additional weight to be given to the testimony of the Apostles, and especially to that of St. Peter, on this head. They had before them at the time a measure of what was meant by the fulfilment of our Lord's predictions. St. Peter, as we have seen, is referred to by St. Paul, and by the third Gospel, as the first Apostle who saw Christ after his resurrection ; he is stated in the Acts to have himself asserted that all the Apostles were witnesses of that event, and in his own first Epistle he declares that he owed to that event his new birth into hope ; but St. Peter, if the whole story of the Christian Church be not pure and gratuitous legend, had but just recovered from the remorse into which his own fulfilment of the distinctly predicted threefold denial of our Lord had plunged him. What a real fulfilment of prophecy meant must then have been most vividly present to his mind. Can we suppose that with that keen personal experience in his mind, he would have confounded a fancy, a hope, a dreamy vision, with the distinct fulfilment of Christ's prophecy that he should rise again. All the Apostles had the same realizing sort of experience to a less extent. They all knew, that our Lord had predicted his shameful death, and that the prediction had filled them with dismay and bewilderment. They

all knew, unless a most gratuitous tradition was afterwards invented by the Church to its own discredit, that he had predicted their all forsaking him on the night of his arrest, and that the prediction had been fulfilled. Would they not all then have demanded, in any fulfilment of the prophecy of the resurrection which they would have accepted as a fulfilment, at least as much clearness of outline as they had already experienced in relation to that of his death, and of their own desertion of him? This will seem a petty consideration only to those who forget how much depends on the reality of mind of a witness to a remarkable event. It is as bearing upon that reality of mind that I attach so much importance to the steadily forward-looking, business-like attitude of the Apostles within a week or two of the crucifixion; and by giving them a measure of what the fulfilment of prophecy ought to be, if they were to rely upon it at all, I think their recent experience must have guarded them against accepting the hearsay of a vision, in the place of clear and tangible facts.

But after all, when we have exhausted all the more learned and all the more refined considerations bearing on the problem, I think it really comes to this—that the reasons which *ought* to determine our *belief*, as distinguished from a suspense of judgment, are really and truly popular reasons to which almost every mind is open. The consideration of the historic evidence leaves the problem indeterminate. (What determines it is the evidence in Christ of that large and intimate spiritual knowledge of the springs of power and life, of his command of which his distinct foreknowledge of future agencies and events, as manifested in the individual instances I have discussed, is but one, though to our intellects perhaps the most striking, illustration. This seems to me to be one of the rare cases in which the final considerations, the considerations on which belief or suspense of judgment should really turn, even in the most learned, are essentially popular, the apprehension of them depending even more on sensitive hearts and consciences than on cultivated minds.) And indeed, if true and reasonable faith be impossible to the people at large, it is pretty evident from the history of all faiths that it is quite as impossible, not to say even more impossible, to the learned too. The foundations of faith do not exist at all if they be not in the truest sense within the reach of the people. That is why it seems to me useful to show that the principal approaches by which religious truth reaches the mind, are approaches, I will not say as direct, but as much more numerous than those of nineteen centuries ago, as the craving multitudes of our own day are more numerous and in even deeper need of spiritual help, than the multitudes who looked for a new redemption in Galilee, Judæa, and Rome.)

RICHARD HOLT HUTTON.



SONGS FOR SINGING.

IT may seem a tame parody of Bishop Blomfield's memorable definition of an archdeacon, to define a song as a lyrical poem fitted for vocal music. Thus to define it, however, involves neither a joke nor a truism, but calls attention to a principle of which modern poets have often strangely lost sight. That much of the recent verse which passes for "song" is for some reason or other unfitted for setting or for singing, is only too notorious. Every amateur vocalist knows to his cost how unsingable the "last new ballads" or the English words adapted to a favourite *aria* commonly are. It is not long since some of our leading professional singers declined on a particular occasion to adopt the translated *libretto* assigned for the opera of the evening. The difficulty of obtaining verse readily adapted for his music may have originally prompted Herr Wagner to become his own librettist, the theoretic reason expressed in his doctrine that "Music is a woman dependent upon man (the poet)" being probably an after-thought. Side by side, however, with this obvious shortcoming of ordinary modern verse, is the equally admitted fact that *per se*, and by comparison with the average verse of preceding centuries, it is eminently "musical"—i.e., in the popular acceptance of the term, it is smooth in versification and flowing in rhythm. The explanation of this paradox must be sought in a substantial distinction between musical verse and verse fitted for music, resting upon some other ground than that of metre.

A partial explanation of the unfitness of so much modern "song" for its avowed purpose may lie in the comparatively low place that music now holds in the culture of the middle class, from which our poets have, with few exceptions, sprung. Though there has recently been some improvement in this respect, the prevailing practice still is for the girls only of a family to be taught music, it being thought unnecessary for the boys. The evidence collected by Mr. Chappell in his "*Popular Music of the Olden Time*," as to the extent to which the art was formerly cultivated by both sexes alike, should suffice at once to clear us from the Continental reproach of not being a musical nation, and sting us with the shame of unfaithfulness to our historical reputation. Since the days of the bards who made and sung their own poems to the accompaniment of their harps, poetry and music, though gradually becoming the subjects of separate cultivation, have never lost the traces of their union in a single profession. The minstrels of the middle ages, though usually singing the verses which had been written for them by the *Trouveurs* or *Rymours*, sometimes (as Percy contended and Ritson was willing to concede) furnished both the words and the melody themselves. Many of the tunes to which our old ballads were set are still extant. "*Sumer is icumen in*," which Mr. Chappell praises for the "airy and pastoral correspondence between the words and the music,"* is a "six-men's song," or canon, of the thirteenth century. One of the graces which Chaucer ascribes to the young Squire is proficiency in

"Syngynge . . . or flowting al the day . . .
He cowde songes wel make and endite."

Whether Chaucer himself were a musician may be matter for doubt, but his allusions to the practice of accompanying the voice with an instrument attest the prevalent cultivation of the arts conjointly. Under Henry VIII. and Elizabeth, when our poetry burst into fuller flower, its union with music was established in popular acceptance. Some of the airs to which Lord Surrey's "favourite songs were sung" are preserved in manuscript.† Sir Philip Sidney was a skilled musician, and arranged words to current melodies, besides writing songs still more worthy to be mated. That Shakespere, the most incomparable song-writer in our language, was also a musician, can scarcely be doubted by any who remember his perpetual and loving references to the art. In the seventeenth century music was an all but universal accomplishment, and the poets were foremost in its cultivation. Cowley, Butler, and Milton were all three skilled in it. Credit for such skill

* *Popular Music*, vol. i. p. 23.

† Printed in Dr. Nott's Edition, 1814.

would not be given to the two former by readers of their verse, but Milton's proficiency on the organ is hardly to be forgotten in considering the richness and sonority of his language. Both he, Herrick, and Waller wrote in concert with Henry Lawes, Dryden with Purcell, Prior with Smith and De Fesch. The scientific "cultivation of music among gentlemen" appears to have "slowly but progressively" declined since the reign of Charles II.,* and the subsequent importation of Italian opera gave a decided check to the development of native talent. Erotic and political songs, and festive glees, however, came increasingly into vogue, and so much knowledge of the art as was requisite for their performance continued to be a national possession during the eighteenth century. Congreve and Gay collaborated with Handel, and Thomson with Arne. Gray, himself an instructed musician, wrote his "Installation Ode" to the score of Dr. Randall, and his "Thyrsis when he left me" to an air by Geminiani. Nearer to our own day, Moore earned his chief title to fame by the marvellous skill with which he arranged words to every variety of melody and achieved feats in the management of "intractable rhythms" which have been the admiration of learned and unlearned hearers ever since.†

The two arts were not united in the persons of Moore's great contemporaries, nor has the union since been maintained with anything like the same persistency as in preceding centuries. We have had eminently melodious poets, but few of them skilled in music, and still fewer have written verse which musicians are anxious to set. This last consideration is not to be overlooked in discussing the essential characteristics of "song." The criterion of demand must be held to apply in poetry as elsewhere, and *ceteris paribus*, a poet whose verse is not sought for by composers, nor beloved by singers, may be taken to have failed in complying with the requisite conditions of fitness. That the possession of musical knowledge, valuable though it be, is not indispensable as one of such conditions, and therefore that its deficiency can only partially explain why so many modern "songs" are unsingable, is apparent from a few notorious facts. As there have been good singers by ear alone, so there have been good writers for music without any knowledge of the art itself; and conversely, as there have been educated singers with a defective ear, there have been poets possessed of that knowledge whose verse is unmeet for

* Chappell, *ut sup.* vol. ii. p. 625.

† One of the ablest musical critics of our century, the late H. F. Chorley, in a lecture upon "English Poetry in reference to Music," and in another expressly devoted to Moore, described him as "without a superior in mechanism as a writer for music," especially remarking upon his adroit arrangement of words to "five-bar tunes," which are notoriously difficult as, *e.g.*, in "Through grief and through danger," and to airs which demand a note to each word, as in "Drink to her whose song."

singing. Moore, in the preface to his "Irish Melodies," expresses his wonder that Burns, "a poet wholly unskilled in music," should possess "the rare art of adapting words successfully to notes, of wedding verse in congenial union with melody, which, were it not for his example, I should say none but a poet versed in the sister art ought to attempt." That, however untaught, Burns "was yet in ear and feeling a musician," Moore admitted to be shown by "the skill with which he adapts his verse to the structure and character of each different strain."* Scott, who also wrote well for music, is another example of the same kind. His possession of an "ear" at all has been denied, and he avowedly cared for no singing but that of the old Border ballads which were endeared to him by association. There have been poets, again, not skilled in music, but universally admitted to have carried the harmony of language and rhythm to the highest perfection, whose verse has seldom or never attracted the choice of composers. Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Shelley are the most prominent instances. The first, though he wrote "The Power of Sound," and the last, though inspired by the "Skylark," do not appear to have been sensitive to artistic music; and Coleridge wrote a poem ("Lines in a Concert-room") in express depreciation of it. Shelley is the only one of the three, so far as we remember, any of whose lyrics have found composers willing to set them, and their number is small indeed out of the large collection which he has left. No exposition of the conditions of song-writing can be deemed complete that fails to account for these paradoxical facts. The subject deserves fuller consideration than it appears to have hitherto received, but the merest outline is all that can be here attempted. No novel doctrines will be propounded, but one must be content to piece together such fragmentary suggestions obtained from various sources as may serve to establish a sound and intelligible system.

The requisite conditions of musical fitness may be provisionally grouped in connection with the meaning and the language of poetry. Under the head of meaning we include all that concerns the structure of sentences, and the varied expression of thought and feeling thereby conveyed. The musician, as best acquainted with the resources at his command, has here a clear right to prescribe for the poet. We have met with no better exposition, from the musician's point of view, of the limitations to which the poet must conform who would write successfully for music, than in a lecture delivered by the late H. F. Chorley at the Royal Institution in 1861.† He stipulates that the poet's "beauty of

* Collected Works, 1841-2, vol. v.

† On English Poetry in reference to Music.

thought and imagery should be devoid of mysticism or subtlety ;" that if passion be introduced, it should be sparingly and rather in the form of declamation than of abrupt outburst ; that in description there should be no confusion of heterogeneous details. Next that

"Not only must the language be clear, chosen with express reference to its sound, with no exaggeration if the theme be serious, or vulgarity if the subject be the broadest comedy, but the sentences must be intelligible as they pass on. The transpositions which give so much nerve and variety to poetry spoken may deprive the same of half its meaning when it is set and sung. The phrases of the composition, however varied in length, must bear a proportion one to the other."

The reasonableness of these rules will be apparent on examination. The first, which debars the poet from mysticism and subtlety of idea, is obviously called for by the limited power of expression which music possesses as compared with its sister-art. The simple emotions, the broad and direct lines of thought, only are within its compass. Abstract or complex ideas, the thousand *nuances* of thought and feeling which poetry finds no difficulty in shaping into words, and the profuse imagery with which it adorns its conceptions, are untranslatable into tones and semitones. Any attempt thus to translate them results in sheer obscurity. The ideal object of attainment being that the singer's or hearer's attention should be carried onward by the poet and the composer in concert, it is necessary that both should avoid any occasion of distraction. Primarily engrossed as he must be by the rapid flow of the melody, he should be exempted from laborious efforts to grasp the poet's meaning, or the beauty of one half of the composition will inevitably be sacrificed. That "unconscious attention" which is a recognized fact in psychology, may, indeed, enable an educated singer to read his notes mechanically while his thoughts are wandering, but will avail him nothing as respects the words, to which he cannot give due expression and significance unless he follows them with an understanding mind. An additional argument for the rule in question is dictated by the very nature of song. It is the spontaneous language, perhaps, of careless happiness alone. Less spontaneously but still naturally, it is the language of excited feeling, whether of love in its infinite moods, of religious fervour, patriotic enthusiasm, gentle regret, or bitter lamentation, but never is it the natural language of thought, whether introspective, reflective, or meditative. No man is disposed for singing when his mind is occupied with serious study, and it can only be in exceptional cases that the two operations are even compatible. Alike, therefore, from the limitations of musical expression, and the need of conforming to the primordial conditions of song, is it incumbent upon the writer of

verse for the voice to select a simple theme, and convey his meaning in direct and scantily-ornamented language.

The operation of this rule thus excludes from the list of available writers for music several whose claims to rank as melodists in language are incontestable, and, within the area of an individual poet's works, draws a line of demarcation between the verse that is available and the verse that is not. It sufficiently explains why a poet so exquisitely rhythmical as Spenser, but essentially a symbolist and a painter of elaborate pictures—why Wordsworth, at times a lofty harmonist, but deeply meditative, and demanding that incessant reflection which a reader may but a hearer cannot give—why Coleridge, whose verses are often the perfection of melody, but so full of sweetness and delicate in tinting that they will bear no “additional touch”—why Shelley and Keats, both in their several ways masters of language and metre, but the one mystical in all his dramatic choruses and dreamy in most of his lyrics, the other a rich colourist whose every word is sometimes a study—should rarely or never have inspired the imagination of a competent musician. The poets here named are of course but types of a class, and the characteristics of their verse generally may belong to particular works of poets who rank in another class. No verse is more perfectly adapted for music than much of Mr. Tennyson's, but there are many of his lyrics which were not designed nor will readily lend themselves to be set. Attention to this consideration would have saved an able composer, the late Mr. Balfe, from the mistake of attempting to set such a poem as “Come into the garden, Maud,” which there is no indication whatever that its author intended for a song. Fascinated by its striking beauty and popularity, the composer did not pause to note that its velocity of passion, wealth of fancy, suffusion of colour, and the controlled rush of its versification, could not possibly be improved, and might easily be injured, by the addition of a musical dress. The mistake was in every way disastrous, not only the entire structure of the poem being mangled in the process of adjustment to the music, but the sense of single passages lost, such as “Queen-rose of the rosebud-garden of girls,” where the word “rose” is omitted, and “rosebud-garden” is cut asunder between two bars.

The limitations prescribed for the introduction of passion and the scope of description have special reference to opera and oratorio, and it would be travelling out of the record to discuss them in connection with songs. It may suffice to say that the one limitation is called for by the structure of the vocal organs, which are unable to unite sustained sonority of sound with the starts, gasps, and sobs that are the natural utterance of passion; and that the other is due to the inadequate expressional power of music.

which, as already noticed, can only translate a few of the ideas addressed to it, by means of imitation, and must rely for the rest upon suggestions which are at the best indefinite and easily become unintelligible.

Passing over that part of the next rule which is concerned with language, a word must be said upon the necessity of avoiding "transpositions." The critic is of course assuming that the composer's aim is to reach the standard of Henry Lawes, in whose settings, as his *collaborateur* Waller gratefully commemorated, "not a syllable was lost" of "the light of sense, the poet's pride." This "talent for rendering music the exponent of poetry"* can only be fairly exhibited when the writer steers clear of inversions of phrase. An amusing illustration of the absurdity which neglect of this precaution may entail is given in one of Addison's strictures on the fashionable folly (as he conceived it) to which we owe the first introduction of Italian opera into this country. After ridiculing the badly translated *libretti* in common use, he says, "It happened also very frequently, where the sense was rightly translated, the necessary transposition of words, which were drawn out of the phrase of one tongue into that of another, made the music appear very absurd in one tongue that was very natural in the other. I remember an Italian verse that ran thus, word for word—

‘ And turned my rage into pity ;’

which the English for rhyme's sake translated—

‘ And into pity turned my rage.’

By this means the soft notes that were adapted to pity in the Italian fell upon the word rage in the English; and the angry sounds that were turned to rage in the original were made to express pity in the translation.† This is an example of *ex-post-facto* transposition. Where it occurs in words written for setting, the poet may impose a difficulty upon the composer from which escape is only possible by great adroitness. One may surmise that Handel's monotonous setting of Gay's verse in "Acis and Galatea,"—

“ The flocks shall leave the mountains,
The woods the turtle-dove,”

was intended to obviate the awkwardness which the unnatural dislocation of the words in the second line might otherwise have occasioned.

The final regulation, that the balance of the sentences designed for music must be carefully maintained, is due to the necessity that every bar in a musical composition should have the same

* Note to Waller's lines addressed to Lawes. Aldine Edition by R. Ball, p. 62.

† *Spectator*, No. 18.

equivalent of notes, however the number may vary. The common expedient of composers for rectifying a deficiency of balance in the sentences they have to set is to repeat or prolong certain words. The vapidity and tediousness resulting from this practice have been a fertile source of amusement to the readers of operatic *libretti*.

The conditions which fall under the head of language and relate to the choice of words for music are, if possible, more important than those which concern the meaning and composition of the sentences. The first rule to be laid down arises out of the simplest exigency of our organs of speech. In order that the singer's intonation may be full and distinct, it is necessary that his mouth should be wide open. The literal and syllabic sounds therefore, which have a tendency to contract the aperture must, as far as possible, be avoided. The expedients adopted by professional teachers and vocalists may here form a guide to us. A good teacher will invariably instruct his pupils in singing the word "love" to prolong the open vowel-sound of *o* and diminish the close consonant-sound of *v*. The singer's practice of pronouncing the word "wind" like "mind," giving the *i* its *y*-sound instead of the *e*-sound which it has in speaking, is a device of the same character. The vowels which contract the organs most are those of the dental, labial, and guttural consonants *f*, *v*, *p*, *c*, *g*, *k*, *q*, together with the sibilants *c* (soft), *s*, and *z*, and of the close vowels *e* (as in *eel*), *i* (as in *thin*), *o* (as in *soul*), *u* (as in *lute*), and *y* (as in *happy*), with the half-vowel half-labial consonant *w*.* The second rule, therefore, will be that a close consonant should, if possible, be followed by an open vowel; *s*, for example, by *o* as in *song*, and *z* as in *side*, not by *o* as in *soul* and *i* as in *sing*.

The third rule is a corollary of the preceding and prompted by the same reason. Sibilants are always to be shunned in verse, and in verse for music above all.† A great living poet has been

* A writer of some authority (Dr. Guest in his "History of English Rhythms," vol. i. c. 1) enumerates the sound of *a* (in *ale*) among the "narrow" and the sound of *o* (in *oat*) among the "broad" vowels. As compared with the sound of *a* in *father*, the former is undoubtedly somewhat narrower, but his organs must be curiously constructed who does not contract the passage of the breath less when pronouncing *a* in *ale* than *e* in *eel*, both which sounds Dr. Guest alike calls "narrow." Every one's experience may be similarly trusted to distinguish that the sound of *o* in *oat* narrows the aperture more than that of *o* in *on*. In relation to singing at all events, it seems to us most reasonable to make no distinction between the sounds of *a*, and to distinguish those of *o*. Dr. Guest adds *h* and *d* to the number of "close" consonants, on the ground that the lips are closed in pronouncing the one and the tongue raised to the palate in pronouncing the other. In conjunction with vowels, however, and in the act of singing, neither consonant has the prolonged effect of closing the passage of the breath, but rather serves as a fulcrum for its more powerful emission. *T*, and in a less degree *m* and *n*, partake of the same character, but it is not shared by *f*, *v*, and *p*, nor any of the gutturals or sibilants.

† Special exceptions to this broad rule may be justified by considerations of meaning, as in Dryden's "Alexander's Feast," where the repetition of *s* in the lines

"Softly sweet in Lydian measures,
Soon he soothed his soul to pleasures,"

is no doubt intended to convey the effect of luxurious effeminacy.

heard to say that he would rather lose a thought than let *s* and *s* come together. Although, as our language is constituted, to escape this wholly would transcend even his power, much of the discordant hissing which offends the ear in ordinary verse might be avoided by a little pains. The writer for music should especially avoid *s* when followed by the aspirate or in juxtaposition with the still more fatal *w*. The word "wish" has been denounced as one of the most unsingable in the language,* but is perhaps outstripped by the word "sweet," where *s* and *w* are followed by a double close vowel and a palatal consonant. The most unhappy introduction of it that we remember is in the favourite Scotch song "Annie Laurie," where the second part of the air has an ascending scale set to the line, "Her voice is low and sweet," involving the coincidence of the last word with the shrillest note, to the utter contradiction of the sense. A word, however, of such incessant employment in poetry, if not musical by nature, must be made so by art. A perfectly successful use of it occurs in Vincent Wallace's setting of Mr. Tennyson's cradle-song from "The Princess"—"Sweet and low"—where it is mated with an appropriate note, and should be murmured rather than sung.

A fourth rule provides for the choice of words in which the liquids *l* and *r* abound. The modifying effect of the former, especially upon the hard or hissing letters associated with it, may be noted in such words as "sleep," "slumber," "plume," "flock." No letter glides over the tongue more softly, and its repetition in a verse confers peculiar satisfaction on the ear. Leigh Hunt remarks upon the lines from Coleridge's "Christabel,"

" Her gentle limbs did she undress
And lay down in her loveliness,"

that "the very smoothness and gentleness of the limbs is in the series of the letter *l*'s."† The same alliteration lends exceeding sweetness to a verse of Mr. Locker's, where it serves in concert with *s* to convey the motion and sparkle of a brook:—

" The flow of life is still a rill
That laughs and leaps and glistens."

The extreme facility of its pronunciation gives this letter more importance in verse written to be sung. *R*, though less suave *per se*, is effective on account of its softness in composition and of its trilling sound. The latter, upon which the French lay so much stress, is very serviceable as a mechanical help in singing.

The last rules upon which it is requisite to insist under the head of language concern the use of alliteration generally.

* Carpenter's Hand-book of Poetry.

† Imagination and Fancy, p. 9.

Judiciously employed, no agency is more musically effective; injudiciously, it creates discord instead of harmony. Those who abuse it usually err, not only by excess, but by monotony. The early English method of repeating the initial letters of two or more words in succession has been commonly adopted by them, whereas the secret of alliterative charm consists in separating the letters which are repeated, and intermingling similar or contrasted sounds. The least sensitive ear cannot fail to be jarred by the harshness of Mr. Swinburne's

“ As the flash of the flakes of the foam flared lamp-like, leaping ”

after comparing it with Milton's

“ Floats as they pass, fanned with unnumbered plumes.”

If an aggregation of identical sounds is offensive in recitation, it is quite intolerable in song. Such a line as that just quoted from Mr. Swinburne is a sheer provocative to stammering. To accommodate itself to the voice alliteration must put on some disguise. This, in its subtlest form, is found in the intermingling of the soft with the hard labial, dental, and guttural consonants, of *b* with *p*, *d* with *t*, *v* with *f*, *g* with *c* or *k*. For illustrations of the happy effect thus produced the reader may consult the poetry of Milton and Mr. Tennyson.*

A safe rule may be laid down that in writing verse for music the greater variety of soft consonants and open vowels that can be obtained the better. A mingling of the close vowels with them adds a charm to the harmony of language intended for recitation only, as in the stanza of Coleridge's “Day-dream,” which Leigh Hunt cites in illustration of “poetic sweetness”†—

“ My eyes make pictures when they're shut :
I see a fountain large and fair,
A willow and a ruined hut,
And thee and me and Mary there.
O Mary ! make thy gentle lap our pillow,
Bend o'er us like a bower, my beautiful green willow !”

But the song-writer, to whom close vowels are an abhorrence, cannot avail himself of this refinement. So limited is his choice of words, however, that in spite of all his pains such vowels will necessarily present themselves, and his fineness of ear will be mainly taxed to secure a measure of openness for his verse sufficient to compensate for this unavoidable drawback.

Upon assonance proper, or rhyme, unless very frequent and rapid, in which case it has the effect of alliteration, we doubt if he can advantageously rely. The ear, being mainly occupied with the melody to which the words are set, can only absorb such of

* See Abbott and Seeley's English Lessons for English People, pp. 181 et seq.

† Imagination and Fancy, p. 38.

their harmonies as are immediately apparent, and will usually fail to detect any that depend upon intervals for their occurrence. M. Gounod (according to a summary which has recently appeared of his views upon this subject*) seems to think that "rhyme rather hampers than assists the composer." Much, however, must be trusted to the collaboration of the musician with the poet in this respect. Special skill on the part of the former may bring to light poetic beauties which would otherwise be hidden, and conceal defects which would otherwise be patent. "By judicious setting and right tuning the words," Henry Lawes contended that "our English," although at a disadvantage as compared with the "better smoothed and vowelled" Italian, and "a little overclogged with consonants," might be made "smooth enough."† And among the elements of smoothness must be reckoned rhyme, the force of which it certainly lies within a composer's power to emphasize. An instance offers in Arne's setting of "Where the bee sucks," which brings out the recurrence of the rhyme to *I* into effective prominence by assigning a long note (a minim) at the opening of each bar to the chiming word, thrice repeating the phrase "When owls do cry," and concluding with a run upon the last word, "fly." But with this branch of the subject we cannot presume to deal further.

A third series of conditions might possibly be grouped under the head of metre, but we incline to doubt if any definite rules hereupon can be laid down. Metre in English verse (which follows the usage of the Provençal and South European languages generally‡) is admittedly the creature of accent, not of quantity, and although for convenience sake we apply to its varieties the names of "feet," which were once appropriated to quantity, those names now only "denote groups of accented and non-accented syllables."§ The word "comfort," *e.g.*, is called a trochee because an accent is thrown on the first syllable and none on the second; "agree" is called an iamb, for the converse reason; "fréquently" is a dactyl; "receíving," an amphibrach; "colonnáde," an anapaest. By traditional and habitual practice we are accustomed to connect particular stresses of the voice with particular emotions and ideas which the ear would feel it inappropriate to alter. To this consecrated usage the writer for music, if he adopts metre as a vehicle, will seek to conform, but to translate the appropriateness of which he is conscious into verse is far from easy, owing to the conflict of associations involved in the meaning of the words employed. Thus "merrily" and

* *Academy*, October 23, 1875, upon his preface to "George Dandin."

† Preface to *Ayres and Dialogues*, 1653, cited in Chappell's *Popular Music*.

‡ Sismondi's *Literature of South of Europe*, pp. 84 et seq.

§ Abbott and Seeley's *English Lessons for English People*, p. 151.

“tenderly” are both dactyls, but the ideas which they express are so different that one cannot predicate of the dactylic measure that it is distinctively suitable to either. For analyses and illustrations, drawn from our great poets, of the several modulations of rhythm which have been employed in the expression of contrasted ideas, the reader may refer to such authorities as Abbott and Seeley’s “English Lessons,” and Guest’s “History of English Rhythms.” We must confine ourselves to observing that in this respect, again, variety appears necessary to ensure the highest effects.

The distinction assumed at starting between the essential characteristics of “musical” verse and verse adapted for music will now be manifest. Setting aside the conditions of meaning, the technical requisites of the latter have been found to consist of literal instead of metrical harmonies. In poetry written for recitation alone the rhythmical elements are of paramount importance. Accuracy of syllabic accentuation, an observance which is habitual without being formal of the “time” belonging to any given measure, due adjustment of the heavy and the light words in each line, and skilful variation of the pause and the cæsura, make up the requisites of what is called poetical music. Any one can test this for himself by studying a passage of Milton’s or Mr. Tennyson’s blank verse, or one of Mr. Swinburne’s best lyrics. That obedience to all these conditions enhances the artistic value, and may even heighten the audible effect, of verse for music we are not seeking to deny, but we doubt if any but the first of them can be considered indispensable. Though Mr. Sully is undoubtedly justified in affirming that “the metric form is one which best harmonizes in its dignity and beauty with the musical vesture, and at the same time one which most readily lends itself to musical treatment,”* it is notorious that some of the finest words ever set to music have been devoid of metrical arrangement. With the rest of the rhythmical elements enumerated the song-writer can afford to dispense, for the simple reason that his words have to be arranged for setting, and, whatever metre he may select, he must suffer the composer to supersede it by a dominant measure of his own. In nine cases out of ten, perhaps, it is inevitable that the rhythm should be drowned in the flow of the melody. M. Gounod (as we learn from the source already quoted) has practically avowed a preference for a prose *libretto*, as a deliverance from rhythmical “monotony and uniformity,”† and though this charge is rather levelled against French poetry than our own, which is governed by different rules, it is of sufficiently general application to illustrate the thesis that rhythm is

* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, June, 1875.
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† *Academy*, ut supra.

far from indispensable. Nevertheless, while contending for the subordinate claim of metrical considerations upon the song-writer's attention, we cannot fail to recognize the charm which an harmonious adjustment of music to metre confers at the hands of a skilful master. In "Where the bee sucks," how felicitously has Arne caught the joyous spirit which Shakespere infused into the dactylic measure of the last couplet! The allotment of notes is not formally accurate, indeed, for the emphatic word "merrily" is set to two quavers and a crotchet, as if it were an anapæst; but Arne, if he thought about the matter at all, probably allowed for the certainty that this would be pronounced in singing as in speaking. Stress is thus practically laid upon the first and last syllables, and the effect obtained by frequent repetition enhances that tripping intonation by which he clearly intended to express the dancing flight and happy carol of the enfranchised fairy. In this case, and a few others, perhaps, the secret of metrical and musical harmony may yield itself to an analysis which for the most part it seems to defy. The investigation demands more knowledge and skill than we can pretend to bring to it, and may be commended to finer hands.

If the conditions thus outlined had to be carefully studied by a poet before he composed a song, not one in a hundred probably would ever attempt it. We need scarcely disclaim, however, the absurdity of such an hypothesis. Every inspired artist doubtless obeys the laws of his art unconsciously during the season of inspiration, and it is reserved for the critic, writing it may be centuries later, to discover by patient research the modes of operation to which the poet was guided by the superior fineness of his organs. How they thus guide him, whether by real instinct or only a much-accelerated process of ordinary mental action, it must be left for metaphysicians to decide. Upon a deliberate revision of his work, however, the poet may become conscious of the path by which he has travelled; and, when once discovered, the laws of art are as available for study by himself as by any of his readers. That some of the laws under consideration were not unknown to our seventeenth-century lyrists is tolerably certain, but the knowledge has grown with the growth of criticism, and the means of studying at leisure analyses of their predecessors' work gives to the song-writers of to-day advantages not to be despised. Analyses of this description, more or less complete, may be found in the volumes of reference already cited. Nothing more can here be attempted than by a rapid literary survey to illustrate and fortify the conclusions above submitted.

Referring to what
find its conditions
song-writer as Sir

and under the head of meaning, we
tolerable fidelity by so early a
overwrought

as his sonnets often are, his best songs are clear in expression, and have verses of rare sweetness. One must except from this praise most of the lyrics in his "Arcadia," but these are generally imitations of classical and Italian models, which it is difficult to suppose were ever intended to be sung. As a rule, too, the words adapted by him to current airs are of far less worth than those that he simply entitled "songs," the melodies appropriate to which we may surmise to have been of his own conception. The eighth song in "Astrophel and Stella" is perhaps his masterpiece as a whole, but the first verse of the tenth is the most perfect in its poetic expression of tenderness, and its adaptation for music :—

"O dear life! when shall it be
That mine eyes thine eyes may see,
And in them thy mind discover,
Whether absence have had force
Thy remembrance to divorce
From the image of thy lover?"

What can be said that has not been already better said concerning the excellence of Shakespere as a song-writer? In all his songs, ranging over the entire compass of emotion, charged with fancy or with humour, and tinged with thought, there is scarcely an obscure or over-subtle passage. The sweet and fresh simplicity which is their dominant charm leaves ample room for musical adornment. Modestly brightened with imagery, unexaggerated in phrase, and balanced in construction, they have proffered the most tempting invitation to be set which a composer has perhaps ever received from English poetry. How eagerly the invitation has been accepted, by Purcell, Lock, Arne, Stevens, Bishop, Schubert, Mendelssohn, Sullivan, and others, every lover of music knows.

In their nervous yet delicate strength of language, some of Ben Jonson's songs are scarcely to be matched. Witness his "Queen and huntress chaste and fair," and "See the chariot at hand," both set by Horsley, and "Drink to me only," among the most popular of glees. Marked by the same qualities of lucidity and grace are the best of the lyrics scattered among the plays of Beaumont and Fletcher, Lyly, Webster, Dekker, and others of the great Shakesperian cycle. Even Ford, who has been blamed for the "plexity and obscurity" of his dramatic language, displays neither in his songs. The minor lyrists of the first half of the seventeenth century—Ayton, Wither, Suckling, Lovelace, and Carew—have similar characteristics. Whatever else may be said of them, they are not dreamy in thought nor enigmatical in style. Two or three of Lovelace's songs are gems of the first water; Suckling and Wither, in their best vein, are incomparably fresh and spirited. More ornate and scholarly in their robe of diction, but intrinsically clear in motive, and, though full of fancy, sparingly touched

with simile or metaphor, are the few songs which Milton has written. Herrick, in "To Daffodils," and "The Kiss," almost recalls Shakespere by his exquisite simplicity, as in the classic refinement of his elegiac poems he almost rivals Jonson and Milton. Dryden, though less happy in his songs than in his odes for music, never fails for want of directness. They are, for the most part, echoes of the prevalent tone of unreal and sickly sentiment which he had not the courage to disavow, but occasionally, as in "Ah! fading joy," and one or two songs in "King Arthur," his masculine and easy grace asserts itself. Waller, whom his contemporaries overpraised for his care to secure "smoothness of numbers," has been accused by his latest critic of attaining this result at the expense of inverting and sometimes obscuring his meaning,* but does not deserve this reproach so far as his songs are concerned. "Go, lovely rose," "While I listen to thy voice," "On a Girdle," and "Phyllis, why should we delay?" are as lucid as they are polished. The poets who succeeded him bestowed such attention to music as they could spare from satirical, didactic, and pastoral poetry, upon the ode rather than the song. The ballads introduced into "The Beggars' Opera," Thomson's "Rule, Britannia," and the songs of Harry Carey and Charles Dibdin, however well adapted for the music set to them, scarcely rise above the level of tolerable verse. One or two of Blake's early and coherent utterances, especially "My silks and fine array," and "A Cradle Song," are of unusual beauty; and, in a lower key, a graceful lyric of Gray's, and a sparkling bacchic of Sheridan's, call for exception; but, in spite of all, the eighteenth century would have been stigmatized as the nadir of song-writing if it had not produced Burns, who, just at its close, animated the art into new and vigorous life. Too well-known to need enumeration, the charm of his songs will be admitted to consist not less in their artlessness than in their tenderness or force. Inspired for the most part by his native melodies, they have effected an amalgamation for which the Union was unavailing, and thoroughly popularized Scottish music over the Border. A generation later, Moore accomplished the same patriotic task for the melodies of Ireland, and consummated a revolution which has displaced from public favour a body of English melody not less beautiful, and probably more varied, than is possessed by either of the sister kingdoms.† To this supersession it must perforce submit, until a national poet arises willing and able to do it equal justice. Meantime, the songs of Moore are a treasury of tuneful verse, replete with fancy, wit, and humour, of which England

* R. Bell, *Aldine*

† *En revanche*—
claimed as of *En*

— that passes for Scottish and Irish has been
— *En*, vol. II. pp. 600 et seq.

not less proud than Ireland. No brighter efflorescence of mere sentiment is to be found in our poetry. His best utterances are clear and manly, and his worst, though sometimes tumid and tawdry, are never cloudy nor intricate.

Two only of Moore's great contemporaries, Byron and Scott, were successful song-writers. If the "Hebrew Melodies" of the former, written by request, not by inspiration, are generally tame and colourless, there is passionate force in the stanzas commencing "I speak not, I trace not, I breathe not thy name;" genuine feeling in "When we two parted;" lively fancy, without elaboration, in the spirit-songs of "Manfred;" and a graceful lightness in such trifles as "Maid of Athens" and "Fill the goblet again." Scott's songs have unusual variety, and exhibit in a narrow compass the same qualities of dramatic and picturesque variety which constitute the enduring charm of his fictions. "Where shall the lover rest," from "Marmion;" the "Boat-song" and the "Coronach," from the "Lady of the Lake;" "The Cavalier," from "Rokeby;" "On Tweed River" and the "Border-ballad," from the "Monastery," may be singled out for special praise. All have colour without richness, and a vigorous directness readily adaptable to musical illustration.

It may seem strange to exclude a poet so eminently endowed with the lyrical gift as Shelley from the number of fortunate song-writers, but the reasons already adduced explain the necessity. Out of the fifty or more songs, choruses, dirges, &c., that he has written, scarcely ten can be selected as wholly available for music, and only two or three ("Swifter far than summer's flight," "Lines to an Indian air," and "An Arabian Love-song") as of supreme excellence. It is not that the language is obscure; in many cases it is clear as crystal; but the ideas are subtle, requiring keen thought to follow them, which music cannot adequately translate, nor, if it could, would the hearer be in a position to apprehend. Passing over Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Keats, for analogous reasons, we find the conditions of meaning observed by some of their minor contemporaries, especially Landor, Procter, Joanna Baillie, and Campbell. The few of Landor's poems which are strictly songs are singularly sweet. "While you, my love, are by," "One year ago my path was green," and "The leaves are falling," unite the classic grace of the seventeenth-century lyrists with a delicate tenderness rarely to be recognized in the poetry of any century but the present. Procter and Joanna Baillie, in their best vein, recall the old dramatists from whom their inspiration was largely drawn. Both have written songs which congenial musicians have been found to set, and with whom they are entitled to share the resulting honours of popularity. Campbell's spirited battle-chants need no more than a

passing mention. In our own day the art has attained its utmost perfection at the hands of a master who has left no mode of metrical expression untried, "*et nihil tetigit quod non ornavit.*" For songs comparable to Mr. Tennyson's, in the highest lyrical qualities, we can revert to none but Shakespere's, of whose ripe wisdom, airy fancy, and many-sided sensibility they often remind us. They have somewhat, too, of Jonson's and Herrick's *finesse*, with greater delicacy, and blend the feeling of Burns with the polish, but without the tawdriness, of Moore. In a certain exquisite refinement of culture diffused over their style, which partakes of the colour of imagination and the form of thought, without carrying either to an excess that would impair their final cause of musical function, a few of these songs seem to us unique. "In love, if love be love," "Tears, idle tears," and "Ask me no more," are typical examples. From dainty playfulness, as in "It is the miller's daughter," to triumphant joy, as in "Light, so low upon earth;" from transient discontent, as in "Love that hath us in the net," to infinite yearning, as in "Sweet is true love;" from the restlessness of hope, as in "The mist and the rain," to the stagnation of despair, as in "Hopeless doom of woman;" from the gaiety to the pensiveness that alike find their reflection in nature, as in "Be merry, all birds, to-day," "The Brook," and "Break, break," almost every chord of emotion is vibrated and every mood embodied, to each being given the most appropriate expression consistent with musical fitness. How widely this fitness has been recognized by contemporary composers we need not stop to recount.

To illustrate the rules above laid down under the head of language involves a tedious numerical calculation of which the reader will no doubt be content with the results. We have first to show that in the songs of the best ancient and modern poets who have established their fame as writers for music, there will be found a considerable preponderance of open sounds. This may be instanced by the vowels. Selecting three of Shakspeare's songs at random, we find in "Where the bee sucks," forty-one open vowels to thirteen close; in "Who is Silvia?" sixty-four to forty-five; in "Orpheus with his lute," fifty-three to thirty-four. In Milton's "Sweet Echo" (from Comus), "O'er the smooth enamelled green" (from Arcades), and "On May morning," there are of open vowels seventy-five, forty, and fifty-five to thirty-nine, thirty-one, and thirty-five close respectively. In Herrick's "Go, happy rose," there are seventy-nine to thirty-two; in "Daffodils," sixty-eight to forty-eight; in "Blossoms," sixty-eight to forty-three. In Moore's "Last Rose of Summer," there are ninety-one to fifty; in "Believe me, if all those endearing young charms," ninety-five to sixty-eight; in "Rich and rare," ninety-eight to forty-eight. Mr.

Tennyson, in three songs from *The Princess*, "As thro' the land," "Home they brought," and "The splendour falls," has respectively forty-six to twenty-six, seventy-six to thirty-five, and ninety-six to seventy-nine.

It has next to be shown that where enforced to employ close consonants, the best writers have corrected the defect in a majority of instances by the addition of open vowels. Selecting the same examples as before, we find in *Shakespeare* forty-five close consonants (including *w*) thus corrected to twenty-six uncorrected; in *Milton* forty-seven to thirty-seven; in *Herrick*, fifty-four to forty-six; in *Moore* a hundred and two to eighty-one; in *Mr. Tennyson* ninety-four to sixty-six.

A paucity of sibilants and *w*'s was the next requisite prescribed. In the three songs selected which consist of seven, fifteen, and twelve lines respectively, *Shakespeare* employs *s* twelve, thirty, and thirty-six times; *w* three, five, and five times. In the three songs of *Milton*, numbering respectively fourteen, twelve, and ten lines, he employs *s* twenty-five, fifteen, and twenty-three times; *w* seven, four, and eight times. *Herrick* employs *s* twenty-three, thirty, and nineteen times; *w* eight, six, and eight times, in his three songs of fifteen, sixteen, and eighteen lines respectively. In the twenty-four, sixteen, and sixteen lines of *Moore*, *s* occurs thirty-three, thirty-two, and thirty times; *w* ten, fifteen, and eleven times. In *Mr. Tennyson's* three songs consisting severally of ten, sixteen, and eighteen lines, *s* occurs eleven, twenty-seven, and thirty-four times; *w* ten, nine, and eight times. In the single instance of *Shakespeare's* "Orpheus" sibilants are used to excess, but they are well distributed except in one line, and even there are separated by open vowels.

An abundance of liquids was the next requisite; and of these we find in the seven lines of "Where the bee sucks," twenty-six; in the fifteen lines of "Who is Silvia?" thirty-eight; in the twelve lines of "Orpheus with his lute," thirty-one. In the fourteen lines of "Sweet Echo," there are forty-four; in the twelve lines of "O'er the smooth enamelled green," thirty; in the ten lines of "May morning," thirty-six. In "Go, happy rose," (fifteen lines) there are forty-eight liquids, in "Daffodils" (sixteen lines) twenty-nine; in "Blossoms" (eighteen lines) forty. *Moore*, in the twenty-four lines of "The Last Rose of Summer," has fifty-six, and in his two other songs, both consisting of sixteen lines, sixty-one and sixty-three. *Mr. Tennyson* has twenty-six in the ten lines of "As thro' the land," fifty-one in the sixteen lines of "Home they brought," and eighty-four in the eighteen lines of "The splendour falls."

The evidences of alliteration in some of the songs selected are so veiled that they may easily escape detection. Without actually counting, few will believe that in the seven lines of "Where the

bee sucks," there are six *b*'s, ten *l*'s, six *m*'s, and six *n*'s; or that in the second verse of Mr. Tennyson's "Bugle-song" (six lines) there are as many as fourteen *l*'s, fifteen *n*'s, and sixteen *r*'s. The method of obtaining an effect of chime without apparent effort, namely, by repeating similar rather than the same sounds, may be illustrated from the second verse of "Who is Silvia?" which contains four *b*'s, three *p*'s, two *f*'s, and two *v*'s; and the first verse of "Orpheus," which contains three *f*'s, two *v*'s and four *p*'s, besides four *m*'s and eight *n*'s. Milton, who uses obvious alliteration more than his fellows, seldom repeats the same initial letter above twice consecutively, often interposes a word commencing with another, and sometimes distributes the repeated sound over several lines.

"And the songs of Sirens sweet,"

in "Comus," is almost an unique instance of threefold alliteration, and this was doubtless designed to suggest the idea of the blandishments described. Phrases such as "Meander's margent," "love-lorn," and "sad song," are to be met with here and there, but the disposition exemplified in such lines as

"My sliding chariot stays,"

"On the lawns and on the leas,"

"The violet-embroidered vale,"

is more common. The following quatrain from the "Arcades" offers a still more favourable example of skill—

"Nymphs and shepherds dance no more
By sandy Ladon's lilyed banks;
On old Lycæus or Cyllene hoar
Trip no more in twilight ranks."

The distribution of a repeated sound may be instanced from the same poem, where that *crux* of poetic art, the letter *s*, is all but confined to a single word for six consecutive lines—

"O'er the smooth enamelled green,
Where no print of step hath been,
Follow me as I sing,
And touch the warbled string,
Under the shady roof
Of branching elm star-proof."

Herrick employs the same artful separation of identical sounds in "Blossoms :"—

"Fair pledges of a fruitful tree,
Why do ye fall so fast?"

Moore skilfully intermingles *b*, *bl*, and *f* in the lines—

"No flower of her kindred,
No rosebud is nigh
To reflect back her blushes."

Mr. Tennyson with still happier effect interchanges *bl*, *gl*, *tl*— and *pl* in the following lines of his "Bugle-song :"—

"Blow, bugle, blow, set the wild echoes flying."

"The horns of Elfland faintly blowing :

Blow, let us hear the purple glens replying,
Ere, echoes, dying, dying, dying."

The final requisite of verse for music—namely, the preponderance of consonants which are either soft themselves or are softened by the addition of liquids—receives ample illustration from the songs of all these masters. In “Where the bee sucks” the proportion of such consonants to hard is thirty-four to ten; in “Who is Silvia?” sixty-eight to thirty-one; in “Orpheus” sixty-nine to twenty-eight. In Milton’s “Sweet Echo” the proportion is eighty-five to thirty-six; in “O’er the smooth enamelled green” forty-six to twenty; in “May Morning” seventy-six to seventeen. Herrick’s “Go, happy rose!” numbers seventy-three to fifty; “Daffodils” sixty-one to thirty-seven; “Blossoms” seventy-two to thirty-six. Moore’s “Last Rose of Summer” has a hundred and six to forty-three; “Believe me” a hundred and eighteen to fifty-three; “Rich and rare” a hundred and twelve to thirty-nine. Mr. Tennyson, in “As thro’ the land,” has forty-six to twenty-one; in “Home they brought,” ninety-five to forty-one; in the “Bugle-song” a hundred and twenty-six to forty-four.

For brevity’s sake these illustrations have been drawn from a few typical song-writers. So far, however, as the same test has been applied, it holds good of others who have attained marked success in the art—notably of Burns, Scott, and Procter. Having justified the prescribed conditions of meaning and language against any suspicion of arbitrariness by such unimpeachable testimony to their acceptance, we are entitled to credit all the great song-writers who have selected themes and words which musicians have been eager to set, and vocalists able to sing, with an instinctive knowledge and faithful observance of similar if not identical conditions. It remains to be shown that the admittedly unsingable character of so much modern verse which reports itself as “song” is attributable to a corresponding ignorance and neglect. For this purpose it will not be necessary to weary the reader by breaking butterflies upon the wheel. Drawing-room “ballads” as a class, allowing of course for many honourable exceptions, may be safely left to the contempt of those who sing them without any assistance from the critic. The “divorce between sound and sense” only too apparent in them is not so flagrant as Moore tells us he found in the popular songs of his early days, to which he could but apply the comment of Figaro: “Ce qui ne vaut pas la peine d’être dit, on le chante.” That we have advanced beyond that stage is due to the few poets among us who have remained loyal to the traditions of the art. That we have advanced no further is the fault not of the poetasters who can write no better, nor of the composers who must take what they can get, but of the poets well qualified to supply them, whose “songs” are either inappropriate for music or impracticable for the voice. Evidences of one form of inadequacy or the other

are to be found in quarters where we should scarcely look for them.

Mr. Rossetti's "House of Life" * includes eleven "songs," many of which are striking and beautiful poems; but we question if more than one, or at most two, of them would have been recognized by their title in the sixteenth or seventeenth century. With the exception of "Plighted Promise," there is none which carries its meaning on its front, none which does not demand a second or third reading before this can be grasped, in which there is not either a subtle tone of thought, rich colouring of language, or profusion of imagery that would hopelessly embarrass a composer and distract the attention of a singer. We select in illustration the first and last verses of "The Sea Limits," which sufficiently embody its motive:—

"Consider the sea's listless chime,
Time's self it is, made audible,
The murmur of the earth's own spell.
Secret continuance sublime
Is the sea's end: our sight may pass
No furlong further. Since time was,
This sound hath told the lapse of time.
* * * * *

"Gather a shell from the strawn beach,
And listen at its lips: they sigh
The same desire and mystery,
The echo of the whole sea's speech.
And all mankind is thus at heart,
Not anything but what thou art,
And Earth, Sea, Man, are all in each."

Thoughtfully conceived and worthily expressed, without doubt; but not easy to follow, and by what sort of right to be called a song? There is no hint in it of the carol, of the serenade, of the hymn, of the pæan, of the dirge, or any other known form of verse which nature or convention has associated with music. It is a pure effort of meditative thought, and its title a palpable misnomer. Others of the series, such as "Penumbra" and "The Song of the Bower," are pure efforts of introspection, some closely analytic. They either suggest ideas which music is unable to interpret, or, when their subject is within its compass, are too lavishly ornamented by the writer's characteristic word-painting to admit of any further decoration.

If an artist like Mr. Rossetti shows so little apprehension of the requisites of vocal poetry, it is not to be looked for from the younger singers whom he has influenced. Here is a "song" from a recent volume by a young poetess,† which, without imitating his manner, is sympathetically coloured by it:—

"As the inhastening tide doth roll,
Dear and desired, upon the whole
Long shining strand, and floods the caves,
Your love comes filling with happy waves
The open sea-shore of my soul.

* Poems by D. G. Rossetti. 1870.

† Preludes, by A. C. Thompson. 1875.

" But inland from the seaward spaces,
None knows, not even you, the places
Brimm'd at your coming, out of sight—
The little solitudes of delight
This tide constrains in dim embraces.

" You see the happy shore, wave-rimm'd,
But know not of the quiet, dimm'd
Rivers your coming floods and fills,
The little pools, 'mid happier hills,
My silent rivulets, over-brimm'd.

" What ? I have secrets from you ? Yes.
But, O my sea ! your love doth press
And reach in further than you know,
And fills all these ; and when you go,
There's loneliness in loneliness."

We have nothing but praise for the graceful ingenuity with which Miss Thompson has worked out her image, but its elaboration alone would unfit the poem for its purpose. A composer, if attracted by the beauty of the theme, would find no room for adorning it, and a singer must consent to be either blind to the poetry or deaf to the melody.

Such violations of the conditions of meaning, however, are less surprising than those which meet us under the head of language. One would certainly have credited Mr. Swinburne as a student of Shakespere and the seventeenth-century lyrists with an artistic insight into the secret of their success. Yet of the six rules which they have been shown to observe there are but two, and these the least important, which he does not violate in Mary Beaton's song from *Chastelard*, "Between the sunset and the sea." It is fair to note the exceptions first. The liquids are moderately numerous (forty-five in twenty-four lines), and the soft and softened consonants largely outnumber the hard. But the requisites on which the greatest stress should be laid are palpably disregarded. Instead of being considerably preponderant, the number of open vowels (ninety-eight) barely exceeds that of the close (ninety-three). Such a line as—

" Joy grew to grief, grief grew to me,"

containing seven close vowels in succession, would require to be pronounced with pursed lips, through which no clear sound could possibly issue. "Between the sea-foam and the sea" is but a trifle more singable. The sum of close consonants corrected by open vowels is but forty-one against sixty-eight uncorrected. The *u*'s are in excess (twenty-eight in twenty-four lines). The sibilants are not so numerous (forty-five), but are massed by three to a line instead of being well distributed. The alliteration mainly consists of them, and where other letters are repeated it is almost confined to initials. In two instances the hard consonant *t* is repeated five times in a line with curiously bad effect—"Love

turned to tears, and tears to fire ;” “ The first star saw twain turn to one.” Of the subtle interchange of similar sounds employed by the great masters we have detected no trace.

No illustration could be completer of the real difference which exists between the essentials of “musical” verse and verse adapted for music than that a poet who justly ranks among our first writers of the one, should be so demonstrably at fault when he attempts the other.*

How little of its original significance the title of “song” can now convey to some who habitually employ it may be seen by two examples from the works of minor poets. In a “song” by the present Lord Lytton, commencing “The purple iris hangs his head,”† we find such lines as these, filled with close and hard consonants inadequately corrected by open vowels, and alliteration as unsingable as could well be devised:—

“The spider spills his silver thread ;”

“The freckled foxglove faints and grieves ;
The smooth-paced slumbrous slug devours
The glowing globes of gorgeous flowers
And smears the glistening leaves.”

In “A Mother’s Song,” one of the prettiest of a recent series by Dr. Bennett,‡ there are no less than ninety-five close to sixty-one open vowels, and the following line—

“Wind ! it will sing in his sails and bring”—

contains six of the former in succession.

Other instances of the same kind might be given, but the reader who cares to pursue the line of analysis indicated may easily discover them for himself. It is pleasanter to conclude by pointing to the names of a few song-writers who will pass through the ordeal of dissection comparatively unscathed.

The distinction between “musical” verse and verse fitted for music which has been exemplified from the writings of Mr. Swinburne receives a striking illustration *e converso* from those of Mr. Browning. Whether from an absorbing sense of the superiority of spirit to form, or from impatience of metrical restraint, he has always manifested an indifference to the beauty of rhythm. Single lines of exquisite melody may undoubtedly be produced from his works, but in any classification of poets by their musical rank he would occupy a place below many who are immeasurably his

* The two songs in “Bothwell” are not chargeable with the worst defects above noted, but they violate in equal measure the conditions of meaning. The first is especially fantastic in its construction, which is modelled upon an Italian *canzone* with six recurring rhymes. Both deal with the theme of love in an abstract impersonal fashion, which a leisured reader may enjoy, but a singer cannot follow. Their persistently metaphorical texture and vague richness of language oppose, we think, insuperable obstacles in the way of musical treatment.

† Clytemnestra, and other Poems.

‡ Songs for Sailors, by W. C. Bennett.

inferiors in genius. An instructed musician, however, as he is known to be, may be trusted not to neglect the requisites of adaptability in such verse as he designs to be sung. Accordingly we find that his songs (excepting those which may be called symbolical and so not intended to be sung, *e.g.*, Aprile's in "Paracelsus," and the heroine's in "Pippa passes") fulfil with adequate fidelity the conditions both of meaning and language. "There's a woman like a dewdrop" ("The Blot on the Scutcheon"), "You'll love me yet" ("Pippa passes"), and the best of the "Cavalier Tunes," may be cited in proof. They have little or none of his usual abruptness of thought, curtness of phrase, or remoteness of fanciful suggestion. In point of rhythmical smoothness they may be easily surpassed, but as songs they excel many that are far more melodious.

Mr. Morris's songs, if we again except those which are symbolical (such as are introduced in "Love is Enough") observe both sets of conditions with sufficient accuracy, although his occasional obscurity of style somewhat detracts from their value. Obedience to the laws of song-writing, however, does not imply special aptitude for it, and this, except in the single case of Mr. Tennyson, is rather to be found among such of our contemporary poets as have not aspired to the highest rank. One or two, indeed, of those whom we account in that rank, Mrs. Browning and Mr. M. Arnold for example, have rarely if ever attempted the art at all. Of the poets yet to be named, two claim precedence, the special sensibility of whose sex to musical impressions may give them some advantage over men. One of them has sung her swan-song, but the loss is too recent to exclude her name from the roll of contemporaries. The two collections of Adelaide Procter's "Legends and Lyrics" contain several songs, which as well for fitness of theme and clearness of expression, often pregnant with thought and coloured by fancy but never overloaded by either, as for accurate perception of verbal harmony, leave little or nothing to be desired. Miss Ingelow, upon whom her mantle has worthily fallen, and who, if not reaching a higher emotional sphere, has a wider range of imaginative vision, approaches to the same completeness in her best songs. That verse adapted for music need not be bare of idea nor cold of hue might be sufficiently proved, if proof were needed, by such typical songs as "Starry Crowns of Heaven" of the one writer, and "When Sparrows build" of the other. Both, among many scarcely less apt setting, have been wedded to graceful melodies by composers who knew how to choose wisely. We commend to some one of equal discrimination the lyrical burden of Miss Ingelow's "High Tide on the coast of Lincolnshire," the most pathetically powerful of all her poems. "I shall never hear her more" should prove, if

the writer's observance of the laws of her art be matched by corresponding skill on the musician's part, among the most effective of modern songs.

Miss Rossetti, although less keen in her apprehension of verbal requirements, strictly fulfils the conditions of meaning in such songs as "Spring Quiet," and "Deeper than the heat can smite."* A similar tribute is due to Mr. Marston for such a song as "My love is dead,"† while Mr. O'Shaughnessy, in his "Barcarolle,"‡ is entitled to praise upon reverse grounds.


The impression which we think most readers will derive from this cursory survey of the theory and practice of song-writing is, that to attain success in it is not so easy as may at first sight appear. From the off-hand manner in which one finds the title of "song" attached to fugitive lyrics generally, and their consequent abundance in modern literature, it might be inferred that any decent writer of verse was qualified for so simple a performance. It would be just as legitimate to infer that the art of tuition was easy because any young lady of average accomplishments, when suddenly thrown upon her own resources for a livelihood, deems herself competent forthwith to become a governess. In one of his essays, Steele defines the characteristics of song-writing in language which leaves no doubt as to his opinion of its difficulty: "A song is, as it were, a little image in enamel, that requires all the nice touches of the pencil, a gloss and a smoothness, with those delicate finishing strokes which would be superfluous and thrown away upon larger figures, where the strength and boldness of a masterly hand give all the grace." To acquire the lightness of touch demanded for such handiwork as this is surely not within every man's reach. The buoyancy of spirit and freshness of resource whereby poets like Shakespere and Tennyson pass from a frolicsome to a pensive or a tender mood, and give utterance to each in words that we never feel to be inadequate alone or discordant by contrast, must be reckoned among the rarer poetic qualifications. And when associated therewith must be an instinct able to discern what order of ideas is most appropriate for musical translation and what conjunctions of syllables are best fitted for the voice to control, we shall hardly err in affirming such a union of qualifications to be rarer still.

HENRY G. HEWLETT.

* *The Prince's Progress, and other Poems*, by Christina Rossetti.

† *Song-tide, and other Poems*, by P. B. Marston.

‡ *An Epic of Women, and other Poems*, by Arthur O'Shaughnessy.



DAVID FRIEDRICH STRAUSS:

A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF MODERN RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

III.

SO Strauss, after twenty years' work elsewhere, returned to his old school. But during his absence its problems had changed their terms. Speculation had run to seed by running into negation. When the "everlasting no" has been reached one can get no further; must retrace one's steps to find the "everlasting yes." Thought had passed from transcendental enthusiasm to descendent paralysis, and stood at the moment in transition, awakening to the impulse science was just beginning to give. It was doing good historical work, always the best sort of work for an age without pre-eminent personalities or creative ideas of its own. Trendelenburg was teaching Aristotle to speak to this nineteenth century. Zeller was building ancient Greek philosophy into a living organism. Kuno Fischer was discovering the constructive principles criticism had missed in the great modern systems. And theology, like her sister, had been more appreciative of the old than productive of the new. Conservatism had been in the ascendant, confessionism doing its utmost to rule the religious mind. The vital question had been the ecclesiastical *modus vivendi*,—whether an inflexible Lutheranism, or a modified and modernized Reformed theology, or an undogmatic Christianity, should be the faith of the Church? The conditions favourable to work of the highest sort did not exist. Books marked by massive thought and extensive study had been plentiful enough. The neo-Lutherans had been great in Old Testament exegesis and

scholarship; the Party of Mediation had been strong in dogmatics and dogmatic history. Hengstenberg, Hofmann, and Delitzsch on the one side; Nitzsch, Müller, and Dorner on the other, had done solid, and, in its own order, excellent work, very influential in theological circles, not influential elsewhere. The students had known nothing of the enthusiasm created by new ideas, by teachers who could make the old faith a new philosophy. There had been men like Tholuck, with the versatility, but without the penetration or elevation of Schleiermacher, powerful to attract the novice, less powerful to retain the initiated; or like Alexander Schweitzer, with the principles, but without the qualifying all-sidedness of his master, able to leaven the Churches around him with his spirit; but they were, each after his kind, echoes of the past rather than prophecies of the future. Richard Rothe, pious while speculative, with the heart of a child, but the intellect of the most fearless metaphysician, had in his expressed thought many epoch-making qualities; but his path was too singular, his method too hard to master, his thinking too recondite, his theories too remote from the realized, and apparently realizable, to speak to a wide circle. He has been mightier in death than in life, and he who while dead yet speaks, may do more for after-times than he did for his own.

But while speculation had been thus inactive in theology, criticism had been untiring and creative. As the one had ceased, the other had begun to speak. F. C. Baur had been an almost silent spectator of the controversy caused by the *Leben Jesu*. That work had had for him nothing new,* as he had watched its growth and discussed every point in the process with its author. His mind, too, was still but ripening, winning new points from which to view things. He had become a Hegelian,† and history was always the strong point of Hegelianism. In him it found a mind whose native bent was to historical inquiry. His tendency, greatly strengthened by his philosophy, was to study too exclusively the creations of the intellect, to look too much to the products and processes of thought, apart from the thinking person and the conditions under which he lived. The earliest fruits of his new standpoint were certain great monographs in dogmatic History, the Christian Gnosis, the doctrine of the Atonement, the Trinity and Incarnation of God, monuments of solid research,

* Baur's *Kirchen-Geschichte des Neunzehnten Jahrhts.* p. 397.

† The date of his transition to Hegel can be fixed with tolerable precision. His reply to Moehler's *Symbolik* (*Der Gegensatz des Katholicismus und Protestantismus*) appeared first in 1833, and exhibits in curious but instructive combination Schleiermacher's Consciousness of Dependence and Hegel's doctrine of the Absolute. This is a work of remarkable breadth and power. Moehler's *Symbolik* has been translated, yet Baur's reply, which has never been so honoured, is its superior in everything but style. One of the most instructive things in it is its success in showing how easily the absolute sovereignty of Calvinism can be translated into the Hegelian Absolute.

patient and penetrative thought. His faults, intelligible enough in a Hegelian, were two—interpreting ancient doctrines as provisional and anticipatory forms of modern principles, and laying an exaggerated emphasis on the action of antitheses, their power, by resisting, to develop each other till comprehended and harmonized in a synthesis. His studies as a historian of dogmas carried him back into the post-Apostolic and Apostolic times. From the controversies of the later he approached the earlier age, seeking in the one the germs of the differences he had found in the other. This point of approach is noteworthy, explains much in Baur's criticism otherwise unintelligible. He had, indeed, as early as 1831, pointed to certain things that indicated the existence of antagonistic parties in the Apostolic Church; but the extent and meaning of the differences dawned on him but slowly. His work on "Paul," published in 1845, two years after his "History of the Trinity," exhibits with consummate critical skill the conclusions he had reached. It made an era in New Testament criticism. The significant points in it were two—one critical and one historical. The critical was—in Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, and Galatians, we have authentic Apostolic documents, genuine Epistles of Paul. They are our best authorities on every question touching the origin, nature, and principles of primitive Christianity. The historical position was—these authentic documents reveal antitheses of thought, a Petrine and a Pauline party in the Apostolic Church. The Petrine was the primitive Christian, made up of men who, while believing in Jesus, did not cease to be Jews, whose Christianity was but a narrow neo-Judaism. The Pauline was a reformed and Gentile Christianity, which aimed at universalizing the faith in Jesus, by freeing it from the Jewish law and traditions. Baur did not at once see the bearing of these positions on the criticism of the Gospels; saw it only after he had made a special study of John. He perceived in it an ideal tendency, and so considered it, not a history, but a free spiritual creation which made facts the vehicles of the writer's ideas. The fourth was in every respect a contrast to the Synoptic or historical Gospels; and to do as Strauss had done, use the Synoptics to discredit John, and John to discredit the Synoptics, was altogether uncritical. But John, thus appraised and relegated to a date late in the second century, made the theory of tendencies applicable to the Synoptics. Matthew was the oldest Gospel, the depository of the Judaic or Petrine Evangelical tradition; Luke was Pauline in its aims, made its selection of narratives and facts in the interests of Universalism; while Mark was later and of a neutral character, won by dropping the points distinctive of the other two. And so the new criticism was the very antithesis of the old. Baur blamed Strauss for attempting a criticism of the

created the processes it described. Paul was more important than Jesus. Impersonal tendencies were greater than conscious persons. Internal divisions and jealousies were forces mightier and more victorious than the enthusiasm of humanity. The genesis of a literature was made in a manner conceivable, but not the genesis of a religion, with its ideas, and truths, and enthusiasms. The tendency had demolished the mythical theory. What was written out of the set purpose to serve a party could not be a product of the unconsciously creative phantasy. The conscious invention could not at the same time be an unconscious creation. But the new theory did not carry us any nearer than the old to the historical realities, especially the living Person that had created Christianity. The rival parties looked real and consistent enough while conceived simply in relation to each other, but became less real and consistent when conceived in historical relation to Jesus. How did it happen that the Petrine party, who had known him and were the depositaries of the pure original tradition, retained so little of his spirit and teaching, while the Pauline, who had never seen him, retained and evolved so much? How was it that two so dissimilar streams flowed from the same source?—that Peter so missed and Paul so discovered the import of Christ?—that his person and death meant so much to the one, so little to the other, their ideal thus contradicting, as it were, their actual relations? By what title could principles so antagonistic as legal particularism and evangelical universalism both claim to be Christian? and how could qualities that excluded each other be akin in origin and united in end? And this, though a radical, was not the only failure on the historical side. The Church, as Baur conceived it, had in its first age well-known men, but almost no literature; in its second a great literature, but almost no known man. How comes it that the jealous-minded men of the first age, who wrote so little, are to us distinct and familiar persons, while the catholic-minded men of the second age, who did and wrote so much, are shadowy and nameless? How has an illiterate age been so full of historical personalities, while a most literate age has hardly one? By what chance have not only the Socrates, but the Sophists, in this case become well-defined characters, living in the full light of history, while Plato and the Platonic circle have faded into nebulous, nameless forms? A theory that involves violent anomalies can hardly claim historical veracity. Baur's had enough of the first to cancel its claim to the second. But the failure of the Tübingen school was far from absolute, was in some essential respects equal to the most splendid success. Their method and many of their results remain a precious and inalienable inheritance, which every explorer on the same field must possess before he can hope to succeed.

It had thus become apparent, even before Strauss returned to theology, that the reading of the evangelical history by the new criticism was not final. But material had been collected that made a new reading both possible and necessary, and men as dissimilar as Renan and Keim, Pressensé and the author of *Ecce Homo*, Schenkel and Strauss, were soon moved to essay it. The latter could not now employ his old speculative and critical *à priorism*; he had changed with the times. His original standpoint had grown antiquated, his method unscientific. In what direction and how far he was moving, his monograph on Reimarus showed.* He had come to love the Rationalism he had once hated. He thought a thing the age needed was the full-length apology of the Wolfenbüttel Fragmentist. A deep draught had refreshed his own spirit,† and the pleasure he had received he could not refuse to give. While much in it was antiquated, its principles were permanent.‡ The negative in it stands, the positive secures a higher and better footing.§ The speculative philosophy was wrong in breaking with the eighteenth century; ought simply to have been its continuation and supplement.|| New criticism need not despise old Rationalism, as it cannot dispense with its help.

The new *Leben Jesu*¶ followed. It differed from the old almost as much as Hume from Hegel, Reimarus from Schleiermacher. It was addressed to the German nation, the people of the Reformation, whose historical right it was to lead the advance from the religion of Christ to the religion of Humanity. The tendency in the new is more earthward than in the old. The child of a transcendental stoops to be the apostle of an empirical and sensuous age. The love of truth may be no less, but the hatred of adversaries is more intense; and while hatred sharpens the eye for the detection of pretence, it blinds it to the soul of goodness in things which seem evil. There is nothing of the Hegelian philosophy save a faint aroma perceptible here in a term, there in a turn of thought. The Church is evil, and must be abolished that the new religion of culture may be realized. The clergy are compared to field-mice, set down as the slaves of self-interest, averse to truth, fighting behind paper battlements which do not deserve a siege.** Mediating and modern theologians are written down knaves or fools.†† Even Baur is not thorough enough to escape censure, is described as using the historical interest as a defence against fanaticism, like the legal fiction which saves the Crown by sacrificing the Ministry.‡‡

The new life is in some respects an improvement on the old.

* Hermann Samuel Reimarus und seine Schutzschrift für die vernünftigen Verehrer Gottes. Leipzig. 1862.

† P. viii.

‡ Pp. 52, 53.

§ P. 285.

|| P. 288.

¶ Das Leben Jesu für das Deutsche Volk bearbeitet. Leipzig. 1864.

** P. 162.

†† P. xix.

‡‡ xiv. 978.

The criticism of the sources is not so utterly inadequate. It is not indeed original, only derivative, a summary of the Tübingen results; but it is a confession that history without literary criticism is worthless. The idea of historical perspective is more developed, the sense for fact keener, the worth of a background to the person and character he would portray, better understood. The man, in short, is, while less of a constructive thinker, more of an artist. But while there are more of the pre-requisites of a genuine life, there is almost as little of the reality. It is like the work of a decipherer, who should prove the date, alphabet, and language of an inscription, but laboriously leave its contents half read; or like the trick of a renovator, who, while professing to restore the painting of an ancient master, should wash out its main lines, and leave only isolated patches of its principal figure. There is indeed in his Jesus, with his bright and tranquil Hellenic spirit, while less of flesh and blood, more of intellectual and spiritual reality, than in the Jesus of Renan. But the reality is contemporary rather than historical. Jesus is less a Galilean peasant than a student, consciously eclectic, receiving into himself from various sources material to be built into unity through the action of his own consciousness. He is, too, at best ill-known, has been so covered with parasites, had his features so eaten away, his sap so sucked out, as to be little else than a hardly recognizable ruin. Of few great men do we know so little. But enough is known to deprive him of unique pre-eminence. He has had predecessors in Israel and Hellas, on the Ganges and the Oxus, and has not been without successors. He looks great to the Church because clothed in clouds. These are not indeed myths in the old sense. The name remains, but the thing is gone. The mythical theory is modified out of existence. Myths cease to be unconscious creations, become more or less intentional inventions. The miracles, whether wrought by Jesus, or on him, like the transfiguration and the ascension, are myths, but made as often with as without a distinct intention. The resurrection is the creation of subjective visions. The method is eclectic, Reimarus and Baur having contributed to it almost as much as the earlier and later Strauss. But by what it loses in ideality it gains in reality. The new theory, as less speculative and more historical than the old, is more amenable to criticism. And so the question, by being simplified, has come nearer solution.

The philosophical bases and goal of the New Life in some respects develop, but in general contradict, those of the old. There is less recognition of transcendental truth, more distinct acceptance of a natural and humanistic faith. The fundamental conception approximates to ancient Stoicism, but in its development and application is modified by modern empiricism. The

only things in Christianity said to be imperishable are not peculiar to it—"the belief that there is a spiritual and moral power which governs the world,"* and the conviction that "the service of this power can be only spiritual and moral, a service of the heart and mind." This faith can stand, without any supernatural aid, on the natural order of the world. It needs no future state; teaches men, when every hope of life is extinguished, not to comfort the present by drawing on the future, to live, if not as saints, yet as honourable men; to die, if not blissfully, yet calmly. Whatever man needs lies within the terms of Nature. Duty has authority only as evolved from what is involved in man. Religion is only culture, humanity in its finest bloom. Thought thus moves on a lower plane in the new than in the old Life. Strauss has fallen back on a narrower and less exalted conception of the universe. There is less of Deity in it. Man has ceased to be a revelation of God. There is not in any proper sense a God to reveal. The "spiritual and moral power which governs the world" has almost nothing in common with the Absolute. The idea of God does not exclude miracles; the most cogent arguments against them are Hume's. Spirit does not now reveal itself in history in changing forms, but in abiding matter. Faith cannot now be translated into science, *Vorstellungen* into *Begriffe*. Where distinctions before existed contradictions now emerge; the Hegelian is superseded by one rougher but much handier, between sense and nonsense, science and ignorance. The ideal truth is not saved, while the historical reality is sacrificed. A speculative Christology is never essayed. The attributes of Christ perish with him; are not transferred to Humanity. There is indeed an ideal Christ, but he is to be construed only as the idea of human perfection. The idea needs to be dissociated from the historical person, the religion of Christ exalted into the religion of Humanity. Nothing can be admitted which transcends Nature. Humanism is the final and highest goal of man.

Almost simultaneously with the new *Leben Jesu* another appeared—Schleiermacher's.† Its relation to the first "Life" has been already indicated. Schleiermacher created his Christ out of the Christian consciousness, while allowing the intellect, as critic and interpreter of the sources, the freest play. Strauss regarded the work as a challenge to criticism, and the criticism was—Its Christ is not the Jesus of history,‡ but an ideal creation, the last refuge of the ancient faith, built, not of confessional, but emotional and imaginative material—"a reminiscence from long for-

* Vor. xvii.

† *Das Leben Jesu, Vorlesungen von Fr. Schleiermacher, herausgegeben von Rüfenik.* His literary executors had withheld these lectures from publicity for more than thirty years, from fear, Strauss affirmed, caused by his own early work.

‡ *Der Christus des Glaubens und der Jesus der Geschichte.* 1865.

gotten days, as it were the light of a distant star, which, while the body whence it came was extinguished years ago, still meets the eye."* He thought the extinction of the wandered and bewildering ray an easy affair. Appended was a criticism of Schenkel's *Charakterbild Jesu*. It provoked the bellicose Professor to a tart retort. Strauss rejoined in a pamphlet denouncing middle courses.† Wholes were better than halves, high Lutheranism than the *Protestantenverein*. Common hatred to a party, which was said to live almost wholly by the issue of false coin,‡ made Strauss and Hengstenberg as once before, though absolute enemies, complimentary as friends. Strauss' whole was immeasurably less than Schenkel's half, the renunciation of Christianity as Paul, the Apostles, and the Creeds had conceived it. Whether the renunciation were absolute was a mere strife about words.§ Enough, truth would remain once the untruths had fallen away. While these treatises indicate his relation to Christianity, his lecture on Lessing's *Nathan*|| may show what he desired his general religious position to be. But his spirit was now too negative to stand where Nathan stood. He can describe the seeker, but cannot pursue the quest; may admire painter and picture, but can neither imitate the one nor realize the other. His affinities were now with Voltaire rather than Lessing. The spirit of delicate appreciation breathes through his lectures on the great French deist.¶ They had been written *con amore*. It might have made Hegel turn in his grave to see his scholar's sympathy with the *Aufklärung* and love of its high priest. These lectures stand in general literary excellence beside the monograph on Hutten, in easy and fascinating narrative above it; but they have subtler affinities with his Reimarus than with his Hutten. The one, like the other, is a study preliminary to a greater work—a mental preparation for it. The Reimarus precedes the new "Life of Jesus," the Voltaire the "Old Faith and the New."** The latter could have had no more appropriate motto than the famous *Écrasez l'infime*, the very dubiety as to the interpretation increasing its propriety.

This work was to many a great surprise, to as many more a great disappointment; but it could be either only because its author, while familiar as a name, was unfamiliar as a man. It was the natural fruit of his mind ripening under the dominant influences of the past decade. During it speculative thought had revived in Germany, but on a basis and in forms scientific rather than metaphysical. Physical and physiological science had laid

* P. 220. † Die Halben und die Ganzen. 1865. ‡ P. 64.

§ Pp. 127, 128. || Nathan der Weise. Ein Vortrag. 1866.

¶ Voltaire. Sechs Vorträge. 1870.

** Der Alte und der Neue Glaube. Ein Bekenntniss. 1872.

siege to the old problems as to nature and mind. Anthropology had in the hands of Waitz raised and placed in the freshest lights many old questions as to the Becoming of society and civilization. Lazarus and Steinthal had revived the philosophy of Herbart, and were carrying it into the new inquiries as to the origin and growth of language and law, religion and the nation. Lotze had clothed in the most beautiful and genial forms a philosophy which claimed to reconcile science and metaphysics, realism and idealism. Hartmann had reproduced and amended Schopenhauer, and an age glutted with wealth, comfort, and victory was turning to his dismal pessimism as to a needed mental tonic. And David Strauss—receptive and assimilative in his age as in his youth—stood in the centre of the current and drank from the meeting waters. The result was manifest in his new work. It showed him a convert to the new physico-metaphysical speculation, but unable to master it as he had mastered the old transcendentalism. It stood related to the new “Life of Jesus” as the *Glaubenslehre* had stood related to the old. Between the first “Life” and the “Dogmatics” Feuerbach had risen, dotted Strauss’ “i,” and the constructive pantheism of the critical became the negative pantheism of the theological work. Between the second “Life” and the “Confession” evolution became—not simply, as with Darwin, a theory as to the origin of species—but as with Haeckel, a speculative hypothesis as to the origin of the world and life; and Haeckel, Strauss’ later Feuerbach, helped him to develop the nascent naturalism of the historical work into the full-blossomed kosmism of the dogmatic. But in learning his new, he did not quite unlearn his old creed, and while interpreting the universe in the terms of the one, he interpreted into it some things he had retained from the other. The old Hegelian made a bad young Darwinian, ill-qualified, in spite of his serene self-confidence, to be the mouthpiece of the initiated, and tell how “we” conceived the universe, and how “we” order our lives.

David Strauss was an old man. He had agitated, more than any other man of his century, the religious mind of Europe. He had touched—many thought he had pierced—the sacred heart of the old faith. He had searched the loftiest peaks and the gloomiest depths of human speculation. And now the thousands he had led from their ancient homes were looking to him, as he sat serene on Pisgah, and crying, “Watchman, what of the night? What signs of coming day?” And the “Confession” was the answer. But as an answer it was anything but illuminative. Its shallow theology and supercilious cynicism were reproaches to the patient and grave German mind. Its blindness to the gravity of the questions discussed, to the immensity of the interests involved, its inability to read the thoughts with the

eyes of the past while judging them with the reason of the present, almost induce the belief that the author had raised but been unable to lay the spirit of the great Persifleur, which had taken its revenge by usurping the brain and using the pen of the man who had disturbed its rest. The book satisfied no class of readers worth satisfying. Theologians of almost every school censured the man who ought to have known the doctrines he discussed, yet seemed to think and write not according to knowledge. Men of science refused to accept his scientific positions and deductions. *Literati* dissented from his exposition of modern thought. His economics displeased the economists, his politics the politicians, his ethics the moralists. Extreme socialists forgave his political sins for the sake of his religious nihilism. Certain old friends stood forward as apologists, remembering past services. But approval was the exception, even with those who were anxious to approve.* A brilliant Frenchman,† almost as well known on this as on the other side of the Channel, thought him the great victim of the Franco-German war, which, causing him to lose his head, had made him a “new” but not a better man.

Analysis of so recent a work is unnecessary; only two points, the one illustrative of his negative, the other of his positive attitude, may be noticed—how he describes Christianity, and how he conceives the universe. The question, “Are we still Christians?” had been often before him, and his answer to it had been growingly negative. It might almost be thought that there is about as much sense in the question, “Are we still Christians?” as in the question “Are we still Europeans?” Our civilization, with all it comprehends, has grown up on the soil of Christianity, and the best, the essentially modern and human elements of our culture, without as within the Church, are Christian. But Strauss defined Christian in a sense extraordinary enough to admit an easy negative. In his early days he had resolved the essence into the accident the better to sacrifice the fact and save the idea; now he resolved the accident into the essence the better to force upon the one the fate of the other. In his “Confession” as in his *Glaubenslehre*, though in a far more eminent degree, he identifies Christianity, not with the religion of Christ, but with given doctrines in theology, in their crudest, most antiquated and exaggerated forms, too. Luther’s doctrine of the devil is made equal to the Christian, and Goethe quoted to prove that if any doctrine is Biblical it is this.‡ The atonement is described as a return to the old heathen notion of human

* See Dr. Fr. Strauss, *Alter und Neuer Glaube und seine literarischen Ergebnisse*, D. D. Rauwenhoff und Nippold. The criticism by the former, which was first published in the *Theologisch Tijdschrift*, was one of the finest that appeared. The summary of the various reviews and notices by the latter is most exhaustive.

† Cf. Albert Reville, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, vol. 104, p. 266.

‡ *Der Alte u. Neue Glaube*, p. 22.

sacrifices.* Substitution attributes to God conduct every one recognizes as that of a barbarian.† The Father as related to the death of the Son is characterized by Diderot's saying—"Il n'y a point de bon père qui voulût ressembler à notre Père céleste."‡ Christianity is said to hand over the vast majority of the human race to perdition, all who lived before Christ, except an elect few, all heathens, Jews, Mahomedans, and, inside Christendom, all heretics and infidels.§ It became victorious in the old world, and has continued to live ever since, not by virtue of its truths, but in the strength of a "world-historical humbug,"|| the resurrection of Christ. He himself is represented as an enthusiast (*Schwärmer*), and while there have been noble and exalted enthusiasts, an enthusiast is not a person to be selected as our Saviour and guide.¶ In his conception of the universe Strauss embodies his recent physico-metaphysical speculations, with a collateral polemic against theories pessimist and theistic. Where the Absolute of his earlier system stood, the Kosmos, the Universe, of his later stands. The latter, indeed, is no purely scientific and homogeneous notion, but has incorporated with it, though surreptitiously, certain ideal qualities proper only to the former. He thinks the antagonism between materialism and idealism a mere word-contest.** Both are monisms, and their common enemy is the dualism which sets the eternal Creator over against the transitory Creation. The old idea of God can no longer maintain itself. It had two sides—God was personal and absolute; but these attributes exclude each other.†† God ceased to be conceivable as a person when the universe was discovered to be boundless. The Copernican theory left to the personal God no dwelling-place,‡‡ abolished Him, and so rendered necessary the translation of the old personal deity into the impersonal but person-creating all.§§ The universe, the great whole which comprehends and unifies all forces, is the only God modern thought can know or recognize. Darwin has abolished design.¶¶ There is no trace of a supreme personal intelligence in the frame of the world, or the progress of history, or the order of society. Yet the new materialist cannot escape from his old idealism; while he cannot regard the world as the work of an absolutely reasonable and good personality, he must still regard it as the workshop of the reasonable and the good.¶¶ He demands for his Universe the same piety holy men of old demanded for their God. We ought to have in its presence the feeling of absolute dependence, not bowing before it in dumb resignation as if it were mere brute force, but as order and love, reason and goodness, to which we can surrender ourselves in loving trustful

* Der Alte u. Neue Glaube, p. 27.

† P. 29.

‡ P. 30.

§ P. 34.

|| P. 72.

¶ P. 80.

** P. 212.

†† P. 107.

‡‡ P. 109.

§§ P. 14.

¶¶ P. 21.

¶¶ P. 14.

ness.* And so the semi-idealized materialism becomes the basis of a new religion, and our lives are to be ordered by laws proceeding from the impersonal fountain of life, intelligence, and goodness.

"The Old Faith and the New" caused a violent controversy, which drew from Strauss an explanatory and apologetic "Postscript as Preface." It concluded with the words—"The time for understanding my work will come, as it has come for the *Leben Jesu*, only I shall not live this time to see it." The presentiment here expressed was soon to be fulfilled. In the autumn of 1872, he returned to his native town. Early in 1873 symptoms of a fatal malady appeared; he underwent an operation that gave no relief; knew his end was at hand, and braced himself to meet it. His biographer has helped us to see in his closing days much that touches the heart. He had great joy in his children, great delight in his grandchildren. The birth of twin grandsons touched lyrical chords in his soul that show how, had his lot been happier, he might have made sweet music for the Fatherland. The approach of death did not shake his convictions; his spirit confronted it with unclouded clearness, and grew soft and mellow sitting in its shadow. Zeller says, to be with him in his sick chamber was to have the feeling of moral consecration. He drew cheer and strength from reading and meditation. While he did not allow the Hebrew Psalms or the Christian Scriptures to speak to him words of patience and hope, he found in the pages of Plato truths full of the fragrance and peace the life to be can breathe into the life that is. He died 8th of February, 1873, in the arms of his son and daughter, and was buried without pomp. At his funeral, where religious services had been forbidden by will, the Isis choir from Mozart's *Zauberflöte* was sung to words he himself had prepared. Professor Reuschel pronounced an oration over the grave, declaring Strauss the Lessing of the nineteenth century. If we cannot agree with the orator we can at least here say as to him he praised—"His memory is a living exhortation not to forget patience in the contests and contradictions of life, to seek in the conflict peace, and never allow hate to master the one thing that makes God and man akin—Love."†

Of David Strauss as a man and a friend, little can be here said. He was not, indeed, a reticent man as to matters of affection. He loved sweet memories and tender allusions. His love, which lived amid many differences, for Justinus Kerner; the genial brotherliness which marked his early friendships; his graceful care in embalming names that were dear to him; the loving words which describe his own and his brother's relations; his devotion, revealed

* De Alte u. Neue Glaube, p. 144.

† Strauss, Justinus Kerner, Kl. Schriften, N. F., pp. 331, 332.

in many places and ways, to his mother and her memory; his affection for his children and delight in their society—all show a heart eminently susceptible and tender. His cold was not a callous nature, save where it had been hardened by controversy. His early were faithful friends. The men who had loved him as a student loved him to the end—affinity of mind being, at first as at last, an almost, though not quite altogether, essential condition of affection. His feeling to his adversaries was always cordial enough, though not of the genial or admiring kind. The clergy had been severe to him in his ingenuous period, and he never forgot or forgave it. As a historian, he interpreted the present into the past; as a contemporary critic, he studied his subjects in and through himself. He conceived his clerical opponent as a man with the opinions but without the honesty, or with the honesty but without the intelligence, of David Strauss; and he saw in liberal apologists men who were seeking by every possible fiction to save beliefs known to be false. While he strove to adorn with sunny epithets and phrases beautiful as fragrant names and memories he loved, he laboured to fix on men and parties he hated words full of bitter irony or blistering contempt. The skill with which he interwove feeling and thought, making the one colour and warm, or brighten and darken the other, gave to his style much of its charm. Where the personal element was absent, his tendency was to discuss the greatest things with as little emotion as if they had been the least; and the subjective tended to become, through much artistic handling, only another phase of the objective. His biographer says, he looked back from the brink of the grave on his own life with the same calm objectivity as he had looked into the lives of his heroes. He had come to measure the worth of his life by its significance for the world; and hence came the motive of the “Confession” which fitly closed his literary career. The best and the last thing he had to leave to posterity was the revelation of himself.

His friends, in attempting to define his position as a critic and thinker, have over and over again named him “the Lessing of the nineteenth century.” But no comparison could be apparently more just, really more unjust. Lessing was a creative thinker, but Strauss was, as his friend Vischer said in 1838, “no creative, but a critical spirit.” Lessing gave to this century many of its most fruitful thoughts. The first hint toward a constructive criticism of the Gospels came from him. His theory as to the Education of Humanity inspired the past with a new meaning, and though itself only an incipient philosophy of history, helped to make one rational and perfect possible. His *Nathan* anticipated certain of the fundamental principles and highest aims of our new science of religion. He resuscitated some of the best elements, religious and philoso-

sophical, in "Spinoza," so contributing to the birth of the Idealisms, which did so much to quicken and exalt the mind of Germany, and through it of Europe. But no man has found or can find in Strauss such creative thoughts. He has combined for collision elements that were considered homogeneous, reduced to chaos systems that were believed well-knit organisms; he has thrown fierce light on the most sacred objects of the imagination and heart, has dissolved into fictions ideals that were thought eternal facts, but he has said or done hardly anything that can be either beacon or landmark to the bewildered intellect seeking the haven of reality and truth. Negative work is often indeed real and necessary work. To prove that a fog-bank is fog and not land is a good thing, may be to cause immediate disappointment, but may also be to save from much ultimate mischief; but to prove that land is not land but a fog-bank is not a good thing, may be to lead through immediate disappointment to ultimate harm. And Strauss' work was as often of the latter as of the former kind. His attempt to universalize the truths that lie in Christianity was but a brief and perfunctory appendix to a large and elaborately destructive work. His criticism of the Gospels, in his first *Life*, had no positive worth whatever; in his second, was but a summary of the results reached by Baur. The latter, indeed, whether as an historical critic or as an historian of thought, is immeasurably superior to Strauss. The one to the other is like a child playing at hide-and-seek to a man forcing his way through a tangled wood. Baur, by the positive qualities of his method and results, founded a school, while by what he did and taught others to do, he widened our knowledge of certain well and long-gleaned fields; but Strauss, because of the negative character of his work, founded no school, made no disciples, pursued a solitary path, marked everywhere by the effects of his progressive destructiveness. The mythical theory, his peculiar creation, has long been seen to be both illegitimate and useless. He used his criticism, not to reach certainty, but to create doubt. His *Lives of Jesus*, in some respects his most characteristic works, are both alike remarkable for the little they spare as historical and real. As a critic, he could, like Wolf, dissolve, but not, as an historian, like Niebuhr, evolve, combine, and restore. He never got nearer the Person and period he needed to understand, even though that Person held him as the ancient mariner held the wedding-guest. While narrowing his claims, he was doing homage to his pre-eminence; yet doing it too much in the spirit of a builder who proves his appreciation of scenery by planting little cottages so as to hide glorious landscapes. His books are of the kind that live in their indirect effects. They stand, like the weeds a strong spring-tide leaves as the high-water mark of a speculative

period, determining the point where the flow ended and the ebb began. Those who saw the waves rise, curl into form, and rush wildly up to their feet, feared their force; those who see only the dry shingle can hardly imagine what cause existed for alarm and dire dismay.

But Strauss was no revived eighteenth-century infidel, or vulgar official controversialist against an accepted faith. He was a critic by nature and discipline, scientific in spirit, veracious in purpose. His attitude to Christianity was not Voltaire's. He approached it from within, not from without, his primary aim being to reform and refine rather than abolish it. Voltaire was inspired by a great hate of the Christian faith, lived to *écraser l'infâme*, was fiercely incredulous as to any good in it, foolishly credulous as to the excellences of other religions. But Strauss was inspired by love of an ideal Christianity, wished to make the actual realize it, and became a nihilist only when, soured into cynicism, he sinned against his own higher nature. The one had but a shallow notion of truth, saw a very little way into the mysteries of the universe; the other, as became a son of the deep-thoughted Fatherland, educated while it was in its sublimest speculative mood, had a strong grasp of the spirit and its realities, though one that grew ever weaker in the harassing struggle for life. Perhaps the parallel that will best explain his relation to Christianity is Mirabeau's relation to the polity of France. Each created in his own sphere a revolution; but Mirabeau, happy in the moment of his death, did not live to test his power or impotence in crystallizing into new and higher forms the polity he had liquefied; while Strauss, unhappy in the opportunity of his life, lived to become the greatest victim of the revolution he had caused.

Strauss made three great endeavours to be a constructive religious thinker, but in none of them did he succeed, though, perhaps—as there is often but a step between success and failure—his first and greatest failure may have come nearest success. He tried first to construe speculatively the supreme evangelical facts; secondly, having dissolved the cardinal doctrines of Christian theology, to resolve the residue into principles of the absolute philosophy; thirdly, to build out of the theory of evolution, supplemented by a superficial optimism, a new religious conception of the universe. The first was the splendid but immature endeavour of the ingenuous young man. He saw that facts are but symbols of the eternal forms which reveal it, and the divinest fact is the fact fullest of the divine. The symbol is less than the reality, the fact inferior to the eternal truth it contains. To interpret the fact, to translate its truth out of a local and temporal form into a universal and permanent principle, is a work worthy of the high minds. What does Jesus Chr

both for man and the universe of his person, appearance, and sufferings in time? is a problem the Church has not exhausted. that invites now, as always, devout yet daring thought. Strauss was right in stating and attempting it anew, but he was wrong in too hastily assuming, what his own first principles did not warrant, that the reality of the facts was incompatible with his ideal construction. He endeavoured to solve the problem before he had mastered its factors. His hold of the principles that underlay his interpretation was none of the firmest; his faith in their validity, as well as in the consistency and completeness of his own deductions, wavered, and the result of many changes was the occupancy of a second position which contradicted his first. Theology was now discredited; its doctrines were but illusions, good enough for the vulgar. The truth in form and in fact existed in philosophy, and for the philosopher alone. And in this case the philosophy was an unsound Pantheism, made to walk in uneasy and unequal fellowship with a rational morality. This second position—the position of the *Glaubenslehre*—Strauss did not long occupy. When he left it we cannot precisely tell; perhaps he himself could not have told. For many years his philosophical conceptions must have been rather fluid, but his ethical more coherent than his metaphysical. His speculative system broke up, and he had no new materials out of which to make a new one. At length evolution became a comprehensive hypothesis as to the origin and order of things, and furnished him with the occasion of his final endeavour to be a religious thinker. It is not too much to say that the last attempt was in everything but the age of the man who made it more juvenile than the first.

Our age has no greater or graver question than, "How are we to conceive the universe?" But certainly nothing can be more impertinent than to make the apotheosis of a still inchoate scientific theory the answer. If, too, the deified theory owes its divine elements to a conception it claims to supersede, the impertinence is still greater. To dismiss the idea of person while retaining personal qualities is, by a trick of thought, to make a change of names equal to a change of the things named. Reason, goodness, righteousness are personal qualities, and if these, as Strauss argued, belong to the Unity which made and guides the universe, it is less correctly named Force than Person. Our physical science is growing more cautious every day. Our more distinguished evolutionists, like our wiser theologians, are getting less dogmatic the more they discuss their theory. They are coming to see that there is a point where teleology not only may, but must stand, and where science and theology can forget their long feud, and become, like Esau and Jacob on the morning after Peniel, twin brothers once more. The physicist has much to do before he can

complete his conception of the universe, and the theologian no less. They approach the same object from different points, the one from the real, the other from the ideal side; the one from fact, the other from thought; and neither need fear his exclusion by the other. The ultimate truth of the universe can never be an evil thing to know, and every one who helps us towards it does excellently well. If the idea of God be rooted in mind, it can never be expelled from nature. Spirit must always find it there. Meanwhile the man who uses his great opportunity to spring on the unwary a hastily and ill-primed mine, which shall lift their God out of nature, does not only a cruel, but an unjustified thing, worthy of sad but severe rebuke from every man who loves the true and reveres the holy.


On the whole, we must conclude that David Friedrich Strauss had a great work to do, and, even after every abatement has been made, did it. He has been in our century a minister of God for good. The Church has need, not only to give an account of its stewardship, but show its right to be a steward of the divine mysteries. We ought not to go on believing by custom, living by retrospect. We cannot do it if we would. The Church has debts to the past, but duties to the present. These are summed up in making religion a living power, the supreme vehicle of spiritual realities to our day. We ought to be as patient and fearless in making our theology as were Paul and John, Athanasius and Augustine, Luther and Calvin; and if we are, it will be as thoroughly living for our contemporaries as their theologies were for theirs. Truth lives in conflict, and must not fear it, dread no change of form that can secure permanence and vitality of substance. Our author, as a leader in the great conflict, has forced the Church to feel that she has enemies she must face and fight. To flee, or feign oblivion of their presence, is worse than defeat, for out of defeat may come victory, out of the flight or oblivion only the exhaustion that means death. It were simply a calamity that sceptical thought should leaven society and never win speech. Let the worst be known that the best may be done. Religious thought has everything to gain by being enlightened and progressive; everything to lose by shutting eyes and mind to the lights shining to a more perfect day. The Church in these days ought to win and wear the character that made Aristides so proud a name—

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλλει.

The friends Strauss gathered round him, the response his writings received from the educated laity, warn her that the critic had something to say she ought to hear and understand. While the missionary to the masses, she should not leave the cultured to a

reviving paganism. No success with the οἱ πολλοί can compensate failure with the οἱ ἄριστοι not of rank but of intellect. Generations of mutual suspicion and reproach have to be lived down, but let science and religion love as its own the other's truth, and then, though in some still distant future, the day will come when science shall be religious and religion scientific, and these no more twain, but one knowledge and one spirit.

A. M. FAIRBAIRN.



HOMEROLOGY.

IV.—ATHENÈ.

ATHENÈ, *Athenaiè*: the standard name of the goddess, who is, without doubt, the most lofty and splendid figure of the entire thearchy of the Poems. Frequently referred to the name of Neith, the Egyptian goddess, as its origin. Neith is rendered "I came from myself." See Bunsen's *Egypt* i. 385 (transl.), and Sir G. Wilkinson in Rawlinson's *Herod.* ii. 89.

Derived by Scott and Liddell, "perhaps" from *anth*, the root of *ἀνθίω*. Max Müller believes that the root *ah*, which yielded in Sanscrit *ahaná*, the dawn, *ahan* and *ahar*, day, supplied likewise the germ of Athenè.—"Lectures on the Science of Languages," second series, p. 502.

I. TITLES.

Atrulonè, the unbroken or unwearied. From *ἀτρώγη*, like *Αἰδώνεος* from *Αἰδής*. Always used in the vocative, and always when appealing to her to perform some act, which she invariably does. Il. ii. 157; v. 115, 714; x. 284; xxi. 420. Od. iv. 762; vi. 324.

Glaukōpis. Interpreted either (1) as flashing-eyed, gleaming-eyed, according to the analogy of *γλαυκῖαι*, Il. xx. 172, used of a lion in wrath, and from the root *λάω* to see. This meaning is adopted by L. and S. (2) Blue-eyed; but the idea of colour seems to be later; (3) owl-eyed or owl-faced, with reference to the fact that the owl was in later times her symbol, and to the theory that she had been worshipped in Troy (*vide* Schliemann) or elsewhere in the form of the owl. The word *glauz* is not in *Hesiodus*.

would be most difficult to prove from the Poems the connection between the goddess and the bird. On the other hand, if the theory just mentioned be sound, it would be quite in keeping with Homer's manner to throw it into the shade, as he has dealt with the Egyptian worship of Horos as a figure with a hawk's head (Homeric Synchronism, p. 246). The representation, however, of Athenè as taking the form of a vulture to witness the duel of Hector and Aias (Il. vii. 58—61) appears to indicate that the Poet was unaware of any connection of Athenè with the owl.

It is declined in the Iliad with the genitive in *ιδος*; but the form *Γλαύκωπιν* occurs once in the Odyssey (i. 156).

Glaukōpis is used about ninety times, commonly as an epithet, but as a title in some few passages, as Il. viii. 373, 406, 420; xxiv. 26; and Od. xiii. 389.

Obrimopatṛè, "daughter of a mighty sire" (L. and S.). "Tochter des schrecklichen Vaters" (Voss). Perhaps, "having the might, or terrors, of her sire."

This name is given only to Athenè; nor has any other deity an appellation of quality thus related to Zeus. It seems then to designate a special relation to her father, and it may be founded on the legend of the "head-born." (See *inf. Tritogeneia*.)

Obrimopatṛè is, in my opinion, a title only, and is used Il. v. 747; viii. 391. Od. i. 101; iii. 135; xxiv. 540.

Pallas is referred to the virgin character of Athenè, having the same root as *παλλάκις* and *πάλλαξ*. In Strabo (816) Pallades are virgin priestesses, of whatsoever deity. (See L. and S.)

The word grew afterwards into a title, and is always so rendered, but with doubtful propriety, for it is invariably annexed in Homer to Athenè or Athenaiè. Il. i. 200, 400, *et al.* Od. i. 125, 327, *et al.* In all between fifty and sixty times.

Tritogeneia, or Trito-born. Derived by some from the lake Tritonis in Libya; by others from a torrent in Bœotia. But we have no trace of either in Homer. On the other hand, the legend of her birth from the head of Zeus, supposed to be signified here from the old word *trito* for the head ("dubious" L. and S.), is not wholly without support from Homer. First, we remark that there is no trace of any mother for Athenè in the Olympian system, while she is in relations of such harmony and co-operation with Herè that, if they had been mother and daughter, it could hardly have failed to be indicated. But interpreters appear to have overlooked the passage, in which Arès reproaches Zeus for his especial and undue indulgence to Athenè. First, he says in Il. v. 875—

σοὶ πάντες μαχόμεσθα, σὺ γὰρ τέκες ἄφρονα κούρην·

which seems to imply something special and peculiar in the fatherhood of Zeus towards Athenè, for the πάντες were likewise in most cases children of Zeus (comp. xv. 196—199, where οὗς τέκεν αὐτός is used to distinguish all his children from his brothers and the other seniors). Then he proceeds to allege that his fatherhood is the cause of the indulgence—

ταύτην δ' οὔτ' ἔπει προτιβάλλεα: οὔτε τι ἔργω,
ἀλλ' ἀνιείς, ἐπεὶ αὐτὸς ἐγείναο παῖδ' ἀτὶ δῆλον—vv. 379, 380.

The sense of αὐτός appears here to be *solus*, alone, as in αὐτός περ ἔων, Il. viii. 99. It certainly indicates something special in the fatherhood.

The lines, then, probably signify that he spoiled Athenè because of his sole parentage of her without a mother, and if so the reference will naturally be to the legend of the head-birth. This legend is expressed in the fragmentary hymn, xxviii. v. 4, with a remarkable combination of the Homeric phrases, and an apparent reference to the passage just cited—

Τριτογενῇ, τὴν αὐτὸς ἐγείνατο μητίετα Ζεὺς.
σεμνῆς ἐκ κεφαλῆς.

See also Hes. Theog., v. 924.

See also *inf.* κυδίστη.

I therefore render *Tritogeneia* "head-born" as the most probable sense.

It is used in Il. iv. 515, viii. 39, xxii. 183, and Od. iii. 378.

II. EPITHETS AND PHRASES.

Ageleîè, leader of the people (λεὼν ἄγουσα); or less probably, driver of spoil (λείαν ἄγουσα). Il. vi. 269, 279; xv. 213. Od. iii. 68; xvi. 207.

Alalkomenēis, protectress, from ἀλάλκεῖν. Il. iv. 8; v. 908.

ἄφρων κούρη, silly or senseless maid: in the reproach of Arès. Il v. 875.

Glaucōpis (see *sup.* under Titles). Il. ii. 172, 279, 446, *et al.* Od. i. 319, 364, *et al.*

Δῖα θεά, peerless, surpassing goddess. Il. x. 290.

Δῖα θεάων, excellent among goddesses. Il. vi. 305.

Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖα, born of Zeus. Od. vi. 22.

Διὸς κούρη, maid born of Zeus. Il. v. 733, x. 553, *et al.* Od. iv. 752, *et al.*

Διὸς τέκος, child of Zeus. Il. i. 202; ii. 157, *et al.* Od. iv. 762.

Epirrothos, helper, hasting to the rescue. Il. iv. 390.

Erusiptolis, saviour, or protectress, of cities. Il. vi. 305.

Eüplamos, with fair or goodly locks. Od. vii. 41.

Eücomos, fair or full-haired. Il. vi. 92, 273, 303: the only epithet of personal beauty anywhere in the Iliad applied to the goddess, and, as all these passages refer to the votive offering of the Peplos, probably referring to her statue.

Θεὸς δαίμη, a dread deity. Il. v. 839. Od. vii. 41.

Θεὰ γλαύκωπις (*sup.* under Titles).

Θυγάτηρ Διὸς, daughter of Zeus. Il. ii. 547; iv. 515. Od. ii. 378; xxii. 205; xxiv. 501.

Κούρη γλαύκωπις (*sup.*). Il. xxiv. 26.

Kudisté, most glorious; applied only to Athenè and Zeus among deities (to Agamemnon among men); only associated with the name Tritogeneia; and perhaps sustaining the opinion that that title refers to the head-birth, the peculiar glory of Athenè. Il. iv. 515. Od. iii. 378.

Iaiossoos, people-saving.

Leitis = ἀγελείη, people-leading: the political rather than the v. datory function is suitable to her deity. But in Il. v. 4 is the epithet chosen for Athenè in spoils of Dolon.

Megathumos, high-souled. Od. vi like this, which describe her in Homer.

Obrimopatré (see *sup.* Titles).

παῖς ἀΐδης, a child pestilent, destructive (as putting out of sight).

In the reproach of Ares. Il. v. 880.

Poluboulos, rich in counsel. Il. v. 260. Od. xvi. 282.

Potnia, venerable. Il. vi. 305.

Phthisimbrotos, man-destroying. Od. xxii. 297, with reference to the special act of the slaughter of the Suitors.

Philè, dear. Il. viii. 373.

φίλον τέκος, dear child. Il. viii. 39 ; xxii. 183.

φίλα φρονέουσ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ, propitious, meditating good. Od. vii. 42.

III. ATTRIBUTES, OR REGULAR FUNCTIONS, OF ATHENÈ.

1. In the Olympian order, she is the goddess of all wisdom and device, the πολύβουλος (*sup.* II.) excelling every other god in counsel, and in craft.

ἐγὼ δ' ἐν πᾶσι θεοῖσιν
μήτι τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσιν. Od. xiii. 298.

In all her proceedings from first to last there is an entire absence of passion, and a sustained force of intellect, never swerving from the mark. This is, indeed, the capital idea, a sublime, unfailing, unfaltering, never-baffled intelligence, based upon the moral order, yet not emotional ; thoroughly masculine, yet never quite unfeminine in its general effect. And this is a thing truly special and separate, in the Homeric Thearchy.

2. She is the goddess of polity. See ἀλακομένης, ἐρυσίπολις, ἀγλαΐη, λῆϊτις. It is in this general capacity, I conceive, as protectress of ordered social life, that she is invoked in the Sixth Iliad ; for there is no mark in Homer of her having had any special relation to Troy, and she is a partisan of the Greeks. This invocation took place under the direction of Helenos, the leading augur (vi. 75, 76). In respect to this political attribute, Themis is the merely mythological representative of the same office.
3. She is the goddess of War, and holds this office as much as Ares. Enūo shares it also. Il. v. 332.

ᾠρσε δὲ τοὺς μὲν Ἄρης, τοὺς δὲ γλαύκωπις Ἀθήνη. Il. iv. 439.

Thus on the Plain. So likewise on the Shield (xviii. 516).

οἱ δ' ἴσαν ἦρχε δ' ἄρα σφιν Ἄρης καὶ Πάλλας Ἀθήνη.

See also Il. v. 430 ; xvii. 398 ; xx. 358. Od. xiv. 216.

The difference is that she represents rational, and he simply destructive war. (See Ares, II. Epithets.)

4. She is the goddess of industrial art. Instructed Penelopè (Od. ii. 116—119), and the women of Scheriè (Od. vii. 110). Instructed artificers (Il. v. 60 ; xv. 411) ; and worked herself : was a paragon in such work.

ἔργα δ' Ἀθηναίη Γλαυκώπιδι ἰσοφαρίζοι. Il. ix. 390.

She gave the accomplishment to the daughters of Pandaros.

ἔργα δ' Ἀθηναίη δέδασε κλύτα ἐργάζεσθαι. Od. xx. 72.

Nor (*sup.*) is this confined to tissues or the works of women

as Crusius says (Il. ix. 390), for she shares with Hephaistos the gift of works in metal, and the workman plating silver with gold is instructed by them in every branch of the art. So also the carpenter: and she assisted Epeios in framing the wooden horse (Il. xiv. 178; Od. viii. 493).

ἰδρὶς, ὃν Ἥφαιστος δέδασεν καὶ Πάλλας Ἀθήνη
τέχνην πάντεσσι, χαρίεντα δὲ ἔργα τελείει. Od. vi. 233, repeated
xxiii. 160.

See also Il. v. 734, 735, where she had herself wrought her own embroidered garment.

Hermès, who is on the border of her province or even within it, seems, however, to be the god of gain or increase, rather than of production.

It has been stated that the Olympian offices of Athenè, industry, wisdom, policy (a special development of wisdom), and war, meet in the State (Smith's Dict., Art. *Athenà*). The conception of the State is architectonic, and without doubt they do thus meet; but so do nearly all functions of all the Olympian deities and of man. There is nothing therefore special to Athenè in the supposed solution, which is thus beside the mark. Again, had this been the true account of the matter, she would have had the idea of the State-goddess for the central notion of her character, instead of the Wisdom-goddess, with her State-offices as one of the branch-conceptions. Personal care,* not State-care, is the supreme office of Athenè; and Wisdom, backed by Power, is the ruling idea of the conception. Wherever the welfare of the Greeks as a whole, and as representing the nation, is in question, it is Herè that acts, and Athenè is either absent or subordinate. Even in composing the civil war in Ithaca, Athenè's office is derivative, Zeus is supreme. But in conducting the designs of Odüsseus against the Suitors she is paramount, and original. So again it is Zeus, not Athenè, who empowers, and punishes, the agents of civil authority (Il. i. 238, and xvi. 387).

In short, the true basis of the character of Athenè is not to be found in Olümpos, nor in any of the older mythological systems, so far as they are known to us; but in the yet more ancient tradition, handed down among the Hebrews, of the Word or Wisdom of God.

IV. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS—HER RELATION TO APOLLO.

• In the greater part of these offices, or features of character, she is closely associated with Apollo. See Apollo, IV. 15—32. They are briefly as follows:—

1. Special conjunction in invocation.
2. The same in honour apart from invocation.
3. Universality of worship within the sphere known to the Poet, if not beyond it. Athenè had no protective relation with Troy; so that the special worship of her in that city belongs to her all-pervading character.
 She is worshipped in Athens.
 She performs acts of divinity, and is worshipped by Nestor, in Peloponnesos (Od. iii. 62, 76, 419).
 Her temple proves her worship in Athens (Il. ii. 549), and her grove in Scheriè (Od. vi. 291). She is worshipped by Telemachos in Ithaca: by Odüsseus and

* Studies on Homer, ii. 121.

Diomed in the Greek camp; and by Laertes (Od. xiii. 324). This enumeration suffices to show that there is no mark of local limitation attaching to the worship of the Homeric Athenè.

4. The use of the Aegis. This is more conspicuous in Athenè even than it is in Apollo. For, firstly, she seems to have an *aegis* of her own, with 100 golden tassels, each worth a hecatomb (Il. ii. 447—449; xviii. 203; xxi. 400). This *aegis* not even the thunderbolt of Zeus can subdue (Il. xxi. 401). Secondly, if, as it seems, the aegis put on by her in Il. v. 738 be the aegis of Zeus, she assumes it as of her own motion, whereas in Il. xv. 229 it is expressly entrusted by Zeus to Apollo.
5. Athenè and Apollo are the special organs of Zeus in carrying on the providential government of the world.
6. They have a profound regard for the divine Order, which they never infringe.
7. They appear to be free from elemental associations.
8. Their Olympian attributes, supremely borne by them, are also found in the hands of inferior personages.
9. They are not tied, especially Apollo, to any local abode.
10. Their action, as well as the worship they receive, is without local limit.
11. Prayer or petition is offered to them in all places alike. (See Prayers in Sect. VII.).
12. They have no physical wants.
13. In locomotion, having departed, they arrive without stages or note of time between.
14. Without appealing to Zeus or the Assembly, they avenge themselves when they have been injured or affronted.
15. They have power to signify the future by omens.
16. In giving effect to their will, they are not tied to the use of second causes.
17. In them alone (besides Zeus) of the gods is displayed greatness, moral or intellectual, or both.
18. They have dominion over the external world and the corporeal nature of man. The instances, as to Athenè, are—

(1.) IN THE ILIAD.

(a.) *Over External Nature*

- iv. 130—140. She diverts the arrow of Pandaros in its flight.
- v. 290—296. Guides the spear of Diomed against him.
- 853—856. Averts the spear of Arès; impels and directs the spear of Diomed.
- xi. 45. Jointly with Herè, thunders in honour of Agamemnon.
437. Stays the spear of Sokos, that it may not mortally wound Odüsseus.
- 438—441. Diverts the spear of Hector, and causes it to return to him.
- xxii. 275—277. Picks up the spear of Achilles, and brings it back to him.
- xxiii. 388. Restores to Diomed his whip. 392. Breaks the yoke of the chariot of Eumelos. 399—405.

Gives courage and speed to the horses of Diomed.

(b.) *Over the Corporeal Nature of Man.*

- x. 367. She gives strength to Diomed.
- xvii. 569. Infuses strength into Menelaos.
- xx. 32—37. Instils nectar and ambrosia into the breast of the fasting Achilles.

(2.) IN THE ODYSSEY.

(a.) *Over External Nature.*

- ii. 421. Sends a toward breeze for the voyage of Telemachos.
- v. 108. Sent a storm upon the returning Greeks.
- 382. Sent a stiff Boreas to carry Odÿsseus towards Scheriè.
- xxiii. 242—246. Lengthens the night, and retards the morning.
- 348. Sends the morning up from Ocean.

(b.) *Over the Corporeal Nature of Man.*

- i. 363, 364. Gives sleep to Penelopè.
 - ii. 395, 396. Makes the Suitors drowsy.
 - iv. 795 seqq. Sends an Eidōlon to Penelopè, in the likeness of her sister Iphthimè.
 - vi. 41. Causes Nausicaa's ball to fall into the thicket.
 - 229. Increases the beauty and stature of Odÿsseus.
 - vii. 14, 39, 140. Envelops him in cloud. (The lowest form of action of this kind.)
 - viii. 18, 23. Further gift of beauty and stature.
 - xiii. 189—193. Again envelops Odÿsseus in cloud.
 - 352. Dispels it.
 - 429—438. Transforms him in figure and garb.
 - xiv. 216. Gives muscular force to the Pseudodÿsseus.
 - xvi. 172 seqq. Re-transforms him to the beauty of prime.
 - 451. Gives sleep to Penelopè.
 - 454—459. Again transforms Odÿsseus to meanness of figure.
 - xvii. 63. Gives Telemachos an inexpressible grace.
 - xviii. 69. Stoutens the limbs of Odÿsseus for the fight with Iros.
 - 187 seqq. Gives sleep to Penelopè, and gifts of beauty.
 - xix. 602. Again sends her to sleep.
 - xx. 54. The same to Odÿsseus.
 - 345—357. Bewilders the Suitors and raises an assemblage of portents of various kinds around them.
 - xxii. 256, 273. Diverts the darts of the Suitors.
 - xxiii. 156, 163. Finally restores the beauty of Odÿsseus.
 - xxiv. 367. Gives flesh and stature to Laertes.
19. Another special characteristic is shared by her with Apollo (IV. 3), that she, like him, is addressed by a term of endear-

ment. She is twice called φίλον τέκος (*sup.* Il.) as he is φίλε Φοῖβε. Such terms would rather have been expected in the case of the youthful Hermès, or of the beautiful Aphroditè; who, however, is only called τέκνον ἐμόν (Il. v. 428). By Herè she is saluted as φίλον τέκος, but only at a moment when practising a trick upon her.

20. Most of all perhaps does she resemble Apollo in this leading point: that no common link is supplied by the Olympian system itself for binding her main attributes in one. Wisdom and the care of polity may be naturally or easily associated, but how to associate that with war, or war itself with works of industry?

These are not mere specialties, but coherent parts of a scheme, according to which these two deities, besides a multiplicity of recognized Olympian function such as is found in the case of no other divinity, and not easily to be explained as mere portions of the ordinary thearchy, have another and wider sphere, in which they extensively present the attributes, and exercise the offices, of deity at large.

The relation of Athenè to Apollo in Homer is not, then, exhaustively represented by this enumeration. Nor is its leading feature to be discovered by any comparison of their respective offices in mythology, which are wholly distinct if not contrasted. The capital feature lies in the distinctive attitude and frame of mind with which the Poet approaches and handles these divinities. He has for them a profound and religious reverence, of such a nature and extent as can best be explained by the supposition that he regarded the traditions on which their characteristics were moulded as of a more venerable nature, or as derived from a purer source, than the mass of purely Syrian, Egyptian, or Pelasgian legends, with which he principally had to deal. This, it may be truly said, is inference. But the difference of exhibition and treatment between this pair of figures in particular, and the ordinary personages of the Olympian Court, is not inference or theory: it is fact.

In this, so to speak, supernal sphere, the dignity of Athenè is the more august of the two in these respects, that—

1. She exercises more of direct personal and mental discipline, especially in the case of Odūsseus.
2. She is never in any matter baffled, even by Apollo, whom she herself baffles.
3. She never strikes, or contends with mortals, but only with gods.

Athenè may be said to be exempt, not from passion, but from perturbation. Troy was hateful to her as well as Herè, from the day when Paris promoted the competition of the three goddesses (Il. xxiv. 25—30). Anger is imputed to her twice in the Iliad: on Olūmpos (Il. iv. 23) at the proposal of Zeus to terminate the war (and viii. 459); but the emotion is not suffered in her case to break out. And once in the Odyssey (xxii. 224); but her feeling seems only to invigorate her action. With these ascriptions may be compared the wrath ascribed to Apollo (*vide* IV. 26 on χωόμενος) whose whole character, however, is far the less intense of the two.

Unless in the point of craft (Od. xiii. 248), exemplified in her acting as tempter to Pandaros (Il. iv. 86—104), which was done under the direction of Zeus (ibid. 68), and in the personation of Deiphobos (Il. xxii. 226—299), she never deviates from her lofty ideal.

As respects conformity with the supreme will, in Apollo it is absolute, in Athenè qualified. He repelled and destroyed (Od. xi. 318) the assailants

of heaven; but she joined with Poseidon and Herè in the attempt to dethrone Zeus and put him in fetters, which would have been successful but for Thetis Il. i. 397—406.

This inconformity of will allows her to remonstrate strongly in the Olympian Assembly (Il. xxii. 178), which Apollo never does. She, by strong effort, procures the divine intervention in Od. i. 44—79 on behalf of Odüsseus. But no discrepancy from Zeus is ever manifested in the face of mortals. She is, under him, the operative Providence for the Greeks, as in Il. iv. 69: and in the Ithacan civil war (Od. xxiv. 520—542).

So careful is the Poet to have no collision between Athenè and Apollo that, though they operate for the respective hosts, not a word or act of opposition ever occurs between them; one appears when the other has retired, and when Athenè in the Doloneia knows that he is (too late) endeavouring to counterwork her by giving the alarm, in warning Diomed for his security she is careful not to name Apollo, but says θεὸς ἄλλος may arouse the enemy (Il. x. 511).

V. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS—RELATION TO OTHER DEITIES.

(A.) Her relation to Zeus.

In comparing Athenè with Zeus, it is obvious that he has the supremacy of rank and power. Nevertheless the ideal picture is far less grand, as she is free from the notes of infirmity and generally of passion, which in him stand like clay mingled with the true metal. Besides being wholly exempt from the sensual taint, she is incapable of being petted and overpersuaded, as he was by Thetis (Il. i. 511—530), much less beguiled and entrapped, as he was by the plot of Herè (Il. xiv. 293 seqq.). The panoply of her mind was perfect, and its internal equilibrium absolute. When she yields to him, it is only to the supremacy of force, or else of parentage (Il. viii. 28—32). And so soon as she has done this, he at once addresses her in caressing terms, as though unwilling to be at variance with her (Il. viii. 39, xxii. 178).

In many particulars the intimacy of her relation to Zeus is common to her with Apollo, either wholly or partially. But her function as the working providence of the world is conspicuous in the Poems above that either of Apollo or of Zeus, as will appear from the following enumeration of details, scarcely less than from her general working in the Odyssey:—

Il. viii. 26—28. Agamemnon will take Troy if Zeus and Athenè grant it.

ix. 254. Joined with Herè in the prerogative of imparting force to a warrior.

xi. 736. The Pylians, about to engage, invoke Zeus and Athenè.

xv. 70. Zeus speaks of the coming capture of Troy as due to the plans of Athenè (Ἀθ. διὰ βουλὰς).

613. While Zeus is glorifying Hector, she is bringing upon him his day of doom (οἱ ἐπώρνευε μόρσιμον ἡμᾶρ).

xvii. 561. Able to strengthen and protect Menelaos in fight. 567, 568. Pleased with his selection of her—

ὅττι ρα οἱ παμπρῶτα θεῶν ἡρήσατο πάντων.

569, 570. Inspires him with the daring of a horse-fly (μυῖη, L. and S.).

xx. 94. Is the coadjutor of Achilles. 192. The same, with Zeus (συν' Ἀθ. καὶ Διὶ πατρί).

146. Helped the Trojans to build the wall which saved Heracles.

xxi. 284—304. Just after her return to Olümpos and Achilles (μέγα γὰρ σθένος ἔμει)

- xxii. 445, 446. Is the conqueror of Hector by the hands of Achilles.
- Od. ii. 116, 125. Her influence is synonymous with that of the gods at large (ἀ οἱ πέρι δῶκεν Ἄθ. followed by νόον ὄντινα οἱ νῦν ἐν στήθεσσι τιθεῖσι θεοί).
- iii. 133—147. The storm which she sent upon the Greeks appears to have been an act of retribution for the offence of calling the Drunken Assembly.
- xiii. 359. Even in making a prayer to the Nymphs, Odysseus refers to her as his Providence.
- xiv. 215. Joined with Arès (it being his special office) in giving prowess to the Pseudodysseus.
- xvi. 232. Her suggestion about the deposit of the property was the *ióτης* of the gods (cf. xiii. 363).
- 260—265. She and Zeus are the chief deities, whom neither gods nor men can withstand.

ὥτε καὶ ἄλλοις
ἄνδρασι τε κρατέουσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσιν.

As regards the nearness of Athenè to Zeus, perhaps the most marked among all the signs are the use of the *Aigis* (v. 738) as if of right, the possession of an *Aigis* of her own, and the putting on, again as if of right, the tunic of Zeus himself.

(B.) *Her relation to Herè.*

In the *Iliad* the two deities are thrown into close and uniform co-operation; and it is managed as follows:—Athenè shows to Herè a marked official deference. In their joint action, Herè always plays the primary and working part. In the divine Council their emotions are alike; but Athenè holds the mastery over them; Herè cannot bridle her tongue. In the *Odyssey* Herè has no place: she being the national, Athenè the personal deity.

- Il. i. 195. She is sent by Herè to appease and restrain Achilles.
- ii. 166. Again, to restrain the Greeks from their sudden impulse to return. (The expression οὐδ' ἀπίθησε means compliance rather than obedience. See Il. iv. 68, where it is used of Zeus.)
- iv. 20—24. They sit together, devising evil to Troy. Both are angry at the proposal of Zeus for an accommodation. Athenè though enraged is silent; Herè breaks out. (ἦτοι Ἄθ. ἀκέων ἦν . . . Ἡρῇ δ' οὐκ ἔχαδε στήθος χόλον, κ.τ.λ.)
- v. 719—748. Agrees to Herè's proposal for a descent on earth in order to control Arès. Thereupon Herè puts the chariot together, harnesses the horses, and acts as driver. Athenè puts off the *Peplos*, clothes herself in the tunic of Zeus, and arms. (In v. 840 she herself acts as charioteer to Diomed, but evidently as an expedient by which she could most conveniently give him aid and comfort in the battle.)
784. In the progress of the joint operation, Herè shouts to the troops in general, Athenè repairs to Diomed and the personal work.
- viii. 370. While in Il. i. 536, Herè only suspects or divines, as a woman might, that Thetis had perhaps been practising upon Zeus, Athenè has knowledge of what took place, asserts it roundly, and describes it accurately.
- xi. 45. They jointly cause thunder in honour of Agamemnon.

(C.) Her relation to Poseidon.

To this god she pays the utmost respect as her uncle, and forbears to show herself under her proper form to Odŭsseus in Scheriè, of which he was the presiding god, that she might not be in conflict with him as her uncle, who relentlessly hated the hero (Od. vi. 329—331; xiii. 341—343). And in the Olympian Assembly, when describing his detention in Ogugiè and promoting his return, she avoids any allusion to the enmity of Poseidon towards him (Od. i. 44—62). And conversely Poseidon withdraws from the storm scene, leaving Odŭsseus on a plank, and then swimming, before Athenè begins to act in his favour (Od. v. 365—383). We must not by any means infer her inferiority to Poseidon when at the court of Nestor she offers prayer to him, acting in the character of Mentor, as a courteous guest and a religious Greek. But at the close the poet declares in most remarkable words that she herself accomplished the petitions which she had offered (Od. iii. 55—62, and Nitzsch *in loc.*)—

ὥς ἄρ' ἔπειτ' ἡρῶτο, καὶ αὐτῇ πάντα τελεύτα.

In the regard of Athenè for Poseidon we perhaps trace something of the Southern legend which made her his daughter.

(D.) Her relation to Arès.

It was her established practice to chastise this brutal deity, so Zeus recommends Herè to set her on him (Il. v. 764—766).

ἧ ἐ μάλιστ' εἴωθε κακῆς ὀδύνῃσι πελάζειν.

- Il. v. 240. She turns aside the blow he aimed at Diomed, and causes the spear of the hero to wound the god. She had first (845) made herself invisible to him.
- xv. 123—142. She severely rebukes him in his excitement, strips him of his arms, and replaces him in his chair.
- xx. 48—53. In the prelude of the Theomachy she and Arès shout for the encouragement of the opposite armies respectively, as the two deities presiding over war; and they are not in collision.
- xxi. 391—426. But in the Theomachy itself, when he has vainly struck at her shield (*Aigis*), she, with a great stone, lays him prostrate and insensible, and subsequently punishes with him Aphroditè, who was leading him off.

Her general precedence in Olŭmpos is established by her possession of a seat, probably the second, next to Zeus, which she yields to Thetis on her paying a special visit to the divine assembly (Il. xxiv. 100). On the seat of honour (at the court of Nestor), see Od. iii. 39.

VI. FURTHER SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS.

(A.) Her relation to Death.

This relation is doubly signified. Firstly, she was a personage felt in the Under-world, where there is no appearance of any exercise of power by Zeus. He sent Heracles thither to fetch away "the dog" (Od. xi. 623), but Heracles himself required a champion, and Athenè was dispatched accordingly. "Had I known," says she, "how Zeus would be now behaving, never should Heracles have been delivered from that region" (Il. viii. 366—369). In this deliverance Hermes had shared (Od. xi. 626),

doubtless in virtue of his general office as conductor in the world below ; but she claims the exploit as her own.

In Il. iv. 845, she put on the helmet of Aides (δῶν' Ἀΐδος κυνέην) to make herself invisible to Arès. There seems to be here some speciality of darkness drawn from the world beneath. It may be related to the Gorgon head, which was on the *aigis* that she was allowed to wear (Il. v. 741), and which was also under the dominion of Persephonè (Od. xi. 634). Both may have had their origin in the Egyptian practice of representing Isis with the serpent's head issuing from her skull.

Secondly, she possessed in some sort a power of averting death : for Eurucleia exhorts Penelopè to pray to her for Telemachos ;

ἡ γὰρ κέν μιν ἔπειτα καὶ ἐκ θανάτοιο σάωσαι. Od. iv. 753.

- (B.) Athenè is not as a rule decorated by epithets expressing personal beauty. The only exception to this rule in the Iliad serves to illustrate rather than impair it. She is termed the fair-haired at the offering of the *Peplos* in Il. vi. (92, 273, 303) ; but this was placed "on her knees," and therefore seems to refer manifestly to her image or statue. The "fair-locked" (ἑὺπλόκαμος) of Od. vii. 41 is an exception which does not fall within this explanation.
- (C.) The only instance in the Poems of a power exercised over the spirit of animals as well as their bodies, is in Il. xxiii. 399, 405 : where it is Athenè who gives courage as well as speed to the horses of Diomed.
- (D.) It still remains, however, to notice the very highest of her peculiar offices. It is the personal care, guidance, and discipline of her chosen ones, mental as well as bodily. In this office, which not even Zeus shares with her, there is an individuality, and a closeness of relation to the human spirit, such as cannot I believe be found elsewhere within the region of Paganism ; differing from the ordinary exhibition of the relation of the deity to man not so much in degree as in kind, and vividly recalling the conception of that relation which is exhibited in the Book of Psalms, and which was kept alive through long ages within the precinct of Hebraism.

This picture has also its darker side. In the character and function of Athenè is lodged that deep secret of moral government which prevents the inveterately wicked man from mending his condition. Odüsseus, advised by her, begs of the Suitors to find out who is well disposed. Amphinomos gives him a couple of loaves. Odüsseus advises him to betake himself elsewhere for safety : but Athenè, by a mental influence, keeps him there for his ruin (Od. xvi. 155)—

πέδῃσε δὲ καὶ τὸν Ἀθήνη
Τηλεμάχου ὑπὸ χερσὶ καὶ ἔγχεϊ ἱφι δαμῆναι.

So, again, she did not suffer the Suitors to flag in their insolence towards Odüsseus (xviii. 346 ; xxi. 284) ; and her purpose is that Odüsseus may be yet more sharply tried by woe. And while stimulating him in the battle, she keeps the issue undecided to make full trial of him and of his son (Od. xxii. 236—238).

VII. PARTICULARS OF THE WORSHIP OF ATHENÈ.

THE PRAYERS TO ATHENÈ.

(a.) *In the Iliad.*

1. Prayer of Diomed, wounded by Pandaros, in the name of her love to Tudeus, for power to discover his enemy. Granted, with the faculty of knowing mortals from immortals; of the last he is only to attack Aphroditè (q. cf.). (Il. v. 114—132).
2. Of Theano, with deposit of the Peplos and promise of a sacrifice, for the repulsion of Diomed. Rejected (Il. vi. 304—311). It was accompanied with the *ὀλολυγή* of the women of the procession.
3. Of Odūsseus in the Doloneia, for success (Il. x. 277—282). Accepted (295).
4. Of Diomed, for the like, pleading his father's name, with a votive promise (283—294). Accepted (295).
5. Of Odūsseus, on slaying Dolon, praying for another such raid on the Thracians, and proclaiming her as the *first* object of their invocations (cf. xvii. 568).
6. Of Odūsseus, who is behind in the foot-race with Oilean Aias, for help. She accepts; fills his limbs, feet, and hands with strength, and causes Aias to fall in the cow-dung (Il. xxiii. 768—777).

(b.) *In the Odyssey.*

1. Of Telemachos, who addresses her from the sea-shore, probably as connecting her with Mentès the Taphian mariner, VIII. (2.), and beseeches aid that he may execute her plan notwithstanding the obstruction of the Suitors.
2. Of Nestor, who, recognizing her in the form of the bird *Phenè*, beseeches her favour for himself, his children, and his wife (Od. iii. 373—381).
3. Of Penelopè, who, admonished by Eurucleia that she can save even from death, prays, pleading the fidelity of Odūsseus in sacrifice, the safety of her son. Accepted (Od. iv. 758—767).
4. Of Odūsseus in Scheriè, that, as she had not defended him against Poseidon, she would secure him a good reception. Athenè complies, but not *ἀνάφανδον* (Od. vi. 321—329).
5. In the Theophany, on the arrival in Ithaca, Odūsseus entreats her to let him know whether he is truly in Ithaca (Od. xiii. 324—328).

Priestess of Athenè.

In Troy Theano, daughter of Kisseus, a Thracian chief, and wife of Antenor (Il. vi. 299; xi. 222—225), reared the spurious son Pedasos with her own offspring to please her husband (Il. v. 69—71). Is *δία* (ibid.), and *καλλιπάρης* (vi. 298, xi. 225).

The Temples and Groves of Athenè.

1. At Athens (Il. ii. 549); in the suspected passage, but in the best part of it.
2. At Troy on Pergamos (Il. vi. 297).
3. In Scheriè (Od. vi. 291—293) she has a stately grove (*ἄγλαον ἄλσος*) with a fountain and meadow. It is also *ἄλσος ἱρὸν*, as well as *κλυτόν* (321, 322).

The Sacrifices to Athenè.

1. Of bulls and rams at Athens (Il. ii. 550, 551). [Subject to some suspicion.]
2. The best robe of Hecabè (Il. vi. 293—295) deposited on her knees (303).
3. Vow of twelve heifers never touched by the goad (Il. vi. 93, 274, 308).
4. Vow of a heifer with broad brow, never yoked or trained, and with gilded horns (Il. x. 292—294).
5. Odüsseus dedicates the spoils of Dolon (Il. x. 460) by hanging them astern of his ship (570).
6. Odüsseus and Diomed, returned to the camp, make to her a libation of wine (Il. x. 578).
7. Cow sacrificed to her by the Pylians (Il. xi. 729).
8. Hecatombs offered, as it appears, by Agamemnon for the army to Athenè before embarkation to appease her, but in vain (Od. iii. 143—146, 155).
9. Vow of a heifer by Nestor in Od. iii. 382—384; cf. Il. x. 292—294. The execution of this vow is given in full detail on the following day.

Sacrifice is received by Athenè, as well as by Apollo, with a dignity and independence not observable in the other deities (Studies on Homer, vol. ii. p. 88).

VIII. THEOPHANIES.

[This section is taken from the article on Theophanies.]

(1.) *In her own person.*

1. Dispatched by Herè, she repairs to the Greek Assembly, visible to Achilles only; takes him by the hair; bids him confine himself to words; promises ample reparation for the great outrage. Returns to Olūmpos. (Il. i. 194—221.)
2. Again dispatched by Herè, and desired to go about the Army and repress the impulse to go home, she repairs to Odüsseus, and devolves upon him the charge she had received. He recognizes her voice. (Il. ii. 155—182.)
3. She darts through the Army with her Aegis, and inspires in all the desire to continue the contest even to the end (Il. ii. 446—454). Again she passes through the Army to rouse the men, iv. 515 (*ἐρχομένη καθ' ὄμιλον*). It is doubtful whether these were personal manifestations, or only inspirations like iv. 439.
4. To Diomed tending his wound. She reproaches him as less valiant than Tudeus. He pleads that he had seen Arès on the field (*sup.* 128), whom she had bid him not to attack. She withdraws the prohibition (Il. v. 793—834), and accompanies him in his chariot to encounter Arès (835—845).
5. Od. xiii. 299, 312. The recognition in Ithaca. See *inf.* (2.) 15.
6. Od. xv. 4—9. To Telemachos by night, to warn him to go home, and teach him how to escape the plot of the Suitors.

(2.) *In human form.*

1. As a herald (*εἰδομένη κήρυκι*), standing by Odüsseus, she hushes the Assembly for him to speak (Il. ii. 279—282).

2. As Laodocos, son of Antenor, persuades Pandaros to discharge an arrow at Menelaos, in violation of the Pact (Il. iv. 86—103).
3. Having descended in the form of an empurpled cloud, to urge on the Greek army, she appears as Phoinix to Menelaos, and is so addressed by him (Il. xxii. 547—561).
4. In answer to the prayer of Achilles to Zeus for rescue from Scamandros, she descends as a man together with Poseidon (*δέμας δ' ἀνδρεσσιν ἔκτλην*). They take his hands, and embolden him. (Il. xxi. 272—298.)
5. In Il. xxii. 226—247, taking the form of Deiphobos, whom Hector specially loved, she with craft (*κερδοσύνη*) declares she could not bear to stay away, promises to stand by him, and so encourages him to fight. But disappears before the encounter begins (294—299).
6. In Od. i. 105, she appears amidst the revelling Suitors at the Palace of Odüsseus, in the form of Mentès, chief of the Taphians and a *xeinos*.
7. Od. ii. 267, in answer to his prayer, as Mentor his father's friend, predicting mischief to the Suitors, and advising him to prepare a ship.
8. Od. ii. 323, in the form of Telemachos, going about the town, makes up a crew, and begs a ship from Noemon.
9. Od. vi. 20—24. As the daughter of Dumas, co-equal in age, she repairs to the bed of Nausicaa, and recommends her to prompt her father, and to execute the washing-trip.
10. Od. vii. 19. As a damsel with a pitcher, meets Odüsseus in Scherië outside the city, and conducts him to the palace (38, 46).
11. Od. viii. 8—15. In the likeness of the Herald of Alkinoos, traverses the city, and exhorts the people to repair to the Assembly after Alkinoos.
12. Od. viii. 193. In the form of a man, comes to encourage Odüsseus at the game of quoits.
13. Od. xiii. 221. In the form of a young lord, employed in tending sheep, to Odüsseus in Ithaca.
14. Ibid. 287—290. Changed into a woman tall and handsome, she discloses herself.
15. Od. xvi. 155. As a fair, tall, skilled woman, at the door of Eumaios, to direct Odüsseus to make himself known to his son, and to promise aid. She is recognized by him and by dogs, but not by Telemachos.
16. Od. xxii. 205. Appears with the form and voice of Mentor during the fight. Odüsseus rejoices, and welcomes him as Mentor, but (210) believes him to be Athenë. 226. She eggs him on to the fight.
17. Again, in like manner, before the final battle: received by Odüsseus with joy. In this guise she concludes the peace, and so closes the Poem. (Od. xxiv. 502—505; 545—548.)

(3.) *In animal form.*

1. With Apollo she sits on the *Phegas*, to enjoy the spectacle of the Duel (*ἀνδράων τεύχεσσι* : both in the form of vultures.
2. She descends to refresh the fasting Achilles, *ἀπὸν αἰνία τάρταρ* : *τάρταρ* *ἀνθρώπων* like, or in the likeness of, the Egyptian kite. Perhaps meaning only like it, (*a*) because he does not apply *καταλάττω* (551), or any kindred word, to birds; (*b*) because

the transformation is not appropriate to the action she is about to perform (Il. xix. 319—354), namely, instilling nectar and ambrosia into the hero.

3. From the Ithacan Palace, where she had appeared as Mentes, she rises on high in the form of the bird Anopaia (a species of kite, *q. v.*), and is recognized by Telemachos.
4. From the banquet of Nestor she disappears in the form of a Phenè (a species of vulture, *q. v.*), and is recognized by him (Od. iii. 371—379).
5. During the fight in the palace at Ithaca, she sits on the cross-beam of the roof (to watch it), in the form of *χελιδων*, a swallow (*q. v.*).

IX. THE RELATION OF ATHENÈ TO ATHENS.

1. In Il. 546—552, she reared Erechtheus, son of Aurora, and placed him at Athens, within her own rich (*i.e.*, richly-gebed) temple, where she has an annual festival. [Apollo, in Od. xxi. 255, has a monthly festival. It is difficult to accept the whole passage, 546—556, which is out of proportion to the place of the Athenians in the Poem; and yet difficult to know how much to reject. The lines 546—548 seem the least doubtful; then 550—551; and 553—555 the worst.—Studies on Homer i. 129—137.]
2. In Od. vii. 78—81, after conducting Odÿsseus to the entrance of the city of the Phaiakes, she withdraws to Marathon and wide-wayed Athens, and enters the solidly-built mansion of Erechtheus. Marathon appears to be a name of Phœnician origin; and the passage may be meant to indicate the re-entry into the Hellenic or Achaian world; yet it does not thoroughly correspond with the general text, since she has further action yet to perform in Scheriè.
3. It will be remembered that neither the olive nor the owl, both of which are closely related to Athenè in the Athenian tradition, have the smallest connection with her in Homer, apart from the contested, and in the Poems uncorroborated, construction of the epithet *Glaukôpis*. This negative evidence is the more remarkable, as to the olive, because we learn what tree her grove among the Phaiakes was composed of—namely, *αἰγείρος*, the blade poplar (L. and S.); and as to the owl, because at various times she assumes the form of the vulture and of several other birds. See *sup.* VIII. (3.)

X. OUTLINE OF THE ACTION OF ATHENÈ.

(a.) *The Action of Athenè of the Iliad.*

[The action of Athenè in the Iliad is occasional; in the Odyssey, except the books of the Outer Geography, it is continuous. Her sentiment on behalf of the Greeks is more personal than national. She tends Odÿsseus in particular like a mother (xxiii. 782), and her attachment to the nation does not prevent her from regarding the Telamonian Aias with aversion on the voyage homeward, probably on account of his rivalry with Odÿsseus (Od. iv. 502) and enduring hatred towards him (Od. xi. 543—564). Hence there is yet greater scope for her in the more personal of the two Poems. So her action in the Iliad is derivative, or permitted; in the Odyssey it is mainly original and unrestrained.]

- i. 104. Her mission to Achilles (*sup.* VIII.) prevents an outbreak before the Assembly.

- ii. 155. Her mission to Odŭsseus (*sup.* VIII.) prevents a premature return home.
- 446. Gathers the soldiery for the array (*sup.* VIII.).
- iii. 439. Cited by Paris as having given Menelaos the victory.
- iv. 20. In Olympian Council, with Herè, mutters dissatisfaction at the proposal of Zeus to find a solution of the quarrel and is fiercely angry (χάλος δὲ μιν ἄγριος ἦρει v. 24; comp. viii. 459).
- 69—73; eagerly obeys the injunction of Zeus to tempt the Trojans into a breach of the truce; and, *sup.* VIII. (2.), persuades Pandaros to shoot an arrow at Menelaos (86—103), which she then diverts, so that it shall only graze the flesh (130—140).
- 439. Stirs up the Greeks to fight.
- 515. Again, rouses them when they flag.
- 539—542. The unwounded were kept so by her protection, she diverting the weapons of the enemy.
- v. 1—3. Inspires resolution and daring into Diomed.
- 29—37. Leads Arès out of the battle; the Trojans hereupon give way.
- 121. Accepts the prayer of Diomed (*sup.* VII.).
- 290—296. Guides his spear against Pandaros, whom he slays.
- 420—425. Her bitter sarcasm on the cause of Aphroditè's wound.
- 511. Her aid to the Greek side.
- 713. Invited by Herè, arms (*sup.* V.), ascends the chariot of that goddess. First they visit Zeus on Olŭmpos; then, alighting on earth, they pass on with dovelike steps, and she finds Diomed tending his wounds (777—795). Her manifestation, *sup.* VIII. (1.).
- 837—839. She enters his chariot, and acts as driver. The great weight of the two.
- 845. Puts on the helm of Aïdes (*sup.* VI.).
- 853—856. Averts the spear of Arès; impels and directs the spear of Diomed.
- 875—882. Is complained of by Arès to Zeus for insubordination; without effect.
- 907—909. Returns successful with Herè to Olŭmpos.
- vi. 84—98. Hector, exhorted by Helenos the Augur, moves Hecabè to proceed with the elder women to her temple, and offer the best robe, with the promise of a sacrifice of twelve cows, if only she will hold Diomed off the Trojans (269—280). It is done; but she repels the prayer (297—311).
- vii. 17—61. From Olŭmpos, perceives that Greeks are falling; and descending to the plain, outwits Apollo by an agreement to arrest the fight, through a challenge of Hector to the Greeks for a trial by single combat. She sits with Apollo on the Phegos, *sup.* VIII. (3.).
- 153 Had given victory to Nestor as a youth in his battle with Ereuthalion.
- viii. 28—40. In Olympian Assembly, professing obedience to Zeus, and promising to hold off from the fight, claims notwithstanding to supply counsel to the Greeks. He acquiesces.
- 357. Zeus having egged on the Trojans, Herè stirs Athenè, who complains of his ingratitude after the service.

she had rendered to Heracles for him, and of his subserviency to Thetis (comp. xx. 146); intimating that she can bring him round (373).

384. Hereupon she arms, and mounts as before the chariot of Herè, to intimidate Hector (377). But Zeus threatens them, especially Athenè, through Iris, with thunderbolt gashes, that ten years will not heal. Hereupon Herè expresses to Athenè a change of mind; they drive back to Olūpos (397—435) in vexation. Zeus further rebukes and threatens them (444—456). She bears it in silence (459), while Herè and Zeus rail.

x. 245. Loves Odūsseus: Odūsseus and Diomed, 553 (cf. xxiii. 782; Od. iii. 221).

274. Sends to him and Diomed a heron as a favouring omen.

277, 283 Each prays to her (*sup.* IV.) 295. She assents.

367. Gives strength to Diomed that he may overtake Dolon, and

482. That he may slay the Thracians. Follows him, 516.

460. Odūsseus dedicates to her the spoils of Dolon (570) with invocation.

507. Admonishes Diomed to retire lest θεὸς ἄλλος give the alarm to the Trojans (*sup.* IV. *in fin.*).

578. Libation to Athenè.

xi. 45. Jointly with Herè, thunders in honour of Agamemnon armed.

437. Would not suffer the spear of Sokos, which, had wounded Odūsseus, to reach a vital part.

714. Had come as ἄγγελος from Olūpos in Nestor's youth to bid the Pylians arm against the Elians: had caused Nestor to arm, and to excel (721).

736. Invoked by the Pylians, together with Zeus, when they engaged (758). She bid them desist from the pursuit.

xiv. 178. Embroidered an ambrosial garment for Herè.

xv. 121—142. Rebuke of Arès, in Olympian palace (*sup.* V. D.); whom she replaces in his seat.

xvii. 543—573. The turning point of the Poem (cf. xviii. 239). With commission from Zeus, whose design (νόος) is now changed, she descends to incite the Greeks in the battle over the body of Patroclos (*sup.* V. A.), and inspires Menelaos with active daring.

xviii. 203—218. Covers Achilles with her aegis, and casts a halo round his head, for his appearance (unarmed) and his shouts from the trench, whereat the Trojans are confounded. She answers (echoes?) the shout.

xix. 349—354. Commissioned by Zeus, eagerly descends and instils nectar and ambrosia into the breast of the fasting Achilles to sustain him.

xx. 32—37. With the other gods of the Greek party, takes her place by the ships for the Theomachy. 48. Shouts for them from the wall and the shore. 69. Pitted against Arès.

94—96. Cited as shedding light in front of Achilles on the field, and bidding him slay.

313. How, with Herè, she had sworn many oaths never to rescue or spare a Trojan.

438—441. In the prelude encounter, diverts the spear of Hector from Achilles, and causes it to return to him.

- xxi. 400—433. In the Theomachy, vainly struck by Arès on her Aigis, she dashes him to the ground with a great stone (*sup.* V. D.). She then, incited by Herè, and herself eager, overthrows Aphroditè in like manner, by a blow on the breast "with her massive hand," who was leading him off; and is amazed (430) at the audacity of the two.
- xxii. 174—187. Zeus having started the idea of perhaps saving Hector, she remonstrates; he may do it, but not with the approval of the rest.
- ἔρδ' ἄταρ οὐ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι.*
- He disclaims any set purpose; and encourages her to work her will. She descends, and (214—224) mightily encourages Achilles, promising joint action (*νῶϊ γ' ἔωλπα . . . Ἑκτορα δηώσαντε, κ.τ.λ.*).
- 226—247. Personates Deiphobos to induce Hector to engage; and then (294—299) abandons him. He recognizes her fraud (*ἔμε δ' ἐξαπάτησεν Ἀθ.*).
- 275—277. She picks up the overthrown spear Achilles had discharged, and gives it back to him, unseen by Hector.
- xxiii. 388. Restores to Diomed his whip; 392 breaks the yoke of the chariot of Eumelos; 399—405 gives courage and speed to Diomed's horses, and gets him the victory.
- 768—777. Secures to Odūsseus, when losing, the victory in the foot-race.
- xxiv. 25. Mindful of the ἄτη of Paris, she has no pity for the dead Hector.
100. Cedes to Thetis on her arrival the place of honour by Zeus.
- Here her action naturally ceases. She can have no interest in the remainder of the proceedings, as they are for the mitigation of the Trojan woe.

(b.) The Action of Athenè of the Odyssey.

- i. 44—62. In the Olympian Council, agreeing that Aigisthos suffers rightly, she pleads for Odūsseus, detained from home by Calūpso, though constant in the duty of sacrifice.
- 80—95. Zeus having admitted the plea, she proposes—(a) that Hermes shall carry to Calūpso the decree for the return; (b) that she herself shall repair to Ithaca, embolden Telemachos to protest against the misdeeds of the Suitors, and attend him to Pulos and Sparta on a voyage of inquiry.
- 96—112. With foot-wings and a spear she appears as Mentès, amidst the revels at the palace of Odūsseus, *sup.* VIII. (2.).
- 113—143. Known as a *xeinos* by Telemachos, is welcomed and set at a table apart, before discourse. After the Suitors have feasted, questioned by Telemachos, she describes herself as Mentès (180), assures him his father is alive (196), and, although no prophet or augur, predicts his return home (203).
- 221—229. Inquires as to affairs in Ithaca.
- 274—305. After warning Telemachos by references to his father, advises him to summon an Assembly, publicly require the Suitors to return home, and his mother also if she be desirous to remarry; then himself to make a tour of inquiry about his father, and wait a year for him if alive,

- but, if dead, celebrate his funeral rites and slay the Suitors, as Orestes slew Aigisthos.
- 319—323. Having filled him with courage she flies away in the form of the bird Anopaia, VIII. (3.), and in the act is recognized by him as a deity.
- 363—364. Sheds sleep on the eyelids of Penelopè.
- ii. 116—119. Had given Penelopè mind (*φρένες ἐσθλαί*), industrial skill (*ἔργα*), and resource or craft (*κέρδεια*), beyond all Greek women.
260. Invoked as the visitor-god of yesterday by Telemachos (*ὁ χθιζὸς θεὸς ἦλυθες ἡμέτερον δῶ*) for aid against the obstruction of the Suitors.
267. Appearing in answer as Mentor, advises him to make ready his ship, and promises to assist.
- 382—419. She obtains a ship and crew, whom she musters at eventide; makes the Suitors drowsy, and sends them to bed; fetches Telemachos, and they embark, sitting astern; sends a rattling breeze to carry them (420). Libation to the gods, most of all to Athenè (432).
- iii. 12—30. She leads the way in disembarking at Pulos, and chidingly exhorts the youth to speak freely to Nestor, assuring him the gods are with him.
- 31—62. At the feast of Poseidon, which is proceeding, they are greeted by Peisistratos, and placed between Nestor and Thrasumedes. She, as senior, first receives the cup of libation, and prays aloud to Poseidon, but herself executes the prayer.
76. Emboldens Telemachos to answer the inquiries of Nestor.
- 133—147. How, in concert with Zeus, she caused the dissensions of the Greeks about embarkation, as she cherished wrath against Agamemnon and Menelaos, for their offence in calling an evening Assembly, cf. v. 108, 109.
221. Her love for Odüsseus in Troas.
229. Rebukes Telemachos for despair concerning his father, though death cannot be averted even by the gods.
330. Recommends retiring to rest seasonably, but with libation first, to Poseidon and the other immortals.
- 371—384. Assuming the form of a *Phenè*, VIII. (3.), she disappears; is recognized by Nestor, who entreats her favour, with promise to sacrifice a heifer; she grants it. 417—463. On the following day this vow is solemnly executed.
- iv. 758—766. On the recommendation of Eurucleia, who had declared her able to save even from death, Penelopè craves of Athenè, in the name of the sacrifices offered by Odüsseus, the safety of her son. Accepted.
- 795—829. Accordingly Athenè sends an Eidolon, in the likeness of Iphthimè, her sister, who announces her mission from the goddess, and declares the safety of her son.
- v. 5—28. In Olympian council, she restates the detention of Odüsseus, as a discouragement to the virtue of kings; whereupon Zeus at once executes the plan of dispatching Hermes to Ogugiè.
382. Binding up the other winds, sends a sharp Boreas to drift Odüsseus to Scheriè.
427. Prompts him to cling to the rock. 435—440. And to strike out swimming from the breaker.
- 491—493. Sends him sleep in his exhaustion.

- 172—176. Again using the rod, she retransforms Odŭsseus to the beauty of prime, with good clothing (cf. 207—212).
 280. She will suggest to Odŭsseus the proper time to stow away the arms in his Palace (cf. xix. 2, 33).
 451. Gives Penelopè her sleep.
 454—459. Again transforms Odŭsseus to a mean figure, lest Eumaios should recognize him, and inform Penelopè.
 xvii. 63. Gives Telemachos an infinite grace.
 361. Urges the disfigured Odŭsseus to ascertain, by begging, who of the Suitors may be (*ἐναίσιμος*), well-disposed.
 xviii. 69. Stoutens (*ῥλδανε*), the limbs of Odŭsseus for the fight with Iros.
 155. Causes Amphinomos (who had given loaves, and had in consequence been warned by Odŭsseus to depart) to remain and be slain.
 158. Inclines Penelopè to show herself, and win admiration from the Suitors, for greater honour in the eyes of her husband and son. With this view sends her to sleep, and gives her immortal gifts of size, beauty, and ivory skin. Then departs (187—197; cf. 212, 291).
 346. Causes the Suitors to persevere in their insolence (xx. 283).
 xix. 2. Aids the thought of Odŭsseus about stowing away the arms. 33. Guides him with a light. 52. Continuously acts on his mind (cf. 2).
 479. Bewilders the mind of Eurucleia after her recognition, to prevent premature disclosure. Odŭsseus then lays hold of her throat.
 604. Sends Penelopè to sleep.
 xx. 54. And Odŭsseus; who had expostulated, but she assures him all is sure. She departs to Olŭmpos.
 284. Still causes the Suitors to persevere in outrage, that Odŭsseus may be yet more sharply tried. 345. Bewilders their mind with portents.
 xxii. 205. In the battle, appears as Mentor, VIII. (2.) 17.
 224. Angered at the speech of Agelaos, stimulates Odŭsseus to the fight.
 239. Takes her place as a swallow on the beam, to watch the battle.
 256, 273. Diverts the darts of the Suitors. 297. Displays from above her fatal Aegis (*φθισίμβροτον αἰγίδα*), and a general panic follows.
 xxiii. 156—163. Without using any symbol, restores the beauty of Odŭsseus.
 242—246. Lengthens the night, and retards the morning.
 348. Sends the morning up from Ocean.
 xxiv. 367. Gives flesh and stature to Laertes.
 472. Inquires of Zeus what is to be the upshot of the civil war in Ithaca? 481—488. Receives his commission to compose it, with an amnesty (*ἐκκλησις*).
 502. Appears as Mentor to hearten Odŭsseus: desires Laertes to pray to her and to Zeus (518 *εὐξάμενος κόρυη γλαυκώπιδι καὶ Διὶ πατρὶ*) before engaging: fills him with courage (520).
 528. She stays Odŭsseus and Telemachos from further slaughter. But he follows the panic-stricken foe. 539. The thunderbolt falls at (Mentor) Athenè's feet. She interposes, and, as Mentor, concludes the peace.

V.—AIOLOS.

Aiolos is certainly one of the key-words of Homer.

I. AN ADJECTIVE.

Aiolos, as an adjective, is of varied use, and controverted signification. It has the following

Compounds and Derivatives (inf. for the references): —

αἰόλλω.
αἰολοθώρηξ.
αἰολομίτρης.
αἰολόπωλος.
κορυθαίολες.
παναίολος.

According to Buttmann (*Lexil. in voc.*), it is from αἶω, to blow, and is akin to ἄελλα. He gives the sense of flexible, easily movable: which does not seem to cover the entire meaning.

According to Benfey (*Wurzel-Lex.* ii. 301), it is one of a large family of words from a root which signifies motion: akin to *velox* and *varius*. A physical changefulness exhibited in motion appears to be the primary idea. But the motion should be one changeful *in itself*: lifting, twisting, plunging, darting, glancing, flickering, wavy, wriggling, zigzag: always more or less irregular, never signifying an equable swiftness like that of a bird in full flight.

Secondarily, the word acquired the sense of spotted, speckled, dappled, mottled, parti-coloured, variegated. It is questioned whether it had already obtained this sense in Homer's time. I shall give reasons for thinking it had.

He most commonly applies it to arms.

κορυθαίολος, a stock epithet of Hector. Il. ii. 816, and in thirty eight other places.
αἰολοθώρηξ. Il. iv. 489; xvi. 173.
αἰολομίτρης. Il. v. 707.
αἰόλα τεύχεα. Il. v. 295.

In all these cases it may describe a wavy, shifting, and glancing movement of light upon the surface of the object described. Yet it would also, especially in the last-named case, very well bear the sense of variegated.

In Il. vii. 220 *Aias* appears—

φέρων σάκος, ἥντε πύργον
χάλκεον, ἑπταβόειον

And this shield is also (222) αἰόλον, which Buttmann renders as easily movable. But a tower is not easily movable; and a shield of seven ox-hides, with a coating of copper upon them, does not well convey that idea. Either the flickering of light, or variety of colour, would suit the passage.

In Il. x. 149, the shield of Odüsseus is called ποικίλον, and in xvi. 134 the same word is applied to the breastplate of Achilles. The word evidently refers to *dividing colours on a surface*, and helps to show that a like meaning is applied to *where it is applied to*

arms. The proposition is further supported by Il. xi. 19—28, where the breastplate of Agamemnon, surfaced with gold, tin, and bronze (*kuanos*), is expressly compared to the rainbow.

A further point in advance is made by the prefix *pan* in *παραίολος*, for *ζώστηρ*, the girdle, Il. iv. 186, 215, x. 77, xi. 236; the breastplate, xi. 374; and the shield xiii. 552. Here the object is *aiolos* all over. Now the glancing light touches only a part, to produce contrast; but the prefix seems to apply to the whole, and to refer to workmanship. See iv. 186, 187.

We have further:—

αἰόλος οἶστρος, the darting gadfly. Od. xxii. 300.

αἰόλαι εὐλαί, wriggling worms. Il. xxii. 509.

σφῆκες μέσον αἰόλοι, wasps wriggling or twisting at the waist. Il. xii. 167.

αἰόλλειν, for the turning round of meat before the fire to roast it. Od. xx. 27.

In **all** these cases the primitive sense of irregular motion seems to be the **leading** idea of the word.

We have still two passages to consider in which neither glancing light, nor irregular fitful motion, will satisfy the true sense.

1. In Il. xix. 404, the divine Xanthos prophetically addresses Achilles from beneath the yoke, with his head bowed down and his mane draggling on the ground. In this office and situation he is called *πόδας αἰόλος ἵππος*, a horse *aiolos* in the feet; and this is commonly rendered nimble; *schnellfüssig*, Crusius *in. loc.*; and so Buttmann.

(a.) I contend that Homeric usage will not allow us (such is the fine adaptation of the Poet's epithets) to make him call the horse nimble-footed when he is not moving, but still and in deep solemn grief. It is a jarring image. Consulting five other passages, where Homer has to describe horses who are either stationary or not moving at high speed, I find that in no one of them does he employ any of his speed-describing epithets for the animal. These are:—

- (1.) Il. ii. 775—778: The horses of Achilles described as kept idle.
- (2.) Il. v. 192—202: The horses of Lucaon, in their stables, standing by the chariots.
- (3.) Il. viii. 564, 565: The Trojan horses in the night watch, by the chariots.
- (4.) Il. xvii. 426—440: The horses of Achilles, mourning for Patroclus, stand still “as a pillar on a tomb.”
- (5.) Il. xx. 220—226: The 3,000 mares of Erichthonios, at pasture.

I would add even a sixth case in the noble simile of the stalled horse (Il. vi. 506, xv. 263), where the horse is in a stately motion, indicating the power of speed (*ρίμφα ἐ γούνα φέρει*), but not in great speed.

On the other hand, when he gives a general description of fine horses, he includes epithets or descriptions of speed, as those of Eumelos, the best in the army (Il. ii. 763—767); those of Rhesos, see the glowing account which Dolon gives in the hope to save his life (Il. x.

435—441); and the colts of the Erichthonian mares (Il. xx. 226—229).

I submit that on these grounds, even if alone, the sense of speed is inadmissible. There are others.

- (b.) I next observe that this phrase is an *hapax legomenon*; while the Poet's epithets of speed are for the most part frequently repeated. On this, taken alone, I should not much rely.
- (c.) The speed indicated by *aiolos* is the wrong kind of speed. It could not apply to the movement of the horse's feet in any of his paces, except a very sharp, rapid trot. But that is an acquired, not a natural pace of the animal. Even so late as in the present century, it has obtained a wholly new development in the United States of America. Later, on the Greek bas-reliefs of the classic age, even approximations to the trot are rare and slight.
- (d.) It is a good precept in the rendering of Homeric epithets to look, where the sense requires, or even admits it, for a characteristic rather than a vague or neutral sense. Now Xanthos is a chestnut horse: and I find, partly by observation, but much more from the best practical authorities, that the white foot, or as it is called the white stocking, is particularly found among chestnuts. This, I submit, is an appropriate meaning; and in reporting this circumstance about the famous horse Xanthos, Homer is in keeping with himself, as when he reports the small stature of Tudeus (Il. v. 801).

In this case, then, it seems necessary to refer *aiolos* to diversity of colour.

2. In Il. iii. 185, the Phrygians are described as *Φρύγες αἰολόπῳλοι*. Buttmann, and also Liddell and Scott, render this "with quick-moving steeds." I submit that the sense is much more likely to be with pieballed, or perhaps speckled, steeds.

- (a.) This is another case of single use. We are particularly bound to look for a characteristic sense, because the epithet is copied in the Hymn to Aphroditè, and again used for the Phrygians, as if reference were made to some well-known fact. Also Castor, in Theocr. xxii. 34, is *aiolopolos*; and I do not know that the word is found in any other place or author.
- (b.) If swiftness is here meant, it would signify that Phrygia was a country famous for its horses; but of this we have no corroborative indication anywhere.
- (c.) Again, the objection applies that *aiolos* indicates the wrong kind of swiftness.
- (d.) We have indeed in nine places the Greeks as *Danaoi*, called *ταχύπῳλοι* (Il. iv. 232 *et al.*): and the Myrmidons once (xxiii. 6). And the word *ταχύς* is properly applicable to speed. But the phrase *Danaoi*, like *Achaioi*, regards especially the chiefs, so that the epithet may merely mean "chariot-borne." Again, the *Μυρμιδόνες* as Thessalians are from a country already and afterwards famed for horses; and it would seem that they were in

extraordinary abundance among them, for this is the only case in which the possession of horses is named in connection with a soldiery generally (Il. ii. 773—777). It is quite possible that the name of Myrmidons properly belonged only to a select part of the contingent of Achilles.

- (e.) The sense then of speckled, pieballed, or skew-balled, would be appropriate, if only we are at liberty to suppose that a tribe or country could be appropriately described as known by having horses of this peculiar colour. Having made some inquiry respecting persistency of colour in breeds and races of horses, I find that there is no reason to represent colour as ineffaceable, but that it is persistent in certain cases, and to a considerable extent. It can be materially modified by selection, and by accustoming the eye of the mare during gestation to dwell on an animal of the colour desired. But, besides that colours can thus be produced where there is a taste for them, I find that they are known at the present day in a natural connection with particular districts: for example, there is a predominance of the chestnut in Shropshire. I am also informed of the case of a pieballed sire of our own time, all whose progeny were pieballed. With regard to diversity of colour in the species, I may refer to the zebra, of whom, together with the horse and the ass, it is composed, and in whom this diversity is permanently maintained. Pieballed horses were largely used in St. Petersburg early in the present century: and the Russian aristocracy might have been called *aiolopoloi*.

The facts of experience therefore appear fully to warrant our giving to the Homeric phrase, Φρίγες αἰολόπῳλοι, a sense which seems on other grounds to be not only proper but requisite.

II. A PROPER NAME.

And this—

1. For the Steward of the Winds dwelling in Aioliè.
2. Involved in the Patronymic Aiolides.

1. *Aiolos the Steward of the Winds.*

- a. Dwells in the Outer Sphere; not a deity, as he is sometimes called, but in favour with the deities φίλος ἀθ. θεοῖσιν (Od. x. 2).
- b. Is the son of Hippotas, which associates him with the followers of Poseidon (Od. x. 2). He has no other epithet or description than these two.
- c. Inhabits an island (πλωτὴ νῆσος) accessible only by navigation proper (v. 3).
- d. It is surrounded by a copper wall: here again he is in foreign association, as copper was brought from abroad (Od. i. 183).
- e. His daughters are the wives of his sons (v. 7). Incest of this

kind is not met with among the Achaians, and has an Eastern character.

- f.* He lives in great opulence and enjoyment (vv. 8—12, 60).
- g.* He takes an interest in the history of the Trojan war, and in its sequel.
- h.* He provides Odŭsseus with a wind to carry him homewards; but on his return refuses him further aid, and treats him as an outcast from the divine favour.

These particulars generally denote Aiolos as an imaginary personage, typical of the Phoinikes, who alone frequent the Outer Sea; yet not as associated with mariners only, but also, through the horse, with Poseidon and his worship.

The last of them seems as if possibly connected with a jealousy on the part of the Phoinikes towards any other nation which might attempt to penetrate the outer seas frequented by them. It is difficult fully to construe the legend; the treatment of Odŭsseus is extremely severe; and it recalls the epithets *oloophron* and *agauos* which the Poet specially applies to the Phœnician character.


This symbol of Phœnician navigation is properly placed in the West, which they alone traversed. All the Greek navigation, of which Homer tells us, is in the Eastern Mediterranean exclusively, and to the east of Greece itself.

2. *Aiolos as the Father of the Aiolidai.*

- a.* The term Aiolian, as applied to Greeks of the Troic period, is absolutely mythical; that is, it reflects upon the fore-time an idea of the after-time. It is also highly deceptive, for it conveys the idea of a people or tribe. The Homeric form is exclusively Aiolid; and this patronymic form of course belongs to a family. It is, however, probable that in this instance, as well as in the last, the name may be typical; but though it may typically represent more than a single family, it has no mark whatever, such as the Achaian or the Ionian name carries, to connect it with a tribe or race.
- b.* The Aiolidai, expressly so called, are only—
 - (1.) Sisuphos, grandfather of Bellerophon, and ancestor, through him, of the kings of Lukiè (Il. vi. 154, 199, 206).
 - (2.) Cretheus, husband of Turo, who bore to Poseidon, disguised as a river,
 - Pelias,
 - Neleus;
 and to her husband—
 - Aison,
 - Pheres,
 - Amuthaon (Od. xi. 241—259).
- c.* The indirect signs go farther :—
 - (3.) Turo was the daughter of Salmoneus (φάτο ἔκγονος εἶναι, Od. xi. 236; comp. Il. vi. 206), king of Elis, and almost certainly an Aiolid (*vide* ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν : and Juv. Mundi, pp. 165—167).
 - (4.) Euphetes (Il. xv. 530) was of the same branch. (*Vid. ibid.*)

- (5.) Eumelos was descended from Pheres, and therefore also an Aiolid. Il. ii. 711. (*Vid. ibid.*)
 (6.) The father of Jason is not mentioned in the Poems. Tradition represents him as the son of Aison. If so, he is one of the Aiolidai.

d. We have at least two distinct lines expressly given :—



It may be observed that Eumelos is not one of the fighting warriors, but that Glaukos is. Eumelos was therefore probably senior. This equalizes the two lines.

- e. It is plain that we are to understand Aiolos to be the son either of Zeus, or more probably of Poseidon, with whose worship in post-Homeric times the name is closely associated; because Bellerophon is called θεοῦ γόνος. Il. vi. 191.

For the connection of the Aiolian name with Phœnician or foreign extraction, see *Anax Andrôn*. The historical name in the Iliad thus has the same significance as the mythical name Aiolos in the Odyssey.

The special features of the two characters are doubtless represented in the name; and the question arises, can they be traced up to the adjective *aiolos*?

Hahn* suggests that αἰόλος (meaning tattooed, as he thinks) stands for a warrior; but in Homer we have absolutely nothing of tattooing; nor is there any etymological connection between the name Aiolos and the character of a warrior.

If Aiolos refers to motion only, and if it is specially related to the navigators of that day, might it possibly have relation to the changes of the wind, or to the movements by sea from place to place of a maritime people, or (in the sense of versatile) to the various characters of merchant, marauder, and kidnapper, in which they appeared by turns? This last approximates to that latest sense of αἰόλος in which it was applied to the mind, as in αἰολόβουλος, αἰολόμητις.


If Aiolos has in Homer's time acquired (see αἰόλος) the sense of variegated or parti-coloured, may the name there (indicating as it does distinctly a race of foreign origin) refer to the elaborate and parti-coloured ornamentation of garments? While the Aryan races kept to a notable simplicity and unity of colour, the Semitic people, says Professor Rawlinson,† affected the most elaborate ornamentation. The same may have been true of the Hamite population of Canaan, as Sisera, in the capacity of Jabin's general, was to receive "a booty of dyed garments and of parti-coloured cloth."‡

W. E. GLADSTONE.

* Albanesische Studien, p. 247 (Jena, 1854).

† Fifth Monarchy, chap. v. vol. iii. p. 345, 2nd ed.

‡ Mr. Espin's Commentary on Judges, v. 30 in the "Speaker's Bible."



THE RESTITUTION OF ALL THINGS: THE TEACHING OF SCRIPTURE AND OF THE CHURCH.

A REPLY TO THE REV. H. N. OXENHAM.

TRUTH, like Christ, age after age is on its trial before men; but while it is being tried, it is really trying everything. Passed on from one tribunal to another, from high-priests to rulers, like Him who was the Truth, and always on its first appearance misunderstood, misrepresented, and even rejected as a deceiver, by those who should be foremost to welcome it, it is yet, by the very judgment men pass upon it, revealing what they are, and sifting all who come in contact with it. In this trial, some of those least valued by the world by their very weakness and griefs are prepared to recognise as divine that which the learned and self-satisfied agree to cast out. These, attracted to the truth, even though they little understand, and at times may even doubt and deny it, first giving themselves to it, and only so fully receiving it, cannot but in due time become its witnesses, content, even if it is mocked and misrepresented and slain and buried out of sight: for its sake to be cast out and misrepresented with it, in the faith that, spite of its rejection, it yet must prevail, and that, though slain, it will surely rise again.

Some months ago a truth, which in every age has been knocking at men's hearts, and has here and there always found some few believers, and which in these last days everywhere is winning many to receive it—I mean the truth, or hope, as some are content to call it, of the final salvation or restitution of all—was set before the readers of this REVIEW, in an article by Pr

fessor Mayor, with words, not of suspicion or condemnation, but of sympathy and commendation. And the testimony of one—I may say at once my own testimony—who, in opposition to the current opinion of the professing Church, had shown that Scripture, spite of apparent passages to the contrary, taught that the love and purpose of God, far wider and deeper than many even of His most loving children had thought possible, would not cease to work for the recovery of the lost, until all should be found and restored to Him from whom they had been beguiled or fallen, was recommended in these pages to the attention of the Church and world. Since then, in four consecutive numbers of this REVIEW,* the same hope or truth of final restoration has been vehemently assailed, and again put upon its trial; the testimony of those who hold this hope, especially of the writer of the present paper, accused of error and irrelevancy; and the contrary doctrine of endless perdition argued at length with skill and learning by one, Mr. H. N. Oxenham, who has already and deservedly made himself a place in the literary world. Little does the critic seem aware, that while he thus becomes both witness and judge, and declares and decides that this or that is truth, and this not truth, he is really being tried himself by what appears to be on trial, and, like the judges of the Truth of old, is showing by his treatment of that which is before him exactly where and what he is. Few remember this eternal law, that our views of any object absolutely and necessarily depend upon our state or standpoint, that is, on what and where we are, and upon the measure of light or darkness which we have to see by; and conversely, that by our views we may learn where we really are, like the mariners in mid-ocean, by our observations discovering our true position; that whether it is of nature, in any of her varied kingdoms, or of Scripture, or of God and of His Christ, or future judgment, or of the things of this life, as to what is pleasure, gain, or honour, the view which each has tells us his state, that is, where he really is. If men can believe another, though their views differ, their creed may be one; for our belief on any question may be beyond our view, and may confess some truth, which may either be wholly unseen, or of which our first very differing views are but the partial apprehensions. But if we will each only believe so much of any fact or truth as we can see, our view must not only depend upon, but also show exactly, where we are. Mr. Oxenham, by his views of future judgment, shows us where he is, while at the same time it is no less true that where he now is accounts for and explains many of his views.

But a man may say, “I get my views from the Church, or from the Bible, or from the Creeds, and these cannot be wrong.” I

* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for Jan., Feb., March, and April, 1876.

answer, How much do you understand the Church, or the Bible, or the Creeds? The Church may speak the truth, and not only may you wholly misinterpret and misapply her true testimony, but she herself, because she is God's witness, may like Caiaphas utter words, as when he said, "It is expedient that one man die for the people," of the true sense of which she may herself be quite ignorant. How often in teaching the young are we made to feel that, even with the truest words, we can make them see only just so far as they have learned to see. Whether it is in Greek or mathematics, something more is needed than true teaching—even the power to receive and digest what is communicated. And how often, as he advances, does the teacher himself learn, that, even while he has been teaching truth, the truth has been far wider and deeper, and even other, than he has at the time conceived it. If I err not, it is so with all the Church's teaching. How much is there in the order of the Christian Year far beyond the thought of the Church herself, which ordained and arranged this order? She had her own thought, for instance, in the appointment of All Souls' Day; but God through her by the same day may have been bearing a far wider and still more blessed testimony. This is true too of the Creeds, which not only may confess far more than the Church's children apprehend, but confess it for reasons, and in relation to matters, which as yet they have not thought of. Why, for instance, is the Church an article of faith, as in the words, "I believe one Catholic and Apostolic Church," when "faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence or conviction of things unseen?" Or why in the Creeds is the Church linked, not with Christ, whose body she is, but rather with the Holy Ghost; or why, again, is she linked with the forgiveness of sins, as when we say, "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church, the forgiveness of sins?" Is it only because she is herself forgiven, or because also she is God's appointed instrument and means for others' forgiveness? And, again, how far does our view of this "forgiveness and remission of sins," or of the "one baptism," through which it is effected, exhaust the great mystery? The answer each may make to these questions will give his view; but does this view measure or fathom the depth which is here spoken of? And so of Holy Scripture, how much do we see of its meaning? Should we without an apostle's help have seen the two covenants, law and gospel, in Hagar and Sarah? Or how many would have detected what the Epistle to the Hebrews tells us is intended by the omission of father and mother in Melchizedek's history? The eye only sees what it has learnt, and brings with it power, to see. It is not enough to have a revelation before us. We need eyes and heart to read that revelation. Do what you will before a babe, it does not see it. A man may say, "I take my view of the sun's

rising from what I see." The question is how much he really sees. What a lesson it is that this sun-rising, perhaps the grandest and clearest of all natural phenomena, is not the truth, but only an appearance of it. In every department of knowledge, therefore, that which marks the man is that he has learned to distinguish what really is from what appears so. No one can do this at first. Therefore God gives us fathers and teachers to help us in our first endeavours to understand His books, whether of grace or nature. And we are no more fit at first, simply because we have the Bible in our hands, to be our own teachers and guides or the guides of others, and no more intended for it, than we are fit, because nature is before us, to be our own astronomers, our own architects, or our own engine-drivers.

But it may be said again, If a thing is proved it will be clear. Clear to whom? A proof is a proof, but not to every one. Take the proof of the Binomial Theorem. To whom is it a proof? Surely not to every one; not even to all those who can use the forms of this theorem. So as to the proof from Holy Scripture of what is God's purpose toward the lost. The clearest proof may be, and must be, and there is mercy in it, no proof to some.

All this, which is the necessary result of our being such as we are, and of the nature of God's words and works, all of which to us at least are veils to cover truth, even while they are also revelations, has a direct bearing upon the question under consideration, as to what God has revealed respecting the future of those who die here impenitent. For it is to what is revealed, or said to be revealed, that I confine my consideration, and more especially to what is revealed in what we call Holy Scripture. Some, by far the greater number of those who accept the Bible as a revelation from God, have understood it as teaching that the lost are lost for ever, and will suffer everlasting punishment. As to what this everlasting punishment will be they differ; some, like Mr. Oxenham, making it mainly a *pœna damni*, others contending for a *pœna sensûs*; but that it is to be endless has been the view of the majority of those who take Scripture as their guide—a view which they receive on the authority of our Lord's express words. On the other hand, all through the ages, another witness has been heard, the witness I grant of a minority, but of a minority which has included some of the most thoughtful in the Church, to some of whom, as to Origen, we owe more even as to the very letter of Scripture than perhaps to any others. These, believing the Scripture to be divine, while they confess that at first sight it seems in many places to teach the doctrine of everlasting punishment, see in it another teaching, just as express, if not far more plain, not resting on any single word such as *αἰώνιος*, but on the character and purpose of Almighty God, that His lost shall all at

last be found, for "He will have all men to be saved," and has distinctly said, that "where sin abounded grace did much more abound." They have therefore concluded that there must be some secret here, the true answer to which is not to be got by ignoring one half of the testimony to keep the other half, but by patiently waiting to learn what is the key to what looks like contradiction and inconsistency. For these searchers into Scripture have noticed how all God's books contain precisely the same difficulty. They see in Nature, which is surely a revelation of God, that it is every where full of apparent contradiction; not only with force against force, heat against cold, darkness against light, death against life, its very elements in ceaseless strife everywhere; on one side witnessing of a Preserver, on the other of a Destroyer; here boundless provision for the support of life, there death reigning; but also that our sense-readings even of the clearest physical phenomena, such as the rising and setting of the sun, are opposed to truth and fact, and need to be corrected by a higher faculty. They see the same apparent inconsistency in Providence, which is also a revelation of God, but which, like nature, is a veil quite as much as a revelation; with the wicked in prosperity, while the righteous suffer; with crime in one instance punished, in another unpunished here; and with creatures born to almost certain life-long suffering, who, as far as we know, cannot be suffering for any wrong-doing of their own. They are not surprised, therefore, to see the same apparent contradiction in that Book which the Church accepts as a revelation, on the testimony of which so many base their belief in endless punishment. For they have learnt, by their own experience, how while they are themselves under the first covenant, which only works death, and wrath, and condemnation, they cannot credit God with the "thoughts of peace" He has towards us, but are through fear of death all their lifetime subject to bondage. But having themselves passed from under that cloud into the ministry of light and life, and learnt what the death and judgment have done for them, they see what this same judgment may do for others also, and that the cloud, though dark, is really big with blessings.

What then does Scripture say as to the final destiny of man? Its testimony appears at first sight contradictory. It speaks of "few finding the way of life," and yet "in Christ of all being made alive," of God's elect being only "a little flock," and yet of "all the kindreds of the earth being blest in Abraham's seed;" of "mercy upon all," and yet of "everlasting or eternal punishment;" of the "restitution of all things," and yet also of "eternal destruction;" of the "wrath of God for ever and ever," and yet of "all things renewed unto Him;" of "eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels," and yet of the "destruction through death, not of

the works of the devil only, but of him who has the power of death, that is, the devil;" of the "second death, and the lake which burneth with fire," and yet of "no more death or curse," but "all things subdued by Christ," and "God all in all." Is not this apparent contradiction? What can it really mean? Is there any key, and if so, what is it, to this mystery?

To this, the short and easy answer of some is that the Book contradicts itself, and so betrays its purely earthly origin. But the common reply of believers, which Mr. Oxenham approves, is that these opposing words only mean that some are saved and some are lost for ever; the simple objection to which is, that, in asserting one side of Scripture, this explanation not only ignores and denies the testimony upon the other side, but represents God in a character absolutely opposed to that in which the Gospel exhibits Him. Can this then be the true solution of the riddle? Is this indeed the glad tidings of great joy to all people? Is it not rather a misapprehension arising out of some mystery connected with the method of our redemption? I have endeavoured elsewhere to show that the truth which solves the riddle is to be found in those same Scriptures which seem to raise the difficulty, and lies in the mystery of the will of our ever blessed God as to the process and stages of redemption;—first, His will by some to bless and save others; by a first-born seed, "the first-born from the dead," the elect of this and other ages, to save and bless the later-born; secondly, His will therefore to work out the redemption of the lost by successive "ages" or dispensations, or, to use the language of St. Paul, "according to the purpose of the ages;"* and lastly, His will (thus meeting the nature of our fall) to make death, judgment, and destruction, the means and way to life, acquittal, and salvation; in other words "through death to destroy him that has the power of death, that is, the devil, and to deliver them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to to bondage."

To go into all this would be impossible here. I say nothing therefore of the light which is thrown upon this question by seeing that the "first-born" or "elect," so far from being, as some have thought, the only saved, are but first-born and elect, like Christ their Head, to be the means to save and serve others, and have a relation to the whole creation, which shall be saved in the appointed time by the first-born seed, that is, by Christ and His body, through those appointed baptisms, whether of fire or water, which are required to bring about the "restitution of all things;" the first-born or first-fruits being elect to be priests and rulers to the later-born, and a pledge, as St. Paul declares, that "if the

* Eph. iii. 11; *κατὰ πρόθεσιν τῶν αἰώνων*, translated, in our Authorized Version, "the eternal purpose."

first-fruits be holy, the lump shall also be holy." Nor can I show here how this blessed and promised consummation can and will be accomplished only through those so-called eternal or "æonial" times,* figured by the "times" and the "times of times" of the old Jewish dispensation, which, like the days of Creation, are the periods during which the Divine Word is working, to bring a ruined world, which is without form and void, with darkness on its face, to bear again the image of God and to be all very good. But I may say that these æonial or age times are the key to unlock all that is hid under that word which our version translates "eternal" or "everlasting," but which really is "of the ages," and refers always to the times during which the present fall, for Scripture asserts a fall, is being remedied.

I must, however, for a moment dwell on the other truth to which I have referred, namely, that death, condemnation, and destruction, are for sinners the one only possible way to life, acquittal, and salvation; because to most this is the great difficulty, which, till they have themselves passed through the process, seems utterly perplexing and incredible, while yet it solves the great riddle. This, the lesson of the Cross, is yet not understood by many who in word confess that the Cross and it alone saves them. They do not see that to be quickened we must die, and that death and judgment are the way to life and blessedness. For fallen man there is indeed no other way. For the one only way out of any world, in which we are or may be, is by a death to it, even as the only way into any world is by birth into it. We have by the serpent's lie not only had our true life poisoned, and so, by losing the life of heaven, have been unable to remain and live in Paradise,—for we cannot live in any world without the life of it,—but we have also to our sorrow had another life quickened in us by the same false word, which, while it poisoned the heavenly life, quickened another which was its very opposite; and, having now the fallen life, we have come in spirit into another spirit-world, of self-love and envy, pride and wrath, altogether unlike that for which we were created; and being in this dark world, the only way out of it is by dying to it. But the mere death of the body, which is only the end of our natural animal life, is not necessarily the death or end of that fallen life in which our spirit lives. The first-born or elect indeed, by receiving the Divine Word, which slays the hellish life within and quickens the heavenly, have even while here in this earthly life, through the loving chastenings and sorrows which God sends, died to and so come clear out of the dark world, "delivered," as St. Paul says, by death with Christ "from the power of darkness

* The *aiōnes* or *χρόνοι αἰώνιοι* of 1 Cor. ii. 7; Eph. ii. 4—7, and iii. 11, 21; 2 Tim. i. 9, and Tit. i. 2, &c.

and translated into the kingdom of God's dear Son." But those still living the selfish life have not so died. At death, that is, the death of the body, they are still in spirit within the sphere, and under the power, of that dark world whose life they live. How are they to be delivered from it? There is but one way, death; not the first, for that is passed, but the second, even that death to the hellish life, which is accomplished by the Word, which kills to make alive. Therefore has God promised a "second death," that those who have not here died to sin and hell may through God's loving judgment do so at last; His judgment for them, even as for His first-born and elect, being the appointed way of their deliverance.

I do not, however, suppose that any statement of this truth can make it clear to all, much less that so bald and imperfect a sketch as that here given can free the subject from the mists with which it is surrounded. I rather refer to these points as illustrating the character of the criticism which has appeared in the recent numbers of this REVIEW from the pen of Mr. Oxenham. While the book he criticizes calls special attention to the fact that the texts of Scripture, on which the doctrine of eternal punishment is based, present only one side of the testimony of Holy Scripture, and that to settle the matter in this way, not only ignores half the Bible, but wholly overlooks all that is taught as to the method of our salvation by death, and also represents or misrepresents God by setting Him before us in a character opposed to the whole spirit of the Gospel, in Mr. Oxenham's articles on the subject there is no attempt to explain all this, which confessedly lies at the very foundation of the inquiry. One might read all that he says, and never be aware that the book, on the authority of which the doctrine of endless punishment is asserted, has on the very face of it this great and manifest difficulty. Only imagine the book of Nature being studied in this way; with one class of facts systematically ignored; with one law, say of gravitation, fully laid down, while the opposite law, of centrifugal motion, was altogether overlooked; what results in science could follow from such a method? Yet this is the way in which not a few yet read the Scriptures, taking their first partial sense-readings for the truth, and shutting their eyes to all that the same Scripture testifies upon the other side.

But the articles which Mr. Oxenham has given us are "from a Roman Catholic point of view;"* and possibly "a Roman Catholic point of view" does not permit one to see the whole question. There are points of view from which but little can be

* The Editor is responsible for altering the title of Mr. Oxenham's papers from "Catholic Eschatology and Universalism" to "Eternal Perdition and Universalism, from a Roman Catholic Point of View."—ED. CON. REV.

seen. What Mr. Oxenham sees, however, has its value, as helping us to gauge the gain or loss of looking at this question, as he does, from a Roman Catholic standpoint. Has this "point of view" helped him? An examination of his views, which, if not altogether the result of his position, yet witness where he is, may throw some light on this matter.

Beginning, then, with an allusion to the spread and "extreme novelty, at all events in this country, as maintained by men professing to accept the Bible" (p. 223), of what he calls "Universalism," which, he tells us, "disorganizes the entire structure of Christian doctrine" (p. 227), Mr. Oxenham proceeds, after a few words as to that which he thinks "lies at the root of most of the angry reclamation," to "the leading causes which help to account for the modern spirit of antagonism to this doctrine of eternal punishment." These, according to Mr. Oxenham, are two (p. 229)—first, the popular opinions and fancies as to the nature of this eternal punishment, in the case of unbaptized infants and the heathen, and as to the comparative number of the saved or lost; and secondly, the neglect or denial of the doctrine of Purgatory and prayer for the dead. This is the substance of his first paper. Let us suppose all this correct. What does it prove as to the truth or untruth of endless punishment or universal restitution? But so far from being correct, these statements, except the one as to the spread of unbelief in endless torment, are all misleading, and indeed erroneous. For, first, is the doctrine of universal restitution an "extreme novelty?" Gieseler's statement (and there is no higher authority) is, that "the opinion of the indestructible capacity for reformation in all rational creatures, and the finiteness of the torments of hell, was so common even in the West, and so widely diffused among opponents of Origen" (he is speaking of A.D. 324 to 451), "that though it might not have sprung up without the influence of his school, yet it had become quite independent of it."* Jerome's words too, which I shall again notice, as to the texts of Scripture, upon which some in his day rested their hope that all "punishment would one day come to an end,"† and Augustine's reference to the "very many (*imo quam plurimi*) who, though not denying the Holy Scripture, do not believe in endless torments,"‡ and the well-known passage in his "City of God," respecting those whom he calls *nostri misericordes*, who are "unwilling to believe that endless punishment will be inflicted,"§ not to speak of other proofs, show how entirely contrary to fact Mr. Oxenham's statement is as to the "entire novelty" of this doctrine. Is then this doctrine "an entire

* Eccl. Hist. vol. i. § 82.

† At the end of his Commentary on Isaiah, lib. v.

‡ Enchirid. ad Laurent., c. 29.

§ D.

novelty; at all events in this country, as maintained by persons professing to accept the Bible?" Has Mr. Oxenham never heard of Jeremiah White, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and chaplain to Oliver Cromwell;* or of Peter Sterry, another distinguished Puritan of the same period;† or of George Rust, chaplain to Jeremy Taylor, and Dean of Connor;‡ or of the famous Dr. Henry More, Fellow of Christ's College, Cambridge, one of the greatest scholars of his day;§ or of the non-juror William Law, author of the "Serious Call," to whom, perhaps more than to any other, under God, England owes the revival of religion in the last century, whose "Address to the Clergy" is full of this doctrine; || or of George Stonehouse, Vicar of Islington, a hundred years ago;¶ or of Richard Clarke, Curate of Cheshunt about the same time;¶ or of Dr. Newton, Bishop of Bristol;** or of Dr. Thomas Burnet, Master of the Charter House;†† or of the Chevalier Ramsay,†† with many others now forgotten; all of whom bore their unfaltering testimony to this truth of restitution, and whose works, though now little known, still remain to witness how clear and persistent has been the testimony on this subject?

And as to Mr. Oxenham's assertion—for it is but an assertion—that "Universalism disorganizes the entire structure of Christian doctrine" (p. 227), is not the fact exactly the reverse? The objection only proves the confusion of thought which passes current for sound doctrine, and how little the nature of the fall, and the redemption by Christ, are really understood. What the Scripture teaches is, that man by disobedience and a death to God fell from God under the power of death and darkness, where by nature he is for ever lost, as unable to quicken his soul as to raise again his dead body; that in this fall God pitied him, and sent His Son, in whom is life, to be a man in the place where man was shut up, there to raise up again God's life in man, to bear man's curse, and then through death to bring man back in God's life to God's right hand; that in His own person, Christ, the first of all the first-fruits, as man in the life of God, broke through the gates of death and hell; that those who receive Him now through Him obtain the life by which they also shall rise as "first-fruits of His creatures;" that "if the first-fruits be holy, the lump is also holy," and that therefore "in Christ shall all be made alive." Is not Sir

* Author of the "Restitution of all Things."

† Author of the "Rise, Race, and Royalty of the Kingdom of God," and the "Revelation of the Everlasting Gospel Message."

‡ Author of "Letter Concerning Origen," printed 1661.

§ Author of "Divine Dialogues," in Two Parts, printed 1688.

|| Author of "Universal Restitution a Scripture Doctrine," printed 1761.

¶ Author of the "Gospel of the Daily Service of the Law," printed 1767.

** Author of a Dissertation, "On the Final State and Condition of Men," in his Works, vol. iii. p 702, 1782.

†† Author of "De Statu Mortuorum et Resurgentium," 1715.

‡‡ Author of the "Philosophical Principles of Natural and Revealed Religion," 1749.

James Stephen therefore quite right in saying that the dogma of eternal punishment is at best "a mere isolated truth, standing in no necessary connection with the rest" (p. 227), but practically contradicting all that the Gospel tells us of Christ's work, and God's character? For if God is indeed love, and wills that all men should be saved, and doeth according to His will in the armies of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth; if Christ indeed died for all, as "the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world;" the difficulty is to conceive how this can consist with any being for ever lost to God, or how Christian doctrine can be complete without some such conclusion as universal restitution. But here as elsewhere we only see what we have learned to see.

As to the supposed causes of the present unbelief in endless punishment, namely, first, the "*idola fori*," or "popular opinions and fancies as to the place and exact nature of this eternal punishment," as examples of which Mr. Oxenham cites Calvin's statement respecting "babes a span long crawling about the floor of hell" (p. 229), and the notion that the number of the lost will far exceed that of the saved (p. 230); and secondly, the neglect or denial by Protestants of the doctrine of purgatory and prayer for the dead (p. 234); does Mr. Oxenham really believe that these are the true causes either of the spread of the doctrine of universal restitution, or of the repugnance to the idea of never-ending torments? Is not the true cause this rather, that men instinctively feel that the doctrine of everlasting suffering,—not the "popular opinions or fancies" about it, as Mr. Oxenham suggests, but the doctrine itself as stated by the most learned of its supporters, such as Augustine, Jerome, or Dr. Pusey,—directly clashes with what the Gospel reveals of God, and further, is in direct opposition to certain portions of Holy Scripture, which, while in some places it threatens "æonial punishment,"* whatever this may be, most distinctly affirms the "restitution of all things" and the "reconciliation of all?"† Can Mr. Oxenham really think that Origen, and Gregory of Nyssa, and all that large body of believers, of whom Jerome and Augustine wrote, who "though not denying Holy Scripture do not believe in endless torments," but "believe that after certain periods of time those who are condemned to the pains of hell shall be delivered out of that state," were led to their rejection of this doctrine of never-ending sufferings either by the "*idola fori*" which Mr. Oxenham speaks of, such as Calvin's "span-long babes crawling about the floor of hell," or by any Protestant denial or doubt as to a purification by fire to be accomplished after death, or the propriety of prayer for the departed? Did they not all hold both prayer for the dead and a

* κόλασιν αἰώνιον.

† Acts iii. 21, and Col. i. 20.

purification by fire after death, and yet with this, and because of this, believe in restitution, simply because Scripture distinctly taught that at last "God should be all in all," and would "reconcile all," and "have mercy upon all?"* It is this same testimony of Scripture, which has forced thousands in this day, slowly and in spite of all their early training, to give up the doctrine of everlasting suffering. They do not, as Mr. Oxenham says, reject the doctrine of endless punishment "because of its difficulties, which to them appear inexplicable" (pp. 432, 433), but because they believe that it is utterly irreconcilable with the revelation given by God Himself.

Nor will the Protestant denial of purgatory, any more than the other opinions which Mr. Oxenham refers to, account for the widespread unbelief in endless torments. The truth upon this point rather is, that the doctrine of Purgatory, properly so called, which gradually grew up from the fifth to the seventh century,† in contradistinction to the earlier view of purifying fire held by Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Ambrose, and others,‡ was itself a natural result of the efforts of Augustine and others to silence the doctrine of restitution. The doctrine of a purifying fire runs, I believe, all through the Scriptures. Not only do the prophets speak of that "spirit of judgment and burning with which the Lord shall purge away the filth of the daughters of Zion, and cleanse the blood of Jerusalem;" the fulfilment of the vision of the "burning bush," which burnt and was not consumed because God dwelt in it; but both St. Peter and St. Paul speak of the "fiery trial which must try us," the "fire which must try every man's work," even that of believers, while "they themselves shall be saved, yet so as by fire." Our Lord Himself too speaks of the "fire which He came to cast into the earth," that "baptism of the Holy Ghost and fire," without which no fallen creature can be perfected. For "our God is a consuming fire," and to dwell in Him we must have a life, which, because it is of the fire (for fire burns not fire), can stand unharmed in it. The believer, therefore, like the material world, must not only go through that baptism, which "is as the waters of Noah," but that other baptism of fire also, by which alone the final transmutation of the creature from corruptible to incorruptible can be effected. The early Fathers too have the same doctrine of "cleansing fire,"§ which

* 1 Cor. xv. 28; Col. i. 20; and Rom. xi. 32.

† Hagenbach, after describing the earlier doctrine as to cleansing fire, says that Gregory the Great may rightly be called the 'inventor of the doctrine of purgatory if we may call it an invention.'—*Hist. of Doctrines*, vol. i. § 141, p. 407.

‡ See Hagenbach, *Hist. of Doctrines*, vol. i. § 77, pp. 235—237.

§ The *πῦρ καθάρσιον* of Origen, *Contr. Cels.* v. 15, called by Clement of Alexandria *πῦρ φθόνου*, *Strom.* vii. 6, and *πῦρ σωφρονοῦν*, *Cohort.* § 47. I believe the expression, "ignis sapiens," which we find in Tertullian, Jerome, and others, originally was used in reference to the same cleansing.

should sooner or later try and perfect all, through which even the Blessed Virgin and Peter and the much-loved John would all have to pass, if they would be conformed to Christ; a fire which, whether in this present life or at the judgment, must, because God loves us, perform its work. But when instead of this, as time went on, and carnal conceptions grew in the Church, the doctrine of endless punishment was taught by many of the greatest Church teachers, there followed with it as a necessary result the Roman view of purgatory, giving men some hope for those loved ones, who, if not fit for heaven, could not be believed worthy of an everlasting hell. But on the change from the early doctrine of a cleansing fire to that of endless torments, and purgatory, properly so called, I cannot enter further here.

And here, in passing, a word as to Mr. Oxenham's view of the eternal perdition of unbaptized infants. These children, he tells us,

"are indeed 'damned,' in the sense that they cannot attain to the Beatific Vision But it is no conscious loss to them. Still less does it imply any suffering of body or soul. On the contrary, it is consistent with the highest enjoyment of natural beatitude and with a natural knowledge and love of God. They are in what would have been Adam's condition if he had neither fallen into sin nor been endowed with original justice. Balmezi thinks this principle may be extended to the case of adults, especially in heathen nations, who die with their moral and intellectual faculties so imperfectly developed that they may be regarded as, in responsibility, children." (P. 230.)

Eternal perdition, therefore, does not imply "any suffering of body or soul," but "on the contrary is consistent with the highest enjoyment of natural beatitude and with a natural knowledge and love of God, in what would have been Adam's condition if he had not fallen into sin."* Let us suppose for a moment that this explanation of Mr. Oxenham's is satisfactory. It is still open to one objection, namely, that it contradicts, and if is true overthrows, all that he says a little lower down on the words *αἰώνιος* and *κόλασις*. For *αἰώνιος*, he tells us, "conveys the full idea of everlasting," and *κόλασις* is not a "corrective chastisement," but torment (pp. 725, 726). But all the lost suffer this *αἰώνιον κόλασιν*: unbaptized children and the heathen are lost: so while they are in "everlasting torments, with quenchless fire, and the undying worm,"—for Mr. Oxenham tells us that the expression *αἰώνιος κόλασις* is "strictly synonymous" with this (p. 726),—they yet are not only without "any suffering of body or soul," but on the contrary in the "highest enjoyment of natural beatitude and with a natural knowledge and love of God." But even this does not agree

* How widely different this doctrine is from that generally set forth for Roman Catholics may be seen by consulting a pamphlet, entitled, "Hell opened to Christians, from the Italian of the Rev. F. Pinamonte, S.J.," illustrated with woodcuts, portraying the tortures of the damned, published by James Duffy, Wellington Quay, Dublin, and Paternoster Row, London.

with what he again tells us further on "is meant by the dogma of eternal damnation : it means in one word leaving the sinner to himself" (p. 433). Where I ask does it mean this? Does it mean it in the words just quoted, as to "quenchless fire," and the "undying worm," and the "shut door," and "many stripes." Certainly it does not mean this in the Fathers, as countless passages from Augustine and Jerome would prove. And all this is advanced by a writer who objects to Universalism because it does such violence to the language of Holy Scripture.

As to the other alleged "misapprehension," "which," Mr. Oxenham tells us, "has probably done more than all other misconceptions put together to prejudice men's minds against the doctrine" of endless punishment (p. 230), viz., that more are lost than saved, his reply is that this opinion though "widely held," "has not, as far as he is aware, ever found place in the creed of any Christian community, and certainly neither does, nor possibly could, appertain to the doctrine of the Catholic Church" (p. 231); while "Lacordaire, who has devoted a volume of his 'Conférences,' 'on the Results of the Divine Government,' to an elaborate and minute examination of the subject,* comes to the conclusion that the great majority of mankind will be saved" (p. 234). Yet, when this selfsame argument is applied to the question of eternal death, for certainly no creed or canon of the Church received by East and West declares it, Mr. Oxenham's reply is that "the belief of the Church is not to be collected solely from creeds and definitions of Councils" (p. 617). The omission, therefore, of an opinion or doctrine in the Creed has a bearing on the question of the comparative number of the saved or lost, but no bearing whatever on the question of everlasting woe. Meanwhile the apparent evidence of Scripture is perfectly overwhelming as to the fact that the many shall be lost and only the few saved; while "the immemorial belief of the Church" (p. 222), which Mr. Oxenham so often appeals to, is in the same direction, the greatest authorities having laid it down as unquestionable that the vast majority of men will certainly be damned.† That this teaching of Scripture asserts that the majority are lost for ever is, as I have endeavoured to show elsewhere, simply a misapprehension of its meaning; the truth being rather that the few who find the narrow way are the "first-born" or "first-fruits," the elect seed, in whom all the kindreds of the earth shall one day be blessed; while the many who are lost are those whom I may call the later-born, who are only brought back to God by the ministry of the elect through the judgment of the

* This is scarcely correct. Lacordaire has *not* "devoted a volume of his 'Conférences,'" but simply one single "Conférence" (the 71st) to this "examination." It is worth reading, if one wishes to disagree with the Abbe's conclusions, as is also the next (the 72nd), which attempts to prove on philosophical grounds the endlessness of misery.

† See Corn. à Lépide, in Num. xiv. 30, and Apoc. vii. 9.

coming age or ages.* Mr. Oxenham does not, however, receive this explanation, but spite of the well-known words, "The wicked (not a few of the most wicked) shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God," and "strait is the gate and narrow is the way that leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it,"—plain words spoken by the blessed Lord Himself,—still argues that because this doctrine has not been asserted in any Church Creed or General Council, it is to be regarded "as a mere opinion, and has no shadow of claim to be considered part of the revealed faith" (p. 231). Only imagine if the question, instead of touching the nature and duration of future punishment, were as to the comparative number of the saved or lost, how those who contend that the many will be damned might point triumphantly to such texts as those just quoted, and ask, Can anything be plainer than such statements of Holy Writ? Yet in the teeth of these plain statements, and though he quotes and endorses Hooker's opinion, "that where a literal interpretation [of Scripture] will stand, the furthest from the letter is commonly the worst" (p. 627), Mr. Oxenham nevertheless believes that the majority of mankind will be saved (pp. 231, 234), and that the opposite view is "a mere opinion which has no shadow of claim to be considered part of the revealed faith." And this is the deliberate conclusion of one who contends for taking the plain meaning of our Lord's own words.

I will not here examine all that Mr. Oxenham urges on the ground of Reason as to the improbability of universal restitution or the probability of a never-ending hell (pp. 425, 426), for this question has been discussed by Professor Mayor in the May number of this REVIEW, and my object is to consider, not so much what sense or reason say, but rather what Scripture is supposed to say, on this question. Nor do I care to follow Mr. Oxenham into the views of the ancient heathen world (p. 616, seq.), interesting as these are on this question as showing man's natural thoughts of God and of himself without revelation, because Christ's resurrection, for those who believe it, and I write for such, has since the days of Greece and Rome thrown new light upon man's lot, proving that the dead and cursed—for Christ was dead and cursed for us—spite of the curse and death may be and have been raised again to highest heaven. This truth with other secrets of God's purpose to the world, which, as the Apostle says, were "hid from the ages and generations" which Mr. Oxenham speaks of, when men felt after an unknown God, uncertain

* The "Quicunque Vult" is twice referred to by Mr. Oxenham (pp. 225 and 620), as if it settled the question; but, even granting this "Psalm" to be a Creed, which strictly speaking it is not, the passage referred to, as to "the wicked going into everlasting fire," simply repeats the words of Scripture, without explaining them, the question still remaining, as to what Scripture means by this language.

whether He were for them or against them, or how the sins which they were conscious of could ever be removed, has been unlocked, for some of us at least, by the appearing of the Lord, who "hath abolished death and brought life and immortality to light by the Gospel." And for us, with all the light which shines from Christ's appearing, to rise no higher in our hopes or views than those upon whose conscience the cloud of God's just judgment weighed in the days before the spirit of sonship descended upon men, seems to me as shameful as for much-loved sons always to cower as slaves, or for men at noonday to have the fears of children in the dark.

I pass on therefore to Mr. Oxenham's assertion respecting the Councils and Fathers, and the teaching of Holy Writ, on this subject. I am guilty, so he asserts, of "special pleading" about the Fifth Council (p. 622), and my quotations from the Fathers, "imposing as the array may at first sight appear," are either "inconclusive," "misapplied," or "mistranslated" (p. 622). Now, as Mr. Matthew Arnold says, "an Englishman has such a respect for fact himself, that he can hardly imagine grave people presenting him with anything as fact, when they have absolutely no right whatever to do so." Mr. Oxenham's assertions therefore, if unchallenged, may be received for truth. In justice to the truth therefore I am obliged to follow him into the facts referred to, as well as into his criticisms on those passages of the Fathers (and he only attempts to shake the evidence of very few) which he asserts do not bear on this question. To general readers perhaps this part of the subject may seem unimportant. For some I know it will have very special interest.

As to the facts, then, I had asked where and when the Catholic Church had ever authoritatively condemned this view of restitution? At what council, or in what decrees, received by East and West, were we to find the record and the terms of this condemnation? I knew, of course, and stated, that Theophilus of Alexandria, the persecutor of Chrysostom, and then Anastasius of Rome, who, according to his own confession, until called upon to judge Origen, knew little or nothing about him, and later on the bishops at the Home Synod under Mennas at Constantinople, the latter acting under court influence, two hundred years after his death had condemned Origen. But there was no evidence, that I was aware of, to show that the doctrine of Restitution had ever been condemned, at least by any General Council; while on the other hand several of the leading Fathers distinctly held that all men would at last be saved.* This was my "special pleading." What is Mr. Oxenham's reply? He cites against me all the facts I had conceded as to Origen's condemnation by certain local bishops, only adding as

* *Restitution of All Things*, pp. 96, 97.

another fact, what is still open to the gravest doubt, and denied by some of the greatest authorities on Church councils,* that the eleventh canon of the Fifth Council also names Origen with others who had been condemned, and that this canon was confirmed by the Sixth and Seventh Councils (p. 621). Let us accept all this as fact (though in the canon, even as cited by Mr. Oxenham, there is not the slightest reference to any of Origen's views), how does all this prove in any way that the doctrine of Restitution ever was condemned? As showing the truth upon this point, let us look at the Acts of the Home Synod under Mennas, which, as I had conceded, without doubt condemned Origen. But for what did it condemn him? Not for the hope of Restitution. On the contrary, though the Emperor sent a list of Origen's opinions to the council, including among others in his ninth article the doctrine of Restitution, with a letter requiring them diligently to read his "exposition" of Origen's errors, and then to "condemn each one of them," the council, while they enumerated with careful minuteness Origen's heretical opinions, would not and did not condemn the doctrine of Restitution. To this one point, spite of Justinian's express desire that they should condemn it, they make no allusion whatever in any one of the fifteen canons which they then passed. All this must be known by Mr. Oxenham, even if the original documents have never been examined by him, for the whole subject has so recently been brought under our notice by one of whom, or of whose work, Mr. Oxenham can hardly be ignorant;† yet spite of this he quotes the condemnation of Origen under Mennas as a proof of the condemnation of the doctrine of Restitution, when he knows, or should know, that this council, while condemning Origen's errors, did not condemn the doctrine of Restitution.

The fact is that this doctrine, though held by Origen, as by many others of the early Fathers, was not the error which then went by the name of Origenism, which rather referred to certain speculations as to the form or formlessness of God, the subordination of the Son, the nature of the resurrection body, the passing of human souls into the bodies of beasts, the return of rational beings into a state where substance, number, bodies, and names, should all be lost in a unity such as that in which they were supposed to have pre-existed, and lastly the never-ending alternations through which all rational souls might pass, from misery

* Walch, perhaps the greatest of all authorities on Church Councils, after sifting the evidence on both sides most fully, decides that Origen's name in this eleventh Canon of the Fifth Council is an interpolation.—*Ketzerhistorie*, vol. viii. pp. 284–290. The facts which he cites as proofs of this are, I think, unanswerable.

† I refer to the Rev. F. N. Oxenham's "Letter to Mr. Gladstone," entitled "Everlasting Punishment; is the doctrine de fide?" (Rivingtons) pp. 17–25, where all the facts of Origen's condemnation are fully given; and see especially the "Note," pp. 94, 95 on the "pre-existence of souls," and the "monstrous restitution" founded on it.

to blessedness and from blessedness to misery for evermore.* These were the main grounds of the dispute, as begun in Egypt, and then carried over to Constantinople. And to argue that because Origen was condemned for these fancies, therefore the doctrine of Restitution has also been condemned, is just like saying that because St. Peter had to be withstood and rebuked by the Apostle Paul for his vacillation at Antioch, in reference to the doctrine of the admission of Gentiles to Church privileges without circumcision, therefore the doctrine of the same St. Peter as to "Christ's preaching to the spirits in prison," or the "day of God," had been then and there "rebuked" also. But what makes this argument still less justifiable from Mr. Oxenham is that he knows quite well, for he tells us so himself (p. 436), that "Origen's peculiar theory was widely different from modern Universalism"—(this by the way is said to the disparagement of modern Universalism)—(pp. 431, 628), and yet spite of this "wide difference," which he confesses, the condemnation of Origen for his "peculiar theory," which no modern Universalist holds, is taken by Mr. Oxenham as proof that the Church has formally condemned the hope of restitution.

As to the quotations from the Fathers which I had cited to prove that some of the greatest of them held the doctrine of final restitution, and which are declared by Mr. Oxenham to be either "inconclusive," "misapplied," or "mistranslated," no reply would be needed had my critic only quoted the passages which he is pleased to dismiss thus summarily. He tells us that Clement of Alexandria, in saying, "*Proinde universos quidem salvat, sed alios per supplicia convertens, alios autem spontaneâ assequentes voluntate, . . . ut omne genu flectatur Ei, cœlestium, terrestrium, et infernorum, hoc est, angeli, homines, et animæ quæ ante adventum Ejus de hac vitâ migravere temporali,*" only means that "the propitiation of Christ was offered, not for Christians only, but for the heathen and those who lived before the Incarnation also" (p. 623). The words, "*Universos salvat, alios per supplicia convertens, alios autem spontaneâ assequentes voluntate, ut omne genu flectatur Ei, cœlestium, terrestrium, et infernorum,*" means only that an atonement was made for all mankind. In the words too quoted from Jerome, as to the views of some in his time, who maintained "*supplicia aliquando finire, et licet post multa tempora tamen terminum habere tormenta,*"—and this because it is written, "God hath concluded all in unbelief, that He might have mercy upon all,"—Mr. Oxenham tells us "Mr. Jukes again misses the point through mistranslation. St. Jerome is stating, without endorsing, the opinion . . . that the sensible sufferings of the

* This last is the point specially mentioned by Augustine, in the well-known passage, *De Civ. Dei*, lib. xxi. c. 17.

lost may after a time" (or more correctly at certain times) "be diminished or relieved" (p. 625). This, so my critic gravely asserts, is the meaning of the words, "*Supplicia aliquando finire, et licet post multa tempora terminum habere tormenta.*" So again in the extracts from Justin Martyr and Irenæus, that "those souls which have appeared worthy of God die no more, but others are punished as long as God wills them to exist and to be punished," and that "he who rejects the life given to him, ipse se privat in sæculum sæculi perseverantiâ," "Mr. Jukes evidently misunderstands, and in the case of Irenæus also mistranslates," for "perseverantia," so Mr. Oxenham tells us, "does not mean 'continuance for ever,' but 'perseverance in good'" (p. 623). Any competent reader can judge how far this statement is correct by looking at the passages in question and their contexts, in the latter of which "perseverantia" is repeatedly used in the sense simply of "continuance." For those who cannot read the originals it may suffice to say that Jeremy Taylor, in his famous sermon on "Christ's Advent to Judgment," quotes both the passages referred to in the sense I have assigned to them, as proving that "Origen was not the first that said the pains of the damned should cease."* As to the two Gregorys, of Nyssa and Nazianzus, Mr. Oxenham is content to say, that "it is well known that they sometimes speak doubtfully on this doctrine; but, on the other hand, they elsewhere most unequivocally assert it" (p. 623). Now their "most unequivocal assertion" amounts to this, that in the passages referred to by Mr. Oxenham, which occur in their popular writings, they, like Origen in similar writings, use the common language on the subject; † while, instead of "sometimes speaking doubtfully on this doctrine," Gregory of Nyssa wrote plainly and strongly in favour of Restitution, and Gregory of Nazianzus more than once gives hints to show that he too received the same doctrine. Neander's testimony upon this point of fact, which is beyond all question, is as follows:—

"But this particular doctrine [of Restoration] was expounded and maintained with the greatest ability in works written expressly for that purpose by Gregory of Nyssa. God, he maintained, had created rational beings in order that they might be self-conscious and free vessels for the communications of the original fountain of all good. All punishments are

* Jeremy Taylor's Works, vol. v. serm. 3. Spite of this Mr. Oxenham says, that "that theory [of annihilation] was first broached among persons not professing to be atheists in the nineteenth century" (p. 621).

† The passage from Gregory of Nazianzus occurs in his fifteenth sermon, on "the plague of hail." The lesson is that it is better to repent now than hereafter. The sermon is just a parallel to so many passages of Scripture, which urge sinners to repent for fear of God's wrath. The passage from Gregory of Nyssa, in his sermon "concerning those who put off baptism" (p. 219, Edit. Grets.), says that there is hope for the baptized; but of the unbaptized, that "salvation is denied by a definite prohibition." He refers to the words, "He that believeth not shall be damned." The contradiction here, if it is a contradiction, to their other statements, is only apparent, like that in Scripture.

means of purification, ordained by divine love to purge rational beings from moral evil, and to restore them to that communion with God which corresponds to their nature. God would not have permitted the existence of evil, unless He had foreseen that by the Redemption all rational beings would in the end, according to their destination, attain to the same blessed fellowship with Himself.*

Now when it is borne in mind that Gregory of Nazianzus presided at the Second General Council, and that to Gregory of Nyssa tradition ascribes all those additions to the original Nicene Creed, which were made at the same Second General Council, and which we now recite as portions of it,†—when we remember the esteem in which the name and works of this same Gregory of Nyssa have ever been held, both during his life and since his death, and that he was referred to both by the Fifth and Seventh General Councils, as amongst the highest authorities of the Church,‡—we shall be better able to judge the worth of the assertion, which is sometimes made, that the doctrine of final restitution is, as Mr. Oxenham asserts, “a heresy.”

On this point therefore I will only add, that by the same process as that which Mr. Oxenham adopts in reference to the testimony of Clement of Alexandria, Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Gregory of Nyssa, and the others whom I have quoted, it might be proved, and an attempt has actually been made to prove, that even Origen never held the doctrines usually and rightly attributed to him, but only spoke according to the so-called Catholic dogma. I have now before me a work, published in Rome in 1864, by Professor Vincenzi of the College there commonly called the *Sapienza*,—which the author tells us was graciously received by the Pope himself, with the words “Sarebbe un gran bene se si potesse ridonare la fama ad un tant’ uomo,”—the whole drift of which is to prove that Origen never held what his words most distinctly prove he did hold.§ Vincenzi’s argument, perhaps I should say his assertion (which is that of Mr. Oxenham respecting Gregory of Nyssa), is, that “it is a baseless charge to say Origen sometimes doubted of the endlessness of the punishment of demons and the wicked, for he asserts it in the strongest and clearest words;” the proof given being that “in certain passages of his writings Origen speaks of future punishment as αἰώνιος.”|| Of this work and its author, spite of the Pope’s good wishes, the

* Neander, Church Hist. vol. iv. p. 455.

† Nicephor. Eccl. Hist. lib. xii. c. 13.

‡ Tillemont, Mémoires, tom. ix. p. 601.

§ This work, by Vincenzi, is in four octavo volumes: the title of the first is, “Origenis de eternitate poenarum in vitâ futurâ omnimodo cum dogmate catholico concordia;” of the second, “Origenes ab hæreseos notâ in cæteris institutionibus vindicatus;” of the third, “Historia critica quæstionis inter Theophilum et Hieronymum, adversarios Origenis, et Origenis patronos, Johannem Chrysostomum et monachos Nitrenses;” of the fourth, “Vigilii Papæ et Origenis triumphus in Synodo Quintâ Œcumenicâ.”

|| Vincenzi, vol. i. pp. 76 seq. and p. 277.

Abbé Freppel. Professor of Sacred Rhetoric, and Dean of the church of St. Geneviève in Paris, does not hesitate to say, "Toute critique sérieuse devient impossible, lorsqu'on aborde les ouvrages d'un auteur avec le parti pris, soit de le dénigrer, soit de faire son apologie."* Whether these words apply to the criticisms we have been considering. I will leave the reader to decide.†

Not more successful is the attempt to set aside the testimony of the Early Church, as to the purification of all through fire, by asserting, for Mr. Oxenham gives no proof of it, that the passages cited from Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of Nyssa, and others, only refer to the "doctrine of Purgatory" (p. 624), which at the time these writers lived had not been heard of. Dr. Newman states the simple fact when he says,‡ that "the Primitive doctrine is not condemned in the [xxiind] Article [of the English Church], unless indeed the Primitive doctrine be Romish; *which must not be supposed*. . . . That doctrine is this, that the conflagration of the world, or the flames which attend the Judge, will be an ordeal through which all men will pass." Dr. Harold Browne bears the same testimony, showing at considerable length what this Primitive doctrine of purification was. Speaking of Origen, he says, that "he considered all the pains of the damned as merely purgatorial, and that their sins would be expiated by fire." But, adds the Bishop, "this theory of Origen is so far from being the same with the Romanist's purgatory, that, first of all, he places it instead of hell, and secondly, so far from looking for it between death and the resurrection, he taught that it would take place, after the resurrection, at the day of judgment."§ This "theory," the Bishop adds, was so "interesting," and "Origen's character and learning so captivating," that "we find eminent writers both in the East and West embracing his speculations," among whom the Bishop cites Gregory of Nazianzus, Ambrose, Hilary, and Gregory of Nyssa, "all whose views spring from the same source and tend to the same conclusion."

The passages therefore which Mr. Oxenham attempts to explain

* In his Cours d'Eloquence Sacrée, vol. i., entitled "Origène," p. 404.

† I add here a word or two respecting Chrysostom, "against whom," Mr. Oxenham says, "no charge of Origenism, distinct or indistinct, was ever brought, at the Synod of the Oak or elsewhere" (p. 623). Any one who will take the trouble to consult the "Annals" of Baronius, from A.D. 401 to 405, almost *passim*, will find that Chrysostom was credited with Origenistic leanings, and accused and reproached constantly from A.D. 401, onwards, on that account. The main points of accusation were, first, that he favoured the Origenists, and ordained some of them, and, secondly, that he declined to join in condemning Origen's books, and was in the habit himself of reading them. To the same effect is the Note by Severinus Binius, upon the history of the Synod of the Oak, given by Labbæus (Conc. Gen., vol. ii. p. 1329). Jerome, too, in a letter to Theophilus of Alexandria. (Ed. Ben. vol. iv. p. 727, Epist. 88), says, that apart from other crimes (Jerome's words are "*scelus*" and "*flagitia*") Chrysostom's conduct with regard to the Origenists was enough to account for his condemnation. So too George of Alexandria, in a tract, entitled, "Res Beati Chrysostomi," given in the "Bibliotheca" of Photius, p. 252, seq.

‡ Tract 90, p. 23.

§ Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles, pp. 498, 499, 500.

away, by saying that they speak of Purgatory, meaning by this the Roman doctrine of Purgatory, speak in truth of something very different. And indeed the quotations given, by various allusions, or references to other particulars, such as that Apostles, like Christ Himself, must preach to spirits in prison,* show that they speak of a cleansing, whether in this life or the next, in which the elect who have here won the prize will act as first-born and joint-heirs with Christ, in doing His very works, whether as prophets, or priests, or kings, throughout the coming age or ages; as prophets, in preaching like Christ to souls shut up; as priests in serving beside the sacrifice of fire. For "the priest's lips should keep knowledge," to preach and intercede; but his work is even more ever to keep alive that fire, by which alone the sacrifices can lose their first and carnal form, and so ascend to God from His altar. The Church and world at this day are full of priests without fire, or, if fire is thought of, it is only natural, not spiritual fire, in lights upon the altar. The great High Priest "came to cast fire into the earth." And He can yet no more spare the fallen nature of His elect than the priest of old could spare the creature which he offered. And so His members, when they shall arise as priests with Him, for "if they were on earth they should not be priests," like Him are called to exercise the same ministry of holy fire, in that coming day when the "laver" shall be multiplied, as Scripture says, into "ten lavers," and "the elect shall run to and fro as sparks among the stubble."† For the elect are those who first after Christ have passed through the fires, without which no perfect change is wrought in any creature; and having first been sacrifices in the hands of the first great First-born High Priest, and so been changed, for no sacrifice changes its form or ascends to God as "pillars of smoke" without fire, have in due time like their Head, who first trod this path for them, become priests also with Him to serve and help others, in that same passage or pass-over from life to death and death to life, which must be accomplished to change the old creation, through death and dissolution, to be without spot or blemish or any such thing. That those who looked for Restitution in Augustine's day saw something of this great truth, is shown from the passage already referred to in the "City of God," which Mr. Oxenham so curtly attempts to set aside, and which distinctly states that some believed it would be brought about through the priestly intercessions or work of the elect.‡

It only remains to notice the argument from Scripture. Here, as is so usual with writers upon this subject, Mr. Oxenham dwells

* See Restitution, &c., pp. 186, 187.

† Exod. xxx. 18; 1 Kings vii. 38, 39; Wisdom iii. 7, 8.

‡ De Civ. Dei, lib. xxi. cap. 18, 24, 27.

exclusively on that side of the testimony which speaks of the "ministration of death and condemnation," though the Apostle expressly declares that this ministration is to be "abolished" and "done away," while he wholly overlooks the other side as to the "ministration of righteousness and life," "which remaineth," without an attempt to solve the riddle of the apparent contradiction. I look in vain through Mr. Oxenham's papers for such words as, "He will not always chide, neither will He keep His anger for ever." Not one word does he give us of God's being "Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe;" not one word of His "swallowing up death in victory, and wiping away all tears from all faces;" not a word as to the promise that "there shall be no more curse;" not a hint "that by death" (even possibly by the second death) "God will destroy him that has the power of death;" not a word of "mercy upon all," because "of Him and through Him, and to Him are all things;" all this is ignored; while the texts which seem to teach another doctrine are pressed as if there were no question respecting their true meaning.

Now I grant, of course, that there are texts, which seem opposed to universal restitution. We have seen that, taken in the letter, text clashes with text on this subject. All those texts which speak of "destruction" and "judgment" are explained by what has been said above as to the way of our salvation, and that it is by death alone that God destroys him that has the power of death. Those passages also which speak of the "lost," as for example St. Paul's words at the commencement of his Epistle to the Romans, are not the declaration of the final lot of any, but of the state of all by nature, till through union with Christ they are made partakers of His redemption. In this lost state some are held far longer than others, and therefore are in a special sense "the lost," as compared with the first-born who are made partakers of the first resurrection. But all the saved have once been lost, "for the Son of Man is come to seek and save that which is lost." The fact therefore that of these lost some are lost for a longer or a shorter period proves nothing against their final restoration; for the Good Shepherd must "go after that which is lost until He find it." Even if this were not so clearly revealed, the Scripture use of the word "lost," showing that the lost indeed are God's loss, should sufficiently assure us that that loss cannot and will not be for ever. For it is not that the Shepherd finds a sheep which does not belong to him, or which he has not missed, or that the Woman finds an unknown coin, and adds it to her store, or that the Father adopts a stranger; but rather that the sheep whose wandering seemed to make the Shepherd poorer for a while, is found by Him, to his own joy, and the

coin that had been missed and mourned for is restored to the treasure which without it would have been imperfect, and the son, without whom the family circle had been incomplete, is welcomed with gladness to that home which had lacked something so long as he continued absent. But according to the views of those who believe in endless punishment God is to be a loser for ever and ever—a loser by that creation which was formed to show forth His praise, and which we are distinctly told will in every part of it one day praise Him, saying, “For Thy pleasure we are and were created.”

There are, however, certain other well-known texts, which are relied on as teaching this doctrine of never-ending punishment. I do not here enter upon these, as I have examined them elsewhere, and what I have said here already is the key to almost every one of them. But on that verse which is most commonly appealed to as deciding this question I may say a few words, I mean the well-known passage in the parable of the Sheep and the Goats, where the same word *αἰώνιος* is used by our Lord both of the life of the blessed and the punishment of the lost. Must not the same word in both cases have the same meaning? Certainly it must. On this point I agree entirely with Mr. Oxenham. But the question still remains, What is the true sense of the word in either case? Is it “everlasting” or “eternal,” or “that which belongs to” or is “proper to the ages”? Perhaps another passage, where the same word again twice occurs in the same sentence, may help us to the true answer. In his Epistle to the Romans St. Paul speaks of the “mystery which has been kept secret,” as our Authorized Version translates it, “since the world began,” *μυστήριον χρόνους αἰώνιους σκεπυμένον*, literally “from everlasting or æonial times,” “but which now is made manifest by the commandment of the everlasting or æonial God,” *αἰώνιον θεοῦ*.* Here the same word in the same sentence is used of “God” and of certain “times.” In each case the word must have the same meaning. It would, as Mr. Oxenham rightly contends, be absurd to hold that in the same sentence it is used in two different senses. But as describing these “times,” which are called “æonial,” the meaning of the word cannot be “endless,” for we are elsewhere told by the same Apostle both of their beginning and ending,—of their beginning, for St. Paul tells us that “God hath called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to His own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before æonial times,”† this “purpose of the ages” being the “hidden wisdom of God which He ordained before the ages unto our glory,”‡—and of their end, for he says again, that “now once in the end, or comple-

* Rom. xvi. 25, 26.

† 2 Tim. i. 9, and Tit. i. 2.

‡ Eph. iii. 11; 1 Cor. ii. 7.

tion, of the ages hath He appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself," and again, that "on us the ends of the ages are met."* In this passage therefore the word, *aiōnios*, whatever it does mean, cannot mean "everlasting" or never ending.† This does not prove that therefore God is not everlasting, any more than His being called the "God of the whole earth" proves that He is not also "God of heaven;" but the use of the same word, both as to "God" and the "times" here spoken of, does surely demand that we should carefully inquire what the writer intended by this expression. My conviction is that here as elsewhere *aiōnios* means "connected with the ages," the truth which lies under this term having to be learnt from what is elsewhere revealed in the same Holy Scriptures respecting these "ages." The Church in these days has little to say of the "purpose of the ages." Few see that these "ages," of which we read so often in the New Testament, are but the fulfilment or substance of the "times and seasons," of the Sabbatic year and Jubilee, under the old law, and all point to those "times of refreshing from the presence of the Lord, when He shall send Jesus Christ who before was preached," and when in due order liberty and cleansing will be obtained by those who now are in bondage and unclean, and rest be gained by those who are now without their rightful inheritance. But our Lord's words, "This is life eternal [that is, the life of the age or ages] that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent," sufficiently show that to know the only true God, as the sender of His Son to be a Saviour, and to know that Son as a Saviour and Redeemer, mark and constitute the renewed life which is peculiar to the ages. Æonial or eternal life therefore is not, as so many think, the living on and on for ever and ever. It is rather, as our Lord defines it, a life, the distinctive peculiarity of which is, that it has to do with a Saviour, and so is part of a remedial plan. And so of the rest, whether redemption, salvation, spirit, fire, punishment, or inheritance, all of which in certain texts are called "æonial," the epithet always refers to the same remedial plan, wrought out by God through "worlds" or "ages." But I cannot here go further into the proof of the true meaning of this word.‡ Enough if what I have said lead any to examine these Scriptures more closely, and to look for themselves into what they testify of the "purpose of the ages."

But Mr. Oxenham has two or three questions, to which he asks an answer. First, "If Christ *had* intended to teach the doctrine

* Heb. ix. 26; 1 Cor. x. 11. As shewing that the *aiōnes* and *χρόνοι αἰώνιοι* are identical, see Rom. xvi. 25, and Col. i. 26; and 1 Cor. ii. 7, and 2 Tim. i. 9.

† And yet Mr Oxenham says, "There is nothing anywhere in the language of the New Testament to suggest that *aiōnios* means anything less than everlasting" (p. 726).

‡ I have gone into the proof of it, "Restitution," &c., pp. 48—68.

of eternal punishment, could He possibly have taught it in plainer or more direct terms?" (p. 627). To this, I answer, Yes, Christ could have said "endless," a word often used by His professed disciples, but which He never used.* Secondly, "If He did *not* intend to teach this doctrine, could He possibly have chosen language more certain *à priori* to mislead?" (p. 627). This cannot be so briefly answered, for it touches the whole question, why the God of Israel, our Saviour, is a "God who hideth Himself;" why His revelations have ever been with reserve and under a veil, whether of type under the Old, or of parable even under the New, Covenant? The fact however is that He has always thus spoken. Nor has the other fact, that many for a while would therefore misunderstand the revelation, kept God from still pursuing the same method of speaking to fallen men by type and shadow and parable. What if when He said, "He that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one," and again, "He that eateth me shall live by me," some should misunderstand the words? their misunderstanding only proved that they were yet unfit for that truth which would shine out of the mystic words so soon as the hearers were inwardly prepared for it. For He has many things to say unto us, which we cannot bear at first, and our misapprehensions of His meaning, though they show us what we are, do not really hurt us, if we still walk humbly with Him.

The argument therefore which Mr. Oxenham presses, that the doctrine of eternal punishment stands precisely and exactly on the same ground as transubstantiation (pp. 628, 629), weighty as it may be to one who looks "from a Roman Catholic point of view," may help others to see the real worth or worthlessness of proofs like this from Holy Scripture. On this point therefore I will only add, that both as to transubstantiation and eternal punishment, Mr. Oxenham, instead of understanding, is I believe only misunderstanding, our Lord's most blessed words. But it is in Scripture as in the books of nature and providence; not only will our sense-readings never solve the difficulty, but such readings need to be corrected again and again if we would possess the real truth.

Mr. Oxenham has yet another question which he seems to think unanswerable, as proving that "there is no repentance in the grave." "What mean," he asks, "those repeated warnings about the thief in the night, the sudden return of the master of the house or of the bridegroom, the two men in one bed, the two women at the mill, the two men in the field, of whom one was taken and the other left?" (pp. 437, and 729). I reply, They mean that the prize of being joint-heirs with Christ, if lost now, as Esau lost the birth-right, is lost for ever. Once let us, who hear the Gospel, while we

* It is sometimes said that the words, "Their worm dieth not," &c. are equivalent to endless. But on this see "Restitution," pp. 123—128.


are in this life sell our birthright and then though we may cry "with a great and exceeding bitter cry," the glory of the first-born is for ever gone from us and we shall find no place or means for reversing our choice, though when too late we do so carefully with tears. But I do not on this account believe that even the *Esau* have no blessing; for I read, - By faith Isaac blessed both Jacob and Esau concerning things to come;" and so, while the birthright is for ever lost, Esau yet has hope as "concerning things to come," and will one day get a blessing, though never the blessing of the despised birthright. Only if we here suffer with Christ shall we reign with Him; only if like Him we lose our life shall we save it for the kingdom.

In conclusion, one word as to the necessary results of looking at the question "from a Roman Catholic point of view." From that point of view universal restitution cannot be seen. Therefore, so it is assumed, it cannot be. But they make poor discoverers who conclude there is no land when they can see nothing but sea; so are they poor learners who deny a truth simply because they do not yet see it. But the Roman Catholic point of view has, if I err not, another disadvantage, for with those who look out from it authority is ever taken for truth, instead of truth for authority. Truth, according to the Roman theory, cannot be got save by authority. God did indeed once speak to men. The "Word of the Lord came" in bygone times to prophets and apostles; but all this is past; revelation is complete and concluded. We are now only to learn what we are taught by those authorities which have been ordained, like the sun and moon, to enlighten all nations. What must be the result when, according to Scripture, "the sun is turned into darkness, and the moon into blood;" when those ordinances in Church or State which have been set for lights give no light, but only blood or darkness; when "the stars," or "angels of the churches," are "fallen to the earth," and have "opened the bottomless pit, so that the sun and air are darkened as with the smoke of a great furnace?" What must be the darkness of those who in such straits have no knowledge of a present Lord, to guide and teach men by His Spirit, who therefore put darkness for light and light for darkness, and bitter for sweet and sweet for bitter? Not of this kind was the faith of that Apostle whom the Church of Rome professes to follow. No Church authority, but the truth itself, taught him that Jesus was the Christ. Flesh and blood did not reveal it, but the Father who is in heaven. Peter believed the truth, because it was the truth, and this, spite of its being rejected and condemned by the assembled council of that nation which had been set apart to bear witness to the truth. Thus believing the truth, because it was truth, he had the witness in himself. On the other hand, the very power to recognise truth

seems gone, when men have once decided that authority, not truth, is for them to determine everything. Any lie thenceforward may be their truth. Some antichrist has but to sit in the temple of God, and his dicta are the words of God.

I will only add the expression of my sincere thankfulness that the pages of the *CONTEMPORARY* have been open to the examination of this subject. Nothing, perhaps, has made more so-called infidels than the assertion that the Gospel declares unending torments. No question, therefore, can be of greater moment, nor can any theology which blinks the question meet the cravings which are abroad, and which I cannot but believe are the work of God's Spirit. Church reviews, however, seem as yet generally unable to give this question a fair hearing. For the "restitution of all things" is to the Church what the "call of the Gentiles" was to Israel; and those who, like Paul, can receive the "wider hope," like him must be content for a season to be rejected by the Pharisees and Scribes in Israel. They may, like the Apostle, even "expound the law and the prophets from morning to evening," but some only will "believe the things spoken, and some will not believe." God's purpose, however, as declared in Scripture, cannot be set aside because the Church is blind to it. And my conviction is that the special opening of this truth, as it is now being opened by God Himself, everywhere, is an evident sign and witness of the passing away of present things in Church and State, and of the imminent judgment of apostate Christendom. But a voice yet says, "He that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit saith." May that Spirit yet more fully guide us into His own truth, and as a means yet more fully open those Scriptures, which, like the world around, contain unknown and undiscovered treasures, even the unsearchable riches of Christ, laid up for lost creatures.

ANDREW JUKES.



THE PULSE OF EUROPE.*

THE pulse of Europe is unquestionably beating rather quick. Let us see, by attention to the other symptoms of its condition, whether this heightened pulse must be taken as denoting the commencement of serious derangement, or whether there is any reason to hope that it is the result of a temporary cause, and one not likely to lead to danger.

We may first look at France, from whose disturbances so many sudden and grievous maladies have had, if not their source, at least their overt beginnings.

* This paper is written in compliance with a special request of the Editor. It is, indeed, in great part a reply to questions put by him; and in order to make it thoroughly intelligible to the reader, some extracts from his letter are subjoined:—

“I suppose that, to ‘feel the pulse of Europe’ just now, one would first put one’s fingers upon the ‘wrist’ of the Bosphorus.

“The seat of fevered action may be far off, either in the heart at Paris, or the head at Berlin, or the stomach at St. Petersburg. But whether originating with one or several of the great organs, the quickened and irregular flutter of the whole blood makes itself most obvious at Constantinople, and, under the name of the Eastern Question, seems the gravest disturbance through which Europe is soon destined to pass. Such a disturbance might perhaps become either a chronic malady or a bracing change for the whole system according to the treatment now to be adopted: and I should greatly like your opinion on the subject.

“Near the root of the matter, as I venture to think, lies the question of the real relation in the Turkish Empire itself between its Christian and Mahomedan populations. Are they becoming, or tending to become, worse or better neighbours? Is fanaticism on both sides becoming intensified, and if so to what causes is it traceable? Is the jealousy of Western innovation on the part of the old school parallel merely to the jealousy of the old school in Christendom which has developed into Ultramontanism (a natural jealousy of ‘the new learning’ as of their destined destroyer, which is inseparable from dying superstitions, and stimulates them to their last convulsive efforts, their ‘lightening before death’)? or has the successor of the Prophet still any real

Is there anything in the present state of France to make us specially uneasy? I think not.

Within the last few months, the Assembly, which had been elected in a dark hour of national peril, has peaceably passed away, and the new Constitution has got into fair working order.

Has there been anything then in the behaviour of the Head of the State to make us forebode mischief? Far from it. He has taken up a more truly constitutional position than any French ruler has done for a long time past.

No one can believe him to be a very ardent votary of democratic opinions. Perhaps he is about as devoted to them as that great ecclesiastic of whom it used to be told, nearly a generation ago, that when a smart shower began to fall as he was going in procession to bless a tree of liberty, he observed to his nearest neighbour, "*Il paraît que notre bon Dieu n'est pas fort républicain.*"

The tone of many about the President is said to be very far indeed from that usual with people who are enthusiastically attached to a non-monarchical order of things, but on the other

power or chance left to him of raising a holy war for existence—not parallel with but in contrast to the Vaticanist holy war? If so, whom would he summon and who would obey?

"In the next place, is there any prospect of anything like Constitutionalism arising and continuing in Turkey, or any other way by which a political and social *modus vivendi* could be arrived at between Christian and Mussulman, such as is more or less found possible (if not always comfortable) between Protestants and Catholics?

"If not, and if a heaven-born ruler, who could weld loose fragments together into a nation by dint of hard and ceaseless hitting, does not soon give signs of his coming, what, in the interest of the great masses of the fleeced inhabitants, now stagnating, rotting, or ready to tear each other's throats, would be the real and valid objection to the absorption of the empire into better-governed countries?

"Is there, or has there ever been, any real feeling of patriotism or nationality in Turkey, which would be *agonized* as was Poland's, or would be even wounded by such an absorption? Is it not rather a faith, a creed, and no sense of kinship of blood, which alone acts (so far as anything acts) as a bond of unity? In the place of any feeling of nationality, is not *Islam* rather than *Turkey* the password to such unity as there is or has been, just as *Church* and not *Country* is (or at any rate was in the middle age) the password with the Roman Catholic world?

"But if there be no real sentiment of nationality, and no signs of its being created—if it be not in the nomad nature of these Tartar-descended men to make a solid, settled, progressive country—and if, in consequence, the sum of human misery is terribly increased as population multiplies under such conditions of barbarous ignorance, rapacity, and misgovernment as now prevail—would it not be right and desirable that the empire should be absorbed amongst communities who live a happier life, and would impart it to their new fellow-countrymen? Has not, in one word, the Turkish Empire been sustained too long (for the interest of its inhabitants) as an accident of the opposing forces of European jealousies, in the absence of any inherent or coherent force of its own? And might not those jealousies be now turned to the account and welfare of the unhappy people whose unhappiness they—and perhaps they alone—now chiefly perpetuate?

"If Turkey were divided, need English interests suffer more than they do now? Grant that our past policy has been and is justified by its fruit in our present hold upon Egypt, and in the open way to India (if, indeed, that fruit be not rather in spite than in consequence of our policy), yet, seeing that we have that fruit, and our fleets to preserve it, what do we need with any more Crimean wars or Black Sea treaties? And why should we not rather assist than hinder the absorption of wretched populations into more prosperous and more promising communities?

"I have left myself no time to ask you more questions in detail, as I had meant to do. But as you turn your attention to one organ after another of the European body, you will perhaps, please, make your comments upon its own local affection, as well as upon its influence on the general pulse, which seems to me to beat 'Eastern Question' at this moment very strongly."

hand it must be remembered that the most pronounced opponents of Republican government for France abuse him in good set phrase; parodying, for example, in bitter scorn of his too constitutional inaction, his famous words at Sebastopol.

After weighing the accusations which opposite extremes bring against the Marshal, I think we are justified in coming to the conclusion that he plays, very reasonably well, a delicate and difficult part.

Turn then to the Senate. Has there been anything in its action to excite disquiet? Has it shown any signs of being wildly democratic, or on the other hand of putting itself into dangerous opposition to the other branch of the Legislature? Its worst enemy would not venture to bring either of these charges against it.

Examine next the proceedings of the Second Chamber. Of course violent proposals have been made in it. It would not be an Assembly truly representative of France if it did not contain a fair proportion of violent men; but these proposals have met with their natural quietus, just as they would have done at Westminster.

Meantime M. Gambetta slowly grows in importance and becomes, at least to persons standing at a distance, less and less like the enthusiast who urged his countrymen to destruction in the winter of 1870-71. There are those who have had good means of judging who say, "The caution which he at present affects is all on the surface, his words are moderate, his actions are not so."

On the other hand, some quite unprejudiced witnesses tell us that he sees through the illusion which makes many of his countrymen, who ought to know better, dream dreams of a Russian alliance. Others again aver that although he, like all French politicians, must reckon with Universal Suffrage, he would have been no advocate of its introduction if it had not existed—that his thoughts run on the separation of religious and secular instruction, on the substitution as far as may be of direct for indirect taxation, and other such matters, which have no terror for Liberal ears in this country—that his political method is not that, of old too common in Paris, of making, namely, a ready-made theory and then fitting the facts to it, but that he really inquires, studies, and learns by experience.

All that is of good promise and to be taken account of in any survey of the present state of Europe, for M. Gambetta is clearly one of the factors of which politicians must take account whether they like it or not.

It is said that scant justice has been meted out by the majority to members of strong Clerical or Monarchical or Imperialist sympathies whose elections have been questioned. I can well believe it. When has a political majority been just in such matters? Was it so of old in England? Have we not quite recently taken

away the jurisdiction in the case of contested elections even from our own carefully chosen election committees, and handed it over to the judges of the land.

If the French were to do the same just at present, they would probably step out of the frying-pan into the fire, unless the *magistrature* has become far more dependable than it used to be in the days of the Second Empire, which there is no reason, I am afraid, to imagine to be the case.

Pass, then, to the state of public feeling. Is it at all alarming? Not so. The German War killed out a great deal of Chauvin enthusiasm. It will wake up again, I fear; but for the present it is less powerful than it has been for a long time.

The influence of the catastrophe of the Commune upon many other forms of misbelief has been no less deadly than that of the German War upon Chauvinism. Socialism, for example, is for the present almost non-existent in France as a political force.

Then, I think I observe more toleration growing up amongst French parties than I have been at all accustomed to. For example, I was talking some little time ago to a man of tried republican and most determined anti-clerical opinions about the young Catholic orator, M. Albert de Mun. In the whole of my acquaintance I hardly know two persons who have less in common; yet the one said with reference to the other, after some words strongly condemnatory of his opinions, "*Mais il est rempli du talent, et j'aime le talent même ennemi.*" When French politicians begin to say such things of their fiercest antagonists, they are on the way to the same state of affairs with which we are familiar in London, and which made a hot partisan from the north of England, when he saw two distinguished Whig and Tory statesmen fraternizing in the lobby with schoolboy *abandon*, after a sharp passage of arms in the House, dash away in a towering passion with the words, "That's the way they sells we."

The name of M. Albert de Mun reminds me of a book which ought to find many readers in England, as being one of the most curious and first-hand narratives connected with the great struggle of 1870.

The Marquis de Mun, father of the gifted Catholic champion, found himself when the war broke out—what few French country gentlemen have the wisdom to be—the maire of his Commune. He determined, accordingly, to remain in his château, which was right in the storm-track of the German invasion. He sent away all his family except his wife, and kept for its absent members a minute record of all that occurred. That many extremely unpleasant things occurred, and that the tact, patience, and courage of Monsieur and Madame de Mun were grievously tried, is a matter of course. An invasion can never be made agreeable even

to the non-combatant invaded; but still the book is on the whole a wonderful testimonial to the general good behaviour of the German army. That many bad things were done in various parts of France by individual black sheep with and without the officer's uniform, is too true; but no army under similar circumstances (for the short campaign of 1866 in Bohemia was not nearly so great an ordeal) ever behaved anything like so well.

Since the voice of Montalembert ceased to be heard in the Assemblies of his country, no voice speaking in those Assemblies upon the clerical side has had any accents which had the slightest charm, except, I suppose, for people who agreed with the views expressed. It will be curious to see how far M. de Mun, if he is re-elected for Pontivy, will form an exception. He has at least a good start, for it is no bad introduction to the attention of educated persons throughout the world, however little they may agree with what is said, to be descended on the father's side from the emphatically eighteenth-century philosopher Helvetius, while one is on the mother's side the inheritor of a name which can only be forgotten with the French language and the Catholic Church.

But I am digressing. If we look away from the political temper to the material condition of France, we find it exceptionally good. She is suffering less at this moment than any other country from the financial collapse that is almost everywhere visible.

This she owes, I presume, chiefly to two causes—

First, to the remarkable succession of corn and wine harvests which she has had;

Secondly, to the fact that the drain upon her resources made by the war of 1870 and its results, discouraged her from undertaking risky pecuniary enterprises, which were so rife till recently in England, Germany, and America.

On the whole, then, our diagnosis must in the case of France, for the moment and for the immediate future, be highly favourable. As to the more distant future, I say nothing one way or other. I am advisedly confining my auguries to the next few months.

In Belgium there are some disorders, but although they are, I am afraid, symptomatic of a deeper and more widely-spread derangement than what I take to be the real cause of the accelerated pulse of Europe at this moment, we must not linger over them. I am not sure besides whether the contemplation of the bitter strife which goes on between Clericals and Liberals in Belgium does not tend to make many people, and especially one of the most intelligent commentators, who addresses the English public on foreign affairs, rather exaggerate the European importance of their dissensions. Anyhow, the graver view of this subject is sure to be forcibly represented in this country.

For ourselves, we will turn towards the south, and, crossing

the Bidassoa, arrive at the unhappy country which "Mexico is almost entitled to pity," and which a Portuguese is said to have described as the "madhouse next door." To her the present year has brought, if not health, at least some alleviation of suffering. The senseless civil war, hopelessly waged for ends partly ignoble and partly absurd, has come for the present to an end, and Spanish statesmen are engaged in the not easy task of attempting to conciliate the interests and feelings of the greater part of the country with what is due to those places in the Basque provinces which did not join the rebels.

A Spanish Conservative statesman said some years ago, "I do not wish to repass the Bridge of Alcolea." The Bridge of Alcolea was the scene of the combat which decided the fate of Queen Isabella's Government, and the speaker meant to convey the impression that he had broken with the state of things prior to 1868. Since that time, however, persons of less Conservative tendencies than Admiral Topete seem very much inclined to repass the Bridge of Alcolea.

That the excesses which marked the career of the short-lived Republic should lead to some reaction when the Restoration came was inevitable; but the reaction has been passing beyond all bounds.

One of the first acts of the Alphonsist Government was to put public instruction entirely under the clergy, and to ill-treat some of the most distinguished professors of the Madrid University, who protested against having to submit their lectures to the rector, with a view to his seeing that they did not contain anything contrary to the tenets of the Roman Church. Many of the leading professors had to resign, and have been trying to establish a private institution where they may continue to teach. Their prospectus is now lying before me. A most sensible and moderate document it is, and it is signed by some of the most honoured names in Spain—honoured I mean by all those who believe that it is only by the diffusion of sound knowledge that the rival mad-nesses of the Catholic fanatic, and the Intransigent fanatic, can be prevented from tearing to pieces the old Spain as similar forces have too often torn the new. These gentlemen, of whom the best-known name in London is Señor Moret y Prendergast, who was lately Minister here, represent all that gives most hope of anything like settled government beyond the Pyrenees.

The reply of Mr. Bourke in the House of Commons on the 19th of June confirmed the unfavourable impressions which observers of Spanish politics had gathered from the newspapers, with regard to the possible difficulties in store for foreign and other non-Catholics in Spain. The new legislation is of that ambiguous kind which may lend itself to very vexatious proceedings on the part of foolish or bigoted local authorities.

The Revolution of 1868 promised at first to effect great benefits, and it did effect considerable benefits. It gave a great impulse to free trade, and it established perfect religious toleration. The countless miseries that have succeeded each other since the death of Prim should rather be set to the account of those who expected to gain by that atrocity than to that of the men who expelled Queen Isabella. Now, however, in spite of the liberal inclinations of the young King, everything seems going back; not quite, perhaps, to the state in which it was before Narvaez died, but a very long way towards it.

Amongst the latest writings of Montalembert are some pages of the most admirable eloquence, in which he defends the Sisters of Vincent de Paul, and others of his co-religionists, against the rigours of Spanish Liberalism in the days of its triumph. Would that we had once more among us that "golden mouth" to denounce equally unjustifiable, and perhaps better authenticated, injustice proceeding from the opposite side. The great orator, however, has gone to his rest, and in the strife of Continental opinion about religious subjects the school which he led, and which, however fervently Catholic, maintained the necessity of freedom even to the vigorous growth of Catholicism itself, is nowhere seen—at least in political life.

In thinking of Spain, as it now is, it is only fair to remember that we are apt to cherish illusions about her days of greatness. That greatness was really based upon the proud ignorance which is to this hour the curse of the country. A nation of nine millions, as has been well said, situated in a corner of Europe, poorer than her neighbours, and unable to send across her frontiers at one time more than 20,000 men, dreamed of universal dominion. Of course she exhausted herself in the attempt to realize an impossibility, and her exhaustion doomed her to endure a government as arbitrary as that of the Committee of Public Safety for something like three centuries. From the torpor induced by that government, she only awoke to be torn by factions of the most virulent kind. The only wonder is that she exists as an organized State at all.

That the old appetite for dominion is still keen we see from the tenacity with which she holds on to Cuba. How that possession is to be kept, without entailing upon the mother-country quite intolerable sacrifices, no one explains. That her Finance Minister should smilingly invite the foreign bondholders to share these is only too much in accordance with the ways of a country where honesty is not considered to have anything to do with honour; but let the part of the bondholders in bearing the burden be ever so great, the problem of holding Cuba so that its possession may be an advantage, and not a calamity, is little nearer solution.

Passing to Italy we find a state of things which six months ago

would have appeared very improbable, but which is, at the same time, in no sense alarming. The new year found at the head of the Government of Victor Emmanuel a statesman widely and favourably known in Europe, assisted by colleagues some of whose names likewise commanded much confidence. Before the end of March that Cabinet had fallen, and had been replaced by another, with regard to which persons outside the bounds of Italy had far scantier opportunities of forming an opinion.

The circumstances, however, which raised them to power, and their conduct in power, have been in no way such as to excite serious disquietude. We may regret the disappearance of M. Minghetti just at a time when equilibrium began to appear as a probability in the national accounts; we may regret that he should have sacrificed his parliamentary majority to a railway policy, which its best friends must admit to be experimental, and against which its opponents have so much that is serious to allege. I see no indication, however, that Italy is likely to go headlong down the steep of democracy, or to give way to ambitious aims, or to affect to play in Europe a part to which her young strength is still unequal.

To nurse her resources; to avoid straying, under the specious pretext of fiscal necessities, too far from the paths of that Free Trade with which, even in the dark days of last century, her name was so honourably connected; to be very cautious indeed about extending the suffrage into the stratum of society where the priest is still a political influence; to think of her army rather as a school for her backward populations than as a means of winning warlike renown; to listen very distrustfully to those who urge her to build more costly ironclads;—these are surely golden maxims for the Italy of to-day.

There is no state in Europe to which circumstances more distinctly prescribe a close friendship with this country. “I was thinking,” said an Italian statesman to me a few months ago, “a long way back in history, and I could not remember one single instance in which the interests of England and Italy were at variance.” “It is curious you should say that to-night,” I replied. “For only this morning I came across a saying in Giusti’s collection of Proverbs which struck me much, and the date of which I would greatly like to know:—

“Con tutto il mondo la guerra.
E pace con Inghilterra.”

Let us now cross the narrow seas to the Eastern Peninsula.

Arrived there, we soon find that in it is the real cause of the startling disturbance which is showing itself in the pulse of our political state-system, and immediately a variety of most interesting questions suggest themselves.

First. What is the real root-mischief in Turkey? I reply, it is

the disorder which is caused by the different rate of growth which has lately been going forward in the Christian and Mussulman part of the community, combined with the fact that a large portion of Europe sympathizes more or less actively with the Christians. The short history of the settlement of the Turks in Europe is, that after all deduction made for their barbarism, fanaticism, and so forth, they were individually and collectively superior to those they conquered. That superiority has, however, long been on the decline. It has not disappeared—far from it. Those who have travelled in Turkey not to establish a theory, but simply to understand the state of the facts, know this well, and unprejudiced persons who do not know it may be referred to such a manifestly truthful document as Mr. Longworth's despatch, laid before Parliament in 1867. In spite of all the denunciations, just and unjust, which have been levelled of late at the head of the Turk in Europe, it will be hard to prove to any one who has seen him through his own eyes, and not through this or that pair of political spectacles, that he is the unreclaimed ruffian which he is often represented to be. Still the Christians, backed by Europe, have for a long time been gaining upon him, and I hold it to be past all question that relatively he must decrease and they must increase.

Nothing is easier for any one who has to speak of the affairs of the Eastern Peninsula, than to incur the reproach of being unfair either to the Turk or to the Christian.

In my judgment, an English politician should neither be philo-Turk nor pro-Christian. He should be Anti-anti-Turk and Anti-anti-Christian.

The moment he abandons that position, he is running into danger,—the danger either of playing into the hands of unscrupulous intriguers, who use the Christians of the East as mere pawns in a political game, or the danger of setting himself in opposition to manifest destiny and to the sentiment of Liberal Europe.

If every one would remember these contrasted dangers, would also remember that nearly everything which the contending parties say of each other is not true, and would further bear in mind that the Christians make twenty statements, at least, for every one that the Turks make, there would be less risk of going wrong in these difficult matters.

When, however, we get beyond this and go into details we are met by one tremendous difficulty—who knows the Eastern Peninsula? Where is one to turn for really sound, *colourless*, information about it?

Go to any good library and count up the recent books. What do they amount to?

But, says some one, although mere students of politics or

Members of Parliament may be at fault, the Cabinet knows all about it. These twelve gentlemen are profoundly versed in all that relates to those complicated matters which are lumped together under the wholly misleading title of the Eastern Question. That is a good hearing for people who want to go about their business in peace, but has it any sort of foundation in fact?

We have been talking much of the Eastern policy of England, but what does that phrase really mean—whose Eastern policy is the policy of England?

Those who have once started in their minds this alarming line of inquiry will have repeated to themselves the names of the Cabinet, and have asked—putting aside Lord Derby—is the opinion of any one of its eleven other members upon the affairs of the Eastern Peninsula of any particular value? Has any of them ever made a special study of the affairs of that part of Europe? Then the inquirer, turning to the Foreign Office List and examining the names, will assuredly go on to ask which of the gentlemen who form the staff in Downing Street can supply the deficiencies of the Committee which, existing principally to manage the House of Commons, decides incidentally upon the issues of peace or war. Is there any provision in the constitution of the Foreign Office for giving that kind of assistance to the Secretary of State which is afforded in such ample measure to his brother secretary at the Indian Office? There are many who think—I am not one of them—that the Council of India might be without disadvantage largely reduced, but few would do away with it altogether, and those who would do so would supply its place by still further adding to the highly-trained and highly-paid ability of the Secretaries of Departments. Now I do not advocate a Council or anything like it at the Foreign Office, but surely it stands to reason that there should be in that office several persons at least, who might fairly sit for the portrait which was traced by Talleyrand, and is reproduced by Lord Dalling in some well-known pages of his “Historical Characters.” On a subject involving so often the “occasion sudden and the practice dangerous,” ought a great nation like ours to be satisfied not to provide the persons whom our parliamentary system of government, from time to time, carries to the Foreign Office, with the very best trained assistants that money and honours can buy?

I am not, observe, making any reflection upon any person now, or lately, at the Foreign Office, nor am I at all taking exception to the way in which the Foreign Office does its *appointed* duty. I believe the machine works extremely well. My point is that Parliamentary Statesmen have not had a just idea as to *what sort of machine* the British Foreign Office ought to be; and I am quite ready to admit that as the party to which I belong has been much more

in power during the last generation than its opponents, we are more to blame for its present deficiencies than they. I consider that every fresh Secretary of State should find when he goes to the Foreign Office three or four persons, whose names and characters are known to the public, with whom it would be as natural for him to talk over general questions of policy, as it would be for the Secretary of State for India to talk over general questions of policy with Sir Bartle Frere, or Sir Henry Rawlinson, or Sir Frederick Halliday.

Half the accusations of duplicity and what not that are often brought by foreigners against English policy have their root, not in any evil will on the part of our critics—still less in any evil intention on the part of those who direct the Foreign Office. They arise from the fact that there are no minds at the Foreign Office *en rapport* with those of the men, or the kind of men, who direct the policy of the other Great Powers. How should they be? To take an example from a man who left the Foreign Office after a long life there, spent in honour, only to take his seat on the Liberal benches in the House of Peers: what opportunities had Lord Hammond in his long and laborious life of getting *en rapport* with the thought—let us say—of Germany, while Germany was gradually climbing to its present place at the head of the Continent? There are and have been many excellent and useful men at the Foreign Office, but with the single exception of Lord Odo Russell, who spent a few months there between his leaving Rome and going to Berlin, there has not been one human being on its staff for the last twenty years who fulfilled the conditions which I hold to be necessary in the highest and most trusted assistants of the Secretary of State.

If, then, I am right in thinking that no Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, chosen as he almost invariably is for any and every reason except for his acquaintance with the delicate matters which he has got to handle, has, as things now are, a proper amount of assistance in Downing Street, how is it at the other end of the wire which connects Downing Street with Constantinople? In a country situated as Turkey has been for many years has the British Ambassador had a proper amount of assistance? I think not. I think that the plan suggested by one who knew Turkey better than all the present Cabinet, and all the last Cabinet, and all the Foreign Office put together—I mean the late Lord Strangford—should have been carried into effect long ago. He wished to provide the ambassador at Constantinople with several pairs of highly-trained eyes, which he might send to collect information at places distant from the centre of affairs, and about which he could not learn the real truth in Constantinople. Every one who has studied Turkey knows that such districts are

numerous. What authentic information about the Herzegovina is really to be got on the Bosphorus? and, as for truly difficult regions, if any one will turn to the long series of despatches presented about the Ansairiyeh converts last year, he will see that for want of better information so sensible a man as Sir Henry Elliot actually forwards to Downing Street as likely to be "interesting" some half-educated chatter of an American missionary about those curious people, just as if they had been a newly-discovered set of cannibals in the outlying parts of the South Seas.

But I must let Lord Strangford speak for himself. After many remarks, all of which are worth reading, he goes on to say—

"But now and henceforward, communication with the Porte, where French is largely spoken, and where official notes are often written in French, is of minor importance; travel in Turkey, intercourse with the people; and comprehension of the rising nationalities, especially of the Bulgarians, are of paramount importance. It is on the necessities of these points, the last in particular, that I rest my present case. But the weight of a recognized authority is chiefly necessary in this country, before a thing can be done, even for its benefit. . . . It is not for me to presume to point out how to choose men to enter this service. Perhaps it cannot be done otherwise than by competitive examination; yet this may burden you with a short-sighted invalid, who can no more sit a horse than Coleridge when he enlisted in the dragoons, merely for being the best hand at answering questions like 'What did Mr. Kemble mean when he called English a dead language?' Not but that competitive examination is the best, or the least bad, system to apply to a vast branch of the public service like the Indian Civil Service, where you must have a system of some sort; but in Turkey you want no system, and are better without one. All I can do is to call notice to the type of man who should be selected, and who is as often the product of the hunting-field as of the study. More than one such man is wanted, and in more than one place; for many different subjects have to be learnt, and checks must be established against possible one-sidedness, or enthusiasm. Time is wanted; for every Englishman in Turkey who is worth anything, or is likely to become so, has to go through the stages of learning, unlearning, and finally re-learning, with a consciousness of his own ignorance and a respect for the limits of his knowledge; he has to pass through the Philhellenic fever, or the Turkish fever, which is apt to become the chief of its *sequelæ*, or the Servian or Montenegrin fever, before his judgment becomes properly hardened and inured to the work of digesting the information he receives. Money is wanted; only a very little, it is true; but it is not usual with us to apply even a very little in a new direction, and without any immediate return. Still, penny wise though we may be, I trust a penny or two may not be considered thrown away in this matter. . . .

"Such a measure as that which I recommend may probably be passed over on the ground that we have already many young men belonging to the families of our consuls in the Levant who 'know the languages,' and upon whom such appointments would be most properly conferred. To this I altogether demur; for, on the one hand, they do not 'know the languages,' as they should be known, unless properly trained; and on the other they are not Englishmen, but Levantines; and it is only Englishmen we want. Their parents, unless they have enriched themselves by trade or otherwise, are mostly men of small means, and often very inadequately paid; they are rarely able to send their sons home to England

for education during the most precious years of boyhood, and are thus often compelled to see their children losing the English nature day by day. . . . We *must* have Englishmen in our public service in Turkey; if we do not send out Englishmen, we must Anglicize our Levantines, and for my part I think we can afford to do both."

Of course I know the objections that would be made to such a proposal, if considered in Cabinet, but all these objections resolve themselves into questions of money, and, as Lord Strangford says, of very little money.

Men attached to the Embassy at Constantinople or Vienna (for the same course should be adopted in Austria),* and then detached into the provinces, to keep their respective ambassadors supplied with information which could not be obtained in the capital, strictly prohibited from political meddling, on pain of instant and ignominious dismissal, well paid, and much made of, would have abundant opportunities of showing what they were worth; and after serving a few years, might either be absorbed into the diplomatic or consular staff, or got rid of with an acknowledgment of their services, and a small sum of money. They would enter upon their duties on the distinct understanding that they had no sort of claim to promotion even *ceteris paribus*.

Some may think that the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service should find in Parliament a sufficient amount of assistance by way of support or criticism to enable them to dispense with further strengthening; but this is not so. Parliament can rarely be useful to them except on broad questions of policy, and few such questions are now ever open. There may be many men in Parliament who could give valuable advice if they had all the facts before them, but this is just what they never have or can have. That is one reason why some of the persons most interested in foreign affairs in the House of Commons are exceedingly shy of introducing them. They know that they cannot possibly know all, and that the *fin mot* of some situation will very likely be just what will escape them.

When Lord Derby and Mr. Bourke leave the Foreign Office, what means will either of these able gentlemen have of keeping themselves fully informed of the daily and hourly changes of the

* In 1870 I said at Elgin, "He must know uncommonly little about Austria who will venture to say that the Vienna embassy, however well manned, can keep the Foreign Office as well informed as it ought to be about all that goes on at Prague and at Cracow, at Lemberg, at Pesth, and at Agram. Well, now, if one thing is clearer than another, it is that one of the results of the great events of the last three months will be to make the position and future of Austria a matter of increasing and most anxious interest to the statesmen of the West. The Eastern question will present itself in quite a new aspect when this storm is over; and, if English statesmen are to deal with it as it ought to be dealt with, they ought to be thoroughly acquainted with all the political facts of Eastern Europe. Lord Strangford, a wise man, too early taken from us, pointed this out some time ago with regard to Turkey, where you have just as much need of ambulant eyes and ears—intelligent reporters strictly prohibited from meddling—as you have in Austria."

kaleidoscope of foreign politics? What opportunity have the present leaders of the Opposition of doing so? It was a feeling of this sort that kept the late Mr. Mill so wisely silent about Indian affairs when he was in the House of Commons. He contrasted Mr. Mill the member for Westminster with Mr. Mill of the India House, who had only to touch a bell to get the fullest information which existed in England about any Indian subject. The telegraph has in this respect greatly increased the gulf between the means of information possessed by the Government of the hour and its critics. A few weeks after anything has happened, an outside observer may get to know as much as it concerns him to know for the formation of his own opinion, but if he trusts to the ordinary sources of information from day to day, and reflects in Parliament his impressions from day to day, he will not be long without being recognized as a tedious devourer of public time.

There are moments when Parliament can be of the greatest use in strengthening the hand of the Foreign Office, as it was, for instance, again and again while Italy was being made; but what is most urgently wanted at the Foreign Office and in the Diplomatic Service is the addition of pillars in the inside, not of buttresses without.

But to return to the Eastern Peninsula, with a view to make the best of the imperfect information we have got.

It is asked whether the Christians and the Turks are becoming worse neighbours to each other or better, and in either case why?

To this I reply that the latest authentic information—not of a fragmentary character—on this subject, before the outbreak of the insurrection now proceeding, is to be found, so far as I am aware, in the consular reports on the treatment of the Christians in Turkey, which were presented to Parliament nine years ago. Now at the very first glance the reader of these will see that they are documents of most unequal value. Some are excellent compositions; some are badly put together and extremely meagre. At the second glance he will perceive that the matter of the reports is as diverse as the manner. Some, like that of Mr. Blunt, from Adrianople, and the Balkan generally, tell of a state of things which, under all circumstances, can only be described as *most encouraging*; others, as those from Cavalla, Kustendje, Prevesa, and Monastir, are bad, or very bad.

If, after reading the reports, one begins to ask about the reporters, the confusion is increased. The testimony of A is of great value; of B of middling value; of C of slight value; and so on.

Then it is natural to turn to a book like “The Turks, the Greeks, and the Slavons,” which was published about the same time as these papers appeared; but that work was written by two

ladies, who began their education in the affairs of the Eastern Peninsula by a conversation at Prague with one of the leaders of the Czech party, and who did not seem to have reflected that they were talking with a violent partisan. One must then take a course of Lord Straungford as a corrective, and when one has done so the conclusion arrived at may be something like this:—

The Ottoman Government is detestable. Both Christians and Turks are horribly oppressed. Generally—though by no means always—the Christian is most oppressed, but his worst oppressors are too often those of his own faith. See especially the really shocking accounts sent by Mr. Billiotti with reference to the Sporades.

How far professors of the two faiths might get on pretty well together if unwise sympathizers from abroad did not excite the Christian and bully the Turk is a question which I cannot answer, but I should like to see ambassadorial and consular pressure chiefly used to protect the Christian—not as a Christian, but as a subject. Relations like those of contending sects to the Indian Government are what we ought to pray for; but, with so many half-barbarian Christians just over the frontier in Austria and Russia, it is not easy to arrive at such a comparatively blissful state, even if the ruling race was willing to give fair play, which, oddly enough, it seems more inclined to do in Asia than in Europe.

It is clear that every day's fighting tends to make the feud of Turk and Christian more envenomed. Should we then wish to have a peace patched up irrespective of its conditions? I really do not know, and I should much like to see the man out of the Foreign Office that does. If I had read the reports of Mr. White, from Belgrade, and the reports of two or three men as good as he from other districts, with which even the Foreign Office has I fear no communication, I would hazard an opinion; but I have not seen them, or any of them.

Next it is asked whether Turkish fanaticism is becoming intensified, and, if so, how far?

The most authoritative answer I know to that inquiry is to be found in Mr. Palgrave's "Essays on Eastern Questions," published in 1872. I should premise that Mr. Palgrave in several places refers to "Our Indian Mussulmans," a book which to the best of my knowledge and belief gives far too sensational a view of the state of Mahometan feeling in India, and after which I should advise the perusal of an admirable paper by a high Indian official in the *Theological Review* for 1872.

This makes me receive Mr. Palgrave's conclusions with some reserve. Still he is obviously an important witness.

He cites (speaking, let it be observed chiefly of Turkey in Asia), in proof of Mahometan revival in the Sultan's dominions—

1. The recent modification of the non-denominational public schools, remarking that a quarter of a century ago they were getting more and more Western, but that now hardly one child of Christian creed or parentage is to be found among a hundred turbaned scholars. "All is as thoroughly Mahometan as an Omar or an Othman himself could desire."

2. The great diminution in the abuse of alcoholic liquors, which always coincides in these countries with the renewal of religious zeal.

3. The exacter observance of Ramadan.

4. The diminution of the number of Christians, and especially of Europeans, in Turkish employment, particularly in the Military and Public Works Departments.

5. The great increase of Mosque building and College building.

He adds—

"Enough to say that from him that sitteth upon the throne, the Sultan of Constantinople, Abd-el-Azeez himself," the Mahometan revival "embraces every class down to the poorest 'hammal,' or street-porter on the wharves, every nationality within the Ottoman Empire, North and South, Turks, Turkomans, Koordes, Arabs, with their respective sub-branches and cross-races; that the recent Circassian exiles, who, on their first arrival, hardly knew a morning prayer or a verse of the Kuran, are now in Muslem exactitude and fervour inferior to none; and that while all the temporal advantages offered by European protection and support, not to mention the direct persuasion and indirect subsidy of well-to-do missionaries, can scarcely, or indeed more truly not at all, procure a single convert from Islam to any form of Christianity, Greek, Armenian, Catholic, or Protestant, on the other hand a reverse process yearly enrolls a very sensible number from one or another, or all of these sects, under the unity of the green banner. This in Turkish Asia; while from Africa reports reach us of whole negro tribes abandoning their hereditary fetish for the religion called of Abraham; and, after all due allowance made for distance and exaggeration, the current idea, that the Libyan Peninsula will soon be, what its best portions in North and East already are, a land of Islam, seems by no means destitute of probability."

And again—

"Islam is even now an enormous power, full of self-sustaining vitality, with a surplus for aggression; and a struggle with its combined energies would be deadly indeed. Yet we, at any rate, have no need for nervous alarm, if its quarrel, even partially, be with us and our Empire, so long as we are consistently faithful to the practical wisdom of our predecessors, that best of legacies bequeathed us by the old East India Company."

Now while this, or something like this, is going on in Western Asia, we must not be surprised if the *contre-coup* is felt in Eastern Europe, and the more we English can do to prevent the troubles of Bosnia and the Herzegovina taking the form of a general quarrel between Turk and Christian throughout the Ottoman Empire, the better will it be not only for humanity in general but for our influence in India, and throughout Central Asia. An

Indian authority in the House of Commons told us the other day that our Mahometan subjects did not care in the least about the Sultan of Roum. I cannot think that he was right, and should much like to hear what our guest, Sir Salar Jung, would say on that subject. That it is utterly untrue with regard to Central Asia would be, I suppose, generally admitted. We must be known neither as the friends of the Mussulman as Mussulman, nor of the Christian as Christian. In fact our wise policy in all times and places is to identify ourselves with good government and justice between man and man, irrespective of religious creed.

Many a bitter disappointment has fallen upon the sympathizers with revolt against the Ottomite since the daughter of M. de Kersaint made her memorable reply to Charles X., when he described the Greeks as Jacobins. What was magnificent then would be childish now. We must beware how we allow ourselves to be misled by fancied analogies between things in the West and the East.

An Eastern Christian does not necessarily, or I fear often, look at things as people deserving to be called Christians look at them in France or England. The following remarkable passage, cited by Mr. Palgrave in another paper, is not by a Christian but by a Mahometan writer:—

“ By Me the Koran illuminates the prayerful recesses of the mosque;
And by Me the sanctuary of the Church is alike lighted up with the Gospel.
In Me the volumes of the Old Testament wherein Moses addressed his people
Evening by evening advantage those who listen to the chant of the elders.
The savage who falls prostrate to the stone he worships in the plain,
It were folly to deny that he occupies a place among my adorers.

“ And they who danced round the Golden Calf may well be excused
From the slur of polytheism, by the ultimate meaning of things.
Thus it is: in no sect or nation has the view been misdirected;
And in no system has man's thought gone astray from Me.
Whoever has admired the sun in the splendours of its rising,
Has but seen in the brilliancy of its light an unveiling of mine.”

A study of Mr. Palgrave's elaborate examination of the fourteen species of the genus Eastern Christian may be recommended before we invest too deeply in anti-Islamite enthusiasms.

If a man, after knowing what these Eastern Christians really are, is deliberately of opinion that the creed which is represented by St. Sophia or the Jumna Musjid is infinitely below them, there is nothing more to be said. But we must not allow ourselves to attend exclusively to names while we wholly forget things.

But some one who cares less about creeds than constitutions asks whether in the European provinces of Turkey there is not a prospect of some form of government arising under which, with representative institutions such as Midhat Pacha is said to wish for, Christian and Mahometan might live together in tolerable harmony? I do not see that there is. It may come about some

day, but I cannot even guess how it is to do so. Both in Servia and Roumania the people have shown themselves thoroughly intolerant, not only of the Turks, but of the Jews. I have even known a person of the very highest European cultivation who had lived much in Bucharest, catch the Roumanian tone, and speak of the Jews as people in England have hardly done since the days of Cromwell. What seem to me much more wanted than representative institutions, are good courts of justice.

Well, then, if you doubt about representative institutions being a panacea, is a heaven-born Sultan possible who would weld the various discordant elements into one composite nation? I reply that everything is possible, but it is most unlikely that any such should appear.

If a heaven-born Sultan was to appear, I think he would have appeared ere this, for the need has been long and terrible. What is worse, I seem to note a failure of hope in the ruling race—one of the worst of bad symptoms. Of course, when people talk of a great Sultan, they mean a man ruling more or less in accordance with the principles of Islam, and a man of the race of Othman. There is nothing, however, to show that the greatest men of that race ever had any gifts for governing subject populations as we in Europe now think they should be governed; and this I say without forgetting the noble words of Mahmoud, "Henceforward I will only know the Mussulman at the mosque, the Christian in the church, the Jew at the synagogue;" but noble sentiments do not alter in a day or in a generation the set of history. Time, as the lawyers say, is here of the essence of the contract. Could a great Sultan do more than dash himself against impossibilities, and write for his line a grand last page in characters of blood and fire?

But if the rise of a great ruler of the line of Othman is very unlikely, is there any chance of a great minister working out his own plans behind the ægis of a well-intentioned though feeble Sultan; and if so, is Midhat Pacha the sort of minister that is wanted? Midhat Pacha has done well in more places than one—well at Bagdad, well at Rustchuk, for example. He would, I think, impress a European who talks to him favourably, but I do not think he would leave on his mind any idea that he was what we in this island call a great statesman.

But supposing Murad V. could find or import a real statesman, the kind of man who would have been a power in any country had he taken to politics—such a man as Nubar Pacha for instance—how would it do? Well, I am very much inclined to think that that would be the best chance. But Nubar Pacha is not even a Turk. He is an Armenian. Could such a man be accepted as the virtual ruler of the Empire? I cannot say. The generation,

however, which saw the Protestant Count Beust become a Liberal Prime Minister in Austria, has learned to think nothing quite out of the question.

But some impatient person says—why wait for some minister who may never come? Why not—giving up all hope of improvement while Turkey holds together—encourage Austria, Russia, and Greece to annex each the part of the Eastern Peninsula that it can best assimilate? First as to Austria. She has quite enough to do with her own conflicting nationalities to make it most unwise for her to attempt annexations south of the Save. The machine only works now by the help of most delicate checks and balances; what if you disturb it by vastly adding to the Slavonic, that is, the anti-Magyar element—an element, in other words, hostile to the race whose tenacity and political ability created the *status quo* in Vienna and Buda-Pesth? Then, are there not divergences enough in the Austro-Hungarian empire already, without adding a large body of Mahometans to the Kaiser's subjects, and what possible annexation can you devise that will not include a large number of Mahometans? The House of Hapsburg by annexing south of the Save would terribly add to its responsibilities, and would in no respect add either to its glory, or its wealth, or its military strength. To do so would be simply to acquire a *damnosa hereditas* of the most alarming description.

With Russia the case is different. The Eastern Peninsula seems at first sight to be to her what Italy used to be to Austria—a natural field of extension towards the south; and if Russia had gone thither in the early part of this century, when Servian and Greek would alike have welcomed her as a liberator, she might very possibly have extended her dominions to Cape Matapan. I say very possibly, for there were obvious difficulties. Still they might have been overcome. Now, however, everything is changed. The shadow goes not back upon the dial in this forward-hurrying age. Neither Greek nor Servian would willingly become Russian subjects. How then would Russia advance? By concert with Austria? What has Austria to gain by so suicidal a permission? Read F'adeyeff's pamphlet, which amounts surely to a demonstration. But if she went without the leave of Austria she would go at her mercy, unless, indeed, Germany kept Vienna otherwise engaged. To Germany, however, the fate of the Eastern Peninsula is only so far a matter of indifference that she is not now thinking about it, because she has more important things to think of nearer home, things which might take such a shape as to make her willing to let Russia have free hand in the East. She would not really desire to see Russia extending in an unbroken line from the extreme north to the extreme south of Europe.

Then of course the eternal Constantinople difficulty would come

to the front. To Russia Constantinople would be more attractive than the whole of the rest of the Eastern Peninsula, but to all the rest of Europe her being there would be the "abomination of desolation standing where it should not." We might, no doubt, seize Candia and Egypt, and hold them so as to keep our way to India clear; but to do so would be an odious necessity, very troublesome, and very compromising in a hundred ways. To the other Mediterranean nations—France, Italy, and Spain—there would come no such compensation. The presence of Russia in Constantinople would be an unmitigated evil, a constant source of alarm and expense.

To Russia itself the possession of the Eastern Peninsula—even if she could retain it peacefully—would be a most doubtful blessing. She would gain nothing substantial, while she would be brought into the most difficult relations with Austria on the one side, and with what remained in Asia of the Turkish power on the other. to say nothing of the disagreeable duty of having to digest Greece, Servia, Roumania, and last, but not least unpleasant in the capacity of an article of food, her hitherto much-petted Montenegro.

I remember falling in, many years ago, in Italy with the last Vladika of that country, the last Montenegrin prince, who was at once bishop and temporal ruler, and, I suppose, for that matter the last bishop in Europe who wore pistols at his girdle. Never shall I forget the expression of one of his followers as, shaking his fist, he said to me, "Montenegro e piccolo, ma eccola Turchia, eccola Austria!" I think a Russian governor would find the little principality a most execrable spot.

Even in Russia itself there are intelligent persons who see that the empire is getting quite unmanageably large, and that the result of becoming the rulers of Constantinople might well be to add most formidably to those divulsive forces which are already at work in it.

Nevertheless the impulse to push southwards is very strong, and the desire to aid co-religionists is very strong. Those who are inclined to stigmatize all the efforts of Russia to reach the Bosphorus as the mere result of unscrupulous ambition should reflect on what we, more fortunate in our insular situation, have done and are doing every day amidst the oceanic spaces; and they should turn to the expressions of opinion here in past times. when Protestantism was being oppressed on the Continent; to Milton's famous sonnet, for example, or to the pamphlets which appeared in England at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War. I have rarely read a more vigorous piece of political writing than the denunciation of the king's slackness and half-heartedness in one of these.

It is most important in considering our relations with foreign

countries to be able to look at things with their eyes. We shall be not less but more firm in saying "No" to a course of action which we deliberately believe would lead to much more harm than good, if we clearly understand what its advocates have got to say for it.

And Greece, which is always hankering after Thessaly and Epirus? Well, if Greece got them, what would she do with them? Has not her management of her own affairs made her the despair of Europe? May we not at any moment learn again that, as was the case a few years ago, the police of Athens had intimated to certain members of the Diplomatic Corps that they really could not guarantee their safety if they were so rash as to walk round the Acropolis at the same hour every day? Has not the *grande idée*—the idea, that is, of replacing through Greek hands the cross upon St. Sophia—become a sort of bad joke? Have the statesmen of Athens managed so well their latest annexation, Corfu, that we should be inclined to see them try really difficult work, and cope with the turbulent populations along their northern frontier? As well set a baby of two years old to drive a four-in-hand through Piccadilly at five o'clock in the afternoon.

That there are many Greeks of great merit, and who might make excellent politicians out of Greece, every one knows, but in Greece there seems something like a curse upon them.

Then it is asked, if Turkey were divided, how need English interests suffer more than they do now? To this I reply, I do not think they need suffer at all more. If an arrangement could be made by which Constantinople with both banks of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus could be made into a neutral state guaranteed by all Europe—a *sufficiently large* if—English interests would be but slightly affected by anything that could possibly happen in the Eastern Peninsula. Servians, Bulgarians, Albanians, Turks, Greeks, and all the rest of them might be left to fight for the next twenty years without further harm arising to this far-off island than the damage to trade due to warlike disturbance in a market of subordinate importance.

Those who defended the Crimean war on the ground of its being advantageous to the interests of England to invest blood and treasure in keeping up the Turkish Empire have been proved by events to have been utterly mistaken. The defence of the Crimean war should be based on quite different grounds—on the common interest of nations in preventing wanton aggression, on the manifest expediency for curbing, in 1853, the overweening arrogance of the Emperor Nicholas. The men who made the Crimean war had not forgotten the invasion of Hungary, and some of them doubtless remembered the proclamation to the Russian armies, which contained the proud words—"Nobiscum Deus! Audite, populi, et vincemini quia nobiscum Deus!"

For a statesman who looked only to the obvious narrow interest of England, the offers of the Emperor Nicholas, through Sir Hamilton Seymour, would have been so tempting that he would probably have wished to close with them at once; but the people would not have stood it for a moment,—and the popular instinct would have been right. We can laugh at being called—we could not laugh at really being—*La perfide Albion*.

I do not think that mere English interests would be so much affected even by Constantinople passing into Russian hands as many do. I am not—I need hardly say—one of those who attach great importance to the Russian conquests in Central Asia. If the Russians keep away from Afghanistan it seems to me to concern us very little what they do, or don't do, in that part of the world; but the people who disquiet themselves about Russian advances in Central Asia ought rather to wish to see the Russians come down into the Eastern Peninsula. It is quite certain that neither the population, nor the resources of Russia are anything like sufficient to enable her to extend herself in both directions at once. If she turns her attention definitely to what a Russian statesman well described to me as *l'Orient sérieux*, she must perforce for some generations give up making fidgety little conquests in what he equally happily described as *l'Orient de fantaisie*.

But it is quite idle to talk of the interest of England as if England were not bound by her past history. No man is free to act in great matters simply upon his interest of the moment, irrespectively of his past, and nations are in this respect like individuals. We English have, all circumstances being taken into account, sufficient interest in keeping Russia away from Constantinople to make us take the same view in this matter as those with whom we live, that is, with half-a-dozen other States which have as much or more immediate interest in keeping her away than we have. That is enough for practical purposes.

What we as a nation, and not as part of a political state-system, have really to look to is Egypt, or in other words the freedom of the Isthmus transit; but that is a matter of life and death, and nothing can possibly be agreed to by us that can in any way endanger it. The *status quo* in Turkey is perfectly satisfactory in this respect, and it was perfectly satisfactory a year ago. The purchase of the Suez shares has hitherto made it no worse, and not, so far as I can see, appreciably better. Any alteration, however, of the *status quo* in Turkey might conceivably be inconvenient to us, and therefore we had I think a perfect right to send our fleet to the mouth of the Dardanelles merely to advertise, as it were, that we did not intend that anything decisive should be done in those regions without our having our say in the

matter. There may have been other and far more urgent reasons for sending the fleet than that. Of course I have heard rumours to this effect, like my neighbours, but there are things as to which you either know all, or know nothing, and until papers are laid upon the table of Parliament explaining fully what has occurred, I am content to have no opinion whatever as to whether these rumours are true or false.

But then my questioner says, If you see so many objections to the absorption of the Turkish Empire in Europe by other Powers, and if you are far from hopeful with regard to the improvement of Turkish rule, what are you looking to? What is your solution of the Eastern question? To this I rejoin, The very first condition of talking common sense about these countries is to get rid of that odious phrase, Eastern question. The next condition of having any rational policy as to the Turkish Empire is to know sufficiently the facts as to some twenty Eastern questions, and I neither know them myself, nor do I believe that any man in England does.

Well, but it may be said, we have all to act on imperfect knowledge of facts: and supposing you had to act, what would you do?

I would use all the influence of England to get into power, and to keep in power, the very best Minister that the Porte would endure. I would do my utmost to get an arrangement come to between the insurgents and the Government everywhere—an arrangement which might last, say for ten years.

If that were found impossible, I would give a kind of modified autonomy to those parts of European Turkey which it was clear would no longer obey Constantinople.

Would that be the case with Bosnia and the Herzegovina? If any one says yes, or says no, I should like to ascertain on what authority he speaks. To me, judging merely from the ordinary sources of information, two things look pretty clear—

1. That the insurrection was the result not so much of any religious quarrel as of intolerable taxation and dishonest tribunals. It is the old story of the revolt in the Netherlands, and open to Schiller's well-known reflection.

2. That if you cut Bosnia and Herzegovina adrift from Constantinople, you might quite possibly make things worse instead of better.

Suppose you divided them, giving part to Montenegro and part to Servia, as some have proposed. Good and well! But can any one say whether the Catholic Christians, of whom many would be included in the part given to Montenegro, if it was not quite trifling, would not hate the Prince of Montenegro much more heartily than the Sultan? Montenegro, as Lord Strangford pointed

out years ago, has got its natural sphere of extension in some Greek Christian districts close to it; but for anything beyond these, it is most unlikely that it could have any assimilative power.

Then as to Servia. Would it be really to her advantage to add to her dominions the whole mass of the Bosnian feudal chiefs, Islamite to the backbone—Islamite, not, as Mr. Yriarte says in his article of last month in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, as the Albanians are, but Islamite as the Poles are Catholics? Surely Europe would be making a very Devonshire present to the busy politicians of Belgrade. I have always been rather a partisan of Servia, and took her side strongly when we discussed her affairs in the House of Commons; but truth is truth, and although the evacuation of her fortresses was right and necessary when it came about, it is quite impossible to deny that she behaved often very harshly to the Turks who were left in the land up to that event. What would she do with the large Mussulman population of Bosnia? Drive it all out too? Is that what civilized Europe would like?

Suppose next you do not divide the provinces, but keep them together. Is it quite certain that you would not, by cutting off the influence of Constantinople, cut off the best chance you have of giving some tolerable kind of life to the population? Recollect that in Bosnia the Sultan has been the protector of the people against the powerful Mahometan chiefs. A very imperfect protector, but at least he has been on their side. As far back as 1851 a most vigorous effort was made by Omar Pacha to trample down that fierce nobility—an effort which was, however, only partially successful. If, however, the occasionally strong hand of the Porte is withdrawn, what would be the state of things? Would it be oppression worse than before, or a constant civil war? Why should not the Porte make things as tolerable at Serajevo for the Christians as they are, say at Trebizond? I know it would be difficult. Would it with constant European pressure be impossible?

I pronounce no opinion about the fate of these provinces. I merely ask questions, but questions which clearly ought to be answered before England takes any line about them. And who can answer them? Can Lord Derby? Hardly, I think; and if he can't, who can help him? Mr. Cross, perhaps, who does his own work so well. As reasonably might you have consulted the late Hussein Avni Pacha upon the Banns of Marriage (Scotland) Bill.

When quiet had been restored, I would strengthen the embassy at Constantinople by four men, of the type described in the passage from Lord Strangford's writings* which I have quoted above. I

* It is curious how little these two volumes seem to be known.

would send them far and near over the Empire, making them report first to Sir Henry Elliot, and then through him to the Foreign Secretary.

I would at the same time catch the man I could find most like Lord Strangford (not an easy thing to do, for his death in 1869 was in my humble judgment little short of a national calamity), and putting him into the Foreign Office with the rank of an Assistant Under-Secretary of State, give him charge of all the countries from the Adriatic to the Indian frontier, imposing on him the duty of advising the Secretary of State upon any emergency that might arise in those countries, and above all the duty of examining and boiling down, so to speak, all the information that came from the four travelling attachés, whose appointment I have suggested.

If this kind of thing went on for a few years, when next an acute crisis occurred in the Eastern Peninsula, the Secretary of State who had to cope with it would, at least, know what he was about, and as he would be either absolutely disinterested, or have the same interest as most of the other powers, he would very probably be able to lead them in a way honourable to all parties. If they, or any of them, adopted the same plan for getting information, so much the better; always provided that the persons employed were simply reporters for their Governments, and had no powers of any other kind.

It is quite possible that if I had before me the kind of survey of the Turkish Empire which the Secretary of State would then have, my ideas as to its future would be very much altered, but on my present imperfect information I am inclined to think that unless some great Minister can work wonders, we shall have, every few years, trouble in that country; and I do not think that anything which European state-craft can do will prevent it. European state-craft cannot hasten the development of the slowly growing Bulgarian nationality, and, till the Bulgarian nationality has awoke to sufficient consciousness to let us see what it is fit for, it is quite impossible to predict the future of the Turkish Empire in Europe. The Bulgarian race is much the most numerous part of the population. It has many good qualities, as any one may see who will read Mr. Blunt's reports already alluded to. It seems to me, as at present advised, that the future belongs to it, but I and those who take this view may be just as wrong as our fathers were about Greece. Assuredly the Bulgarian will not have the same faults as the Greek, but he may have other faults quite as fatal to his capacity for rule.

I have been prescribing as if I believed that the object of nearly all the Powers, and their ministers, was simply to make, in perfect good faith, the best arrangement for the prevention of the effusion of blood, and for the gradual sinking of the Turks, and

rise of the Christians in the Eastern Peninsula, not as a thing to be wished for because they were Christians, but as a thing inevitable, because they were becoming so much more numerous than their rivals. Of course I am not unaware that a hundred ambitions, and dishonesties, and self-seekings, may have to be encountered and dealt with. One cannot even trust the honesty of one's own Government. Who is to know that this or that move may not be dictated from time to time by some motive of party interest, as, for instance, a wish to show that such and such a Government is more zealous than its predecessor for the honour of England?

Who can examine the conduct of the present Administration in the matter of the Suez shares, and believe for a moment that the interest of England was the only thing that was thought of? In one respect that transaction ought to be in the highest degree soothing to our national pride. Nothing but the perfect confidence that we have in the purity of our public men, with reference to pecuniary transactions, would have made the way in which that purchase was carried out endurable to the nation. Just conceive what would have happened if the head of a Government in France, or an American President, had, at a moment when money could have been raised on the best mercantile bills at 3 per cent., taken out of the pocket of the taxpayer 15 per cent. and put it into the pocket of a fortunate and favoured capitalist? Half the press, at least, of both countries would have been up in arms. Had it even been done by Mr. Gladstone, the Conservative newspapers and the Conservative members of Parliament would have made such an outcry as has never been heard in England in our times. We Liberals, in our anxiety not to be factious, have become almost subservient. Who but remembers the noise that was made when the last Government was in power, about ridiculous fiddle-faddles like the Ewelme Rectory and the Collier appointment? Yet this transaction, than which few have occurred in the modern history of this country which more required explanation,—this transaction which reduced the wealthiest and most scrupulous State in the world to borrow on terms which might be looked askance at by Honduras or Paraguay, has hardly called forth one really emphatic protest, except, indeed, from Sir John Lubbock.

When Sidonia, in May, 1845, gave Tancred a letter of credit on his correspondent at Jerusalem, he wrote as follows:—

“ To Adam Besso, at Jerusalem.

“ My good Adam,—If the youth who bears this require advances, let him have as much gold as would make the right-hand lion on the first step of the throne of Solomon the king, and if he want more, let him have as much as would form the lion that is on the left, and so on through every

stair of the royal seat. For all which will be responsible to you the child of Israel who among the Gentiles is called

“SIDONIA.”

I know not whether gentlemen of Sidonia's way of thinking, when corresponding in Hebrew, always carry on business in what we Nazarenes would call this rather loose, although undoubtedly grand, manner, but whether they do or do not do so, in conducting their private affairs, the method is surely quite inapplicable when they are dealing with other people's money.

The nation will awake one of these days from its dream about the Suez shares. It will then see that although they may turn out all very well as an investment, if such investments are proper for nations, and although it might be worth paying something more than their market value, with a view to intimate to the world that we considered ourselves to be deeply interested in Egypt, the operation of buying them was badly carried into effect, and was connected quite unnecessarily with discreditable things. When this comes about there will be one more item added to the unpleasant account which is running against the present possessors of power.


“Tra i salmi dell' Ufficio
C'è anco il *Dies ire* :
O che non ha a venire
Il giorno del giudizio?”

I allude to these things, however, in the present connection merely as an example of the infinite number of incidents, arising from the pursuit of this or that by-end, which may at any moment throw into confusion a whole system of policy; but after all it cannot be an irrational course for any country to throw its influence into keeping things pretty much as they are in another country, until it sees clearly in what direction to apply the great power which it can exert.

To sum up then in a few sentences my conclusions with respect to the present state of Europe I would say:—

(There are local maladies in various parts of ^{Europe} it, but the true cause of the heightened pulse is the state of the Eastern Peninsula. With this state you should deal by sedatives, submitting meantime that part of the European body politic to a most minute and long-continued series of observations, for you may rest assured that your present knowledge is not sufficient to enable you to deal with the malady; and if you use the knife, or adopt any other heroic remedy, you may well bring about results which it makes one tremble to think of.)

M. E. GRANT DUFF.



LORD MACAULAY'S ESSAY ON BACON EXAMINED.

II.

6. **T**HERE is no part of Bacon's life in which he seems *to me* to have been truer to all his duties than in his dealings with the Earl of Essex; nor have I any reason to suspect my judgment of error in that more than in other things: for there was nothing to influence it either way: nothing to gain or lose; nobody that I knew of to whom my opinion would give either pleasure or pain; no end that I was pursuing, besides the satisfaction of my own mind, which would be either helped or hindered by one conclusion more than the other. If I started with any bias, it must have worked the other way; for this was always the most unpopular of my heresies, in which I found sympathy most rare and antipathy most vehement. But as in entering upon the inquiry I had nothing to do with sympathies or antipathies, but merely wanted to find out what a man, whose book I had been reading with interest, was like, and what he had done, I do not believe that I did start with any bias. And as the opinion which I arrived at then, upon such information as then lay within easy reach, has survived not only the assaults of friends and foes, but the much severer test of a very close and careful examination of all the evidence I have been able to meet with which bears upon the question, I cannot doubt that it is my real opinion, which others may value as they please, but which I am myself bound to respect. In so far as it is a question of moral taste and feeling, our *opinions* will of course vary with our various

moral constitutions ; but in these historical matters, where anybody may, without fear of contradiction, say anything, feelings are apt to make *facts*. Now an ill-made fact may sometimes be detected and removed. It will be seen presently that the theory of Bacon's relation to Essex which finds, in *both* stages of it—the loyal no less than the disloyal period—a proof that he prized Court-favour above friendship and gratitude, depends for much of its plausibility upon facts misstated or misinterpreted. It will be seen also, I think, that the adoption of these statements and interpretations by the reviewer is not itself a fact of much weight, because it is evident that in this, as in the instances I have already examined, his information was both scanty and loose.

The evidence in this case is in two parts, which must be treated separately. Bacon attached himself to Essex in the opening of his career. He acted as counsel against him at the close. In both cases, we are told, it was “for these objects”—namely, “wealth, precedence, titles,” &c. “For these he joined, for these he forsook, Lord Essex.”

First for the first. That Bacon *joined* Essex from unworthy motives was a new suggestion, I think, of the reviewer's own. But as Essex was not a man whom nobody joined from good motives, why are we to suspect Bacon of bad ones? Was there anything unworthy in the circumstances which brought them together, or in the nature of the mutual attraction which united them? Looking back, as before, for the reviewer's own account of the origin of the alliance, all I find is, that Essex's “mind, ardent, susceptible, naturally disposed to admiration of all that is great and beautiful, was fascinated by the genius and accomplishments of Bacon,” and that “a close friendship was soon formed between them.” Of the origin of this friendship, and the history of its formation, this is absolutely all he tells us. Was there any reason, then, why Bacon should have rejected the friendship so offered, or so offering itself? Was Essex, however naturally disposed to admire good things, a man whose real character ought to have forbidden Bacon to enter into such relations with him? Look back again at the reviewer's own description of him—“a new favourite, young, noble, wealthy, accomplished, eloquent, brave, generous, aspiring . . . who was at once the ornament of the palace and the idol of the city ; who was the common patron of men of letters and of men of the sword ; who was the common refuge of the persecuted Catholic and the persecuted Puritan.” The fact that Bacon became the close friend of such a man being the only fact adduced to prove an unworthy motive in “joining” him, the charge might be dismissed without more words, were it not that the very introduction of such a count into such an indictment by a man of sense and virtue requires explanation. The

reviewer must have been thinking, surely, of something which he has neglected or avoided to express; and, with the help of Mr. Montagu, we may partly guess what it was. He found it stated in Montagu's "Life," that "this intimacy could not fail to excite the jealousy of Lord Burghley;" and that "in after-life Bacon was himself sensible that he had acted unwisely, and that his noble kinsmen had some right to complain of the readiness with which he and his brother had embraced the views of their powerful rival."* What authority Mr. Montagu had for such a statement I do not know. The letter which he refers to in his note, apparently by way of authority, contains no hint of any such thing, and I think it was a mistake. The reviewer, however, concluded on the strength of it that in joining Essex Bacon had *deserted his party*—an offence, in a modern politician's eyes, not to be excused in any man without special reason; and though "joined Essex" was all he said, what he saw in his mind while he said it was Bacon *forsaking Burghley*. Having, however, in the last sentence but one, charged him with the same offence of meanness and low ambition for *not* forsaking Burghley six years before, he could not bring in the name here with good effect. If his persevering loyalty to his uncle, in spite of "morose humours," "sharp lectures," and "unjust and ungracious repulses," during the last six years, "bordered on meanness,"† it would have been difficult to contrive that the transfer of his services from one whom he had served so much too long to one who deserved of him in every way so much better, should tell as a fresh example of the same kind of meanness. The rhetorical instinct of the reviewer therefore suppressed all allusion to the political desertion of which he was (I suppose) accusing him in his mind. But in so doing, while he threw a veil over one difficulty, he exposed another; for if the joining of Essex was not the desertion of anybody else, what business has it in a catalogue of offences which are to prove that Bacon's only object in life was Court-favour?

This, however, is only a speculation of my own, and may or may not be right. The material fact is that (whatever may have been the inward motions which led to the conclusion) the conclusion itself was wrong. Knowing that Bacon had spoken against a proposition of *Burghley's* in the Parliament of 1593, and that immediately after the dissolution he was set up by *Essex* as a candidate for the Attorney-Generalship, the reviewer inferred that Bacon, having by that speech put an end to all hopes from Burghley, had *transferred* his services and political allegiance to Essex. But the fact is that his alliance with Essex had been

* Life of Bacon, p. xxvi.

† Essays, ii. p. 301.

formed long before—formed at a time when he had least reason to despair of help from Burghley—and upon conditions which did not involve any sacrifice of his interest in him, or any alienation of feeling. I do not know that the reviewer had the means at hand of determining the date of it. He knew, or might have known, that it had ripened into intimacy before *Anthony Bacon* returned from abroad; but without access to *Birch's Memoirs of Queen Elizabeth* (which is not likely to have been among the books taken out to India) he could not have ascertained precisely when that was. I made out myself, however, from such evidence as was then accessible, that the beginning could not be dated *later* than July, 1591;* and I have learned since that there are traces of it still earlier—as early as 1588.† Now it was in 1589 that Burghley obtained for Bacon the reversion of the clerkship of the Star Chamber, and in 1592 that Bacon wrote the spirited and affectionate vindication of Burghley's character, both personal and political, which forms a separate chapter in his "*Observations on a Libel.*"‡ Nor is there to be found in any of the communications which passed between them after the Parliament of 1593 the least trace of any change in their feelings towards each other. Upon the first part of the charge therefore—that Bacon's only object in *joining* Essex was the prospect of "wealth, precedence, titles," &c.—I think I may conclude that the case breaks down like the others, and may be dismissed, not only as unproved, but as proved to have no substance in it whatever.

The second part will require a longer discussion. That "*for these objects*" Bacon "*forsook* Lord Essex," is a short statement involving several assumptions. The act of forsaking a friend may be one thing or another, according to the circumstances and conditions. The motives may be of many kinds, insufficient or sufficient. We must look back for the particulars.

According to the reviewer, Essex's fortunes reached their height in 1596 with the Cadiz expedition, and began to decline immediately after.§ But it was not till the autumn of 1599, after his return "in disgrace" from Ireland, that Bacon prepared to "forsake him." Up to that time,—and after that time, until he found that "while he was trying to prop the fortunes of another he was in danger of shaking his own,"||—it is admitted that he "honestly employed all his address for the purpose of mediating between his friend and the Queen;" and the date of the supposed resolution to forsake him happens to fix itself with an accuracy which is

* L. & L. i. 104.

† In a letter from Bacon to the Earl of Leicester, asking his furtherance of some suit in his behalf, which the Earl of Essex had moved. Mr. John Bruce, who told me of this letter in March, 1869, informed me at the same time that there was nothing else in it of any importance.

‡ "Certain true general notes upon the actions of Lord Burghley." L. & L. i. 198.

§ *Essays*, ii. p. 310.

|| *Ibid.* p. 312.

wanting in all the rest of the story, and very welcome. It was "when Essex was brought before the Council to answer for his conduct in Ireland." That was in the beginning of June, 1600; four years after his fortunes had begun to decline; ten months after his return in disgrace from his last and greatest employment.

Here then we have the *date* of the desertion clearly determined. The resolution was taken when Bacon saw that "the fall of his patron was at hand." It was then that "he shaped his course accordingly;" and it was on the 5th of June, 1600, that the first act was committed.

Proceeding from the question of date to the next question—what was the *nature* and what the *conditions* of the desertion? we get a tolerably definite answer to that also.

"The person on whom during the decline of his influence he chiefly depended, to whom he confided his perplexities, whose advice he solicited, whose intercession he employed, was his friend Bacon. The lamentable truth must be told. This friend so loved, so trusted, bore a principal part in ruining the Earl's fortunes, in shedding his blood, and in blackening his memory."*

The desertion then was of the worst kind. He did more than forsake; he joined in the attack. The trusted friend turned into the active enemy, from no better motive than the fear of marring, or the hope of making, his own fortunes.

But when we come to the third question—what had Essex done? what was laid to his charge? what was the character, intention, and issue of this proceeding against him before the Council? and what was the part which Bacon bore in it?—we can find no answer at all. We are only told that "Essex was brought before the Council to answer for *his conduct in Ireland*," and that "Bacon appeared at the bar in support of *the charges*." Of this, the first overt act of infidelity, the first fruit of the resolution to sacrifice his friend's fortune for the promotion of his own, this is all we are to know. If we look back again to see what Essex had been doing, we read that "his administration in Ireland was unfortunate, and in many respects highly blamable;" that "he did not possess the caution, patience, and resolution necessary for the conduct of a protracted war, in which difficulties were to be gradually surmounted, in which much discomfort was to be endured, and in which few splendid exploits could be achieved;" that "for the civil duties of his high place he was still less qualified," because "though eloquent and accomplished he was in no sense a statesman;" that his "overthrow" had been foreseen by Bacon as the inevitable consequence of his "accepting the government

* Essays, ii. p. 311.

of Ireland," from which he did his best to dissuade him; and that the prediction was accomplished by his return "in disgrace." * From all which we may gather that the administration of affairs in Ireland had been committed to him during a protracted, difficult, and uncomfortable war; that he had been unsuccessful; that he returned with a damaged reputation; and that he was called before the Council to answer for *something* that he had done or not done. But can anybody gather anything more? Was it to answer for having been unfortunate, or incautious, or impatient, or irresolute, or unqualified for civil duties, or what? Before we condemn Bacon for "appearing at the bar in support of the charges," we ought surely to know what the charges were. Can we find any hint of them in the *causes* assigned for the decline of Essex's fortunes in 1596, and the irreconcilable quarrel with the Queen in 1600? Not the slightest. Among them I find mention of "frankness" and "keen sense of injustice," which were "by no means agreeable" to the Queen; of "hatred excited by the daring and contemptuous manner in which he bade defiance to his enemies;" of "faults" which "the multitude still regarded with fondness;" of "loss of credit at Court even for the merit which he really possessed;" of "a spirit, proud, resentful, and ungovernable;" of "the rage of a young hero, incensed by multiplied wrongs and humiliations:" but of the nature of the charges which he was called before the Council to answer, and which Bacon committed his first treason by appearing at the bar to support, not any indication whatever. Can it be that the reviewer *did not know* what they were? Some of the circumstances are very suspicious. His description of the difficulties which Essex had to deal with in Ireland is remarkable for the absence of all allusion to the difficulties which he really encountered, and suits the subsequent administration of Montjoy much better than his. The position of a commander-in-chief going over in April at the head of 16,000 men to strike a great blow at a rebellion in the north, and proceeding to strike it in August with only 2,500,† having in a *triumphant* march through the south lost or otherwise disposed of the remaining 13,500, would surely have been a tempting subject for his pen if he had known of it; and a "return in disgrace" from an administration which had been "unfortunate and in some respects highly blamable" would hardly have satisfied him as a description of the sudden return, without warning, in direct disobedience to a positive command—accompanied with, or followed by, a great number of his captains and gentlemen, who "had quitted their commands, not willing to stay there after him"—of the man who had been trusted with so great an employment. And on what

* Essays, ii. p. 311.

† Letters and Life, ii. p. 141.

pretence? Because the rebel chief whom he had been sent to reduce to obedience had refused to say what conditions would satisfy him, without a promise that they should not be set down in writing!*

If he knew all this, could that ambitious pen have been content to let the case pass as if it had carried in it no more matter for a paragraph than the recall of an unsuccessful governor? For my own part I must confess that when I first went seriously into the study of this article—now forty years ago save one—knowing nothing of the author, except his reviews, his speeches, and his reputation for universal knowledge, especially historical, I was so struck with the extraordinary obscurity in which the part played by Essex in his own tragedy was allowed to remain, that I inclined to ascribe it to the skill of an advocate concealing the weak part of his case; for that a writer so deeply read in English history *knew* no more about so considerable a man as Essex was as difficult to believe as that so great an artist in historical narrative, if he did know more and had no motive for keeping what he knew out of sight, would not have told the story better. Now, however, that I have read his own life and letters, I can no longer suspect him of a deliberate design to conceal truth or mislead judgment. I believe rather that having forgotten the particulars of the story, and feeling that he could not handle them without risk of mistakes, he purposely avoided details and definite statements, and confused under a kind of luminous haze the forms which he could not draw. Certainly there is no evidence in this review that the writer knew a single circumstance in Essex's life between the summer of 1596 and the summer of 1600, which he might not have learned from Mr. Montagu's extremely meagre narrative. And yet those four years were filled with stirring and striking events which he must have felt, if he had remembered them, to be quite inconsistent with his general description of the situation. Those four years he speaks of as the period of "the decline of Essex's influence," during which he "chiefly depended upon" Bacon, confiding to him his perplexities, soliciting his advice, and employing his intercession.† Could he have so described them if he had remembered that during those four years Essex had had influence to procure for himself, against the most powerful rivalry and competition, and contrary to Bacon's advice, the sole command of the two greatest military enterprises of the time—the great naval expedition against Spain in 1597, and the army of 16,000 men sent over to Ireland in 1599? If the review had been the production of any ordinary writer, I should have inferred that he had never heard either of the Island Voyage or of Tyrone. And of these it is true that there is not much to be learned from Mr. Montagu (from whom he seems to

* *Letters and Life*, ii. pp. 141, 146, 155.

† *Essays*, ii. p. 311.

have taken without suspicion everything except his sympathies and judgments); for of the Island Voyage Mr. Montagu knows no more than himself, and as to the nature of the charges upon which Essex was called into question leaves us almost as much in the dark. But about the character and intention of the trial itself, about the part which Bacon had to play in it, about its immediate issue and the effects which followed (of all which it is as difficult to understand how he can have known nothing as how, if he knew anything, he could have passed them over as he does), he might certainly have learned something from the pages which lay open before him,—even without troubling himself to refer to the notes at the end, where he would have found Fynes Moryson's report of the whole proceeding printed at full length.

He might have learned from the text alone that the purpose of the proceeding, both real and declared, was only to justify before the world the course which had been already taken with Essex, by calling on him to answer publicly the charges upon which he had been committed, without involving him in the penalties which, if the answer were not satisfactory, a prosecution in the usual form would have entailed*—that the part of the charge with which Bacon had to deal related only to certain points of “undutiful behaviour,”†—fruits of the virtue which he so much admires in him, the “boldness such as was then found in no other subject” with which he “conducted himself towards his sovereign,”‡—and for which the worst penalty the Queen wished to exact was an apology—that the immediate issue was nothing worse than the prolongation during the Queen's pleasure of the condition in which he was; the sentence being only suspension from his offices and continuance as prisoner in his own house till it should please her Majesty to release him§—that though, in consequence of the foolish meddling of his partisans, the effects which were both intended and expected did not follow so fully or so soon as they would otherwise have done, they were not fine, or imprisonment, or any new form of oppression or disgrace; but a complete release within a few weeks from all restraint, with leave to retire into the country for his health.|| He might have learned, moreover (what with a view to the question specially at issue was specially important) that Bacon himself, both before the trial, when he undertook the part assigned to him, and after it was over, fully expected that that day's work would end the quarrel; and that the part he took in it was taken and performed in the confident hope that it would the better enable him to bring about that which he most wished and hoped, and

* Montagu, p. lxvii.

§ Montagu, p. lxix.

† Ibid. p. lxviii.

‡ Essays, ii. p. 307.

|| Ibid. p. lxxvi.

now daily looked for—the full restoration of Essex to his former place in the Queen's favour.*

All this, I say, he might have learned from Mr. Montagu's "Life of Bacon" (which it is clear that he did not use merely as a text for an independent discourse of his own, but had by him, and read, and quoted); and if he knew it all, how is it that (the question being in what spirit Bacon acted on the occasion) he took no notice of any part of it? If the judicial proceeding was arranged for the express purpose of opening a fair way for Essex to deserve mild and favourable treatment—which it was publicly declared to be by the Queen's own command; if it was conducted throughout, so far as she had control over it, in that spirit—and that it was so is manifest upon the very face of the report; if the sentence imposed no new penalty, but merely sanctioned and justified what had been done already, leaving the duration of it to the Queen's pleasure; if the complete restoration to liberty, which had been intended and expected to follow immediately, did (though delayed by a fresh outbreak of the factious rumours which the public hearing was meant to silence†) actually follow within a few weeks; ‡—upon what pretence can it be set down, without a word of explanation, as the first act of Essex's *fall*—the fall which was "announced by a thousand signs to be at hand"§—to take a part in which was to *forsake* him? Compare the two stories, and make your choice. The question is not, as in the case we shall have to consider presently, whether Bacon ought not to have taken part with his friend against his country rather than with his country against his friend, when to be with the one was to be against the other, but simply in what way he could at that juncture have served his friend best. *He* says that, hoping that the difference between the Earl and the Queen would be ended by that day's work, he consented to take part in it, not only because it was his duty to do so if required, but also because the better he satisfied the Queen at that time, the more effectually would he be able to perform afterwards the office of mediator between them: which office he did actually set about the very next day. The reviewer, on the other hand, supposes that he consented to appear on that occasion against his friend, not as hoping to serve his cause the better afterwards, but as having made up his mind to abandon it for desperate. Now, though we cannot know Bacon's *motives* except from himself, we do know that for three months immediately following he was in fact endeavouring all he could to reinstate the Earl in the Queen's favour, and was in that endeavour risking his own fortunes. Which of the two shall we believe? Surely we can have no hesitation in accepting the

* Montagu, pp. lxx., lxx., lxxx.
† Ibid. p. lxxvi.

† Ibid. p. lxxv.
§ Essays, ii. p. 312.

story with which all the dates and all the recorded facts otherwise ascertainable agree, which is Bacon's; and in rejecting that with which they all disagree, which is the reviewer's. The truth is that for not refusing to discharge on this occasion the ordinary duties of his place Bacon had every motive but one. The single consideration that might have deterred him was the fear of unpopularity—of a false imputation of ingratitude. Of his many concurring motives, which was the strongest, and which would have given way in a conflict with the rest, it is idle to inquire. There was here no conflict. Whether his desire to serve Essex was or was not stronger than his reluctance to lose his influence with the Queen, there is no doubt that he did desire to serve him, and there is as little doubt that the only chance of serving him was to *keep* his influence with the Queen. Had it been otherwise—had he (for instance) been in possession of some secret which his duty to the Queen required him to disclose, and the disclosure of which would have ruined Essex—then there would have been a conflict; and I do not pretend to say what he would have done in such a case; probably he did not know himself. As it was, he could not have done Essex a worse service than to throw away in an idle ostentation of magnanimity his opportunities of access and audience at Court, these being in fact the only handles by which he could help him through. And as he is not even accused of having had anything to do with the previous proceedings against him, this instance may be dismissed, like the others, as not advancing the reviewer's case by a single step. So much for the part he took in "ruining the Earl's fortunes."

But this last instance, though a bad witness for the reviewer, is a good one for me. As a proof of ignorance or indifference with regard to material facts, it is strong as it stands; but its full strength is yet to be seen. For besides omitting the circumstances which I have supplied—and which, though so legible in the pages of Mr. Montagu, I must believe that he did not know of—he has so misplaced and misdated those which he did know of, as to make them tell the story quite wrong. Readers who have hitherto derived their impressions of the case from this review will be surprised to learn that the period during which Essex depended chiefly upon "his friend Bacon"—confided to him his perplexities, solicited his advice, and employed his intercession—the period during which Bacon "honestly employed all his address" in the "difficult, delicate, and perilous" task of "managing two spirits equally proud, resentful, and ungovernable," till he was suspected by each to be working in the interests of the other*—that this period was not *before* he appeared at the bar in support of the

* *Essays*, ii. p. 312.

charges, but *after*. How the reviewer contrived to mistake the date of these transactions is still harder to understand than how he contrived to overlook the others; for in the very book from which his information came a minute and circumstantial account of them *follows* the account of the judicial proceeding of the 5th of June, and *extends* (with the help of much weak and unnecessary commentary) *over* no less than seventeen pages;* in which—to make the error more *unaccountable*—the dates of the principal transactions—June 6, 1600; June 12, 1600; August, 1600; October, 1600; January, 1601—are given twice over; being in each case separately set out in the margin. How such an oversight can have occurred, I must leave to be explained by those who understand the possibilities incident to rapid reading. But the effect of it is simply to transfer to the first six months of 1600 the negotiations which were really the business of the last six, and by passing in absolute silence all that happened between the 5th of June, 1600, and the 8th of February, 1600-1 (no date being mentioned in either case), to make the trial at York House for contempt, and the trial for treason at Westminster, seem almost like parts of the same transaction—one following naturally upon the other with no event between worth mentioning.

Read the whole passage as it stands, and tell me how much the writer knew about the case upon which he was going to pass judgment. I do not ask how fairly he judged, but how much he can be supposed to have *known*.

“When Essex was brought before the Council to answer for his conduct in Ireland, Bacon, after a faint attempt to excuse himself from taking part against his friend, submitted to the Queen’s pleasure, and appeared at the bar in support of the charges. But a darker scene was behind. The unhappy young nobleman, made reckless by despair, ventured on a rash and criminal enterprise, which rendered him liable to the highest penalties of the law.”†

Did the writer know, when he penned these three sentences, that Essex had suffered nothing as yet beyond loss of Court-favour, suspension from his offices, and confinement, first in the house of his friend the Lord Keeper,‡ and afterwards in his own house under the custody of Sir Richard Barkley?§ Did he know that early in July his keeper was removed, and that the only remaining restriction upon his liberty was the prohibition to leave London?|| Did he know that before the end of August this prohibition was withdrawn, and he was free to go where he would, except to Court?¶ Did he know that during all these months he had been using Bacon as his intercessor with the Queen, in those very negotiations which have been just described as conducted so honestly

* Montagu, pp. lxx.—lxxxvii.
§ Ibid. p. lv.

† Essays, ii. p. 312.
|| Montagu, p. lxxvi.

‡ Montagu, p. li.
¶ Ibid. p. lxxxii.

and ending so unfortunately, and had himself been writing to her letters of dejected and passionate supplication for restoration to favour? Did he know that these letters were only flattering precursors of a suit for the renewal of his expiring patent for a monopoly of sweet wines, the renewal of which he considered "as one of the most critical events of his life; an event which would determine whether he might ever hope to be reinstated in his former credit and authority?"† Did he know that the "despair" which made the unhappy young nobleman "reckless" was due entirely to the failure of his suit for the renewal of this patent; which was passed in October to trustees for the Queen's use?‡ Did he know that this event produced a sudden change in his style from obsequious adoration to coarse contempt and abuse? Had he, in his rapid reading of the book which lay before him, happened to light upon the following paragraph?—

"Irritated by the refusal of his patent, he readily listened to the pernicious counsels of a few needy and interested followers. Essex House had long been the resort of the factious and discontented; secretly courting the Catholics, and openly encouraging the Puritans, Essex welcomed all who were obnoxious to the Court. He *applied to the King of Scotland for assistance, opened a secret correspondence with Ireland, and calculating upon the support of a large body of the nobility, conspired to seize the Tower of London and the Queen herself, and marshalled his banditti to effect his purposes.*"§

Did he know that in this business "men of the highest blood and the fairest character were implicated"—men "highly favoured by the Queen, and in offices of great trust and importance?"|| and that when the Queen sent four chief officers of State—all of them his friends, and two of them his kinsmen—to inquire what was the matter, "he seized and confined" them, and "proceeded into the city, *calling upon the citizens to join him?*"¶ Did he remember what, in allusion to this very enterprise, he had himself admitted a few pages before—that Essex "put to hazard the lives and fortunes of his most attached friends, and *endeavoured to throw the whole country into confusion, for objects purely personal?*"** And, knowing and remembering all this, did he think that in inviting his uninstructed readers to consider how the actors in such a business ought to have been dealt with by those who were responsible for the peace of the country, it was enough to describe it as "a rash and criminal enterprise" "ventured on" by "an unhappy young nobleman made reckless by despair," "which rendered him liable to the highest penalties of the law?" I cannot believe it. Mr. Montagu's statement of the case (to which I have hitherto confined myself, because I have no reason to suppose that any other

* Montagu, lxxvi.—lxxviii.

† Ibid. p. lxxxiv.

¶ Ibid. p. lxxxviii.

§ Ibid. p. lxxxvii.

† Ibid. p. lxxxiii.

|| Ibid. p. lxxxviii.

** Essays, ii. p. 306.

authority had been consulted) is timid and weak, and gives a very imperfect idea of the real emergency. But if his reviewer had seriously considered the words which I have printed in italics and all that they imply, I cannot believe that he would have taken it, as he seems to have done, for a mere act of youthful indiscretion—a burst of impatience under circumstances of extreme provocation—which though not legally justifiable was morally innocent, and entitled to all excuses, true or false, which were compatible with a formal record of conviction. To read his remarks upon the manner in which it ought to have been treated severally by the counsel for the prosecution, by the Peers, by the Queen, and by personal friends, one would think he took it for one of those acts of disputable legality which are sometimes made the subject of formal proceedings in a court of justice merely for the purpose of trying the case and ascertaining the law; as if the plea of self-defence (which was the one really set up) ought not to have been answered or disputed further than might be necessary to induce the Court to pronounce it insufficient to constitute a legal justification: as if, when it was once settled by authority that neither despair of recovering a Court-fortune, nor fear of being murdered in his bed, justifies a man in seizing the person of his sovereign and calling on the people to rise in arms, all was done that needed to be done, and no further inquiry should have been made as to the real history of the conspiracy. The fact is that Mr. Montagu has been so afraid of speaking out about Essex, and, though admitting the truth of so many grave charges, says so little about the manner in which they were proved, and that little in so vague and confused a fashion—giving no account at all of the accusation, the evidence, the defence, the reply, the subsequent confession, and the further disclosures to which that confession led—while, on the other hand, he says so much about the courage and firmness of the prisoner during the trial, about the rancour of the lawyers, the searching questions of adversaries, the betrayals by confederates, the manly composure with which he heard the sentence pronounced, his unselfish anxiety to save the life of his friend without consideration of his own,*—and then about the fluctuations of the Queen's resolution, and her subsequent misery, remorse, and death,—that the material parts of the case are overlaid and hidden by the chaff; and it is just possible to fancy an impatient and self-satisfied critic sweeping all out of his path together, without looking at any of them. It is true that the reviewer does on this occasion betray (for once) some curiosity to know more of the case than he had before him in the text. He is referred by Mr. Montagu for what is called “an account of the

* Montagu, p. xcii.

trial" to a note at the end ; and this note he must have looked at, for there is one passage in it of which he knows more than the allusion in the text could have told him. But that he knew a single fact about it *besides* what he found in this note (which, by the way, instead of "an account of the trial" contains only an extract, scarcely intelligible by reason of the blunders of the manuscript from which it is printed, of the two passages in which Bacon took part ; without a word to indicate their connection with what had gone before, or their bearing upon what followed), I see no reason to suspect, and several reasons to disbelieve. And as we have seen that his description of Essex's Irish campaign is best accounted for by supposing that he knew *none* of the particulars, and his description of his rebellion by supposing that he knew no more of the particulars than might be gathered from a very rapid and careless perusal of Mr. Montagu's account of it ; so it will appear that his remarks on the conduct of his trial are best accounted for by supposing that he knew no more about it than he found or fancied in this extract. Of the "State Trials," to which Mr. Montagu refers for further information, there was probably no copy at hand. And that he could have seen the duty of the several parties who had to deal with the case in the light in which he exhibits it, if he had had even a vague notion of the real nature of the fact, of the character of the evidence, of the manner in which it came to light, of the order in which it was produced in Court, of its effect upon the defence, of the shiftings of the ground, of the wanderings from the point, of the occasions which led to Bacon's interposition and the object at which it aimed, is to me simply incredible.

It is true, however, that at this crisis Bacon did at last "forsake Lord Essex ;" and the question is, whether he could have taken any other course without forsaking something which had an earlier, a stronger, and a more sacred claim upon him. His endeavours to mediate between him and the Queen, having been persevered in with continual hope of success for about five months after the proceeding of the 5th of June, had been suspended about Michaelmas, when the Queen would no longer listen to him, and finally abandoned in the beginning of January, when he was convinced at last that they could do no good ; for Essex, who had never since his return from Ireland given him more than half his confidence, was now preparing to appear in a new character, and had ceased to confide in him at all. His own position, feelings, hopes, interests, and wishes were not otherwise changed. The restoration of his friend to his former greatness was as important an object to him as it had ever been. He had no new patron to please, no new object of ambition to aspire after, no new part to play. Nor had there ever been a time when he

more desired or had more reason to desire the reinstatement of Essex, through loyal service and behaviour, as the Queen's favourite, than on the morning when he threw off the mask, and appeared as leader of an armed and open rebellion against her government. From that day, no doubt, he "forsook" him. If he had not forsaken him, he must have forsaken the cause which he believed to be just and holy, in favour of that for which he had always both felt and professed the deepest abhorrence—the cause of "three of the unluckiest vices of all others, disloyalty, ingratitude, and insolency; which three offences, in all examples, have seldom their doom adjourned to the world to come."* The reviewer, not knowing apparently that this sudden outbreak was the result of long premeditation—that it was the miscarriage of a project which, after cooling in Essex's mind for a whole year, had been revived three months before, upon no greater provocation than the loss of his monopoly, and during those three months had been diligently thought on, discussed, and prepared—took it for a frantic ebullition of youthful impatience. He was "unhappy." He was "surrounded by enemies." They had "ruined his fortunes." They "sought his life." Their "persecutions had driven him to despair." The act which he had ventured on was indeed a crime that rendered him liable to the highest penalties of the law; but having been committed in broad day, and in the presence of thousands—the fact being undeniable, and its character unequivocal—why probe it further? Conviction was inevitable, and beyond a conviction, what could anybody want?†

To a man who (having probed it no further himself, and not knowing what it was, or how many people were engaged in it) has taken no pains to imagine the feelings or understand the position of those who witnessed and had to deal with it, such a question may perhaps seem rational. But it is from *their* point of view that we must look at it if we are to judge *them* justly; and to accept such palliations for excuse, or to let such an act pass without inquiring further into its character and history, was for them impossible. Why was Essex unhappy? He had liberty, leisure, the society of his friends, the love of his countrymen, all the accomplishments of mind and body, and all the tastes, which give sweetness and dignity to private life. He was unhappy (for anything that anybody not in his innermost confidence then knew) only because he was no longer a Court-favourite. What "enemies" was he surrounded by? Only competitors for offices, employments, and honours. What "persecutions" had he suffered? He had suffered some inconveniences. Having incurred the Queen's serious and just displeasure by several acts of direct disobedience,

* Letter of advice to my Lord of Essex, immediately before his going into Ireland.
L. & L. ii. p. 129.

† Compare *Essays*, ii. pp. 313, 314, 320.

as well as by wasting ten or twelve thousand men, and three hundred thousand pounds of treasure, in obtaining a useless truce, on terms so dishonourable as to suggest grave suspicions of something worse than mismanagement, he had been called to account, and had suffered some restraint of liberty, some reduction of income, and for the present a total loss of power in Court and Council. But he was not now suffering for want of liberty; he had been freed five months ago from all remaining restraint. His reduction of income consisted only in the non-renewal of the expired lease of a lucrative monopoly, for which he had no claim. And the loss of power was only the direct and inevitable consequence of his own misuse of the powers with which he had been trusted. Were these the persecutions, this the kind of ruin, that should "drive a man to despair?" Despair of what? Not liberty, fortune, or reputation. All these were safe in his own hands. And for his "life," who had threatened to touch him? The picture of the pitiable condition of "the unhappy young nobleman" must have been drawn merely from his own random attempts at recrimination, when required to explain and justify his actions. But was it an enterprise that might be despised?—the act of a solitary madman, with no force to back him? The numbers, rank, and character of the persons engaged in it are not mentioned in that part of the report of the trial which is printed in Mr. Montagu's notes, and may therefore have escaped the notice of the reviewer. But the Government that took them in the act must have known something about it—must have known that so many persons of so many qualities, coming from so many places, could not have been ready at an hour's notice to join in such an insurrection without preconcert, and must have understood the necessity of knowing more, if they were to answer for the public safety. The State was in fact threatened with a danger of which no one could guess the extent or imminence. Imagine an enterprise so aspiring and audacious suddenly bursting forth without any note of warning or preparation; an enterprise in which more than a hundred noblemen or gentlemen of birth and character were engaged; in which the authorities of the city, if not actually implicated, were at least so dealt with and appealed to by the insurgents that it was plain they were by them supposed to be ready to join;—what could such a thing mean? what had been the beginning of it, what was to be the end? how far had it spread? what secret mines were ready to burst under their feet? what secret treason was there in the heart of the Court, upon which the conspirators relied for aid? To learn all this must have been the immediate care of the Council. Not the conviction of the traitor, but the discovery of the treason, was the first thing needful: not the punishment of the incendiary, but the extinction of the fire.

That *they* were to blame for immediately setting on work all the examining power at their command, to discover the secret of it, will hardly, I suppose, be contended. But it was at this point that Bacon had to make his choice between the private and the public duty. If his consent to take part in the examinations escapes the censure of the reviewer, it can only be because he was not aware that any investigation preceded the trial; for the course which he holds him to have been bound by "friendship, gratitude, and honour," to take in Court, would certainly have forbidden him to assist in collecting the evidence and preparing the case.

"To a high-minded man, wealth, power, Court-favour, even personal safety, would have appeared of no account when opposed to friendship, gratitude, and honour. Such a man would have stood by the side of Essex at the trial—would have spent 'all his power, might, amity, and authority,' in soliciting a mitigation of the sentence; would have been a daily visitor at the cell; would have received the last injunctions, and the last embrace upon the scaffold."*

If this was his proper duty at the trial, it must have been his duty before the trial (the case being one in which the criminality was so obvious that conviction was certain) to refuse his help in sifting the evidence. Yet on what ground could he have asked to be excused? It was a service that came strictly within the duty of his place; and though there are cases in which a man ought rather to resign his place than perform its duties, he ought to have a good reason for doing so; especially in seasons of emergency and danger, when all hands are wanted. Conspiracies against the Queen's life were things of annual occurrence. For protection against them she relied not so much on her military guard as on the vigilance of her councillors and lawyers in detecting the treasons and bringing the traitors to justice. And no doubt their loyal zeal was kept by such services in a state of continual excitement, so that hesitation to act was as much out of the question with them as with a soldier. Now suppose Bacon instead of being a law-officer had been an officer of the guard, and when Essex was coming in strength down Ludgate Hill had been ordered to charge. Would you have had him say, "No, he is my benefactor; he gave me a piece of land; you have plenty of people to fight him; I resign my commission, and will be only a looker-on?" Surely not. Now I say that in turbulent times, which teemed with conspiracies open and secret; being nevertheless times of peace, when the law was the weapon by which they were to be met; times, too, when the divine right of kings was universally believed in, and loyalty was felt as a *religious* obligation; a sworn law-officer of the Crown must have felt his charge to be

* Essays, ii. p. 313.

as definite, as imperative, as paramount, as that of a soldier on duty. An order to examine witnesses or to prepare an indictment was to the one what an order to charge was to the other. Not to be *with* the Crown in such a case would have been to be *against* it. Nay, setting all that aside, I doubt whether even as a friend of Essex who would not willingly believe him guilty of the worst, Bacon would naturally have *wished* to decline the duty. So long as Essex's plans and motives were unknown, it must have been possible to hope that his case was not so bad as it appeared. A seasonable question to a witness might have brought out a palliating circumstance, which an unfriendly examiner, not looking or wishing for, would have missed. If he did wish to "succour" Essex, this would have given him much the best chance—much better than "standing by his side."

But it may be thought perhaps that when the examinations were finished, when the depth of the danger was known, and the duty that remained was only accusation and production of evidence, he might have left that part to somebody else. I do not believe he could have wished even then—either as a faithful servant to the State or as a faithful friend to Essex himself—to abdicate his position. The secret of the "rash enterprise" had been so carefully concealed and so well kept that all the examining committees were hard at work for seven successive days without finding it out. On the eighth they found out all; and every hour's delay being, in the excited state of men's minds, full of danger, they determined to bring the two principals to trial the next day. The evidence just discovered was communicated at once to Coke and Bacon, with orders to proceed upon it immediately. Upon what pretence could Bacon have refused his part? He could not say that it was an offence which ought not to be proceeded against. He could not say that the proposed proceeding was any way unjust, unfair, or harsh. He could not say that Essex, if guilty, ought not to be declared guilty. Did he think there were palliating circumstances in the case? He could not deny that the proper time for bringing them forward was at the trial. Did he think those circumstances were such as might properly induce a pardon? He could not deny that it was after the trial, not before, that that question ought to be considered. Clearly, the first thing to be done was to discover the *truth*; and what he had to do was no more than to set forth truly that portion of the case which was assigned to him; and though the confessions of the principal conspirators, taken separately yet agreeing in all material points, had now made the case against Essex so clear that there could hardly be any doubt of his guilt, we must remember that nobody as yet knew what he had to say for himself, or what line of defence he would adopt. Not only with a view to a just

conclusion of the trial was it necessary that the counsel for the prosecution should be perfect masters of the case, but for the interest of Essex himself (who, though he could not have escaped a verdict of guilty, might nevertheless by his demeanour have deserved mercy), it was most desirable that the prosecution should not be left entirely in the hands of the most illiberal and merciless and passionate of all prosecutors—Edward Coke. A tender, temperate, and skilful speaker, though his office were to urge the charge home, might nevertheless have done much to temper and soften it, and moderate the behaviour of the prisoner. If Bacon had not cared about his duty at all,—if his entire sympathy had been with Essex, and his sole object to befriend him as far as his case admitted,—I do not think he could have wished to be released from his share in the prosecution. Not that I believe that *was* his motive. I believe he was a true soldier, prepared to defend his position against whomsoever, friend or enemy. But I have no doubt that he wished Essex to come out of the business as well as he could, consistently with truth and justice; and on both accounts,—both as a lover of justice and as a lover of Essex,—he must have wished to have the opportunity of speaking. As for standing by the side of the prisoner at the trial and soliciting a mitigation of the sentence, visiting his cell, and all that, what can the reviewer have been thinking of? I give him full credit for ignorance of most things bearing on this trial; but he *must* have known that Bacon would not have been permitted to hold any communication with the prisoner, or to open his mouth in his behalf.

Of all that took place between the insurrection and the trial, of the evidence which the preliminary examinations elicited, and of the complete alteration which it produced in the complexion of the case, he does not appear to have known anything. Of the trial itself he appears (as I said before) to have known no more than might be collected from the report of Bacon's part in it, as printed in the notes to Montagu's "Life;" and as in this there happened to be no allusion to the consultations at Drury House,—the fatal discovery which not only overthrew the whole fabric of the defence, but darkened the aspect of the treason by proving it long considered and deep laid,—he remained in ignorance of these to the last, and constructed his theory of the case, and how it ought to have been dealt with, upon the assumption that the action of the 8th of February was a sudden outbreak of desperation inspired by the fear of something that some enemy was going to do to him. But as this is the ground of his main attack upon Bacon—his proof that he bore a principal part in shedding the Earl's blood, on which he labours for some ten pages of narrative, illustration, and argument—and as people are not satisfied with a reference to a full and correct statement of the case, as showing that his whole

argument rests upon a misconception of the facts and needs no further answer, I have no choice but to take the points of the charge one by one, and answer them separately.

“He appeared as counsel for the prosecution. In that situation he did not confine himself to what would have been amply sufficient to procure a verdict. He employed all his wit, his rhetoric, and his learning; not to ensure a conviction,—for the circumstances were such that a conviction was inevitable,—but to deprive the unhappy prisoner of all those excuses which, though legally of no value, yet tended to diminish the moral guilt of the crime; and which therefore, though they could not justify the Peers in pronouncing an acquittal, might incline the Queen to grant a pardon.”*

Of Bacon’s consent to appear as counsel for the prosecution I have already said enough. He had no motive for refusing to take the part which belonged to his place except the fear of unpopularity. And the charge of going beyond his duty in performing it rests upon two or three assumptions in doctrine or in fact which I think will not be allowed.

The first is, that a counsel for the prosecution is not justified in proving more against the prisoner than just enough to make out a legal case for conviction. If the prisoner alleges, in his own excuse, circumstances which without making his act legal make it less immoral, he is to have the benefit of them, whether true or false (I add the last clause, because if they are true, he clearly ought to have the benefit of them either way): which is as much as to say that a court of justice is to take no notice of the moral quality of the offences on which it sits in judgment, and that every excuse which, if true, would deserve a pardon, is to be taken as true without inquiry. According to the letter of the law, every man who followed Essex on that day was guilty of treason; to prove that he was with him was “sufficient to procure a verdict.” But was every man as guilty as he? And if he was guiltier than those who believed that they were only defending him against assassination, how were the Peers or the Queen to know it, unless the counsel for the prosecution was permitted to show that the fear of assassination, though a true excuse in one case, was a false pretence in the other? Was it fit that, in a proceeding upon so grave a matter in the highest court of justice, no distinction should be made between the leader and the follower, or between a crime of malice and a crime of madness? As a general doctrine, I do not think the reviewer himself would have seriously maintained this. He must have been secretly possessed with the belief that the excuses, of the benefit of which Bacon laboured to deprive Essex, were true. And this brings me to his assumptions as to the facts, which I must give in his own words:—

“The Earl urged as a palliation of his frantic acts that he was sur-

* *Essays*, ii. p. 313.

rounded by powerful and inveterate enemies, that they had ruined his fortunes, that they sought his life, and that their persecutions had driven him to despair. This was true; and Bacon well knew it to be true. But he affected to treat it as an idle pretence. He compared Essex to Pisis-tratus, who by pretending to be in imminent danger of assassination, and exhibiting self-inflicted wounds, succeeded in establishing tyranny at Athens. This was too much for the prisoner to bear. He interrupted his ungrateful friend by calling on him to quit the part of an advocate, to come forward as a witness, and to tell the Lords whether in old times he, Francis Bacon, had not, under his own hand, repeatedly asserted the truth of what he now represented as idle pretexts.”*

To this statement I have several exceptions to take.

In the first place, Essex pleaded the persecutions of his enemies, not in palliation of a frantic action, but in justification of a deliberate action, which he came prepared to avow and defend. Had he acknowledged his guilt, and excused it as a short madness brought on by despair of the Queen's favour (for this, after all, was the only kind of persecution which he was suffering), the whole trial would probably have taken a different turn; and Bacon would undoubtedly have made a very different speech from that which he did make.† But he took the opposite course. He boldly pleaded not guilty; came prepared to justify the whole action as undertaken in self-defence against a plot laid by his private enemies to assassinate him. And this ground (in the opening of the case, when he thought the Government knew of nothing beyond the armed assembly and tumult) he did actually and explicitly take up. It is true that when he found they had discovered the whole secret—that they knew all the particulars of the previous preparations and consultations, and how (many days before) the expediency of raising a party in the city had been talked over, the project of seizing the Tower formally discussed, and a plan for surprising and mastering the Court considered in detail and all but matured;—and moreover, when the Earl of Southampton, standing by his side at the bar and answering on the sudden to these unexpected charges, had by his answer virtually admitted the facts;—it is true, I say, that he then shifted his position, and (being compelled in his extremity to put another colour upon his proceedings) pretended or admitted (call it which you will) that he had a further object, which was to force his way to the Queen and induce her to remove his enemies from her councils. But his mention of these “enemies” in the first instance was distinctly as of persons from whom he stood in fear of a personal attack; and his motive for mentioning them was to account for the armed assembly on Sunday morning at

* *Essays*, ii. p. 314.

† “I did not expect that matter of defence would have been pleaded this day; and therefore I must alter my speech from that I intended.”—*Report of the Trial*.

Essex House, and for locking up the Lord Keeper, Lord Chief Justice, and other officers sent from the Council to command them to lay down their arms. It was indeed the pretence which he had devised and meditated from the beginning, and which he always intended to rest upon. The evening before the insurrection, he had industriously scattered about the city and elsewhere rumours of a pretended plot against his life. On the morning of the insurrection he declared to the Lord Keeper, as accounting for the concourse of so many armed friends, that his life was sought, that he should have been murdered in his bed, that he and his friends were assembled there to defend their lives. When he went into the city to seek help there, he repeated the same story with some variations to the people in the streets. Upon his trial he again alleged the same apprehension in justification of his proceeding on that day. "Having had certain advertisement" (he said) "on Saturday at night that *my private enemies were in arms against me*, and the same news being seconded on Sunday morning by persons worthy the believing, I resolved to stand upon my guard." And again—"As for locking up the Lords sent from the Council, it was done in charity and without disloyalty, and intended only to safeguard them lest they should have taken hurt; for when the people in the streets shouted with a great and sudden outcry, they said, 'We shall all be slain'—at which time I and my friends thought *our enemies had been come to beset the house*." It is evident, therefore, that Essex's plea was not that the persecutions of his enemies had "*driven him to despair*," but that they had driven him to take up arms in defence of his life. And this was the plea against which Bacon's answer was directed.

In the second place, we are told that the plea "was true, and Bacon well knew it to be true;" both which assertions I flatly contradict. It was false; and Essex well knew it to be false. There were no enemies of the kind. Enemies who sought his life (the only kind of enemies in question) there were certainly none. *Rivals* there were no doubt, who were doing what they could to keep his fortunes down; but the worst they could do was to keep him out of Court, and the worst of his despair was but a farewell to Court-favour.

But though Essex's plea was totally false, it was necessary that it should be answered. For had he been able to make it good—had he been able to show that his original design in gathering a number of armed men at Essex House was no more than to resist an attack by armed enemies, which he really apprehended, and that the rest of the action followed upon this, one thing drawing on another in the hurry of the time—it would have amounted not only to a
very nearly to a justifica-

tion. At any rate it would have discharged him of all imputation of a treasonable intention. It seems also to have been a line of defence which the Government had not anticipated; and in the desultory progress of the trial (during which, in consequence of the prisoners being allowed to make their remarks upon the several points of the charge and evidence as it proceeded, the argument was continually shifting from one thing to another), there was some danger of its being left unanswered. And therefore it was that Bacon (whose eye was always upon the material points of the case in hand) rising in his turn, and "altering his speech from that he had intended," recalled this point of the defence, and showed how ill it hung together, and what a mere pretence it was, and an artifice as old as the days of Pisistratus. The illustration was certainly fair and apt; and what harm there was in quoting it, I confess I cannot see. The comparison was not in any way degrading. It was not as if he had compared him to Nero or Catiline, or any of the infamous characters of history.

In the third place, we are given to understand that Bacon had himself "in old times, under his own hand, repeatedly asserted the truth of what he now represented as idle pretexts;" which again I deny. Bacon had never asserted any such thing as that Essex had enemies against whom it was necessary that he should stand upon armed guard; or that there was any machination against him which could be resisted by force. "Under his own hand" (if by that he meant *in his own person*), Bacon had said nothing about the existence of enemies of any kind. It was only in a letter drawn up by him in Essex's name, and which was to be taken for Essex's own composition, that he had (not "repeatedly" but once; not "in old times" but lately; not "under his own hand" but under Essex's) attributed the depression of his fortunes to the power of certain persons about the Queen, who having access to her ear abused it with false information. To say that this amounted to an admission on the part of Bacon that the story about the plot against Essex's life was true, is merely absurd. It does not even prove that the depression of his fortunes was believed by Bacon to be the work of Court-enemies. It only proves that he could think of nothing so likely to make the Queen restore him to favour as the suggestion that his exclusion from favour was not her own doing, but the work of others who were abusing her. Anyhow, the matter was totally irrelevant. The letter was a dramatic work; a device got up between Bacon and Essex for the purpose of producing an impression upon the Queen. And this public reference to it was no less idle, considered as an argument upon the point in question, than unjustifiable considered as a violation of confidence.

This was the first speech Bacon made during the trial; the first

occasion on which he is mentioned as taking any part. His object was to bring the discussion back to the question, from which Coke, who was the leader, had allowed himself to be drawn away. The defence set up by the prisoner had not been properly answered; and yet it required an answer. That the answer he gave was just and to the point cannot be denied; and unless it was his duty to act as the prisoner's counsel I cannot see the impropriety of urging it.

His second, and only other speech, was made at a later stage, and had a similar object: an object which cannot be properly understood without reference to the progress of the trial, and was therefore unintelligible to the reviewer, for whom these two speeches constituted the whole proceeding, but, taken in its place, appears quite natural and pertinent.

Let us take his account of it first.

“As if the allusion to Pisistratus were not sufficiently offensive, he made another allusion still more unjustifiable. He compared Essex to Henry Duke of Guise, and the rash attempt in the city to the day of the barricades at Paris. Why Bacon had recourse to such a topic it is difficult to say. It was quite unnecessary for the purpose of obtaining a verdict. It was quite certain to produce a strong impression on the mind of the haughty and jealous princess on whose pleasure the Earl's fate depended. The faintest allusion to the degrading tutelage in which the last Valois had been held by the House of Lorraine was sufficient to harden her heart against a man who in rank, in military reputation, in popularity among the citizens of the capital, bore some resemblance to the Captain of the League.”*

Here again we have this extraordinary new doctrine as to the duty of a counsel for the prosecution: as if the object of a criminal trial were to obtain a bare verdict,—not to discover the offence; and moreover as if a public prosecutor in a court of justice ought to be thinking, not of his business, which is to “show the face of Truth to the face of Justice,”—but of the means of working on his sovereign's humour. Elizabeth, we may be sure, knew all about the day of the barricades without being reminded of it by Bacon. It was as superfluous to remind *her* of the true nature of this business, as it would have been vain to attempt to conceal it from her. But there *was* a party whom it was not superfluous to remind of these things,—who were but too likely to overlook them,—and to whom it was of great national importance to present them in a just light;—I mean the public at large. Whatever might be the result of the trial, whatever punishment might be awarded to the offenders, it was most important that the justice of it should be made out to the satisfaction not only of the judges, but of the people. Substantiated

* *Essays*, ii. p. 314.

as the charge against Essex was—fully substantiated in every point—we know that the people did in fact murmur against the sentence. How much more, and how much more dangerously, would they have murmured, if the case had been left by the counsel for the prosecution only half made out! How unjust would it have been, not only to the State, the safety of which depended upon the right dealing with it, but to the prisoner himself! Such an attempt by so popular a man as Essex was a very serious thing. The advantage of a few hours might have turned it into the first stroke of a civil war. The punishment of it was a momentous question of State; and the question was what it really *deserved*, therefore what it really *was*;—not whether a capital sentence was justified by the bare letter of the law, but whether the execution of that sentence was demanded by justice and State-policy. For this purpose, to present the case in its true colours was surely the imperative duty of all persons charged with the prosecution. To let the Queen and the people believe that Essex's real object was only to defend himself against assassination, would have been most unjust to them. To explain to the Queen privately, or to the people extra-judicially, the falsehood and frivolity of that plea,—without having publicly challenged it at the bar,—would have been most unjust to him. The first would have betrayed the State in concealing the truth; the second would have betrayed the prisoner in cheating him of his opportunity of defence.

Now as to this fresh allusion which the reviewer says was “more unjustifiable” than the other—this topic which he “cannot understand why Bacon had recourse to”—he could have had no difficulty in understanding it if he had known how the case stood at the time when it was introduced. I can hardly think he would have disapproved of it. Essex's first story was that he was merely acting in self-defence against private enemies from whom he had reason to apprehend an attack. In answer to this it had been shown that there was no ground for any such apprehension, and that it was, in fact, a mere pretext like that of Pisistratus. But this excuse, even if true, would have accounted only for the muster of friends and the restraint of the Councillors. How was he to account for his projected attempt upon the Court and for his endeavour to raise help in the city? To this question he replied that his object was only to secure access to the Queen, that he might “unfold to her his griefs against his private enemies.” Bacon answered,—Grant that you meant only to go as a suppliant, “shall petitions be presented by armed petitioners? This must needs bring loss of liberty to the Prince. Neither is it any point of law (as my Lord of Southampton would have it believed) that condemns them of treason, but it is apparent in common

sense. To take secret counsel, to execute it, to run together in numbers, armed with weapons,—what can be the excuse? Warned by the Lord Keeper—by a herald—and yet persist; will any simple man take this to be less than treason?" Upon this Essex argued that "if he had purposed anything against others than those his private enemies, he would not have stirred with so slender a company." "Whereunto Mr. Bacon answered" (continues the Report), "It was not the company you carried with you, but the assistance you hoped for in the city, which you trusted unto. The Duke of Guise thrust himself into Paris on the day of the barricados, in his doublet and hose, attended only with eight gentlemen, and found that help in the city which (thanks be to God) you failed of here. And what followed? The King was forced to put himself into a pilgrim's weeds, and in that disguise to steal away and 'scape their fury. Even such was my Lord's confidence too; and his pretence the same; an all-hail and a kiss to the city; but the end was treason, as hath been sufficiently proved."

This is all the passage. Is there anything strange in the introduction of such a topic? Surely it was very necessary to meet Essex's argument, which was, in fact, a very plausible one. For if he could have proved that his purpose was merely to present himself to the Queen *in formâ supplicantis*, without any force to back him—I do not say without meaning to *use* force, for his meaning would have been no guarantee for his actions; he could not himself know what he would have been led to do when he once found himself in that position—but if he could have shown that he had taken no measures and made no endeavour to provide himself with force more than for his personal protection—then, although the act might still perhaps have been treason in law, yet the aspect of his offence, politically as well as morally considered, would have been totally altered. Now the fact that he went into the city with a slender company, armed only with pistols, rapiers, and daggers, seemed to keep this story in countenance. It was necessary to reconcile that fact with the more criminal intention imputed to him, or the case against him would have been left incomplete in a material part. And the example of the Duke of Guise was so directly in point, and lay so obviously in the way, that one does not see how Bacon could have passed it by. And none of the reports of the trial represent him as having wandered into any declamations or aggravations in the matter. He appears to have confined himself strictly and exactly to what was material.

The reviewer, it is true, having no information but what he found in Montagu, and being strongly inclined to believe Essex and to disbelieve Bacon, may have persuaded himself that the

imputation of a criminal intention was false—that the march into **the** city was only a rash act without an object. But I do not see **how** any one who has read the confessions and depositions can **doubt** that he went into the city in the hope of gathering a force **there** strong enough to make head against the Government. It **may** be true that his *ultimate* objects (so far as he himself knew **them**) were limited to what we should nowadays call a change of **ministry**. But his *immediate* object was to make himself, by **force** of arms, master of the then established and lawful **Government**. How can anybody doubt this, who knows that the **preparatory** conferences had turned upon the means not only of **surprising** the Court, but of gaining possession of the Tower and **of** raising a party in the city? He did, I dare say, mean to **assume** the attitude of a suppliant; but being well aware that his **supplication** would not be freely granted, he meant to provide **against** that accident by coming with a power strong enough if **necessary** to enforce it.


This, then, was the part taken by Bacon in “shedding the **Earl’s** blood,” for he is not accused of having advised the **execution**. And we have now before us the whole case upon which the **reviewer** rests his conclusion that Bacon forsook Essex for the **sake** of “wealth, precedence, titles,” &c. I say that his conclusion **is** built on an imperfect knowledge of the facts; that if he had **known** a little more about the real conditions of the case he would **have** concluded differently. If he had known the nature of the **charges** which Essex was called on to answer before the Council at York House on the 5th of June, 1600, and the reason why he **was** to make his answer before a Court so constituted, he would **not** have thought that Bacon, in taking the part assigned to him, **was** forsaking the part of a friend. If he had known that between the 6th of June and the end of September Bacon was doing all he **could** to persuade the Queen to receive Essex into favour **again** and to persuade him to deserve to be received, he would **not** have thought that he had resolved on the 5th of June to **forsake** him because he foresaw that his fall was at hand. If he had **known** that early in July Essex was relieved from his keeper, that on the 26th of August he was freed from all further restraint, and that from that time he suffered nothing at the hands either of the **Queen** or of his enemies, worse than exclusion from Court-**favour**, he would not have taken him for an unhappy young noble-**man** driven to despair by persecution, or his endeavour to raise a **rebellion** in the city on the 8th of February, 1600-1, for a **frantic** enterprise entitled to excuse on the plea of provocation. If he had known that this enterprise was the result (though spoiled **by** hurry in the execution) of three months’ deliberation, that it had **been** planned beforehand in minute detail, and that its object was

to master the Court by an armed force and impose terms upon Queen Elizabeth, he would not have thought that a member of Queen Elizabeth's learned counsel ought to have gone over to the leader's side, and taken upon himself the duties of a modern counsel for the prisoner; still less that, if he felt himself bound in consideration of his general retainer to act as one of the counsel for the prosecution, he ought to have made use of his office to hide from the Court all those features in the transaction which revealed its real character. He would have thought, in short, not that Bacon forsook Essex, but that Essex had forsaken himself, and left his most faithful friends no choice but to take part against him.

The charge of "blackening the Earl's memory," in so far as it supposes misrepresentations of fact, may be explained in the same way as the others. How much the reviewer had read of the "Declaration of the Practices and Treasons attempted and committed by Robert, Earl of Essex" (beyond the title, which he could not have got from Montagu's "Life" without referring to one of the volumes of the "Works") I have no means of knowing. The terms which he applies to it are at once so vague and so inappropriate that I doubt for my own part whether he had read it at all. But the question is not material. Whether he passed it by altogether with the contempt which he thought it deserved, or whether he read it through with a running assumption that every fact which he had not heard of before, and which did not fit with his own conception of the case, was a fiction, the result would be the same. Every sentence which contradicted or corrected his own story would be set down as containing a falsehood; and the number would be large. Luckily, however, the question does not depend upon the personal credit of rival authorities. The substantial truth of the official narrative is proved by independent evidence; and even if every item of news that can be picked out of a contemporary letter, reporting the last rumour of Paul's Walk, were allowed to be of more value than an attested deposition, and alterations made accordingly, the story, though it would be rendered less consistent here and there with itself, would not be materially altered.

But the reviewer's account of the *occasion* of this publication shows that he was unaware of some discoveries, made after the trial, which he would certainly have allowed to be material, and might perhaps have allowed to modify his opinion. What I have to say about these I must reserve for another paper.

JAMES SPEDDING.



HAS THE BRITISH SEAMAN DETERIORATED?

THE long debates in the present session on the Merchant Shipping Bill, and the numerous amendments that were introduced, have brought into strong relief widely different opinions; but on one point unanimity has prevailed. It has been acknowledged by all that the security of life will have been but imperfectly assured, if our ships are made seaworthy in their hull and equipment alone, and are not manned by skilful and well-disciplined seamen. While, however, the essential importance of securing an efficient body of seamen has been strenuously insisted upon, it has been alleged, with scarce one dissentient voice, that the British seamen of the present day have degenerated grievously from their predecessors.

It is proposed, in the following pages, to bring together the opinions of the most competent authorities, and thus to supply the materials for solving a problem of vital importance to an insular people, who are dependent on the mariner alike for their material prosperity and their influence abroad.

Several witnesses before the Royal Commission on Unseaworthy Ships spoke strongly to the deterioration of our seamen; but the most important evidence in support of this view of the case was furnished by the Committee of Shipowners formed at Liverpool in 1870. In November, 1869, Mr. Shaw Lefevre, who was then Secretary to the Board of Trade, had visited Liverpool, with the view of obtaining information upon subjects connected with

merchant shipping legislation. During the discussions which took place, the condition of the sailors became a prominent topic. It was affirmed that they had deteriorated in skill and conduct; and an association was organized for the purpose of prosecuting a systematic inquiry.

The members of the committee were Messrs. Bryce Allen, Balfour, Beazley, Christopher Bushell, Duckworth, Forwood, Galloway, Hall, of Newcastle, Ismay, P. H. Rathbone, Squarey, Ward, and Williamson, with whom were associated Captains Judkins and Ballantyne. Their first report was based on the information collected by a sub-committee, who had circulated a well-considered series of questions among the principal shipowners and most experienced shipmasters of the port. Replies were received from 31 masters of sailing-ships, 13 masters of sailing and steam-ships, 4 masters of steam-ships, 14 late masters, now owners or overlookers, 39 sailing-ship owners, 3 steam-ship owners, and 7 others, coming under none of these designations.

The principal deductions from an analysis of their answers were tabulated as follows :—

“ 89 per cent. state that seamen have deteriorated as seamen ;

“ 65 per cent. that they have deteriorated in physical condition ;

“ 71 per cent. that they have deteriorated in subordination.”

In anticipation of comprehensive legislation, the same committee issued a supplementary report in 1874. In this document the unfavourable opinion of the merchant seamen is repeated, though, if possible, in terms more decided and emphatic than before. For a period of five years the committee had prosecuted their inquiries into the condition of our merchant seamen. They had watched the progress of legislation on shipping, and had given special attention to the difficult problem of securing for the merchant service a body of seamen superior in skill and conduct to the great majority of those at present employed. They had summoned an influential meeting of shipowners in 1872, to meet representatives from the Board of Trade at Liverpool, when the conclusions at which the committee had arrived were supported with almost unbroken unanimity. While the additional information, collected during the lapse of the five years devoted to their inquiry, had induced the committee to alter their original suggestions on points of detail, they alleged that their first impressions, both as to the actual condition of the seamen, and the best means of improving them, had in the main been strongly confirmed.

The committee further quoted the speech delivered at Liverpool by H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh, in which he declared it to be his firm conviction that, so long as the system of crimping and

advance notes existed, there would be no certainty as to how many ships might be lost before they had gone their first day's voyage.

The Liverpool Committee not only investigated the actual condition of the merchant service, but they undertook the far more difficult task of remedial legislation. Their proposals were embodied in the following resolutions, which were passed at a meeting held on the 20th October, 1874:—

“ 1. It is undesirable that the present training, industrial, and reformatory school ships be interfered with in any way, except that the State should give such ships pecuniary aid, in the form of a capitation grant, as in the case of Public Elementary Schools.

“ 2. Care should be taken not to weaken the valuable system of apprenticeship, now in operation, but to encourage it.

“ 3. Training ships and nautical schools are absolutely needful for the education of seamen for the merchant navy, and for educating a sufficient number of boys to maintain the Royal Naval Reserve at the strength recommended by the Royal Commission of 1859. Government should establish such ships and schools in the different seaports of the United Kingdom.

“ 4. The expense of maintenance of these training-ships should be borne by the Government, and by the mercantile marine; and the proportion of the expense falling upon the mercantile marine should be defrayed by an annual tonnage contribution, not exceeding sixpence per ton, to be returned to those ships which carry indentured apprentices up to a fixed standard, hereafter to be agreed upon.

“ 5. All vessels under 100 tons register to be exempt from contribution.

“ 6. Boys to be admitted into the training-ships between the ages of fourteen and sixteen, to be subjected to a medical examination, and to bind themselves:—

“ (a.) To serve in the Royal Naval Reserve, for such period and on such terms as the Government may determine.

“ (b.) To remain in the training-ships for not less than twelve or eighteen months.

“ (c.) To serve in British merchant ships for a fixed period of not less than three years.

“ 7. The management of these training-ships should be vested in persons to be appointed by the Government and mercantile marine; the ships to be periodically inspected by an officer appointed by the Admiralty.”

A copy of these resolutions was circulated amongst the Shipowners' Associations established at the principal ports, and they were invited to give their opinion as to the expediency of adopting them. The suggestions of the Liverpool Committee found unanimous approval on all points save one. The proposal for a compulsory contribution for the maintenance of training-ships was at once rejected by the shipowners of the North-eastern ports, and subsequent events give reason to believe that shipowners generally would object to taxation for such a purpose.

We shall have occasion to revert to these suggestions in greater detail. They are given in this place in a connected form, in

justice to the Liverpool Committee, who have bestowed so much labour and thought on plans for remedial legislation.

The latest official evidence as to the deterioration of the British seamen is contained in the replies of the consular body to the interrogatories addressed to them in the Board of Trade circular of 1869.

The opinions of the whole consular body may be summarized thus. Opinions unfavourable to the British seamen were given by the consuls at Antwerp, Christiania, Naples, Smyrna, Riga, Mobile, Marseilles, Memel, Amsterdam, Alexandria, Dantzic, Oporto, Pará, the Dardanelles, Portland, Callao, Pernambuco, and Monte Video. Favourable opinions were given by the consuls at Barcelona, Genoa, Lisbon, New Orleans, Savannah, Odessa, San Francisco, St. Petersburg, Patras, Stockholm, Archangel, and the ports in Japan.

Next in order of time we have to refer to the report on the supply of British seamen by Mr. Gray and Mr. Hamilton, of the Board of Trade, presented to Parliament in 1872. The language of the marine department of the Board of Trade has been generally favourable to the seamen, although, as the following extracts prove, it has not always been consistent.

In this report Messrs. Gray and Hamilton use the following language :—

“Our practical conclusions, therefore, are that, for the purposes of our mercantile marine, no case is made out for the interference of Government to increase the number or improve the quality of seamen serving on board British merchant ships, and that nothing need be done for undertaking the special education of persons going to sea as merchant seamen, with a view to making them fit for the Royal Naval Reserve, until it has been first shown that there are not among our merchant seamen and fishermen at the present time an adequate number sufficiently good for the purpose.”

After an interval, however, of only two years, Mr. Gray, at a meeting of shipowners at Liverpool, spoke in much less glowing terms of the qualities of our merchant seamen.

“There is,” he said, “undoubtedly, in the mercantile marine, an immense waste, through the unseaworthiness of seamen. Men were shipped who were utterly unfit to go to sea, from their physical condition. The question of the supply of seamen to the mercantile marine was not a small one, and must be taken up from a comprehensive point of view.”

Again, at a meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, held at Newcastle-on-Tyne, Mr. Gray said that the question of loss of life at sea was not a question of unseaworthiness of ships so much as of the unseaworthiness of seamen.

It has already been stated that the leading steam-ship owners,

who gave evidence before the Duke of Somerset's Commission, spoke highly of the seamen. Among these witnesses we may refer especially to Mr. Burns, who said:—"We have 3,000 able seamen, always afloat. Our seamen are as good to-day as they have ever been."

Another most experienced and impartial witness, Captain Furnell, for twenty-one years superintendent of a shipping office in London, said that he did not believe that our seamen had deteriorated. In 1873 there were shipped at his office 17,000 seamen, 1,800 mates, and 1,100 apprentices. An officer, who has retired from the sea to take charge of such a vast amount of business, must have the best opportunities of forming an opinion, and, appointed as he is to do equal justice between the seamen and their employers, his judgment may be accepted with the more implicit confidence.

During his service as commander, Captain Furnell had experienced the greatest difficulties. He had gone down the river to Gravesend with few of his crew sober. Swedes and Norwegians, he regarded as first-class men so long as they did not form the majority of the crew of a British ship. When brought together in large numbers they were likely to be most troublesome, finding fault with, and growling at, everything.

It is satisfactory to learn from such a source that, although the number of our seamen may not have kept pace with the increase in shipping, yet they have not deteriorated in character; while, on the other hand, they have improved in education.

The evidence taken by the Duke of Somerset's Commission is reviewed in an article on merchant shipping in the *Quarterly* for January last.

"Special temptations to drunkenness, debauchery, desertion, and insubordination, have always existed, and have at all times been the despair of the philanthropist and the legislator. And, when statements are freely made concerning the recent deterioration of seamen, it is scarcely possible to adopt any standard by which to judge whether these evils are greater or less now than they formerly were. The evidence before the Royal Commission on unseaworthy ships consists chiefly of individual opinion, which is in itself of little value, nor is it at all in the same direction. The opinion of the consuls in reply to Mr. Lefevre's circular of 1869, like those of the witnesses before the Royal Commission, differ; but the larger number are decidedly unfavourable. Out of about thirty-five, who give a positive opinion, two-thirds at least think the condition of the seamen bad, if not worse than it formerly was; and drunkenness, desertion, quarrelling, and insubordination figure largely in their reports. One bright feature, however, there is. In all these reports, except two or three, a very favourable account is given of the crews of steamers. These appear on the whole to be steady well-conducted men, who seldom desert, and give very little trouble. And this becomes an extremely important feature in the case, when it is considered how large a proportion they form of the whole service. In 1874 the number of men employed in British merchant ships in the trade of the United Kingdom, exclusive of masters, was 203,606, and

out of these the number employed in steamers was 74,843, a number forming a third of the whole, and constantly increasing in proportion.

"Some other facts are clear. It is certain that the number of men employed in proportion to the tonnage is less now than it was formerly, and that it is becoming still smaller. The proportion of men to each 100 tons was in 1852, for sailing ships, 4·55, and, for steamers, 8·04. In 1874 the proportion was, for sailing-ships, 3·19, and for steamers, 4·1.

"It is also clear that the supply of young sailors in the form of apprentices is rather falling off than increasing. The number of new apprentices enrolled in 1850 was 5,055; in 1860, 5,616; in 1870, 4,241; and in 1874, 4,445.

"Under the circumstances, it is difficult to say whether the condition of seamen is better or worse, on the whole, than it was in 1850. It was not satisfactory then, and it is not satisfactory now. The growth of steam has separated seamen into classes, more distinctly than was formerly the case; and there is probably in this employment, as in others, a less abundant supply of efficient men, in proportion to the demands of the trade now, than there was then.

"The evils which beset seamen are notorious — want of education, want of homes, crimping, drunkenness, debauchery, disease, and insubordination. The measures which have been suggested are improved training, a pension fund, prohibition of advance of wages, prompt and early payment of wages, further protection against crimps on landing, the extension to merchant seamen of that protection against contagious disease which has proved so valuable to sailors and soldiers in the public service, and further provisions for maintenance of discipline in foreign ports — an object of great importance, and one which can only be attained by means of consular conventions with other countries."

Shipowners generally may be disposed to regard the organization of unions or protective societies as tending to promote insubordination rather than as an indication of an improvement amongst seamen; and it may be that the strength derived from united action may sometimes be employed in the furtherance of objects which are equally disadvantageous to the seaman and to his employer. If, however, we may rely on the written and spoken declarations of the responsible officers of these unions, we cannot but admire the principles and the policy by which they profess to be regulated. The following observations occur in a letter from the president of the London Seamen's Mutual Protection Society, dated the 7th of June, 1875:—

"We are the very antipodes of trades-unions, although forced to be enrolled under that Act. Strikes are our abhorrence, and the first principle laid down is to make good men, and that the owners' property is the first care of a member of this society to see to: and, in case of disaster at sea, the lives and safety of women and children, and also male passengers, are to be seen to before the members' own."

I may conclude by briefly stating the result of my own experience. The voyages in which I have been concerned not being conducted for commercial objects, it may be thought that the experience thus obtained would throw little light on the state of affairs in the mercantile marine. I may, however, remark that, in a voyage on the coasts of North America, in 1872, I visited

Quebec and New York, two of the ports where the activity and evil influence of the crimps have given rise to the most frequent and bitter complaints.

At Quebec my vessel was moored to the booms for ten days, and, notwithstanding the constant facilities for access to the shore, and to those parts of the town which offer the greatest temptations to seamen, no instances of misconduct whatever occurred during the whole of my stay.

The same remarks would apply to the good discipline of the crew during a long visit to the port of New York.

The instances are happily rare where the British seaman has failed to do his duty in tempestuous weather at sea. The seaman-like qualities and courage of our nation are seldom wanting whenever an emergency arises.

It will be evident, from what has been already said, that the widest possible differences of opinion exist with reference to the efficiency of the British seaman at the present time. A comparison of the character and skill of the seaman of to-day with the same class, as it is conceived to have been forty years ago, always gives rise to divergent opinion among shipowners and ship-captains. As a general rule, it will be found that the complaints proceed from ship-captains advanced in years, and from the owners of sailing-ships. In the shipping community there is the same disposition, which we commonly observe in all aged persons in other walks of life, to indulge in the *laus temporis acti*; to extol the men and the things of the past, and to disparage their contemporaries.

At the time of the earlier Parliamentary inquiries, unfavourable opinions with reference to seamen were as strongly expressed as they are to-day. Sir William Hall assured the Manning Committee of 1852 that the conduct of British seamen was so bad that, in many instances, merchants gave the preference to foreign ships. And again, in 1860, Mr. Beazley, of Liverpool, whose interest in the Manning question has never flagged, made the same complaints to Mr. Lindsay's Commission on Merchant Shipping, which have of late been so repeatedly renewed. He enlarged on the difficulty of obtaining efficient crews, and on the desirability of establishing training-ships under the auspices of the Government. Then, as now, the disparaging statements made on the one side were refuted by the more favourable opinions of other witnesses. It would be unsafe to yield a too ready deference to the opinions of shipowners engaged in an ever-recurring struggle to keep down expenditure. Their tendency naturally is to exaggerate the difficulties of the hour, and to forget all that they have had to contend with in years gone by. Opinions, formed under such circumstances, cannot be perfectly impartial.

In my judgment, a more reasonable conclusion, on the much debated question of the deterioration of the British seaman, is conveyed in the reply observations of Sir Philip Francis, our Consul-General at Constantinople, to the circular of 1869.

“The general condition of British seamen must be one of comparison and doubt. Whilst many people are inclined to magnify the merits of the days gone by, and the men of former generations, others see progress with a sanguine eye, and unduly despise old times and fashions. The general habit here, however, is to declare that the British seaman has degenerated. My personal experience runs over a period of ten years only, and my opinion is, I fear, of small value; yet I think it is true that the character of the British seaman, whether better or worse than formerly, is open to improvement.

“There is, from the nature of the business, a disposition for vagabonds to volunteer into the trade; not that they like the sea, but that they wish to escape from the land. The sea affords to a reckless or an unlucky man, whether much or little acquainted with the duties of a ship, an opportunity to get board and lodging, and to obtain a small advance for necessities.

“Masters are also glad to hire men at small wages, and so, frequently, an indifferent crew is got together, the men being neither fit for, nor satisfied with, their work.

“In the same fore-castle may meet, amongst a crew of eight or nine, an escaped pickpocket, a fugitive poacher, and a reduced field-preacher. But this has always been so, more or less, and a handy man may soon pick up enough knowledge of his work to get along, if he has heart in it; but few of the class I am referring to desire anything else than to escape other evils, to which they were exposed at home.

“The class of ships which come to this port, ships which have brought coal from Cardiff and Newcastle, and which return with corn, is not a very high one, and we probably see here not the best class of sailors. Again, there is an admixture of foreigners, not always of the best class. But, notwithstanding all the unfavourable remarks which are made on the British sailor of the present day, there are excellent qualities among the class; and, with the better provision now made for their comfort on board, and at sailors’ homes on shore, I see no reason why they should deteriorate.”

On the whole, it would appear that the alleged deterioration of the British seaman is not conclusively established. If too many sailors go on board their ships under the influence of liquor, they did the same in years gone by; and, on the other hand, in more recent times, very many sailors have become total abstainers. If, again, it be true that the general standard of excellence is lower, it is not likely that the remedy will be found in more active intervention on the part of the Government.

In point of fact, those shipowners who entertain the least favourable view of the present race of seamen refer the commencement of the process of deterioration to the merchant shipping legislation of 1854. The effect of that Act, it has been urged, has been to destroy, in a large measure, the confidence which formerly existed, and which it is so desirable to foster and strengthen, between the sailor, the captain, and the shipowner.

“I remember,” said Mr. Lamport, in his evidence before the Duke of

Somerset, "the late Mr. Graves stating that he could not account for the deterioration of seamen during the last sixteen years. I called attention to the fact that Mr. Graves had spotted the very time when the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 came into operation. I do believe the effect of legislation, which began with that Act, has been very much to injure the moral character of seamen. It has destroyed the confidence between the sailor, his officers, his captain, and his owner."

The rapid growth of the shipping, which has been described as so oppressed and harassed, suggests an obvious explanation of the difficulty of procuring seamen in those branches of the trade where the wages are fixed on the lowest scale, and work is exceptionally arduous. There has been a greater demand for sailors during the last three years in consequence of the rapid increase in sailing tonnage. The tonnage of the sailing-vessels built in the United Kingdom has increased from 90,600 tons in 1873 to 206,000 tons in 1874. Meanwhile, however, the building of steamers, although diminished in extent, is continued with great activity, and seems to point to the gradual substitution of steamers for sailing-ships in all the shorter voyages.

It must, indeed, be admitted that the tendency of modern changes in naval architecture, in its application to merchant ships, has been to check the increase in the employment of seamen, which, but for recent inventions, would of necessity have occurred. It has already been shown how great an increase has taken place in the movement of shipping in our ports. But, owing to the growing number of steamers, there has been no increase in the tonnage of registered vessels of the United Kingdom, and only a trifling addition to the number of seamen employed. The total number of seamen employed in the registered vessels of the United Kingdom was:—

In 1867	.	.	.	196,340 men and boys.
„ 1868	.	.	.	197,502 „
„ 1869	.	.	.	195,490 „
„ 1870	.	.	.	195,962 „
„ 1871	.	.	.	199,738 „
„ 1872	.	.	.	203,720 „
„ 1873	.	.	.	202,739 „

The diffusion of education has made it practicable for a much greater number of seamen to obtain a sufficient knowledge of navigation to pass the examinations instituted by the Board of Trade. Thus, many of the most valuable men before the mast obtain certificates. Their promotion to the quarter-deck of necessity reduces the number of able seamen; and, while there is an insufficient supply of good working hands, the number of certificated officers is in excess of the demand. In former times, when education was less widely diffused, there would not have been the

same number of candidates from the fore-castle for promotion to the quarter-deck.

The alarm which has been raised at the prospect of a falling-off in the supply of seamen has probably been exaggerated. It is true that there has been a great reduction in the numbers apprenticed and enrolled since the system of compulsory apprenticeship was abolished. The number enrolled in 1845 was 15,704; in 1846, 10,376; in 1856, 7,410; in 1866, 5,454; and in 1871, 4,111. There are, however, a large number of boys afloat who, although not regularly apprenticed to shipowners, are coming forward as the future seamen of the mercantile marine. Their training may not be so systematic as it ought to be, but where they are fortunate enough to be under the care of a captain anxious for their welfare, and where they are associated with seamen who take a pleasure in instructing them in their art—and many such captains and many such seamen are to be found—the boys are learning their business quite as effectually as if they had been regularly apprenticed to the sea. Owing to the abolition of compulsory apprenticeship, few boys are now apprenticed to shipowners unless they are intended to become officers in the merchant service. The greater number of the able seamen of the mercantile marine have been reared without passing through a regular apprenticeship, yet it is impossible to prove that there has been any deterioration in seamen regularly employed in sailing-ships either in character, in skill, or in physical power. Our sailing-vessels make quicker passages and they are manned by fewer hands than were considered necessary in former days. In steam-vessels, the difference is even greater than in sailing-vessels. The average proportion of men to 100 tons was, in the foreign trade, in 1854, 7·69; in 1869, 4·68; and in 1873, 3·97. This reduction of the crews does not lead to the conclusion that our seamen are inferior, either in strength or in skill, to their predecessors.

A seaman constantly employed in a jury-rigged steamer, after a certain interval, must necessarily lose his skill in the handling of canvas. But there is no reason to suppose that seamen, if they were constantly employed in sailing-ships, and were selected with the same care, and were paid the same wages, as the men employed in steamers, would be inferior to the mariners of former times.

To take an illustration familiar to the present writer, let comparison be made between the skill and seamanship of the crews of our large and increasing pleasure-fleet, and the performances of the crews of the years gone by. The handsome racing-schooners which now crowd the anchorage of every favourite resort of our yachtsmen are the creation of recent years. By the science of our shipbuilders and sailmakers, acting under the direction of a few clever yachtsmen,

and by the admirable seamanship of the numerous fishermen whom they employ, the sailing powers of schooners have made a rapid and remarkable advance. Formerly it was a rare, now it is a common, achievement for a schooner to compete with success against a cutter. Year by year larger yachts are being built, with spars more ponderous, and with greater area of canvas. No difficulty whatever is experienced in finding competent masters and fine crews for these vessels. It may be presumed from these facts, that in the more important department of the mercantile marine, a seaman placed in the same condition as his predecessors is not inferior either in discipline or in skill.

I have spared no pains to acquaint myself with the facts of the case, and the many widely differing opinions which prevail on the subject; and it is my firm conviction, after a careful and, I trust, an impartial examination of the evidence brought forward by those who entertain a less sanguine opinion, that the falling-off in the quality and the character of our seamen is confined chiefly to the men employed in long-voyage sailing-ships. The seamen are not deteriorated, though unhappily they have the same faults which they have always had. There is, therefore, large room for improvement; and it will be a reflection on our age of advanced civilization if nothing effectual is accomplished for their amelioration.

The conditions of a sea life will excite the sympathy of those whose lot is cast in happier and nobler places. They have been described by one who knows them well—Dr. Roe, physician to the Seamen's Hospital at Callao.


"A man," he writes, "makes an agreement to sail in a vessel on a foreign voyage, which, it is generally stipulated, shall not exceed three years. He is to receive certain wages, to be fed according to a scale, and to be provided with certain accommodation. In return, he puts himself completely at the disposition of the master of the vessel. He generally works all day, and at night he is four hours on the watch and four hours below alternately; but his rest is often broken. Crowded with others into a small space, restricted to a monotonous, unwholesome diet; undergoing great variations of temperature, with inadequate clothing; going for days sometimes, in bad weather, without a cooked meal, without the means of being cleanly, or even decent—add to these the mental worry of often impending shipwreck, and the hard and unremitting discipline necessary to drag both ship and men through the manifold dangers of the sea—and it is not strange that the sailor, arriving in port, is debilitated and exhausted. Possessed of an uncontrollable desire for change, for freedom, for stimulants, for food, he deserts, and plunges into all kinds of debauchery. By the act of desertion he forfeits twelve or eighteen months' pay, and he squanders three months' wages, paid in advance, in a week's dissipation."

Sailors spend their lives, for the most part, far removed from the best influences which can elevate human nature, far away

from their native land, far from their hearths and homes, on the broad and lonely sea, where the authority of the magistrate cannot reach, where public opinion is unfelt, and the Sabbath bell is unheard.

Mr. Plimsoll has evoked a deep sympathy with the seafaring classes which cannot for ever absorb the large share of public attention it now commands. It is earnestly to be desired that the force derived from popular sentiment should be directed into practical channels ere it is diverted by other questions which must sooner or later press for solution.

THOMAS BRASSEY.



"SUPERNATURAL RELIGION."

VIII.—THE CHURCHES OF GAUL.

IN the preceding papers I have investigated the testimony borne by the Churches of Asia Minor to the Canonical Gospels, and more especially to the Fourth Evangelist. The peculiar value of this testimony is due to the close personal relations of these communities with the latest surviving Apostles, more particularly with St. John. At the same time I took occasion incidentally to remark on their attitude towards St. Paul and his writings, because an assumed antagonism between the Apostle of the Gentiles and the Twelve has been adopted by a modern school of critics as the basis for a reconstruction of early Christian history. I purpose in the present paper extending this investigation to the Churches of Gaul. The Christianity of Gaul was in some sense the daughter of the Christianity of Asia Minor.

Of the history of the Gallican Churches before the middle of the second century we have no certain information. It seems fairly probable indeed that, when we read in the Apostolic age of a mission of Crescens to "Galatia" or "Gaul,"* the western country is meant rather than the Asiatic settlement which bore the same name; and, if so, this points to some relations with St. Paul himself. But, even though this explanation should be accepted, the notice stands quite alone. Later tradition indeed supplements it with legendary matter, but it is impossible to say what sub-

* 2 Tim. iv. 10. Gaul was almost universally called "Galatia" in Greek at this time and for many generations afterwards.

stratum of fact, if any, underlies these comparatively recent stories.

The connection between the southern parts of Gaul and the western districts of Asia Minor had been intimate from very remote times. Gaul was indebted for her earliest civilization to her Greek settlements like Marseilles, which had been colonized from Asia Minor some six centuries before the Christian era; and close relations appear to have been maintained even to the latest times. During the Roman period the people of Marseilles still spoke the Greek language familiarly along with the vernacular Celtic of the native population and the official Latin of the dominant power.* When therefore Christianity had established her head-quarters in Asia Minor, it was not unnatural that the Gospel should flow in the same channels which had already conducted the civilization and the commerce of the Asiatic Greeks westward.

At all events, whatever we may think of the antecedent probabilities, the fact itself can hardly be disputed. In the year 177, under Marcus Aurelius, a severe persecution broke out on the banks of the Rhone in the cities of Vienne and Lyons—a persecution which by its extent and character bears a noble testimony to the vitality of the Churches in these places. To this incident we owe the earliest extant historical notice of Christianity in Gaul. A contemporary record of the martyrdoms on this occasion is preserved in the form of a letter from the persecuted Churches, addressed to “the brethren that are in Asia and Phrygia.”† The communities thus addressed, it will be observed, belong to the district in which St. John’s influence was predominant, and which produced all the writers of his school who have been discussed in the preceding papers—Polycarp, Papias, Melito, Apollinarius, Polycrates. Of the references to the Canonical Scriptures in this letter I shall speak presently. For the moment it is sufficient to say that the very fact of their addressing the communication to these distant Churches shows the closeness of the ties which connected the Christians in Gaul with their Asiatic brethren. Moreover, in the body of the letter it is incidentally stated of two of the sufferers, that they came from Asia Minor—Attalus a Pergamene by birth, and Alexander a physician from Phrygia who “had lived many years in the provinces of Gaul;” while nearly all of them bear Greek names. Among these martyrs the most conspicuous was Pothinus, the aged Bishop of Lyons, who was more than ninety years old when he suffered. A later tradition makes him a native of Asia Minor;‡ and this would be a highly

* They are called “trilingues,” Varro in Isid. *Etym.* xv. 1.

† It is preserved in great part by Eusebius, *H. E.* v. 1, and may be read conveniently in Routh, *Rel. Sacr.* I. p. 295 seq.

‡ See the references in Tillemont, *Mémoires*, II. p. 343.

probable supposition, even if unsupported by any sort of evidence. Indeed it is far from unlikely that the fact was stated in the letter itself, for Eusebius has not preserved the whole of it. But whether an Asiatic Greek or not, he must have been a growing boy when St. John died; and through him the Churches of Southern Gaul, when they first appear in the full light of history, are linked directly with the Apostolic age.

Immediately after this persecution the intimate alliance between these distant parts of Christendom was manifested in another way. The Montanist controversy was raging in the Church of Phrygia, and the brethren of Gaul communicated to them their views on the controverted points.* To this communication they appended various letters of the martyrs, "which they penned, while yet in bonds, to the brethren in Asia and Phrygia." About the same time the martyrs sent Irenæus, then a presbyter, as their delegate with letters of recommendation to Eleutherus Bishop of Rome, for the sake of conferring with him on this same subject.†

Some twenty years later, as the century was drawing to a close, another controversy broke out, relating to the observance of Easter, in which again the Asiatic Churches were mainly concerned; and here too we find the Christians of Gaul interposing with their counsels. When Victor of Rome issued his edict of excommunication against the Churches of Asia Minor, Irenæus wrote to remonstrate. The letter sent on this occasion however did not merely represent his own private views, for we are especially told that he wrote "in the name of the brethren in Gaul over whom he presided." Nor did he appeal to the Roman bishop alone, but he exchanged letters also with "very many divers rulers of the Churches concerning the question which had been stirred."‡

Bearing these facts in mind, and inferring from them, as we have a right to infer, that the Churches of Gaul for the most part inherited the traditions of the Asiatic school of St. John, we look with special interest to the documents emanating from these communities.

The Epistle of the brotherhoods in Vienne and Lyons, already mentioned, is the earliest of these. The main business of the letter is a narrative of contemporary facts, and any allusions therefore to the Canonical writings are incidental.

But, though incidental, they are unequivocal. Of the references to St. Paul, for instance, there can be no doubt. Thus the martyrs and confessors are mentioned as "*showing in very truth that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared*

* Euseb. *H. E.* v. 8

† Euseb. *H. E.* v. 4.

‡ Euseb. *H. E.* v. 27.

with the glory which shall be revealed in us," where a sentence containing fourteen words in the Greek is given *verbatim* as it stands in Rom. viii. 18. Thus again, they are described as "imitators of Christ, *who being in the form of God thought it not robbery to be equal with God,*" where in like manner a sentence of twelve words stands *verbatim* as we find it Phil. ii. 6. No one, I venture to think, will question the source of these passages, though they are given anonymously and without any signs of quotation. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that when Attalus the martyr is called "the pillar and ground" (στύλον καὶ ἐδραίωμα) of the Christians at Lyons, the expression is taken from 1 Tim. iii. 15; or that when Alcibiades, who had hitherto lived on bread and water, received a revelation rebuking him for "not using *the creatures of God,*" in obedience to which he "partook of all things freely and *gave thanks to God,*" there is a reference to 1 Tim. iv. 3, 4. These passages show the attitude of the author or authors of this letter towards St. Paul; but I have cited them also as exhibiting the manner of quotation which prevails in this letter, and thus indicating what we are to expect in other cases.

From the third and fourth Gospels then we find quotations analogous to these.

Of Vettius Epagathus, one of the sufferers, we are told, that though young he "rivalled the testimony borne to the elder Zacharias (συνεξισοῦσθαι τῇ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου Ζαχαρίου μαρτυρίᾳ), for verily (γούν) he had *walked in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord blameless.*" Here we have the same words and in the same order, which are used of Zacharias and Elisabeth in St. Luke (i. 6). Moreover, it is stated lower down of this same martyr, that he was "called the paraclete (or advocate) of the Christians, having the Paraclete in himself, the Spirit more abundantly than Zacharias." This may be compared with Luke i. 67, "And Zacharias his father was filled with the Holy Ghost."

The meaning of the expression "the testimony of Zacharias" (τῇ τοῦ Ζαχαρίου μαρτυρίᾳ) has been questioned. It might signify either "the testimony borne to Zacharias," *i.e.* his recorded character, or "the testimony borne by Zacharias," *i.e.* his martyrdom. I cannot doubt that the former explanation is correct; for the connecting particle (γούν) shows that the assertion is intended to find its justification in words which immediately follow, "*he walked in all the commandments,*" &c. I need not however dwell on this point, for the author of "Supernatural Religion" himself adopts this rendering.* Yet with an inconsistency, of which his book furnishes not

* S. R. II. p. 201. In earlier editions the words are translated "the testimony of the elder Zacharias;" but in the sixth I find substituted "the testimony borne to the elder Zacharias." The adoption of this interpretation therefore is deliberate.

a few examples, though he not only adopts this rendering himself, but silently ignores the alternative, he proceeds at once to maintain a hypothesis which is expressly built upon the interpretation thus tacitly rejected.

An early tradition or conjecture identified the Zacharias, who is mentioned in the Gospels as having been slain between the temple and the altar (Matt. xxiii. 35), with this Zacharias the father of the Baptist. And in the extravagant romance called the *Protevangelium*, which is occupied mainly with the birth, infancy, and childhood of our Lord, the Baptist's father is represented as slain by Herod "at the vestibule of the temple of the Lord."* Our author therefore supposes that these Christians of Gaul are quoting not from St. Luke, but from some apocryphal Gospel which gave a similar account of the martyrdom of Zacharias.

Whether this identification which I have mentioned is true or false it is unnecessary for my purpose to inquire. Nor again do I care to discuss the question whether or not the authors of this letter accepted it, and so believed the Baptist's father to have fallen a martyr. I am disposed on the whole to think that they did. This supposition, which however must remain uncertain, would give more point to the parallelism with Vettius Epagathus. But it is a matter of little or no moment as regards the point at issue. The quotation found in St. Luke's Gospel has (according to the interpretation which our author rightly receives) no reference whatever to the martyrdom; and therefore affords no ground for the assumption that the document from which it is taken contained any account of or any reference to the death of the Baptist's father.

But, granting that the writers of this letter assumed the identification (and this assumption, whether true or false, was very natural), our Third Gospel itself does furnish such a reference; and they would thus find within the limits of this Gospel everything which they required relating to Zacharias. The author of "*Supernatural Religion*" indeed represents the matter otherwise; but then he has overlooked an important passage. With a forgetfulness of the contents of the Gospels which ought surely to suggest some reflections to a critic who cannot understand how the Fathers, "utterly uncritical" though they were, should ever quote any writing otherwise than with the most literal accuracy, he says, "There can be no doubt that the reference to Zacharias in Matthew, in the *Protevangelium*, and in this Epistle of Vienne and Lyons, is not based upon Luke, *in which there is no mention of his death.*"† Here and throughout this criticism he appears to

* *Protev.* 23. See Tischendorf, *Evang. Apocr.* p. 44.

† *S. R.* II. p. 203. So previously (p. 202), "his martyrdom, *which Luke does not mention.*" I have already had occasion to point out instances where our author's forgetfulness of the contents of the New Testament leads him into error; CONTEMPORARY

have forgotten Luke xi. 51, "the blood of Zacharias which perished between the altar and the temple." If the death of the Baptist's father is mentioned in St. Matthew, it is mentioned in St. Luke also.

But, if our author disposes of the coincidences with the Third Gospel in this way, what will he say to those with the Acts? In this same letter of the Gallican Churches we are told that the sufferers prayed for their persecutors "like Stephen the perfect martyr, *Lord, lay not this sin to their charge.*" Will he boldly maintain that the writers had before them another Acts containing words identical with our Acts, just as he supposes them to have had another Gospel containing words identical with our Third Gospel? Or will he allow this account to have been taken from Acts vii. 60, with which it coincides? But in this latter case, if they had the second treatise which bears the name of St. Luke in their hands, why should they not have had the first also?

Our author however does not stop here. He maintains that these same writers quoted not only from a double of St. Luke, but from a double of St. John also.* "That was fulfilled," they write, "which was spoken by the Lord, saying, *There shall come a time in which whosoever killeth you will think that he doeth God service,*" where the words of St. John (xvi. 2) are exactly reproduced, with the exception that for "There cometh an hour when" (ἐρχεται ὥρα ἵνα) they substitute "There shall come a time in which" (ἐλεύσεται καιρὸς ἐν ᾧ). This substitution, which was highly natural in a quotation from memory, is magnified by our author into "very decided variations from the Fourth Gospel." He would therefore assign the quotation to some apocryphal gospel which has perished. No such gospel however is known to have existed. Moreover this passage occurs in a characteristic discourse of the Fourth Gospel, and the expression itself is remarkable—far more remarkable than it appears in the English version (λατρείαν προσφέρειν τῷ Θεῷ, not "to do God service," but "to offer a religious service to God"). I may add also that the mention of the Spirit as the

REVIEW, May, 1875, p. 854. Yet he argues throughout on the assumption that the memory of early Christian writers was perfect.

The *Protevangelium* bears all the characteristics of a romance founded partly on notices in the Canonical Gospels. Some passages certainly are borrowed from St. Luke, from which the very words are occasionally taken (e.g. cc. 11, 12); and the account of the martyrdom of Zacharias is most easily explained as a fiction founded on the notice in Luke xi. 51, the writer assuming the identity of this Zacharias with the Baptist's father. I have some doubts about the very early date sometimes assigned to the *Protevangelium* (though it may have been written somewhere about the middle of the second century); but, the greater its antiquity, the more important is its testimony to the Canonical Gospels. At the end of c. 19 the writer obviously borrows the language of St. Thomas in John xx. 25. This, as it so happens, is the part of the *Protevangelium* to which Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* vii. p. 889) refers, and therefore we have better evidence for the antiquity of this, than of any other portion of the work.

* S. R. II. p. 381.

Paraclete, already quoted, points to the use of this Gospel by the writers, and that the letter presents at least one other coincidence with St. John. Our author certainly deserves credit for courage. Here, as elsewhere, he imagines that, so long as he does not advance anything which is demonstrably impossible, he may pile one improbability upon another without endangering the stability of his edifice.

But even if his account of these evangelical quotations could survive this accumulation of improbabilities, it will appear absolutely untenable in the light of contemporary fact. Irenæus was the most prominent and learned member of the Church from which this letter emanated, at the very time when it was written. According to some modern critics he was the actual composer of the letter; but for this there is no evidence of any kind. According to our author himself he was the bearer of it;* but this statement again is not borne out by facts. There can be no doubt however, that Irenæus was intimately mixed up with all the incidents, and he cannot have been ignorant of the contents of the letter. Now this letter was written A.D. 177 or, as our author prefers, A.D. 178, while Irenæus published his third book before A.D. 190 at all events, and possibly some years earlier. Irenæus in this book assumes that the Church from the beginning has recognized our four Canonical Gospels, and these only. The author of "Supernatural Religion" maintains on the other hand that only twelve years before, at the outside, the very Church to which Irenæus belonged, in a public document with which he was acquainted, betrays no knowledge of our Canonical Gospels, but quotes from one or more Apocryphal Gospels instead. He maintains this though the quotations in question are actually found in our Canonical Gospels.

Here then the inference cannot be doubtful. But what must be the fate of a writer who can thus ride roughshod over plain facts, when he comes to deal with questions which demand a nice critical insight and a careful weighing of probabilities?

From this letter relating to the martyrdoms in Vienne and

* S. R. II. p. 200; "The two communities [of Vienne and Lyons] some time after addressed an Epistle to their brethren in Asia and Phrygia, and also to Eleutherus, Bishop of Rome, relating the events which had occurred This Epistle has in great part been preserved by Eusebius;" and again, II. p. 210: "We know that he [Irenæus] was deputed by the Church of Lyons to bear to Eleutherus, then Bishop of Rome, the Epistle of that Christian community describing their sufferings during the persecution," &c. Accordingly in the index, pp. 501, 511, Irenæus is made the bearer of the Epistle.

This is a confusion of two wholly distinct letters—the letter to the Churches of Phrygia and Asia, containing an account of the persecution, which is in great part preserved by Eusebius, but of which Irenæus was certainly not the bearer; and the letter to Eleutherus, of which Irenæus was the bearer, but which had reference to the Montanist controversy, and of which Eusebius has preserved only a single sentence recommending Irenæus to the Roman Bishop. This latter contained references to the persecutions, but was a distinct composition: Euseb. *H. E.* v. 3, 4.

Lyons, we are led to speak directly of the illustrious Gallican father, whose name has already been mentioned several times, and who is the most important of all witnesses to the Canonical writings of the New Testament.

The great work of Irenæus is entitled the "Refutation and Overthrow of Knowledge falsely so called," and consists of five books. The third book was published during the episcopate of Eleutherus, who was Bishop of Rome from about A.D. 175 to A.D. 190; for he is mentioned in it as still living.* It must therefore have been written before A.D. 190. On the other hand it contains a mention of Theodotion's version of the LXX;† and Theodotion's version is stated not to have been published till the reign of Commodus (A.D. 182—190). Unfortunately Epiphanius, the authority mainly relied on by our author and others for this statement, contradicts himself in this same passage, which is full of the grossest chronological and historical blunders.‡ No stress therefore can be laid on his statement; nor indeed can we regard its truth or falsehood as of any real moment for our purpose. It is immaterial whether the third book dates from the earlier or later years of Eleutherus. As the several books were composed and published separately, the author of "Supernatural Religion" has a right to suppose, though he cannot prove, that the fourth and fifth were written during the episcopate of Victor (A.D. 190—198 or 199). But in his partiality for late dates he forgets that the weapon which he wields is double-edged. If the fourth and fifth books "must," as he confidently asserts, have been written some years after the third, it follows by parity of reasoning, that the first and second must have been written some years before it. Yet, with a strange inconsistency, he assumes in the very same sentence that the two first books cannot have been written till the latest years of Eleutherus, because on his showing the third must date from that epoch.§

With the respective dates of the several books however we

* Iren. iii. 3. 3.

† Iren. iii. 21. 1.

‡ *De Pond. et Mens.* 16, 17. Epiphanius states that Antoninus Pius was succeeded by Caracalla, who also bore the names of Geta and M. Aurelius Verus, and who reigned seven years; that L. Aurelius Commodus likewise reigned these same seven years; that Pertinax succeeded next, and was followed by Severus; that in the time of Severus Symmachus translated the LXX; that "immediately after him, that is, in the reign of the second Commodus, who reigned for thirteen years after the before-mentioned L. Aurelius Commodus," Theodotion published his translation; with more of the same kind. The *Chronicon Paschale* also assigns this version to the reign of Commodus, and even names the year A.D. 184; but the compiler's testimony is invalidated by the fact that he repeats the words of Epiphanius, from whom he has obviously borrowed.

I should be sorry to say (without thoroughly sifting the matter), that even in this mass of confusion there may not be an element of truth; but it is strange to see how our author's habitual scepticism deserts him just where it would be most in place.

§ II. p. 213. "We are therefore brought towards the end of the episcopate of Eleutherus as the earliest date at which the *first three books* of his work against Heresies can well have been written, and the rest *must* be assigned to a later period under the episcopate of Victor († 198–199.)" The italics are my own.

need not concern ourselves; for they all exhibit the same phenomena, so far as regards the attitude of the author towards the Canonical writings of the New Testament. On this point, it is sufficient to say that the authority which Irenæus attributes to the Four Gospels, the Acts of the Apostles, the Epistles of St. Paul, several of the Catholic Epistles, and the Apocalypse, falls short in no respect of the estimate of the Church Catholic in the fourth or the ninth or the nineteenth century. He treats them as on a level with the Canonical books of the Old Testament; he cites them as Scripture in the same way; he attributes them to the respective authors whose names they bear; he regards them as writings handed down in the several Churches from the beginning; he fills his pages with quotations from them; he has not only a very thorough knowledge of their contents himself, but he assumes an acquaintance with and a recognition of them in his readers.*

In the third book especially he undertakes to refute the opinions of his Valentinian opponents directly from the Scriptures. This leads him to be still more explicit. He relates briefly the circumstances under which our Four Gospels were written. He points out that the writings of the Evangelists arose directly from the oral Gospel of the Apostles. He shows that the traditional teaching of the Apostles has been preserved by a direct succession of elders which in the principal Churches can be traced man by man, and he asserts that this teaching accords entirely with the Evangelical and Apostolic writings. He maintains on the other hand, that the doctrine of the heretics was of comparatively recent growth. He assumes throughout, not only that our four Canonical Gospels alone were acknowledged in the Church in his own time, but that this had been so from the beginning. His Valentinian antagonists indeed accepted these same Gospels, paying especial deference to the Fourth Evangelist; and accordingly he argues with them on this basis. But they also super-added other writings, to which they appealed, while heretics of a different type, as Marcion for instance, adopted some one Gospel to the exclusion of all others. He therefore urges not only that

* Our author sums up thus (II. p. 203 seq.): "The state of the case, then, is as follows: We find a coincidence in a few words between the Epistle [of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons] and our Third Gospel; but so far from the Gospel being in any way indicated as their source, the words in question are, on the contrary, in association with a reference to events unknown to our Gospel, but which were indubitably chronicled elsewhere. It follows clearly, and *few venture to doubt the fact*, that the allusion in the Epistle is to a Gospel different from ours, and not to our Synoptic at all." Of "the events unknown to our Gospel" I have disposed in the text. But the statement which I have italicized is still more extraordinary. I am altogether unable to put any interpretation upon the words which is not directly contradictory to the facts, and must therefore suppose that we have here again one of those extraordinary misprints, which our author has pleaded on former occasions. As a matter of fact, the references to the Third and Fourth Gospels in this letter are all but universally allowed, even by critics the least conservative. They are expressly affirmed, for instance, by Hilgenfeld (*Einführung*, p. 73) and by Scholten (*Die ältesten Zeugnisse*, p. 110 seq.).

four Gospels alone have been handed down from the beginning, but that in the nature of things there could not be more nor less than four. There are four regions of the world, and four principal winds; and the Church therefore, as destined to be conterminous with the world, must be supported by four Gospels, as four pillars. The Word again is represented as seated on the Cherubim, who are described by Ezekiel as four living creatures, each different from the other. These symbolize the four Evangelists, with their several characteristics. The predominance of the number four again appears in another way. There are four general covenants, of Noah, of Abraham, of Moses, of Christ. It is therefore an act of audacious folly to increase or diminish the number of the Gospels. As there is fitness and order in all the other works of God, so also we may expect to find it in the case of the Gospel.

What is the historical significance of this phenomenon? Can we imagine that the documents which Irenæus regards in this light had been produced during his own lifetime? that they had sprung up suddenly full-armed from the earth, no one could say how? and that they had taken their position at once by the side of the Law and the Psalmist and the Prophets, as the very voice of God?

The author of "Supernatural Religion" seems to think that no explanation is needed. "The reasons," he writes, "which he [Irenæus] gives for the existence of precisely that number [four Gospels] in the Canon of the Church illustrate the thoroughly uncritical character of the Fathers, and the slight dependence which can be placed upon their judgments."* Accordingly he does not even discuss the testimony of Irenæus, but treats it as if it were not. He does not see that there is all the difference in the world between the value of the same man's evidence as to matters of fact, and his opinions as to the causes and bearings of his facts. He does not observe that these fanciful arguments and shadowy analogies are *pro tanto* an evidence of the firm hold which this quadruple Gospel, as a fact, had already obtained when he wrote. Above all, I must suppose from his silence that he regards this testimony of Irenæus as the isolated opinion of an individual writer, and is unconscious of the historical background which it implies. It is this last consideration which led me to speak of Irenæus as the *most* important witness to the early date and authorship of the Gospels, and to which I wish to direct attention.

The birth of Irenæus has been placed as early as A.D. 97 by Dodwell, and as late as A.D. 140 by our author and some others, while other writers again have adopted intermediate positions. I

* S. R. II. p. 474.

must frankly say that the very early date seems to me quite untenable. On the other hand, those who have placed it as late as 140 have chosen this date on the ground of the relation of Irenæus to Polycarp in his old age,* and on the supposition that Polycarp was martyred about A.D. 167. Since however it has recently been shown that Polycarp suffered A.D. 155 or 156,† it may be presumed that these critics would now throw the date of his pupil's birth some ten or twelve years farther back, i.e. to about A.D. 128 or 130. But there is no reason why it should not have been some few years earlier. If the suggestion which I have thrown out in a previous paper deserves attention,‡ he was probably born about A.D. 120. But the exact date of his birth is a matter of comparatively little moment. The really important fact is, that he was connected directly with the Apostles and the Apostolic age by two distinct personal links, if not more.

Of his connection with POLYCARP I have already spoken.§ Polycarp was the disciple of St. John; and, as he was at least eighty-six years old when he suffered martyrdom (A.D. 155), he must have been close upon thirty when the Apostle died. Irenæus was young when he received instruction from Polycarp. He speaks of himself in one passage as "still a boy," in another as "in early life." If we reckon his age as from fifteen to eighteen, we shall probably not be far wrong, though the expressions themselves would admit some latitude on either side. At all events, he says that he had a vivid recollection of his master's conversations; he recalled not only the substance of his discourses, but his very expressions and manner; more especially he states that he remembers distinctly his descriptions of his intercourse with John and other personal disciples of Christ together with their account of the Lord's life and teaching; and he adds that these were "entirely in accordance with the Scriptures."||

But Irenæus was linked with the Apostolic age by another companionship also. He was the leading presbyter in the Church of Lyons, of which POTHINUS was bishop, and succeeded to this see on the martyrdom of the latter in 177 or 178. With Pothinus

* Iren. iii. 3. 4, "Whom we also saw in early life (ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμῶν ἡλικίᾳ); for he survived long (ἐπιπολὺν γὰρ παρέμεινε), and departed this life at a very great age (πάνυ γηραλέος) by a glorious and most notable martyrdom." This passage suggests the inference that, if Polycarp had not had a long life, Irenæus could not have been his hearer; but it cannot be pressed to mean that Polycarp was already in very advanced years when Irenæus saw him, since the words *πάνυ γηραλέος* refer, not to the period of their intercourse, but to the time of his martyrdom. A comparison with a parallel expression relating to St. John, in ii. 22. 5, *παρέμεινε γὰρ αὐτοῖς μέχρι κ.τ.λ.*, will show that the inference, even when thus limited, is precarious, and that the *γὰρ* does not necessarily imply as much. Extreme views with respect to the bearing of this passage are taken on the one hand by Ziegler, *Irenæus der Bischof von Lyon*, p. 15 seq., and on the other by Leimbach, *Wann ist Irenæus geboren*, p. 622 seq. (in *Stud. u. Krit.* 1873), in answer to Ziegler.

† See CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, May, 1875, p. 838.

‡ Ibid p. 833, note †.

§ Ibid p. 832 seq.

|| See the last reference, where the passage is given in full.

therefore he must have had almost daily intercourse. But Pothinus lived to be more than ninety years old, and must have been a boy of ten at least, when the Apostle St. John died. Moreover there is every reason to believe, as we have already seen,* that like Irenæus himself, Pothinus came originally from Asia Minor. Under any circumstances, his long life and influential position would give a special value to his testimony respecting the past history of the Church; and, whether he was uncritical or not (of which we are ignorant), he must have known whether certain writings attributed to the Evangelists and Apostles had been in a circulation as long as he could remember, or whether they came to his knowledge only the other day, when he was already advanced in life.

In one passage in his extant work, Irenæus gives an account of elaborate discourses which he had heard from an elder who had himself "listened to those who had seen the Apostles and to those who had been disciples," *i.e.* personal followers of Christ.† It seems most natural to identify this anonymous elder with Pothinus. In this case the "disciples" whom he had heard would be such persons as Aristion and John the presbyter, who are mentioned in this same way by Papias; while under the designation of "those who had seen the Apostles" Polycarp more especially might be intended. But, if he were not Pothinus, then he forms a third direct link of connection between Irenæus and the Apostolic age. Whoever he was, it is clear that the intercourse of Irenæus with him was frequent and intimate. "The elder," writes Irenæus, "used to say," "The elder used to refresh us with such accounts of the ancient worthies," "The elder used to discuss." Indeed the elaborate character of these discourses suggests, as I have stated in a former paper,‡ that Irenæus is here reproducing notes of lectures which he had heard from this person. With the references direct or indirect to the Canonical writings in this anonymous teacher I am not concerned here; nor indeed is it necessary to add anything to what has been said in a previous paper.§ I wish now merely to call attention to these discourses as showing, that through his intercourse with this elder Irenæus could not fail to have ascertained the mind of the earlier Church with regard to the Evangelical and Apostolic writings.

Nor were these the only exceptional advantages which Irenæus enjoyed. When he speaks of the recognition of the Canonical writings his testimony must be regarded as directly representing three Churches at least. In youth he was brought up, as we saw, in Asia Minor. In middle life he stayed for some time in Rome,

* See above, p. 406.

† Iren. iv. 27. 1 seq.

‡ CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, October, 1875, p. 841, note.

§ CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, February, 1876, p. 494.

having gone there on an important public mission.* Before and after this epoch he for many years held a prominent position in the Church of Gaul. He was moreover actively engaged from the beginning to the end of his public career in all the most important controversies of the day. He gave lectures as we happen to know; for Hippolytus attended a course on "All the Heresies," delivered perhaps during one of his sojourns at Rome.† He was a diligent letter-writer, interesting himself in the difficulties and dissensions of distant Churches, and more than one notice of such letters is preserved. He composed several treatises more or less elaborate, whose general character may be estimated from his extant work. The subjects moreover, with which he had to deal, must have forced him to an examination of the points with which we are immediately concerned. He took a chief part in the Montanist controversy; and the Montanist doctrine of the Paraclete, as I have before had occasion to remark, directly suggested an investigation of the promise in the Fourth Gospel. He was equally prominent in the Paschal dispute, and here again the relation between the narratives of St. John and the Synoptists must have entered largely into the discussion. He was contending all his life with Gnostics, or reactionists against Gnosticism, and how large a part the authority and contents of the Gospels and Epistles must have played in these controversies generally we see plainly from his surviving work against the Valentinians.

Thus Irenæus does not present himself before us as an isolated witness, but is backed by a whole phalanx of past and contemporaneous authority. All this our author ignores. He forecloses all investigation by denouncing, as usual, the uncritical character of the fathers; and Irenæus is not even allowed to enter the witness-box.

The truth is that, speaking generally, the fathers are neither more nor less uncritical on questions which involve the historical sense, than other writers of their age. Now and then we meet with an exceptional blunderer; but for the most part Christian writers will compare not unfavourably with their heathen contemporaries. If Clement of Rome believes in the story of the phoenix,

* See above, p. 407. The author of "Supernatural Religion" himself (II. p. 211) writes: "It is not known how long Irenæus remained in Rome, but there is every probability that he must have made a protracted stay, for the purpose of making himself acquainted with the various tenets of Gnostic and other heretics," &c.

There is reason to think that this was not his first visit to Rome. The notice at the end of the Moscow MS. of the *Martyrium Polycarpi*, recently collated by Gebhardt (see *Zeitschr. f. Hist. Theol.* 1875, p. 362 seq.), states that Irenæus, "being in Rome at the time of the martyrdom of Polycarp, taught many," and that it was recorded in his writings how at the precise time of his master's death he heard a voice announcing the occurrence. This story is not unlikely to have had some foundation in fact.

† Photius *Bibl.* 121; see *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW*, October, 1875, p. 841. It is not stated where these lectures were delivered; but inasmuch as we know Hippolytus only as the Bishop of Portus and as dwelling in Rome and the neighbourhood, the metropolis is the most likely place, in the absence of direct evidence.

by several classical writers of repute. If Justin Martyr affirms that Simon Magus received divine honours at Rome, heathen historians and controversialists make statements equally false and quite as ridiculous with reference to the religion and history of the Jews.* Even the credulity of a Papias may be more than matched by the credulity of an Apion or an Ælian. The work of the sceptical Pliny himself abounds in impossible stories. On the other hand individual writers may be singled out among the Christian fathers, whom it would be difficult to match in their several excellences from their own or contiguous generations. No heathen contemporary shows such a power of memory or so wide an acquaintance with the classical literature of Greece in all its branches as Clement of Alexandria. No heathen contemporary deserves to be named in the same day with Origen for patience and accuracy in textual criticism, to say nothing of other intellectual capacities, which, notwithstanding all his faults, distinguish him as the foremost writer of his age. And again, the investigations of Theophilus of Antioch, the contemporary of Irenæus, in comparative chronology are far in advance of anything which emanates from heathen writers of his time, however inadequate they may appear in this nineteenth century, which has discovered so many monuments of primeval history. There are in fact as many gradations among the Christian fathers as in any other order of men; and here, as elsewhere, each writer must be considered on his own merits. It is a gross injustice to class the authors whom I have named with such hopeless blunderers as Epiphanius and John Malalas, for whom nothing can be said, but in whom nevertheless our author places the most implicit confidence, when their statements serve his purpose.

Now Irenæus is not one whose testimony can be lightly set aside. He possessed, as we have seen, exceptional opportunities of forming an opinion on the point at issue. His honesty is, I think, beyond the reach of suspicion. He is a man of culture and intelligence. He possesses a considerable knowledge of classical literature, though he makes no parade of it. He argues against his opponents with much patience. His work is systematic, and

* It is only necessary to refer to the account of Jews given by an intelligent author like Tacitus (*Hist.* v. 1 seq.). It is related, he says, that the Jews migrated to Libya from Ida in Crete, about the time when Saturn* was expelled from his kingdom by Jupiter, and were thence called *Judei*, i.e. *Idæi*. Some persons, he adds, say that Egypt being over-populated in the reign of Isis, a multitude, led by their chieftains Hierosolymus and Judas, settled in the neighbouring lands. He states it, moreover, as an account in which "plurimi auctores consentiunt," that the Jews consecrated an image of an ass in their temple, because a herd of these animals had disclosed to them copious springs of water in their wanderings; these wanderings lasted six days continuously; on the seventh they obtained possession of the land, where they built their city and temple; with more to the same effect. All this he writes, though at the time the Jews in Rome counted by tens of thousands, any one of whom would have set him right. The comparatively venial error of Justin, who mistook the Sabine deity *Semo Sancus* for *Simo Sanctus*, cannot be judged harshly in the face of these facts.

occasionally shows great acuteness. His traditions, no doubt, require sifting, like other men's, and sometimes dissolve in the light of criticism. He has his weak points also, whether in his interpretations or in his views of things. But what then? Who refuses to listen to the heathen rhetorician Aristides or the apostate Emperor Julian on matters of fact, because they are both highly superstitious—the one paying a childish deference to dreams, the other showing himself a profound believer in magic? In short, Irenæus betrays no incapacity which affects his competency as a witness to a broad and comprehensive fact, such as that with which alone we are concerned.

And his testimony is confirmed by evidence from all sides. The recognition of these four Gospels from a very early date is the one fact which explains the fragmentary notices and references occurring in previous writers. Moreover his contemporaries in every quarter of the Church repeat the same story independently. The old Latin version, already existing when Irenæus published his work and representing the Canon of the African Christians, included these four Gospels, and these only. The author of the Muratorian fragment, writing a few years before him, and apparently representing the Church of Rome, recognizes these, and these alone. Clement, writing a few years later, as a member of the Alexandrian Church, who had also travelled far and wide, and sat at the feet of divers teachers, in Greece, in Asia Minor, in Palestine, in Italy, doubts the authenticity of a story told in an apocryphal writing, on the ground that it was not related in any of the four Gospels handed down by the Church.* What is the meaning of all this coincidence of view? It must be borne in mind that the Canon of the New Testament was not made the subject of any conciliar decree till the latter half of the fourth century. When therefore we find this agreement on all sides in the closing years of the second, without any formal enactment, we can only explain it as the convergence of independent testimony showing that, though individual writers might allow themselves the use of other documents, yet the general sense of the Church had for some time past singled out these four Gospels by tacit consent, and placed them in a position of exceptional authority.


One other remark on the testimony of Irenæus suggests itself before closing. Irenæus is the first extant writer in whom, from the nature of his work, we have a right to expect explicit information on the subject of the Canon. Earlier writings, which have been preserved entire, are either epistolary, like the letters of the Apostolic Fathers, where any references to the Canonical books must necessarily be precarious and incidental (to say nothing

* *Strom.* iii. 13, p. 553.

of the continuance of the oral tradition at this early date as a disturbing element); or devotional, like the Shepherd of Hermas, which is equally devoid of quotations from the Old Testament and from the New; or historical, like the account of the martyrdoms at Vienne and Lyons, where any such allusion is gratuitous; or apologetic, like the great mass of the extant Christian writings of the second century, where the reserve of the writer naturally leads him to be silent about authorities which would carry no weight with the Jewish or heathen readers whom he addressed. But the work of Irenæus is the first controversial treatise addressed to Christians on questions of Christian doctrine, where the appeal lies to Christian documents. And here the testimony to our four Gospels is full and clear and precise.

If any reader is really in earnest on this matter, I will ask him to read Irenæus and judge for himself. He will find many things for which perhaps he is not prepared, and which will jar with his preconceived ideas; but on the one point at issue I have no fear that I shall be accused of exaggeration. Indeed it is impossible to convey in a few paragraphs the whole force of an impression which is deepened by each successive page of a long and elaborate work.

J. B. LIGHTFOOT.



CLARENDON.

PART II.—AFTER HIS FIRST EXILE.

IN the summer of 1645 the military affairs of Charles went swiftly to wreck, and Sir Edward Hyde and the Lords Capel and Hopton were told off to form a council for the Prince of Wales. They fell back with the Prince into the west of England, and were soon forced to leave the mainland. They first set foot on St. Mary, one of the Scilly Isles, and after a pause of a few weeks proceeded to Jersey, where the little Court was broken up. Prince Charles, yielding to the commands of his mother, joined her in Paris. Hyde, with Capel and Hopton, remained in the island.

His situation was well fitted to depress or break the strongest spirit. In the prime of manhood, he saw his ambition thwarted, his professional prospects blighted, his patrimony in the hands of his enemies. Now, however, it was that his best qualities shone out. He did not sink into the angry egotistic brooding of disappointed vanity, or seek relief in vociferous execration. In patience he possessed his soul. *Qui bene latuit bene vixit*, he inscribed on his house in Jersey, and proved that, if he fell short in those kingly and conquering qualities indispensable for success in enterprises of great pith and moment, he was richly dowered with the virtues that light a man's face in the shade. Like all the noble Cavaliers, he was devoutly religious, and his Church had never been so dear to him as when her proscribed services were his solace in exile. He began a commentary

on the Psalms. He walked daily on the sands of the bay with his friends, Capel and Hopton, experiencing, we may presume, that soothing influence which "Sophocles long ago," and Homer before him, and Mr. Matthew Arnold after him, have attributed to the melancholy music of the sea.

But his main resource was the composition of that historical work, in which he, being dead, still speaks to all civilized men. The month in which he landed in the Scilly Isles had not closed before he commenced a narrative of the events in which he had been engaged, and during the two years of his abode in Jersey he completed that part of the work which describes the beginning of the troubles, the rupture between King and Parliament, and the defeat of the Episcopalian Royalists. This is by far the most important part of the whole, for in it he pronounces upon the conduct of the two great parties at the moment when the civil war broke out. The nature of his decision is well known. It is expressed in his title,—*"The Great Rebellion."* In these words he takes for granted exactly what he had to prove. The Parliamentary majority who engaged in war with Charles would have committed to the Tower on a charge of high treason any man who had dared to apply to them the word "rebels." Pym and Hampden made no appeal to the right of insurrection, claimed no licence to break with the historic past of England. They professed to aim with all simplicity at perpetuating, under the conditions imposed by the age, the ancient liberties of their country. Their contention, logically stated, was not that they rebelled justly, but that they did not rebel at all; and it is this plea which Clarendon, by the very name on his title-page, puts out of sight.

Herr von Ranke delivers the following opinion on Clarendon:—

"The effect which an historical work can have is, perhaps, nowhere seen more strongly than in the '*History of the Rebellion*.' The view of the event in England itself and in the educated world generally, has been determined by the book. The best authors have repeated it, and even those who combat it do not get beyond the point of view given by him; they refute him in details, but leave his views in the main unshaken. Clarendon belongs to those who have essentially fixed the circle of ideas for the English nation."

It is true that in Clarendon's book there dwells, as it were incarnate, that subtle and potent persuasiveness which lured Falkland to his doom and sealed the ruin of thousands of gallant and honest gentlemen. His history may be defined as the grand mistake of his life stated in language; and if neither he nor the multitude he misled penetrated that mistake at the time it was made, it was perhaps to be expected that several generations should fail to discern its character when set forth on the printed page. But it is not true that "the best authors" have repeated Clarendon, or

have not got beyond his point of view, or have refuted him only in details. The best authors who have written on the Puritan Revolution—Hallam, Brodie, Forster, Macaulay,* Carlyle, Masson, Sanford, Bruce, Goldwin Smith, Green, and others—take an irreconcilably different view of the whole affair from that of Clarendon. Herr von Ranke states with nice precision the reverse of the fact, when he says that they refute him in details, but leave his general scheme unshaken; for they accept from him not a few matters of detail as authentic and important, but demonstrate his theory and conception of the business to be egregiously wrong. What I have described as the grand mistake of his life was vindicated by himself in a series of plausible and well-worded documents, which delighted Charles and had a profound effect upon simple-hearted, simple-minded Cavaliers; but men of strength and insight on both sides even then saw through them. The surface-logic and rhetorical varnish of those manifestoes have been reproduced in his *History*; but consummately able men, thorough in research, sharp and sure in judgment—men in several instances of great genius—have rubbed off the paint and displayed the canvas. No hand will ever lay that paint again.

In his powerful book on the Great Remonstrance, Mr. Forster argues that Clarendon deliberately falsified the record of those transactions in which he took part in 1641 and 1642, and Mr. Brodie has been equally explicit in his charge of untruth. While not daring to maintain against such accusers the perfect good faith of Clarendon, I believe that he was, on the whole, consciously honest. What is unique in his case is the value of his facts, as contrasted with, nay, as demonstrating, the inconsequence of his reasonings. Other historians, when they go wrong, can be refuted only by reference to other authorities; Clarendon can be answered out of his own lips. Hallam comments thus on Clarendon's untrustworthiness:—

“When he sat down in Jersey to begin his history, irritated, disappointed, afflicted at all that had passed in the last five years, he could not bring his mind back to the state in which it had been at the meeting of the Long Parliament.”

This is Clarendon's apology; but it deprives of all apology the men who accept Clarendon as an historical authority. Had he risen out of the atmosphere of fiery partisanship in which his blood boiled for years—had his magnanimity and imaginative sympathy enabled him to do justice to his opponents—he would have been a Shakespeare among historians. Hallam fails, however, to explain what strikes me as the peculiar and unparalleled circumstance that Clarendon's memory and conscience escaped, or

* “Mahon tried to defend Clarendon, but was put down by Hallam and Macaulay.”—*Lord Carlisle's Journal*, quoted in Macaulay's *Biography*.

comparatively escaped, the influences which perverted his judgment. His partisanship clouded his reasoning faculty, and rendered him unable to do justice to his adversaries; but it did not destroy his recollection of facts, or prevail with him to suppress them. He propounds a theory, or delivers an opinion, with placid assurance that he is right; and then calmly jots down facts demonstrating that he is wrong.

Take, for example, that celebrated passage, perhaps the most signal illustration, in historical literature, of mock-heroic eloquence and elegiac bathos, in which he describes the England of Laud's and Strafford's ascendancy as basking in the sunshine of peace and joy, and suggests that some mysterious infatuation, like what might fall on a nation doomed of Heaven, could alone account for the rising up of the English people against their saintly monarch. They had, he says, only one grievance!—it was a case of losing Paradise for an apple. And then he arithmetically proves that the grievances were *three*: for he tells us that money was wrung out of the people by Court favourites to an amount out of all proportion to that granted by Parliament, or paid into the Treasury; he admits that the King's policy was a “total declinature of Parliament;” and the one grievance which, at the moment when he penned his threnody, he had in view, was the subjection of the law to regal power. Even if we confine our view to his one grievance, must we not pronounce it feeble and foolish to lay stress upon its being numerically one? To speak of the infatuation of a people, agriculturally and commercially prosperous, in sacrificing tranquillity rather than permit the law to be trampled down by the King, is like expostulating with a man whose habit of body is full, and whose complexion is ruddy, because he concerns himself about unquestionable disease of the heart. Clarendon knew and praised Jonson, but I have seen no proof that he ever read Shakespeare, or studied the character of Mercutio. Had he done so, it might have struck him that, as a wound need not be so wide as a church door, or so deep as a well, to let out a man's life, so a nation may have the vital spark of its freedom extinguished though its population is not wasted by famine, nor its cities given up to fire and sword. And is it not a strangely ignoble conception of what ought to rouse a nation to resistance against tyranny, which implies that revolution is folly except in the presence of gross material injuries? How far worthier is the satisfaction which May, the historian of the Long Parliament, expresses in the power of even his lowlier countrymen to discern and appreciate the bitterness of the calamity that had come upon England, in the violation of her Parliaments! If there is their country of which English

England in those years refused to live by bread alone. The evidence derivable from Clarendon's own narrative, that the golden age of his exordium was a picture of the brain, becomes overpowering when we find that he acted with Hampden and his party in the first session of the Long Parliament. He gives with pomp of approbation a list of those measures by which the policy of Strafford and Laud was condemned, its instruments broken, its ministers punished.

Can we prove also, from Clarendon, that the men who carried the Grand Remonstrance did well and wisely? Some will probably, even at this date, answer in the negative. Dark as is the roll of grievances enumerated in the Remonstrance, they had, for the most part, been redressed. Could Charles be trusted? Was the attempted arrest of the five members a mere passing caprice? Were law and liberty safe under the guardianship of an admonished and repentant monarch? Clarendon maintains the affirmative; but it is literally true that the green turf of his theory is here again honeycombed by his own averments of fact. One sufficient proof is as good as a thousand; and I submit that the heartfelt detestation with which Charles regarded what had been done in the first session of the Long Parliament, and his definite intention to effect a counter-revolution, are absolutely demonstrated by Clarendon's own account of his private interview with the King and Queen *before* the accusation of the members. My conviction that Clarendon did not consciously fabricate or suppress is based largely upon his description of that interview. A mere special pleader, determined to bring out but one side of the case, would have buried the incident in the deepest cavern of his memory; and I am not aware that, if Clarendon had not reported it, we should have known anything about it, for Henrietta Maria, singularly enough, completely passes it over in her narrative to Madame de Motteville. But Clarendon does not suppress the fact though it grinds his own reasonings to powder. Clarendon the chronicler annihilates the pleas of Clarendon the advocate; Clarendon the personal attendant of the vacillating yet self-willed, the weak yet tyrannical, the tortuous, ever-plotting, slippery Charles, enables us to put together a portrait of the Royal Stuart as different as possible from that which Clarendon the historian paints for us, and labels Royal Martyr. He calls the noble and deep-thoughted men who were engaged in working out the constitutional liberties of England miscreants and rebels for not staking their own lives and the freedom of their country on the faith of a King who, from first to last, deceived Clarendon himself, and who is seen deceiving Clarendon on Clarendon's own page. Charles's plots within plots startled Hyde at the time of the attempted arrest; counter-worked Hyde and the peace-party

in the Royal camp, in their endeavours to prevent the outbreak of the war and to bring it to an end after it had lasted for a few months; and involved Charles in connections with the Popish party in Ireland from which Hyde would have shrunk. Pym and Hampden held that, when the Queen was on the Continent pawning the crown jewels for arms, and the King was moving to the North to draw the sword, it would be high treason to England to take no measures to resist the attack; and so long as Clarendon's history remains in print, and men have eyes to see when an advocate's facts destroy his own case, the reasonableness of this opinion of theirs, and the calamitous folly of him who deserted them and joined the King, will be manifest. While it stands written with the pen of Clarendon that, at the date of the Great Remonstrance, Charles was under the influence of the Queen, was desirous of removing St. John from his office, was bent upon substituting Lunsford for Balfour in the governorship of the Tower, it will be unnecessary for any one whose object it is to vindicate the memory of Pym and Hampden to pass beyond the boards of Clarendon's history. If Hyde and Falkland had stood by Hampden and Pym, Charles would indeed have ceased to be formidable to the liberties of the State; and the same united party which could have dared to deal generously with the King could have saved the Church, not indeed from reform, but from overthrow.

Clarendon's authority, totally worthless as it is, has without question been accepted, as Herr von Ranke says, by a great multitude of persons. It is a question of some interest how this has occurred. Something must be attributed to his style—to that "eloquence of the heart and imagination" which Hallam acknowledges, to that stateliness and felicity of phrase over which Professor Masson walks as if "stepping on velvet;" but perhaps not very much. Hume, who owed Clarendon a good word—for his account of the Puritan Revolution is simply that of Clarendon told by a skilful and unscrupulous literary artist—says plainly that his style is "prolix and redundant, and suffocates by the length of its periods." So it is, and so it does. More is accounted for by his anecdotic talent, his skill at an after-dinner story, his occasional chuckle of dry fun, his grave irony, his strenuous hatreds, his love of scandal. The Queen's favours were, he says, always "more towards those who were like to do services than to those who had done them." He tells us how Hollis, irritated by Ireton in debate, challenged him to cross the river and fight; how Ireton said his conscience would not permit him to fight in personal quarrel; and how Hollis thereupon "in- him by the nose, telling him, if his co- from giving men satisfaction, it shoul"

them." He dwells with much comfort on the severe ugliness of Monk's wife, adding that the general wished well to the Presbyterian preachers "for his wife's sake, or rather for his own peace with his wife, who was deeply engaged to that people for their seasonable determination of some nice cases of conscience, whereby he had been induced to repair a trespass he had committed, by marrying her; which was an obligation never to be forgotten." Superstitious as was his reverence for bishops, he remarks of clergymen generally, that they "understand the least, and take the worst measure of human affairs of all mankind that can write and read." Hard measure, surely, to be dealt out to clerical gentlemen by the historian whom they have adored. It is to the influence of ecclesiastics, more than to any other cause, that he owes his authority. It has been for the interest and honour of generations of clergymen and university dons to accept and propagate his view. They placed him on the historical bench, and told their countrymen to bow to his decision. But he has been degraded as a judge; he has been refuted as an advocate; and only in the witness-box, under searching cross-examination, can anything of value be elicited from him. His history is comprehensively fallacious, incurably wrong. Its fundamental position is that the men who, while he acted with them, were sober-minded, honourable, and discerning, became, from the time he left them, a pack of God-forsaken miscreants. An incredibility like that cannot be qualified into correctness or annotated into common sense. The time has gone by, and can never return, when Herr von Ranke could say with truth that the ideas of the English nation on the Puritan revolution are those of Clarendon.

In the spring of 1648, when the Presbyterians were making their desperate effort to save Charles, Hyde was summoned by the Prince of Wales, to whom a large portion of the fleet had deserted, to join him in the Downs. He sailed from Jersey. The ship was boarded by a Spanish privateer or pirate, he was roughly handled, robbed of money and clothes, and forced to remain in Ostend until Prince Charles returned to the Hague. There they met, in the month of August. In the following January the King was executed. Hyde found no congenial occupation in the threadbare Court that squabbled, caballed, and plotted round young Charles. The Queen's people disliked him; the party of Argyll and the Covenanters found no favour in his eyes. He had an interview with Montrose at a village near the Hague, an interview on which imagination lingers. It is easy to see from Clarendon's narrative that the great marquis tried hard to arrive at an understanding with the leader of the High Church Cavaliers. But Montrose, though detesting the Solemn League and Covenant, had never swerved from his allegiance to

the National Covenant of Scotland, and could give Clarendon no hope of Episcopal uniformity throughout the island. Clarendon does Montrose personally the justice to say that those who most loudly accused him of violence and cruelty confessed they could fix upon no one fact, apart from the slaughter of his battle-fields, on which to base the charge. But the cold Anglican, proud even in defeat, refused to make common cause with the forlorn hope of Scottish Royalism; and Montrose, feeling himself deserted, turned mournfully away. Charles threw himself into the arms of Argyll; and Hyde, while his master went to be crowned at Scone and defeated at Worcester, betook himself, in capacity of the young King's representative, to the Court of Spain.

At Madrid he had not so bad a time of it. He studied the language and read Spanish books. The ceremoniousness of Spanish manners was congenial to him, and he seems to have derived an enjoyment from the bull-fights unqualified by any compunctious visitings on the score of their inhumanity. A bull-fight was a bull-fight then. Sixteen excellent horses would be killed on a single occasion, and, as a fairer field seems to have been allowed the bull than is accorded by the elaborate cowardice of modern Spain, four or five men would be killed as well as the bulls and horses. His English feeling was gratified by the circumstance that one English mastiff, kept in reserve for the contingency of two of the best Spanish dogs being despatched by the bull, never failed to hold the animal that it might receive the death-stroke.

When Charles II. was once more a fugitive, and the Spaniards became afraid to entertain his envoy, Hyde joined him. Charles now made up his mind to cultivate relations with the High Church Royalists, and accepted their chief as his monitor. Rigorous in the enforcement of his Laudian formula, Hyde insisted, when the worship of the Church of England was suspended at Paris, and the King proposed to attend divine service in the Huguenot chapel at Charenton, that he should rather abstain from public worship altogether. The Queen remonstrated against such fanatical exclusiveness, aptly referring to the example of Queen Elizabeth, who countenanced the Huguenots and sent her ambassadors to their chapels. But the warm Protestant sympathies of Anglicans in the days of Elizabeth had frozen into sectarianism under the influence of Laud: and Laud's friend and disciple was inflexible. When we reflect that, within a year or two of this date, Charles had been crowned in a Presbyterian church, had sworn to maintain the Presbyterian covenant, and had seen thousands of Presbyterians go for his sake to death or to slavery, we shall admit that Hyde gave proof, on this occasion, of a rare power of ecclesiastical antipathy. The alternative for Charles was to stay at home in the society of an

acquaintance he had recently made, Miss Lucy Walters, who is understood to have been not unsuccessful in consoling him for the loss of a preached gospel.

In the Court of the ex-King, Hyde held the titular rank of Chancellor of the Exchequer. His duties, in the years intervening between the battle of Worcester (1651) and the death of Cromwell (1658), were those of a house-steward in a family in painfully straitened circumstances. There is a stern pathos, not the less real that it is too dismally prosaic to engage the tragic muse, in the shifts to which he and his royal patron-clients were reduced, in order to find bread to eat, clothes to put on, and sticks to make a fire. "I am so cold," writes this Chancellor of the Exchequer once, "that I am scarce able to hold my pen, and have not three sous in the world to buy a faggot." It has been whispered that, when things were at the worst, Hyde held out signals of surrender and opened a correspondence with Thurloe; but there is no serious evidence that he ever broke the silence of hatred and scorn with which he regarded the triumphant Puritans. In the men whose valour, energy, and genius were regarded by the rulers of France and Spain with admiring awe, he saw a mere gang of robbers. His grand hope was that Cromwell and his coadjutors "would be each others' executioners," a hope akin to that which the Royal Martyr entertained respecting the Presbyterians and Independents. The hope was in both instances the bitter expression of implacable spite rankling in the hearts of men unworthy of the steel of heroes. Cromwell's higher officers would each and all, thought Hyde, consider themselves as deserving as Oliver, and would fiercely compete with him for ascendancy. Surprising to say, the presage was vain. Year after year went by, and Cromwell's officers did not mutiny and cut his throat. Inexplicable as the phenomenon seemed to the worshipper of Stuart kings and Laudian bishops, the Protector's fellow-soldiers did not snarl at his heels like ill-conditioned curs, or affirm, like modern charlatans, that one man was in this instance as good as another; but recognized him as their natural chief, and were loyally thankful to God and to him when they saw him occupying the place of kingliest difficulty, danger, and honour. *Detur digniori*, muttered those rough fellows, as they saw Noll wielding his constable's baton, which in his hand looked really something like a sceptre.

When Cromwell died, he left his power so thoroughly established that the change seemed at the moment rather to darken than to brighten the prospects of Charles; but so soon as the weakness of Richard became apparent, affairs began to wear a better aspect. Constitutionally cautious and schooled by adversity, Hyde conducted Charles's business with great skill, and not more

than a high diplomatic average of duplicity. He possessed the confidence of the Episcopalian Royalists, and advised them at every step. When Richard summoned a Parliament, abandoning, in the issue of the writs, those precautions which his father had taken to confine electoral power to Puritans, Hyde told his friends in England to make their way into the House of Commons in as large numbers as possible. They were, no doubt, required to take an oath of fidelity to the Commonwealth and of abjuration of the Stuarts; but this did not preclude their adopting the policy marked out for them by Hyde—namely, to cast discredit on the measures of the late Protector, to oppose money-grants and all that tended to settlement, to widen the breach between the Republicans and the adherents of Oliver's family, and, with a view to obviating the ascendancy of Lambert or Fleetwood, to asperse Richard's advisers and praise himself. Of armed insurrection in the royal favour Hyde was judiciously shy, and when Booth and his Presbyterians raised the standard of Charles, he did not encourage the High Church Cavaliers to support them.

It required all the discretion and caution which either Charles or his Chancellor could muster, to watch, without spoiling, the dark and hazardous game of Monk. We are, however, forcibly reminded of that incompetence, almost amounting to imbecility, in affairs of action, which characterized Clarendon and the Stuarts, when we find that the hint had to come from Monk, in obedience to which Charles left Spain, where his risk of being seized and detained as a prisoner of war had become extremely great. Clarendon exercised much self-control in forcing that hatred of Presbyterians which was one of the strongest passions of his nature to bide its time. The Presbyterians had never swerved in their devotion to the monarchy, and the return to Westminster of the members excluded by the army was the immediate prelude to the Restoration. True, however, as the Long Parliament was to monarchy, it was equally true to Presbyterianism, and one of its last votes was, that the established religion of England should be Presbyterian.

The Convention Parliament succeeded the Long Parliament, preceded the Restoration Parliament, and was in character something between the two. The Royalist and Anglican reaction had been gathering force ever since the death of Oliver, and the tide continued to rise while the Convention was being elected; but opinion never changes rapidly in England; society had for twenty years been pervaded with Puritanism; and the framework of the ecclesiastical establishment was as nearly Presbyterian as Cromwell's determination, first, that it should be perfectly under the control of his government, and secondly, that Independents should share its advantages, would permit. Accordingly, the Presby—

terian influence in the Convention, though not so powerful as in the Long Parliament, continued formidable, and Hyde's most delicate management was required in order to lull it into harmlessness. Charles's promises from Breda had been large but indefinite, and the Presbyterians of the Convention, sucking the honey of Hyde's music vows, did not see the necessity of placing those promises under Parliamentary sanction. The members of the Convention took the Covenant, and as his Majesty had done the same on a still more solemn occasion, it was natural for them, by an illusion of imaginative sympathy, to transfer to Charles some part of their own zeal for Presbyterianism. The Presbyterians of that age, both in England and in Scotland, drew a distinction between an Episcopacy of order and human institution, and an Episcopacy of lordship and divine right. The latter they named Prelacy, and classed with Popery among things to be renounced and condemned; the former was not declared unlawful by the Scotch Presbyterians of 1637, was not abjured in the Solemn League and Covenant, and was studiously left without condemnation by Henderson at the Uxbridge Conference. The great body of the Presbyterians of England in 1660 had no insuperable objection to a modified Episcopacy and a revised Liturgy. Charles had promised these at Breda, and a bill was introduced in the Convention to give his promise the force of law. The simplicity of the Presbyterians in not absolutely insisting that it should pass was almost criminal. Simpletons receive from nature much the same treatment as knaves; and when we find them letting the bill be lost, we feel that their punishment was that "whipping" which Iago prescribes for "such honest knaves." Meanwhile the reaction grew in strength. The loyalty of the Convention which had prepared the way for Charles was lukewarm in comparison with that of the populace when it had been driven into frantic enthusiasm by the sight of his face. To get rid of the Presbyterian Convention was evidently desirable, and Hyde was the man to organ out the members with sweet words and bland smiles. "The King is a suitor to you," he said, as he dissolved the Convention in his master's name, "that you will join with him in restoring the whole nation to its primitive temper and integrity, to its old good manners, its old good humour, and its old good nature—good nature, a virtue so peculiar to you that it can be translated into no other language, and hardly practised by any other people." If the Presbyterians had known what the speaker had in store for them, they would have required all their good nature to sit quiet.

And now the reaction reached its height. The flood which had been held back for twenty years swept over all boundaries. The Puritans either caught the prevailing madness, or fell back disconsolate; the High Church Cavaliers, who had never taken heart for

the Stuarts since Naseby, seeing the Puritan army disbanded, rushed to the front, hustled aside the Presbyterians, whose royalism had been as vehement as their own, and elected a Parliament of furious Anglicans. Less than sixty Presbyterians obtained seats. A large proportion of the members were young ruffling Cavaliers, who, under the reign of the saints, had pined for horse-races and cock-fights, and who now signalized their loyalty by vociferous swearing. The Covenant was burnt by the hand of the hangman. The members of the House of Commons were ordered to take the Sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England. Charles was startled. Even Clarendon, though he surely chuckled inwardly, gave signs of alarm at the pace. Mr. Christie states in his *Life of Shaftesbury* that, when the Commons threatened to refuse supplies unless Charles confirmed the proposed exclusion of the Presbyterians from their livings, the King answered that "if he had not wherewith to subsist two days, he would trust God Almighty's Providence rather than break his word." Mr. Christie seems to believe that the Black Bartholomew, with its consignment to penury of about 2,000 clergymen, many of whom had made their pulpits ring with appeals to the nation to restore the King, was too strong even for Clarendon. If Charles, however, resisted honestly, he did not resist long; and Clarendon makes no secret that, for his part, he was "very much to the prejudice of the Presbyterians." Very much indeed. The Commons were more cruel in their reactionary fanaticism than the Lords. The Upper House, with the approval of Clarendon, attempted to secure for the ejected clergy one fifth part of their incomes, as the Commonwealth had allowed in the corresponding case, but the Lower House would not leave them a farthing. The Lords Spiritual alone equalled the Commons in cruelty, and, for all their trumpeting of the duty of passive obedience, reminded Charles of the limitations of his prerogative when he tried to show mercy to the Presbyterians. Years went by, and the new order of things became consolidated, but time brought no mitigation to the mean, cowardly, revengeful hatred with which the Cavaliers of the Lower House pursued their fallen conquerors. One of the earliest Acts of the Parliament excluded Puritans from corporations; the Conventicle Act made their public worship a crime; the Five Mile Act banished them from corporate cities and parliamentary boroughs. Cromwell, yielding to the necessities of his position, had laid a heavy hand on the wealth of the malignants, and dealt summarily with insurgents taken with arms in their hands; but the persecution to which the Puritans were now subjected was incomparably more mean and irritating than that endured by the Cavaliers. The Puritans placed their yoke on the necks of their enemies with the mag-

nanimity of conquerors; the Cavalier Parliament persecuted with the bitter spite of the slave whom circumstances, not strength or merit, have made master. "There is no passion," says Scott, "so unutterably selfish as fear."

But it is no more than justice to Charles and to Clarendon to admit that the red-hot bigotry of the Parliament of the Restoration absolves them from some considerable part of the blame due to these persecuting measures. Parliament had become irresistibly supreme in the State, and the Puritans had made it so. The Cavalier House of Commons, while putting aside with furious haste all that the Long Parliament had done to remodel the Church, appropriated with the calmest assumption its vindication of the privilege and power of Parliament. If Charles was hypocritical in his professions of a desire to obtain reasonable terms for the Presbyterians, he was certainly sincere in his wish to obtain for himself a dispensing power, to be used on behalf of the Catholics; but he failed to obtain it. He was soldier enough to wish intensely that some of Cromwell's regiments, the finest troops in Europe, should remain embodied; but the Commons would not hear of a standing army. Charles could with perfect truth have told the appealing Presbyterians, as Mr. John Sands told his drowning wife when she implored him to save her, that he could not, for they had tied his hands.

The Long Parliament was more Presbyterian than the country; the Restoration Parliament was more High Church than the country. Such is the nature of representative bodies in free States. There is always a risk of their being elected in some paroxysmal mood of feeling, and of their remaining to do work for which the nation represented is not, in its permanent thoughts and feelings, prepared. The Long Parliament was elected while England was incensed against Laud, and fiercely determined that the Scots should get as much Presbyterianism as they wanted, if only they could be thus coaxed out of England and kept among their own brown heaths and shaggy woods. The representatives best fitted to secure this end were Presbyterians and Puritans, and accordingly a much larger proportion of these had seats in the Long Parliament than corresponded to the Presbyterian and Puritan element in English society. The Restoration Parliament was elected to shout at the coronation of Charles. Its High Church feeling was as much above the average of English High Church feeling as the Puritanism of the Long Parliament was above the English average of Puritanism. Hence there was a good deal in the proceedings of the Long Parliament, and a good deal in the proceedings of the Restoration Parliament, which has not been ratified by the deliberate judgment of England.

There are two ways in which the very serious drawback to the

usefulness of representative bodies thus revealed might be obviated. The one is that a Parliament elected for a particular purpose should, as a matter of constitutional usage, be dissolved when that purpose has been accomplished; the other is that Parliament should never be dissolved at all, and that there should be no general elections, but that a certain proportion of seats, in addition to those vacated by death or voluntary retirement, should become vacant every year, and should every year be filled up. A standing Senate, fed with new blood in this way and constantly hoarding experience, might produce a remarkably efficient government, and, while beneficently maintaining a due state of political excitement among constituencies by constantly-recurring elections, might, with equal beneficence, avert the periodical fever-fit of a general election. Since, however, this method does not make it sure that sufficient impulse would be imparted to the Legislature on particular occasions, when it might be desirable to effect organic changes, or to throw the whole force of the nation's excited will into a great administrative policy, the other method is probably, on the whole, the better of the two. The operation of the rule, however, that Parliament should always be dissolved after accomplishing organic reforms, could rest upon no other foundation than the will of the Parliament itself to conform to the constitutional tradition of the country; and this tradition it would be most likely to disregard exactly in those instances in which the temporary agitation under which it had been elected was strongest. In short, it is impossible to contrive political institutions which will be infallible; and one chief use of history is to point out those defects in political machinery which may be rectified, or partly rectified, by the wisdom, self-denial, and energy of those who put that machinery in motion, and can be rectified in no other way. The Civil Wars might have been prevented if there had been a general election at the end of the first session of the Long Parliament; but we cannot add that, if Charles had then dissolved the Parliament, the liberties of England would have been safe.

It is now necessary for us to pause, in order to gather up a few threads in the personal and domestic history of Clarendon which we were forced to let lie while tracing the main events in that wind-up of the Puritan Revolution, in which he played so important a part.

In 1655, when the fortunes of the Chancellor were at their lowest ebb, the Princess of Orange, sister of Charles, invited his daughter Anne to become one of her ladies in waiting. After a great deal of finesse on the part of her father, who seems to have been simply incapable of doing anything without as much finesse as could be got into the business, the offer was accepted. Anne

visited Paris in the train of the Princess, and had the good or bad fortune to be fallen in love with by James, Duke of York. She was plain, memorably plain, if this is the epithet for plainness so striking that people remember it, and hand down the report of it to posterity; but she was clever, vivacious, with expressive eyes and good manners. She did not repel her Royal lover, but by no means lost her self-control, and obtained from James, before accepting him as her husband, not only a promise, but a written contract of marriage. Lord Campbell says that this constituted a valid marriage, and treats it as self-evident that, in these most judicious proceedings, the girl acted under the advice of her father. The affair, however, was kept secret, and not until after the Restoration, when the confinement of the Duchess was approaching, and the marriage ceremony had been performed in Clarendon's house in accordance with the rites of the Church of England, did James inform Charles that Anne was his wife. Charles took the matter with his usual nonchalant good-nature, and summoned Clarendon to Whitehall, with a view to congratulate him on his daughter's marriage.

When Clarendon reached the palace, he found Ormond and Southampton waiting in a room to receive him. He professed to have no knowledge of the cause why his Majesty had commanded his attendance, and Ormond and Southampton told him that Charles wanted to congratulate him on his daughter's being *enceinte* by the Duke of York. Hereupon Clarendon "broke out into a very immoderate passion against the wickedness of his daughter, and said with all imaginable earnestness 'that as soon as he came home, he would turn her out of his house as a strumpet, to shift for herself, and would never see her again.'" They rejoined that they "thought that the Duke was married to his daughter." He replied that "he had much rather his daughter should be the Duke's whore than his wife," and expressed the hope that, if she were married, the King "would immediately cause the woman to be sent to the Tower, and to be cast into a dungeon, under so strict a guard that no person living should be admitted to come to her; and then that an Act of Parliament should be immediately passed for the cutting off her head," which punishment he would "very willingly" be the first man to propose. At this point the King entered the room, and appears to have expressed surprise at the demeanour and exclamations of Clarendon. Southampton and Ormond made the remark, which would have occurred to most people under the circumstances, that the Chancellor seemed to have gone mad. Clarendon continued his passionate outcry, urging Charles to send his daughter to the Tower. James shortly came in, and tried to pacify this Roman father. At last Clarendon went home. Did he rush to Anne's room, drag her about by the

hair, and finish by flinging her into the street? Not at all. He "sent his wife to command his daughter to keep her chamber and not to admit visits!" Anne received her husband by night as by day, as she had done before.

Macaulay calls the passage, of which I have transcribed the essentials *verbatim* from Clarendon, the most extraordinary autobiography. It is almost equally inconceivable either that he should be sincere in conducting himself in such a way, that he should hope that people would believe him to have been sincere. If he meant what he said, then a man ostensibly religious, who interlarded his account of debates and expeditions with edifying observations on Providence, and wrote commentaries on the Psalms, preferred that his daughter should commit a sin marked with peculiar emphasis of condemnation in the Christian code of morals, undergoing at the same time the greatest wrong and degradation possible for a woman, rather than that she should infringe the conventional ordinance which placed royal blood apart from common humanity. Never in this world was the base maxim, *sunt superis sua jura*, so basely obeyed. I don't know whether there is record of any Pagan so vile as not to have experienced some thrill of resentment when one of the scampish immortals of Olympus defiled his daughter, but certainly no Pagan ever grovelled so low as to say that he wished his girl had been made a whore rather than that the divinity which hedged about her Olympian lover should be compromised by his treating her as an honest woman. The hypothesis that Clarendon was play-acting seems at the first glance obviously the right one; for the envy to which he had exposed himself was formidable in the extreme. The violence of his gestures, tearing a passion to rags so villainously that he seemed insane, confirms this view, and it is supported by the farcical mildness of the discipline by which he intimated his paternal indignation to the daughter whose deserts he had just been alleging to be prison and death. But is it not almost inconceivable that, knowing men as he must have known them, Clarendon should have believed that Charles and the Court would be imposed upon by his acting? And does not the difficulty of this hypothesis reach an astounding climax when we find Clarendon in his autobiography, written some ten years subsequently, putting upon paper, without compunction, retraction or apology, in the seeming expectation that his readers will believe him to have been sincere, every drivelling detail in this unparalleled service of king-worship?

With all its difficulties, the second is the sole credible hypothesis. Clarendon was not a sheer fool; therefore he must have been play-acting; and there is no reason to believe that Charles had any doubt on the point. But when we fully realize the fact that

Clarendon could attempt to play off, first on his friends and contemporaries, and secondly on posterity, so flagrant an hypocrisy, we are most painfully confronted with the question whether there must not have been in his nature a dark reserve of duplicity and falsehood. It is melancholy to think that a man who had been on terms of familiar friendship with Hampden should write that his daughter's imaginary crime "exceeded the limits of all justice divine and human," or should tell the coarse plebeian James that there was One as much above his Royal Highness as his Royal Highness was above Clarendon.

We have not yet done with the illustration afforded by Anne Hyde's marriage of those new modes of feeling, new conceptions of what is honourable and what dishonourable in human conduct, which came in with the Restoration. The announcement of the marriage drove the ladies of the Royal family almost as frantic as Clarendon had pretended to be. The Princess of Orange stormed about the humiliation of yielding precedence to a girl who had stood behind her chair. Sir Charles Berkeley, Lord Jermyn, and other members of the circle in which Henrietta Maria and the King principally moved, bethought them how the Duke could be saved from what they chose to regard as degradation. With the connivance, if not at the suggestion, of the Princess of Orange, Sir Charles Berkeley swore that he had seduced Anne; and Arran, Jermyn, and other courtly "gentlemen," corroborated his evidence. James, who with all his faults was capable of strong affection, loved his wife; but the evidence against her seemed overwhelming, and he became sad and moody. Meanwhile small-pox, the Harpy bane of the period, swooped down upon the Royal house, carried off the universally beloved Duke of Gloucester, and put the Princess of Orange in imminent peril of her life. While the intrigue was at its height, the Duchess of York was brought to bed. Morley, Bishop elect of Worcester, kneeling in her chamber, adjured her in God's name to speak the truth as to the accusation made against her. She calmly answered that she had been faithful to her husband, and that she believed him to be, at heart, convinced of the fact. The Princess of Orange, moved by the terror of death, which seemed impending, betrayed the plot, and expressed sorrow for having countenanced it. Sir Charles Berkeley confessed that his oath had been false. The others withdrew their calumnious charges. The fair fame of Anne was vindicated from all imputation, and James, delighted with the infant son who had been born to him, dismissed all suspicion from his mind.

And how, asks the reader, did the husband and the father of the injured lady proceed? Did James drive for ever from his presence the pack of infamous liars whom Berkeley had led? Did

Clarendon feel the sting of noble anger? Decidedly not. James received Berkeley again into favour. Clarendon, when Berkeley came apologizing, "was obliged to receive him civilly." Even Anne forgave him, and if the author of the "*Mémoires de Grammont*" can be believed, made the remark, with allusion to Berkeley's desire to perform a service for James, that nothing proves more signally the devotion of a friend than to tell a bit of a lie for friendship's sake. These personal and domestic items—glimpses of the Court idyl of the period—are not without historical significance. They help us to gain a definite idea of the state and tone of society which succeeded that of the manlier Puritan time.

Whatever he may have dreaded from the publication of his close relationship to the Royal family, Clarendon seemed at the time to suffer no detriment on account of it. The Restoration saw him exalted to a height of fortune and of rank towards which Mr. Hyde, the barrister of Lincoln's Inn, can hardly have dared to lift his eye. Charles had presented him with £20,000. An offer of 10,000 acres in land and a garter he refused to accept. He was created Baron Hyde of Hindon and Earl of Clarendon, and while continuing Chancellor of the Exchequer was appointed Lord Chancellor of England. To no man did the King pay more deference. Having never compounded with the Puritan Government, he had sold none of his land, and was able, therefore, to enter upon full possession of his estates. Neither his reason nor his conscience had ever been divested of the influence of that old persuasion—entertained by the great body of the political classes in the days of his youth—that a place in the Government might legitimately be the source to its occupant of very much larger emoluments than were ostensibly attached to it; and he fiercely repelled the idea that Parliament, in addition to voting supplies in the lump, had a right to demand an account of the expenditure in detail. He was able therefore to indulge those patrician tastes which had long languished unfed, and commenced building a magnificent mansion in London. He was not the man to veil his splendour in a too gracious modesty, or to let any of his contemporaries forget who was the foremost subject in England.

But that was a time of strong passions, and many strong passions were arrayed against the magnificent Chancellor. A host of enemies, a host torn by the bitterest internal animosities, made common cause against him. The Presbyterians owed him an ancient and deadly grudge. Those Cavaliers who had compounded with the Puritans, and sold part of their estates at prices often far below their value, had found him inexorable in his determination to leave such bargains alone. To have interfered with

them would, in fact, have dislocated the general framework of property in England, and Clarendon's policy has been approved by authors ; but not the less did the straitened Royalists impute to him as an unpardonable offence the ingratitude with which they believed themselves to have been treated by the King. It might be thought that the most High Church Parliament which ever sat in England could not have withdrawn its favour from the friend and follower of Laud ; but the Restoration Parliament scornfully repelled and resented Clarendon's attempts to confine it to what he thought its proper functions. By the nation he was cordially detested. No sooner was the business of administration fairly in the hands of the new Government, than that drama of turpitude and disaster, which had been suspended during the administration of Cromwell, but which England had played under the first and second Stuart, began to be re-enacted. The reverses of the Dutch war, the sale of Dunkirk, the embezzlement of the pay of the navy, the acceptance of bribes from France, irritated a nation whose haughty intolerance of misgovernment had been one of the main causes of the troubles. The bitterness of self-contempt gives place to the sweetness of conscious virtue when we inflict upon another the punishment due to our own stupidity and baseness ; and the English nation promptly avenged upon Clarendon its own preference of ignominy and defeat under Charles II. to honour and predominance under Oliver. Clarendon was implicated in the general maladministration only in the sense that he possessed no practical genius, and was incapable either of devising or conducting a great policy ; but he was held guilty of all. He incurred the dangerous enmity of the King's mistresses because, though he meanly tried to prevail on Queen Catherine to receive Lady Castlemayne as one of her "maids" of honour, he drew the line somewhere, and would not let his wife visit the ladies of the Royal seraglio. But he might possibly have weathered the storm, if he had not given mortal offence to Charles. The Portuguese Princess whom the King had espoused was childless ; he had fallen in love with pretty Fanny Stewart, and, finding that she was not otherwise accessible, had thought of marrying her in the event of his being able to procure a divorce from Catherine. Before he had matured his scheme, Miss Stewart married the Duke of Richmond, and Charles believed that Clarendon, bent on securing the throne for his grand-children, had brought about the match. Charles was clever and cool-headed, and had enjoyed unusual opportunities of knowing men and of knowing Clarendon ; it is unlikely that he would be wrong on this point. Wrong or right, he believed that Clarendon was playing a dark and profoundly selfish game, and the Court became aware that the frown of the Sovereign had fallen inexorably upon

the minister. A thousand painful experiences then informed him of the change that had taken place. The Whitehall beauties tittered at him; Buckingham and Killigrew mimicked his strut and gestures. There was something in the atmosphere of the Court of the Restoration intensely alien, even in its frank and honest badness, to consequential and sanctimonious virtue. It was hard to convince Clarendon that he was in danger. He loved England, and clung to her as a vigorous boy of six might cling to a nurse or mother who, having received him back with caresses after he had been long from home, suddenly changes her mood into fury, and attempts to cast him from a precipice into the sea. If the King had stood by him, he would probably have run all hazards of meeting the fate of Strafford rather than leave the country. But Charles had made up his mind that he should go, and it at last became plain to him that he must choose between exile and death.

He embarked at Erith on the 29th of November, 1667, and sailed for France. He was tossed about for three days and three nights before setting foot on shore. The continuation of his journey by land was still more calamitous. Between Dieppe and Rouen, his coach was stopped by armed men, and M. le Fond, an officer of the French Court, informed him that he must leave France, but offered to conduct him to the frontiers. With much difficulty he obtained permission to live at Avignon, and proceeded in the direction of that town under M. le Fond's escort. At Evreux he halted to take some rest, and to seek alleviation of the gouty maladies by which he was tormented. A number of English sailors were employed at the place in connection with the French artillery service, and when they heard that the great English minister was in the town, they came clamouring for their arrears, and threatening to take his life. The door of the room in which he lay in bed was secured, but the infuriated men entered by the window, inflicting several dangerous wounds upon M. le Fond, who stood in the breach and displayed signal courage until overpowered by numbers. The frantic ruffians now rushed upon the fallen statesman. One inflicted a sword-blow on his head, which deprived him of his senses. His trunks were broken open, his clothes rifled; and he was in the act of being dragged out to be murdered in the court-yard when the magistrates of Evreux, with the city guard and the French officer in command of the artillery, effected a rescue. The incident affords curious illustration of the universality and intensity of the hatred with which Clarendon was regarded by his countrymen.

He never ceased to wish and to hope that he might return to England, and humbled himself so far as to beg piteously for permission to do so. In 1671 he wrote to Charles from Moulins,

imploping that he, "an old man who had served the Crown above thirty years, in some trust and with some acceptance," might die in his own land amid his children. In 1674, from Rouen, he uttered a last wail of entreaty, using the argument that "seven years was a time prescribed by God himself for the expiation of some of his greatest judgments." Charles took no notice of either of the letters—he might surely, even if unable or unwilling to recall the outcast Minister to England, have let fall a drop or two of comfort into the cup of one who had served him so well. It was a grave addition to Clarendon's distress that his daughter Anne professed herself a Papist, finding probably that life with her obdurate and uxorious bigot would otherwise prove intolerable. He wrote to her in a tone of earnest expostulation; and in his letter there is a warmth of Protestant feeling which, during the long and internecine war in which he had been engaged with Protestants of a different type from his own, might be thought to have cooled down or to have died away.


And yet Clarendon was not beaten. Amid exile, obloquy, bodily pain, old age,—with the edifice of his ambition lying shattered round him,—denied a hole in his dear England wherein to die,—he held the fortress of his soul invincible, and showed that a man true to himself can smile at fate. In a fine form, without conceit or arrogance, he exhibited in those years that humour which is the habitual mood of reason, the very bloom and aroma of practical philosophy—a humour which has little or no connection with fun, or wit, or audible laughter; but consists in an unsubduable capacity to make the best of things; a clearness and azure serenity of the soul's atmosphere which *cannot* be clouded over; a steadfast realization, against optimists and pessimists alike, that life on earth is neither celestial nor diabolic, but, under all conditions possible for a wise man, is worth having. Ready to welcome any enlargement, any dawn of royal favour, he did not pine for the want of it, nor did he court the delusive but subtly seductive opiate of egotistic brooding over his virtues and his wrongs. He addressed himself to wholesome labour, wrote his autobiography, studied the languages and literatures of Italy and France, carried on his commentary on the Psalms, and, looking up his controversial harpoon, attempted to fix it in the nose of leviathan Hobbes. He felt and wrote of his dear Falkland with a poetic tenderness which almost makes one love him. In his loyalty to the laws of a universe which had not been for him a garden of roses, and his filial reverence for a Divine Father who had, he believed, afflicted him, he presents a notable illustration of the tendency of sincere religion to promote mental health. He "was wont to say,"—the words are his own,—"that of the infinite blessings which God had vouchsafed to confer upon

him," he "esteemed himself so happy in none as in his three acquiescences" or "vacations and retreats" from political business; the first in Jersey, the second in Spain, the third in France. This last, which to common observation seems the most desolate of all, he describes as "his third and most blessed recess in which God vouchsafed to exercise many of his mercies towards him." Though he "entered into it," he tells us, "with many very disconsolate circumstances, yet in a short time, upon the recovery of a better state of health, and being remitted into a posture of ease and quietness, and secure from the power of his enemies, he recovered likewise a marvellous tranquillity and serenity of mind, by making a strict review and recollection into all the actions, all the faults and follies, committed by himself and others in his last continued fatigue of seventeen or eighteen years; in which he had received very many signal instances of God's favour, and in which he had so behaved himself, that he had the good opinion and friendship of those of the best fame, reputation, and interest, and was generally believed to have deserved very well of the King and kingdom." He died in France in 1674, but was laid in Westminster Abbey.

"In that temple of silence and reconciliation where the enmities of twenty generations lie buried," it was perhaps well that he should rest; though the work of his life was not reconciliation but profound and malignant division, and the clash of controversy has rung around his grave. To him, more than to any one man, it was due that the policy shadowed forth in the Grand Remonstrance, a policy of magnificent breadth and far-stretching consequence, never came to an experiment. Statesmen of consummate ability, and of loftier moral character than any who have helmed affairs in Great Britain, were prepared to constitute a patriot Ministry, which might have finally wedded the liberty and law of England to the forms of her ancient monarchy; placed the Church of England once and for ever, without destruction of her Episcopal framework, at the head of the Protestant Churches; and passed an Act of Union binding England and Scotland together in links of enthusiastic amity. It seems impossible that Clarendon, if he had possessed but a little more strength of intellect, a little more magnanimity of heart, should have frustrated, instead of promoting, all this. Not much was required of him. It was only to refuse with sharp decision to be ruled by the suicidal wilfulness and foolish irritation of Charles—to post himself and his party in the Parliamentary arena, where they might have stood impregnably—to tell the silly King that, if he and his wife were resolved to fight, they must storm the batteries alone. Clarendon missed the right path narrowly, but miss it. Lacking intrepid clearness of insight— the sea—he moaned

and drifted into ruinous blunders. Bewitched by Laud with superstitious fancies about the divine right of bishops and kings, tempted by the forbidden fruit of the Premiership, he deserted the good and great men with whom he had long acted, stole to midnight interviews with Charles and the Queen, and devoted all the energies of a genius powerful at least in persuasion to the task of painting up a cause which his own facts prove to have been bad, and his own words declare to have been hopeless. In all except the re-establishment, at the Restoration, of Laudian Episcopacy, his statesmanship was a failure. He may be described as an abstract of the weaker parts of two strong men, Strafford and Laud. He had some of the nobleness of both. He escaped the eternal infamy of a prosperous and applauded career like the time-server Whitelock's. Let amplest justice be done him ; but let it not involve injustice to Pym, to Hampden, to Cromwell, to Vane, to any of those patriots whom he opposed in the matter of the Grand Remonstrance. They were wiser, better, greater men than he, and they deserve at our hands that we should vindicate them from the calumnies with which he attempted to blast their names.

PETER BAYNE.



A DEAD MOVEMENT WHICH LEARNED TO LIVE AGAIN.

MOVEMENTS, like men, die—some a natural, some a violent death. Some movements perish early of deficient vitality, or of intellectual rickets from lack of care, or of inappropriate nutriment; or, falling into blind hands, never see their most obvious opportunities, and are lost by transmitted incapacity. It is true of movements as of men, those who act and do not think, and those who think and do not act, alike perish. In days of social storm or insurrection, revolution or invasion by an enemy, every word of counsellors entitled to be heard has significance. Yet words of counsel, well given, have weight at any time, if wise men give heed thereunto. Storm is but sudden change; and change is but a silent storm, ever beating, ever warning men to preparation; and they who stand still are swept away. But movements do not often die in their beds; they are assassinated in the sheets. Error, fed upon ignorance and inspired by spite, is commonly strong and unscrupulous. Truth must fight to live. There is no marching on without going forward and confronting the enemy. Those who know the country and are resolute, may occupy more of it than they foresee. It is a delusion to think that pioneers have all the ground to clear. Men's heads are mostly vacant, and not a few are entirely empty. Interest and stupidity guard the portals of the brain, but there is hollowness within, and, in more cases than are imagined, hunger for ideas. Interest being always sensitive, and truth being a disturbing element, desperate

resistance arises, in which truth, if it happen to be feeble, afraid, and unskilled in attack and defence, gets the worst. The war of truth and error goes on like the war of races, and the survival of the fittest means the victory of the most dexterous and most persistent. When capacity and determination are on the side of truth, it makes way by its inherent vitality; and when we discern it, we call it progress. In the course of conflict the infantine forces of truth are oft defeated by the full-grown powers of interest and error. No bravery can win, no enthusiasm can sustain the unequal contest, until time and experience bring reinforcements.

Thus it befell Co-operation, which after thirty years of valorous vicissitude died, or seemed to die, in 1844-5. The first Lord Lytton, in one of those fine passages which oft came from his fertile pen, has told us how neglected, derided, and apparently exploded opinion suddenly breaks like summer on the winter of the world. "A new mind," he says, "is first infused into society, it takes root, it expands, silently, almost imperceptibly, for the surface of things remains the same; the same laws, the same form of government, the same acknowledged practices and customs still prevail. In the meanwhile, the spirit that is abroad is breathed from individual to individual, from family to family, it traverses districts, and new men, men with new hearts and new feelings, unknown to each other, arise in different parts. A new people is dwelling with the old people, but their power is little, for they have no ties of association. At last a word is spoken which appeals to the hearts of all, each answers simultaneously to the call, a compact body is collected under one standard, a watchword is given, and every man knows his friend."

In 1845 the busy, aspiring, and hopeful movement of Co-operation, so long chequered by ardour and despondency, hope and disappointment, was rapidly subsiding into silence and decay. The little armies on the once militant plain of social progress had been one after another defeated and disbanded. The standards which had been carried defiantly over the agitated field with some daring and loud acclaim, had fallen one by one, and in many cases the standard-bearers had fallen by their side. For a few years to come no movement is anywhere observable. Hardly a solitary insurgent is discernible in any part of the once animated horizon. The sun of industrial hope, which kept so many towns aglow, has now gone down. The very air is cold and thick over the blank and desolate scene. The star of the North—the "Northern Star," strong, lurid, and glaring (which arose in Leeds, intended to guide the political pioneers of Lancashire and Yorkshire)—is becoming rapidly obscured. "The Star in the East," promising to indicate that among the managers of Wisbeach a

new Deliverer has come, with a greater capacity of contention than deliverer had ever shown before, has dropped out of the firmament. The hum of the "Working Bee" is no more heard in the fens of Cambridgeshire; the small "Morning Stars" that appeared year by year from Ham Common to Whitechapel, shining upon a dietary of vegetables and milk, have fallen, one by one, out of sight. "Journals" are kept no more; "Calendars" no longer have dates filled in; "Co-operative Miscellanies" have ceased; "Mirrors" fail to reflect the faces of the pioneers. "The Radical" has torn up its roots; "The Commonweal" has no one to care for it; believers in the "New Age" are extinct. "The Shepherd" is gathering his eccentric flocks into a new fold; readers of the "Associate" have discontinued to assemble together; "Monthly Magazines" forget to come out; "Gazettes" are empty; "Heralds" no more go forth; "Beacons" find that the day of warning is over; the "Pioneer" has fallen in the last expedition of the forlorn hope which he led; there is nothing further to "Register," and the "New Moral World" is about to be sold by auction, and will be lost by its purchasers wrangling on their way home about the proprietary rights which go with their rival biddings. Samuel Bower has eaten all his peas; Mr. Etzler has carried his wondrous machines of Paradise to Venezuela; Joseph Smith has replaced his wig; Mr. Baume has sold his monkey, and the Frenchman's Island, where infants were to be suckled by machinery, has not inappropriately become the site of the Pentonville Penitentiary. The "Association of All Classes of All Nations" has not a member left upon its books. Of the seventy thousand Chartist Land-dreamers, who had been actually enrolled, nothing is to remain in the public mind save the memory of Snigg's End. Labour Exchanges have become by-words; the Indiana Community is as silent as the waters of the Wabash by its side; Orbiston is buried in the grave of Abram Combe; Ralahine has been gambled away; the Concordium is a Strawberry Garden; Manea Fen has sunk out of sight; the President of Queenwood is encamping in the lanes; the blasts of the "Heralds of Community" have died in the air; the notes of the "Trumpet Calls" have long been still, and the trumpeters themselves are dead. It may be said as the Lord of the Manor of Rochdale* wrote of a more historic desolation—

"The tents are all silent, the banners alone,
The lances uplifted, the trumpets unblown."

Time, defamation, failures, losses, derision, distrust, disappointment, dismay appeared surely to have done their work of utter

* Lord Byron.

destruction. Never human movement seemed so very dead as this of Co-operation. Its lands were all sold; its scrip had no more value; its orators no more hearers. Not a pulse could be felt throughout its whole frame, not a breath could be discerned on any enthusiastic mirror held to its mouth. The most scientific punctures in its body failed to elicit any sign of vitality. Even Dr. Richardson would have pronounced it a case of pectoral death.* I felt its cold and rigid hand in Glasgow, the last "Social Missionary" station which existed. Though not inexperienced in the pathology of dead movements, the case seemed to me suspicious of decease. All seemed over with the poor prostrate thing. Wise Americans who came over to look at it declared with a shrug that it was a "gone coon." Political and social physicians declared life was quite extinct. Political economists avowed the creature had never lived. The newspapers, more observant of it, thought it would never recover, which implied that in their opinion it had been alive. The clergy, uninquiring as they were then apt to be, never troubled themselves on the point; but, content that Socialism was reported to be gone, furnished with delighted alacrity uncomfortable epitaphs for its tombstone.

Yet all the while the vital spark was there; extreme exhaustion, efforts beyond its strength, exaggerations experience had not taught it to control, had brought upon it suspended animation. The first signs of latent life were discovered in Rochdale some time subsequent. In the meantime the great comatose movement lay stretched out of the world's view, but neither abandoned nor disregarded by a few devoted Utopianists, who had crept from under the slain, and other more experienced adherents. Old friends administered to it—familiar faces bent over it. For long unnoted years it found voice in the *Reasoner*, which said of it one thing always—"If it be right it can be revived. Truth never dies, except it be deserted." Then a great consultation arose among the social medicine men. The regular physicians of the party, who held official or missionary diplomas were called in; the licentiates of the platform also attended. The subscribing members of associated Socialism—the pharmacutists of Co-operation—were at hand. They were the chemists and druggists of the movement, who compounded the recipes of the social doctors, in case any new prescriptions were given out. Opinions were not advanced in the order of the rank of the learned advisers, but as the symptoms of the patient seemed to warrant, or as the contrariety of recommendations given inspired rival doctors, as in graver

*Dr. W. B. Richardson maintains that men may recover from glacial death—from pectoral death never.

consultations, some of the prescriptions were retaliatory and made rather with a view of differing from a learned brother, than of saving the patient. The only thing in which the faculty present in this case agreed was that nobody proposed to bleed the invalid; there was clearly no blood to be got out of him. Many readers may be familiar with the names of the physicians. To them, and to others unacquainted with them, it will confirm the reality of the story to give them; besides it may be of service to the sociological profession, as some of the doctors are still in practice. The first opinion pronounced, caught up by the timid, from the clamour outside, was that mischief had arisen through want of orthodoxy in Co-operation. It was thought that if it was vaccinated by a clergyman of some standing, with the Thirty-nine Articles, it might get about again; and Mr. Minter Morgan produced a new design of a parallelogram with a church in it—wisely desiring to show that while the rejection of theological tenets was no impediment to co-operative association, neither was the sincere profession of any form of religion a disqualification; the worship of service and the worship of faith were alike free, in a social organization where all conviction was regarded. Some Scotch doctors advised the Assembly's Shorter Catechism. A missionary, who had been a Methodist, thought that an infusion of Wesleyan fervour and faith might help it. A Swedenborgian said he knew the remedy when "Shepherd Smith" persisted that the doctrine of Analogies would set the thing right. Then the regular faculty took courage and gave their opinions. Mr. Ironside attested with metallic voice that recovery was possible. Its condition was so weak, that Pater Oldham—with a beard as white and long as Merlin's—prescribed for it celibacy and a vegetarian diet. Charles Lane raised the question, Should it be "stimulated with milk?" which did not seem likely to induce in it any premature or violent action. James Pierrepont Greaves suggested that its "inner life" should be nurtured on a preparation of mysticism of which he was sole proprietor. Mr. Galpin, with patriarchal stateliness, administered to it grave counsel, Thomas Whittaker presented a registry of its provincial pulsations, which he said had never ceased; Mr. Craig suggested fresh air, and if he meant commercial air, there was need of it. George Simpson, its best financial secretary, advised it neither to give credit nor take it, if it hoped to hold its own. Dr. John Watts prescribed it a business dietary flavoured with political economy, which was afterwards found to strengthen it. John Colier Farn, who had the Chartist nature, said it wanted robust agitation; Alexander Campbell, with Scotch pertinacity, persisted that it would get round with a little more lecturing. Dr. Travis thought its recovery certain, as soon as it comprehended the "Self-determining Power of the Will." Charles

Southwell, in his fearless way, chafed at the timorous speech and retractation of some of his colleagues, avowed that the imprisonment of some of them would do the movement good. William Chilton believed that persecution alone would reanimate it, and bravely volunteered to stand by the cause in case it occurred. Maltus Questell Ryall, generously indignant at the imprisonment of certain of his friends for orthodox incapacity, spoke as Gibbon was said to have written—"as though Christianity had done him a personal injury"—predicted that Socialism would be itself again if it took courage and looked its clerical enemies square in the face. Mr. Allsop, always for boldness, counselled it to adopt Strafford's motto of "Thorough." George Alexander Fleming surmised that its proper remedy was better obedience to the Central Board. James Rigby tried to awaken its attention by spreading before its eyes romantic pictures of Communistic life. Lloyd Jones admonished it in sonorous tones to have more faith in associative principle. Henry Hetherington, whose honest voice sounded like a principle, advocated a stout publicity of its views. James Watson, who shook hands like a Lancashire man from the shoulder—with a fervour which you would have cause to remember all the day after—grasped the sinking cause* by the hand, and imparted some feeling to it, which appeared to startle it a little. Mr. Owen, who never doubted its vitality, regarded the moribund movement with complacency as being in a mere millennial trance. Harriet Martineau brought it gracious news from America of the success of votaries out there, which revived it considerably. John Stuart Mill inspired it with hope by declaring that there was no reason in political economy why any self-helping movement of the people should die. Mr. Ashurst looked on with his wise and kindly eyes to see that recovery was not made impossible by new administrative error. But none of the physicians had restored it, if the solid-headed and sagacious men of Rochdale had not discovered the method of *feeding it on profits*, the most nutritious diet known to social philosophy—which, administered in successive and ever-increasing quantities, gradually restored the circulation, opened its eyes, and set it up alive again, with a vigour of action and capacity of growth which the world never expected to see it display; and it forthwith began to look over society with a thousand eyes and operate upon it with a million hands.

Most readers have heard in one way or other of the "Lost Communities" which benevolence projected, devotion attempted, and prematurity and incapacity frustrated. The last of these was commenced in Hampshire. It would have borne the name of New

* I am not sure whether a "cause" has a "hand"—perhaps it has, as it certainly has a heart.

Harmony had not financial discord interfered. It came to be known by the prettier and less cloying title of Queenwood. How the last and grandest hope of Co-operation vanished like a dream which leaves a pain behind it, it is irrelevant to tell. One day the higher conception will revive, as the lower form of it has, and men of more experience, commanding larger means, and sustained instead of frustrated by popular forces, will renew the comprehensive attempt. Its failure, however, in 1844-5 was complete. A community was regarded in social mechanics then as a sort of flying machine, and it fulfilled the expectation of the day by falling like one.

The fall of Queenwood, alike when it became evident and when it had come to pass, intensified the discouragement of Co-operation. Disappointed adherents kill propagandism in all but the men of conviction, and the efforts these made were discredited by the despondency of those who had failed; and it was not until a new generation arose that co-operative enthusiasm was seen again. There were, however, many advocates of it who well foresaw that there were difficulties in the way of creating unity in society given over to infinite divisions, and they had counted on many failures. Co-operation was an element of the time; it was in the air, and there were happily those who believed that

"Even our failures are a prophecy,
Even our yearnings . . .
After that fair and true we cannot grasp." *

Whether Von Sybel was right or not, when he said, "There never was a great revolution that was not either social or religious," it is certain that the revival of Co-operation was more owing to a moral dislike of the daily brutalities of competition than even to the desire of using a new device of gain. The Socialists were not cowards in commerce. They could all take care of themselves in competition as well as their neighbours, and that their neighbours well knew. The police in every town knew them as the best-disposed of the artisan class; employers knew them as the best workmen; tradesmen knew them as men of business of disquieting ability. These societarian improvers disliked the conspiracy against their neighbours which competition compelled them to engage in, and they were daily anxious to find some means of mitigating it. If they could promote their common interest in anything by friendly arrangement, they were prepared to do it. At this period, those who attempted the recommencement of Co-operation had chiefly to encounter the public distrust of it. It was regarded as altogether an exploded doctrine. All lectures about it, all vindications of it by advocates, turned upon the merits

* George Eliot.

and demerits of competition as a principle of industrial and commercial action. Competitive partisans did not suffer the question of Association to be agitated without assailing it by epithets of sentimentality, folly, and supplementary accusations of meditated spoliation and that kind of nonsense. All the world knows now, from the pages of Bastiat, the philosopher of competition, what was thought of it. At this time, when Co-operation tried to raise its head again in 1844, it was sat upon by all the small Bastiats extant. The force of the argument against it will be best apparent to the reader of to-day by regarding here Bastiat's objections, who lifts up his voice in all its compass of derision of those who did not absolutely accept competition, which he contended was "a principle of nature universal, beneficent, and indestructible." Of course, were half this true, there needed no Bastiat to argue anxiously or otherwise in its favour. He was but the expositor of that school which has disciples in every country, who think that Nature itself would be a failure were it not for them, and would indeed go down did they not vindicate it. To the mind of Bastiat, Plato must have been an object of pity, and he must have deplored the "social craze" of those mistaken apostolical co-operators who "had all things in common."

The cry of competition by the Bastiats, English as well as French, is—Liberty; liberty unlicensed, unlimited, and uncontrolled by any consideration of moral results to the community. The argument of this school, perhaps interpreted with exaggeration, was understood to be that all restrictions or limitations of trade action are pitiable. Leave a man to cut his neighbour's throat if he can in a commercial way, it is good for society. Yes, the co-operator replied, there was liberty in the old days of conquest. Each nation that could, cut down the nation next to it. All leagues of weaker nations to check assault restricted the noble license of subjugation. The strong-armed man struck down his weaker adversary, protesting against the effeminacy which attempted to change that economical and vigorous order of proceeding. These were the healthy days of freedom. Then parents had a motive for rearing their children strong and combative. Fighting was a religion, and bravery and brutality the chief virtues. Weak or cowardly opponents, who could not withstand the competition of stronger muscles and greater courage, were held to be rightly supplanted, as feeble or scrupulous tradesmen are now under the liberty of competitive trade. We admit this, and do not like it. The world knows what followed. In what must be regarded, on the competitive theory, as an evil day, the Law stepped in and co-operated to protect the weak and oblige the eager and heroic assailant to submit his quarrel to the effeminate adjudication of the magistrate. Here was a deplorable

interference with the "universal, indestructible, and beneficent law of nature," which had established fighting as an instinct of men. The first man who did any "smart stroke" of competitive business in the world was Cain. Competition deifies Cain. It is Co-operation which takes sides with Abel. The contention of the co-operator is that competition is not the one sole path of progress. He maintains that there are at least two: that if competition is one, Co-operation is another. It is admitted, it can no longer be denied, that concert is successful both in production and distribution. This proves that competition is not universally the only rule, and that there is a new principle coming into operation in human affairs.

If the reader wishes to know what was at the bottom of the co-operative movement when it was recommenced in England, he will see it in the statement of the question here presented, and be able to answer the inquiries so often made during the thirty years which have elapsed since 1844.

Within an hour of writing this page, a literary clergyman whose life is not undistinguished by personal heroism in Africa, who seemed to know everything, who could doubtless determine the date when each of the Apostles wrote, and tell by whom every disputed text has been corrupted, asked in the Temple Club, whether the Co-operation now talked of did not originate in avarice and envy of others. If one whose business it is to trace and know and estimate the social sources of thought, that he may not irritate by injustice of imputation those whom he should inform, or guide by a generous sympathy, knew nothing whatever of the inspiration of a movement, now felt in every town and village of all civilized countries, the busy, irresponsible, and indifferent public must have many questions to put to any who can answer them. By what motives were the new co-operators stirred into action? What impelled them to recommence that dreary march towards success, when they had encountered so many failures by the way? With no one to favour or cheer them, with no triumphs to point to, to mitigate incredulity, what constrained them to move forward? Was it the improvement of their condition? If this was their motive, why should they alone be actuated by it, when their artisan comrades in equally low circumstances were inactive and hopeless? Their main desire was not merely to improve the chances, but to improve the morality of industry. They disliked competition more than poverty, and they imagined co-operation would terminate or mitigate both. Save for this belief, they had been no more bold, or adventurous, or persistent, than their compeers in labour. The view of social life to which their attention had been drawn, and which influenced them, was one which to this day influences the

chief leaders of the movement, and its explanation will facilitate the reader understanding it. The social distinction between Competition and Co-operation is that competition is a fight for life, co-operation an agreement to live. A state of society in which men must depend for prosperity upon their skill in outwitting, or overreaching their neighbours or the wider public, is one of competition. These acts bear the name of "enterprise," "capacity for business," and "commercial success." This is nevertheless a state of war. True there are honourable tradesmen — and emphasis, emphatic and audible, should be given to the fact — who intend to sell genuine articles, and as far as in them lies do so, or execute as manufacturers excellent work, and charge only such prices as repay them for their purveying, risks, and labour. But a merchant or manufacturer who limits the profits he will make, when opportunity occurs of increasing them, is considered "sentimental." If he refused to enter into a combination to restrict the supply in the market, he would be regarded as a very offensive and dangerous person. If he made open opposition to the combination necessary to this purpose, there would be a combination against him by the chiefs of the trade to which he belonged. If possible his business would be paralyzed and he would be ruined for his stupidity, or obstinacy, or honesty, as the case might be — his "impracticability" is the commercial term for it.

The effect of these well-known combinations is the exaction from the consuming public of higher prices than otherwise they would have to pay. This is merely the modern form of levying "black-mail," and it will be described as commercial "brigandage" as soon as men see their way well out of it. Against these exactions Co-operation could give the public, to a great extent, protection. The law affords none. It recognizes the predatory features of competition. In the shop window made gay, or the counter illuminated to beget a conviction that elegance of the sale-room denotes excellence of the articles, there the public meet the Claude Duvals of the highway of commerce, who dance with the purchaser before troubling him for his purse. Among tradesmen who do this are included many who like it and think it quite right. Others have never given a thought to what they are doing. All they know is that their fathers did it, and everybody does it, and that if they did not accomplish these abstractions when they can, others will — which is the pickpocket's philosophy when he enters a crowd. There are also honest, right-minded, clear-seeing tradesmen who do it and who know well what it means, and do not like it, and wish they were well out of it. The ill-meaning and the well-meaning alike know that competition is war. In battle, in civilized armies, men do not aim to kill, but to disable the enemy. Even in a street fight a man may not kick

his adversary; in the prize-ring certain blows are proscribed as foul. So in trade, a manufacturer may not steal his materials, nor a dealer sell stolen goods, nor put off one thing for another, nor adulterate with quickly-poisonous ingredients; but it is not unlawful to form an Agricultural Implement Makers' Agents' Union to destroy co-operative dealers and prevent makers selling to or farmers buying of any but themselves, and at such prices as the Union arrange to levy; nor for fish factors to combine and secure a monopoly of all sales—keeping fish from the poor man's table;* nor for gas companies to combine—compelling the public to buy bad gas at a high price: nor for coal-owners to combine to maintain high rates—killing the poor, both young and aged, in cold seasons. These, and other forestalling arts of gain regardless of the public interest, are not prohibited nor thought "ungentlemanly." All combinations of the few to the detriment of the many are merely forms of federated competition. Even if Trade Unionists combined to force up wages beyond an equitable point, it would be equally plunder of their employers or the public. This competitive larceny of commerce, this venal adroitness, is accorded a certain degree of esteem—as the talent of "looking after the main chance." The tone of the public is, however, not so favourable to it as formerly. "Parson Lot" (Canon Kingsley), Professor Maurice, and other eminent and honoured clergymen, did and have done much to discredit this feature of trade. Carlyle, and, later, Ruskin, have written on behalf of honour in commerce and workmanship as only men of sincerity would—as only men of genius could. In Parliament, Bills against adulteration are honestly passed against little tradesmen,† in the presence of men who on a grand scale adulterate business, adulterate banking, public companies, railway administration, and politics too. It is thought dangerous to society to draw attention to these facts, but it is proof that the public are more with the co-operator than heretofore, that restrictions of competitive resources are devised with a comprehensiveness unknown before. The co-operator approves of these efforts of repression without expecting much from them. He is not so much given to millennial expectations as he is represented to be. He sees that the inextinguishable evil is in the system, and therefore proposes as far as he is concerned to conduct trade and manufactures on a new one, in which it shall be the interest of those concerned to study equity and act upon it.

* In this way the uses of Columbia Market which cost the Baroness Burdett Coutts £200,000, were said to be frustrated by a few fish factors in Billingsgate.

† The *Liverpool Post* Journal of Liverpool pointed out some time ago that the Commissioners of Internal Revenue always withheld in their Reports the names of great manufacturers who cannot fraud upon the revenue, while the small shopkeeper detected in selling a pound of adulterated tobacco is punished by name in the newspapers. The name of a dishonest firm being suppressed, the public never knew who the culprits are, and suspect the whole in their ignorance, which is an injustice to those who are honest.

He wastes very little time in applying unpleasant names to his neighbours or in delivering homilies to them. To look for general honour in competition where dexterous fraud, or loss and ruin, are alternatives constantly presented to men, is the Utopian expectation of those who believe in the perfectibility of mankind. The co-operator who sees that honesty must in the main depend on the creation of honest conditions of trade, proposes, where it is practicable, to exchange the competitive system for a new one. That new one is to bring the public into partnership in stores, and the workman and the customer into partnerships in manufactures.

The co-operator is commonly regarded as one who conspires in his way to bring about a state of average equality—and equality is regarded as impossible and absurd. This objection, always flippant, is no longer so forcible a one as it was once imagined to be. Most people see now that society is moving in the direction of equality. Every wave that carries it forward is broader than the one which preceded it, and whatever tends to further the peaceable equality of condition, tends to mitigate great evils otherwise irremediable. In all supremacy of power, of strength, of wealth, or even intelligence, there is danger to society, and the only security against it lies in equality. Absolute political power is always found to be corrupting;* it involves the subversion of all freedom when it is held in tyrannical hands, and is attended by effeminacy of public spirit when it takes a form of paternal government in benevolent hands. The only remedy found has been to put power equally in the hand of the many, and to make its exercise not the right of inheritance but of election. The advantages of great physical strength on the part of a few were found to end in the insolence of those who had it and the subjection of the feeble. This reign of insolence society has corrected by the establishment of law, which regulates right by justice and not by might. The possession of great wealth enables the rich to command the poor, to hold the earth, to compel the landless to live, or rather huddle together in unwholesome numbers, or to command their labour by controlling the markets and the means of life. Hence, all these social revolutions occurring or imminent in the nations, which can never cease until the distribution of wealth is equitably facilitated, and all are placed under certain common conditions of security and comfort. Even intelligence, the least suspected form of mastership, enables the wise to take infinite advantage of the ignorant; hence the reluctance of many who have knowledge to permit the multitude to obtain it, and the determination of the friends of the people to diffuse it until it becomes a common possession. At every great point at

* It brought a usurper to Sedan, and a late descendant of The Prophet to the scissors on the Bosphorus.

which we survey the progress of society, we see that equality is the new element which marks and measures its advancement.

Such is the history of the ideas which occasioned the revival of Co-operation. Some persons thought competition wholly bad and a thing to be superseded. The wiser sort saw that Co-operation could have standing ground sufficient, and sufficient to do if it would make good its claim to mitigate competition at the points when it became mere war and fraud. Monopoly is apt to be a sleepy, covetous, insolent thing; but when in the hands of men of taste and honour, trade monopoly, like a good paternal government, may be showy and pleasant. A tradesman secure of his position may be unservile, opulent in his ways, dainty in the qualities of goods in which he deals; and in many cases the public have been better served by such persons than by the sharp, abrupt, insecure, half-fawning, half-offensive competitor. Nevertheless, experience shows that "grandmotherly" government is apt to degenerate into pupillage and the rod, and monopoly itself become mere selfishness and brutality, and when this is the case, competition is a public deliverer who takes monopoly by the throat. Competition may then be for a long time the source of many blessings. At length the day arrives when its own liberty is turned into licentiousness, and itself becomes a new disaster in society. Inspired by wit and greed, and driven by the pressure of its own imitators, the more powerful competitors combine among themselves and establish a monopoly as vicious and more irresponsible than that sometimes created by law. Then it is that Co-operation comes into existence and combines against the new usurpation, Co-operation being the new form of self-defence on the part of society from the unforeseen aggression of one of its own agents of progress. The individualism of the savage, the predatory conqueror, or the feudal chief, is in the earlier stages of associative life subjugated by society and put under the control of law. That stage not being reached at which the organization of labour is thought of, or practicable if it is, individualism is left the only moving force in the community, and of necessity reasserts itself in commerce and trade under the forms of monopolies granted and legalized by governments. These monopolies are coveted by powerful subjects for profit, but fall upon the people in the shape of exactions. At first it is justified with some fair show of reason as providing for the development of trade and furnishing the security of business which conduces to skill in craftsmanship. For a time these benefits do appear to arise; certain classes to whom the exercise of the monopolies are restricted attain opulence, an industry rises to the rank of art. In time, however, the race-element of monopoly appears. The few are fattened while the many famish. Some artisans acquire renown, while the majori-

have no opportunity of rising above mere labourers. The capacity of multitudes perishes, the field of its cultivation being closed by monopoly, which with all its fine pretensions is oft a selfish, exclusive, and remorseless force. It comes to pass then that free trade is dimly conceived as a possible remedy. Political philosophers, like Turgot and Adam Smith, then arise, and proclaim the advantages to industry of liberty in competition, which becomes a social necessity of popular communities, and opens vast sources of new wealth. Thus competition beneficially combats the organized individualism of monopoly, and restores society, for a time, to its right of general life. After a while the multiplicity of competitors fight against each other, and reduce the gains of each to the point of despair or distress. Then the wealthier and endangered competitors have recourse to combination against their smaller and feebler rivals, and create new forms of monopoly which law has no means of reaching. At this stage, there enters into the mind of society the idea of Co-operation. At first it is faintly perceived, and when it becomes more palpable it is regarded as "visionary." Eventually it attains force, but travels slowly; too feeble to be dreaded, too obscure to be avowedly recognized, its lot is to be derided. The condition of the many being as hopeless and helpless as under the dominion of law-protected monopoly, society at length discerns that the aggressive combinations of capitalists can only be combated by Co-operation. The monopoly of competition, more beneficent in effects than that of law, produces a more skilled community than heretofore existed. There is then an overwhelming supply of knowledge and skill, and no market for it. The markets are no longer closed by law; they are closed by combination. It is of no consequence inquiring how it comes about, whether by fraud or fate—the effect is the same—the great total of wealth, which capital and labour, thought and industry, have produced, is found in possession of a few, and the many run about in a state anxious and precarious, strongly advised to emigrate without delay to some other land where they find the same, or a worse condition of things prevails. Of two parties to one undertaking, the smaller number of workers are able to retain profits sufficient for affluence; while the other and larger number, receive a share hardly sufficient to pay taxes; and by no parsimony or self-denial can they secure for themselves competence. No insurrection can remedy the evil. No sooner shall the bloody field be still than the same principle of competitive struggling will reproduce the same inequalities, and the victors of to-day be plundered to-morrow by those whom they have taught this murderous mode of redress. A very different remedy has found favour among industrial thinkers. By producers giving security for the use of capital, and dividing

the profits earned equitably between capital-lender and labour-giver, a new distribution of wealth is obtained which accords capital rightful compensation and secures labour enduring provision. Thus the advocates of the new form of industry by concert tried to induce society to combat competition by Co-operation, which promises to protect it from the further insurgency of individualism, by creating a field for its energy and security for its reward. Instead of two men fighting which shall steal a field, which neither can honestly hold alone, co-operators agree to buy it, to till it, and divide the produce. This is the species of constructive Co-operation whose origin and procedure is the new social feature of our time. This modern Co-operation is more varied than the old. That of the earlier period was comparatively brief and determinate. Its features are fixed in theories and dreams, in periodicals and pamphlets, and are unchangeable now; but contemporary Co-operation grows every month, and takes some fresh form or development every year. Its course is more difficult to define with approximate definiteness, because it is ever growing, devising new applications, and pursuing new ideas. But though its future can neither be seen nor foreshadowed, the principles which have animated it and the methods of its procedure are capable of such statement as may enable the reader to understand it.

The kind of Co-operation which existed in what we call the Pioneer period of its career, was very simple and very precarious. The stores of those days sold goods at the average market prices, and what was saved by economy of shopkeeping, with a few mostly unpaid servants, without advertisements, in low-rented rooms, went as profit to the shareholders, who were a few adventurous persons who supplied the humble capital. These adherents were at first mostly devoted to propagandism and subsequently to the promotion of home colonies. So long as the directors of the earlier stores provided purer provisions and fairer weight than was to be had elsewhere, or so long as the store was a centre of social discussion and information, the stores made way, until there came decrease of social interest, or leading members left or died, or mismanagement and loss or fraud broke them up one after another.

There were distinguished advocates of Co-operation in various parts of Great Britain who continued to speak on behalf of concerted efforts for industrial improvement, and writers were not wanting in the land who maintained that new life in society was to be looked for in that direction. Thus everywhere a small inspiration was diffused which inclined men in many towns to try Co-operation again. Rochdale was one of these, and its distinction was that it manifested so much vitality and persistence in its methods, and achieved success so striking, that its Equitable

Pioneer Society became the pioneer store upon which a thousand others have been modelled.

The simple theory of modern Co-operation is that the purchaser should share the profits made by a distributing store. The total profits arising after payment of all trade and reserve fund expenses, are reduced by one-half per cent., set apart for education of the members, and the residue is divided among all the buyers of the store, in proportion to their purchases. In a productive society, after the payment of all expenses, of wages, capital, material, rent, and reserved fund which the special risks of trade may require, the total profits, after the provision is made for educational purposes, are divided in the proportion agreed upon between labour and capital. After capital is rewarded according to its risks, the main object is to secure to labour such substantial share of the gains as shall be sufficient to enlist the highest skill of the workman and secure permanent interest in the enterprise. It appears likely that it will take as long to educate workmen into intelligent participation in this scheme of equity as it took to educate purchasers to put trust in stores and give their custom to them. In some cases employers have made advances in the same path, and have considerably formed industrial partnerships, in which they have accorded to their workmen such share of profit as could be shown to arise from their putting their skill and goodwill into their work, which in any business will improve, and in many greatly increase the returns. Some employers who have done this have drawn back, displaying as little confidence or interest in the intrinsic merit and equity of the arrangement as men have done in other cases; or they have attached degrading conditions to their overtures, which men of independence resented. In other cases employers have made generous sacrifices, and have paid profits which have not been created by the men, in order to encourage confidence and perseverance in a plan which must yield advantages to each when heartily carried out on both sides.

Not unfrequently the men who form co-operative manufacturing societies prove themselves wanting in patience and generosity towards their comrades. They are unwilling to wait while their fellow-workmen come up to them in sense, energy, and intelligent acceptance of the principle of equity. The sharper sort, perceiving that a successful trade may speedily produce large profits, prefer commencing or converting the affair into a joint-stock one, and keeping the gains in their own hands, and taking their chance of hiring labour like other employers. Thus, instead of the mastership of two or three, they introduce the system of a hundred masters. They may not be said to be traitors to Co-operation, since they cannot be accused of betraying what has

not existed. They simply desert it, and instead of promoting it, multiply organizations for the individual rather than the common profit, and enlarge the field of strikes, and prepare ground for contests between capital and labour more furious and savage than any which have hitherto occurred.


Greater honour is therefore due to those employers, manufacturing and agricultural, who generously set the example of affording facilities for those who engage in their service, for taking in some degree the position of partners, which endows labour with dignity and more or less with a share of its profits. The present Speaker of the House of Commons did this when he announced to those who worked upon his estate, that he would afford them facilities for becoming part proprietors of it. This gave them a position of pride and self-respect, which was valuable beyond calculation. The social consequences of such an admission, rightly used, would produce more advantages than many agitations such as are within the means of labourers to conduct. To have it admitted by a gentleman so eminent and influential as the representative of the House of Commons, that labourers had a social right to share in the profits of the estate which they contributed to cultivate, was an admission of more service to the working people than many Acts of Parliament passed in their name and professedly for their benefit. For an humble villager to be able to say that he was a shareholder in the Glynde estate, however small might be the portion which his prudence and frugality enabled him to acquire—however small might be the profits thus accruing to him—puts him into an entirely changed position. His forefathers were slaves, then serfs, then free labourers. He becomes in some sort a landowner. He henceforth stands upon what Sir Alexander Cockburn would call a “colourable” equality with the proprietor himself. If he had any cultivated spirit of independence in him, such labourer would have more satisfaction in the idea than many a tenant farmer is able to find in the position which he holds. It must follow in a few years that the wages of such a man must increase, his political consideration must be recognized, and by prudence, temper, and good judgment the relation between this body of small proprietors and the chief owner must have been the most pleasant and honourable in England. That these labourers were wanting in the disposition or were ill-advised by those to whom they would naturally look for counsel, and neglected to act on the unusual offer made by the Right Honourable Mr. Brand, detracts in no way from the value of it. Men may be taken to the steps of Paradise and decline to ascend, yet he is not the less meritorious who gives the opportunity. A man may not have the sense to ascend; he may not understand his opportunity; he may even

distrust it through his own ignorance; he may have the humility which makes him doubt his own fitness to advance; he may have the diffidence which makes him distrust his own power of going forward; he may even prefer to remain where he is, content that he may advance on another occasion. But he is no longer the same man; he stands higher in his own esteem. He has had the chance of better things, and the old feeling of discontent and sense of exclusion and bitterness at his previous state are for ever killed within him; and an inspiration of manliness, and equality, and undefined satisfaction takes the place of his former consciousness. A man may have a great opportunity and not embrace it. For some purpose, or preference, or infatuation of his own, he may go past it; he may regret it, but he is a happier man by far ever after, than he who never had the chance of bettering himself. So every manufacturer and every landowner, who makes overtures of industrial partnership to his men, raises the character of mastership and proprietorship. Sooner or later men will accept the offers, and be grateful for them, and turn them to fortunate account. In the meantime the whole temper of industry is being changed by these overtures; the mighty doors of conciliation and equality are being opened through which, one day, all the workmen of England will pass.

In the meantime, the mere dream of this invests the Order of Industry with new interest and hope. This will seem sentimental only to those who know human nature second-hand. We all live in ideals. Those who deny the ideal of others live in one of their own, lower or higher, though they may not know it. The true artist, solitary and needy though he may be, paints for the truth; the thinker thinks for it; the martyr dies for a principle the glory of which only his eye sees. Progress is the mark of humanity, the seal of its destination; and the aspiration of the lowest is the ideal which carries him forward, and when it fails manhood falls back and perishes. Whoever or whatever presents men with a new opportunity of advancement, brings it near to them, and keeps it near to them until they understand it, inspires progress.

This is what Co-operation has done. It has filled the air with new ideas of progress by concert. When these Utopian ideas were first revived in industrial circles, men thought they were the mere flashes of lightning which play upon the fringe of a coming tempest. They may be rather compared to the rainbow arch, which denotes a permanent truce between the warring elements, a sign that the storm is passing away.

GEORGE JACOB HOLYOAKE.



ON THE REVISION OF THE ENGLISH NEW TESTAMENT.

*"Let us pursue the inquiry, not in relation to all ideas,
lest the multitude of them should confuse us, but let us
select a few of those which are reckoned to be the
principal ones"—PLATO, Sophist. p. 254.*

III.

HAVING spoken thus far generally of the principles which should guide the translation and revision of the New Testament, and having indicated some kinds of alteration that may be dispensed with in order to preserve the tone and character of our version, it remains to point out more exactly the kind of changes which are to be considered important, and to which the attention of the reviser should in the first instance be directed. But before going so far into detail, it is perhaps necessary to make a few observations on the Greek text and on the history of our English version.

THE TEXT.

It is obvious that the interpretation of any book of which the autograph is not accessible, and especially of an ancient writing, involves the prior question of the settlement of the text. The general nature of this question in regard to the New Testament is at last coming to be better understood in this country. From the very fact that the intense and continuous labour which it demands is confined to a few persons, in whom the critical may be assumed to be generally stronger than the ecclesiastical interest, this subject has been less liable than that of interpretation to the intrusion of "idols of the temple." Father Montfaucon maintaining the cause of Dr. Bentley in the meeting of

superiors of the monastery of St. Germain,* is no isolated example of the common spirit which has bound together those engaged in this work, even when belonging to different communions or schools of thought. And there has been a growing disposition on the part of the educated public to accept their decisions, which have thus an authority like that of the acknowledged results of science. Most persons nowadays would be ashamed of the panic which seized the religious world at the beginning of the eighteenth century, on being told that Dr. Mill had discovered 30,000 various readings in Greek MSS. of the New Testament. Their ready answer to such an objection would be that the variations were unimportant. Yet this comfortable assurance has not come spontaneously. Those who enjoy it owe more than they are aware to many a half-forgotten combatant who in his day was compelled to undergo the imputation of Unitarianism. There is probably now hardly any clergyman of average scholarship who believes in the genuineness of the text of the three witnesses (1 John v. 7). Yet it should not be forgotten that, for two centuries and more, no clergyman could have questioned the authority of this verse, without incurring the danger of being reputed a Socinian. This and some other facts about the Bible have passed out of the stage in which it was said of them, "They are not true," into the other stage, in which the orthodox interpreter declares that "Everybody knew them." It is not quite well that these sudden conversions or revolutions of opinion should be passed over, like the changes in some men's political views, without the slightest reference being made to them afterwards. "Let bygones be bygones" is not applicable to scientific questions. There is an *amende honorable* due to those who originally held the right opinion, and who are now conveniently ignored. The Unitarian has been habitually attacked for falsifying the Scripture, and ridiculed for want of scholarship. But it must at least be acknowledged that the fault has not been all on one side; and theologians may learn from this the lesson of humility, and be less confident that the reading or interpretation which is maintained by them to-day will be maintained two centuries hence. It should be remembered that the giving up of these verses involves giving up the names of Horsley, Waterland, Bull, and others, who fought the Unitarians, though we are far from wishing to fix upon them the stigma with which they succeeded in branding, in the opinion of Churchmen,

* Monk's Life of Bentley, p. 432: "Here Father Montfaucon, the most distinguished of the body, maintained the cause of Dr. Bentley with an ardour which shows that the spirit of chivalry may find its way into the regions of scholastic literature. He contended that the request of so great a scholar, from whom they had received obligations, ought by all means to be complied with, even though their own undertaking should thereby be prejudiced; and that he would rather send the treasures themselves to Cambridge for Bentley's use, than, by refusing the indulgence requested, bring a disgrace upon the Benedictine name."

the great name of Priestley. It is remarkable that no serious complaint of heresy has attached to Milton, Locke, or Newton, though they were at least Arians, probably because orthodox Christians have not liked to confess too openly the loss of such champions.

The condition of the text of the New Testament differs from that of the classical authors, chiefly in the following respects:—
1. In the greater number of the MSS., and, what is more important, the greater age of many of them. 2. In the causes of interpolation. 3. In the existence of the early versions, having in some cases an authority at least equal to that of the early MSS. 4. In the numerous quotations of the early Fathers, which may be compared to the citation of classical writers by the Alexandrian grammarians, and the peculiar uncertainties to which the use of these quotations is liable. 5. There is one other difference, which may be expressed in the words of Bishop Marsh:—

“There is no principle more firmly resisted in sacred criticism than the admission of conjectural emendation—of emendation not founded on documents.” “In the application of criticism to classic authors,”

adds the bishop, with unconscious irony,

“conjectural emendations are allowable. There such liberties can do no harm, either to the critic or his readers; they affect no truth, either religious or moral. But the case is widely different when conjectural emendation is applied to the sacred writings. It then ceases to be merely an exercise of ingenuity; it becomes a vehicle *for the propagation of religious opinion.*”—*Lectures*, p. 26.

So strongly has this been felt, that even Bentley, who, in his controversy with Collins, does not fail to use his favourite weapon,* in his “Proposals for printing the Greek Testament,” which he was anxious to recommend to as many persons as possible, has this clause:—

“The author is very sensible that, in the sacred writings, there’s no place for conjectures or emendations. Diligence and fidelity, with some judgment and experience, are the characters here requisite. He declares, therefore, that he does not alter one letter in the text, without the authorities subjoined in the notes.”†

The reasons for this caution in sacred criticism have been, besides the general importance of the subject, (1) the number and antiquity of the MSS., and the greater amount of documentary evidence generally; (2) the fear of the imputation of doctrinal bias, or rather the apprehension that such a principle, if once admitted in the case of Scripture, might be abused (the weapon was two-edged); (3) the association in the popular mind between the real letter of Scripture and the traditional text. Of these reasons, the first alone is strictly binding. The second is a con-

* See Monk’s *Life of Bentley*, p. 435.

† See *Phileleutherus Lipsiensis*, pp. 104, 140. (8th edition, a. 1743.)

fession of weakness. There is no ground for supposing that Biblical criticism may not be emancipated from doctrinal bias, so that, after deciding on the external evidence which of two or more readings is probably the earlier, the question may be calmly argued, whether the earlier reading is probably genuine or not, and, if not, whether any emendation may or may not be regarded as probable. But, considering the great difficulty of judging from the style of writings which are so fragmentary, and whose authors were so little versed in literary composition; considering, also, that no conjectural reading in all these centuries has hitherto met with general approval; and, lastly, the great practical importance, in the case of the New Testament, of presenting the facts simply as they are, it must be regarded as a fortunate circumstance that no respectable critic has ever ventured to insert his conjectures into the text.*

The text of the New Testament cannot be regarded as finally settled. But this consideration is not to be entertained as an objection to the work of revision, unless it is assumed that the present generation is to do this work for all time. If the object were merely to soothe apprehensions, or to prevent the possibility of disturbance or inquiry in the future, it might be desired, however vainly, that the present revision should have the character of finality. But those who simply wish to come as near as is possible with the means at their disposal to the truth of facts, will not be disappointed, if the work now done should awaken further inquiry; and they will be contented to base their alterations, so far as they see fit to make them, on the text which is most in accordance with the evidence which is at present accessible. It might be convenient to adopt some rule. For instance, the agreement of Tischendorf in his latest edition with Lachmann in the edition of 1842-50 might be taken as a rough criterion. But the testimonies are so fully given in recent critical editions, that a scholar who was equal to the task might in some cases form an independent judgment.

In order to make the most recent knowledge of the text available in the translation, it would be necessary occasionally to make use of brackets, and, as in some of the earlier English versions, of smaller type. For instance, the concluding verses of St. Mark's Gospel†—which are absent from the Sinaitic and Vatican MSS., and are proved not to belong to the original

* In Lachmann's case this is probably due to the accident of his never having completed his design. See his Second Preface, n. 1850.

† "When Archbishop Secker said, in vindication of these condemning clauses [in the Athanasian Creed], 'Our condemnation is no more hardened and uncharitable than our Saviour's is at Mark xvi. 16,' he did not know that he relied on a passage of Scripture which is of such very questionable authority."—*The Book of Common Prayer*, printed page for page with the revised Liturgy of 1689.

texture of the book, but existed in the second century, as appears from the quotation of Irenæus, and are found in four uncial MSS. of the first order—cannot well be excluded, and yet ought not to appear as if written continuously with the preceding verses, and of equal authority with other parts of the Gospel. This difficulty might be met by putting them in brackets and in a smaller type.*

The same rule might be applied to the well-known *pericopè* in the Fourth Gospel (John vii. 53—viii. 11), which has even less external evidence in its favour, and yet undoubtedly existed in the third century, and has strong internal evidence—not, indeed, of belonging to the book in which it is found,—but of being a stray leaf of the earliest Gospel tradition.

HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH VERSION.

Our present English version of the New Testament is still mainly due to the single-hearted energy of the greatest of the English Reformers, William Tyndale (1525-36). He was the greatest, because his work was the most original and the most independent of external influences.† With all the powers of his time against him, and “finding no place” for his work “in all England,” it was not given him to obtain immediate success. Even had he lived longer, it is doubtful if he could have overcome the political forces under which he was crushed. But the effort was indeed a grand one, for it was no less than to popularize the highest religious thought of that age. With singular fearlessness and moderation, with the enlightenment of a scholar and the faithful love of an apostle—combining in a measure the gifts of Luther and Erasmus, without their weaknesses—he strove nobly to spread amongst his countrymen those first ideas of reformation, which had a thoroughness and reasonableness, an enlightenment and simplicity, that contrast favourably with the half-mediaeval, half-antinomian extravagances of later movements.

Tyndale can be extremely bitter in controversy, and he is not always fair to the principles which he is combating. But no one was ever more candid in expressing his thoughts, and there could not be a clearer expositor. The spirit of every word in his writings is that of saying to the people, “Hear and understand.” And though an exile and a prisoner, he awakened amongst his countrymen a response, even before his martyrdom, and

* Cp. Ps. xiv. The interpolated verses of this Psalm were translated by Coverdale, with the note “not in the Hebrew.”

† Although Tyndale was no doubt influenced by Erasmus and Luther in different ways, yet the independence of his version is clearly evident. Neither was it based on that of Wyclif, which may therefore be left out here, however important in any complete account of the English Bible.

roused a spirit which has never since been quite extinguished. He effected this chiefly through the work of translation. It would be curious if it were possible to ascertain how much of the Englishman's love for his Bible was originally due to the instinctive recognition of the fearless, irrepressible love of truth and of his countrymen which moved Tyndale to lay down his life. Proscribed even by those who had authorized a slightly altered recension of it, the original version of Tyndale was still clung to by many, at the risk of their lives; the version still held its own even in the first years of the Genevan Bible, and, generations afterwards, editions of the Bishops' Testament were printed without the division into verses, apparently for no other reason than because this was the form of page which the version of Tyndale had made familiar. Such magic was in the honesty of the man.

It is very instructive to notice the force of popular sentiment when once fully awakened, even in the reign of Henry. When, from political causes, the Reformation had prevailed at Court, and it was determined to give the Bible to the people, not only was the still proscribed version of Tyndale made the basis of the recension (the work of Coverdale), but hardly any attempt was made, even by the bishops, who professed to have examined the work and to have found it free from heresy, to replace the old ecclesiastical words, for changing which Tyndale had been so virulently attacked by More, and which Gardiner would have gladly seen restored in any version that was undertaken by Convocation.* A politician like Cromwell may have felt that no version which had "church" for "congregation," "priest" for "elder," or "penance" for "repentance," could meet with the acceptance which he desired. The only one of these words which was afterwards replaced in any Protestant English version is "church" for ἐκκλησία, in the New Testament. And this was due, not to the English hierarchy, but to the Puritan divines, for whom the word "church," as meaning the body of the elect, had acquired a new theological significance. The Geneva Bible set the example of distinguishing between the "congregation" of the Old Testament and the "church" of the New. For instance—"On this rock will I build my church" (Matt. xvi. 18), but "the congregation in the wilderness" (Acts vii. 38). And yet, in the Bishops' Bible (probably because the work was done by various hands), in what would seem to be the *locus classicus* of ecclesiasticism, Matt. xvi. 18, the word "congregation" is retained, while "church" is substituted in the other passage (Acts vii. 38).

The two most popular versions were also those which were most

* Although Coverdale had restored "penance" in some places, it does not appear in the Great Bible. "Priesthood" was once inserted, but did not hold its ground.

immediately based upon the Greek :* that of Tyndale following the text and (although independently) the interpretation of Erasmus, and the Genevan version (in revising Tyndale) the text of Stephens and the interpretation of Beza.† The Genevan version of the New Testament (1557-60) is rather less idiomatic than that of Tyndale, though often closer to the Greek. It was against this version, and Beza, as the arch-enemy, that the polemic of the Rhemists was directed. In basing their translation (1590) upon the Vulgate, they followed the Roman Catholic tradition, but some of their reasons for doing so are not wanting in force, and, however uncouth and unreadable from its close adherence to the Latin, and although some of its Latinisms (*e.g.* “chalice” for “cup”) may have a theological motive, their version is free from many little interpolations which had crept into the Greek copies—*e. g.*, in Matt. vi. 4, it has “shall reward you,” for “shall reward you openly,” where the word “openly,” introduced for the sake of antithesis, lessens the force and beauty of the saying of Christ. The Bishops’ Bible was also intended by its projectors to take the place of the Genevan Bible, but failed to do so, partly because not proceeding from a popular quarter, and partly, as Professor Westcott has remarked, from the inequality of the work. This, like all other versions, except the Authorized Version, underwent many alterations in successive editions, and the immediate precursor of the Authorized Version was not the Bishops’ Bible of 1568, but that of 1602, which in many places has the readings which have been supposed to appear first in the Authorized Version, or to have been adopted by King James’s revisers from the Rheims version. For instance, “charity,” which in several passages of the Authorized Version has been substituted for the “love” of all the earlier versions, appears first in the Bishops’ Bible of 1602, where, in common with many other Latinisms, it seems to have found its way from the Roman Catholic version of 1590.

Thus for nearly a century the English version had been in process of continuous change: not only at the great cardinal points (Tyndale, Cranmer, Geneva, Bishops’ Bible), but in each successive issue of the numberless editions that still present a field not fully explored by bibliographers,‡ there were variations which showed that neither the learned nor the people at large regarded the work as finally completed. But with all its changes, the translation still

* That of Cranmer, for instance, is in several places retouched from the Vulgate.

† It is a curious illustration of the tendency to call a book after some great name, that Tomson’s edition of the Geneva Bible (1595) professes on the title-page to be “translated from the Greek by Theodore Beza.”

‡ I am bound to express my obligations to the kindness of Mr. Francis Fry, of Cotham, who several years ago allowed me to inspect his valuable collection of English Bibles. He will differ from some of the opinions expressed in this article, but I hope he will not regret his liberality.

retained, on the whole, the one great attribute of honesty and integrity which it had received from the incorruptible spirit of Tyndale. The Tudor State-ecclesiastic might add here and there an explanation in brackets and small type, for godly admonition to the reader; the spirit of the early Reformation, or of Geneva, may have here and there crept out of the margin into the text with a slight emphasis or expansion, such as "Drink ye of it every one" (Matt. xxvi. 27), "ordained by election" (Acts xiv. 23); but on the whole there is wonderfully little that is inconsistent with Tyndale's averment, "I never altered a syllable of God's word against my conscience, nor would this day, if all that is in the earth, whether it be pleasure, honour, or riches, might be given me;" or Coverdale's, "I have neither wrested nor altered so much as one word for the maintenance of any manner of sect; but have, with a clear conscience, purely and faithfully translated this out of five sundry interpreters, having only the manifest truth of the Scripture before mine eyes." The English language had been greatly enriched in the Elizabethan era. The number of translations from the Italian, French, and Latin—the diffusion through the grammar-schools of the knowledge of the Latin tongue—the variety and excellence of the original works that appeared in every style of composition—had enlarged the vocabulary and deepened the harmonies of our native speech. These causes had already, to some extent, modified the English version. The plain and nervous Saxon of Tyndale's vernacular had been already dignified here and there with courtly or learned phrase, and the amount of Latinism in the last recension of the Bishops' Bible, which had been preceded by the Rheims New Testament, is probably far greater than in any previous version of Protestant origin. At the same time the work of revision had already shown the narrowing tendency which distinguishes the reviser, who is giving his attention to the parts, from the translator, who is realizing the whole. The Genevan version especially, together with increased accuracy, betrays a tendency to a literal adherence to the Greek, which, as compared with Tyndale's free handling, implies a certain lowering of the idea of translation: (the introduction of italics is a tangible instance of this :) and it may once or twice even reflect the Calvinistic theology. In like manner a word here and there might be pointed to in the Bishops' Bible which has an Anglican colouring. But when the Genevan exiles write, "Be not ye called doctors," and the English prelates, "On this rock will I build my congregation," we feel that they are not likely to have intentionally misrepresented the original.

The so-called Authorized Version of 1611—which is, in fact, a revision of the last Bishops' Bible (1602), with the help of those

which had preceded (especially that of Geneva, which was still current at the time), and has remained without material change as the standard English Bible for two centuries and a half—is certainly a noble monument of English learning and fidelity. But, like everything which has been a support to the Church, and so a buttress to the Constitution, it has been the subject of exaggerated panegyric, which has led to an exaggerated reaction. Time was when men spoke of the almost inspired wisdom of our translators, who, if one reason were urged against a rendering, had doubtless weighed this against fourteen reasons on the other side. Now it is become the fashion, even with Church dignitaries, to speak of the looseness and inaccuracy of the Authorized Version.

We certainly owe a lasting debt, not to King James's bishops (except so far as they personally took part in the work), but to the body of scholars and divines who by the King's appointment made with extreme care and judgment out of the many existing versions one which is confessedly better than all, notwithstanding many instances in which, by the voice of a majority of them, the true rendering has been relegated to the margin. And yet no one can read the account in Fuller of the conference at Hampton Court, in which the thing was determined on, without feeling that in some ways it was not an auspicious moment for giving final shape to the work which Tyndale had inaugurated. The odious flattery of the new King, the browbeating of the few Dissenters who were there by sufferance, and to whom this sop was cast rather as something which could do the Church no harm than as a common work to be undertaken for the good of Christian souls, must revolt every honest mind. And we cannot but remember that amongst these were some of the same men who, in the very year in which the version appeared, committed to the flames for "heresy" two men whose lives are said by the historian* to have been irreproachable. All honour to the Nonconformist, Dr. Reynolds, who, apparently without any considerable backing from his own party—the revision of the Bible was not an article of the Millenarian petition—preferred this claim at the conference amongst other grievances. Credit is also due to the King, who saw in some degree the importance of the work, although no one at that time could have foreseen the full importance of a version which has remained undisputed alike in Puritan and Anglican times, and which, amidst multiplied divisions, all sects of Protestant Christians in this country can agree to use.

The work was done, and done well. And now, after 260 years,

* Fuller, who regards it as a subtle device of Satan to serve up the poison of heresy in a "clean cup."

during which there have been many isolated attempts, we for the first time seemed prepared for a fresh breaking of the ground. For this two or three chief causes may be assigned. First, there is the development of textual criticism, the results of which are beginning to be diffused, and the general readiness of scholars to acquiesce in an approximate settlement of the text, on far wider evidence and by surer methods than were known in the sixteenth century. Another cause which makes the conception of a new revision easier, and gives hope that it may be done with success, is the increasing study of English literature and philology, and, in particular, of the history of the English Bible. We are less apt to regard as final what we find to be the revision of a revision. We are less afraid of extensive alteration when we see how much of Tyndale's New Testament has remained intact, through the revisions of Coverdale and Cranmer, of the Genevan exiles, the English bishops, and the so-called translators of King James's reign. At the same time, we may hope that not only in Greek scholarship, but also in English scholarship, our generation is not unfitted for the task. The writers of the last century may have been more skilful in balancing a period or in turning a phrase; but more, perhaps, may be looked for from the scholars of the present day in the delicate work of adjusting between the pure but rugged vernacular of Tyndale and the somewhat over-Latinizing dialect of the Jacobean era. They are not likely to err in the fastidious preference of interwoven phrases to plain words; and yet they are recovering from the fit of purism that would have rejected as far as possible all vocables that could be traced to any other than a Saxon (or "English") source. They have an ear for the grand harmonies of the later Elizabethan prose, and at the same time a heart responsive to the aspiration of the great translator, who was determined, at all hazards, to be "understanded of the people." Their acquaintance with the range and capabilities of their own language will be their best security against the minute pedantry which, failing to comprehend the whole form and spirit of a writer, would stick him all over with Lilliputian distinctions and refinements of which he knew nothing when he lived.

We may now proceed to examine some of the changes which are to be considered important enough to be made at all hazards in any revision of the New Testament.

I. And first, there returns upon us the old question about the Ecclesiastical Words, to which Tyndale gave an unhesitating practical solution more than three centuries ago. Caring only that the people might have access to the pure Gospel contained in the Bible, and might thus be liberated from priestly rule, and

receive the law written in their heart, he strove to get rid of all technicalities, especially such as seemed to him to have been the stronghold of ecclesiastical despotism. His work in this respect has remained almost intact, with the exception of the one word, which he everywhere translated "congregation," and which in the Authorized Version is almost everywhere in the New Testament translated "church." This was in accordance with an explicit direction amongst the injunctions to the translators, from which, however, they seem to have departed in retaining "congregation" in the Old Testament. The motive of the authors of the injunction was probably not the same with that of the Genevan revisers; but this has no bearing on the question now. There are some passages in which few will deny that "congregation," or "assembly," is more suitable than "church," and there are others, in which St. Paul is speaking of the Church in an ideal aspect, where most would now admit that the word "church," with the associations which it calls up, is nearer to the Apostle's meaning than the less abstract "congregation."

There remains a large class of passages in which the actual body of believers is spoken of; and in these, notwithstanding the definition of the Church in the English Articles as the "congregation of faithful men," the word is too inseparably associated with modern ecclesiastical organizations, whether Catholic or Reformed, to recall the true image of the primitive Christian societies. There seems to be no reason why in these instances we should not return to the original version of Tyndale.*

The early Reformers seem to have been contented to retain the word "bishop" for *ἐπίσκοπος*, not out of any love for the episcopal office, but because they hoped to convince the world that bishop, curate, presbyter, were convertible terms.† In this they have not succeeded. The current of State Ecclesiasticism has been too strong for them, and there is a certain unfairness towards Non-conformists in retaining the word, when it is evident that the common apprehension will not learn to distinguish sufficiently between the ancient overseer of his brethren and the modern bishop. There are inconsistencies in the Authorized Version which in a general revision might to some extent be removed, not, however, by inserting the word "bishop" where it has been avoided, but by the adoption of some word of general significance, with-

* It may seem a curious illustration of Tyndale's antipathy to the word "church" as an equivalent for *ἐκκλησία*, that he has applied it to the idol's temple (in translating *ἱερόσυλοι*) in the well-known phrase "robbers of churches," in a passage where *ἐκκλησία* must necessarily be translated "assembly." Acts. xix. 37—40. In this, however, he perhaps followed Luther's "Kirchenräuber." Cp. 2 Macc. iv. 42.

† See Tyndale's Prologue to Titus: "In the first chapter he sheweth what manner of man a bishop or curate ought to be." Genevan (Tomson's ed.) note on Phil. i. 1: "By the bishops are meant both the pastors which have the dispensation of the word, and the elders that governe." Genevan note on 1 Tim. iii. 2: "A bishopricke or the ministerie of the word is not an idle dignitie, but a work and that an excellent work."

out pressing too closely to the etymology. Why not, for instance, "the office of a pastor;" "the Shepherd and Pastor of your souls;" "his pastoral office" (or "pastorate") "let another take"?

The English word "elder," with which Tyndale finally replaced the "seniour" (elsewhere "ancient") of his earliest version, has been retained in the Authorized Version as the equivalent of *πρεσβύτερος*. It was one of those changes from which there was no going back. Only in one verse does any trace appear of subsequent controversy. In 1 Tim. iv. 14, Tyndale (1534) had "with laying on of the hands of an elder" (reading *τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου*). Sir John Cheke's revision (1553) gave "with laying on of hands, by the auctoritie of eldership;" the Genevan New Testament of 1557, "with laying on of the hands by the eldership;" the Genevan Bible of 1560, "with laying on of the hands of the companie of the eldership" (with the marginal note "Under this name he containeth the whole ministerie of the Church which was of Ephesus"). This was the only passage in which the authors of the Great Bible ventured to restore one of the disputed ecclesiastical words. In the Great Bible of 1539 it is "with the laying on of hands by the auctoritie of priesthood." But again in the Bishops' Bible of 1602, by what looks like a subtle Anglican compromise, we read "with the laying on of hands by the auctoritie of the eldership." There is little to be said against the Authorized Version, "with laying on of the hands of the presbytery;" for although "presbytery" has some narrowing associations, it admits of the wider meaning, and represents more exactly than "eldership" the collective force of the original word.

It is less clear whether the word "ordained" should be kept in all the places where it occurs, or whether the word "chosen," which represents *χειροτονηθεὶς* in 2 Cor. viii. 19, might be extended to one or two other passages, *e.g.* to Acts xiv. 23. (In 2 Cor. viii. 19, the Genevan Testament of 1557 has "chosen by election," while the Rhemist Testament has "ordained.")

The word "penance" occurs nowhere in our English Bible, and any attempt to introduce it would be as fruitless as the wish expressed in the Communion Service for the restoration of the thing: not because remorse has ceased to drive its fruitful furrows through the heart of man, but because the feeling which made penance so comfortable in former times now finds a more wholesome outgoing and relief in beneficent labour. But it is interesting to remember that a violent controversy once raged about this point, and that the gentle Coverdale (1535) tried to remove some of the odium attaching to Tyndale's translation by sometimes introducing the word in his revision. It is also worth notice that the Genevan divines, and Coverdale in some places,

were not satisfied with "repentance" as an equivalent for *μετάνοια*, but often preferred "amendment of life," "convert," "turn to God," in translating *μετάνοια* and *μετανοεῖν*.

Whether "grace" should be retained in every passage where it has been substituted for the English "favour" is a question worth raising, although there are few theological terms which have acquired a more vernacular sound.

Tyndale deliberately rejected "charity" for "love;" and, as has been already shown, his judgment was followed in every revision until the Bishops' Bible was once more revised in 1602. It is no objection to "charity" that, with many other Latinisms, it has crept into our Bibles probably from a Roman Catholic source. There is something to be said on either side. "Love" is simpler, more direct, more human; but has associations on the human side which tend to confuse the distinction between *ἔρως* and *ἀγάπη*, between the love that is half desire, and that which is all affection and goodwill. "Charity" has been preserved by sacred use from any such taint as this, and from its position in the New Testament, especially in 2 Cor. xiii., has been surrounded with many beautiful images of Christian grace. But, like other abstract words of foreign origin, it is apt to be too negative in common use. "The law of charity" implies prohibition: "the law of love" suggests unlimited command or impulse. To "do so much for charity" is to do that which is least. The bolder policy is often the best in theology. The simpler word, if used continually with a right intention, even if sometimes liable to misconstruction, will have a greater, and, in the long run, a more just effect than one drawn from sources more remote for the sake of procuring accuracy of distinction. Even the most well-meant of ecclesiastical disguises may prove a hindrance to that simple transparent intuition of the early Christian life, which may still be rich in wholesome suggestions to an age that is searching for an ideal. Those who, forsaking the ghost of mediæval sentiment, which they had mistaken for Christianity, have sought their comfort in the gracefulness of a re-animated Paganism—before whom there floats the vision of a manhood of the world, in which human passions shall be refined into a generous enthusiasm—may find in the pages of the New Testament the well-springs of a moral force that is not yet exhausted, an affection at once individual and universal, the recognition of a tie of brotherhood that is not less intense because it is absolutely pure—the *love* spoken of by St. Paul and by St. John.

One more change of this kind will be expedient, which was not made by Tyndale, because the ecclesiastical word in this case had a thoroughly vernacular usage in his day. In any new revision "spirit" should be almost everywhere substituted for "ghost."

And whatever exceptions it may be found necessary to make, the baptismal formula is not one of them.

The mention of the Ecclesiastical Words suggests the consideration of a few places in which the translation seems to have been modified by some bias (whether Catholic or Reformed) respecting Ecclesiastical Order.

Thus the objection to refusing the cup to the laity perhaps led Tyndale to give undue emphasis to Matt. xxvi. 27, "Drink ye of it every one" (altered in Geneva Version to "Drink ye all of it").

The same has often been assigned as a motive for the rendering of "or" by "and" in 1 Cor. xi. 27, which appears first in the Geneva version. The point is not raised in the objections of the Rhemists, while, on the other hand, there is nothing in Beza to have suggested the departure from an exact rendering. In the absence of evidence, the motive of the change must be regarded as uncertain. It would certainly be better to return to the more literal translation here.

The "washing of regeneration," in Titus iii. 5, is hardly to be regarded as an error, unless we would accept Dean Alford's version of Eph. v. 26, "cleansing her by the laver of the water in the word." An emphatic expansion (or gloss), similar to that noticed above, appears also in Tyndale and the Geneva versions, in Acts xiv. 23—"ordained them elders by election."

II. In approaching the consideration of passages which have been associated with doctrine, it is to be remarked that there are two opposite tendencies, against both of which the translator of Scripture should be on his guard—the tendency to find certain doctrines in the Bible, and the tendency to deny all traces of them there. It is not easy to keep the mind free from both. The opinion which makes doctrinal belief to rest on texts of Scripture gives rise to a temptation which it is difficult to resist. Even one whose mind is not immediately affected by it may be affected by the consciousness of the power it exercises on the minds of others. It is natural to desire to have Scripture on our side, or at least to wrest this advantage from our adversaries.

But it is surely possible to conceive that one who takes a rational view of the whole subject, who is aware of the human element in the Bible, who knows the questions which have been raised about the composition and authorship of the different books, and the growth of opinion and controversy within the Apostolic age, may be able to address himself to each difficulty in a purely critical spirit, without having the daylight of interpretation tinged with a nervous anxiety for possible consequences. The question for such a one will be, *not*, Has an interpretation a dogmatic or anti-dogmatic bearing? but, Have doctrinal or anti-doctrinal ten-

dencies led consciously or unconsciously to a misunderstanding of the simple meaning? Even were the conceivable results of interpretation more momentous than they are, the mind possessed with the spirit of true criticism would only feel this to be a reason for greater care in weighing evidence and appreciating inferences. An approximation to the mental attitude that is here indicated has sometimes been made by Roman Catholic interpreters, who were fortified against this anxiety respecting Scripture by the foundation which had been laid for dogma in the authority of the Church.* Petavius, for instance, while maintaining orthodoxy, denied the existence in Scripture, as well as in the Ante-Nicene Fathers, of any formal statement respecting the doctrine of the Trinity.† He was answered by the Anglican bishop Bull,‡ who received the thanks of the Sorbonne for defending a position which the Roman Catholic doctor had abandoned. And in our own time a theologian like Dr. Döllinger is free from many prejudices by which Protestants are still hindered in interpreting Scripture.

The chief passages in which the text or the translation of the New Testament has been affected by doctrinal tendencies may be viewed in the order in which the power of these influences has been most strongly felt, viz.: (1) Nicene or Athanasian conceptions; (2) Evangelical and Lutheran opinions; (3) Calvinism; (4) Rationalistic notions, though subsequent to the Authorized Version, deserve to be considered in connection with the subject of revision.

1. The first of these causes, having been in operation more than a thousand years before the invention of printing, has left its impress chiefly on the text. And for this reason, in the advance of sacred criticism, the facts respecting some of the passages in question are coming to be accepted as they are. The public are compelled to admit, at the dictates of the scholar, what they would never have admitted if they had known from the first the consequences of the admission. There has been a growth of criticism of the Greek which has necessitated a corresponding growth in popular interpretation. But although some of the facts which are now to be stated are fast becoming the common property of all, there remains the interest of observing the arguments with which the mistaken readings have been defended, and the results which flow from the denial of them. The texts whose

* "The Papists deny that the doctrine of the Trinity is to be found in Scripture. See this plainly taught and urged by Card. Hosius, *de Auth. S. Script.* l. iii. p. 53; Gordonius Hunlaeus, *Cont. Tom. Comb. de Verbo Dei*, c. 19; Gretserus and Zanerus, in *Colloquio Rattisbon.*; Vega, Possevin, Wickins . . . These learned men, especially Bellarmine, and Wickins after him, have urged all the Scriptures they could, with the utmost industry, find out in this cause, and yet, after all, they acknowledge their insufficiency."—*Locke's Commonplace Book. King's Life of Locke*, vol. ii.

† *Pet. de Trin.* i. 5. 7; 8. 2.

‡ *Bull, Def. F.*

authority is thus weakened represent the most direct Scriptural testimony, and perhaps three-fourths of the Scriptural testimony, to the Divinity of Christ and to the Athanasian doctrine of the Trinity. Nor does the withdrawal of them leave the remaining passages in the same position as formerly. For if there are such important interpolations, of which we can trace the origin and growth, can we be certain that there are not other interpolations made in the time before the history of the text becomes known to us?

a. The words in 1 John v. 7, 8, from "in heaven" to "in earth" inclusive, are not found in any Greek MS. that is earlier than the invention of printing,* nor in the early copies of the Latin of Jerome, nor in the earliest text of any version other than the Latin, nor in the Greek Fathers, who quote repeatedly the words before and after; nor are they quoted by any Latin Father before the middle of the fifth century (although the Latin Fathers also quote the contiguous words) unless they can be shown to be quoted by Cyprian. They are found in three Greek MSS. of about the sixteenth century (*i.e.*, about contemporary with the Complutensian edition), but with important variations, one having and two omitting the articles before the proper names. (This might easily happen in a translation from the Latin.) The two that omit the article also omit the words in verse 8, "and these three agree in one," but read these words in verse 7 in the place of "and these three are one." They are found also in copies of the Vulgate, with the exception of more than fifty, these fifty including the two earliest. But here again there are variations; some copies giving the words as we have them, some omitting the words in verse 8, "and these three agree in one," some inverting the order of the sentences, and putting the earthly witnesses before the heavenly. And of those which so invert the order, some connect the clauses not with "and" but "as:" "As there are three that bear record in heaven—" This, as Porson suggested, may perhaps be the original form of the marginal illustration which has erroneously been allowed to creep into the text.—They are quoted by the Latin Fathers from towards the end of the fifth century.

It has been supposed, and is still supposed by some, that the words are alluded to by Cyprian, who is earlier by two centuries than any other testimony to their existence even in the Latin version. He says (*de Eccles. Unit. vi.*), "It is written of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, 'And these three are one.'" But Facundus expressly says that Cyprian here understands the spirit and the

* The "seven MSS. of R. Stephens," which are supposed to have contained the verse, are sufficiently shown by Porson and Sir Isaac Newton to have grown out of the misprinting of a garbled text. Note also that when Beza speaks of "our MSS.," he is merely following what he believes to be the meaning of Stephens.

water and the blood to signify the Father, Son, and Spirit. Whence it is evident that Facundus knew nothing of verse 7; and his view of Cyprian's meaning is confirmed by a passage of Augustine, which not only gives evidence against the genuineness of the words, but throws light on the cause of the interpolation (*adv. Maximin.* 22):—

“Should we wish to inquire what these signify [viz., the spirit and the water and the blood], we shall not unreasonably think of the Holy Trinity itself, which is one God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; of whom it could be said most truly, that they three are witnesses, and that the three are one; understanding it so, that the Father is meant by the spirit, the Son by the blood, and the Holy Spirit by the water.”

If Augustine had ever seen verse 7, he would not thus have interpreted verse 8. But his interpretation, or one like it, may very possibly have given rise to the reading. And similar interpretations are actually found in Greek marginal notes to verse 8; such as “*I.e.* the Holy Spirit and the Father, and He Himself” (witnessing) “to Himself.” “He says ‘three’ in the masculine because these are symbols of the Trinity.” After this it need scarcely be observed that when Tertullian (*adv. Praxeas* 25) says, as if alluding to Scripture, “which three are one thing, not one person,” he has verse 8, and not verse 7, in his mind. It is clear that the whole matter has grown out of the coincidence of the simple words, “These three agree in one” (*οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἓν εἰσι*), with the Trinitarian theology. The first appearance of the words in a Greek dress is in the Greek translation of the Latin decrees of the Lateran Council in 1215. They are repeated in the same language by two Byzantine monks in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries (the later of these quotations appears in a possibly spurious writing). Then came the Spanish (Complutensian) edition of the New Testament, in 1514, which contained the verse, with the words “and these three agree in one” taking the place of the corresponding words in verse 7, and omitted in verse 8.

Erasmus did not insert the words in his first edition, and still omitted them, notwithstanding adverse criticisms, in 1518. But before his third edition in 1522 he had seen or heard of a Greek MS. (of about the sixteenth century!*) since known as Codex Dublinensis, which contained the words; and he inserted them, as he characteristically says in his “Apology to Stunica” (the Complutensian editor), “lest there should be an occasion of slander against him, although he suspected that even this MS. had been made conformable to the Latin version.”

The words were omitted in the version of Luther, although in the Swiss variety of that version in 1529 they appeared in small

* As if some vaunted MS. nowadays were shown to be of the nineteenth century.

print. Tyndale translated them (probably following Erasmus' text of 1522), but in his later editions he put them in italics and within brackets, and here he was followed in the Great Bible. They have become established in almost all modern versions (as in the English from the Geneva version downwards), but have been again omitted in the Dutch version published with the authority of the National Synod in 1868.

All the learning of Porson, the reasonings of Locke and Newton, and the adverse judgments of such theological critics as Bishop Marsh,* have not succeeded in dislodging the interpolation from English editions of the Greek New Testament. Might not the case have been different, if in 1522 Erasmus had acted according to his convictions?

Or if (following a suggestion of Porson's) we suppose for a moment that the Complutensian editors had embodied in their text the gloss of Cassiodorus on 1 John ii. 13, 14, by reading *Γράφω ὑμῖν, παιδία, ὅτι ἐγνώκατε θεὸν τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα*, "I write unto you, little children, because ye have known God, the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost," what a world of confusion and controversy might have been occasioned!

b. Hardly second in controversial importance to the "three witnesses," and hardly less questionable on the ground of evidence, are the familiar words, 1 Tim. iii. 16, *θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί*, "God was manifested in the flesh." Both texts are discussed by Sir Isaac Newton, in his "Letter to a friend on the History of two texts of Scripture," published by Bishop Horsley in his edition of Newton's Works (vol. v. pp. 495—550).

But the testimony of the early Greek MSS., which all admit to be of prime importance, has been much more fully examined since his time. And this additional testimony only confirms the opinion, which he and many others had expressed, that *θεὸς* had no place in this passage before the sixth century. Of the four great MSS. which contain the text (the Vatican is defective here), the Sinaitic, Alexandrian (?), and Codex Ephraemi had originally *ὅς*, "who;" the Codex Bezae D had *ὃ*, "which," (as in the Latin versions). In all of them this original reading has been changed by a much later hand to *ὁ* = *θεὸς*, God.

There has been much discussion about the original reading of the Alexandrian MS. All are agreed that the lines by which *ὅς* is visibly changed to *θεὸς* are by a much later hand. The most that has been asserted in favour of *θεὸς* as the original reading by any recent witness is that one of these lines may possibly cover one in the old ink which has been thus rendered invisible, and that "one singularly bright hour, Feb. 7th, 1861," Mr. Scrivener saw (apparently only

* Also see the question reviewed in a paper by Crito Cantabrigiensis, who is believed to have been the late Bishop Turton of Ely.

or a moment) "the slight shadow of the real ancient diameter, only just above the recent one." That the Alexandrian, like the Sinaitic, Codex Ephraemi, and D, has been "emended," is a patent fact, although in the face of this evidence, to which should be added the earlier statement of Mill, it cannot be regarded as equally *certain* that the coarse recent hand ("to make assurance doubly sure") has not merely retouched what was there written from the first. But the silence of the early Fathers is very strong evidence on the other side. For if *θεός* had been written in A, the world would have heard of this reading in some early controversy. On the other hand, if *θεός* is the real reading of A, this is the only trace of such a reading that has come down from the first five centuries. And in the silence of the Vatican, the testimony of the Sinaitic MS. is of the greater importance.

The tendency to insert the name of God or Christ, apart from any motive of doctrine, appears in other places: *e.g.* in Gal. i. 15, the authorities are divided between "God, who separated me," and "he who separated me," with a preponderance in favour of the latter. In Jude 4—*τὸν μόνον δεσπότην [θεόν]—θεόν* was added without any theological motive. In Gal. iii. 17, the words *εἰς Χριστὸν*, "in" (or unto) "Christ," are omitted in the best authorities. In James i. 12, "which [the Lord] hath promised," "the Lord" is omitted in the Sinaitic, Vatican, and Alexandrian MSS., and several of the early versions have "God" instead. In Mark xiv. 61, the Alexandrian has "the Son of the blessed God," for "the Son of the Blessed." And the same tendency reappears in the English version, as in 1 John iii. 16, "Hereby perceive we the love of *God*" ("Hereby perceive we love," Tyndale; "Hereby have we perceived love," Geneva version); Acts vii. 59, (the subject of a notable conjecture of Bentley's), "Calling upon *God* and saying" ("Calling on and saying," Tyndale). And we may notice in passing, that the italics in these passages do not prevent unlettered persons from receiving an impression respecting the testimony of Scripture to the Divinity of Christ that is destined to be removed by investigation.

The relative "who" or "which," appearing to identify "the mystery" with Christ, may be illustrated from Col. i. 27: "To whom God would make known what is the riches of the glory this mystery among the Gentiles; which is Christ in you, the hope of glory." And a similar doubt between the masculine and neuter relative occurs at verse 24 of the same chapter, where several MSS. read "who is the church." Cp. also Acts xvii. 23.* A *g* also bearing on this point occurs in Col. ii. 2, 3, "to the acknowledgment of the mystery of Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge."

* The place is still not free from difficulty, and it is just possible that *θεός, ὅς* have all grown out of a dittographia or double writing of the *ε* of *ἐφανερώθη*. F is more conjecture.

ledgment of the mystery of God [and of the Father, and of Christ]; in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge:" where the words here placed in brackets are of very slight authority, and the relative pronoun in verse 3 is very possibly neuter, referring to "the mystery."

c. The interpolation in each of the two preceding instances was in so far skilfully made, that, except from the analogy of Scripture, it would have been difficult to reject them on the ground of internal evidence alone. The argument from analogy against the remaining passages in which Christ is *unequivocally* and *absolutely* spoken of as God is greatly strengthened when 1 Tim. iii. 16 is withdrawn. For there are only two of them. And it so happens, that while the external testimony in their favour is considerable, they bear the marks of spuriousness on their face.

One of these two is a reading which has not yet had a place in our English version, but has lately been brought into prominence through being found in the Sinaitic as well as in the Vatican MS.

In John i. 18 these both read "only-begotten God," *μονογενὴς θεός*. It is clear, therefore, that this reading had a wide currency in the fourth century, and we may expect it to be largely quoted by the Christian Fathers of that and of the subsequent centuries. But it is also found in the Latin translation of Irenæus, in the Coptic, and one recension of the Æthiopic, and on the margin of the Peshito variety of the Syriac version. But the other reading, "the only-begotten Son," *ὁ μονογενὴς υἱός*, appears in another passage of the translation of Irenæus, in the text of the Peshito Syriac, and in the Syriac of Cureton, which is supposed by many to be earlier than the Peshito. Hence in regard to what precedes the fourth century, the evidence is divided, and there is good reason for supposing that the reading "Son" existed, even if the reading "God" existed beside it in other copies. The evidence of the Alexandrian MS. in this case is unequivocal in favour of "Son." The text of Origen varies like that of Irenæus.

It may be allowed that when due weight is given to the authority of the Sinaitic and Vatican MSS., the external evidence preponderates in favour of *θεός*, "God." But this is already somewhat weakened by the tendency which has been observed in MSS. to interpolate this sacred name, especially if it could be shown that in 1 Tim. iii. 16 *θεός* was the original reading of so early a MS. as the Alexandrian.* It is more likely, as Tischendorf says, that "Son" was changed to "God," than *vice versâ*. Under these circumstances strong arguments from internal evidence may be allowed to have full weight. And on comparing the two

* Note that *θεοῦ* is read for *κυρίου* in the Alexandrian MS. in Eph. v. 17.

readings it can hardly be doubted for a moment which harmonizes best with the context. The expression "only-begotten God" would be of itself unique in Scripture, and requires even for its interpretation a kind of theological inference from verses 1—4 which implies a crude and questionable development of doctrine. For it is not merely the Word that is here in question, but the "Word made flesh" (verse 14). And where in this case would be the antithesis, which is obviously intended by the writer? Surely Tischendorf is justified in saying, "*θεὸς* si reposueris, totius loci sententia parum concinnè scripta est"—"If you substitute *θεὸς*, the connection of the whole passage is confused." The interests of orthodoxy can hardly require the change, which could not well have been made after theological questions had been thought out with any clearness, and betrays rather the rude and simple reverence of an ante-theological age, in which Christian converts had not yet shaken off the associations of polytheism. For is there not a "division of the substance" when the "only-begotten God" is set over against "God" in this way?

d. In the other of the two passages (Acts xx. 28)—which stands thus in the Authorized Version: "to feed the church of God, which he hath purchased with his own blood"—there are two places in which the readings vary. Instead of "God," many authorities give "the Lord," and several "the Lord and God." And the words signifying "his own blood" are differently arranged in different copies, some reading *τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος* and some *τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ ἰδίου*. Now, it is precisely on the collocation of these two phrases that the peculiarity of the passage rests.

The two earliest MSS. are again in favour of *θεοῦ*; but it appears from the versions and quotations of the Fathers that both readings (*θεοῦ* and *κυρίου*) existed in the earliest time. Supposing *θεοῦ* to be an interpolation, it is manifestly one of the same kind as that in John i. 18; and we should therefore be the less surprised to find it in the Sinaitic and Vatican MSS. Tischendorf argues that, as "the church of God" is the almost constant expression of St. Paul, it was the less likely to have been changed into *ἐ. τοῦ κυρίου*, "church of the Lord," and that the tendency to insert the name of God which (as we have seen above) appears elsewhere may be traced in the third reading *τοῦ κυρίου καὶ θεοῦ*, "of the Lord and God."* And it may be urged in confirmation of this that the only two passages in St. Paul's writings in which the form "church of Christ" occurs (Rom. xvi. 16, 1 Cor. xi. 16. "the churches of Christ") are in places where, as here, he is expressing his affectionate solicitude respecting a particular church. The exceptional mode of expression in each case has a pathetic force.

* This may probably be due to a marginal reading, viz., *καὶ θεοῦ*, having found its way into the text.

But if θεοῦ were regarded as established, the wavering of the evidence in the other part of the verse between τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος and τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ ἰδίου would still leave room for suspicion. Some might conjecture that τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ, "the blood of His own Son," was the original reading. For if one of the contiguous υ's were dropped in copying, the repetition ιουιου would seem unintelligible, and be attributed to *dittographia*. Thus υἱοῦ would disappear. (For the expression, cp. Rom. viii. 32—ὅς τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ οὐκ ἐφείσατο.) Others may suppose that the whole clause, ἣν περιποιήσατο διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ ἰδίου, is a later addition. But one supposition does not seem to be admissible—viz., that the text of the Sinaitic and Vatican MSS. is in this case the original Scripture. For "the blood of God" is an expression so unique, and to the religious mind of that age would have conveyed a meaning so portentous, that even the unanimity of the early testimonies, which is not present here, could hardly convince us of its genuineness. Besides, the God who is thus asserted to have shed His blood for the Church is not "God" in any secondary or modified sense; for the word is used with the same absoluteness as in the phrase, "No man hath seen God at any time." It is not "the Church of our God and Saviour," but "the Church of God." Compare the two expressions, "No man hath seen God," and "God hath purchased the Church with His own blood."

Such a momentous doctrine as is here implied, if held by the Apostles at all, would have been stated somewhere, and not dropped carelessly by the way in a relative clause.

On the whole, it seems probable that κυρίου is the right reading here. (1.) It does not violate the analogy of Scripture. (2.) θεοῦ is the more likely to have been invented than κυρίου. (3.) κυρίου (as well as θεοῦ) existed as a reading in the earliest time of which we have any trace. (4.) This reading is most in harmony with the connection. The personal appeal to Christ is in keeping with the affectionate tenor of the whole speech (cp. Rom. xvi. 16), and with the character of St. Paul, as this appears in his own Epistles and in the Acts.*

The inference from the evidence respecting these two passages is the same which may be gathered from the pseudo-Ignatius, and from other sources; viz., that in very early Christian times, but hardly in the earliest, the word θεός was used with less strictness of definition than before or afterwards, partly from the

* It is no objection to the above reasoning that the word περιποιήσάμην, in the LXX. version of Isaiah xliii. 21, is used in this sense in the person of Jehovah. St. Paul does sometimes attribute actions to Christ which are elsewhere attributed to God. What we do not find in his undoubted writings, or in any expression genuinely attributed to him, is the interchange of Χριστός, or κύριος as applied to Christ, with θεός, as synonymous terms.

remnants of polytheism, which still clung to the minds of the new converts. Hence, if in some of the latest books of the New Testament it should be found that *θεός* was indisputably applied to Christ, it would still remain to be determined whether the word was used in the strictest sense, or in some such manner as that alluded to by Christ himself when He said, "If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came, and the Scripture cannot be broken."*

e. Romans ix. 5. This verse is, according to the common reading, the only one in the undoubted Epistles of St. Paul (for the Pastoral Epistles are the most questionable) in which the Divine Name is directly applied to Christ. This fact is enough to awaken doubt, which is strengthened by observing that the word *εὐλογητός* is elsewhere in the New Testament referred exclusively to God the Father, and not to Christ; and it has been proposed, by a simple change of punctuation, to turn the words which in our version are referred to Christ into a doxology to God the Father. "Of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came. God, who is over all, is blessed for ever. Amen." (Cp. 2 Cor. xi. 31; Rom. i. 25.)

Against this it is urged (1) that the words "according to the flesh" need some corresponding clause expressive of the exaltation of Christ. But this is set aside by comparing other passages, in which the same phrase occurs without any contrast, and also by the frequency of implied antitheses and qualifying clauses in the writings of St. Paul.

(2.) Another objection is that in similar expressions elsewhere the word for "blessed" occupies the first place. But in those passages (2 Cor. i. 3, Eph. i. 3, 1 Pet. i. 3) the doxology is introductory to other matter, and comes at the beginning of a paragraph, where the first place is naturally the most emphatic. In the passage before us the doxology, if it be such, is appended at the conclusion of a sentence, and the words *εὐλογητός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας* may be expected again to occupy the most emphatic place, which is the last.

As a general observation, it must be allowed that "had St. Paul ever spoken of Christ as God, he would many times have spoken of him as such, not only once, and that by accident."

On the whole, then, we must regard the punctuation of these words by Lachmann as probably established.

In the passages which remain to be considered under the

* There is not room to notice fully the interpolations in Luke ii. 33, 43, where for "Joseph and his mother" of the Alexandrian and most later MSS., the oldest authorities give in the former verse "his father and mother," and in the latter "his parents." Jerome has "Joseph et Maria" also in verse 41. Tyndale has "his father and mother" in all three places. Another interpolation which has an indirect bearing on the Nicene theology is that in Eph. iii. 9, "God, who created all things [by Jesus Christ]," where the words "by Jesus Christ" are absent from the Sinaitic, Vatican, and Alexandrian MSS.

present heading, the question does not affect the text, but is merely one of interpretation.

f. In Tit. ii. 13, it has been thought important by some revisionists to alter the Authorized Version in conformity with "Granville Sharp's rule," by reading "of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ" for "of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ." King James's translators have perhaps purposely left a passage ambiguous, respecting which there was a difference of opinion between Beza and Erasmus. Tyndale, following Erasmus, rendered "of the mighty God and of our Saviour Jesus Christ;" and it is an indication of the haste with which their work was done that the Genevan translators, while following Beza's version, "*magni illius Dei ac Servatoris nostri, nempe Jesu Christi*," so far as to change "the" to "that," did not follow his interpretation by cancelling the second "of."* Dean Alford has again returned to the interpretation of Erasmus, rendering "of the great God and of our Saviour Jesus Christ."

The chief question is whether the absence of the article before "Saviour" necessarily implies that the words "God" and "Saviour" both refer to one and the same subject, viz., Jesus Christ.

An exactly similar doubt is raised about another passage, viz., 2 Pet. i. 1, which in Tyndale (1525) runs thus "the righteousness that cometh of our God, and of the Saviour Jesus Christ;" in the Genevan (1595, Tomson), following Beza, "the righteousness of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ;" and in the Authorized Version, "the righteousness of God and our Saviour Jesus Christ." Beza is clearly right in asserting that the interpretation of these two passages (perhaps we should add that of Jude 4) must stand or fall together.† But in the second verse of this chapter, which,

* Beza's note is curious:—"Nobis quidem non desunt plurima apertissimaque deitatis Christi testimonia, qui nisi verus esset Deus, certè nobis adorandus non esset. Cur igitur quæcunque se nobis offerunt ejusmodi ut sine manifestâ calumniâ non possint aliò torqueri, cur non utrisque manibus, imò manibus ac pedibus, imò vivi ac mortui totis viribus non potius retineamus quàm vel tantillum hæreticis concedamus? Itaque Erasmus sanè nolum in eo imitari quòd nobilissimos quosque locos ad eam rem pertinentes, non modo nobis sciens ac prudens sinat e manibus elabi, sed etiam totis viribus extorquere conetur." He then adds two reasons which must be allowed to have considerable force. 1. That *ἐπιφάνεια* is nowhere used of the Father. 2. The use of the article—"Quum scriptum sit *ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν* I. X., non autem *τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος*, dico non magis probabilius ista posse ad duas distinctas personas referri quam illam loquutionem *ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*." The force of this had been already admitted by Erasmus, who says (Comment. in I.). "Omissus articulus in libris Græcis facit nonnihil pro diversâ sententiâ. Evidentius distinxisset personas si dixisset *καὶ τοῦ σωτῆρος*." Will it be said after this that the scholars of the sixteenth century were ignorant of the refinements of Greek grammar?

† Mr. Granville Sharp further applies his rule to 2 Thess. i. 12; 1 Tim. v. 21; 2 Tim. iv. 1, in all of which the phrase "of God and the [or, our] Lord Jesus Christ" occurs, the word for "God" having, and that for "Lord" not having, the article. In this he has not been much followed, partly because his notion is not supported by the Greek Fathers (notwithstanding which Mr. Wordsworth says: "The matter is not immediately to be given up in despair."—*Letters*, p. 48). But it is hardly admissible to apply one rule of interpretation to these passages, and a different rule to another passage, in which the title "Saviour" is substituted for the title "Lord."

as in some of St. Paul's Epistles (Gal. i., 1 Cor. i.), is an echo of the first, the words translated "the knowledge of God and of Jesus our Lord" are so arranged that the words for "God" and "Lord" cannot both be referred to the same subject Jesus. This fact, together with the rarity of the application of *θεός* to Christ, raises the presumption that in the first verse also (and therefore in Tit. ii. 13) there are two separate subjects, and we are led to believe that "Saviour," like "Lord" or "Father" (James i. 27), as a constant attribute of Christ, is one of those words which in Scripture approach the condition of a proper name, and tend to be exempted from Granville Sharp's (or shall we say Beza's?) rule.* On the other hand, it must be admitted that in the analogous expression "our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ," which occurs in three other passages of 2 Pet. (i. 11; ii. 20; iii. 18), the two nouns are proved to belong to the same subject by the comparison of a fourth passage of the same Epistle (iii. 2), "the Apostles of the Lord and Saviour." But the impression produced by this analogy is again removed by the comparison of the following passages of St. Paul's Epistles, in which it is pretty clear that there are two subjects, and that the rule in question is brought under the limitation above specified: Eph. v. 5, "in the kingdom of Christ and of God." (*τοῦ Χ. κ. θ.* Beza, however, as well as Chrysostom and others of the Fathers, claims this also as a text confuting the Arians.)† 2 Thess. i. 12, "the grace of our God and the Lord Jesus Christ." (*τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.* This is not claimed by Beza.) 2 Tim. iv. 1, "I charge thee therefore before God, and the Lord Jesus Christ." (*τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ,* according to the best text.) 1 Tim. v. 21, "I charge thee before God and the Lord Jesus Christ" (*τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ,* or, *καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*). We infer from these passages that a title such as "Christ" or "Lord" (and why not "Saviour"?), may dispense with the article, though applied to a different subject from that which has been previously mentioned with the article.‡ And this is confirmed by our observing a slightly different class of exceptions to the rule, in which, while the two nouns refer to one subject only, a genitive is attached to the second of the two; whereas according to the rule, it should have been bound to both

* Ἡρακλειτείων, ἢ ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις Ὀμηρείων, καὶ ἔτι παλαιότερων. Plat. Theæt. 179 c.

† Beza does this again on the ground of the article. His note is "Notandum est non scribi καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ, sed unico articulo τοῦ subiici nomina Χριστοῦ et θεοῦ, qui locus manifestè convincit Arianos."

See also Wordsworth's Six Letters to Granville Sharp.

‡ The article is also sometimes added exceptionally, e.g., 1 Pet. iv. 14, τὸ τῆς δόξης καὶ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πνεῦμα. No theological inference has been made from this. John xx. 28 ὁ Κύριος μου καὶ ὁ θεός μου. Are there two subjects here?

See also Phil. i. 19 (διὰ τῆς ὑμῶν δεήσεως καὶ ἐπιχορηγίας τοῦ πνεύματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ) for another violation of the famous rule.

of them by the "vinculum" of the article placed before the first. In Rom. xv. 6, the Authorized Version, "God, even the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," is clearly right, and that of the similar expression in Col. i. 3; 1 Pet. i. 3, "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," is clearly wrong. (Tyndale and the Genevan version are right in all three places.) In these two cases the word "Father" in this connection belongs to the same class of constant attributes with "Saviour," "Lord," and "Christ."* (Also 2 Cor. xi. 31, ὁ θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ.)

g. John i. 1, θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. Tyndale (1525) and Cranmer followed the "unorthodox" interpretation, "God was that Word." The Genevan version, probably guided by Beza, has "that Word was God." The comparison of John iv. 24, "God is a spirit;"† Heb. xi. 10,‡ "whose builder and maker is God," as well as the immediate context, in which there is a natural climax or progress of thought, confirms the view which is at present undisputed that the regular use of the article is followed here, "the Word" being the subject, and "God" the predicate; and that the rendering of the Authorized Version, "the Word was God," is clearly right. The true Divine nature is predicated of the eternal Word, not "in a lower sense," as by Philo, nor with any conscious distinction between "the Divine Nature" and the "Divine Being," but in the simplest intention of the words.

The same rule should, however, have been applied to another passage, Matt. i. 23, where θεὸς having the article is the subject of a sentence, which should therefore be rendered, as in the version of Dean Alford, "God is with us."

h. Heb. i. 8. This passage is one of extraordinary elevation, in which, as in John i., Rev. i., there is a mystical exaltation of the person of Christ, unlike anything in the Epistles of St. Paul. Compare also vii. 28. It is also to be observed that here, as elsewhere in this Epistle, there is less of necessary connection between the original meaning of the passages quoted from the Old Testament and their application by the writer, even than there is in other books of the New Testament.

The words in Ps. xlv. 6, 7, mean in the Hebrew either "Thy throne is divinely established for ever and ever," or "Thy throne, which is divinely established, is for ever and ever." The LXX, misunderstanding the Hebrew, have rendered, "God is eternally thy throne." But "God," which is the subject in the version of the LXX, appears to be understood, or at least quoted, by the

* Winer says on Tit. ii. 13:—"The article is omitted before σωτήρος, because this word is defined by the genitive ἡμῶν, and because the apposition precedes the proper name." He adds, that in 2 Thess. i. 12, we have simply an instance of κύριος for ὁ κύριος.

† πνεῦμα ὁ θεός. Cp. 1 John iv. 8. ὁ-ι ὁ θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν.

‡ ἡς τεχνίτης καὶ δημιουργὸς ὁ θεός.

writer of this Epistle, as if it were the vocative. (Cp. x. 7, *alib.*) This is not grammatically necessary, but appears probable from the following considerations:—

(1.) The rhetorical argument, or rather the rhetorical contrast, is more perfect if *ὁ θεός* is taken as vocative.

(2.) The words in the Septuagint are so harsh, that it is natural they should be modified in being applied.

(3.) The quotation in verse 7 involves an equal departure from the Hebrew original.

(4.) The words in verse 10, “Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundations of the earth,” are so obviously applicable in their first intention to Jehovah, that it is the less surprising to find the Divine Name here given to the Son.

(5.) There is also to be taken into the account the tendency already noticed in this Epistle towards the exaltation of the Person of Christ, and that by means of mystical interpretations of the Old Testament Scriptures.

(6.) Although the cases in which *θεός* is applied to Christ in the New Testament have been shown to be extremely few, the parallel of John xx. 28, “And Thomas said unto Him, My Lord and my God” (where there is no reasonable doubt as to the meaning), is sufficiently close to support the interpretation here.*

These arguments do not, however, apply to verse 9, in which there is no sufficient reason for supposing a departure from the original meaning, “God, even Thy God, hath anointed Thee.”

So much for the grammatical interpretation of the words *ὁ θρόνος σου ὁ θεός*. But in making theological use of this text, or of John xx. 28, it should be borne in mind—(1), that it is the language of feeling; (2), that in the present case the feeling is clothed in rhetoric, and associated with a mystical method of interpretation belonging to the time; (3), it requires to be determined whether the word *θεός* is used everywhere in the New Testament in the strictest sense, and, in particular, whether it is always so used in quotations from the Old Testament; and a peculiar light is thrown upon this question by the words attributed to Christ himself, John x. 35, 36, “If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came, and the Scripture cannot be broken, say ye of him, whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of God?”

2. *Evangelical*, and 3. *Calvinistic Influences*.—The version of Tyndale was a part of the earlier Reformation movement which sought to base human life on Scripture, interpreted in the

* Tyndale gave first “God thy seate is for ever,” and afterwards “God, thy seate is for ever.”

light of the new doctrine of the freeness of the Gospel, which had been developed through the revived study of the Epistles of St. Paul. There are very few places, however, in which the limitation which is here implied, and which was inseparable from the age, can be said to have interfered with the exact rendering of the original meaning. The critical acumen of Erasmus, and the simplicity and integrity of Tyndale, have prevented this. The Genevan revisers, on the other hand, cannot wholly be exonerated from the charge of theological bias. This is, of course, chiefly observable in the notes, but, in a few instances, has crept into the translation, where it may generally be traced to the authority of Beza. No one can read his Latin notes to the New Testament without perceiving that theological system was again asserting an injurious prevalence over the interpretation of Scripture.

In adducing a few examples of these influences, I will put those first in which the questionable rendering or reading originates with Tyndale, and afterwards mention some of those passages in which his version has been altered for the worse by the doctors of Geneva.

(1.) Romans iii. 25. "Thorow faith in his bloud."—Tynd.

Tyndale has here departed from the paraphrase of Erasmus, who renders *ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ*, "interveniente sanguine ipsius;" and the Geneva version, in following Tyndale, neglects the punctuation of Beza.* It is now generally admitted that the two phrases, (a) "through faith," (b) "in" (or "by") "his blood," are co-ordinate, and to be connected separately with the preceding words.

(2.) Acts vi. 8. "And Stephen, full of faith and power"—T., G., A. V.: "full of grace and power"—MS. reading.

"Faith" seems to be an ancient reading, though it has little MS. authority, being found in the Peshito Syriac. Both readings were known in the sixteenth century, and it seems probable that "faith" was preferred from a theological motive.

(3.) Eph. iii. 12. T., "which we have by faith on him." G., "by faith in him." A.V., "by the faith of him." Rom. iii. 22, "by the faith of Jesus Christ." T., G., A. V. *Ibid.* verse 26. T., "which believeth on Jesus." G., "which is of the faith of Jesus." A.V., "which believeth in Jesus."

The different translators have here been divided between theological and grammatical accuracy. In each case the genitive is probably objective, so that the more definite rendering (though it may have been prompted, in the first instance, by theological preconception) is, in this instance, nearer to the truth, and it

* At least, if this is followed in the third edition of Beza's New Testament, dated 1582.

would be well, for the sake of greater clearness, if the preposition "in" were used throughout.

- (4.) Rom. iii. 25. T., "in that he forgeveth the sins that are passed." G., "by the forgiveness of the sins that are passed." A.V., "for the remission of sins that are past."

Explained thus by Beza: "Considerat Paulus omnes in genere homines, quorum dicit misertum esse Dominum quo tempore essent ipsius inimici, peccatis videlicet ac densissimis tenebris sepulti."

It is now admitted that the passage should have been rendered "because of the letting-go" (or "passing over") "of the sins that are past." Cp. Acts xvii. 30: "The times of this ignorance God winked at, but now commandeth all men everywhere to repent." The formal notion of "the scheme of salvation" has overlaid a characteristic thought of the Apostle. The mistranslation of these words has led to misconception respecting the true connection of the passage, as if the words that follow were a mere resumption. "To declare, *I say*, at this time his righteousness," and not connected with those immediately preceding, "because of the letting go of sins that are past through the forbearance of God, for the declaration of his righteousness at this time."

- (5.) Rom. v. 11. "By whom we have now received this atonement"—T. ("the atonement"—A. V.)

The question as to the original meaning of the word "atonement" may be left out here. As the passage is one affecting doctrine, it will be well to substitute "reconciliation" here, for three good reasons:—1. Because the corresponding participle has been twice translated "reconciled" in the preceding verses. 2. Because the noun, which is one approaching to a technical meaning, is so translated in the three other places in which it occurs (Rom. xi. 15, 2 Cor. v. 18, 19). 3. "Reconciliation" conveys more simply and directly than "atonement" the notion of *καταλλαγή* to the modern reader.*

(6.) Amongst passages altered from Tyndale by the Genevan translators, Rom. iii. 25, in which "seat of mercy" was changed by them to "propitiation," should probably be counted in their favour; but the following may be adduced as alterations for the worse:—

- Heb. x. 38. T. "But the just shall live by faith. And if he withdraw himself, my soul shall have no pleasure in him." G. "Now the just shall live by faith: but if *any* withdraw himself, my soul shall have no pleasure in him." A. V. "Now the just shall live by faith: but if *any man* draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him."

* It may be noticed in passing, that in several passages where the original has ἀπειθεῖα (Eph. ii. 2; v. 6; Col. iii. 6; Heb. iv. 11), the Geneva version has substituted "disobedience" for "unbelief" of Tyndale; and this correction has been followed (except in Heb. iv. 11) in the A. V.

The change was introduced in the Latin version of Beza. The obvious meaning of the words appeared (1) logically inconsistent (for he who draws back is not just); (2) discordant with the doctrine of final perseverance.

- (7.) Col. ii. 15. T. "And hath spoiled rule and power, and hath made a shew of them openly, and hath triumphed over them in his own person." G. "And hath spoiled the principalities and powers, and hath made a shew of them openly, and hath triumphed over them in the same *cross*." A. V. "And having spoiled principalities and powers, he made a shew of them openly, triumphing over them in it"* (mg. "Or, in himself").

Here the Genevan version returns to an old Patristic fancy, which suits the reformed doctrine. The A. V. probably intended the same thing, but, as elsewhere, retains something of the vagueness of the original, "it" referring either to the cross, or to the "hand-writing." The true interpretation of this difficult place is probably different from all three.

- (8.) 2 Cor. v. 14. Tyndale rightly translated this: "Because we thus judge, if one be dead for all, that then are all dead."†

This the Geneva altered to: "Because we thus judge, that if one be dead for all, then were all dead," which is substantially the same rendering with the A. V. The motive for the change is probably indicated in Beza's note:—

"*Fuisse mortuos, ἀπέθανον.* Mortuis opponuntur οἱ ζῶντες proximo versiculo. Itaque quamvis mortificatio veteris hominis sit prima nostræ sanctificationis pars, malo tamen hoc referre ad eam conditionem in quâ versatur quisquis non est regeneratus, ut scribitur Eph. ii. 1. Nam etiam hoc maximè pertinet ad scopum Apostoli, habentis illos pro mortuis qui affectibus ambitionis aut gloriæ ducuntur. Vulg. *Mortui sunt*, quod mihi non placet. Neque enim amplius est mortuus, qui est in Christo vivificatus."

The error arose less from ignorance of grammar (of which Beza can hardly be accused) than from a sort of illogical logic prevailing over an obvious grammatical rule.

- (9.) We may conclude this subject by quoting one or two of the marginal notes of the Genevan version.

Rom. x. 17, "Word of God:" "That is, by God's commandment, of whom they are sent that preach the Gospel. It may also be taken for the very preaching itself."

Rom. xi. 2, "he knew before:" "And elected before all beginning."

Ibid. verse 29. "To whom God giveth His spirit of adoption, and

* In him, i.e., in Christ, God being the subject, verse 12.

† The Dutch translation of 1868 is—"Indien één voor allen gestorven is, zij dan allen gestorven zijn."

whom He calleth effectually, he cannot perish: for God's eternal counsel never changeth."

Acts xiv. 23, "ordained them elders by election:" "The worde signifieth to elect by putting up the hands, which declareth that ministers were not made without the consents of the people."

The notes become more Calvinistic in successive editions, *e.g.*, Tomson's ed., 1595. Note on Rom. ix. 15: "There is no unjustice in the everlasting counsel of God, touching the destruction of them whom He listeth to destroy, for that He hardeneth before He destroyeth."

Cp. Matthew's Bible, note on John i. "But that the world through him might be saved:" "The world here doth only signify the chosen, and those that do beleve."

It may be questioned whether in Rom. v. 13, the "regarded" of Tyndale ought not to be preferred to the more technical "imputed" of the Genevan and A. V.

4. Rationalistic interpretations are for the most part subsequent to the influences which have affected the English version. But they have left a trace on some more recent attempts, and should not be neglected in considering the question of revision. There is only room here to mention a single example, in which it has been sought to modify the Scriptural testimony to the inspiration of Scripture by an ingenious application of the doctrine of the Greek article. So true it is that such weapons are two-edged. Thus Greek scholarship has been supposed to require that the words translated, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable," should have been rendered, "Every writing that is God-inspired is also profitable." But *γραφή* is one of those words that may dispense with the article as being all but proper names, and the simpler construction is by far the more probable.

Many subjects remain to be considered, but it is time to bring this essay to a close. Before doing so, however, it may be well merely to touch on the influences which have affected passages having a direct bearing on the Christian life. These are (1) ascetic; (2) antinomian. The latter influence has been very slight, having at most rather increased the tendency to put belief and unbelief for obedience and disobedience, and this, in many passages, not without some warrant from the connection.* It is

* Robert Gell, in his "Essay toward the Amendment of the last English Translation of the Bible," published in 1659, mentions as one cause of error the desire "of avoiding and preventing that (as too many esteem it) execrable error of inherent righteousness," adducing amongst other proofs of this that often in the New Testament *ἀπειθεῖς* "disobedient," is rendered as all one with *ἀπιστοί*, "unbelieving." (xiv. 2; Heb. iii. 18.) And there is some reason in this, although the distinction between obeying and believing is not sharply drawn.

certainly not chargeable to the Genevan translators, who change "repentance" to "amendment of life." The traces of asceticism, beginning from a very early age, are found chiefly in the following passages :—

1 COR. VII. 3.

A. V.

True Text.

"Let the husband render unto the wife due benevolence."

"Let the husband render unto the wife her due."

1 COR. VII. 5.

"That ye may give yourselves to fasting and prayer; and come together again."

"That ye may have a time for prayer, and be together again."

1 THESS. IV. 6.

"Defraud his brother in any matter."

"Defraud his brother in the matter."

GAL. V. 12.

"I would they were even cut off."

"I would they would even cut it off."


A word may be added in conclusion on the practical aspects of this question of revision.

We cannot close our eyes to the doubt whether the most wisely conceived and executed revision of the Authorized Version will find acceptance with the people. But it is still a sacred duty which scholars owe to this generation. It is part of the larger task incumbent on those who believe in the Divine excellence of our religion—that of giving Christianity the best chance possible. To clear the Scriptures from suspicion is an important part of the work of clearing religion from suspicion, and recommending it to educated men. If amongst the many influences which are loudly claiming the allegiance of our contemporaries the spirit of the first century is to have its fitting place, the vessel which contains it must be freed from the incrustations of the succeeding centuries, at least from those which actually deface its outline, and are not merely part of the necessary work of time. One effect of this work will be to bring religious persons to consider the real nature of the Bible. Another effect will be to draw the attention of many who have never thought about the Bible at all. And in so far as the attempt succeeds, it will not

But where the same writer finds fault with the rendering of Heb. x. 34, which originates with Tyndale, "Knowing in yourselves that ye have in heaven," and proposes to render "Knowing that ye have in yourselves better wealth in heaven," both interpreters are naturally perplexed with a false reading, the true one being, "Knowing that ye have unto yourselves [i.e., of your own] in heaven."

leave theological questions where they are. In spite of protestations to the contrary, the removal of texts on which dogmas have been supposed to rest will produce an impression. Even if it be granted that the doctrines have an independent standing-ground, this nemesis for the misplacement of the foundation of faith is still inevitable. It will be sought, no doubt, to make up for the narrowing of the Scriptural basis by strengthening the authority of the Church, or by making appeal to the general Christian consciousness. But the authority of the Church is only another word for the assumed certainty of an opinion, and the Christian consciousness can hardly be thought to testify to anything as one of the essentials of the faith which is not expressly recognized in the teaching of Christ or of St. Paul.

LEWIS CAMPBELL.



THE POLITICAL ELEMENT IN MASSINGER.

AMONGST the Caroline dramatists Massinger takes a high place. If it cannot be said of his works, that

"Every word is thought
And every thought is pure,"

This coarseness is merely adventitious. The main intention of his work is moral. He never descends to paint immoral intention as virtuous because it does not succeed in converting itself into vicious act.

It will probably be a surprise even to those who are far better acquainted with the history of literature than I can pretend to be, that in many of Massinger's plays we have a treatment of the politics of the day so plain and transparent, that any one who possesses only a slight acquaintance with the history of the reigns of the first two Stuarts can read it at a glance. It is quite unintelligible to me that, with the exception of a few cursory words in Mr. Ward's "History of Dramatic Literature," no previous inquirer should have stumbled on a fact so obvious.

In speaking of the political element in Massinger, I mean something very different from those chance allusions and coincidences which are so often taken as evidences that a great poet is taking a direct part in contemporary politics. I mean nothing less than that Massinger treated of the events of the day under a disguise

hardly less thin than that which shows off the figures in the caricatures of Aristophanes or the cartoons of *Punch*.

As might be expected, Massinger's standpoint is the standpoint of the Herberts. His connection with the younger of the two brothers, the Philip, Earl of Montgomery, who afterwards became Earl of Pembroke, is witnessed by himself. With William Herbert, Earl of Pembroke, it has hitherto been held that he had no personal dealings. Whether this be so or not, I hope to show that he expressed himself in a way which would have been altogether satisfactory to Pembroke, though this may possibly be accounted for by a wish to please his brother Montgomery.

The first play in which anything political is to be found is "The Bondman," which, when printed, was dedicated to Montgomery. In the dedication Massinger says that he "could never arrive at the happiness to be made known to his lordship," but that his "lordship's liberal suffrage taught others to allow" the play "for current." It would be a vain task to inquire what were the personal views of a man who had so little of the politician in him as Montgomery; and we must, therefore, ask what were the views of his brother.

Pembroke has often been held to be the original begetter of Shakespeare's sonnets. Whether this be so or not, I fancy that if anybody had spoken of him as the original begetter of "Hamlet," it would have been rather difficult to prove the negative. Clarendon's description of him carries us back to Ophelia's description of Hamlet;

"The expectancy and rose of the fair state,
The glass of fashion and the mould of form ;"

whilst those who have watched his progress minutely know how the force of his will was not equal to the grasp of his intelligence, so that the man to whom Englishmen looked up as the most honourable and patriotic of Councillors came to deserve the brief contemptuous words of Bacon, who told Buckingham that Pembroke was "for his person not effectual, but some dependencie he hath which are drawn with him."

These words were spoken by Bacon on January 2, 1624, as advice to Buckingham to win over Pembroke before Parliament opened. Pembroke had just been in one of his temporary fits of resolution. Buckingham and the Prince had returned from Madrid, and wanted James to declare war with Spain as soon as possible. Pembroke had never been in favour of the Spanish alliance; but he distrusted Buckingham as a leader, and he thought that Buckingham was behaving shabbily in advocating the breach of engagements of which he had been himself the strongest advocate. In these weeks of Pembroke's opposition "The Bondman" was written.

It **was** licensed on December 3, 1623. There is more of allusion **than** of direct reference to passing events in this play; but the **audience** must surely have thought of the young Lord Admiral of **England** as they heard such lines as these (i. 1):—

<p>“ <i>Leosthenes.</i> <i>Timagoras.</i></p>	<p>Who commands The Carthaginian fleet? Gisco's their admiral, And 'tis our happiness; a raw young fellow, One never train'd in arms, but rather fashion'd To tilt with ladies' lips than crack a lance; Ravish a feather from a mistress' fan And wear it as a favour. A steel helmet, Made horrid with a glorious plume, will crack His woman's neck.”</p>
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A **little** further (i. 3), we have the expression of regret that **England** has no worthy commander :—

“ *Archidamus.* O shame! that we, that are a populous nation,
Engaged to liberal nature for all blessings
An island can bring forth; we, that have limbs
And able bodies; shipping, arms, and treasure,
The sinews of the war, now we are call'd
To stand upon our ground; cannot produce
One fit to be our general.”

The scene in which Timoleon sets before the men of Syracuse the necessity of sacrifice in war looks as if Massinger thought that others beside Buckingham were to blame. The following lines seem to include Middlesex as well as Buckingham; and Pembroke, as we know, had as little sympathy with Middlesex as he had with Buckingham :—

“ *Timoleon.* Your senate house, which used not to admit
A man, however popular, to stand
At the helm of government, whose youth was not
Made glorious with actions whose experience,
Crown'd with grey hairs, gave warrant to his counsels
Heard and received with reverence, is now filled
With green heads, that determine of the state
Over their cups, or when their sated lusts
Afford them leisure; or supplied by those
Who rising from base arts and sordid thrift,
Are eminent for their wealth, not for their wisdom;
Which is the reason that to hold a place
In council, which was once esteem'd an honour,
And a reward for virtue, hath quite lost
Lustre and reputation, and is made
A mercenary purchase.”

If Massinger has an eye to Buckingham and Middlesex, he has an eye, too, to the future House of Commons. I am unable to follow Mr. Spedding in all that he has said against the Commons of 1624, but I am bound to acknowledge that he has Massinger's forebodings on his side. “ Yet,” Timoleon proceeds—

“ In this plenty
And fat of peace, your young men ne'er were train'd
In martial discipline; and your ships unrigg'd

Rot in the harbour: no defence prepared,
 But thought unuseful; as if that the Gods,
 Indulgent to your sloth, had granted you
 A perpetuity of pride and pleasure,
 No change fear'd or expected.

* * * * *

Old fester'd sores
 Must be lanced to the quick and cauterized,
 Which borne with patience, after I'll apply
 Soft unguents. For the maintenance of the war
 It is decreed all moneys in the hand
 Of private men, shall instantly be brought
 To the public treasury."

Murmurs are heard, and are thus checked by Timoleon :—

"O blind men!
 If you refuse the first means that is offer'd
 To give you health, no hope's left to recover
 Your desperate sickness. Do you prize your muck
 Above your liberties; and rather choose
 To be made bondmen than to part with that
 To which already we are slaves?"

The next play of which I shall speak is very different in its tone. "The Great Duke of Florence" was acted on July 5, 1627. The Herberts had by this time been reconciled to Buckingham, who had now started on that expedition to the Isle of Rhé, from which so much was expected. Strange as it may seem, it is impossible to read the play without thinking of James, and Charles, and Buckingham. Sanazarro, the favourite of Duke Cosimo, is deputed to have an eye to the love affairs of the duke's nephew, and joins the nephew in hoodwinking the old man. It may, perhaps, be overstraining a point to refer to the commencement of the declaration against Raleigh, when Cosimo says (i. 2)—

"Though
 We stand not bound to yield account to any
 Why we do this or that, the full consent
 Of our subjects being included in our will;"

or to think of Charles, in the commendation of Giovanni (iii. 1)—

"Cosimo. You are, nephew,
 As I hear, an excellent horseman;"

or again

"How do you like
 My nephew's horsemanship?"

But James and Buckingham can hardly have been out of the thoughts of the spectators when Cosimo says (v. 2)—

"The honours we have hourly heap'd upon him,
 The titles, the rewards, to the envy of
 The old nobility, as the common people,
 We now forbear to touch on."

Still, however, as it could hardly fail to be, the allusion is ~~le~~ direct than in "The Bondman." The way in which stress

laid upon the military qualities of the favourite may possibly be meant to call attention to the commander of an expedition which had not yet failed, but it may also be that Massinger was laughing in his sleeve at the man whom he thought it expedient to praise.

I now come to the group of three plays to which I wish especially to draw attention. "Believe as you List" was offered for license on January 11, 1631; "The Emperor of the East" was licensed March 11 of the same year; and "The Maid of Honour" was printed in 1632, and probably written in the preceding year. The group therefore covers a space of twelve or fifteen months.

The circumstances which attended the refusal of a license to "Believe as you List" at once arrest attention. In his prologue Massinger asks for pardon if

"What's Roman here,
Grecian, or Asiatic, draw too near
A late and sad example ;"

and it has hitherto been held that this is sufficiently explained by the fact that Sir Henry Herbert refused to license a play of which the name is not given, "because it did contain dangerous matter, as the deposing of Sebastian, King of Portugal, by Philip II., and there being a peace sworn 'twixt the Kings of England and Spain." I have no doubt that Colonel Cunningham was quite right in pointing out the coincidences between the Antiochus of the play and King Sebastian. But he failed to notice that there was much in the proceedings of Antiochus which cannot by any possibility be fitted into the story of Sebastian. Antiochus, like the Sebastian of the popular story, is supposed to die in battle, and then reappears to claim his crown. But in the case of Sebastian, the defeat comes from the Moors, whilst his crown is taken by the King of Spain. In the case of Antiochus, the crown is taken by the victor who defeats him in battle. Sebastian again does not wander, as Antiochus does, from State to State, asking aid for the recovery of his dignity and his lands. If we want to find "a late but sad example" who will suit this part of Antiochus' story, we must look, not to Sebastian of Portugal, but to Frederick, Elector Palatine and titular King of Bohemia.

Even in the first act, where the Sebastian side is shown with tolerable consistency, we have words thrown in which must have reminded hearers of that generation of Frederick. When Antiochus laments (i. 1) how—

"All those innocent spirits
Borrowing again their bodies, gashed with wounds,
(Which strew'd Achaia's bloody plains, and made
Rivulets of gore), appear to me, exacting
A strict account of my ambitious folly,
For the exposing of twelve thousand souls,
Who fell that fatal day to certain ruin ;

Neither the counsel of the Persian king
 Prevailing with me; nor the grave advice
 Of my wise enemy, Marcus Scaurus, hindering
 My desperate enterprise ;”

we can hardly avoid thinking of the defeat in Bohemia, which ended an enterprise begun in spite of warnings from friendly James of England and hostile Maximilian of Bavaria.

In the second act Antiochus applies to Carthage for aid, just as Frederick applied to the Dutch Republic, and Carthage finally answers (ii. 2) just as the Dutch answered Frederick—

“ <i>Amilcar.</i>	We wish we could Receive you as a king, since your relation Hath wrought so much upon us that we do Incline to that belief. But since we cannot As such protect you, but with certain danger, Until you are by other potent nations Proclaimed for such, our fitting caution Cannot be censured, though we do entreat You would elsewhere seek justice.
“ <i>Antiochus.</i>	Where? when 'tis Frighted from you by power.
“ <i>Amilcar.</i>	And yet take comfort. Not all the threats of Rome shall force us to Deliver you.”

If this had been all, it might be said that the resemblance was accidental, and there are of course many points in which it does not by any means run upon all fours. But the third act is, I think, decisive.

Let us, before proceeding further, represent to ourselves the situation of the English Court in January, 1631.

It had only been with the greatest reluctance that, after a prolonged negotiation, Charles had just consented to make peace with Spain, without obtaining from Philip IV. a direct promise that he would force the Emperor to surrender the Palatinate. But he had got a promise that Spain would do all in her power to recover the Palatinate by any means short of force. In accepting this promise Charles had put himself under the guidance of the Lord Treasurer Weston, who was always, in the long run, able to curb his master's occasional longing for more energetic action, by telling him that without a Parliament he could not maintain a war, and that a Parliament would only resume the attitude of the Parliament of 1629.

On the other side there was a considerable party at Court, of which Pembroke and his brother formed a part, who disliked Weston and his policy and believed him to be merely actuated by a sordid love of gain. These men attempted to make use of the Queen, who cared nothing for politics, but who had quarrelled with Weston on account of his rude overbearing manners, and on account of a difference of opinion about the money needed for her rather extravagant housekeeping. Let us read part of scene 3 of

Act iii., substituting King Charles for Prusias, Henrietta Maria for the Queen, Weston for Philoxenus, whose very name (a lover of strangers) is meant to suit him, and Coloma, the Spanish, for Flaminius the Roman Ambassador, only remembering that Frederick was not in person in England, as Antiochus was in Bithynia.

The scene opens with a dialogue between Flaminius (Coloma) and Philoxenus (Weston). Flaminius begins—

“What we have said the consuls will make good
And the glad senate ratify.”

Philoxenus replies as the leader of the so-called Spanish party in England might be expected to reply—

“They have so
Obliged me for this favour that there is not
A service of that difficulty from which
I would decline. In this rest confident,
I am your own—and sure.”

After assuring Philoxenus of the rewards that awaited him, Flaminius proceeds to flatter him, delicately caricaturing those points in Weston which were most open to caricature.

“Since a wise forecast in the managing
Worldly affairs is the true wisdom—rashness
The schoolmistress of idiots. You well know
Charity begins at home, and that we are
Nearest unto ourselves. Fools build upon
Imaginary hopes, but wise men ever
On real certainties.”

All Weston's materialism, his utter contempt for the ideal, are there. Then, after much else in the same strain, we have his relations with the King, as the Opposition understood them, presented in such a way as to stir up the indignation of Charles.

“But to the point. With speed get me access
To the king your pupil. And 'tis well for him
That he hath such a tutor. Rich Bithynia
Was never so indebted to a patriot,
And vigilant watchman, for her peace and safety
As to yourself.”

This then, in the eyes of Pembroke and his party, was Charles's true position. He was Weston's pupil, and Weston was in the pay of Spain. Philoxenus accepts the imputation with becoming modesty—

“Without boast I may whisper
I have done something in that way.”

Flaminius goes on flattering him to the top of his bent, and laughs at him as soon as he is gone. Philoxenus then returns, accompanied by the King. In Prusias we have Charles's talk about subordinating his alliance with Spain to the demands of honour, which call upon him to maintain his brother-in-law's

cause, just as it is familiar to us now. "What," says Prusias, when he hears of the arrival of the Roman—

“What can he
Propound which I must fear to hear? I would
Continue in fair terms with that warlike nation,
Ever provided I wrong not myself
In the least point of honour.”

This is Charles all over. Then comes Flaminius' message, putting the advantages of peace in that low material form which was so familiar to Charles's courtiers, and which obtained a literary expression in Carew's lines on the death of Gustavus Adolphus—

“ *Flaminius.* Know then, Rome,
In her pious care that you may still increase
The happiness you live on ; and your subjects,
Under the shadow of their own vines, eat
The fruit they yield them—their soft musical feasts
Continuing, as they do yet, unaffrighted
With the harsh noise of war—entreats as low
As her known power and majesty can descend,
You would retain, with due equality,
A willingness to preserve what she hath conquered
From change and innovation.”

Prusias accepts all this. But he is stung to the quick when the demand comes to surrender Antiochus—

" Prusias.

Shall I, for your ends,
Infringe my princely word? or break the laws
Of hospitality? defeat myself
Of the certain honour to restore a king
Unto his own? and what you Romans have
Extorted and keep from him? Far be 't from me!
I will not buy your amity at such loss,
So it be to all after-times remembered
I held it not sufficient to live
As one born only for myself, and I
Desire no other monument."

This, Massinger would seem to say, is the real Charles, generous and high-minded. It is only the low, coarse-minded minister who intervenes between his better self and action.

Flaminius turns to Philoxenus—

“ *Flaminius*. Here’s a man.
The oracle of your kingdom, that can tell you
When there’s no probability it may be
Effected, ’tis mere madness to attempt it.

" *Philoxenus.* A true position.
" *Flaminius.* Your inclination
Is honourable, but your power deficient
To put your purpose into act."

At this truth Prusias starts, precisely as Charles would have = started—

" *Prusias.* My power ?
 " *Flaminius.* Is not to be disputed, if weigh'd truly
 With the petty kings, your neighbours ; but when balanced
 With the globes and sceptres of my mistress, Rome,
 Will but—I spare comparisons, but you build on
 Your strength to justify the fact. Alas,

It is a feeble reed, and leaning on it
Will wound your hand much sooner than support you.
You keep in pay, 'tis true, some peace-trained troops,
Which awe your neighbours ; but consider, when
Our eagles shall display their sail-stretched wings,
Hovering o'er our legions, what defence
Can you expect from yours ? ”

Flaminius proceeds to urge the dangers of war, Philoxenus occasionally chiming in as chorus. Then, as if Massinger saw into the very heart of the man who was to deliver up Strafford to the block, we have the poor, helpless King exclaiming, when Flaminius proudly offers peace or war—

“ <i>Prusias.</i>	How can I
	Dispense with my faith given ?
“ <i>Philoxenus.</i>	I'll yield you reasons.
“ <i>Prusias.</i>	Let it be peace, then. ” Oh ! pray you call in
	The wretched man. In the meantime I'll consider
	How to excuse myself.”

Antiochus comes in, and Prusias mumbles out some excuse about “necessity of State.” The Queen pleads earnestly and passionately. But Prusias, like the Charles who in real life was terribly frightened lest he should be thought to be under his wife's influence, cuts her short, and has her carried off, for which last proceeding, it must be acknowledged, history affords no warrant.

“The Emperor of the East” has no such scene in it as this. But for some remarks which have been made on it by others, it would hardly have been necessary to notice it here. There is a good deal in it about projectors and informers, and when anything is said about bad government of any kind, it is generally supposed to be intended as an attack upon Charles. There is in reality no part of history which requires more careful walking than the eleven years which passed without a Parliament. It is a period with respect to which writers suddenly become utterly regardless of chronology, and seem to imagine that anything which was done wrong at any time during the whole period may be referred to as having been done in any given year between 1629 and 1640. For the present I can only express my belief that there is nothing necessarily satirical in “The Emperor of the East,” and that what is there written of a good king as compared with a bad one may very well have been intended to be taken as complimentary to Charles.

The next and last play to which I wish to draw attention is “The Maid of Honour.” I suppose if any one were to assert, without bringing evidence to prove his assertions, that in the reign of Charles I. a dramatist had actually brought the King's father upon the stage, and had there displayed him in a way by no means to his advantage, he would be met by a smile of incredulity. Such, however, appears to me to have been the fact.

It is unnecessary to say much of the charges which English

public opinion brought against James for his conduct in neglecting to defend the Palatinate. We all know how he clung to peace, when many people thought that peace was neither safe nor honourable, and how, when he finally made up his mind to offer assistance, he refused to declare war openly, and took credit to himself for allowing volunteers to go to fight for his son-in-law under Sir Horace Vere. Let us now see how far all this is mirrored in the character of Roberto, King of Sicily.

The first scene of the first act introduces an ambassador from Ferdinand, Duke of Urbino, to Roberto as soon as he has taken his seat upon his throne. A few touches are enough to carry the audience from Ferdinand, Duke of Urbino, to Frederick, Elector Palatine, whose acceptance of the Bohemian crown caused all the trouble.

“ *Amb.*

Your Majesty

Hath been long since familiar, I doubt not,
With the desperate fortunes of my lord; and pity
Of the much that your confederate hath suffered,
You being his last refuge, may persuade you
Not alone to compassionate, but to lend
Your royal aids to stay him to his fall
To certain ruin. He, too late, is conscious
That his ambition to encroach upon
His neighbour's territories, with the danger of
His liberty, nay, his life, hath brought in question
His own inheritance.”

Frederick's relations to the Palatinate and to Bohemia could not be more neatly put. The ambassador goes on to describe his master's plight in the city which he had thus seized, and asks for assistance for him just as Frederick asked aid in his difficulties in Bohemia. Roberto's answer is conceived in the very spirit of James.

“ *Rob.*

Since injustice

In your duke meets this correction, can you press us
With any seeming argument of reason,
In foolish pity to decline his dangers,
To draw them on ourself? Shall we not be
Warn'd by his harms? The league proclaim'd between us
Bound neither of us further than to aid
Each other, if by foreign force invaded.”

The exact description of the interpretation put by James upon the treaty which bound him to the Princes of the Union.

“ And so far in my honour I was tied.
But since, without our counsel or allowance,
He hath ta'en arms, with his good leave he must
Excuse us if we steer not on a rock
We see and may avoid. Let other monarchs
Contend to be made glorious by proud war,
And with the blood of their poor subjects purchase
Increase of empire, and augment their cares
In keeping that which was by wrongs extorted,
Gilding unjust invasions with the trim
Of glorious conquests; we, that would be known
The father of our people, in our study
And vigilance for their safety, must not change
Their ploughshares into swords, and force them from

The secure shade of their own vines, to be
Scorch'd with the flames of war: or, for our sport
Expose their lives to ruin."

Then follows a conversation between the King and Bertolo, who urges the advantages of war, and reminds Roberto that he rules over an island. He calls it Sicily, but he is evidently thinking of England.

"Here are no mines of gold
Or silver to enrich you: no worm spins
Silk in her womb, to make distinction
Between you and a peasant in your habits:
No fish lives near our shores whose blood can dye
Scarlet or purple; all that we possess
With beasts we have in common: nature did
Design us to be warriors, and to break through
Our ring, the sea, by which we are environ'd,
And we by force must fetch in what is wanting,
Or precious to us."

After much more in the same strain, the King replies:—

"*Rob.* Think not
Our counsel's built upon so weak a base
As to be overturn'd, or shaken, with
Tempestuous winds of word. As I, my lord,
Before resolved you, I will not engage
My person in this quarrel; neither press
My subjects to maintain it; yet, to show
My rule is gentle, and that I have feeling
O' your master's sufferings, and these gallants, weary
Of the happiness of peace, desire to taste
The bitter sweets of war, we do consent
That, as adventurers and volunteers,
No way compell'd by us, they may make trial
Of their boasted valours."

The question naturally rises to our lips, What object could any one have in holding the mirror up to nature, in a form likely to be so particularly offensive to the King? The answer is not very difficult to discover. As the play in which this scene occurred followed close upon "The Emperor of the East," it must have been produced at some time between the spring of 1631 and the following year, when it was printed. In the summer and autumn of 1631 Charles was doing exactly what his father had done in 1620. Gustavus Adolphus had long been looking to him for assistance. Charles gave permission to the Marquis of Hamilton to carry over volunteers to his help, just as James had allowed Vere to carry over volunteers to the Palatinate. Hamilton sailed in July, 1631. Then came diplomacy. Vane was sent to negotiate with Gustavus, whilst Anstruther was negotiating in Vienna. Charles felt sure that he had done enough to induce one ruler or the other to engage to restore the Palatinate to his brother-in-law. But he would not engage in open war, for which indeed, as matters stood, he was destitute of the means. He refused even to send more volunteers to reinforce Hamilton's diminished levies. His Majesty, wrote Secretary Dorchester, in December, felt Hamilton's losses "like a father of his

people to whom their blood is precious," and he would, therefore, risk no more soldiers in Germany. Roberto's last speech no longer represents the words of James. It brings before us Charles himself, as he must have appeared to those who wished him to take an active part in the war.

"*Rob.* 'Tis well, and, but my grant in this, expect not Assistance from me. Govern as you please The province you make choice of ; for, I vow By all things sacred, if that thou miscarry In this rash undertaking, I will hear it No otherwise than as a sad disaster, Fallen on a stranger ; nor will I esteem That man my subject, who in thy extremes In purse or person aids thee."

The party to which Massinger attached himself was not one to which any Englishman can look back with satisfaction. The Queen's faction thought more of its quarrel with the Westons, of its private jealousies in Court and Council, than of the responsibilities of power. Ever clamouring for war and a Parliament, they had no policy to prepare for war and no statesmanship to direct a Parliament.

A man like Massinger, however, may very well have thought, as the able and excellent Sir Thomas Roe thought, that at least they were better than their rivals. The mere materialism of Weston's policy must have been offensive to him. To seek to keep the peace and encourage commerce, in the hope that the people being well fed would cease to care for Parliamentary debates, was a very unideal aim for a statesman to set before himself. It touched the lowest part of English nature, its love of practical success as measured by wealth. It had its exponents too in literature, in that poetry of which the inspiring thought is

"that woman is but dust,
A worthless toy for tyrants' lust,"

and which, whenever it raised its thoughts above the fleeting follies of the moment, eulogized peace, not as the parent of fruitful works and innocent joys, but as opening possibilities of self-indulgence. Carew's verses on the death of Gustavus Adolphus, to which I have before referred, may be taken as a measure of the baseness which festered round the Court of Charles I.

"The Maid of Honour" may be taken as a protest against this mode of regarding the world. I do not know whether there is any truth in the supposition that Massinger was a Roman Catholic. But it is evident that he had much in him which leant that way. The scene in which Camiola is claimed as a nun helps us to understand the Court conversions which frightened Protestant England into rage, and which had as much to do as ship-money had with the final uprising against Charles.

Camiola takes refuge in a nunnery, not from any desire to obtain freer scope for spiritual aspirations, but in order that she may be safe. She wants to reach

“ the secure haven, where
Eternal happiness keeps her residence,
Temptations to frailty never entering.”

She is, says Roberto,

“ a fair example
For noble maids to imitate! Since to live
In wealth and pleasure 's common, but to part with
Such poison'd baits is rare : there being nothing
Upon this stage of life to be commended.”

Nothing to be commended ! What a voice to rise from the Court of Charles ! We have lately had in the pages of the *Quarterly Review* an arraignment of the Houses of Commons which successively stood up against the King. The faults and vices of Parliaments are patent to the world. Their unjust judgments, their hasty condemnations, are published in the face of all men. The Court of Charles robed itself in outward decency and escaped the penetrating eye. Here and there we are able to lift the veil, and we are soon repelled by the vacuity, the want of moral earnestness of the life behind. No wonder Court gentlemen and Court ladies fled from its vacuity to a form of religion which offered to save them from this living death.


Upon a play with such an ending it is difficult to rest with satisfaction. Instinctively we turn from her who ends as Camiola ends to her who begins where Camiola ends—to the bright, clear soul of the Isabella of “ Measure for Measure,” which, starting from the restrictions of convent life, and carrying with her the ignorance of the world, the slowness to understand the meaning of evil, the readiness to be guided by others, which naturally flow from such a mode of life, triumphs over them all by the innate purity and bravery of her spirit, and finds at last in the very heart of the city of abominations a place where she can work more worthily than in self-chosen retirement.

If we turn from Massinger back to Shakespeare, we may turn forward too to the singer of the “ Comus.” Two years were to pass away after the exit of Camiola before Milton took upon himself to unfold

“ The sublime notion and high mystery
That must be uttered to unfold the sage
And serious doctrine of virginity ;”

of that clearness of spirit and purity of soul which as Shakespeare and Milton knew, and as Charles's dramatists did not know, is the saving grace of man and of woman, of the matron and the maid.

S. R. GARDINER.



THE REALITY OF DUTY :

AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MR. JOHN STUART MILL.

MR. MILL'S Autobiography was written in order to let posterity know how his education was conducted and his intellect formed. To those who share his opinions it is interesting as showing what he desires to show. To others it is hardly less so, as exhibiting (on their view) a struggle of human nature against the adverse bias of a powerful theory and an elaborate training. It is in this point of view that I desire to examine it, so far as it relates to the history of Mr. Mill's moral sentiments, and some of the philosophical tenets which grew out of them.

His account of his childhood is like nothing else in the world. Remembering the nature of the man, our first wonder is to find him so much of a manufactured article. In general, influences which go to make up character are complex and heterogeneous. The varied discipline, the pleasures, the pains, the quarrels and attachments of family and school, chance companionships, chance adventures, chance books, sicknesses, mishaps, escapades and their consequences, combine beyond possibility of analysis to make the boy what he becomes. But the boy John Stuart Mill was the creation of a single force, applied by a single mind to a responsive material. His history, according to his own representation, is the history of paternal discipline applied relentlessly, unceasingly, exclusively of other influences, from the cradle, and with a definite and inflexible purpose. It is evident that, clearly to understand Mr. John Mill, you must first understand his

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father. I abridge the son's account of him, retaining where I can his words :—

Respecting the creation and government of the universe, he believed that nothing positive could be known. Only he held that the prevalence of evil in this planet was a conclusive proof that its author could not be at once absolutely good and absolutely powerful. But he thought that as the world had grown older its conception of the Deity had grown worse and worse, till in Christianity it reached the *ne plus ultra* of wickedness, and had no small effect in demoralizing the world. These opinions he taught his child, warning him at the same time that they could not be prudently avowed.

With regard to morals, he believed (with Bentham) that the exclusive test of right and wrong was the tendency of actions to produce pleasure and pain. But in pleasure he had scarcely any belief. "He was not insensible to pleasures, but he deemed very few of them worth the pain which in the present state of society must be paid for them." The pleasures of the benevolent affections he placed high in the scale of enjoyment. "But he never varied in rating intellectual enjoyments above all others, even in value as pleasures, independently of their ulterior benefits." On the whole "he thought human life a poor thing after the freshness of youth and of unsatisfied curiosity had gone by." Passionate emotion (pleasurable as it unquestionably is) he despised as a kind of madness (pp. 43—49). It would seem, however, that he was able to laugh heartily (p. 102).

"Feelings, as such, he considered to be no proper subjects of praise or blame. Right and wrong, good and bad, he regarded as qualities solely of conduct—of acts and omissions,—there being no feeling which may not lead, and does not frequently lead, either to good or bad actions; conscience itself, the very desire to act right, often leading people to act wrong. Consistently carrying out the doctrine, that the object of praise and blame should be the discouragement of wrong conduct and the encouragement of right, he refused to let his praise or blame be influenced by the motive of the agent. He blamed as severely what he thought a bad action, where the motive was a feeling of duty, as if the agents had been consciously evil-doers. He would not have accepted as a plea in mitigation for inquisitors that they sincerely believed burning heretics to be an obligation of conscience. But though he did not allow honesty of purpose to soften his disapprobation of actions, it had its full effect on his estimation of characters. No one prized conscientiousness and rectitude of intention more highly, or was more incapable of valuing any person in whom he did not feel assurance of it. But he disliked people quite as much for any other deficiency, provided he thought it equally likely to make them act ill. He disliked, for instance, a fanatic in any bad cause as much or more than one who had adopted the same course from self-interest, because he thought him even more likely to be practically mischievous." (Pp. 49, 50.)

"All this," says Mr. John Mill, meaning the paragraph which I

have quoted at length, "is merely saying that he in a degree once very common but now very unusual, threw his feelings into his opinions." It is in fact, however, saying very much more. And what it says is very material in the formation of his son's character. It says that pushing to its legitimate results the philosophy of Mr. Bentham, which he adopted, he valued his fellow-creatures not according to any conception of intrinsic dignity, nobility, purity, elevation, or tenderness (whatever meaning may be attached to these words), but like a watch or a spinning-jenny on account of their tendency to produce pleasure, and in proportion to that tendency. Ordinary moralists would impute to a man who tortured others for his own personal amusement or advantage, an intrinsic baseness, which would not attach to one who tortured them because he was seriously though wrongly convinced that the good of the world or of the man himself required it. Mr. Mill refused to admit of intrinsic differences, and disliked the zealot more than the knave "because he thought him more likely to be practically mischievous." In valuing a horse we ask whether he can do our work. If he cannot, we do not care whether it is because he is vicious or because he is blind. Mr. Mill estimated his fellow-men as he would have "priced" a hack. A blunder, or habit of blundering, would have been to him as odious as a lie or a habit of lying, provided he thought it likely to do as much harm. To this dethronement of the moral instincts, much of the son's peculiar character is traceable.

If these instincts, instead of being indiscriminately poured forth upon mankind, were confined to some intellectual or other aristocracy, I cannot help thinking that they would be recognized as bearing somewhat the same relation to moral philosophy that genius does to learning—say that musical genius does to a knowledge of thorough bass. Even in the fields which science affects to cover, there exists by its side a prophetic subtlety which outstrips the lagging methods of reason, and, with a tact beyond analysis, detects a harmony or discord which philosophy has to accept at its hands and account for at its leisure. And on ground where science can scarcely find a footing (as among first principles or the construction of a musical melody) it is generally supposed that intuition reigns supreme and furnishes the very data on which science has to plant its foundations. Here and there a person is to be found, who with a correct ear has scarcely a tinge of musical taste. Such a person, if also a mathematician, can understand and apply the laws according to which music performs its office; and can appreciate, no doubt, with a certain satisfaction, the fact that this or that composition is an application of these laws. But the sweetness, the elevation, the pathos, the majesty, the playfulness—that indescribable thrill

which may be all or none of these—the whole range of various enjoyment which music is capable of furnishing over and above the sense of uniformity to law—all this is to him simply inaccessible. He may tell you as long as he likes, and tell you truly, that he is a better musician than you are. But not the less are you privileged to enter a sphere of experience—the experience that beauty is beauty—to which he can no more attain than a beast to the comprehension of Euclid. I do not examine how closely this applies to a man who closes his mind to the appreciation of intrinsic moral excellence, and measures the nobility of a human character (as I understand Mr. James Mill to have done) by the probable utility of the motives which constitute that character. Thus much is at any rate plain—that he excludes himself from a world of feelings which in some respects constitute knowledge, and which give life and value to knowledge which they do not constitute. He puts from him that affectionate admiration of what is called beauty of character which affects us in actual life apart from consideration of results—that tranquil reverence or buoyancy of heart which is called up by certain great poetical representations only because they are what they are. This whole field of refreshing, consoling, inspiring experience was closed to Mr. James Mill, possibly by his nature, certainly by his theories; and what was closed to him, was in a great measure closed to the son, to whose being he gave the colour of his own. Characteristically enough, “he was no great admirer of Shakespeare, the English idolatry of whom he used to attack with great severity,” and if he advised his son to read that author “it was chiefly on account of the historical plays” (p. 16).

“My father’s moral inculcations were at all times mainly those of the ‘*Socratici viri*,’ justice, temperance (to which he gave a very extended application), veracity, perseverance, readiness to encounter pain, and especially labour; regard for the public good, estimation of persons according to their merits” (*i.e.*, the probable results of the motives by which they were governed), “and of things according to their intrinsic usefulness, a life of exertion in contradiction to one of self-indulgent ease and sloth. . . . These and other moralities he conveyed in brief sentences uttered as occasion arose of grave exhortation or stern reprobation or contempt.” (P. 47.)

He had his theory of praise and blame. But in his practical teaching we hear nothing of praise or encouragement, but only of “grave exhortation, or stern reprobation or contempt.” This omission of what is amiable from his discipline is hardly less significant of his character than the omission from his moral code, not only of such virtues as humility, modesty, and chastity, but also of courtesy, sympathy, pity, gratitude, personal affection, in short, of all the great and small things which constitute love, which is drily replaced by “regard for the public good.”

"It will be admitted," says the son, "that a man of the opinions and the character above described was likely to leave a strong impression on any mind principally formed by him, and that his moral teaching was not likely to err on the side of laxity or indulgence" (p. 51). Certainly it did not so err in regard to his first-born, who must have been a model of industry and obedience.

Between the ages of eight and twelve "I was continually incurring his displeasure by my inability to solve difficult problems" in the differential calculus and other portions of the higher mathematics, "for which he did not see that I had not the previous knowledge" (p. 12). After twelve, "of all things which he required me to do there was none which I did so constantly ill or in which he so perpetually lost his temper with me" as reading aloud Plato and Demosthenes (p. 23).

"I was always too much in awe of him to be otherwise than extremely subdued and quiet in his presence" (p. 34). "Both as a boy and as a youth I was incessantly smarting under his severe admonitions on the subject" of want of alertness (p. 37).

With this exhibition of the relations between son and father we are not surprised to be told that

"The element which was chiefly deficient in his moral relation to his children was that of tenderness. I do not believe that this deficiency lay in his own nature. I believe him to have had much more feeling than he habitually showed, and much greater capacities of feeling than were ever developed. He resembled most Englishmen in being ashamed of the signs of feeling, and by the absence of demonstration starving the feelings themselves. If we consider further that he was in the trying position of sole teacher, and add to this that his temper was constitutionally irritable, it is impossible not to feel true pity for a father who did, and strove to do, so much for his children, who would so have valued their affection, yet who must have been constantly feeling that fear of him was drying it up at its source. This was no longer the case later in life, and with his younger children. They loved him tenderly, and, if I cannot say so much of myself, I was always loyally devoted to him." (Pp. 51, 52.)

In short his relations to the man who formed him seem to have been strangely like those which Mr. Fitzjames Stephen considers appropriate to the Creator of all things as conjecturable by reason.

"If it be further asked, 'Can you love such a Being?' I should answer, Love is not the word which I should use, but awe. The law under which we live is stern and, as far as we can judge, inflexible, but it is noble, and excites a feeling of awful respect for its Author and for the constitution established in the world which it governs, and a sincere wish to act up to, and carry it out as far as possible. If we believe in God at all, this, I think, is the rational and manly way of speaking of Him."—*Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity*, p. 311.

The element "Abba, Father," is alike wanting in the two cases—and the son does not make light of it.

"I do not believe that fear, as an element in education, can be dispensed with, but I am sure that it ought not to be the main element; and where it predominates so much as to preclude love and confidence on the part of the child to those who should be the unreservedly trusted advisers of after years, and perhaps to seal up the fountains of frank and spontaneous communicativeness in the child's nature, it is an evil for which a large abatement must be made from the benefits, moral and intellectual, which may flow from any other part of the education." (P. 53.)

There is something strangely pathetic in this cry of sorrow and sympathy. The father who "did, and strove to do, so much for his children,"—so seriously alive to the obligation of making the most of the extraordinary mind for which he found himself responsible—so capable of honest pride in the expanding genius which he was fostering, and which promised to occupy the exact sphere of utility which he could best understand; the son earnest, obedient, devoted; yet both alike cut off from the opportunities of improvement and enjoyment which circumstances so bountifully offered to them by the imperious and unsympathetic nature of the father, issuing in a certain acrid irritability, and hardened by a theory which dried up the specific affections by teaching that the advantage probably derivable from a human being is the gauge of his intrinsic value. Mr. James Mill took the same hard pains with his son that some gamekeepers would with a valuable pointer; and this was the result of treating a sensitive human being like a dog.

Nor was there anything to qualify this dismal outlook. Of Mr. Mill's mother we are told nothing. It is to be inferred that there was nothing to tell. His younger brothers and sisters he was required to teach, and he found it very disagreeable—"not a good moral discipline." From boys of his own age he was carefully kept apart, lest he should be corrupted by them. In matters of religion he had been taught to believe that all theologies were bad, and that nearest him the *ne plus ultra* of wickedness. So that as far as the development of his affections was concerned, his father was a terror to him, his mother a blank, his brothers and sisters were bores, he had no companions, no play, and no God.

What desolation! And yet he tells us that his childhood was a happy one. It must have been a singular happiness—one in which the play of the affections, the enjoyment of sport, the interchange of childish sympathies, and the aspirations of childish fancy were absent, and which was based on the delight of expanding intellect—the growing love of labour—the triumphant conquest of successive fields of knowledge,—soon also a rising consciousness of intellectual power, and at last perhaps a noble desire to apply that power to useful purposes and the acquisition of legitimate eminence.

Under these conditions his education went on. It was the conscientious determination of his father that he was to be a "thinking

machine" capable of unparalleled performances, and animated by the motives most likely to produce benefit to mankind. To this end he was elaborated day by day—almost hour by hour. What was effected, if truly related, was almost miraculous. So were the industry and sagacity which Mr. James Mill brought to his task—an industry which must have absorbed every spare moment of his time, and a sagacity not less remarkable because occasionally misled by his overbearing exigency, and throughout limited by his arid conceptions of human nature.

Born in 1806, John Mill had begun Greek before he was three years old; at seven he was reading Dialogues of Plato, including the *Theætetus*, "which last dialogue, I venture to think, would have been better omitted, as it was totally impossible I should understand it." Then he took Latin in hand, reading all that is to be read—an incredible list of authors. At twelve he embarked on logic—scholastic and Aristotelian. At thirteen he went through "a complete course" of political economy. At fourteen he finished his education in France, and then started, "I may fairly say, with an advantage of a quarter of a century above my contemporaries."

And now came one of the crises of his intellectual life. His father had already educated him in Benthamism. He now "put into my hands Bentham's principal speculations as interpreted on the Continent, and indeed to all the world, by Dumont, in the *Traité de Législation*. The reading of that book was an epoch in my life, one of the turning-points in my mental history."

It was natural. Mr. Mill's nature was preparing itself for an outburst. His sympathies, impulses, susceptibilities, affections had been starved or discouraged. He had become a machine for absorbing knowledge and pursuing argument. Objects of love he had none, and for an object of veneration the strange mixture (in the ancient sense) of "the Stoic, the Epicurean, and the Cynic," which he called father. And yet, within his critical and unresting intellect lay an ardent moral nature, hungry for food. And thus, while in Bentham's unsparing butchery of every form of sentimental morality he seemed to find a complete philosophy, in his penetrating application of the greatest-happiness principle to practical life, he found an object for his moral aspirations.

"What thus impressed me was the chapter in which Bentham passed judgment on the common modes of reasoning in morals and legislation, deduced from phrases like 'law of nature,' 'right reason,' 'the moral sense,' 'natural rectitude,' and the like, and characterized them as dogmatism in disguise, imposing its sentiments upon others, under cover of sounding expressions which convey no reason for the sentiment, but set up the sentiment as its own reason. It had not struck me before that Bentham's principle put an end to all this. The feeling rushed upon me that all previous moralists were superseded, and that here indeed was the com-

mencement of a new era in thought." (Pp. 64, 65.) . . . "When I laid down the last volume of the *Traité*, I had become a different being. The 'principle of utility' understood as Bentham understood it, and applied in the manner in which he applied it through these three volumes, fell exactly into its place as the keystone which held together the detached and fragmentary component parts of my knowledge and beliefs. It gave unity to my conception of things. I now had opinions, a creed, a doctrine, a philosophy; in one among the best senses of the word, a religion, the inculcation and diffusion of which could be made the principal outward purpose of a life. And I had a grand conception laid before me of changes to be effected in the condition of mankind through that doctrine." (Pp. 66, 67.)

Here then we find Mr. Mill in possession of a creed and an object of practical devotion. The real mental crisis in his life cannot be appreciated without clearly conceiving what that creed and practical object were. It is in some degree caused by their collision—or rather by the discovery that one did not support the other.

I begin with the creed. As far as the present subject is concerned, all men, I suppose, agree that every act of the human will must be founded on some desire; and that the most frequent object of that desire is perhaps the acquisition of some pleasure, including in that the avoidance of pain, and embracing every form of enjoyment, high or low, present or future. But most of us believe that it is possible to desire other things than pleasure, even in this extended sense. It is supposed possible by some persons, and in some degree, to desire the happiness (or indeed unhappiness) of others, posthumous fame, success, moral excellence, or, in the case of religious men, the glory of the God in whom they believe—for itself, and independently of any pleasure reflected back from it. It is supposed that human beings are capable of making, to a certain extent, a sacrifice of known pleasure, absolute as far as it goes, not because the pleasure of that sacrifice is greater than its pain, but because they deliberately choose something else rather than their own personal greater enjoyment. It is said, for instance, that an old Irish countess, when urged on her deathbed to make restitution of a large amount of ill-gotten land, rejected absolution on those terms, and died saying that "it was better that an old woman [herself] should howl for a thousand years in purgatory than that the Butlers should lack land." Most people would imagine that this old countess's sentiment was not dictated by the desire for her own greater enjoyment, but that the prosperity of the Butlers was to her a particular and final object of desire, to which she was ready to make a large and uncompensated sacrifice of her own comfort. Possibly she died with the satisfaction of thinking that the importance of the Butlers was saved. But the vulgar opinion would be that the prospect of this transitory personal pleasure was insufficient to account for a sacrifice so tremendous; which there-

fore would be ascribed to a deeper and more overpowering motive—a passionate family devotion. The desire (on this view) is not due to the prospect of personal gratification, but the personal gratification, if any, is the consequence of the supposed accomplishment of the desire. The pleasure would not be there unless there was the desire to begin with. So if a man does or does not betray a comrade on the rack, it is generally supposed, not that he is at the mercy of a balance of conflicting agonies, present or future, moral or physical, but that he is between an agony on the one side, and on the other a particular desire, incorporated in a determination to save his friend. Nor at this point is it material to inquire how he came to have this desire. If the desire is substantial and self-sustaining, so as to furnish a motive of action independently of the prospect of pleasure, then the acquisition of pleasure is not the only motive of which human nature is capable.

At the next step, however, the history of desire *does* become material; for, as the world appears to itself to see that these and the like actions are not explicable by the hope of present pleasure, so it refuses to believe that they can in all cases be accounted for by the ghosts of pleasures that are past. Granting that a miser's love of gold is referable to the associations which attach to it as an instrument of pleasure; granting that human life is studded with the pleasures and pains of such associations; granting, further, that motives arising from association are often latent, and therefore discoverable (like selfishness) when we least expect them—granting all this, it remains the fact that many men, even among those who seriously tax their intellects to discover the source of their feelings, are led to the belief that as desire may exist in the mind independently of present or future pleasure, so it may arise without connection with any past pleasure, and, in particular, that a man may desire absolutely and in itself—"because he does," as children say—to be and do good. Believing in particular objects of desire, they believe further that some of such objects are more noble and excellent than others, and that men are capable of pursuing these objects on account of their excellence, not merely on account of the pleasure derivable from that excellence by way of self-satisfaction or otherwise, nor by way of mere senseless habit as a miser loves his gold, but for the sake of that excellence itself. They also believe that the evidence of this real and intrinsic excellence lies in a certain internal and authoritative approval or admiration, the proof of which is in itself—clear to those who see it—incommunicable to those who do not—an approval sometimes taking the form of an infallible appreciation of axiomatic truth (as in recognizing the excellence of truth, justice, and benevolence), sometimes that of a fallible

instinct (as in a disgust at all that is called unnatural); but in all cases apart from and claiming precedence over pleasure. And finally, they believe that the choice between excellence (say) and pleasure, or between other particular motives which can be reduced to no common measure or logical comparison, is, at least in certain cases, effected by an inscrutable and self-sustained power called free-will.

This view of human nature, when carefully examined, is encumbered with much that is puzzling, all which is summarily swept aside by the Benthamite theory of man.

According to Mr. Bentham, it is impossible that a man can be really actuated by any other motive than that of securing pleasure or avoiding pain. And it is his single duty, in the only rational sense of the word, so to form his own disposition and govern his own conduct, as to secure as much as possible of one, and avoid as much as possible of the other.

Before a theory of this nature such words and ideas as "moral sense," "right reason," and "natural rectitude,"—or, I add, such as "conscience," "moral dignity," or "natural decency,"—do indeed fall like docks and nettles before the scythe of the mower. And it was by the keen completeness with which Mr. Bentham applied this weapon to the relentless demolition of all that rests on intuitive approval or disapproval that he captivated the youthful intellect of Mr. John Mill.

To say that pleasure is the only possible object of desire, is to say that nothing can be desired except in proportion as it seems to be pleasurable. Some persons (including eventually, as we shall see, Mr. John Mill) have shrunk from this inevitable conclusion. But Mr. Bentham was not one of them. His catalogue of pleasures, indeed, included the most exalted as well as the most despicable. But he utterly repudiated the notion that one pleasure is made better or worse than another by being exalted or despicable, if only the quantity is equal.

Benevolence, truth, justice, chastity, and the rest, are only valuable when, and so far as, they conduce to the interests of those whose interests are in question; that is, as I understand, the interests of an individual if he is considering the matter by himself and for himself—the interests of a community when they embrace his own, and when, therefore, he finds himself forced to a collective consideration of profit and loss.

As this statement of Bentham's fundamental dogma may not be universally acknowledged, I subjoin a few passages from his "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," quoting from an edition published in 1823, which may be taken therefore to represent his opinions at the period on which we are engaged. The italics are Bentham's.

The treatise opens as follows :—

“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, *pain* and *pleasure*. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, and in all we think. Every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their empire, but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while.” (Chap. i. § 1, p. 1.)

Pleasure being thus, in the general, our only sovereign master, it becomes requisite to frame a principle of valuation for the comparison of particular pleasures. Their value, he says, must depend exclusively on the following considerations :—

1. The intensity of the pleasure.
2. Its duration.
3. Its certainty.
4. Its propinquity.
5. Its fecundity (or its tendency to produce more pleasures).
6. Its purity (carefully explained to mean its non-liability to produce subsequent pain).

And lastly—

7. (When the interests of many persons are in question) its extent—or the number of persons who will share it. (Chap. iv. §§ 2, 3, 4, pp. 50, 51.)

It will be seen that every element of value (except perhaps the questionable one of propinquity) turns on mere quantity—to the exclusion of every form of sentiment or other heterogeneous idea. This it is that gives Bentham the logical completeness in which he delights, and which he drives home with a genuine pleasure in his own paradox.

“A motive,” he says, “is substantially nothing more than pleasure or pain operating in a certain manner.

“Now pleasure is in itself a good—nay, even setting aside immunity from pain—the only good. Pain is in itself an evil; and indeed, without exception, the only evil, or else the words good and evil have no meaning. And this is alike true of every sort of pain and every sort of pleasure. It follows, therefore, immediately and incontestably, *there is no such thing as any sort of motive that is in itself a bad one.*”

And, to avoid all possibility of misapprehension, he adds, in a note :—

“Let a man’s motive be ill-will; call it even malice, envy, cruelty; it is still a kind of pleasure that is his motive; the pleasure he takes at the thought of the pain which he sees, or expects to see his adversary undergo. Now even this wretched pleasure—[Why wretched? It may be in the highest degree intense, certain, immediate, and fruitful in expectation of similar pleasures]—even this wretched pleasure, taken by itself, is good. It may be faint, it may be short, it must be at any rate impure—[Why so, as far as the individual is concerned?—yet

while it lasts, and before any bad consequences arise, it is as good as any other that is not more intense." (Chap. x. §§ 9, 10, pp. 169, 170.)

The same sentiment, at bottom, is expressed in the Deontology compiled by Dr. Bowring from Bentham's MSS. :—

"The talisman of arrogance, indolence, and ignorance is to be found in a single word, an authoritative imposture, which in these pages it will be frequently necessary to unveil. It is the word 'ought' . . . If the use of the word be admissible at all, it 'ought' to be banished from the vocabulary of morals."—*Deontology*, vol. i. pp. 31, 32.

I do not say that this is philosophically consistent with all that Mr. Bentham and his disciples may say elsewhere. That is their affair. But it is unequivocal—as unequivocal as an unparalleled ability for plain-speaking can make it, and cannot be taken in a non-natural sense without destroying that incisive coherency which constitutes the attractive force of Benthamism.

And how is it that such a creed—I will not say can be made the foundation of a religion, but—can be made consistent with one, with a religion "in one of the best senses of the word"—of a religion "the inculcation and diffusion of which could be made the principal outward purpose of a life," and would thus supply an object of practical devotion? An answer, if it did not suggest itself, would be suggested by the sequel of Mr. Mill's history.

However we may explain the fact, men in general certainly have hearts. And I should like any one who is in this respect *unus multorum*, to ask himself one question—"Could any evidence on earth persuade me to believe, and to act on the belief of two propositions—first, that I have not the power, and therefore am under no obligation, to pursue any other object than my own greatest enjoyment; secondly, that this enjoyment is to be found in a course of unflinching treachery, injustice, and cruelty?" Let any honest man, who is not tied hand and foot to a philosophical creed, try to imagine himself endeavouring to accept such a conception of things as a practical rule of conduct, and he will, I think, see before him an imperative impossibility of doing so—an impossibility invulnerable to logic, not sufficiently explained by habit; but even if so explained, still, in fact, positive and ineradicable.

Now I have not the slightest doubt, indeed the fact is evident, that many Utilitarians are men of elevated and tender characters; and though capable, like their neighbours, of yielding to temptation, are as incapable as their fellow-men of adopting falsehood and ferocity as a rule of life. The practical conclusion which inevitably follows from the two foregoing premisses is as abhorrent to them as to any one else. So, as their philosophy will not allow them to deny the major premiss (that pleasure is the only good), their nature makes it an article of faith to deny the minor

(that vice can be true happiness). They justify personal virtue by assuming, with a confidence which, if God is not and conscience is only a fantasy, I do not quite comprehend, that a man will find his own happiness in devoting himself to that of others. This *concordat* between the nature of a Utilitarian and his philosophy can, by a certain not very convenient stretch of language, be called a "religion." It makes it possible for a high-minded man, on the platform of selfishness, to embrace practically a noble course of life, justified ostensibly by a philosophical deduction (which I do not desire to scrutinize too closely), but based in reality on that deep sense of goodness and aspiration after it which religious men identify with religion, and which compels those who deny its authority on paper to find in practice some excuse for obeying it.

It was in this sense that Mr. Mill extorted what he called a religion from Benthamism. He found in it a career which satisfied at once his philosophy and his nature—his philosophy because it was pleasant, his nature because it was lofty. His stunted affections and his nascent aspirations were struggling for an outlet. He had been taught to seek this in public spirit. And Bentham seemed to show him to what great and interesting purposes that public spirit might be turned.

Some years of happiness followed. But in his full career of Benthamist usefulness he found himself sharply arrested by something within.

"From the winter of 1821, when I first read Bentham, and especially from the commencement of the *Westminster Review*, I had what might truly be called an object in life, to be a reformer of the world. My conception of my own happiness was entirely identified with this object. The personal sympathies I wished for were those of fellow-labourers in this enterprise. I endeavoured to pick up as many flowers as I could by the way; but as a serious and permanent personal satisfaction to rest upon, my whole reliance was placed on this; and I was accustomed to felicitate myself on the certainty of a happy life which I enjoyed, through placing my happiness in something durable and distant, in which some progress might be always making, while it could never be exhausted by complete attainment. This did very well for several years, during which the general improvement going on in the world, and the idea of myself as engaged with others in struggling to promote it, seemed enough to fill up an interesting and animated existence. But the time came when I awakened from this as from a dream. It was in the autumn of 1826. I was in a dull state of nerves, such as everybody is occasionally liable to; unsusceptible to enjoyment or pleasurable excitement; one of those moods when what is pleasure at other times becomes insipid or indifferent; the state I should think in which converts to Methodism usually are, when smitten by their first 'conviction of sin.' In this frame of mind it occurred to me to put the question directly to myself, 'Suppose that all your objects in life were realized, that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to could be completely effected at this very instant, would this be a great joy and happiness to you?' And an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, 'No!' At this my heart sank

within me; the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down. All my happiness was to have been found in the continual pursuit of this end. The end had ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in the means? I seemed to have nothing left to live for." (Pp. 132, 133, 134.)

At first he hoped that the cloud would pass away. It did not. It seemed to grow thicker and thicker. His favourite books ceased to charm him. Great examples had lost their power over him. He did not love any friend sufficiently to confide in him. His father could not have understood him. His distress was not respectable in his own eyes. His achievement of precocious distinction had exhausted the resources of vanity and ambition, and thus selfish and unselfish pleasures (a more unmitigated Benthamite would have said self-regarding and extra-regarding) had alike ceased to please. He went about hardly remembering what he did; and his state during the "melancholy winter of 1826-1827" was one of such "dry, heavy, dejection" that he began to question the duty of living, and thought he could not bear such a life for more than a year.

Viewed in the light of the current moral philosophy, his case was an exceedingly curious and interesting, but also an exceedingly simple one. With all the impetus of enthusiasm he had struck on a rock not laid down in the Benthamite charts. It was the corner-stone of the adverse philosophy, and the whole fabric of the "religion" which had been found for him trembled at the shock.

Observe his case narrowly. It was not that human happiness having been, in fact, accomplished under his eyes, he unexpectedly found that it failed to give him pleasure; but that, placing the idea of this happiness before his mind, with all the license of expectant imagination, he found that he had ceased to desire it. Word it how he will, this is a true representation of his posture of mind. He did not find the water bad, but he had ceased to be thirsty. He was confronted by the perception that the pleasures of benevolence were beyond his reach unless he had an antecedent desire for the happiness of his fellow-creatures. And this, if true, is the contradiction and refutation of the cardinal principle which gives method and completeness to Benthamism.

But even if the end were worthless, could not the chase be continued for its own sake?

A fox-hunter does not cease to enjoy hunting because he ceases to desire the death of the fox. May we not pursue human happiness for the mere excitement of the game without caring whether the object of our pursuit is venison or vermin? Mr. Mill's answer rose from depths which his philosophy had not sounded, and was in the negative. An instinct which he did but imperfectly recog

nize told him that in this case at least the chase was a mockery unless the end had a substantial hold on the mind. "On ne badine pas avec l'amour," as a sentimental French play says. The benevolent sympathies are noble with a self-sustained nobility, and authoritative in virtue of that nobility—or they are nothing. If they are seen to be a mere amusement they cease to be even that. In real truth that sovereign compound of love and duty which is inadequately called conscience presented itself to him; and without knowing what it was he was appalled by it—appalled for six whole months. He saw it, but not, he thought, within him. Once apprehended, it terrified him by its absence from his own heart, though in truth he had all his life long been taught that he had no business to expect it there.

There are men who would not have been so terrified—men to whom the cynical "*bon estomac, mauvais cœur*" is a sufficing recipe for happiness. But John Mill was not among them.

He was not apparently an amiable youth, but his history shows him capable of passionate personal attachment, and a nature capable of strong affections will always seek an object for them. He was also an egotist. He could hardly have been otherwise. An object of his father's unremitting attention, and debarred from the penetrating discipline of boyish companionship, what could he think of but himself and his performances? Mr. James Mill, indeed, who to a philosopher's familiarity with the laws of human nature joined a philosopher's ignorance of that nature itself, seemed to suppose that he could check the inevitable risings of self-complacency by unsympathetic severity, which, as a wiser mother would have told him, could only drive it inwards. Finding himself twenty-five years ahead of his contemporaries, what prospect could he brood over but that of coming importance? Nursed in a philosophy whose claim to attention was that it reduced all motives to the prospect of personal pleasure, what could he consistently believe in but his own interests? The self-sufficiency which under these circumstances was almost unavoidable, shows itself in the gravity with which he pronounces those wrong who thought him a conceited boy, and in the intellectual Pharisaism (for it cannot be called less) with which he pronounces ordinary society unworthy of him (p. 228). But egotist as he thus became, he was susceptible—highly susceptible—to the idea of disinterested devotion to an object. At the bottom of his nature the yearnings of affection and the sense of duty lay hidden in unsuspected strength.

No doubt they had been kept under by a vigorous practical pedantry. To most children praise and blame are not only reward and punishment—they open the conception of a moral world—a world in which desert is real and admiration legitimate ;

in which certain acts are not only beneficial but "good," others not only inexpedient but "naughty." Not so Mr. James Mill. "In psychology," says his son, "his fundamental doctrine was the formation of all human character by circumstances, through the universal principle of association, and the consequent unlimited possibility" of improvement by education. Accordingly, as we have seen, praise and blame were to him mere instruments for the formation of expedient characters, by an arbitrary association of pleasurable ideas with expedient actions. They were to man what carrots or sticks are to a horse or an ass—engines of manufacture, not revelations of truth. It was this carrot and stick discipline to which Mr. John Mill was subjected, and which he accepted dutifully as flowing from that perfect wisdom of which up to this time his father had been the representative. But after all, humanity is ineradicable. A vigorous moral nature may be distorted, but it cannot be quite repressed. And Mr. Mill's mental disturbance was the insurrection of such a moral nature against a discipline which had given no object to his affections, and a philosophy which refused him a conscience. The *concordat* which had for some time furnished a *modus vivendi* between nature and philosophy had broken down; the understanding that his nature would submit to a selfish theory if his philosophy would justify an unselfish practice was for the moment torn up. Reversing the usual trials of youth, the dogmas of pleasure were face to face with the instincts of duty, and he had to choose between them.

All this, however, which to a commonplace observer is evident, Mr. Mill was by no means prepared to admit to himself. Indeed, if he had, he must have almost begun his philosophy anew. But neither was he altogether disposed to shirk the question which had been sprung upon him. He accepted conscientiously the obligation of explaining himself to himself in his own and his father's calculus—that is, without adopting the hypothesis of conscience as an independent motive power.

"My course of study had led me to believe that all mental and moral feelings and qualities, whether of a good or a bad kind, were the results of association; that we love one thing and hate another, take pleasure in one sort of action or contemplation, and pain in another sort, through the clinging of pleasurable or painful ideas to these things, from the effect of education or of experience. As a corollary from this, I had always heard it maintained by my father, and was myself convinced, that the object of education should be to form the strongest possible associations of the salutary class; associations of pleasure with all things beneficial to the great whole, and of pain with all things hurtful to it. This doctrine appeared inexpugnable; but it now seemed to me, on retrospect, that my teachers had occupied themselves but superficially with the means of forming and keeping up these salutary associations. They seemed to have trusted altogether to the old familiar instruments, praise and blame, reward and punishment. Now I did not doubt that by these means, begun early and applied unremittingly, intense associations of pain and

pleasure, especially of pain, might be created, and might produce desires and aversions capable of lasting undiminished to the end of life. But there must always be something artificial and casual in associations thus produced. The pains and pleasures thus forcibly associated with things are not connected with them by any natural tie; and it is therefore, I thought, essential to the durability of these associations that they should have become so intense and inveterate as to be practically indissoluble, before the habitual exercise of the power of analysis had commenced. For I now saw, or thought I saw, what I had always before received with incredulity—that the habit of analysis has a tendency to wear away the feelings: as indeed it has when no other mental habit is cultivated, and the analyzing spirit remains without its natural complements and correctives. The very excellence of analysis (I argued) is that it tends to weaken and undermine whatever is the result of prejudice; that it enables us mentally to separate ideas which have only casually clung together; and no associations whatever could ultimately resist this dissolving force, were it not that we owe to analysis our clearest knowledge of the permanent sequences in nature; the real connections between things not dependent on our will and feelings; natural laws, by virtue of which, in many cases, one thing is inseparable from another in fact; which laws, in proportion as they are clearly perceived and imaginatively realized, cause our ideas of things which are always joined together in Nature, to cohere more and more closely in our thoughts. Analytic habits may thus even strengthen the associations between causes and effects, means and ends, but tend altogether to weaken those which are, to speak familiarly, a *mere* matter of feeling. They are therefore (I thought) favourable to prudence and clear-sightedness, but a perpetual worm at the root both of the passions and of the virtues; and, above all, fearfully undermine all desires and all pleasures, which are the effects of association—that is, according to the theory I held—all except the purely physical and organic, of the entire insufficiency of which to make life desirable no one had a stronger conviction than I had. These were the laws of human nature, by which, it seemed to me, I had been brought to my present state. All those to whom I looked up were of opinion that the pleasure of sympathy with human beings, and the feelings which made the good of others, and especially of mankind on a large scale, the object of existence, were the greatest and surest sources of happiness. Of the truth of this I was convinced, but to know that a feeling would make me happy if I had it, did not give me the feeling. My education, I thought, had failed to create these feelings in sufficient strength to resist the dissolving influence of analysis, while the whole course of my intellectual cultivation had made precocious and premature analysis the inveterate habit of my mind. . . . And there seemed no power in nature sufficient to begin the formation of my character anew, and create in a mind now irretrievably analytic fresh associations of pleasure with any of the objects of human desire.” (Pp. 136—139.)

Pleasures of sense he saw had a real foundation in our nature; and accordingly the most searching analysis could but establish their substantial character. But then they were wholly insufficient for the happiness of a human being. Moral pleasure—pleasure in the happiness of others, was, to a man who was susceptible of it, the surest source of happiness. But then analysis showed that the happiness of others was at bottom no affair of ours; and under the solvent force of this demonstration all our happiness must evaporate, unless in early life, the trick (so to call it) of taking pleasure in doing good had been too firmly fastened in the

mind, as an invincible prejudice, to be affected by any intellectual exposure. To him the exposure had come before the prejudice was inveterate. The truths of analysis had taken root, and it was no longer possible "in a mind now irretrievably analytic" to create fresh associations of pleasure with beneficence. To one who believes that moral phenomena revolve round conscience, the explanation itself is a curious spectacle. It is like the lucubration of a Ptolemaic astronomer, trying to impose upon an audience of Copernicans the system of cycles and epicycles by which he was himself obliged to methodize the sidereal movements, until he should convince himself that the earth went round the sun.

There, however, it was—Mr. Mill's account of the situation.

Philosophy appeared to have gained the day—a philosophy of despair. But the nature which he had repudiated came to his aid. The mighty mother, who had alarmed him, put forth at last her hand to soothe. "After half a year a small ray of light broke in upon my gloom. I was reading accidentally Marmontel's '*Mémoires*,' and came to the passage which relates his father's death, the distressed position of his family, and the sudden inspiration by which he, then a mere boy, felt and made them feel that he would be everything to them—would supply the place of all that they had lost. A vivid conception of the scene and its feelings came over me, and I was moved to tears. From this moment my burden grew lighter. The oppression of the thought, that all feeling was dead within me, was gone. I was no longer hopeless; I was not a stock or a stone. I had still, it seemed, some of the material out of which all worth of character" (in which, in spite of his philosophy he could not help believing) "and all capacity for happiness are made" (pp. 140, 141).

The cloud broke; he recovered by degrees his interest in life, and was never again so miserable as he had been. He had at least affections, or the capacity of them. But his intellect stood firm. He was still determined to believe that this unselfishness of which he felt the supreme necessity had not really anything in it. A fresh concordat had to be negotiated; and a fresh compromise was patched up on the old basis, but with a difference. Philosophy was to reign over his creed, but nature was to dictate his practice. He held firmly to the great Benthamite principle that the end of all human action must be the personal happiness of the agent, but he determined that men must act as if it were not.

"I now thought that this end (happiness) was only to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy, I said, who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness—on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming at something else they find happiness by the way. . . . The only chance is to treat not happiness, but some end external to it, as the purpose of life. . . .

This theory now became the basis of my philosophy of life. And I still hold to it as the best theory for all those who have but a moderate degree of sensibility and of capacity for enjoyment, that is, for the majority of mankind." (Pp. 142, 143.)

A less direct concession to the moral principle was, that he seems now to have felt the importance of *being* something as well as *doing* something. "I for the first time gave its proper place among the prime necessities of human well-being to the internal culture of the individual." Poetical and other susceptibilities became valuable in his eye. And in particular he was fascinated by Wordsworth's power of putting spiritual life into natural scenery. Wordsworth taught him "that there was real permanent happiness in tranquil contemplation, . . . not only without turning away from, but with a greatly increased interest in, the common feelings and common destiny of mankind." "The delight which these poems gave me proved that with culture of this sort there was nothing to dread from the most confirmed habit of analysis" (p. 148).

Thus virtue might properly be cultivated, not only as an exciting career, but, among other susceptibilities, as a pleasant dream. "The intensest feeling of the beauty of a cloud lighted by the setting sun is no hindrance to my knowing that the cloud is vapour of water, subject to all the laws of vapour in a state of suspension; and I am just as likely to allow for and act on these physical laws whenever there is occasion to do so, as if I had been incapable of perceiving any distinction between beauty and ugliness" (p. 152). So apparently we may admire the beautiful prismatic colours of the bubble virtue while perfectly aware that the touch which destroys its spherical conformation will reduce it to a spray of soap and water.

Nature had not yet quite done with him. During the few following years he "found the fabric of his old and taught opinions giving way in many places; and never allowed it to fall to pieces, but was incessantly occupied in weaving it anew" (p. 151). He — was occupied in an immense amount of transitional thinking.

"Much of this, it is true, consisted in rediscovering things known to all the world, which I had previously disbelieved or disregarded. But the re-discovery was to me a discovery, giving me plenary possession of the truths, not as traditional platitudes, but fresh from their source; and it seldom failed to place them in some new light by which they were reconciled with, and seemed to confirm while they modified, the truths less generally known which lay in my early opinions, and in no essential part of which I at any time wavered." (P. 168.)

Something of this kind came to pass in regard to the *rerata questio* of free-will, which now began to exercise him.

"During the later returns of my dejection the doctrine of what is called philosophical necessity weighed upon me. I felt as if I was scientifically

proved to be the helpless slave of antecedent circumstances; as if my character and that of all others had been formed for me by agencies beyond our own control, and was wholly out of our own power. . . . I pondered painfully on the subject, till gradually I saw light through it." He rediscovered "that, though our character is formed by circumstances, our own desires can do much to shape those circumstances, and that which is really inspiring and ennobling in the doctrine of free-will is the conviction that we have real power over the formation of our own character; that our will, by influencing some of our circumstances, can modify our future habits or capacities of willing."

And with this he seems to have been satisfied, though he admitted as "most true" (Logic, book vi. cap. 2, sec. 3, vol. ii. p. 426) that this very "will to alter our character is given, not by any effort of ours, but by circumstances which we cannot help. It comes to us from external causes or not at all." To this fatal objection he replies with an odd kind of ingenuity, that if we desire to change ourselves we can do so, and if we do not it does not signify—and therefore that we have (as I understand) all the freedom which we want—all that is necessary to give us spirit and nobility. His experience does not inform him, it seems, that the inability to desire is as oppressive as the inability to obtain what we desire—that men every day wish in vain that they could change their wishes, and groan under the inexorable necessities of a character which they cannot throw off by any inner force of which they are masters. Surely what has been said of the father may be repeated of his pupil, that, learned and ingenious as he may be in what concerns the laws of human nature, he is greatly ignorant of that nature itself. The empire of circumstance is not less oppressive or humiliating because it is exercised through as well as over the will. The slavery does not cease to be slavery because the will itself is subdued by it, nor power become "real" which is only exerted by such an enslaved will.

Mr. Mill had to confront the usual dilemma. Either man has a real and ultimate power over some of his own actions, or he has no such power. If he has, he is to that extent a first cause; if he has not, he is altogether a machine. Mr. Mill had a philosophical conviction that he was not himself a first cause, but was driven to despair by thinking himself a mere machine. However, he received consolation himself, and offers it to others, in the thought that a will—though not a free one—is among the cog-wheels of his machinery. I do not myself see how this mends matters. But Mr. Mill was able to stop his own mouth with it. And so the arrangement between his intellectual and moral self was for the moment rounded off. He could pursue noble objects, telling himself that he pursued them for their own sakes. He could use freely the language of moral approval and blame, and could indulge the feelings which

they express. Indeed the personal character and teaching of our Saviour seem to have inspired him with a kind of enthusiasm, partly of regret at the great opportunity which was lost to the world, but partly, also, of real, though one-sided admiration. The belief which he had derived from Marmontel in his own capacity of affection must have been confirmed by a passionate attachment to the wife of a friend, whom he ultimately married, and to whose portraiture a great part of his subsequent autobiography is devoted. But his practical recreancy from the Benthamite system did not shake his philosophical fidelity to the principle which had originally captivated him. To the notion of a moral sense—whether innate or connatural, inborn or uprising—he was as determinedly opposed as in the heyday of his Benthamite enthusiasm.

The result appears in his book on "Utilitarianism." He was not a man to be satisfied without rationalizing, to his own satisfaction, a conclusion so uncongenial as that the cardinal principle of his philosophy was true in theory and false in practice. And here he supplies a harmony. He proclaims as unreservedly as ever the great negative on which his system rests, that "pleasure and freedom from pain are *the only* things desirable as ends, and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the Utilitarian as in any other system) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain." (Utilitarianism, p. 10, Ed. 1871.)

From this unambiguous first principle Bentham, as we have seen, drew the corollary which logic and the coherency of his system required. To say that pleasure is the only thing desirable is surely to say that nothing is desirable except in proportion to the quantity of pleasure which it contains. A smaller quantity of pleasure cannot be more desirable than a greater, except in virtue of some desirable element other than its pleasurable-ness. But by hypothesis no such element exists. If a benevolent pleasure is more intense and durable than one of malignity, it must be better worth having. If not, it cannot. To eke out its deficiency by speaking of benevolence as noble, excellent, or obligatory, is to say that nobility, excellence, or performance of duty, are desirable in themselves, independently of the pleasure they confer. This is to introduce "ought" in disguise, and re-establish the reign of "caprice." Bentham's great engine of argumentative destruction the interrogative "why?" applies to it directly and conclusively. The question "why" I prefer a greater pleasure to a less, or a less pain to a greater, answers itself. And therein is the force of Benthamism. But "why" am I to prefer a noble to an ignoble pleasure? Why am I to prefer the pleasure of others to my own the two being shown to be really in conflict? No answer is

possible except by appealing to a sentiment which acknowledges another object of desire beyond and besides pleasure.

But this necessary consequence Mr. Mill refuses. "It is quite compatible," he says, "with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some *kinds* of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. . . . It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality should be considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone." (Utilitarianism, pp. 11, 12.) Not at all absurd, but, on his own theory, natural if not necessary. If "all other things" are only valuable as instruments of pleasure, and if they are only instrumental to pleasure in virtue of some quality, it is plain that the first condition of their value is that they should have as much as possible of this quality; the second that they should be themselves plentiful. On the other hand, if we can detect in all that is valuable one only element of real value, it is, to say the least, not absurd to imagine that this element should be only measurable against itself in respect of its amount, unaffected by any accidental peculiarities which leave that amount unchanged.

Mr. Mill, however, proceeding on this difference of kind, constructs for himself a certain "sense of dignity" which seems no better than conscience, shorn of its imperial breadth and flexibility; and then, without further justification, goes on to claim self-devotion as a possible Utilitarian virtue, and to declare that "the Utilitarian morality does recognize in human beings the power of sacrificing their own greatest good for the good of others" (p. 24).

That is to say, he holds at the same time, first, that it is not possible for man to desire anything but pleasure, and next that it is possible for him to sacrifice his own pleasure to that of others—not for his own greater pleasure but absolutely.

And, with all this, he is unreasonable enough to charge the assailants of Utilitarianism with injustice (p. 24) because they refuse to recognize his change of front, and point out, with the author of his philosophy, that Utilitarianism is nothing if not selfish. "The assailants of Utilitarianism," he says, "seldom have the justice to acknowledge that the happiness which forms the Utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness but that of all concerned." And then he proceeds to expand this doctrine as composedly as if it were not directly contradictory to the cardinal principle of Bentham, which he adopts unreservedly.

It must have been in virtue of his fidelity to Bentham, and, notwithstanding his infidelity, that he found himself called on to take in hand the demolition of self-evident truths. Bentham, we have

seen, had convinced him that phrases like "the law of nature," "right reason," "the moral sense," "natural rectitude," and the like, were disguised dogmatism unjustified by reason. But the course of controversy led Mr. Mill to see that, if it was possible for truths to be mathematically self-evident, it might also be possible for them to be morally self-evident, and therefore that so long as mathematical truths were admitted to be self-supporting, Bentham's work remained incomplete. He set to work to complete it by showing that nothing at all was self-evident, but that mathematical, like moral truths, were founded on experience.

"The notion that truths external to the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness, independently of observation and experience, is, I am persuaded, in these times, the great intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions. By the aid of this theory every inveterate belief and every intense feeling, of which the origin is not remembered, is enabled to dispense with the obligation of justifying itself by reason, and is erected into its own all-sufficient voucher and justification. There never was such an instrument devised for consecrating all deep-seated prejudices. And the chief strength of this false philosophy in morals, politics, and religion lies in the appeal which it is accustomed to make to the evidence of mathematics and of the cognate branches of physical science. To expel it from these is to drive it from its strong hold; and because this had never been effectually done, the intuitive school, even after what my father had written in his 'Analysis of the Mind,' had in appearance, and, as far as published writings were concerned, on the whole, the best of the argument. In attempting to clear up the real nature of the evidence of mathematical and physical truths, the 'System of Logic' met the intuitive philosophers on ground on which they had previously been deemed unassailable, and gave its own explanation, from experience and association, of that peculiar character of what are called necessary truths, which is adduced as proof that their evidence must come from a deeper source than experience."—*Autob.*, p. 225.

I wish to clear this issue in my own way, at the cost of saying what is extremely familiar to everybody who has thought on the subject, and, indeed, has been, in part, already said. The question is not to what extent every man has in his own heart a monitor which informs him what is right and what is wrong in particular cases as they arise. The Utilitarian may, without inconsistency, admit the existence of a certain moral tact, analogous to a poetical or artistic instinct, speaking the truth in its own department—not, indeed, infallibly—but with greater promptitude and subtlety than ratiocination. We may have different analyses of the phenomenon, but we need not differ about its existence. The real issue I understand to be this. Those whom Mr. Mill calls the intuitive school maintain that, as in mathematics, the human mind, having embraced as possible the conceptions of space and equality, perceives with certainty, as an ultimate and necessary truth, that spaces which are equal to the same are equal to each other; so the same human mind, having embraced as possible the conceptions of free-will,

of happiness, and of misery, perceives with the same certainty, as another self-sustained and necessary truth, that a free agent who delivers himself over to willing and effecting the misery of others is worse than one who devotes himself over to willing and effecting their happiness, and, more than this, that in the distribution of pleasure and pain there is a certain fitness (in the absence of other reasons) in assigning the greater share of pleasure and the lesser share of pain to the better rather than the worse being. In other words, they claim for the human mind, when sound and mature, the power first of forming a moral conception only to be embodied in such words as "good" and "bad," and secondly, of seeing axiomatically that benevolence and justice are "better" than malignity and injustice.

This it is which Mr. Mill denies: and because he denies it in the sphere of morals, he has to deny it in the sphere of mathematics. With regard to morals, he says that we have no internal sense which supplies us with authoritative conceptions of goodness and desert; but holds (as I understand) that circumstances will, if we are reasonably fortunate, have impressed on our natures certain associations of pleasure with acts which are conducive to the benefit of our fellow-creatures—that it is their interest and ours to cultivate these associations by means of praise and blame, reward and punishment—that this almost universal interest leads to an almost universal and frequently unconscious conspiracy for this purpose—and that the outcome of this almost universal conspiracy is the feeling which we call approval, and erect into a religion. With regard to mathematics, he says (as I understand), that the habit of finding without exception, and under every conceivable test, that things equal to the same are equal to each other, disables us from imagining that in some very different order of things, this may not be the case, and leads us to suppose ourselves capable of perceiving this intuitively as a necessary truth. Even if my understanding of Mr. Mill is imperfect, thus much is clear, that the question, whether moral and mathematical truths are founded on intuition or on experience, pierces to the very root and origin of all human knowledge, on which I shall endeavour to exhibit the conclusions which Mr. Mill finds himself obliged to adopt.

Those conclusions are to be found in the third chapter of the third book of his "Logic," to which, as we have seen, he refers. Induction, which is, according to him, the sole firm basis of all that we know, may be summarily defined as a "generalization from experience." But then it is inevitable to ask, by what right human beings generalize? On what ground, in the absence of intuition, do we expect that because under the same circumstances, the same thing has happened for ten thousand years, it will

happen again when next the same circumstances recur? Granted that millions upon millions of men have died, why therefore should we expect to die ourselves? Our warrant for this expectation is to be found, according to Mr. Mill, in "a universal fact," differently described by different philosophers, but expressed by him in the proposition that "the course of nature is uniform."

But then the question recurs (still in the absence of intuition), how are we to know that the course of nature has been or will be uniform in matters beyond our experience? Mr. Mill is at some pains to reply that this is itself an induction of the largest kind—a generalization from experience, resting on particular facts ascertained by almost infinite observation.

The course of argument will be most simply represented in a series of questions and answers:—

Why are we to believe any abstract or general truth whatever?
Because of experience.

Why are we to believe experience?

Because the course of nature is uniform.

Why are we to believe that the course of nature is uniform?

Because of experience.

Why are we to believe experience?

Because the course of nature is uniform. And so on, *ad infinitum*.

That is to say, the foundation of all human knowledge (except that of particular facts) is to be sought at the bottom of a bottomless pit, only accessible by perpetually arguing in a circle.

The explanation by which Mr. Mill attempts to mitigate the apparent audacity of this reasoning, will be found in the twenty-first chapter of the third book of his "Logic." I reproduce in his words what I understand to be its pith:—

"The assertion that our inductive processes assume a law of causation [explained to mean invariable and unconditional sequence], while the law of causation is itself a case of induction, is a paradox only on the old theory of reasoning, which supposes the universal truth, or major premiss in a ratiocination to be the real proof of the particular truths which are ostensibly inferred from it. According to the doctrine maintained in the present treatise, the major premiss is not the proof of the conclusion, but is itself proved along with the conclusion from the same evidence."—*Logic*, vol. ii. p. 105.

Surely this is mere mystification. In the part of his treatise to which Mr. Mill refers, he points out, with truth (like many others before and after him), that men practically argue from particulars to particulars, dispensing with an explicit major premiss. But what has this to do with the present question, which is whether without the assumption of some general principle any particulars

will warrant any conclusion at all? No manipulation of major premisses will enable him to show that the validity of the inductive process can be proved by induction. What is a *petitio principii* if this is not?

It is fair perhaps to add a passage in which Mr. Mill attempts (as I should say) to disguise the collapse of his theory.

"I agree with Mr. Bain," he says, "in the opinion that the resemblance of what we have not experienced to what we have, is, by a law of our nature, *presumed through the energy of the idea* before experience has proved it."

"Stick a feather in his crown," says the nursery song, "and call him Macaroni." What is this law of our nature, forcing belief through the energy of an idea, but intuition with a feather in his crown?

But leaving this argument to take care of itself, and fully admitting, what of course is undeniable, that experience is one of our great teachers of truth, I desire to exhibit the consequences of adopting it for sole teacher, as they are accepted by Mr. Mill.

And first, with regard to self-evident truths in general, I submit an observation. If a herd of animals are seen at a distance, a very long-sighted man can tell us more immediately and more certainly than his neighbour what they are. But if one of the animals is put on the table, his advantage ceases, and his neighbour, not being absolutely blind, or delirious, or subject to special delusion, can see as clearly as he can that a dog is a dog. Nor is this equality impaired, even though the long-sighted man may be the first to tell the colour of the dog's eyelashes, or, being a zoologist, may perplex the neighbour much by cross-examining him as to the exact difference between a dog and a cat.

I venture to think that something like this is true of the intellect. In a subtle or extended or intricate question, a man of knowledge and capacity sees his way before an average thinker has well mastered the meaning of the terms used. But in matters of extreme simplicity (happily for mankind) this difference almost vanishes. Newton's maid-servant could probably see that two and one made three as clearly as the great astronomer himself. It is conceivable that she might even have beaten him in drawing simple conclusions, by use of the four first rules of arithmetic. And so it is a matter of frequent experience in practical matters that the clever man misleads himself by his own subtlety, and even obscures what he can understand by the dust which he raises in searching for what he cannot. In elementary matters, therefore, I claim, for men of fair sense, seriousness, and education, the right to place much reliance on their own distinct perceptions, in

the face of high authority, and in spite of all that Mr. Mill may point out respecting human liability to error.

Now, as to these axioms, the more I (as an average man) examine my own mind, the more completely I find myself satisfied about them. If I am informed that in a particular case two spaces which are equal to the same have been found not to be equal to each other, or that two units added to three have been found to be more than five, I say, with a confidence beyond what any experience could give, that the thing cannot be. I refuse to involve myself in arguments to which Mr. Mill introduces his readers respecting the inconceivable, and the unbelievable, and the unthinkable, and the incompatible. I know my own meaning, and, such as it is, have expressed it to my own satisfaction in monosyllables, and I deny that it receives any new light from being expressed pentasyllabically. "I see that it can not be." The name of Mill and the more formidable name of Herschel—more formidable not merely from the eminent capacity of Sir John Herschel, but because his opinion (I assume) was not formed under the pressure of controversy—do not overpower me. How can I believe, on the authority of these great men, that two and two may possibly make five, when even their own existence is less clear to me than that two and two only make four? *Provoco ad populum.*

To some extent Mr. Mill agrees with me. He appears to admit that the conclusions of experience cannot be absolute. I suppose he cannot help himself. Indeed when we consider the possibilities of the universe, infinite space before and behind, infinite time before and after—perhaps also within the same space and time, or emancipated altogether from the laws of space and time, infinitely numerous and infinitely different orders of existence incapable of physical or intellectual contact with each other—when we recollect all this, it becomes quite extravagant to suppose that the observation of facts for a few pitiful thousands of years on the surface of an extremely insignificant member of a single trumpery sidereal system can furnish ground for a generalization which shall extend to all space and time, and all other things which are not space and time. In order to warrant so gigantic an application of a principle it is indispensable to be convinced that the principle is necessarily true—a conviction which experience alone cannot give. Of all this Mr. Mill seems fully aware, and he limits accordingly the authority of experience. He is prepared to believe that in other orders of existence two and three may be equal to four, and that distances equal to the same may not be equal to each other. That a straight line is everywhere the shortest distance between two points he will not pronounce, though he does not doubt it to be true in the region

Of the fixed stars, where (he says) we have ample reason to believe that the present constitution of space exists. (Logic, i. 363.) But he goes farther still. Our fundamental belief "that the same proposition cannot be true and false at the same time" is, according to him, no exception from the general law of axioms, being in fact "one of our first and most familiar generalizations from experience." It shares, therefore, the nature of other generalizations, in being limited by the experience on which it is founded. And in worlds of which we have no experience Mr. Mill was bound to believe, and, I doubt not, did believe it conceivable that the same proposition might (of course in the same sense) be true and false.

That any person who understands what he himself means by the word "true," and who also understands what he himself means by the word "false"—*i.e.*, not true,—should be of opinion that under certain conditions the same thing should be one and the other, is to my apprehension so enormously impossible that, reflecting on the matter as quietly as I can, I feel a difficulty in escaping the conclusion that either I am or he must have been in a state of mental derangement.

And now, whether Mr. Mill is right or wrong, I will attempt to summarize some of his conclusions.

On the one side is the theory that we are capable of desiring particular things independently of the pleasure they give us; and, among the rest, that man has an intuitive sense of goodness which makes goodness in its multitudinous forms desirable. On the other side is the theory that pleasure is the only possible object of desire, and experience the only foundation of knowledge.

The following are some of the conclusions to which the great anti-intuitionist and Utilitarian teacher finds himself driven:—

First, that though the theory of disinterested action may be false in philosophy, yet it must in the vast majority of cases be adopted as a rule of life, if life is to be worth having.

Secondly, that it is possible to act disinterestedly, though it is impossible to desire anything but our own interest.

Thirdly, that an intuitive certainty that good is good (unfounded as it is) is as respectable as an intuitive certainty that equals to the same are equal to each other.


Fourthly, that if we substitute experience for intuition as the basis of knowledge, that basis is to be reached by the process commonly called "arguing in a circle," at the bottom of a bottomless pit.

And lastly, Mr. Mill would not, I imagine, shrink from the conclusion that in the extremely remote region to which the foundations of all human knowledge are thus relegated, the conditions

of existence may be such that even if the intuitive theory (or anything else) be absolutely false, this need not prevent its being entirely true.

If the intellect of our universities (as I understand to be the case) is being moulded into accordance with this philosophy, it appears to me that we may expect some startling conclusions from the rising generation. Whether these conclusions will be long maintained, either by the thinking or by the unthinking part of the world outside, is another matter.

BLACHFORD.



AUTOMATISM AND EVOLUTION.

*"Semper ego audier tantum? nunquam reponam
vexatus toties. . . ."*

THE eloquent and learned address delivered by Professor Tyndall at Belfast, in the autumn of 1874, followed by what was termed the "brilliant vindication" of Professor Huxley, may be considered to mark an epoch in philosophical thought, as being a full, formal, and public recognition of the doctrine of EVOLUTION carried out to its logical conclusion. This conclusion is precise and intelligible, and may be summed up in two short propositions, the second being the natural and inevitable corollary of the first—

1. MATTER IS ALL-POWERFUL AND ALL-SUFFICIENT.
2. MAN IS ONLY A SENTIENT AUTOMATON.

The enunciation of doctrines such as these, on such authority, and before such an assembly, could not fail to cause great excitement, both amongst the few who think for themselves, and the many who allow others to think for them, and to form their opinions. And whilst they were received at the time with "whirlwinds of applause," and have since been upheld with enthusiasm, as being the "death-knell of superstition," and the signal for the "emancipation of thought," there have not been wanting earnest and enlightened seekers after truth wherever it was to be found, who have not only refused to accept this *teaching* and its "logical consequences," but have been unable to see in it anything more

than a flimsy framework of hypothesis, constructed upon imaginary or irrelevant facts, with a complete departure from every established canon of scientific investigation.

The enthusiasm on the one hand, and the opposition on the other, are sufficiently comprehensible. It is less easy to understand the indignation, the dislike, and the apprehension with which these utterances have been received. Nothing can be more certain than that every man has a perfect right, moral and social, as well as legal, to express before a scientific assembly any opinion that he may hold in science or philosophy. It is, therefore, worse than unmeaning to complain, as certain critics have done, that Professor Tyndall has "abused his position as President of the Association" in enunciating views "subversive of religion and morality" as understood by them.

Still more misplaced and illogical is the alarm that has been felt, and expressed in no measured terms, as to the consequences of these doctrines. Two simple reflections might at once set at rest all these apprehensions. The first is the self-evident consideration that *one truth can never contradict or be opposed to another*, to whatever department of knowledge or belief they may respectively belong. The second is, that statements made, and opinions expressed, on the personal authority only of men of great scientific eminence, are not necessarily scientific truths. The first duty of all thinking men, before expressing adhesion, attempting compromise, or manifesting alarm, is to inquire, "Are these doctrines *true*?" If they prove after proper investigation to be so, we may certainly leave the consequences to take care of themselves, feeling well assured that they will disturb no other truth in any domain of thought. But in this investigation no amount of mere assertion or authority must be allowed to rank as demonstration or proof.

Professor Huxley, in concluding his very able address, dwells some little time upon the "logical consequences" of this doctrine, but suggests that any inquiry into these matters should be carried out, irrespective of these. He says—

"The logical consequences are very important, but in the course of my experience, I have found that they were the scarecrows of fools, and the beacons of wise men. Logical consequences can take care of themselves. The only question for any man to ask is this: 'Is this doctrine true or is it false?' No other question can be taken into consideration until that is settled. And as I have said, the logical consequences of doctrines can only serve as a warning to wise men to ponder well whether the doctrine be true or not, and to test it in every possible direction."

This is a fair challenge, and the issue is simple and direct. *Is this doctrine true?* Not who has said it, or what great authorities have upheld it, or under what overwhelming prestige it has been

Advanced, or what adventitious support it has received from personal or other sources. Nor, on the other hand, is it the question, "Is *any other* doctrine, theory, or tradition true or false?" Every other question it is proposed to set aside for the time being, and to inquire solely, "Is the doctrine of Evolution (of which Human Automatism is the logical outcome) true?"

Perhaps, however, there may be an inquiry worth pursuing for a brief space even before this which concerns the *truth* of the doctrines. We may ask, "Do the sponsors for these statements really mean what their words seem to imply? or are they like children playing in the dark, of whom the bolder and more adventurous take pleasure in practising upon the fears of their weaker companions?"

Professor Tyndall discerns in matter "the promise and potency of all terrestrial life." But does he really mean this? It would not have been very surprising if, with his devotion to, and perhaps unrivalled facility for, physical investigation, he had lost sight of another order of phenomena, which cannot be interpreted in terms of matter. But this is not the case. In his essay on "Scientific Materialism"* he distinctly recognizes in the facts of consciousness *another* class of phenomena, the connection of which with physics is *unthinkable*, and speaks in set terms of "two classes of phenomena" the "chasm between" which must ever "remain intellectually impassable." This reduces the omnipotence of matter to a very innocent cry of "Wolf."

It is, doubtless, possible to *assert* that the "two classes of phenomena" are equally due to matter, although the causative connection between them cannot be traced, or even *thought*; but such assertion must necessarily lack all scientific value. And indeed, if made, it would be answered by the author himself, far more completely than I could hope to answer it. No longer ago than November, 1875 (see *Fortnightly Review*, p. 585) Professor Tyndall quotes and *adopts* the words of Du Bois Raymond, to the effect that "it is *absolutely and for ever inconceivable* that a number of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen atoms, should be otherwise than indifferent as to their own position and motion, past, present, or future;" and adds, in his own words, that "the continuity between molecular processes and the phenomena of consciousness . . . is a rock on which materialism must inevitably split whenever it pretends to be a complete philosophy of the human mind."

In the same essay (p. 595) the author intimates that if our "capacities" were "indefinitely multiplied," he could *imagine* that we should observe "not only the vegetable, but the mineral

* Fragments of Science. p. 121.

world, responsive to the proper irritants ;" in other words, we should find that mere elementary matter is endowed with the attribute of consciousness or sensation. Referring to this, it was recently well and tersely observed by Mr. Martineau, that "you will get out of your atoms by Evolution exactly so much, and no more, as you have put into them by hypothesis." I may add that on the same principle we might make any number of baseless assertions on any scientific subject whatever, and defend their obvious inaccuracy on the grounds of the imperfection of our senses, or of our instruments of research.

Professor Tyndall again refers (see "Scientific Materialism," p. 419) to "the relation of physics to consciousness" as being "invariable." I have no doubt the writer firmly believes in this assumption ; and its assertion on such high authority will weigh powerfully with many ; yet it needs no profound acquaintance with modern physiology and pathology to convince us that no such "invariable relation" can be verified ; that in fact, it does not exist.

Comparing these various utterances, we cannot but see that "the promise and potency" of life and mind which Professor Tyndall discerns in matter must be understood with many limitations ; and that he himself most carefully guards us against attaching to these words a literal significance.

It has, however, been asserted, as supporting this proposition, that "naturalists *prove* that there are no other forces in nature beside the physical, chemical, and mechanical,"* and that therefore all the phenomena of life and mind must be due to them ; although "as to the *how*, it must be confessed that our knowledge is but scanty." The latter clause of the sentence is perfectly true ; the former stands closely related to most of the assertions on which the modern doctrine of Evolution is built. That some naturalists and (so-called) philosophers *assert* this, with marvellous monotony and perseverance, is true enough ; that they *prove* it, that they even make the most distant approach to proving it, is altogether opposed to the truth. I hope at some future time to enter more fully into this subject ; at present I content myself with affirming it to be demonstrable that whatever evidence we may be able to adduce for the existence of matter and physical forces there is corresponding evidence, at least as strong (I think *much* stronger), for the existence of something, *certainly not material*, in any ordinary or legitimate acceptation of the term, which is antagonistic to matter in its activities, and which we are accustomed to call mind.

Professor Huxley defines man as being "a conscious auto-

* Büchner's *Force and Matter*. Preface, p. xxvii.

maton ;” but, perhaps, lest the assertion should be too strong food for his weaker brethren, he qualifies it immediately by saying that the automaton is “endowed with free will, in the only intelligible sense of that much-abused term ; inasmuch as in many respects we are able to do as we like.”*

An “automaton endowed with free will” is certainly a pleasing and interesting novelty in physical science ; and Mr. Huxley deserves great credit for his ingenious invention. It would have been an intellectual treat to listen to him replying to any unfortunate opponent who had committed himself so profoundly. Meanwhile his proposition, taken as a whole, is simply suicidal ; for as no one, to my knowledge, ever considered *free will* to signify anything else but the power *to do as we like*, the definition of man as being an “automaton endowed with free will” leaves him exactly where it found him ; that is, as an intelligent free agent.

In entering formally upon the proposed inquiry, are these doctrines true ? it will clear the way to ask first what support they receive (1) from comparative analogies, and (2) from what has been called “the aggregate common sense” of mankind.

1. It is not easy to find any satisfactory illustration or analogy from comparative anatomy or physiology. Professor Huxley adduces the case of the frog, which can stand, balance itself, jump, avoid obstacles, and perform a variety of acts simulating volition, when all connection between the brain (the centre of volition) and the limbs is severed. The facts are interesting ; they are also well known, and indisputable ; but the inferences from them are hasty and altogether unwarranted. It can by no means follow, that because *certain* acts of some animals *may be* automatic, *all* their acts *are* so.

But even supposing, for the sake of the argument, that this had been proved, that all the motions of a frog in the normal state were automatic, and might, in fact, be performed as well without as with a brain ; the question would naturally arise, How far will these experiments and conclusions apply to the higher animals ? And on trying the same mode of investigation upon any of the warm-blooded quadrupeds we should arrive at the absolute certainty that no such results could be obtained. A dog or cat, for instance, will not live for one moment after division of the spinal cord at its junction with the brain ; much less will it perform any quasi-voluntary acts. In these, as in man, under certain diseases or injuries, some simple reflex motions may be elicited ; but nothing that resembles complex voluntary action in any way. It has never occurred to any physiologist to doubt that *certain*

* *Fortnightly Review*, Nov. 1874, p. 577

motions and actions in man are automatic; nor that a much greater proportion of the actions of the lower animals must be considered so; but it would require many intermediate steps of argument to enable us from this to conclude that man is an automaton.

2. What has the "aggregate common sense" of mankind to say to this question? Does any man's personal experience lead him to the conclusion that he is an automaton? I think not. It is only as a sequel to reasoning, or pseudo-reasoning, that he arrives at this stage of confusion. On the contrary, every sane man knows that, within certain limits, physical, social, legal, and the like, he can exercise a definite power of *choice* as to what he will do, and what he will leave undone. And that this kind or appearance of choice is not delusive, is admitted by Mr. Huxley himself, candidly, even if reluctantly. In his essay on "The Physical Basis of Life" he confesses that "*our volition counts for something as a condition of the course of events*;" and that this "can be verified experimentally as often as we like to try,"*—so recognizing our personal consciousness as authoritative and trustworthy, to this extent;—and as quoted above, in his latest essay, he allows that "we are in many respects able to do as we like."

In what sense, then, are we supposed to be automata? Mr. Huxley seems to be playing a little game of bo-peep with the idea: first, we are automata pure and simple; that we are *conscious* automata is granted, but apparently rather by way of concession to prejudice. Then we find ourselves endowed with free will and power "to do as we like." And finally it appears that "there is no proof that any state of consciousness is the cause of change in the motion of the matter of the organism," and that "the feeling we call *volition* is not the *cause* of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act."†

Some special training in mental gyration is certainly required to enable us to follow, without vertigo, these ever-changing phases of opinion. A plain man, attributing only the ordinary and received meanings to words, might well be justified in asking, "What does it all mean?"

It is highly desirable, in a case like this, where the general conviction and "aggregate common sense" of mankind are set aside as untrustworthy, to ascertain in what the *truth* of a doctrine consists, and on what it depends. If assertion and reiteration, on high authority, constitute truth, then are these doctrines very true indeed; but perhaps that will not be contended. On the other hand, they are not *necessarily* untrue, *because* opposed to the general conviction and consciousness of men. I *think*, for instance,

* Lay Sermons, p. 145.

† *Fortnightly Review*, Nov. 1874, p. 577.

that in any given act A, I exercise my volition V, to change my place by locomotion, to escape sensation S. But if I am assured that S directly excites in my nervous system the change which effects A, and that my sensation V, which I erroneously suppose to be volition, is only a "symbol" of the state of brain so produced, I have no absolute and incontestable answer to the allegation, except such as arises from the *dicta* of my own consciousness, and from the testimony of all other men.

In the same way, a person who is generally called "colour-blind" may tell me that all ripe cherries are of the same colour as the leaves of the tree. I can but reply that I see them differently, and that, with very few exceptions, all men do the same. Should he reply that he and the few exceptions alone see rightly, and that I and all the world are subject to diseased vision, I do not know that the argument could be profitably prolonged. The truth is, that in all such questions as these, our ultimate appeal must and will be to the evidences of our own consciousness. It may be proved to us again and again that this evidence is unreliable,—that consciousness is liable to this, that, and the other error, physiologically and pathologically. We know, when we come to reflect, that this much-despised consciousness is at the very root of *all* our knowledge and *all* our belief; and that if we propose to reject its testimony, we *pro tanto* close our *only* source of information.* We may for a moment be startled by being told gravely and authoritatively that we are only conscious automata, as we should be if assured with equal solemnity that some marvellous change had suddenly occurred in the colour of our skin or hair. But as in the latter case we should look in the glass, and trust implicitly to its evidence as revealed through our consciousness; so in the former, when told that we can neither think, act, nor move, except automatically, we arise and walk, if we so wish it, and our consciousness says, "*Solvitur ambulando.*"

If a speaker in an assembly, or a piece of music in a concert, displease me, I *think* I balance in my own mind the advantages and disadvantages of leaving the room, and *feel* that I act accordingly. If this idea of mine is deceptive, and I am only obeying a state of brain of which my "supposed volition is a symbol," I am certainly acting automatically; but in that case, it is not true that *my volition counts for anything in the course of events*, which Mr. Huxley asserts to be the case. In regard to any individual act or motion, it is no doubt impossible, except by personal consciousness,

* A distinguished and learned writer, whom for the present I forbear to name, lately urged the necessity of studying the operations of the mind by investigating the structure and functions of the brain; because from the unreliableness of our consciousness, no other course offered any hope of success. The idea is amusing enough; but would have been more practical had it been further shown how we were to dispense with this unreliable auxiliary.

to *prove* that it is not automatic; but in that case the suggestion of free will in any form is out of place. On the other hand, if the said act be the result of any intelligible form of volition, it certainly is not the act of an automaton. One or the other view we must adopt; there is no compromise or alternative possible.

The assertion, however, that "Man is but a conscious automaton" does not profess to be based on the results of experience or consciousness, but upon considerations connected with his nature and origin. It is, as stated in the outset, the logical and inevitable corollary of the doctrine of Evolution. If this doctrine, as now held by a large and powerful section of the scientific world, does indeed, as it professes, afford the only possible solution of the various problems of ontology, then it follows naturally and of necessity, that matter is all-sufficient, and that man is an automaton, "without spirit or spontaneity." Then is our immortality a dream; volition, choice, and responsibility are mere delusions; virtue, vice, right, and wrong, are sounds without possible meaning; and education, government, rewards, and punishments, are illogical and mischievous absurdities. Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we shall be carbonic acid, water, and ammonia.

It cannot be too clearly understood that the *consequences* of a doctrine afford no argument whatever against its acceptance. My reason for briefly enumerating some of them here is that I have met with many earnest and even educated men who have accepted these doctrines without investigation, *because* propounded on high authority, without reasoning or reflecting what these consequences were, or what is their logical sequel.

It is evident, however, that the importance of these results renders it absolutely necessary to inquire What is this doctrine? and what is its scientific value? For this inquiry the time is fully ripe. Evolution, which not long ago was modestly, even somewhat timidly, advanced as offering a rational solution of certain natural phenomena, is now boldly set forth, with unlimited pretension, as affording the only possible or thinkable system of nature. The last edition of the gospel of Evolution, the "Constructive Philosophy" of Mr. Herbert Spencer, is announced as "stereotyped," conveying a significant intimation that the system is now complete, and that no further advance in that direction is probable or required; and those who do not accept it are described as only "those who have not kept pace with the recent advances in natural history," or "who have lagged behind in science," and as generally unworthy of consideration. Evolution, in one word, is the Shibboleth of modern progress.

"The question of questions for mankind," says Professor Huxley,* "the

* *Man's Place in Nature*, p. 57.

problem which underlies all others, and is more deeply interesting than any other, is the ascertainment of the place which man occupies in nature, and of his relations to the universe of things. Whence our race has come; what are the limits of our power over nature, and of nature's power over us; to what goal we are tending; are the problems which present themselves anew, and with undiminished interest to every man born into the world?"

By the conclusions of Evolution, these problems would appear to be definitively solved. As to man's origin, it is now *known* that he is the last term in a long but uninterrupted series of developments, beginning with "cosmic gas," and effected without "the intervention of any but what are termed secondary causes."* As to his present relations to the universe of things, and his power over nature, he is an automaton, and nothing more than a "part of that great series of causes and effects which, in unbroken continuity, composes that which is, and has been, and shall be, the sum of existence."† To what goal *the race* is tending is not yet satisfactorily known, but individually, the man resolves into carbonic acid, water, and ammonia, and has no more personal future existence than a consumed candle.

The earliest condition of our world (or universe) presents itself to the "eye of the imagination" as a vast expanse of "cosmic gas," in which it is to be inferred that there exists but one form of matter, and probably only one form of force or motion.

After this we catch glimpses of a "fiery cloud," in which "not alone the more ignoble forms of life, not alone the nobler forms of the horse and lion, not alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but the human mind itself—emotion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena . . . all our philosophy, all our poetry, all our science, and all our art—Plato, Shakespeare, Newton, Raphael"—all are supposed to be "latent" and "potential."‡ (See the foot-note ‡ at p. 551 also.)

Then follows a long period of cooling and contraction, by means of which the crust of the earth is formed, and the once homogeneous matter becomes differentiated by a process to be alluded to hereafter. Watery vapours are condensed; seas, rivers, and lakes are formed; and thus the earth is prepared for the appearance of Life, which is first recognized under the form of sea-slime, or mucus (Haeckel).

Opinions are not quite in unison as to the mode in which this living mucus or "*protoplasm*" (Oken) arises; but all are agreed that it is a product of inorganic matter and force without any creative intervention. Oken's account is direct and unhesitating—"Light shines upon the water, and it is salted. Light shines upon the salted sea, and

* *Man's Place in Nature*, p. 108.

† *Fortnightly Review*, Nov. 1874, p. 577.

‡ Professor Tyndall on the Scientific Use of the Imagination.

it lives."* Perhaps this would scarcely be considered sufficiently explicit as a scientific statement. Mr. Herbert Spencer, the "Apostle of the Understanding," as he is termed by Professor Tyndall, is much more circumstantial. Thanks to him, we now know exactly how organic matter is formed out of inorganic material. It is in this wise:—

"Certain of the ethereal waves falling on them [*i.e.*, the carbonic acid, water, and ammonia] . . . there results a detachment of some of the combined atoms, and a union of the rest. And the conclusion suggested is that the induced vibrations among the various atoms, as at first arranged, are so incongruous as to produce instability, and to give collateral affinities the power to work a re-arrangement which, though less stable under other conditions, is more stable in the presence of these particular undulations."†

And, to quote a well-known prestigiator, "*that's the way it's done.*"

Having arrived by this simple and lucid process at the sea-slime, mucus, or protoplasm, there seems to be no further difficulty or doubt. The *monera* is the first form of individual life, and this "was formed from inorganic matter" (Haeckel). Then by successive evolutions we pass through amoeboids, worms, polyzoa, and ascidians, "which last produced the two remaining stripes of the vertebrata and the mollusca." Amongst the vertebrata are found sundry families of apes, from one of which, the Catarhini, man is directly and lineally descended.

Those who wish to verify this abstract are referred to Dr. Haeckel's "Natural History of Man," or to what is more readily accessible to the many, Professor Huxley's excellent review of the same, entitled the "Genealogy of Animals," as also to Mr. Darwin's "Descent of Man." I have not attempted here to give more than the barest outline of the general idea of the doctrine of Evolution.

From the gravity with which these statements are enunciated, from the vast number and weight of the books written in support of them, and from the enormous amount of learning and research of which they seem to be the result, it might well appear as though this were a system founded on knowledge and observation. It is somewhat difficult to realize the idea that all this is but a figment of the imagination; and that at the best it is but a hypothesis, in direct support of which not one single fact in the whole range of natural history or palæontology can be adduced.

It is in this doctrine that is illustrated what Professor Huxley calls "Nature's great progression, from the formless to the formed, from the inorganic to the organic, from blind force to conscious intellect and will." We find man set forth as a natural and inevitable product of the inorganic world, without "the intervention of any but what are termed secondary causes,"‡ and necessarily with

* Elements of Physiophilosophy, Sec. 905.

† Principles of Biology, vol. i. p. 82.

‡ Man's Place in Nature, p. 108.

only such attributes as attach to such a material origin. He is an automaton and nothing more.

This is a conclusion summary enough, but the end is not yet. The tendency of Evolution is to reduce all force to one expression or formula, and *that* the mechanical. Mental phenomena are but higher expressions of the ordinary vital and nutritive changes; *these* are but the chemistry of quaternary compounds; and chemical force in its turn is not to be distinguished from mechanical, except under the penalty of sacrificing all claim to enlightened views. In the *Fortnightly Review*, for February, 1869, Professor Tyndall says:—"I do not think that any really scientific mind at the present day will be disposed to draw a substantial distinction between chemical and mechanical phenomena." And thus the modern school of philosophy recognizes but *one force*; all nature, whether living or dead (if indeed there is any difference between the two), is but mechanical.

It appears further, according to this system of philosophy, that not only is there but one force in nature, but there is only "one ultimate form of matter, out of which the successively more complex forms of matter are built up."* And finally it would seem that matter itself, as generally conceived, does not necessarily exist, but may be only a "phenomenal centre of energy" or force;† and thus we arrive at Cimmerian darkness, where "naught is everything, and everything is naught."

This, although a meagre and bare, is, I believe, a tolerably faithful outline of a system, which is now *known* to afford the only possible solution of the mystery of the universe, a conclusion the grounds of which "will never be shaken,"‡ a doctrine not founded "on the basis of vague conjecture, but of *positive knowledge*."§ It is contrasted with the doctrine of "special creation," by Mr. Herbert Spencer, much to the disadvantage of the latter; and the comparison concludes thus:—

"The belief which we find thus questionable, both as being a primitive belief, and as being a belief belonging to an almost extinct family, is a belief that is not countenanced by a single fact. No one ever saw a special creation; no one ever found proof of an indirect kind that a special creation had taken place. It is significant, as Dr. Hooker remarks, that naturalists who suppose new species to be miraculously originated, habitually suppose the origination to occur in some region remote from human observation."||

If this be intended for argument, it is certainly double-edged.

* Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 155.

† Matter is only a "*hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness*."—*Physical Basis of Life*, p. 143.

‡ Darwin's *Descent of Man*, vol. ii. p. 385.

§ Professor Tyndall's Belfast Address, p. 5.

|| *Principles of Biology*, vol. i. p. 336.

Did any one ever see an Evolution? or did any one ever see *proof* of an Evolution having taken place? The answer must be No! however circuitous and veiled it may be. In the remaining allegation, there is an unconscious and childlike innocence that almost disarms criticism. The system that demands "ten or a hundred thousand generations" for the development of the distinguishing characters of a single species, and a world so different from its present state that not even a trace of its existence remains, can scarcely object logically or consistently to the relegation of certain phenomena to a "region remote," whether in time or in space.* And with all this, those who do not or cannot accept this Evolution doctrine are denied the possession of the very faculties of thought or belief. To any one who says that he *thinks* the universe was created, Mr. Spencer replies, "No! you do not think so, for such a doctrine is not thinkable." And to those who say they *believe* in a Creator and a creation, Mr. Spencer replies, "No, you do not believe, you only believe you believe."† Surely this is the very Dundrearyism of philosophy.

But it is far from my present object to discuss or uphold the theory ("if it can be so called") of creation, or of any other system of ontology, in opposition to Evolution. Creation is no more accessible to proof "from experimental demonstration" than is Evolution. It is not a *scientific* doctrine, and those who believe in it do so on far other than scientific grounds. The question is not whether the doctrine of creation is tenable or otherwise, but whether that of Evolution is true or not.

It is not altogether easy to approach this question so as to obtain a decisive answer. If we treat it as a scientific inquiry, and ask for some confirmatory evidence, we are told almost plaintively, that "the strength of the doctrine of Evolution consists not in an experimental demonstration."‡ If we further inquire how it is to be approached, and in what its strength *does* consist, we fail to get any definite answer, except some vague statement, as to "its general harmony with scientific thought." Indeed the attitude of Evolution is entirely exceptional. It seems to be taken for granted that the doctrine possesses some esoteric and mysterious principle of vitality and credibility, which makes it independent of any support from science or certain knowledge. We have a right, however, to expect, if it be a true philosophy, that whenever it comes into relation with the results of observation

* "If it were given to me to look beyond the abyss of geologically-recorded time, to the still more remote period when the earth was passing through physical and chemical conditions which it can no more see again than a man can recall his infancy, I should expect to be a witness of the evolution of protoplasm from not-living matter."—*Professor Huxley's Critiques and Addresses*, p. 239.

† *Vide Principles of Biology*, vol. i. p. 337.

‡ *Professor Tyndall's Address*, p. 58.

and experience, it shall not be found *opposed* to these. How far this is the case, further inquiry will show.

The first question that arises then is this : *Is it true* that there is originally but one form of matter ? Mr. Herbert Spencer says that there is “reason to suppose” so ; and that “by the different grouping of units, and by the combination of the unlike groups each with its own kind, and each with other kinds, it is supposed that there have been produced the kinds of matter we call elementary.”* The “*reason to suppose*” all this, and the subsequent *supposing* of it, seem to exist only in Mr. Spencer’s own mind ; and to have their *raison d’être* in the emergencies of the “constructive philosophy.” It is known to chemists that a very few of the now supposed simple bodies may be *suspected* to be compound, as one or two of the gases and some less known bodies ; but I have never heard of any “reason to suppose” that iron, phosphorus, iodine, and gold were composed of different arrangements of the same units since the time when alchemy gave place to chemistry.† A captious person might perhaps be disposed to ask, also, how it happened that with one form of matter and one force any “different groupings” or “further combinations” could possibly occur. But this would doubtless be dismissed as a frivolous detail.

An excellent illustration is afforded by this subject of the mode in which the “constructive philosophy” is built up, and of the gigantic strides that are taken from conjecture to certainty in the interests of the Evolution hypothesis. Mr. Spencer, having seen “*reason to suppose*” such and such things, as already quoted, in the very next paragraph, and without adducing any proof whatever, treats these suppositions as ascertained facts, and proceeds to build upon them as if they were solid foundations of scientific truth in this wise—“If, then, WE SEE (!) that by unlike arrangements of like units, all the forms of matter, apparently so diverse in nature, may be produced,” &c., &c.‡ Such being the received method§ of evolving science out of personal consciousness at the present day, it ceases to be subject for surprise that so many volumes of such portentous dimensions should have appeared, containing so little absolute addition to our certain knowledge of nature.

Is it *true* that there is but one form of force ; that chemical and

* Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 155.

† Büchner, a most thorough-going Evolutionist, affirms on the contrary, that “nitrogen, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, sulphur, and phosphorus possess their inherent qualities from eternity”—implying by this that all the elementary bodies are eternally different.

‡ P. 28. *Op. cit.*

§ A curiously similar instance of *evolution* of truth occurs in Professor Tyndall’s Essay on “Scientific Materialism.” In one sentence (Fragments of Science, p. 120), he states that “we should, on philosophic grounds, *expect to find*” such and such physical conditions ;—and in the next commences an induction from the same, with the phrase, “The relation of physics to consciousness *being thus* invariable !”—a relation which, as I have above pointed out, does not exist in any demonstrable form, if at all.

mechanical forces are fundamentally the same? Generalization is very pleasant, very attractive, and very philosophical when it is legitimate, and when the resultant formula covers and includes *all* the phenomena treated of; but it is eminently injurious to the advancement of knowledge if these conditions be not fulfilled; when from detached facts a desperate guess is made at analogies and resemblances which do not exist in nature. It may be fairly questioned whether we are not getting on too fast, and whether true science will not rather be hindered than advanced by such rash leaps in the dark. For what advantage is it to us to say that chemical force is mechanical in its operation, if we have at the same time to explain that it is something different? Surely this tends to great confusion of thought as well as of verbiage. If we fasten together two plates of iron with screws or rivets we *call* the union mechanical. If we dissolve these iron plates in mineral acids we *call* the process chemical. It is certainly convenient to know by different names processes that differ so much, and until their virtual identity is much more clearly demonstrable than it is at present, the advantage of further generalization is problematical.

But both in this order of phenomena, and in some others to be noticed hereafter, the authoritative statements as to "identity" of matter, force, or essence, are so extraordinary, and so impossible to be received or comprehended by the ordinary intelligence, that some special theory seems to be required to account for them; and I would venture to suggest one that would perhaps remove many difficulties and misunderstandings. I cannot but suppose that with a new philosophy there has arisen a new language or terminology, in which words have not the same meaning as they formerly had. One illustration will explain the bearing of this theory. On February 2, 1871, Professor Tyndall delivered a discourse at the Royal Institution on "The Identity of Light and Radiant Heat." The lecture was, as usual, interesting in the extreme; and the experimental illustrations were of that brilliant and striking order that apparently he alone can accomplish. But a considerable part of these illustrations were absolutely dependent upon the *differences* that exist between light and radiant heat, as in the following experiment:—

"A horizontal beam of light was reflected upwards by a plane mirror, and when *the light was cut off* by the introduction of the opaque cell, a *powerful beam of reflected heat was proved still to remain*. The luminous beam was then totally reflected to a horizontal direction; the light was again cut off, and a powerful deflection of the galvanometer needle was obtained by the *residual heat-beam*."*

In this, and several other experiments to show *identity*, we saw

* Proceedings, 1871, p. 419.

the beam of heat separated from the beam of light by *reagents*, so to speak; radiant heat would pass where light would not, and so on.* I conclude, therefore, that words of this kind have now a different signification to that which they formerly possessed, and that when Professor Tyndall speaks of chemical and mechanical forces being substantially the same, he intends to imply that they are as different as they well can be; and in like manner when, as we shall find shortly, Professor Huxley can see *no difference* between the formation of water from its elements under the influence of the electric spark, and the assimilation of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen by a living organism, it may be that he intends to imply that the two processes are utterly and irreconcilably different,—in which he will be quite correct.

But the real question as to the *truth* of Evolution commences at the next step in "Nature's great progression," that is, in the progression from the inorganic to the organic. Of this part of the doctrine Mr. Huxley is the best-known and most distinguished exponent. He claims no originality for the idea of Protoplasm as the "Physical Basis of Life," but he has made it all his own, and inseparably associated it with his name, in England at least, by the inimitable charm of style, and the marvellous fertility of illustration with which he has invested it, in the well-known essay in the *Fortnightly Review* for February, 1869. This essay was written, as it appears, with the double object of showing† that all life, activity, and intelligence, are solely due to the arrangement of the molecules of ordinary *matter*,—and that *materialism* has no sound philosophic basis.‡ His mode of reconciling the latter proposition with the former will perhaps appear hereafter; the doctrine in question is as follows:—

The Physical Basis or Matter of Life is "*Protoplasm*." This is composed "of ordinary matter, differing from it only in the manner in which its atoms are aggregated, and is again resolved into ordinary matter when its work is done."§

"The matter of life . . . breaks up . . . into carbonic acid,

* Professor Tyndall explained, in his treatise on "Light," published in 1873, that when he said "identity," he did not mean identity in "all respects."

† See *Yeast*, p. 90.

‡ In Professor Huxley's essay on the "Genealogy of Animals," he thus states the "fundamental proposition of Evolution:"—"That proposition is, that the whole world, living and not living, is the result of the mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of the forces possessed by the molecules of which the primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed. If this be true, it is no less certain that the existing world lay, potentially, in the cosmic vapour; and that a sufficient intelligence could, from a knowledge of the properties of the molecules of that vapour, have predicted, say the fauna of Britain in 1869, with as much certainty as one can say what will happen to the vapour of the breath in a cold winter's day." And yet Professor Huxley "repudiates" the materialistic philosophy, and states in "*Yeast*," that one great object he had in view in writing his essay on the "Physical Basis of Life," was to "show that what is called Materialism, has no sound philosophical basis!"

§ P. 136. This and the following references are to the pages in the original essay in the *Review* above mentioned.

water, and ammonia, which certainly possess no properties but those of ordinary matter. . . . Carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen are all lifeless bodies. Of these carbon and oxygen unite in certain proportions, and under certain conditions, to give rise to carbonic acid; hydrogen and oxygen produce water; nitrogen and hydrogen give rise to ammonia. These new compounds, like the elementary bodies of which they are composed, are lifeless. But when they are brought together, under certain conditions, they give rise to the still more complex body, protoplasm; and this protoplasm exhibits the phenomena of life.

"I see no break in this series of steps in molecular complication, and I am unable to understand why the language which is applicable to any one term of the series may not be used to any of the others.

"When hydrogen and oxygen are mixed in a certain proportion, and an electric spark is passed through them, they disappear, and a quantity of water, equal to the sum of their weights, appears in their place. . . .

"Is the case in any way changed when carbonic acid, water, and ammonia disappear, and in their place, under the influence of pre-existing protoplasm, an equivalent weight of the matter of life makes its appearance? . . .

"If scientific language is to possess a definite and constant signification whenever it is employed, it seems to me that we are logically bound to apply to the protoplasm, or physical basis of life, the same conceptions as those which are held to be legitimate elsewhere. If the phenomena exhibited by water are its properties, so are those presented by protoplasm, living or dead, its properties.

"If the properties of water may be properly said to result from the nature and disposition of its component molecules, I can find no intelligible ground for refusing to say that the properties of protoplasm result from the nature and disposition of its molecules."*

This, then, assumes to be a scientific statement, clothed in "scientific language," and as such, it is amenable to ordinary investigation as to its accordance with, or departure from, the known facts of science. I have quoted it at length, first, because it is rarely that in the history of Evolution we are brought face to face with anything that resembles *science*; and secondly, because it is the most important link in the chain of the doctrine, and with the demonstration of its truth or error Evolution stands or falls. If we are compelled to acknowledge the formation of living from non-living matter, by ordinary chemical affinities, Evolution has made good its position—all the rest is mere detail—and man is an automaton, "without spirit or spontaneity." If, on the other hand, it can be demonstrated that there is, and can be, no truth in this part of the doctrine, Evolution has no *locus standi*, and must relinquish all pretension to existence as a scientific hypothesis. To this statement of Professor Huxley's, then, I propose to apply the test suggested by himself, and inquire, "*Are these doctrines true?*"

I know of no form of negation sufficiently explicit, compre-

* In Professor Huxley's essay on Yeast (see Critiques and Addresses, p. 90), he denies ever having "said anything resembling" the assertion that "life matter was due only to chemistry,"—and that such an assertion would be "absurd!"

hensive, and emphatic in which to reply to this question. The doctrines as here stated are so utterly at variance with the most familiar facts of chemistry that it is marvellous they should have so long passed unchallenged.* If Professor Huxley expresses an *opinion* on a matter of science or philosophy, it is doubtless worthy of all consideration, *as such*, but if he makes a scientific statement, couched in "scientific language," then it is as open to scientific criticism as if the veriest tyro had said it.

To enter into detail: it is in no sense true that protoplasm "breaks up" into carbonic acid, water, and ammonia, any more than it is true that iron, when exposed to the action of oxygen, "breaks up" into oxide of iron. A compound body can only break up into its constituent parts; and these *are not* the constituent parts of protoplasm. To convert protoplasm into these three compounds requires an amount of oxygen *nearly double the weight* of the original mass of protoplasm; speaking approximately, every 100 lbs. of protoplasm would require 170 lbs. of oxygen.

Under *no possible "conditions"* can carbonic acid, water, and ammonia, when brought together, "give rise to the still more complex body, protoplasm." Not even on paper can any multiple, or any combination whatever of these substances, be made to represent the composition of protoplasm, much less can it be effected in practice. Carbonic acid (C O_2), water ($\text{H}_2 \text{O}$), and ammonia (N H_3) cannot by any combination be brought to represent $\text{C}_{36} \text{H}_{26} \text{N}_4 \text{O}_{10}$, which is the equivalent of protein or Protoplasm.

But the most incredible of all the errors, if it be not simply a mystification, is found in the comparison between the formation of water from its elements and the origination of protoplasm. Hydrogen and oxygen doubtless unite to form an equivalent weight of water; that is, an amount of water equalling in weight the combined weights of the hydrogen and the oxygen; and Professor Huxley asks, "Is the case in any way changed when carbonic acid, water, and ammonia disappear, and in their place, under the influence of pre-existing protoplasm, an equivalent weight of the matter of life makes its appearance?"

The answer is, Certainly; the case is changed in every possible way in which a process, whether chemical or otherwise, can be changed. But it must also be premised that the fact as stated is *not true*, that when these three substances disappear, under certain conditions, an "equivalent weight of the matter of life makes its appearance." Every chemist knows what an "equivalent weight" means—knows also that there can be no weight of protoplasm "equivalent," chemically speaking, to any amount of carbonic

* Unchallenged, that is, on purely chemical grounds. On other issues, both relevant and irrelevant, they have been often objected to.

acid, water, and ammonia that may or can have disappeared. These are simple, well-known, and understood chemical facts, and need no discussion. But granting for the moment, and for the sake of argument, that these bodies disappear, and that protoplasm appears, it is manifest—almost too manifest to require stating—that there is *no resemblance whatever* in the two processes by which the results which Professor Huxley considers identical are obtained. In the formation of water the whole of its constituent parts combine to form an equal weight of the compound; the case is entirely otherwise with regard to protoplasm, for here the so-called elements *do not combine at all*. On the contrary, they are uncombined or decomposed, by a process and by affinities most assuredly unknown in our laboratories. The carbonic acid and the ammonia are certainly decomposed, and whilst the carbon and nitrogen are assimilated, and add to the bulk of the plant, part of the oxygen is eliminated by the leaves, and part is destined to the performance of various functions in the economy.

Yet we are invited to see in this complex programme of decomposition, selection, fixation, and rejection, only a process analogous to the formation of water from its elements; and Professor Huxley can see “*no break*.” It might be interesting to inquire how wide a chasm must be before it is visible to an Evolutionist; and in the subsequent part of the inquiry it is probable that further illustrations will be met with of the Emersonian axiom that “the eye sees only what it brings with it the power of seeing.”

But what especially and generally distinguishes the formation of protoplasm from all these chemical processes is that it is never formed except under the immediate contact and influence of pre-existing and living protoplasm.

It is this which constitutes the “break” that Professor Huxley cannot see. It is this appearance of an *entirely new* and distinct order of affinities that annuls the force of Professor Tyndall’s truly elegant and powerful illustration of a curve whose elements have been determined “in a world of observation and experiment” being prolonged into “an antecedent world”—whence we “accept as probable the unbroken sequence of development from the nebula to the present time.”* There is, there can be, no one curve the elements of which will comprehend the phenomena of matter, of life, and of mind. There is no transition from one order of activity to the other; there is no “great progression from the inorganic to the organic.” To say otherwise is mere waste of time in asserting what is at once incapable of proof, and at variance with all known facts.

How such doctrines came to be received can only be accounted

* Scientific Use of the Imagination.

for in Professor Huxley's own words when treating on some other antagonistic "teaching," which he says was only "tolerable on account of the ignorance of those by whom it was accepted." Referring to some anatomical question, he says further that "it would, in fact, be unworthy of serious refutation, except for the general and natural belief that deliberate and reiterated assertions must have some foundation."* It is by this time tolerably clear that Professor Huxley's "Chemistry of Life" has no foundation except that of "deliberate and reiterated assertion."

If such be the case with the chemistry, what is to be said for the argument founded upon it, or attached to it—if, indeed, argument it can be called? Seeing "no break" in the processes by which life is evolved from inorganic matter, Professor Huxley jumps to the conclusion that we are no more justified in speaking of "vitality" than we should be in speaking of "aquosity," thus overlooking the most obvious necessity for distinguishing between things that differ. Water has none but physical properties, or in Professor Huxley's own words, none "but those of ordinary matter;" therefore we require no special term to express succinctly the sum of its properties. If we did, "aquosity" would be perhaps as good as any other. But a living organism has certainly some properties or functions which are materially different from those of "ordinary matter," *in addition to* those which it possesses as a chemical compound merely—that is, it *has* its mechanical and chemical relations, but it also has *something else*.

And here arises the distinction: we do not speak of "vitality" so long as we discuss protoplasm only in its physical and chemical relations, but when in addition to these it has life, we require something to express that life, and we call the sum of its functions its "vital properties."

Names are to know things by. We are accustomed to call a certain class of forces "mechanical," and in general we understand what is meant by the term. When we meet with other manifestations of force, apparently differing from these in energy, complexity, and what we might almost call *origination*,† we call these chemical, electrical, magnetic, and the like. Doubtless these are closely inter-related, and it *may be* also that they are "substantially" mechanical, according to Professor Tyndall's opinion. But it would not tend to clearness of thought, nor yet to comprehensibility of scientific language, to speak of the induced electric current as a mechanical phenomenon; nor of the effervescence of chalk on the addition of a strong acid as a magnetic manifestation.

Further, when we meet with phenomena indicating forces still

* *Man's Place in Nature*, p. 85.

† In a *motor* aspect.

more complex, still more active, and even *suggesting* spontaneity, we are not satisfied to sum these up under a category especially adapted to express only a simpler and lower order of energies. It appears unsatisfactory to call them chemical, electric, or magnetic, until we can demonstrate how these forces are disposed or combined so as to produce the complex manifestations of contraction, nutrition, and reproduction, to say nothing for the present of thought, sensation, and will. We want another and more specific name; and inasmuch as these acts are *essentially* and *exclusively* the acts of living matter, we call the *sum* of such actions "vitality," and the forces which immediately preside over their production "vital." Moreover, until their identity with the forces of inorganic nature can be demonstrated, or inferred on some better ground than vague conjecture, reckless assertion, or hasty generalization, we think ourselves authorized to believe in some essential difference. Vital or *organic* force or affinity is at least as different from chemical or magnetic force or affinity as these are from those of a mechanical order.

I have said "*as different*;" but this does not express the whole idea. Mechanical force is convertible into the others, under certain limitations, and the more active forces are all convertible into the mechanical. But by no known means are we able to convert any of these forces into the higher order of energy that we have called "vital." Even this is not all: not only are we unable to produce *living* force, but we are unable to make a combination of *non-living* matter out of inorganic elements, resembling in any way matter that may or can live. Supposing protoplasm to be only a chemical compound—which is not impossible—the affinities whereby it is held together belong to a chemistry of which we *know nothing*. We can decompose it into what we are pleased to call its elements, but it has never been re-formed, except under the direct agency of *actually living* protoplasm; and thus we are indebted not only for all organization, but for all organizable matter, to an *original, specific, and self-propagating endowment*. It is of small moment what this endowment, which we ever and entirely fail to imitate, is called. It is sufficient for us to know that, so far as our present knowledge extends (and we have no right to dogmatize on conjecture) it differs infinitely more from chemical or electric force than these differ from each other, or either of them from the mechanical. For anything I can see, the old expression "vital force" is as good as any other. In any case the difference is specific, and not one of degree merely; and it is no part of true philosophy to overlook such distinctions, or to ignore them to satisfy the exigencies of a formula or a creed.

This inability to construct organizable matter (say protoplasm) out of its elements, is without doubt a recognized difficulty in the

way of the absolute demonstration of Evolution. What is the usual answer to it, or method of meeting it? Mr. Huxley rather ignores it; but Mr. Herbert Spencer feels that it must be met, with some form of words at least, and his followers copy him verbatim. He says—

“The chasm between the inorganic and the organic is being filled up. On the one hand, some four or five thousand compounds, once regarded as exclusively organic, have now been produced artificially from inorganic matter: and chemists *do not doubt their ability** so to produce the highest forms of organic matter. On the other hand, the microscope has traced down organisms to simpler and simpler forms, until in the *Protozoa* of Professor Haeckel, there has been reached a type distinguishable from a fragment of albumen only by its finely granular character.”†

It seems incredible that this should be intended for serious argument. Does not every candid observer know that this said “chasm” is not in any way “being filled up;” and that the chemist could quite as easily construct a full-grown ostrich, as this despised bit of finely granulated albumen? And as for the “four or five thousand compounds,” as well might the goldsmith say that he did not “doubt his ability” to make gold out of a baser metal, because he had already moulded it and coloured it in four or five thousand different fashions. It is true that systematic writers on chemical science divide their subject into “organic” and “inorganic;” and also that, according to the individual views of the writer, many compound bodies are placed in one or other division interchangeably. It is further true that of late years many bodies once supposed to be exclusively of *organic origin*, have been artificially formed. But it is not in any sense true that any substance even distantly resembling *organizable* matter has been formed. The line of demarcation is as wide as ever. For what are these “organic” matters said to have been formed from their elements? They are chiefly binary and ternary compounds, as cyanogen, urea, certain acids of the compound radical class, some alcohols, ethers, and the like. Not one of them bears the most remote resemblance to anything that *can live*. Few of them contain nitrogen, and these few, chiefly *amides*, are only combinations of ammonia or ammonium with other binary or ternary compounds, and can only by courtesy or convention be allowed to be of “organic” nature. Neither chemically nor physically are they in any way allied to viable matter. One least particle of albumen, granulated or otherwise, would be a thousand-fold more crushing answer to the opponents of Evolution than myriads of such compounds.

* There are men who “*do not doubt their ability*” to square the circle; but this confidence in their own powers is not generally supposed to entitle them to the rank of great mathematicians.

† Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 137.

If rightly considered, the very success of modern chemistry in this domain, whilst an impassable barrier still prevents any progress towards the construction of *organizable* matter, should lead us to the conviction that the affinities of life and living matter belong to a chemistry of which we know nothing, and which we in vain strive to imitate.

Let the matter be disguised or slurred over as it may, the fact remains that we are utterly unable to imitate vital affinity so far as to make a bit of material ready for its use, or even to make any definite substance that will have similar chemical relations. But even could this be done, a further difficulty would remain—how to breathe into this dead matter the breath of life. We can neither give life to previously inert matter, nor can we restore the life that has, however recently, left the organism. Living tissue, once dead, is dead for ever, as regards the individual organism.

“If I quench thee, thou flaming minister,
I can again thy former life restore,
Should I repent me;—but once put out thine,
Thou cunning'st pattern of excelling nature,
I know not where is that Promethean heat
That can thy light relume. When I have plucked thy rose,
I cannot give it vital youth again,
It needs must wither.”

Yet against those who see something more than chemistry, magnetism, electricity, and mechanics, in the affinities that hold together organic bodies, modern physiology launches the scathing sarcasm that we might as well talk of a “steam-engine principle,” a “watch principle,” or a “railroad principle” as of a vital force or principle. And Professor Huxley inquires with like pungency—

“What justification is there then for the *assumption* of the existence in the living matter of a something which has no representative or correlative in the not-living matter that gave rise to it? What better philosophic status has *vitality* than *aquosity*? And why should *vitality* hope for a better fate than the other *itys* which have disappeared since Martinus Scriblerus accounted for the operation of the meat-jack by its inherent *meat-roasting quality*, and scorned the *materialism* of those who explained the turning of the spit by a certain mechanism worked by the draught of the chimney?” (P. 140.)

This is very amusing—no one can be more so than Professor Huxley;—a little perception of facts and analogies would make it perfect. To all this the answer is obvious, if answer is required. All these are machines which man has made, and can again make, by the use of well-known forces and material which he can combine at will; it is not therefore necessary to hypothecate any other force or principle. When man can make any, even the simplest organism, out of inorganic matter, then shall we be compelled to acknowledge that chemical and other forces are sufficient, and that the hypothesis of a vital principle has had its day and may cease to

be. To Professor Huxley's illustration I will respond seriously when he has demonstrated to me that meat-jacks have been developed from the beginning of time only and exclusively under the immediate contact and influence of pre-existing meat-jacks. Until then the analogy is scarcely close enough to need refutation or discussion.

Professor Huxley acknowledges candidly (p. 140) that "the influence of pre-existing living matter is something quite unintelligible;" but, he adds, as if this were a complete answer by analogy, "does any one *quite* comprehend the *modus operandi* of an electric spark which traverses a mixture of oxygen and hydrogen?" I suppose no one knows better than himself that the two cases are utterly distinct, and afford no illustration whatever one of the other. Certainly we *do not* comprehend the action of the electric spark any more than we comprehend the essential nature of any affinity or force whatever. But we know that we can at will evoke and use the electric spark in much the same way as we can utilize any other chemical agency. We can use it to combine the oxygen and hydrogen, and so form an equivalent of water; and by decomposing this water with adequate adaptations we can reproduce the same amount of the constituent parts, and liberate again the electricity, which can be used again and again indefinitely, making due allowance for the imperfection of our instruments. Can this be done with an organism? Can we arrest or store up the organic force as it departs in the death or decomposition of an organism? Can we make the faintest or most distant approach to this? Professor Huxley knows that we cannot. He knows that not only is the action of a living organism "something quite unintelligible," but that it is unintelligible in a mode and in a region of thought quite apart from the unintelligibility of ordinary chemical or electrical affinities. To persist in saying, then, that vital force is nothing different from ordinary physical and chemical agencies, except perhaps in complexity, whilst confessing that it is "quite unintelligible," cannot be considered as a "scientific statement clothed in scientific language," but must be considered as of the same value as the assertion so perseveringly enunciated by Mr. Pulvermacher, that "Electricity is Life."

But I think that the utterly fatal flaw in the physical theory of life, as set forth by Professor Huxley, is found in the considerations respecting *dead* and *living* protoplasm. The learned professor speaks of dead matter of life and living matter of life; he speaks of mutton as "once the living protoplasm," now the "same matter altered by death" and cookery, but as not being by these alterations rendered "incompetent to resume its old functions as matter of life" (p. 137). He speaks of its being subjected to "*subtle influences*" which "will convert the dead protoplasm into the living

protoplasm"—which will "raise the complex substance of dead protoplasm to the higher power, as one may say, of living protoplasm" (p. 138). All this is dwelt upon at some length, but not a hint is given that there is any difference in chemical constitution, or in "arrangement of molecules" between the dead and the living; and indeed when it is alluded to at all, the idea is pronounced "frivolous" (p. 135), unless I misapprehend the meaning of the writer's rather obscure and perhaps "*quâquâ-versal* expressions."

Here then we enter upon a dilemma. The properties of protoplasm are dependent altogether, as we have seen, upon the arrangement of its constituent atoms. But we find protoplasm in one condition manifesting only *passive* properties; and again, without any change, *i.e.*, any known or knowable change, in its chemical properties or arrangement of particles, we find it exercising a vast variety of *active* properties, as assimilation, contraction, and reproduction; not to mention thought, feeling, and will. We have then an effect, nay, a whole train of marvellous effects, *without a cause*,—a conclusion that the most enthusiastic Evolutionist would scarcely pronounce to be in "harmony with scientific thought." And from this dilemma we cannot escape, unless either by hypothecating a change, mechanical or chemical, of which, by Professor Huxley's own confession, we can possibly know nothing (p. 135), and on which "we have no right to speculate"—or else by confessing that these *subtle influences* of which we have heard are only another name for that *vital force or principle in which* it is now so unfashionable and so unscientific to believe.

Had we not been assured on the highest authority that the principles of Evolution are founded "on *certain knowledge*," and also that these foundations could "never be shaken," we should have perhaps seen ground to suspect that this appeal to "subtle influences," to eke out a process that had been proclaimed with a sound as of many trumpets to be only chemical and mechanical, was merely an attempt to evacuate an untenable position with the honours of war—a somewhat ignominious giving up of the entire question. But Evolution is forbidden to be judged by any ordinary standard: it has privileges, a language, and an inviolability, all its own; and those who think or believe otherwise, do not, as we have before seen, think or believe at all, but only think they think, and "believe they believe."*


One further consideration will aptly conclude this division of the subject. It has been urged, and it is granted, that the protoplasm, cell, or plasma is, in form and chemical composition,

* It is interesting to know also that they lie like "strangled snakes" around the cradle of this science; by the side of which stands the "Majesty of Fact!" (see *Lay Sermons*, pp. 278-9); and, on the authority of the learned and modest Dr. Büchner, that they are "speculative idiots."

apparently identical in all living creatures. Is not this in itself a most pregnant and significant fact, as indicating that there is, beyond all our visual or chemical investigations, a distinct and special endowment in operation, of which we know absolutely nothing? For whilst it is true that man can "assimilate lobster," and the lobster can "return the compliment" and assimilate man, it is equally true that the assimilated matter is converted into another and special form of plasma, destined to the performance of the most diverse and varied functions, according as it enters into the composition of the lobster or of man. Here then appears the knot of the whole question. All the activities of life (it is said) arise solely from "the arrangement of the molecules of ordinary matter;" and here we have two such arrangements, in which there is "no substantial difference," manifesting a variety of functions, almost infinitely removed from each other in the two cases; for whilst the functions of the lobster protoplasm may be fairly summed up, as proposed, under the "three categories" of "nutrition, motion, and reproduction of the species," the same protoplasm in man is found subservient to the manifestation of the "higher faculties" of "intellect, feeling, and will." This might appear conclusive as to the existence of something beyond chemical and mechanical "aggregation of atoms" as influencing the dynamic properties of life-matter; but Professor Huxley, whose resources are inexhaustible, cuts the knot by the summary declaration that "*all* the multifarious and complicated activities of man are comprehensible under these categories," nutrition, motion, and reproduction; and that these are "substantially one" with, and include, "those manifestations of intellect, of feeling, and of will, which we rightly name the higher faculties" (p. 130).

How this most marvellous proposition is elaborated and vindicated, will afford matter for future consideration.

CHARLES ELAM.



LORD MACAULAY'S ESSAY ON BACON EXAMINED.

III.

WHEN the Earl of Essex was called before the Council on the 5th of June, 1600, to answer for his conduct during his Irish campaign in the previous year, the Crown lawyers who were to give the information received special warning not to press the charge to any point implying disloyalty. The inference is that some of his proceedings had been such as to bring his loyalty under suspicion, though the Queen did not choose to bring them into public question. But we know that twelve months before, while he was still in full command of all the forces in Ireland, she had begun to suspect some underhand design, and had spoken of his proceedings, not only as "unfortunate, without judgment, and contemptuous," but as "*not without some private end of his own*;"* and indeed her apprehensions had been so serious, that when she resolved to require of him a strict account of what he had done and what he meant to do, she took the precaution, under pretence of an apprehended attack from Spain, of putting the country under arms.† What his private end might be was as yet only a matter of conjecture; and after his return, when she had him safe under her own keeping, she did not think it expedient to stir the question. Nor was it raised at the trial; for after the action of the 8th of February, the proofs of treason being plain, direct, and indisputable, it was thought better not to mix with them any-

* Bacon's Apology.

† Additions to Camden Works, vol. vi. p. 358.

thing that depended upon inference and presumption. The suspicions, however, had not the less been just; and when the truth came out at last, it became evident that that action, far from being a sudden effect of desperation, was connected with a political design which he had been meditating and pursuing for two years—his aim being to put himself into a position in which the Queen would be compelled to let him have his own way.

The truth came out through his own voluntary confession. The day after his trial he asked for an interview with four of the principal Councillors, that he might discharge his conscience. To them he not only confessed the truth of all that he had himself been charged with and the falsehood of the charges which he had retorted against “those whom he had particularly called his enemies,” but accused others of complicity who had not been suspected—some of them holding important offices—and denounced, as “having been his chief instigators to all those disloyal courses into which he had fallen,” two of his own most intimate counsellors and confederates. These confessions and accusations, which he afterwards set down on paper, led to fresh inquiries which brought out two fresh disclosures of great moment—a secret offer, in the summer of 1599, to assist the King of Scots in an armed movement to extort from the Queen a declaration of his right to succeed her; and a secret resolution, in the following autumn, to take the remains of his Irish army over with him to England and march up to London with a force strong enough to dictate conditions. It is true that neither of these projects was carried out. For the Scotch King was not prepared to take his part in the first, and the two friends whom Essex consulted about the second succeeded in persuading him to give it up. But there can be no doubt that he had seriously intended both. The particulars of the Scotch intrigue were made known to the Government by Sir C. Danvers on the 1st of March, and those of the project of invasion by Sir C. Blount on the 7th. On the 16th, “twenty-five papers concerning the Earl of Essex his treasons” were delivered by Coke to Bacon “for her Majesty’s service;” and on the 14th of April “a discourse in writing, containing a declaration of the late Earl of Essex’ treasons, which her Majesty thinketh fit should be published for the better satisfying of the world,” was sent from the Council to the Queen’s printer to be printed immediately.*

This was the declaration which the reviewer describes, first as “a vindication of the Queen’s late proceedings,” which she thought “it expedient to publish;” next, as a “murder of the Earl’s fame;” thirdly, as “a performance abounding in expressions which no

* Letters and Life, ii. p. 241.

generous enemy would have employed respecting a man who had so dearly expiated his offences;" and lastly, as "an abusive pamphlet." As her motive for publishing such a thing, he merely alleges the "gloomy looks and faint acclamations" with which "she was received by the citizens of London,"* which is indeed all that Mr. Montagu suggests.† But if he had known of the new matter which had come to the Queen's knowledge since the trial, and appreciated its importance, he would surely have seen that she had a more cogent reason. If Essex had gone through the Irish campaign with such projects in his head, many things which had seemed unaccountable could be probably accounted for: his treason assumed a new aspect; and the facts disclosed at the trial were but a small part of it. The popular sympathy with the criminal grew out of a misapprehension of the nature of the crime; and though some portions of the new evidence had been published in the course of the later trials, it was only by snatches and fragments, and chiefly through the mouth of Coke, who was not then a popular authority. No complete and authentic account of the case was accessible, while the false accounts which were spread abroad by rumours and pamphlets threatened the Government with a storm of popular discontent and disaffection at a time when it seemed to be on the point of being assailed by three dangers coming at once—foreign levy, domestic malice, and the prospect of a disputed succession. What could be more natural than that the Queen, in order to relieve her Government from an unjust odium, the result of ignorance, should decide to put forth a declaration of the facts of the case from the beginning; that for this purpose she should apply to the man who, of all the men in her dominions, could tell a story most truly, most concisely, and most perspicuously; and that she should explain to him how the subject was to be handled—namely, that it was not to be merely a narrative of the insurrection and the trial (for though this included the specific act of treason for which Essex suffered, it did not include all or nearly all the matters which had to be taken into consideration in order to determine whether or not it were a fit case for mercy), but was to contain an exposition of all the precedent practices which had now come to light, and which proved Essex to be a man whose life was dangerous to the State? This task the Queen commanded Bacon to execute. Upon what pretence could he decline? He was not called upon to justify a case which he believed to be a bad one; however sorry he might be for Essex, he could not but believe that both sentence and execution were just and inevitable. He was not asked to assist in a needless and superfluous attack upon the memory of a dead man;

* *Essays* ii. p. 315.

† *Montagu*, p. xcii.

he could not but believe that to relieve the Government from a popular imputation of unjust severity executed upon a popular idol, was necessary for the security of the State and the peace of the nation. He was not called upon to say a word which he believed to be untrue, or to countenance an imputation which he believed to be unjust; part of the scheme was to print in an appendix the very words of the evidence from which the statements in the narrative part were drawn. He undertook the task, prepared a draught, and laid it before the Council. That draught not having been preserved, we have no means of knowing more of the manner and spirit in which he performed his part than we can gather from his own report; and from that we only know that it underwent considerable alteration both by the Council and the Queen before it was published, and that in making the alterations all the parties concerned were "as religious and curious of truth as desirous of satisfaction,"—a statement which the reviewer can hardly have remembered when he declared that "in the succeeding reign Bacon had not a word to say in defence of this performance."* From the nature of the case, however, it is obvious that he is not to be held answerable for any alterations in his draught which he did not approve. As the declaration was to go forth in the name of the Queen and Council, and not in his, the question *what* should be declared rested finally and absolutely with them. If the responsibility was to be theirs, the work must be theirs also. *His* responsibility ended with the composition of the narrative which was submitted to the Council, after which he had no control over it, and of *that* narrative we cannot judge, because we have neither the manuscript itself nor any account of it to judge by. We know, however, what it was after the Queen and Council had corrected it to their minds; and as no successful attempt has yet been made to convict it even of an inaccuracy, Bacon might have borne the entire responsibility without much damage to his reputation. There are a few harsh and stern expressions in it—the result probably of alterations ordered by the Queen herself†—which it would not have become him to use in his own person, and which even in a state paper he would naturally have wished to avoid. But it is only the manner that can be objected to. The matter I take to be the truth. It was to be a *judicial*

* Essays, ii. p. 315. He must have seen it, or had it within sight, for it is quoted in Montagu's text, p. xciii.

† "And after it had passed their allowance, it was again exactly perused by the Queen herself, and some alterations made again by her appointment; nay, and after it was set to print, the Queen, who as your Lordship knoweth, as she was excellent in great matters so she was exquisite in small, and noted that I could not forget my ancient respect to my Lord of Essex, in terming him ever *my Lord of Essex, my Lord of Esser*, almost in every page of the book, which she thought not fit, but would have it *Essex*, or *the late Earl of Essex*; whereupon of force it was printed *de novo*, and the first copies suppressed by her peremptory commandment."

statement, and I doubt whether it contains a single phrase which would have misbecome a judge in passing sentence.

Such then are the grounds on which Bacon is charged with "exerting his literary talents to blacken the Earl's memory;" and with this may be dismissed the sixth instance which was to prove that "wealth, precedence, titles," &c., were the objects which governed his life.

7. The next instance is harder to deal with for want of particulars. For these objects Bacon had "sullied his integrity." A man may be said to sully his integrity who exposes his reputation for integrity to reasonable suspicion; and this he had certainly done. But a man may be reasonably suspected of acts which nevertheless he has not committed. And if I were asked for an instance in which Bacon either advised any man to do what he thought wrong or unwise, or permitted anything to be done which he thought wrong or unwise, when he could have prevented it, or pronounced any judgment which he believed to be unjust (and these are the acts which touch the integrity of a councillor and a judge), I should not myself be able to produce one. The specific acts which the reviewer appears to point at as inconsistent with integrity as a councillor, are two:—

First, that whereas on taking his seat in Chancery he had pledged himself to discharge with the greatest caution and impartiality his function with regard to the sealing of patents; and whereas patents of monopoly are not considered good things; he did not "stay every patent of monopoly that came before him."

Secondly, that with regard to the particular patent for the exclusive manufacture of gold and silver thread, he informed the King that it was convenient it should be settled, and assisted the patentees both to obtain it and to guard it.†

I do not find any other acts of the kind laid here to Bacon's charge. But these, though meant of course to be taken only as samples, are offered as sufficient. "It is needless," he concludes, "to say more. Our readers are now able to judge whether, in the matter of patents, Bacon acted conformably to his professions." If the statement set before them (which is indeed a fair enough representation of *Mr. Montagu's account*‡ of that passage in Bacon's speech) contained all that is material, perhaps they are. But if they substitute the passage itself§ they will find it necessary to know a good deal more.

"For the second commandment of his Majesty, touching staying grants at the great seal; there may be just cause of stay either in the matter of the grant or in the manner of passing the same. Out of both which I extract these six principal cases, which I will now make known."

* Essays, ii. p. 341.

† Ibid. p. 342.

‡ P. ccxiv.

§ Letters and Life, vol. vi. p. 187.

all which nevertheless I understand to be wholly submitted to his Majesty's will and pleasure, after by me he shall have been informed ; for if *iteratum mandatum* be come, obedience is better than sacrifice."

Here then we have his *profession* : here is the "general rule" which he promises to proceed by. If a grant comes to the seal which he thinks objectionable, he will inform the King, and not pass it *unless the King, being so informed, shall bid him*. That he will in any case resist the King's known pleasure he certainly does not profess. He thinks, I fancy, that he has no right to do so. Whether in so thinking he mistook his duty, is not the present question. We are called on to compare Bacon's practice with his profession. Now his profession distinctly is, that if the King be resolved that a grant shall pass, he, as Keeper of the Seals, will *not* refuse to pass it. And this is a sufficient answer to the first question—why he did not stay *every* patent of monopoly that came before him. If there were not many which he himself thought unobjectionable, there were at least many which he knew the King would have commanded him to pass.

Of the six cases in which there might be just cause of stay, those which touch the present question are only the third and fifth:—

"Thirdly, if it be a grant which I conceive out of my little knowledge to be against the law ; of which nature Theodosius was wont to say when he was pressed, 'I spake it, or I wrote it ; but I granted it not if it be unjust ;' I will call the learned counsel to it (as well him that drew the book as the rest) or some of them ; and if we find cause I will inform his Majesty of our opinion, either by myself or some of them ; for as for the judges, they are judges of grants past, but not of grants to come, except the King call them."

* * * * *

"Fifthly, if as a councillor of estate I do foresee inconvenience to ensue by the grant in reason of estate, in respect of the King's honour, or discontent and murmur of the people, I will not trust mine own judgment, but I will either acquaint his Majesty with it, or the Council-table, or some such of my Lords as I shall think fit."

Such was his promise. Unless it can be shown therefore that he failed to report objections in law or policy which he felt to be just, and which the King had not already heard and overruled—a case which it would not be easy to establish—I do not see how he can be accused of breaking his own professed principle, whatever objection may be taken to the principle itself. Neither do I see how any one can pretend at this distance of time to judge in what cases, and to what extent, it would have been judicious to press his objections. Had he resolved to resist at all hazards and to all lengths every course which he disliked, his life would indeed have presented a simple enough problem to himself, and an easy story to his biographer ; but he must have given up public business. Had he acted upon that principle from the beginning,

he could never have entered—had he begun to act upon it now in his fifty-seventh year, he must at once have quitted—the public service. Suppose him to have refused peremptorily to set the seal to these patents, what would have followed? The seals would have been taken from him; the patents would have been passed by some one else; and what influence he had in the King's counsels would have been gone for ever. Would that have mended the case of the public? I think not. So long as he retained his influence as an adviser he could do something, though not much. He could continue to urge the calling of a parliament, and (as a preparative to a parliament) the abandonment of those monopolies which were most complained of. This was his policy; he had been pursuing it for years; and whether it was the best or not who can say? And in this he did at last succeed. A parliament was at last actually summoned; the King was at last prepared to make large popular concessions. In what way Bacon would have improved, or endeavoured to improve, the opportunity, must unfortunately be left to conjecture. Most unfortunately, one of the first measures of that Parliament was to remove him from the helm and throw the direction of the counsels of the kingdom at the critical time into other hands; and though I admit that his removal was necessary, and rendered necessary by his own fault, I think no one will maintain that the affairs of the nation went the better for his absence.

This I submit in answer to the reviewer's general censure of Bacon for not staying "*every* patent of monopoly that came before him." Though monopolies were bad things, though Bacon knew them to be bad things, still I say that it does not follow that he ought to have stopped them all indiscriminately.

Particular cases I admit there might be in which he was to blame for not stopping them. But how much he was to blame in the instance selected by the reviewer, and selected no doubt as the worst he knew of,—how far he was personally implicated in the illegalities committed,—I cannot quite satisfy myself. We have not any clear and continuous account of the case, and the fullest we have comes only from, or at least through, the accusing party. The story, as well as I can collect it,* is this:—

This patent for the sole manufacture of gold and silver thread was not a new one, but was granted originally to the Countess of Bedford in Salisbury's time, when Bacon does not appear to have had anything to do with it. In 1615 the patent was surrendered and granted anew, "upon warrant of the former commissioners," to two of the agents that had been employed by the Countess. Still Bacon had nothing to do with it. It was then that Sir

* See Journals of the Commons, 1620-21; and Bacon's Letters.

Edward Villiers became a partner and invested £4,000 in the business; and, finding (it would seem) some difficulty in protecting the patent, applied to Sir Henry Yelverton, then Solicitor-General. Sir Henry, by his own account, "disliked the patent as being a monopoly," and advised a change in the form—namely, that it should be "by indenture between the King and them; whereby they should be but as agents; and the King might easily put it down, if it were found inconvenient." A proposition to this effect being submitted to the King was referred by him, at what exact date I cannot learn, but apparently about the close of the year 1617, to Bacon, then Lord Keeper,—Sir Henry Montagu, then Chief Justice of the King's Bench,—and Sir Henry Yelverton, then Attorney-General; and, if one may judge by an impatient message from the King, dated the 7th of February, 1617-18, desiring despatch and a speedy account of the matter, it appears to have met with some obstruction. The result, however, was a certificate (not preserved) that they approved of Sir Henry's device, and that "the course was good, *if well used*." Later in the same year a petition was exhibited by Sir Edward Villiers in the name of the two new patentees, representing the obstructions which they met with in enforcing their patent, the expenses they had incurred, the losses they were suffering by the delay; and praying for an amendment of the commission. The petition was referred by the King to Bacon in the summer vacation of 1618, and appears to have been still under consideration, when, in consequence of some objections urged against the project, he sent another message (4th Oct., 1618), desiring him to call in the Chief Justice, the Attorney, and the Solicitor;—to consider with them of the fitness, the convenience, and the probable profit of the business; and report with all convenient speed. The letter which the reviewer quotes as Bacon's interposition is the joint answer of Bacon, Montagu, and Yelverton to this reference. In the end, the indentures (drawn by Yelverton upon warrant from Buckingham) passed. If, therefore, they involved any provisions contrary to law, I admit that Bacon was implicated in the illegality; but this has not been asserted, so far as I can discover.

The provisions, whether legal or not, do not appear to have been stringent enough for the purposes of the undertakers; and they desired of the King a proclamation to give them effect. This proposition the King referred to Sir H. Yelverton and Sir Thomas Coventry, his Attorney and Solicitor, who joined in drawing up a proclamation accordingly. With this again Bacon, it seems, had nothing to do.

But now comes the point which touches him, and unluckily I cannot be certain that I understand exactly how the case really stood. I collect, however, that, in the indentures between the

King and the undertakers, certain commissioners were appointed on the King's behalf for the execution of the provisions. These commissioners were "the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Treasurer, Sir Henry Yelverton, [the] Solicitor-General, Sir Giles Mompesson, Sir Francis Michell, and Sir Allen Apsley: but (says the witness upon whose authority I give these names) *the principal were Sir Giles Mompesson and Sir Francis Michell.*" The commission is stated to have been directed to any two of them; and I conclude that, though the other five were officially included, yet the business, as often happens in matters of this kind, was left practically and personally to the management of Sir Giles and Sir Francis. So far, a man so fully occupied as the Lord Chancellor was may be reasonably presumed to have been ignorant of what was going on, and excusably ignorant. But I am not sure that the excuse will hold for the next stage in the affair, without the aid of an uncertain and charitable conjecture.

The monopoly, in spite of Yelverton's device, was still a monopoly, and of course included some power to punish interlopers. Sir Giles Mompesson, finding, I suppose, the regular process to be slow, devised a new one. He proposed to those tradesmen who were likely to interfere with the patent that they should enter into "a bond not to meddle or make any gold or silver thread;" and upon their refusal called upon Yelverton to imprison them. Yelverton drew the warrant, though reluctantly, as he afterwards declared; and not without the express confirmation of the Lord Chancellor. The prisoners remonstrated, but he gave them no answer. They complained to the Lord Chancellor, were called before him, heard, and sent back to prison. Thereupon the City petitioned the King on their behalf, and the King immediately discharged them.

Now if this be a true statement,—and I have no reason to suspect the truth of it, except that it rests only upon the authority of Yelverton, who would naturally wish to make his own share of the fault less by throwing as much of it as he could upon another,—I cannot here plead ignorance as an excuse for Bacon; for it seems he twice confirmed the imprisonment, and once after hearing the parties in their own defence. And though we do not know what the particular conditions of the bond were, what the exact powers of the commissioners, or how far, under the large and indeterminable authority of prerogative, they might, as the law then stood, be legally stretched; yet it is not probable that the imprisonment admitted of any absolute justification in point of law; or Yelverton, one of the best lawyers of his time and the party with whom the blame principally lay, would have taken that ground of defence; which he does not seem to have done.

Now if by simply supposing that it was an arbitrary and illegal proceeding in which Bacon took part with open eyes for fear of offending Buckingham, we could account for the whole thing so as to leave no difficulty behind, I should merely say that it was a great fault, which cannot be defended, and which the multitude of his business, the abuses of the time, and the precariousness of his position can but a little extenuate. But I feel that when all this is freely admitted, and all questions of probability depending upon my interpretation of Bacon's character are put aside, the case is still strange and unaccountable. Upon this supposition, his conduct implies not only a want of fortitude, but a want of prudence and foresight which it is most difficult to understand. The date of the imprisonment of these people for refusing the bond I cannot find; but as Sir Giles Mompesson was not on the commission before the latter end of October, 1618, the thing must have been done at a time when Bacon knew that a new parliament must very soon be summoned. He knew of what especial importance it was to avoid at such a time all just occasions of clamour and discontent. He knew that there was no grievance so certain to be complained of as illegal imprisonment of London citizens for the purpose of enforcing an unpopular monopoly. Whether he considered the King's interest, or Buckingham's, or his own, it was equally imprudent. If we find no difficulty in supposing him to have committed such a fault, how can we account for his committing such a blunder?

The answer to this question which has occurred to me is only a guess, and supposes one or two things which, though I see no improbability in them, I cannot undertake to prove.

In the first instance, when he was only called on to confirm a warrant drawn by Sir Henry Yelverton, I can easily believe that he did it in reliance upon Sir Henry's judgment and without looking into the case. Afterwards when the parties were heard before him and recommitting, he must be supposed to have known and considered what he was doing. But I do not know that he could legally have discharged them by his own sole authority; and it appears that the recommitment was *immediately followed by their discharge*, upon the petition of the City to the King in their behalf. Now my guess is that, seeing these things had been done in the King's name and in virtue of his supposed regal power, and that all judicial acts tending to define the precise limits of that power were pregnant with consequences more than could be foreseen, Bacon wished (provided the substantial claims of justice could be otherwise satisfied) to avoid any formal decision implying that the act done was contrary to law and equity; therefore that he preferred this course of letting the King discharge the prisoners upon the City's petition: by which course the City was gratified; the

King, in place of being convicted of oppression, was enabled to do a gracious and popular act; the sufferers were relieved; and all question concerning the legal extent of the prerogative was avoided. This supposition does not quite clear him, I know; but it makes the case intelligible. They had among them done a wrong thing; the question was how to get it undone with least scandal, mischief, and noise. And in this respect it seems to have been successful; for although when all these things were hunted out by the Committee of grievances this was presented among the foremost and greatest, it does not appear to have raised any formidable clamour at the time. About two months before the meeting of Parliament, the King's learned counsel—Bacon, Montagu, Hobart, Coke, and Crew—drew up a list of those grievances which they thought most likely to be complained of. Among these were three patents which concerned Buckingham's special friends; but the patent for gold and silver thread was not one of them. So it cannot have been making much noise at that time; and I find no news of it in any contemporary letter that I have met with.

Nor does the result of the inquiry made afterwards by Parliament into the business give us any clear light as to Bacon's part in it. He was touched in two points; as a referee before the patent was granted, and in this matter of the imprisonment afterwards. In a conference between the Lords and Commons, of which we have no detailed report, his name was brought in question; and he, being one of the Lords' committees, offered some justification. The Commons asked whether he spoke as by commission from the House of Lords generally; to which the Lords all answered no. His conduct in saying what he did say was afterwards complained of in the Upper House, as irregular; he confessed it was, received a reprimand, and apologized. *What* he had said we are not informed. We only know that he did say something in justification of himself,—and probably had something more to say. The broad result, therefore, was that his conduct having been inquired of in the House of Commons, and called in question in conference with the Lords, was at last passed by in silence. The question was stirred and dropped. It must remain, therefore, a matter of conjecture. The conjecture which I have offered is that which seems to me to involve the fewest improbabilities; and whatever may be thought of it otherwise, it will at least serve to show that the question cannot be disposed of in the summary way in which it is handled by the reviewer, who was probably innocent of the knowledge of all these particulars (though I have introduced into the story nothing that was not to be found in printed books long before the review was written), and only knew that the two principal patentees were very severely

handled by the House of Commons in 1621,* and were supposed to be the originals from which Massinger drew Sir Giles Overreach and Justice Greedy.†

So much for the grounds on which Bacon is charged with having "sullied his integrity" as a councillor and officer of State. I do not yet find evidence which would enable *me* to say that he had either advised what he thought wrong or unwise, or permitted when he could have prevented it. But I speak only for myself.

His integrity as a judge is impeached on grounds which would be conclusive, if they were established. But again the allegations involve assumptions, and the assumptions involve improbabilities.

"In his judicial capacity his conduct was not less reprehensible. He suffered Buckingham to dictate many of his decisions. . . . He had not been Lord Keeper a month when Buckingham began to interfere in Chancery suits; and his interference was, as might have been expected, successful."

Here the thing assumed is the entire matter of the charge. When this was written, the only reason anybody had for supposing that Bacon allowed Buckingham to dictate any of his decisions was that he had received letters from him recommending certain cases to his favour, so far as it might stand with justice. It cannot have been supposed that it was unusual in those days for a Chancellor to *receive* such letters from men in Buckingham's position; and what effect they took—what became of the cases so recommended—no one had inquired. Indeed, it was not then known that there were any means of finding out. The "Order-books" preserved in the Record Office—a comparatively recent discovery, first made known (I believe) to historical inquirers through Mr. Hepworth Dixon—will probably, when carefully examined by some one sufficiently acquainted with the details of Chancery practice at that time, supply an answer to the question, and enable us to judge whether the causes recommended by Buckingham were in fact decided less justly than others. Till this is done it will be premature to make conjectures as to the fact; but whatever may be the result of the investigation, the *assertion* of the fact upon such data as the reviewer possessed, even if we supplement them by those which have come out since, must surely be considered unjustifiable. The only one of these cases which has undergone investigation by a competent judgment with the help of the Order-books was exceptional; for it was undertaken at my own suggestion, because I observed in it some-

* Montagu, p. cccviii.

† Essays, ii. p. 341.

thing peculiar and unlike the others; and the result of the investigation was that Buckingham's interference had in this case induced Bacon to consent to an irregularity of procedure. My reason for declining to go further and conclude (in the absence of both plaintiff and defendant) that the irregularity of procedure involved an act of substantial injustice, I have stated in a former paper, and need not repeat. All that I shall attempt now is to explain what we *ought to know*, before we assert, as a fact which we *do know*, that Bacon "suffered Buckingham to dictate many of his decrees." We ought to know that he decided many cases at Buckingham's request otherwise than he would have decided them upon their own merits. Now, we do not yet know even that Buckingham's letters were *intended* to have any such effect. They have not, to me, the appearance of it. They are generally cold, formal, and commonplace, containing at most a brief notice of the chief points in the case that seem to make it deserving of a favourable consideration, and never expressing any personal interest in the issue, more than the natural wish that a friend's cause may go well. Besides, they appear to have been written for the most part merely to get rid of the importunity of suitors and might, every one of them, have been accompanied with some such explanation as this to the party applying for it,—“You know I cannot interfere in such causes, nor ask for any man more than justice; and justice you will have without my interference; but if you insist upon it, I will write to the Lord Keeper and desire him to show you what favour he lawfully may for my sake. Now if this was really and in good faith the character and intention of these letters,—if they were not meant to be understood as meaning more,—why should I think that they had so much as a *tendency to interfere with the course of justice?* If, on the contrary, they were written by Buckingham with the intention of influencing the decision, we must surely have had evidence of it indirectly, in one of two ways. Bacon must either have yielded to the influence or not yielded. If he yielded, he must have pronounced many unjust decrees, which (considering the unpopularity of Buckingham, the boldness of the Commons, the friendless position of Bacon himself, and the proneness of losers to cry out) must have been heard of. If he did *not* yield, then he must in many cases have disappointed and offended Buckingham: and (considering how touchy, imperious, outspoken, and powerful Buckingham was) it could hardly be but we should find some traces of remonstrance, resentment, or quarrel, upon this score. Now I do not think that there is a word on record of menace or offence addressed by him to Bacon upon this ground. And in spite of the extreme scrutiny and fearless strictures to which

Bacon's conduct was submitted while not one of these cases was above four years old, I do not remember that any unjust decree pronounced *out of deference to Buckingham* was ever even alleged against him.

If then we are to prefer that explanation of the case which involves the fewest improbabilities, we must believe that though Buckingham acquiesced in this common though bad practice of the times (for there is no doubt that it was a common practice: I counted in the Harleian MSS.—vols. 6,996 and 6,997—twenty or thirty letters of the same kind, addressed to Lord Keeper Puckering by the Earl of Essex during the years 1594 and 1595 alone), yet he did not mean, and was not understood as meaning, to interfere with the course of justice or “dictate decrees.”

There is still less excuse for gratuitous assumptions in the matter of gift-taking, because in that case we know both what Bacon was charged with and what he confessed; and as the charges were the result of diligent inquiry armed with full authority, it is not likely that any material circumstance of aggravation was overlooked or omitted.

How far the receipt of such gifts as he admits that he received in the manner in which he admits that he received them was consistent with judicial integrity, in the sense of regard for justice in deciding cases, is the question which chiefly concerns his character. But it turns upon a point which the reviewer has thought hardly worth noticing; and in order to show where his argument fails to meet the case, I must begin by explaining the case itself, as I understand it.

I think that Bacon *was* guilty of corruption; that he had not the means of clearing himself; that the sentence pronounced against him, though severe, was not unjust; that his act moreover was not only in law indefensible, but in morals culpable, and more culpable in him than it would have been in another man; that he had, in short, allowed himself to do that which he knew ought not to be done.

But, on the other hand, I think that his act, though criminal, was a political rather than a moral, and (if I may so speak) an artificial rather than a natural, crime. I mean that it was one of those acts which are declared and *made* criminal, because they are likely to lead to crime; not criminal *in se*, as including and presupposing crime actually committed or intended; an act therefore from which, though rightly forbidden and punished, the conscience would not naturally and necessarily recoil. I do not call it a sin of ignorance; it was more than that; but I think it may be called a sin of *inattention*; and if we allow a distinction between vice and frailty, may be classed among the frailties.

A modern illustration will make my meaning clearer. Less than forty years ago a candidate for a seat in Parliament might follow the practice of his ancestors in giving a dinner to his constituents without meaning thereby to influence corruptly a single vote; therefore with perfect innocence. But in the year 1842 the law finding that this ancestral practice did in many cases lead to corruption, decided that it should hereafter be considered as an act of corruption in itself: where a dinner was given, corruption was to be presumed. Since that act was passed, every candidate who gives a dinner is in law guilty of corruption; and even in morals (unless he disapproves of the act) he is guilty of an offence; for he is allowing himself to do that which he believes ought not to be done. Yet for all that he may still give the dinner without intending anything wrong. He may conform to the old practice only because the omission of it would be esteemed ungracious, illiberal, unthankful, or unpopular, without meaning or wishing to purchase any man's vote by it, without a single thought of bribery or corruption entering his head. In such a case his moral offence is that he conforms to a practice which tends to evil; yet of the evil itself to which the practice tends his conduct may be absolutely free.

I put an extreme case, that the distinction may be seen to be a real one—a case in which the act which the law forbids is certainly committed, while the moral offence which it was meant to prevent is certainly not committed. In other cases the moral offence will be found to enter more or less, through all degrees of culpability; and in a court of morality the question must be how much in each case of what was immoral, as distinguished from what was illegal, the act involves.

That such a distinction is admissible,—that the immorality is not necessarily in direct proportion to the illegality,—the reviewer can understand as well as anybody, when it suits his argument. When the Earl of Essex pleads as a justification of rebellion that the persecutions of his enemies have driven him to despair, he claims it as an excuse “which, though legally of no value, yet tended to diminish the moral guilt of the crime,” and might be a ground for pardon, though not for acquittal. When a judge accused of corruption pleads in palliation that he has never pronounced a corrupt judgment, he should surely allow it as a fact, if it be a fact, which, though not entitling him to an acquittal, materially alters the moral aspect of the crime. Yet of this distinction in Bacon's case he scarcely takes notice. He has much to say in answer to Mr. Montagu's other arguments, which for the most part invite an easy victory; but when he comes to this he merely puts it aside as so obviously “futile” that “the plainest man among his readers” may be trusted to answer it.

In order, however, to make the plain man's task easier, he is obliged to introduce some features into the charge of which I find no trace in the articles of impeachment, and of which he offers not a shadow of evidence. That the amount of the gifts in question was regulated by a "*bargain*" between Bacon and the suitor; that he had "jackals" (p. 350), "decoys" (p. 367), and "many agents looking out in different quarters for prey" (p. 369); and that the presents were understood to be made in consideration of favourable judgments to be pronounced;*—these are all assumptions of his own, which, if granted, would no doubt settle the question. But where is the evidence? Nothing of the kind is either expressed or implied in any of the charges which Bacon was required to answer, which state only that the presents had been taken, but say nothing of any contract, condition, or unjust judgment. That a present *may* be given and taken without an understanding that the giver is to have some unjust advantage in return, will hardly be denied. That the presents received by Bacon *were* so taken he himself declared privately, and publicly he was not accused of having taken them otherwise. It may be that his declaration was false, and that the Lords omitted that point of aggravation because they had enough without it. But why should I think so? They were so far from being satisfied with what was enough, that they invited complaints from all quarters; passed special resolutions to forbid the use of the depositions in other courts or other cases; and to make the assurance doubly sure—because another Parliament might have ruled the question otherwise—caused them all (as I suspect) to be removed from their records and destroyed. All that came were entertained and examined. As many as upon the complainants' showing they considered to be substantiated were collected into a formal instrument and presented to him for his answer. His answer, which was the *altera pars*, was accepted as "full and ingenuous." I say then that it is upon this answer that we must judge him. We have no right to assume that he was guilty of more offences than, after so full and determined an investigation of the case, the Lords thought fit to charge him with; or that he was more guilty in these than, in his confession thus accepted, he admitted himself to be. We have no right therefore to assume the intervention of "jackals" or "decoys," or "agents looking out for prey." The character of the persons through whom the gifts are known to have been presented, and the apparent absence of all precautions to keep the transaction secret, are more easily reconcilable with the supposition that the practice was familiar to the people of the time, and not disreputable.

* "The hundreds who have got what they paid for remain quiet." (P. 369.)

The reviewer, indeed, has two reasons for concluding that it was even then universally regarded as unjustifiable and odious. It had been preached against seventy years before with popular applause, and the Lords and Commons now united in condemning it. But he makes no allowance for the irregular movement of opinion in such matters. He forgets that social abuses are denounced by preachers and satirists long before they are made punishable by law; and that they are condemned by opinion long before they cease to be both generally practised and generally tolerated. There are no broad gulfs fixed by nature between the "known to be bad" and the "generally believed to be good." New discoveries in morality never pass thus suddenly from darkness into full daylight, but have always a dawn, during which the true shape and aspect of the moral question is seen darkly; not yet clearly distinguished and yet not altogether undistinguishable; doubtfully guessed at through the mists of custom and prejudice. The progress of light in every department is marked by these gradations, and in no department so much or so inevitably as in the detection and bringing into disrepute of an abusive custom. "Men's thoughts are much according to their inclination; their discourse and speeches according to their learning and infused opinions; but their *deeds* are *after as they have been accustomed.*" Hence it is that corruption adheres to the grosser element of manners long after it has been expelled both from opinion and from doctrine. And this brings us to the real point upon which our question turns: what was the actual condition of public opinion with regard to gift-taking by judges during the time of Bacon's chancellorship?

Now I think it will be found that the reformation of social abuses always proceeds by a course of secret undermining. The habit, which is as the crust on the surface, is the last thing which goes. The ignorance or error out of which it originally grew is gradually cleared away; but the habit itself, being interwoven with the business and interests of life, cannot be so easily altered. The practice therefore continues till all that justified, or seemed to justify, it is gone; and then it falls with a touch, and great is the crash thereof. The process, dropping metaphor, is this: A practice, natural and perhaps innocent in itself, grows into a custom, and is abused for purposes not innocent. The corrupt tendency of it is first seen and exposed by one man, then denounced by a few men, then generally admitted and recognized by all who are not concerned in it—who, not being under the thrall of custom, are called on to deal with it in "speech and discourse" only, not in "deed." Then it is that the Latimers preach against it and the Londoners applaud. Meanwhile those who have been bred up in it and worked it into their habits, though for that very

reason they cannot *feel* the badness of it, are yet unable to defend it in reason. They are therefore silent. They do not at once shake it off; for that requires more prompt and peremptory resolution than will commonly be inspired by a simple disapproval and *wish* to reform, when unstimulated by the fear of shame or the jealous sense of honour. Thus the practice still continues, while the censure passing uncontradicted obtains a popular allowance. Then it is that good men may be seen conforming to a practice which is generally condemned, which they themselves cannot justify, but in which they are still countenanced by the custom, and *tolerated* by the opinion, of the time; (for that a practice which is universally condemned may nevertheless be generally tolerated, we have abundant proof about us at all times). At length comes the crisis. The opinion and the practice—the new opinion, expressed and allowed but not yet enforced; and the old practice, condemned and undefended but still tolerated—are brought by some accident into collision. Some one—no matter who; not the guiltiest, but he who happens to stand most in the way—is publicly charged with the old practice which the new opinion condemns as a crime. He is fairly caught. He has done that which everybody says is wrong. He cannot say that he has not done it; he cannot say that it is not wrong. All men are prepared to cry shame, and those perhaps will cry loudest who are most in his own situation; who, not being able to feel in their hearts, yet cannot refuse to acknowledge in argument, the badness of the practice. And thus, though guilty of nothing worse than the want of extraordinary virtue, he is amazed to find himself all at once convicted of a proclaimed and acknowledged crime.

This I take to be the natural history of a moral reform—of the process by which manners are purified. And therefore when Bacon's case is truly stated, it altogether eludes the dilemma in which the reviewer tries to catch it. The offender's excuse is to be found not in the general prevalence, but in the general *toleration*, of the offence. Now the sudden discovery by the men of Bacon's own times that they all thought gift-taking criminal, the consent of the Commons to impeach him and of the Lords to fine, imprison, and degrade him for it, are by no means incompatible with the fact that gift-taking had been *till then* as well generally tolerated as generally practised. That the bankrupt has no friend to help him in his need does not prove that the spendthrift had no friend to encourage him in his waste. As long as a judge could be known to take presents without losing his reputation for integrity, so long the practice of taking presents was tolerated; and so long as it was tolerated it was an abuse of the times, and as such entitled to all the excuses which a practice of that kind can justly claim.

“ Antonio, gratify this gentleman,
For in my mind you are much bound to him,”

is the recommendation of the Duke in the “ Merchant of Venice,” made publicly in the court to the suitor who has won the cause ; “ this gentleman ” being the person who has officiated as judge. I do not suppose there was a man in the theatre to whom the suggestion did not seem as proper and natural as it evidently did to Shakespeare himself, and yet it was a recommendation to make a present to a judge exactly analogous to most of those which are set forth in the articles of impeachment against Bacon. It was not “ similar to the perquisites which suitors paid to the members of the Parliaments of France ”—fees to which the magistrate “ had a legal right,” and of which “ the amount was regulated by law.”* It was to be a present “ not sanctioned by the law,” “ not made under the public eye,” and of which “ the amount was to be regulated by private bargain between the magistrate and the suitor ”†—in other words, was to be left to the suitor’s option.

Now if this was the popular feeling with regard to such a transaction, the manner in which the presents were given and received in Bacon’s case is sufficiently accounted for. That “ men of rank, bishops, privy councillors, and members of Parliament ” were employed as “ agents,” is not, indeed, allowed by the reviewer as affording any reason for supposing that the transactions were not notoriously criminal ; because, he says, “ the whole history of that generation was full of the low actions of high people,” and “ men as exalted in rank as any of the decoys Bacon employed ” are known to have “ pimped for Somerset and poisoned Overbury.”‡ But a comparison of the cases will show at once that there is no analogy between them, or only such an analogy as serves to expose the error of the inference. One man of high rank there was who pimped for Somerset and had a hand in the poisoning of Overbury. But that such men should be selected as instruments to be openly employed in a proceeding notoriously infamous, I cannot think *likely*. It was certainly not so in the case to which the reviewer alludes. The Earl of Northampton (whom he means by “ men ”) was not an instrument, but an employer of instruments. He was a principal instigator of the murder of Overbury ; and the instruments whom he selected were men of the lowest character. The most cautious and guilty secrecy was observed in the whole transaction. Not a single man of decent reputation was made privy to it ; except perhaps the Lieutenant of the Tower : and he was brought from a distance and placed there on purpose. As soon as the fact came to the knowledge of the Council, it was treated as a monstrous crime. The King did not wait for a virtuous House of Commons to demand the prosecution, but

* Essays, ii. p. 366.

† Ibid. ii. p. 367.

‡ Ibid. ii. p. 267.

Ordered the most rigorous investigation to be commenced at once. Every person who was found to have had a hand in it became from that moment infamous. These are the outward signs of an infamous transaction. But not one such sign can be traced in Bacon's case. The presents seem to have been brought, as it happened, some by his own servants,—secretaries or gentlemen of his retinue; some by friends who were in habits of intercourse with him; not hired, not specially selected, not charged to observe secrecy, not admitted (so far as we know) to any peculiar confidence. When they did these things, they had characters to lose. When they were known to have done them, their characters were not lost. Concealment does not seem to have been studied at all; the very number of witnesses is enough to prove that; and when I look at the particulars of the original charges which appear to have dropped off upon examination, as not touching Bacon personally,—the particulars, I mean, which appear in the charges as sent up by the Commons and not in the collection finally made out by the Lords,—I cannot help suspecting that he knew less of what was going on than any one else in his household. If it could be proved that these transactions had been carefully kept from the knowledge of all men of credit and character,—that no man of credit and character had anything to do with them,—the presumption that he meant to act corruptly would surely be much stronger; and if so, the rank of the persons through whose hands the presents came, though it may not be a conclusive, is surely not a *trifling* circumstance in his favour.

When I speak of these presents as being received *openly*, I mean of course, with no more secrecy than is usually observed in private pecuniary transactions of a complimentary kind, where the gift is not a debt, but a gratuity. But as the reviewer insists that they were received not only secretly, but with guilty secrecy, and endeavours to prove it by an argument which is cast in a logical form and claims to be conclusive, I may be expected to notice it. A little while ago he called upon us to admit that the practice itself of gift-taking was in Bacon's time not only "universally allowed to be altogether unjustifiable," but was "in the highest degree odious," upon the single ground that Bishop Latimer had denounced it in Edward VI.'s time, and the citizens of London had cheered him;* and now he calls upon us to conclude that all Bacon's presents were taken secretly but one, because he remarked in his confession that in that one secrecy was manifestly impossible. But I must give it in his own words—

"Unhappily the very circumstances which prove him to have been innocent in this case prove him to have been guilty on the other charges. Once, and once only, he alleges that he received a present publicly. The

* Essays, ii. pp. 362—364.

inference is, that in all the other cases mentioned in the articles against him, he received presents secretly. When we examine the single case in which he alleges that he received a present publicly, we find that it is also the single case in which there was no gross impropriety in his receiving a present. Is it then possible to doubt that his reason for not receiving other presents in as public a manner was, that he knew it was wrong to receive them?"*

The step from the premises to the conclusion seems to be rather a long one. But it is more important to observe that the reviewer appears to have missed the point of Bacon's remark. He has told us in the preceding paragraph that the case was one of "amicable arrangement between two parties;" both of whom being satisfied with his decision, had "joined in making him a present in return for his trouble;" and therefore that "there is no ground in this case for accusing him of corruption." My own examination of the single case (in its relation to the others) suggests several corrections in this account of it, and, I think, will make some doubt as to the conclusion at least possible.

There were twenty-seven distinct cases in which Bacon was charged with corruption in receiving presents from persons who had suits in his court. He did not deny that he had received them. He did not deny that *in some of the cases* the receiving of them did in true construction of law amount to corruption. But did they imply a corrupt intention? Of that, none of them contained conclusive evidence. Some of them had been received after the cause was over, no precedent promise having passed: some, that had been received before the cause was over, had been presented as new year's gifts, or upon his first coming to the Seal, or upon the furnishing of a new house, or upon some of the occasions when presents were usual to persons in his station from persons who were not suitors: others came from old clients in acknowledgment of old favours: others were for services not strictly judicial,—as awards made with the consent of the parties upon reference to him as arbitrator: others had been ordered to be returned; and so on: each case having its peculiar circumstance of palliation. That they had been given and taken without any studious attempt at concealment may be inferred, as I said, from the evidence; but this (being no justification) was not insisted on by him, except in one instance, where a special circumstance made it decisive as to the innocence of his intention. Having, as arbitrator between three companies, concluded an arrangement with which they were all satisfied, he had received a present from each of the three; each present being made *out of a common purse*, the purse of the company. And these presents counted as three among the charges of corruption. Upon this item, after explaining the nature of the case and why he had not

* *Essays*, ii. p. 367.

thought it wrong to receive what they voluntarily offered, he very naturally pointed out the circumstance of the *common purses*, as conclusive of the innocence of his intention—"for if I had taken it [he said] in the nature of a corrupt bribe, *I knew it could not be concealed*, because it must needs be put to accompt to the three several companies."

This is all, and from this we may justly infer that in the other cases he had not *evidence equally conclusive* that he meant no harm; for if he had he would probably have mentioned it. In the other cases he had only not studied concealment, but in this he must have known that concealment was impossible.

But why was this the only case in which this appeared? Obviously, because evidence equally conclusive could only be found where one of the parties happened to be a *company* with a common purse. In any other sense than that, it does not appear that the present was received more publicly on this occasion than on any of the others. Had he been arbitrating between three individual merchants instead of three companies, the case would have been the same, the fault the same, the excuse the same. Only what the reviewer calls the "publicity," meaning the knowledge that concealment was impossible, would have been wanting. The publicity was not a precaution, but an accident. And since his reason for receiving this present so openly was not that he knew it was right to receive it, but only that he was dealing with a company, it will be possible to suppose that his reason for receiving others less openly was not that he knew it was wrong to receive them, but only that he was *not* dealing with a company: and therefore that the argument in the last paragraph is wholly inconclusive. Indeed, to deny the reviewer's inference is not only in logic possible, but in fact necessary. That none of the other presents was received as openly, is in fact not true; the French merchants presented Bacon *out of their common purse* with a thousand pounds. That none of the other presents was received as innocently is in fact not true: two others, the second and the thirteenth, were received upon occasions of the same kind,—the conclusion of an amicable arrangement between parties who had voluntarily submitted to his arbitration.

Still, therefore—this one case of admitted innocence notwithstanding—I find it possible to believe that the others were equally clear of corrupt intention, and that the causes were all decided with a single eye to their merits; while, on the other hand, I find it no easier to understand in this case than in that of Buckingham's interference, which I have already mentioned, how it can have happened, if Bacon was really in the habit of pronouncing sentences and orders upon consideration either of fear or favour or reward or hope of reward, that there should be no record of the reversal of

any one of them. It is certain that, after his confession and sentence, no aggrieved suitor could have been deterred from seeking redress for an unjust judgment either by the fear of his authority or by the authority of his reputation, for both were gone. It is certain also that in several cases proceedings were *commenced* with that view. There are records in the journals of the House of Commons of bills *brought in* about the time of his fall for the reversal of decrees in Chancery; but I cannot find that any of them reached a third reading, and there are no traces of them among the titles of the private Acts. Until evidence can be produced of a decree reversed in a case where a present had been taken, I must consider the charge of "sullyng his integrity"—in the sense of pronouncing unjust judgments for reward—to be not proven.

8. Of the eight charges remaining on the list, that of having "plundered suitors" is disposed of under the last head. That Bacon ever used any means to extract from a suitor what he was not disposed to offer we have as yet seen no attempt to prove.

9. That of having "violated the most sacred obligations of friendship and gratitude" refers again to the case of Essex, and has been fully considered in this and the preceding paper.

10. That of having "persecuted the innocent" alludes, I presume, only to Bacon's appearance in the case of Oliver St. John as counsel for the prosecution—he being Attorney-General, and the prosecution being ordered by the Council. Of this I spoke at large in my first paper on Dr. Abbott,* and shall only add here that if the reviewer had known what was really laid to St. John's charge, and what effect the sentence had upon his own opinion of his own act (things not to be learned from Mr. Montagu), I think he would have tried to find a better representative of "manly and constitutional conduct" under persecution.

11. The charge of having "tortured prisoners" refers to the single case of Peacham (for of the other case, which would have been more to the purpose, but which does not appear in Mr. Montagu's summary narrative, he evidently knew nothing); and that in this case the application of torture was in any sense Bacon's act—as having been either suggested or executed (approved, or even silently concurred in by him—I have already given reasons for doubting,† which I have not yet seen answered. I have found, however, upon further examination, that the reviewer's statement of that case, as well as his comments upon it, may be accounted for better than I formerly supposed. For he might fairly have appealed for his authority to Mr. Montagu's own narrative, in which several of the most material features

* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, April, 1876, pp. 669—672.

† Ibid. pp. 672—

the story, as I read it from the original authorities, are not to be found: and if he took his impression of it from the text alone, without looking into the notes or the correspondence from which the narrative in the text was meant to be abstracted, he might easily go away with an impression that Bacon was the chief, if not the only, actor all through. If he had known that the prosecution of Peacham originated with Secretary Winwood; that the warrant to examine with torture was issued by the Council; that the conduct of the examination was committed to two privy councillors; that the report of the result was drawn up by one of them; and that Bacon was only attending by command and as in duty bound along with the other law-officers of the Crown; we may hope that he would have hesitated to assume that Bacon was the one person who did it all.

12. The charge of having "tampered with judges," which I have also discussed in a former paper,* and concerning which I found it so hard to understand how Lord Macaulay had contrived to know as much as he did without knowing the rest, is to be explained, I find, in the same way; though the explanation is less satisfactory; inasmuch as the portion of the correspondence which he certainly had before him should have been itself sufficient, if not to supply all the requisite correction, at least to show that correction was needed; and because he must have seen the first paragraph at least of the note to which the text referred him, and which contains a full copy of the letters in which the whole transaction is so clearly explained. It is nevertheless true that Mr. Montagu himself failed to perceive the point at issue; and if I may believe that his reviewer's knowledge of the case was limited to pp. clxx.—clxxvii. of the "Life," together with the opening paragraph of the second section of note Z Z,—headed in black letter, "*Temp. Jac. Before Bacon was Chancellor*,"—I can partly understand how he contrived not to detect the mistake. That he had seen that paragraph is proved by his reproduction, with a fidelity not otherwise explicable, of an inaccurate quotation which it contains of Coke's words. It is evident that Mr. Montagu mistook the proposed consultation with the judges "before the prosecution was commenced"—that is, extrajudicially—for the novelty to which Coke took exception; whereas it may be proved, two or three times over, out of the very letters which he was setting out in his notes, that this was at that time "the ordinary course." The novelty consisted in the proposal to ask their opinions, not only privately, but separately and unknown to each other: a proposal to which Sir Matthew Hale, if he thought extrajudicial consultations permissible at all, would not, it seems, have objected; for according to him "every judge ought to give sentence

* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, April, 1876, pp. 674—

to his own opinion and conscience, and not to be swayed by any respect or deference to another man's opinion"*—which was exactly what the King wanted, and Coke objected to. The reviewer adopts Mr. Montagu's error, and builds three pages of argument upon it.

13. That Bacon had "resigned his independence" is in one sense true. He had undertaken duties which could only be performed through other men, or in conjunction with them; and which (other men having an interest in them) he was not free to abandon at pleasure. But this is a condition as inseparable from the worthiest objects as from the least worthy.


14. That he had "flattered the worthless," can only mean that he had praised the King and expressed affection for Buckingham, to both of whom he was under great obligations; greater (if gratitude is to be in proportion to benefits *received*, which, however, is the reviewer's doctrine, and not mine) than any he owed to Essex; but the praise was always for merits which he believed the King to possess, and the affection which he professed for Buckingham was no more than he really felt.

15. That he had "wasted on paltry intrigues all the powers of the most exquisitely constructed intellect," &c., refers, I suppose, to some single passage of his life; but the description not being definite enough to enable me to guess which, I must leave it for those who can identify it to examine for themselves.

And this brings us round again to the general charge with which we started, and which we reserved for consideration till the particular charges produced in support of it had been seen and examined,—the charge of stooping to everything, and enduring everything, for the sake of "wealth, precedence, titles, the mace, the seals, the coronet, large houses, fair gardens, rich manors, massy services of plate, gay hangings, curious cabinets"—any good thing, in short, with a sounding name which ever belonged to him. In order to examine this charge properly, I should have to call witnesses on the other side. I should want to know whether he did not spend a great deal of time and pains in work that could have no such aims, and yield no such fruits. But this would be a large inquiry. And for my present purpose what we have is enough. I undertook to show that the reviewer had not examined with care the facts to which he himself appeals in support of his own proposition; that when they are stated correctly their force is gone; and I expect it to be admitted that, whatever may remain to be discovered or urged against Bacon by more diligent inquirers, it is not in this essay that any trustworthy information or well-considered judgment is to be looked for.

JAMES SPEDDING.

* See p. clxxi. note.



FRENCH PREACHERS.

I.

THE French are the least poetical nation in Europe. They have neither the exuberant idealism of the North, nor the enthusiastic realism of the South. A brave, brilliant race, with a temperament of great contrasts, and an energy all but fatal in its restlessness, they are deficient in at least two qualities, without which there can be no truly great poetry—in earnestness and in repose. And their very language lends itself with difficulty to express the feelings of imagination. It has neither majestic strength nor ravishing sweetness; it is singularly poor in “concord of sweet sounds;” it has no music—it does not “sing.”

But the gods have not left themselves without a witness. France is the land of rhetoric; the French are a nation of rhetoricians. Rhetoric reigns supreme, for good or for evil, in every department, from the highest to the lowest. Its authority is unquestioned; Church and State bow before it; truth itself makes it now and then a humble courtesy. You may object that it teaches men to value expression above thought, to devote their chiefest energies to the study of the “how,” to sacrifice, if necessary, everything to form; but you cannot do away with the fact that it is in admirable harmony with the temper of the people. Hence it has met with a ready response; and the language is now no longer pressed into a reluctant service; it yields itself gladly. Where shall we find a match for the marvellous prose of France? where shall we look for another Montaigne or a Voltaire?

This national rhetorical tendency, with which the Frenchman is born, shows itself as much in the Church as in the world. The history of the pulpit in France is in reality the history of rhetoric in the Church. Church oratory is but one of the departments of *belles-lettres*. The unfortunate Protestant preacher has to leave nature behind him whenever he steps across the threshold of the temple of grace. Deeply imbued with the notion of the sanctity of his function, he takes care to remove as far as possible from him all that savours of the wicked world, and his very thoughts are clothed in the *patois* of Canaan. Not so the French Catholic preacher. The arms of the statesman in the political assembly, the weapon of the lawyer before the judicial tribunal, the power of the *littérateur* with his motley audience, are transferred to the pulpits of the Church. The theme may be different; the method remains the same. Oh, happy land, where nature is not yet excluded from her pulpits!

The natural love for rhetoric finds itself strengthened by the Catholic Church, which, so far from looking upon it as an invasion, uses all its influence to promote it. The atmosphere of Catholicism is favourable to the cultivation of the æsthetic, for two reasons. First of all, the preacher is the mouthpiece of a faith, fixed in the cardinal points, and in the minutest details, and supported by all the authority and strength of an unbroken, united tradition. He asks no questions—blessed are they that ask none—he “only believes,” as the Evangelicals would say. This repose of faith leaves him, as a matter of course, time to devote himself to the development of outward graces. The substance is secured; he can now turn himself to the study of the form.

But the position of the Protestant preacher is altogether different. Whilst the strength of Catholicism lies in affirmation, the force of Protestantism is the grandeur of negation. Its climax is that sublime scene, when the brave Martin Luther defies the world gathered at Worms. Its basis is the right of the individual, its banner is the banner of unfettered criticism; its history, if true to itself, will therefore be a continual conflict, and its only consolation the mournful yet hopeful “I cannot do otherwise, God help me.” Consumed by the love of truth, and never pausing in its search after it—here is grand and sombre poetry—it gladly leaves vestments, and flowers, and forms, as an amiable weakness, to women and children.

In the second place, Catholicism has ever appealed to the latent poetry of humanity. A faith which does not appeal to the imagination is doomed; for what else is religion but the highest form of poetry? The want of it was at first unfelt in Protestantism, for, as we remarked on a former occasion,* it was a great

* The Protestant Pulpit in Germany, CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for August, 1874.

moral outburst, and its leaders were religious geniuses and heroes. But the Protestantism of later days resembles the perplexed King of Israel in the famous representation of the Judgment. Whither shall it turn—to the right or to the left? But it is too weak to be a religion, and too strong to be a philosophical school.

One may disapprove of the view which Catholicism has taken of art or of the method which it has adopted in regard to it. The distinction between “sacred” and “secular” is in our eyes intensely immoral. To us the music of Offenbach is as sacred as that of Bach; to us the introduction of theology into art is an unpardonable sin. But no one can deny the soundness of the principle of Catholicism or cease to remember the debt of gratitude which we owe to it. The Catholic Church has bound together æsthetics and Christianity. She has attempted to give expression to the religious sentiment, which would otherwise have been condemned to silence; she has imparted to the religious life colour and harmony. The many voices of the inner life of adoration have found a tongue in her rites and forms; the heart of humanity, wearied and saddened by the realities of life, has found in her ideals an imperishable source of rest and consolation.*

Under the twofold influence, therefore, of natural proclivity and of the encouragement of the Church, has the rhetorical element made its power felt in the pulpit. Nor is there any reason why the rhetorical method should not succeed as much as any other. We are unable to look to the Old Testament as our guide, for alas! our preachers are in no sense of the word prophets. We cannot follow the example of the apostles, for they preached no sermons, and limited themselves to the proclamation of certain facts with which we are familiar, thanks to those articles *de luxe*—the creeds of Christendom. Moreover, the Shemitic ideas of interpretation are not ours. It is true we cannot accept implicitly, as our master, a Cicero or a Demosthenes. As Herder has wittily remarked: “There is no Philippos at our gates, and we are not called upon either to condemn or to acquit a notorious criminal.” Who ever dreamt of anything after a sermon except of going home? But a sermon, being intended to keep alive and stir up within us the ideal temper, is as likely, if not more so, to gain its end by adopting a classical model as by following a Hebrew inspiration. At any rate, we shall now glance at the history of the pulpit, and see what it has become in the hands of succeeding rhetoricians.

II.

The Catholic pulpit before the days of Bossuet has only a few names which deserve to be recorded. It was the misfortune of

* I do not forget that the real cause of the hostility of Protestantism to art is to be looked for in its peculiar method of solving the dualism on which all religion is founded.

the preachers of the age of Louis XIII. to be succeeded by the three greatest preachers of French Catholicism. But, had it been otherwise, it is far from certain that their fame would have been greater or more lasting than it has proved to be. In fact, their chief title to recognition is simply that they preceded Bossuet.

The Renaissance which, like the Spirit of the Lord, had gone forth to break the fetters of unhallowed tradition and tyrannical authority, had had but little influence on the Church. The Church is in all ages conservative *quand-même*; in her eyes a thing is good simply because it exists. She generally looks upon what is new with suspicion if not with aversion, and, in nine cases out of ten, when she utters a word in favour of progress, we may be sure that, like Pilate, she says it not of herself, but that another has told her.

Scholasticism, though it had killed every atom of life in the Church,* still lingered behind, not merely in those cells of the cloister, where it had held undisputed sway for ages, but in the Church, in the pulpit, where it had celebrated so oft its barren triumphs. Its principle was indeed too invaluable to be given up. Its fundamental idea was, that there is but *one* truth, so that a thing, when theologically true, must be also philosophically true, and *vice versâ*, and that this *one* truth is to be found in the traditional dogma of the Catholic Church. This deification of the stereotype in matter and also in form had indeed made of the Church a vast graveyard. But, unlike the Greek hero, she preferred reigning over the dead to wandering in the midst of the living, at the risk of being nothing more than a fellow-labourer working together with others for the great common good.

Whilst, therefore, there was on all hands a general revival, and France, under one of her greatest kings—great because he was the concentration of the national virtues and vices and follies—Francis I., was rapidly becoming one of the civilizing centres of the world, the Church continued in a state of stagnation. The beautiful gods of Hellas, under whose tranquil reign joys had been great, and sorrows, though not unknown, had pressed but lightly, had dethroned the stern, sombre, violent God of Mediævalism. And the world breathed once more freely, and felt like one who, waking from a horrible dream, finds himself still in the heyday of youth with life before him. But the Church remained in that past over whose grave the world had sung its *Te Deum*. Its form of teaching was undoubtedly somewhat changed; as in the days of Philo Plato and Moses walked hand

* It is almost superfluous to state that my remarks apply to scholasticism in general. Had the middle ages produced none other but the author of the "Imitation," that masterpiece of egoism—but all religion is egoistical—or the noble thinker and martyr Abelard, it would have been impossible to say that they had been devoid either of religious or of intellectual life.

in hand, so now the Greeks and the Hebrews appeared together. But the substance was altogether unchanged, and the form of the discourse, because of the want of assimilation, resembled oft the coat of the unfortunate Joseph—beautiful, I dare say, but withal with too many patches.

The Renaissance, translated in the dialect of the Church, is nothing more than scholasticism with a slight gloss. The celebrated preachers of the reign of Henri IV., such as Seguiran and Coton, are in reality nothing else but disguised scholastics. Even Francis de Sales, one of the most popular and most successful preachers of the day—it is said that he made about 72,000 converts—is no exception to the general rule. His devotional writings have all the charms of a childlike spirit and a poetical temper. They display a richness of observation and a knowledge of the human heart such as one might expect of a man whose skill in the *direction des âmes* was unparalleled. They are also marked by a tenderness which, however passionate, never transgresses certain bounds, so that one feels no doubt about the safety of his spiritual wives. There is, lastly, a freshness of language which, by way of contrast with other productions of a similar kind, is singularly refreshing. But, whenever he ascends the pulpit, a complete change comes over him. His sermons abound in far-fetched allegories, treating the Bible as if it were a book of conundrums; long, dry explanations, tending more to the glorification of the “particle” than to the glory of God; curiously grotesque images, more productive of a smile than of a feeling of devotion. How shall we explain this falling-off? Is it because the pulpit is enthralled by some evil spell, or because the tyranny of fashion is nowhere more powerful and more successful than in the precincts of the Church?

But Francis de Sales contributed indirectly to the reformation of the pulpit, for he was one of the great leaders of the religious revival in the Catholic Church of France during the seventeenth century. Protestantism had rendered to the Church the services of a parliamentary opposition. It had been the misfortune of the Church to have reigned for centuries with well-nigh undisputed authority; it had been her sad fate to proclaim a truth all but unquestioned. Now, though nature may safely be left to its infinite developments, it would seem that the moral world, when thrown completely on its own resources, falls sooner or later into a state of atrophy. And as for truth, every truth being at the same time true and false, it is incomplete without its contrary part. Truth ever includes an affirmation and a negation. There is but one great heresy, *i.e.*, to imagine that a *part* of the truth is *the* truth.

The dying Roman Church was roused into active life by

Protestantism. This I consider an undeniable fact. But at no period of her history did she manifest more clearly her hidden vitality and her apparently inexhaustible resources of piety and of energy. When in the seventeenth century Protestantism, forsaking its original moral foundation, exhibited not-to-be-mistaken signs of weakness, Catholicism was once more full to the brim of life and vigour.

The Council of Trent had been a great logical folly. Francis de Sales and Vincent de Paul had an inspiration which was worth a thousand councils. The tendency of the Western Church, as distinguished from the speculative Eastern Church, had always been of a practical nature. These two men, true children of their Church, used therefore all their energies to stir up the latent life of the Church. Starting from the principle that "knowledge without virtue and virtue without knowledge are insufficient;" they insisted upon mental cultivation and moral reformation, as both equally indispensable to the priesthood.* They then founded schools, sent out mission-priests, covered the land with monasteries, and, above all, gave to the world that greatest glory of Catholicism—among the many incarnations of the divine, one of the chiefest—the Sister of Charity.

The religious atmosphere being thus gradually purified, it is certain that its influence will at last be felt by the pulpit. The pulpit has never originated any religious movement, strange to say; it has contented itself with following in the wake and gathering up the fragments. The good results of the revival are to some extent perceived at once. Take, as an instance, the sermons of le Père le Jeune, one of the priests of the Oratory. They are simple and practical; it is impossible to say of them "that they aim at nothing and that they hit it." The preacher looks upon his audience as grown-up children to be catechized for the time being with more or less severity. There is a gentle firmness in everything he says, and an air of reality about his utterances so as to make one believe that the preacher is in the first place a man, and in the second place a theologian. No doubt all this is not what we understand by "eloquence;" but is it not a great thing that for the first time during many centuries the pulpit should have as its occupant a man and not a scholastic?

Or look at the sermons of the Jesuit de Lingendes, written in Latin before they were delivered. He wears the garment of a *doctor ecclesiæ*, his reasonings and discussions are oft protracted to an inordinate length. But under the garment of the logician beats a passionate heart. Père le Jeune at his very best has a dead

* "La science à un prêtre, c'est le huitième sacrement de la hiérarchie de l'Eglise."—*Francis de Sales*.

perfection ; he has no verve, no inspiration. But Claude Lingendes has that holy spirit, the absence of which is death. His morality has none of those subtleties attributed to his order. It is simple, austere, naked,—not bedecked so as to excite the admiration of children and of monkeys. It makes vivid, passionate, nay, violent appeals to the audience. The great preacher must be almost tyrannical. The prophets, the greatest religious orators of the world, were men of violence ; they built their morality chiefly on fear. Thus it was that they fell, but thus it was also that they had reigned for centuries in the face of a threefold opposition : the throne, the priesthood, and the majority of the nation.

We are still a long way from Bossuet, Bourdaloue, and Massillon ; we have seen, however, some of the “missing links.”

It is interesting to note the contrast between the Catholic and the Protestant preachers of the period. How different the tone, which breathes through the sermons of Pierre du Moulin, or Jean Mestrezat, or Jean Daillé. The Protestants are clad from head to foot in a theological armour. They spend all their energies in the exposition and the defence of a theological dogma. They cling to the *letter* of the Scriptures, guarding it with a lover-like jealousy, which, to say the least, is somewhat exacting. Their sermons are merely detailed explanations of their text, a custom, however, which has as much *raison d'être* as the modern fashion of speaking about everything except about the text. Unfortunately their literalism is mostly extreme, and their text says never anything but Yea and Amen to their theological system.

If in the contents of their sermons they offer a theological analysis, supposed to be founded on the Scriptures, the form in which they express their convictions is even less attractive. The style is as bare as their temples ; devoid of imagery and ornament and every artistic element. It is sombre, hard, oft bitter. It bears all the traces of pressure and haste ; it does not make the faintest attempt to be rhetorical, for it would probably have looked upon oratory as a snare of the devil.

But let us do justice to those disciples of Calvin, the sternest of the Reformers, whom the strange chapter of accidents had thrown amongst a people, with great *religious instincts*, but without a *conscience*. The gloom of their faith was deepened by their lives, which were equally stern and sad. That dogma which they preached contained, in their eyes, the question of “to be or not to be,” and they had the courage to suffer in its defence. It inspired them during a life of action, and sustained them amidst the horrors of the galleys, the weariness of exile, and the terrors of persecution. And if their style had not a Ciceronian polish, shall we blame them ? It was manly,

vigorous, oft heroic. There was eloquence after all in that man, standing in all simplicity before his audience, in a temple not made with hands, taking up his Bible, over whose pages he had pored in prayer and wept in silence, and speaking from the fullness of a God-loving heart, to a crowd which, before the shadows of evening had fallen, might number some of its members among "the noble army of martyrs."

But if the eloquence of the preachers of Protestantism was to be found above all in those obscure, holy, active, stormy, suffering lives, it can proudly point to the name of Jacques Saurin, as a proof that it had no inherent incapability of producing an orator. Saurin is the Protestant Bossuet. The son of a distinguished family at Nîmes, he spent his youth at Geneva. Thoroughly indoctrinated in the tenets of Calvinism, he came to London, where he became the minister of a French church. From England he went to Holland, where the martyrs of philosophy and of theology had found a welcome asylum, and it was at the Hague that he celebrated his oratorical triumphs.

He had all the outward qualifications, which, it is true, do not make an orator, but without which success is rarely obtained. His appearance was imposing, his voice was sonorous, and his delivery was so fascinating that one of his hearers, after having listened to him for the first time, exclaimed, "Was it an angel that spoke, or a man?" His sermons were long; he preached never less than an hour and a half, but in those days the length of sermons was not measured by time, but by the interest of the subject and of the method of its treatment.

The chasm between Saurin and his predecessors, and, we are compelled to add, his successors also, is very wide. The circumstances under which he delivered his discourses were favourable. Far removed from the din of theological polemics, in the possession of complete liberty, and surrounded by a fashionable sympathetic audience, he had few barriers to his eloquence. But he was more than eloquent, he was an orator.

Protestantism till then, at its very best, had been eloquent. But it had moved in a very narrow circle, identifying Christianity with a theological formula, and forgetting, in its zeal for Christianity, that religion of Jesus which is as much above dogma as the sun is above the earth. Within that limited space, every inch of which it had contested with a tenacity worthy of a better cause, it had served as a guide to its adherents, taking them again and again over the well-beaten track. But it was getting monotonous; and in religion, as in everything else, one ought to be careful to avoid *ennui*. Its atmosphere, too, was somewhat stifling, and religion cannot flourish without fresh air.

Saurin's first merit was that he enlarged the horizon of Protes-

tantism. The choice of his subjects is of the most varied **description.** He roams through heaven and earth, especially through the former. He is taken up too much, no doubt, with **theological** questions; but apart from the fact that he was fond of **metaphysical** subtleties, and skilled in the intricacies of dialectics, **theology** will always be paramount in a system which is based on **a theological** proposition: the free sovereignty of God, graciously **electing** a few and kindly damning the many.

But Saurin often deigns to be human. Then he leaves the **dogma** to take care of itself, and chooses a moral topic, bearing upon life, with its every-day struggles and trials. On these **occasions** he evinces both in his descriptions (he had a remarkable **dramatic** power) and in his direct applications and appeals, great **breadth** of view combined with a practical temper. The one keeps him from losing himself in details; the other prevents him from confining himself to generalities.

The divisions of his sermons are for the greater part very ingenious. He pours a wealth of learning on his subject, which even then fatigued the audience, and which in our days—days of the deification of shallowness and of mediocrity—would be considered as perfectly appalling. There is at times something overwhelming about him; but he always gives one the idea of being possessed of an immense power to be wielded at his good pleasure. As to his style, it is at all times transparent and simple.

But how shall we impress our readers with the idea of his oratorical power? His printed sermons manifest a richness of thought, a power of imagination, and a force of expression, which must at all times command admiration. But we must go to his contemporaries to know what he really was. If it be the characteristic of a religious orator to rouse his audience from “moral stupidity” to moral consciousness, to stir up within them the dormant religious sentiment, to force them, by some mysterious power peculiar to himself, to contemplate themselves and their lives in the presence of the ideal, and to humiliate themselves before it—if it be the mark of a great orator that he knows how to make himself gradually master of the soul of his hearer, to make it think, and feel, and live with him for the time, however much it may be opposed to him when the spell is broken—if it be, in short, the badge of the orator to wield power, to make the truth live before his hearer and reign within him—then Saurin is an orator, and only next to the three great preachers of Catholicism.

III.

At last came Bossuet.

He came in an age when the world was exhausted. The great sixteenth century, which had given birth to the Renaissance

and to the Reformation, was followed by a period of rest; and rest for humanity is retrogression. Great individualities, great characters, great conceptions, great instincts, belonged to the past. Nature with its spontaneity was giving place to art and the artificial.

Louis XIV., like another Augustus, had no greatness, except the power of appreciating it in others, and the desire to concentrate it around him. He gathered the illustrious men together, and proclaimed himself the centre of authority and of unity. In accordance with this idea he persecuted Protestantism, Port Royal, and the Papacy, and put himself forward as the defender of the liberties of the Gallican Church. There was no power to resist him, for though the *Reformation* had brought to light the *individual*, the *Revolution* was still to come, which should make known the *people*.

There is but one Louis XIV., and Bossuet is his prophet. Bossuet was the apostle of absolutism in every form, only now and then modified, as at one time he was more under the influence of the Jesuits, and at another more under the influence of the King. His ideal was the theocracy, his political creed was the *droit divin* carried to its utmost limits. His religion was one of affirmation and authority. Doubt was unknown to him. With majestic mien and calm countenance, and surrounded by the pageantry which befits a pompous age, the religion of the Bishop of Meaux presented itself to his contemporaries.

A theocratic religion, in harmony with the State, as concentrated in and interpreted by Louis XIV., this is the great fundamental thought of Bossuet. It is the key-note, at any rate so it appears to us, of his many and varied writings; it makes itself heard also in those wonderful sermons, which began with the brilliant improvisation of the Hôtel de Rambouillet, and ended sixty years later in the quiet and comparative obscurity of a country church.

The sermons of Bossuet do not come before us like his funeral orations, which were written and revised by himself. But though without the master's finishing touch, they have all the characteristics of his other productions.

A glance at his predecessors convinced us of the little progress which pulpit oratory had made. Bossuet, not able to learn much from those immediately before him, turned to the original sources. He made himself a complete master of that petrified thought which is but another word for tradition. No one read the Fathers as he did; but, what is more to the point, no one either before or after him knew how to use them as he did. His special study, however, was the Old Testament. Isaiah, and above all the unknown author of the second part of his book, so majestic and so sublime; Jeremiah, with his intense pathos; Ezekiel, with his gorgeous colouring;

the author of the book of Daniel, with his philosophical power; in short, all these men without parallel as lyrical poets, interpreters of the heart and prophets of the conscience, became models to the young preacher reading and meditating in the silence of his cell. And verily the mantle of one of those religious geniuses of Hebrew history fell upon him; Bossuet was an Eastern echo on Western shores.

The subject of his sermons was principally the theological dogma. This was in accordance with his absolute tendencies. Morality holds but a subordinate place in his teaching; it oft blends skilfully with his theology, but it always remains somewhat in the background, never offers anything striking, and rarely descends into details.* The prominent bringing forward of the theological dogma is detrimental to morality. The man who is moral in obedience to an external authority, with some ulterior end in view, either of gain or of loss, is, in our eyes, not yet moral; his morality rests on an immoral foundation. Morality finds its great authority and sanction in the gospel written long before all others: the gospel of the conscience. But, whether or no, one thing is certain, that the triumph of Bossuet as preacher of the theological dogma is much greater than if he had been a preacher of morality. To inspire life into the latter requires talent; to make the former live is the work of genius.

And where shall we find the majesty of the Church's doctrine if not in Bossuet? I do not now refer to the kingly splendour of his style, the perfection of form which has never been equalled, or to the dignity of his office which has left its mark on every page. The developments of Catholicism had been altogether external; in the hands of Bossuet, the very *heart* of the dogma is laid bare. We see its hidden centre in the sublimity of its grandeur and the depth of its tenderness. Tenderness—it was forced upon Bossuet by the study of the Old Testament. It is a strange fancy which looks upon the God of Israel as cruel and vindictive. The God of the Old Testament is full of love. And no wonder, for Jewish theology is throughout anthropomorphic.

The genius of Bossuet made of the theological dogma a living reality. His audience could hardly follow him as he soared to heights on which few had ventured; they were dazzled by the variety, the strength, and the skill of his arguments; they were overwhelmed by a force, great at all times, greatest perhaps when it confessed his weakness; they were humbled, if not crushed, by the great problems which were set before them as demanding a

* It should be remarked that Bossuet had to contend with great difficulties. The age was theological but irreligious—an age of priests and of mistresses. Bossuet has been blamed for his want of boldness: as a matter of fact, he was bolder than others. The rudeness of John the Baptist—"It is not lawful," &c.—would have been sadly out of place in the polite age of Louis XIV.

solution, and the vigorous demonstration of the weakness and the insufficiency of reason to supply the answer. But they were never allowed to forget that there was a way of escape, nay, more, that there was a path which, when trodden, would bring certainty and rest. It was the Catholic dogma, venerable because of its antiquity, fascinating because of the vitality with which the orator knew how to endow it. Here was the anchor in the midst of uncertainty; the remedy against every ill; the stay in the hour of weakness.

And as men listened to that wonderful inspiration which held them captive, however unwilling, some believed, others doubted, others again trembled. But upon all came that feeling of awe with which Jacob, rising from his dream at the brook of Jabbok, exclaimed, "I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved."

The funeral orations of Bossuet are as inferior to his sermons as art is to nature. The latter are a spontaneous outburst, the former are a work of reflection. They bear, as a matter of course, the impress of Bossuet's genius; they are full of grand thoughts couched in the sublimest of dictions. Nowhere, except in the Prophets, are the glories of the Divine celebrated in more jubilant strains, or the miseries of humanity, in the midst of its greatness and dignity, described with more sorrowful accents. But the literary merits of these discourses are open to many strictures, and their tone is that of the polished courtier, who dexterously avoids an unpleasant topic, and, when unable to do so any longer, knows skilfully how to turn a reproach into a disguised flattery.

However, in this *genre* as in everything else, Bossuet is *facile princeps*. Compare his funeral orations with those of the preachers who stand foremost in the second rank—Fléchier and Mascaron. Fléchier was a great rhetorician, and his funeral orations, especially the one on Turenne, contain passages of great beauty. Mascaron also was a celebrated preacher, and known chiefly by his funeral orations. But how artificial is the atmosphere into which they usher us! The language is elegant, the words are well chosen, the harmony of the periods is admirable. We are inclined to forget for the moment the poverty of thought, and to be carried away by the richness of the garment which hides it from our view. But I forget who it was that said, "*L'éloquence continue ennuit*." Ere long those high-sounding phrases grow wearisome; that flowery style, mistaken for poetry, palls upon us; those well-meaning commonplaces irritate us; that long continued strain of flattery gets fulsome.

Oh, over the grave let there be silence! But, if there must be speech, let it be the voice of nature,—majestic and meek,

violent and tender, stern and consoling, sad and joyful ; but in all her varying moods, simple, real, truthful. Chant on our graves thy requiem, thou whose lullaby has so often soothed us !

Bossuet occupies a unique place in the history of the pulpit ; Bourdaloue, the inheritor of its old traditions, was in reality its reformer.

The contrast between the Bishop of Meaux and his successful rival, the Jesuit Bourdaloue, is very striking. Bossuet is original in his method of treating the dogma. It is true he neither adds to nor takes from it ; his excessive caution and common-sense keep him from indulging in any extremes and from presenting it to his hearers in any but the orthodox form. But within the Church's limit he gives full scope to his power. He places the dogma in a relation to life which it had never yet had ; he finds a way and creates a language to express it and to make its power felt. Bourdaloue's method, on the other hand, is the old one marked with the stamp of centuries. Thanks to the age in which he lives, it is free from bad taste, pedantry, and the defects which had characterized it in the preceding age. The originality of Bourdaloue consists in the subjects which form the matter of his discourses. He returns to those fields from which the doctors of the Church should never have strayed. Can we doubt for a moment what is the legitimate province of the pulpit ? Judaism was a theology, Christianity is morality.

His sermons are a complete manual of religious morality. He had a thorough knowledge of men by means of that splendid spiritual dissecting-room, the confessional. A knowledge of humanity is indeed independent of a knowledge of men. The observation of men is not necessary in order to understand humanity ; nay, being generally partial, is rather detrimental than otherwise to that wider and more general knowledge. But the confessional enables every priest, unendowed though he may be with powers of abstraction or of imagination, to obtain a practical knowledge of the conscience ; whilst the Protestant clergyman, with the sorry substitutes of visiting or of marriage,* flounders hopelessly, the Catholic priest stands on *terra firma*. The ordinary priests of the Catholic Church are not more eloquent as a rule than our Protestant curates. Universal eloquence would indeed be an unmitigated calamity. But they display an astounding knowledge of the human heart. Who that has stood in a little country church and listened to the discourse of the simple village priest, has not felt constrained to say, "This man may not be eloquent, but he knows the people ?"

A plain, practical, every-day morality is, I must allow, some-

* Visiting reaches at the very best but a small portion of a limited class of the people ; and, as to marriage, does any clergyman ever make a study of his wife ?

what tedious; but every-day life is tiresome, and it is useless to complain of it. It is useful, though not very beautiful; as we all know, "*rien n'est beau que l'inutile.*" It suits the majority, who are quite satisfied with the possession of five senses, and care little for that sixth sense without which it were better not to have been born—the sense of the ideal. It comforts the weak souls, which have got so used to crutches that they have forgotten how to walk. It has the merit of leaving few disturbing elements behind it, for who ever applied a moral description or precept to any one else save his neighbour?*

The method of Bourdaloue was that of the scholastics. His logical powers were unrivalled. He had the faculty of grasping his subject as a whole, and of mastering it into the very minutest details. He was a master in clearness of exposition. His subject was carefully laid out in a certain number of parts; each part contained a number of propositions, with divisions in which the matter under discussion was thoroughly ventilated, the arguments in favour of it enforced, and the objections to it refuted. It would be easy to point out an occasional excess of subtilty, a want of directness, a failure of progressiveness; but it is enough for our purpose to point out the method. Morality in a logical garb reduced to scientific formulas and appealing to reason—such is the strange spectacle which the preacher Bourdaloue presents to us.

It has been said that he had no imagination, and that he was dry and barren. In my opinion he is to be commended for the faithfulness with which he adhered to his method. The logic of the pulpit must be either scientific or rhetorical; it must be the logic of the schools or that of the people. It may be said that the former is, at its best, too impersonal; that it is unsafe and provokes opposition, nay, possibly defeat. Good and well; let it be discarded.

But I think we should object most strenuously to the mixture of two different methods of argumentation—to the sermon which, after a train of reasoning, suddenly breaks off at a moment favourable to the preacher and rushes into a torrent of feeling, where it remains or whence it emerges again at the bidding of the preacher. Such sermons may be highly applauded by the faithful; but the world outside the chosen people will say to the minister, "If you put yourself on the standpoint of reason, come then, let us reason together; if you put yourself on the point of view of the religious sentiment, come then, let us compare souls." Bourdaloue, honest and straightforward, having adopted the method of the dialectician, remained faithful to it, and reached a standard of per-

* I am only speaking of a certain kind of morality; not of the morality which, as I conceive it, should be the subject of the pulpit.

fection never surpassed. And being beside an adept in gentlemanly satire, and skilled in religious gossip, he succeeded in gaining the ear of the people. Audiences thronged round him, and acknowledged his power, returning homeward convinced if not persuaded.

The voice of Bossuet was no longer heard, and the utterances of Bourdaloue were few and far between, when, a young disciple of the Oratory, Massillon made his first appearance. A great age, which had been ushered in amidst shouts of joy, was drawing to a close amidst bursts of tears. Not merely because of political misfortunes. The rottenness and hollowness of the régime, was chiefly seen in the collapse of society. Autocrats keep their subjects in peace by pursuing a vigorous foreign policy. Thus their attention is drawn away from affairs at home, and no attempt is made to penetrate beneath the more or less gilded surface. But a defeat abroad involves a greater defeat at home. The tinsel, glitter, and polish being removed, there remains a material which, whatever it may be, is far from sound. Society which, during the brilliant years of Louis XIV., had revealed little of its corruption to the looker on, or at any rate had impressed him with the idea that its vices and virtues were both splendid, was suddenly seen in its hideousness. The intrigues and sensuality, in short the immoral atmosphere in which Louis XV. lived and breathed was the result. So great was the corruption that even taste and good manners deteriorated rapidly; the former, because, though not dependent on the morality of the individual, it is the outcome of the general atmosphere; the latter, because society had been polite but not civil.

It has been said that the decay of pulpit oratory began with Massillon. The accusation is unjust. A gentle, Jeremiah-like nature, he coped boldly with the difficulties by which he was on all sides surrounded. His style, like that of the prophet, shows traces of literary decline. In both there is a want of ideas, a monotonous repetition of the same pictures and images, an excessive abundance of words, a seeming richness of style which is in truth but disguised poverty. But there are no traces of falling off in Massillon when we look at the treatment of his subject. The choice of his theme in itself was masterly, it was the religious sentiment. The age, as we have seen, was immoral. In addition, a philosophy had sprung up which told man to study nature around him and within. Massillon, discarding the dogma with great wisdom, and avoiding a practical, detailed morality, went to the root of the matter, when he tried to show that human nature, closely interrogated, reveals the existence of a religious sentiment, and that its voice, when truly interpreted, proclaims in favour of virtue.

Massillon then placed himself on those serene heights of the

religious sentiment where divisions and distinctions fade away like morning mists, and where men meet, in virtue of a common humanity, to give expression to a faith which shall interpret the feelings by which they all are inspired. He appealed to fear, to veneration, to admiration, to sorrow and joy, to love—in one word, to all that could stir up a sentiment which, denied by scepticism and trampled upon by vice, rises from its knees in moments when man's spirit is lonely and his heart is sad, and mutters in his ears, unwilling as they may be to hear: "*Eppure si muove.*"

Massillon's sermons abound in pictures. He delighted in word-painting, and was oft carried away by it. His love of antitheses is extreme, and there is a want of breadth about them which is decidedly disappointing. One feels that a few bold strokes would have been more efficient than the most detailed portrayal. On the other hand, some of those tableaux are highly effective. What glowing descriptions of the righteous and his death! What terrible pictures of the life and the condition of the wicked! Is it difficult to imagine that as the preacher proceeded there rose from the heart of one of his hearers the prayer of the old prophet: "Let my soul die the death of the righteous?"

Massillon is fond of removing objections. It is to be feared that the ingenuity of the preacher oft suggests to the hearer some excuse or obstacle he had not thought of before. But if it be true that "the heart is desperately wicked and deceitful," it follows that it is most unwilling to love the highest, even when it is seen. It is well, therefore, to remove any real or seeming hindrances. The great orator must engage in a struggle with his audience. He has to fight, not for the victory of the truth—for it has conquered and goes on conquering—but for the acknowledgment of that victory and submission to it.

At other times Massillon, after having painted a certain moral condition in harmony with, or opposition to, the religious sentiment, points out the causes of which it is the result or the motives by which it is determined. Sometimes he dwells prominently on the effects produced by certain states, and draws from those and other characteristics a conclusion as to whether such a condition be desirable or no. He speaks at all times as if the question affected him personally, hence that temper of humility and of sadness which but rarely gives place to moderate joy.

It has been objected that his ideal was too high. An ideal which is too lofty deters the timid, drives those that are conscientious to despair, and produces in the indifferent a gay or melancholy recklessness. But it must not be forgotten that the majority of the audience are only too ready to lower the ideal which has been

set before them, and to detract from the force of the preacher's words. Christianity has a very high ideal, and, though it would probably have chosen a lower standard had its conceptions been Hellenistic instead of being Shemitic, the fact remains that its ideal is one of the highest. In lessening it, in bringing it down to the level of the carnal, the selfish, or the indolent, what shall we gain? Men are not won by concessions; they despise them as an avowal of weakness: they are won by those that know how to command. Or shall we abate its claims out of despair because the ideal has not yet been reached? The Christian religion is not a *fait accompli*; it is a religion which grows. A Christian is not he who believes in certain theories—that were seeking the living among the dead; he is one who works out the principles which Jesus taught—the truths which are everlasting because they are the truths of the conscience. Shall there not be progress in this, as in everything else?

Bossuet, the preacher of dogma, appealing to the conscience; Bourdaloue, the preacher of morality, addressing himself to reason; Massillon, the interpreter of the religious instinct, speaking to the heart: a Church which has had three men like these is immortal.

IV.

The eighteenth century was the child of the sixteenth. The leaders of great movements are generally unconscious of the real nature of the work in which they are engaged, and the gods, in pity for humanity—for what great work would otherwise have been carried out?—keep from them the knowledge of the consequences to which the principles which they lay down, with child-like frankness, must inevitably lead. There arises therefore sometimes a little confusion in the paternal relationship; and children, who appear very unlike their father, have in truth a perfect right to call him by that or any other endearing name. Thus Evangelicalism and Rationalism are both children of the Continental Reformation: the one, of the Reformation, as practically understood or misunderstood by its authors; the other, of the Reformation, as it was laid down in principle and in method.*

The eighteenth century was the protest of humanity against the State religion, and the attempted usurpation of the theocracy. The age of Louis XIV. had had an artificial religion. A State religion is the best substitute yet invented for no religion. It secures to religion a certain amount of stability and of respectability, and, above all, keeps it within certain limits. That

* In the English Church, *e.g.*, a High-Churchman is the historical, a Broad-Churchman the logical, child of the Reformation.

religion however had had its day, and at the time of which we are speaking the subject which occupied the minds of men was morality.

The Thors of the age take up their hammer and shatter into atoms a religion which is in every way external. They are great in nothing but negation; but every negation is an affirmation. Unfortunately they go too far, or rather not far enough. In preaching an irreligious morality, in teaching man that his end is in himself, and that the end of society is in man, in thus carefully eliminating every divine and theocratic element, they keep out of sight the most intimate depths of human nature, and fail to penetrate to the ultimate principles which rule the world. Their punishment overtakes them: whilst they have rendered humanity never-to-be-forgotten services in protesting against hierarchy, in gathering up the fragments of true religion, in proclaiming the Gospel of humanity, they failed in the ideal which they had set before them—the restoration of human nature—and ended, like their opponents (such is the irony of history), in establishing a despotism, and in promoting an order of things which, being merely external, was at its best a superficial morality and at its worst a glaring immorality.

The preachers of that period were in an unfortunate position. The pulpit had run through its three great phases, and seemed condemned to remain *in statu quo*, unless some great original force should unexpectedly come to its aid. This, however, was not the case. During the most revolutionary period in the world's history, the Church was for the greater part asleep. The few that were awake tried to make way against wind and waves by making use of the instruments which had formerly proved successful. In vain—the new order of things required to be met in a new way.

But some sank even lower: they fell to the level of the times and of the society whose guides they were supposed to be. The pulpit must indeed be of the world, but it must be at the same time above the world. The morality of the age became the theme of many a pulpit, and religion was made to play the part of a humble servant. The preachers were, it need scarcely be remarked, less enlightened than their rivals, and were opposed in the secret of their heart, though they might think it safer not to express their hatred, to the popular movement which was going on in their midst. For want of intellectual originality and moral sympathy, there remained therefore one thing: to display a force of character which should have secured respect if not sympathy. But they laid their head quietly on the lap of Delilah, and enjoyed it amazingly no doubt, till the Philistines, who had always suspected and hated them, came upon them in full force

and led them away captives. They had attempted to be something between a priest and a man; the people, which detests halfness, rose against them and swept them away.

Among the preachers of the day, Poulle and Neuville were the most popular. Poulle's fame rests chiefly on two charity sermons. Endowed with a lively imagination, and possessing a poetical style, it would be unfair to deny that there are passages in his discourses which go far to justify the public opinion. Neuville was chiefly known for his funeral orations. But his sermons, as judged by the standard of the times, are not without beauty. The style may be here and there too florid, or the tone savour now and then of pedantry—let us remember that we are in the day of small mercies, and “for these and all other mercies, may the Lord make us truly thankful!”

It would be easy to point to other names, such as Lenfant, on whom the mantle of Bourdaloue seemed to have fallen, master as he was of that direct argumentation in which the great preacher of Louis XIV. had been paramount; or the versatile Maury, a brilliant panegyrist and political orator, reviving by his eloquence classical days. Or one might call attention to the many excellent pastorals and charges issued by the bishops in times when the horizon wore a most threatening aspect. Or one might recall to memory some of the philosophical productions of the day, such as the works of Guenard, and, to pass on to days somewhat later, those of Boyer. But such a catalogue of names, however interesting in the sense of completeness, would be, after all, dreary. The names and the works of those men, excellent as they were, are forgotten. Time never forgets what is worth remembering; if they perished it is because they did not deserve to live.

“Eighteenth century, thou callest thyself a philosophical age; how fatal thou shalt be in the history of the mind and of morality. We do not dispute the progress of thy knowledge, but could not the weak and proud reason of man control itself? Having succeeded in reforming ancient abuses, must it needs attack truth itself? . . . Revolution, thou art more fatal than the heresies which have changed the character of many surrounding countries; they left, at any rate, a worship and a morality behind them. But our unfortunate descendants shall be without either. Oh, holy Gallican Church! oh, Christian kingdom! God of our fathers, have mercy on their children!”

Thus spoke a known preacher of the day—De Beauvais, Bishop of Senes, in his funeral oration on Louis XV., a *genre* of eloquence in which he had only one rival, the Abbé de Bois-mont. A gentle, moderate man, doing quietly his work in the Church, and, after the manner of many ecclesiastics of the times, a member of the political assembly, he had one of those moments

of inspiration—or shall I call it intuition?—which come now and then, let us trust, to the man who earnestly and sincerely loves the truth. The storm of the French revolution broke out at last over the Church and the nation. The year 1790 saw the last public ordination before the Revolution. In a few years the Church will be deprived of her temples, her altars desecrated, and her priests martyred. Ere long the flocks will be without pastors, the living without guidance, the dying without consolation; and on the ruins irreligion and anarchy will celebrate their triumph, but a victory which is a defeat—the Goddess of Reason in the form of a handsome prostitute!

Then men will cry out for a religion. In epochs of national calamity, the people, which ever connects suffering and guilt, rushes to the altars to endeavour to appease the gods. Touching avowal of human weakness, the most sublime confession of human strength! But a religion cannot be created at command; a religious faith is not the work of a generous caprice or of a passionate impulse.

A Church, however, can be re-established by authority. On Easter Day, A.D. 1802, the celebrated Boisgelin, Archbishop of Tours, preached a sermon in Notre Dame, on the re-establishment of religion.

V.

The period upon which we now enter has none of the majestic repose which was the outcome of the revival at the close of the sixteenth century, or of the undignified sleep from which the Church of the eighteenth century had been roused so ungently by the iron hand of revolution. The spirit of restlessness characteristic of our times—days when the multitude of ideas keeps men in continued suspense, and prevents them from ever coming to a conclusion—penetrates even into that Church whose loudest boast is that she is the mouthpiece of an unbroken tradition, a fixed dogma, and an infallible authority.

The Concordat, which Napoleon had concluded as a stroke of policy, threatened that spirit of independence and of nationality which had been characteristic of the Gallican Church in her golden age. Gallicanism, though anxious to live in an *entente cordiale* with the Papacy, had always protested against the usurpation of the Italian element in the Catholic Church, and refused to be nothing but a vassal of Rome. Its clergy, too, had always had a leaning towards that form of Broad-Churchism which had been associated with Port-Royal. It had hated Ultramontanism as a foreign importation, and cultivated a Christianity of an enlightened nature and with moderate tendencies. Traditions

Such as these could not easily be effaced and never be completely obliterated. They continued to linger behind, and to find now and then an eloquent expression; but as years rolled on their influence became weaker and weaker, till at last it grew all but imperceptible.

The Restoration, however, was more destructive of the Church than the Empire. It identified the Church with a political party; it made of religion a political tool. When the Church is narrowed to the limits of a party, either religious or political, it ceases to be. It answers to its description only when it includes all parties and is above them all. The Church of the Restoration lent itself to the Governmental theories of absolutism. Ultramontanism, though a religious absolutism in its extremest form, might have gained adherents. Who has not known hours of moral weariness, of spiritual tossings to and fro, when a man, in his passionate longing for rest, would sell his soul, if need be, to obtain it? And where is rest for humanity except in one or other extreme? But, identifying itself with a political party, Ultramontanism gained momentary strength and lost in the end; for it stirred up the political animosities of men who would have looked upon it with indifference from a religious point of view. The result was that its altars were once more overthrown, and that it had again the glories of martyrdom. But after all it may have gained; for, leaving the next world out of the question, there is nothing, even in this one, which has its reward like martyrdom.

Ultramontanism then and political absolutism effect an entrance, at the beginning of this century, in the Gallican Church. They are set forth as a metaphysical theory by Bonald, in whose eyes a limited monarchy is an abomination, and to whom the theocracy is the only legitimate form of government. They are defended by the paradoxical De Maistre, who hurls his thunderbolts against the age, finding the one remedy against the ills which he paints with the sombrest colours, in the death of Gallicanism and the supremacy of the Pope. They find an enthusiastic advocate at first in Lamennais, one of those characters whose life must needs be full of change and of tragedy, because their morbid idealism makes them believe in a future which can never be realized, and their whole-hearted nature, incapable of a *juste milieu*, or of any state bordering on halfness, drives them on with a passion which, like a fatal fire, burns and consumes, leaving nothing behind but ashes.

But the struggle which will soon divide men, and range them in opposing camps, is delayed for a brief moment. The voice of a poet, whose brilliant imagination casts a magical spell over all it comes in contact with, vibrates through the length and breadth of France. The poet paints Catholicism in all its splendour; its

saints and ideals rise before the eyes of men in all their majesty and grandeur; the rites and ceremonies of its worship appeal to them in all their solemn pomp and stately glory. To a Protestant the "*Génie du Christianisme*" seems to offer a Christianity without backbone. He will complain of the enervating effect of the atmosphere; he will probably, from his common-sense point of view, accuse the book of sentimentalism. But religion and Catholicism appeal to the uncommon sense of man. I do not, indeed, deny the weakness of the romantic Christianity of Chateaubriand; I do not deny the dangers of a religion which is *exclusively* the development of the sense of the beautiful. But the "*Génie du Christianisme*" in bringing forward the æsthetic aspects of Christianity, in pointing out to men the beauties of those undying traditions and immortal recollections whose halo had grown pale and whose brilliancy had been dimmed, taught men at any rate to contemplate the ideal and to adore. Adoration is not necessarily prayer, but it may lead to it; the acknowledgment of the beauty of the ideal does not necessarily compel submission, but it is the only way to it.

Frayssinous was the great preacher of the Restoration, who endeavoured to make the doctrine of absolutism popular among the masses. He began his ministry at the Carmelite church in Paris, and was the first to give a series of "conferences." He was a firm Royalist and loyal Ultramontane. The Pope was to him the centre of Catholicism; and the supremacy of the Catholic Church was in his eyes paramount both in the spiritual and in the political domain. In conjunction with Charles X. he did all he could to secure the authority of the Jesuits. He fell a victim to his zeal, and died in obscurity.

As the chief originator of *conférences sur la défense du Christianisme*, he deserves a special mention. The "conference" is neither a sermon nor an essay; it is a religious oration. Evangelicalism, which sums up the Gospel in a theological formula of St. Paul, has virtually abdicated in favour of the pulpit of Protestant countries—the Press. But the Gospel of Catholicism is wide enough to embrace everything. Theology, metaphysics, moral philosophy, physical sciences, political economy, in short, everything which belongs to human science or human life, is laid under contribution by the Catholic preacher. This had always been the wise policy of the Roman Church. But how astonished would the great preachers of the seventeenth century feel if they could enter the Notre Dame of to-day! What variety in the choice of subjects, what diversity of method in their treatment!

The defence of Christianity in most of the "conferences" is of a peculiar nature. The historical and critical school, the glorious fruit of German Protestantism, had shaken the very foundations

of orthodoxy. The shock, though specially felt in a neighbouring camp, was too great not to produce vibrations elsewhere. The origin of the dogma was laid bare ; its history and necessary development were clearly and firmly traced. Who could henceforth attach any absolute value to a dogma, when he remembered its birth and progress ?

The Catholic preacher generally avoids the question. As a rule he has not had the thorough training of Protestantism, and he would probably find it a difficult matter to meet in detail the objections of Rationalism. But apart from this, the Church resembles a woman who begins to reason. She may or may not be lost, but she has left the safer platform of mild obstinacy for a dangerous parley with the enemy. The Catholic preacher knows how to be silent ; his Church has reduced silence to a science. Marvellous and unsurpassed as is the eloquence of the Roman Church, its silence is more astonishing still. The audacity of its silence is sublime ; it does not affirm, it gives no denials, it simply ignores.

The Catholic preacher leaves the dogma untouched ; it is a *fait accompli* : we all know the power of facts. For the greater part he carries the war into the enemy's country ; he shows his greatest brilliancy in attack and not in defence. But he knows, if necessary, how to maintain his cause. Avoiding as much as possible historical and critical questions, he entrenches himself within the stronghold of the conscience. He points out the moral aspects of religious truths ; he exhibits them in their bearing on political, social, and individual life. Sometimes he gives nothing more than a brilliant exposition and defence of a spiritualistic philosophy, or a powerful justification of his principles from the events of the day and the conditions of life. Thus he gains a twofold object. The masses of the people judge by results ; they willingly believe in the truth of a principle, if its use has been demonstrated. The philosopher, who knows that the *belief* in a reality is quite as powerful for good or for evil, whether that reality have an *objective existence or no*, can have no objection to a preacher stirring up a faith productive of good, so long as he passes by the truth of the object to be believed in.

From the days of Frayssinous to the present time the great preachers of Catholicism have continued to hold "conferences." The traditions of the Church have found representatives in Ravignan, discussing the dogma with perilous subtlety and denouncing sternly the tendencies of modern times, yet withal carrying his audience before him by the combined power of a logical method and an ascetic life ; in Dupanloup, the eloquent advocate of education, passionate apologist of Christianity as a safeguard against anarchy, and, above all, violent defender of the Papacy, compelling admiration from friends and foes by the exhi-

bition of extraordinary versatility, unusual skill and brilliancy in debate, and unmistakable enthusiasm; in Père Felix, to mention only one other name, who boldly attacked modern criticism, in "Jésus Christ et la Critique nouvelle," and the world of to-day in his "Conférences sur le Progrès par le Christianisme." A semi-theological philosophical mind, he discussed the *questions brûlantes* with comparative moderation, declaring himself in favour of progress—progress in faith, humility, holiness, and love.

But, however distinguished the preachers of tradition may have been, what were they when put next to the leaders of the small band, which may be called the Broad Church party of French Catholicism? The disciples of Lamennais, differing widely in many respects, had one thing in common; they were *francs-tireurs* engaged in a holy warfare. In the conflict between authority without liberty and liberty without authority, they wished to find a formula of reconciliation. They desired to show to the world that it was possible to be a good Catholic and a good liberal; that the principles of Catholicism and of modern civilization were not in themselves antagonistic. Noble endeavour, in which to fail was glorious, in which to conquer was to be immortal!

Three men stood out prominently from among the rest—Gratry, Lacordaire, and Hyacinthe.

Gratry preached in the chapel of the Oratory; he was chiefly known as a writer. One evening, he tells us, when he was a young man, he had a dream. Life was stretched out before him, and as he looked down along its vista he saw honour, fame, love. But suddenly the dream vanished, and he was left alone. In the midst of a peaceful existence, given up to contemplation, he felt a void which demanded to be filled. Then religion revealed itself to him.

So much is certain, that this man was an enthusiastic priest all his life. "If there were twelve men," he said, on one occasion, "absolutely bent on doing God's will, and ready to proclaim it even unto death, they would usher in a new epoch in the world's history." But the priest's heart beat warmly for the world, for the age in which he lived. With all his idealism he had the passion of the reality, which he tried to understand and to love. Saddened as his heart must have been, vibrating to every human voice around him, disappointed as he must have felt when loyal aspirations were misunderstood or failed to meet with a response, he never despaired of humanity, for he never ceased to believe in God. "One thing astonishes me," he said, "it is to see Christians despairing of the world and of its progress on the way to justice."

But let us leave the brilliant philosopher, strange mixture of mysticism and of algebra, so subtle, so imaginative, so passionate, and pass on to Lacordaire.

We know his life. A young man describing himself in after days as one whose eyes had been bandaged, whose bandage gradually falling away reveals to him glimpses of light, till being removed altogether, he finds himself face to face with the sun, the voice of Lamennais calls him from the dream of unbelief and of freedom to the supposed realities of faith and of liberty. With his friend he hails the revolution of July as the dawn of a better day, when religion, freed from the chains of state, shall reign in spiritual supremacy and celebrate its triumph in a liberated hierarchy. As a priest, he will raise the dogma to a place of honour, by striking off its fetters; as a Liberal, he will attempt to reconcile Democracy and Catholicism. In the midst of his high ambitions he hears the voice of censure from Rome. He submits, and whilst remaining an "impenitent Liberal" becomes a "penitent Catholic."

His career as an orator reached its climax in the conferences of the Notre Dame. The domain where the preacher loved to dwell was the borderland of religion and philosophy. In that wide, somewhat vague region between heaven and earth, the preacher breathed freely, never forgetting, when he soared to the clouds, the earth which he had left behind; ever remembering, when he stood on the ground, the sky which stretched out above him. One time he invoked philosophy, then he appealed to history, now he came forward as the preacher of a wide morality, discussing those general principles which should be the theme of the pulpit and not merely enumerating duties; then he discussed questions which belonged specially to Christianity, now he became the interpreter of society, of the individual in his doubts, struggles, aspirations, then he made heard the voice of the Church, of that Divine authority which will guide men amidst the bewilderments of life and lead them to the haven where they would fain be.

Artist, philosopher, poet, religious thinker, Liberal politician, Christian—all these met in Lacordaire. His generalizations were often dangerous; his knowledge was not profound enough, and his imagination carried him away; his logic was frequently at fault, swayed as it was more by sentiment than by reason; his historical views were often partial, for they stood under the influence of a dogma, or at any rate of an *à priori* idea; his political theories were often visionary and inconsistent, but what a problem—to be consistent as a Catholic and as a Liberal! his social views were often too theoretical and too subtle; his diction, in fine, was sometimes too pompous; but notwithstanding all these criticisms, and many more which it would be easy to bring forward, Lacordaire was the greatest orator of Catholicism since the days of Bossuet, and his *conférences*, both in subjects and

in method, in my opinion the nearest approach to the realization of the ideal of Christian eloquence.

Look at the grand majestic style, free from all mannerism, the affectation of would-be great men ! It is the reflection of a lofty individuality ; it is worthy of the exalted ideas which it has to convey. There are no artificial tricks, no unnecessary phrases, no straining after an effect ; the grandeur and beauties of the style, which is subservient to thought, produce not merely a literary effect, they stir up feelings and emotions which lead men to inquire, what subject is capable of inspiring an eloquence like this ? Or think of the boldness of the preacher, his flights of imagination and depths of passion. Unlike Chateaubriand, his magic wand does not content itself with calling from the dead a bygone world ; a splendid painter of the past, as he shows himself to be, he directs his chiefest efforts to present the Church and the world of to-day in their poetry and beauty. And whilst his imagination opens up to men the horizon of the ideal, he throws himself, so to speak, upon his audience. His firm hand sweeps across the strings of their hearts—hearts which, it may be, had not vibrated to any touch since the days when the little child knelt at its mother's knee—and the silent strings, which seemed doomed to break without so much as a sigh, break forth once more into music.

For this passionate Dominican, in his picturesque garb, is very human. He knows what it is to wrestle, to weep, to suffer, to pray, to triumph, to rejoice ; he knows what it is to fear, to hope, to believe, to love ; he understands what it is to be “troubled on every side, yet not distressed ; to be perplexed, but not in despair ; persecuted, but not forsaken ; cast down, but not destroyed.” His wounds are now healed but the scars remain. Hence, “who is weak, and he is not weak ? who is offended, and he burns not ?” His experience makes him gentle, full of tenderness and of sympathy ; let others preach damnation, he will proclaim salvation ; let others command, he is willing to beseech men. And the result is, that dazzled as men are by the marvels of his imagination and carried away by his poetry, they continue to hear, when the effects of these have passed away, that “still small voice” which murmurs in broken accents of a “Paradise lost” to point to a “Paradise regained.”

There seemed no limits to his sympathy. In his wide treatment of the great general questions which he invariably discussed, and to which the pulpit should chiefly confine itself, he showed an ardent desire to understand his age and to sympathize with it. Striking the key-note that Christianity is the foundation on which the life of societies and of individuals must be built, and endeavouring to show in every way, with a zeal worthy of a better

cause, that the rock on which the world is to rest, in order to ensure its safety and progress, is to be found in the doctrines of Catholicism, he was at the same time the enthusiastic defender of liberty, and the opponent of every form of despotism, either ecclesiastical or political. His eloquence brought the world to the Church's altar; it kept it there for a brief moment; was it possible to do more?

The religious tribune passed away; the Carmelite Hyacinthe succeeded him. His heroic eloquence, imaginative rather than scientific, bearing witness to his intellectual sympathies with and moral affinities to all that is best and noblest in modern science and life, was worthy of the pulpit which Lacordaire had made glorious. Père Hyacinthe, discussing at times the most abstruse questions of philosophy, as far as it is possible to do so before a mixed audience, did not shrink at others from bringing forward the political and social problems of the moment. In language, glowing not merely with a poetical fire or an ardent temperament, but with the warmth of an earnest conviction, he laid bare the wounds of society, that he might point out its remedy.

Suddenly his voice was silenced. Europe was moved by the spectacle of a soul in moral agony; it rang with the voice which raised the protest of the conscience. And when at last he was cast out it was felt that here was more than the loss of an orator. The last representative of Catholic Broad-Churchism had departed; Ultramontanism had triumphed.

VI.

Meanwhile Protestantism had been revived at the end of the eighteenth century, and officially recognized by Napoleon I. Two influences were soon at work: the Rationalistic spirit of the eighteenth century, and the Methodist revival, which under Scottish inspiration had originated in Switzerland, and from thence spread to France. The former found its preacher in Coquerel, the latter in Adolphe Monod.

Both were men of great eloquence. Coquerel preached in elegant language a gentle morality; he laid little stress on the dogmas, for to him practice seemed all-important; he loved truth, but he loved charity better. Monod, on the other hand, proclaimed the theology of the Reformation. But he knew how to combine with it a deep knowledge of the human heart, a profound insight in life, a keenness of analysis and of observation, and, lastly, a mysticism, which bore golden fruits in those touching "Adieux," probably unsurpassed by any Protestant mystic. Protestantism has had no preacher like him since the days of Saurin. Fearless, earnest, without guile, with a touch

of sadness, laying siege to the conscience with the weapons of terror, or with the entreaties of love, his words produced a powerful effect. The *chef d'œuvre* of his eloquence is probably his "St. Paul."

But the timid rationalism of Coquerel was destined to give way to a rationalism more logical and more powerful. Dissatisfied with a theory which makes of the Holy Ghost a schoolmaster, and of apostles and evangelists a party of schoolboys, and which desires to make men bend before the authority of the Scriptures, which, from a Protestant point of view, can mean nothing else but the authority of Jones or of Brown as the case may be, the brilliant thinker Scherer raised the cry of liberty. And this was the origin of the famous Strasburg school, and of the movement in France of which the younger Coquerel and Paschoud were distinguished representatives.

That school committed oft the great mistake of discussing questions of criticism and of history in the pulpits of the Church. It forgot that the atmosphere of the Church is one of faith, and not of science. Not satisfied with the knowledge that the facts of Christianity are facts of the religious consciousness, and that they are sometimes the allegorical embodiments of the highest moral truths, they occupied themselves with investigations as to whether these facts were historical, in the ordinary sense of the word, or no. Thus their teaching was oft vague and unsatisfying; it appeared to present to the hearers a religion *à la carte*. But religion, being for the many, must be definite. Great without contradiction are the Eleusinian mysteries, but only for the few.* Great also is "Diana of the Ephesians." Whoever without cause denies her greatness, whoever needlessly disturbs a little child in its innocent slumber, let him be anathema!

But whenever the distinction between faith and science was clearly grasped, when the preacher laid bare with psychological skill the depths of the human heart, when he tried to show the harmony of religious morality with all that is truest and best in human nature, when he held up the *ethical* Christ as a living perfection, and insisted on faith in Him—that is, attachment to His person—can his words have been in vain?

The orthodoxy of Monod, if not superseded, was somewhat softened down by a modern Evangelical school. The distinguished and eloquent Edmond de Pressensé is the chief leader of what might be called the right centre. Adhering to the principal doctrines of the Reformation, he acknowledges the rights of historical criticism and allows himself to be influenced by its results. Characteristic of him and his school is the frequent use of the psychological argument. Protestantism has here made a step in advance.

* φιλόσοφον πλῆθος ἀδύνατον εἶναι.—Plato.

VII.


In conclusion, it will be seen that France is divided once more into two opposite camps. Liberal Catholicism being silenced, there remains, on the one hand, Ultramontanism, reaping at present the fruits of a reaction and unbelief more respectful, more in earnest than in the days of Voltaire, and equally determined and destructive. Between the two extremes are the masses of the people, indifferent, gay, or sad, in accordance with the event of the hour, careless about anything beyond the present moment.

Never was the Roman Church more powerful, as an organization, than at present. Never was its hold stronger, notwithstanding appearances to the contrary. It has learnt nothing; it has anathematized its reformers, and cast out those who wished to bring it in harmony with the age. It stands forward in glaring opposition to modern civilization, but it continues to reign. Shall the storm, now heard faintly in the distance, once more sweep it from its moorings? shall it drift once more helpless on the sea of human passions, or shall it be able to hush into the silence of submission the cry which will otherwise sooner or later swell into the clamour of rebellion, and to ride safely at anchor in the midst of gathering gloom?

The triumph of Ultramontanism cannot be permanent; but when it falls what can replace that great Catholic Church which, notwithstanding its frequent crimes and sins, has a right to the gratitude of humanity and to a respectful farewell, as one which in ages past nobly fulfilled its mission. Can Protestantism? But what is a Church without authority and without tradition? or a Church which embodies a compromise between Rome and Protestantism? The spirit of Truth answers, "Rome I know, and Geneva I know; but who are you?"

The thinker is no prophet, but he has no fears. On the ruins of Catholic and Protestant Churches he will chant no *Te Deum*, and still less a *Miserere*. He will turn to that East, which has given the world its religions; he will bow himself before the Revelations of Shemitic genius. He knows that the principles of Jesus, admitting of indefinite development and infinite application, can never be surpassed; that, seated on the throne of the ideal, the Virgin's Son shall reign for ever. He knows that humanity is necessarily religious; that, however led astray for a time, its conscience will demand a religious morality, its pious sentiment long for an altar, and its artistic instincts cry out for a poetic ritual.

A. SCHWARTZ.



LORD BALTIMORE AND MARYLAND TOLERATION.

CARDINAL MANNING, and others who have replied to Mr. Gladstone's essays on Vaticanism, with exultation, have referred to the supposed tolerant course of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the early days of the then province of Maryland.

Bishop Gibbons, of the Roman Catholic diocese in the State of Virginia, writes—

"As to whether religious and civil liberty will suffer any detriment from the Catholic Church, we can appeal with confidence to the past, especially to the history of our country [United States of America]. The same spirit still animates, and always will animate the Catholic Church, that dictated the memorable decree which was passed by the General Assembly of Catholics [in Maryland] in 1649 :—

"No person whatsoever in this province, professing to believe in Jesus Christ, shall from henceforth be anyways troubled or molested for his or her religion, or in the free exercise thereof, or any way compelled to belief or exercise of any other religion against his or her consent."

The Virginia Bishop, in making this assertion, has only followed two of the most approved historians of the English colonization of America. Sir James Grahame, speaking of George Lord Baltimore's plans, remarks—

"With the intention of promoting the aggrandisement of his own family he combined the more generous project of founding a new commonwealth, and colonizing it with the persecuted votaries of the Church of Rome."

Alluding to Cecil, the second Lord Baltimore, he uses these words—

“This nobleman, like his father, was a Roman Catholic, and his avowed purpose was to people his territory with colonists of the same persuasion, and erect an asylum in North America for the Catholic faith.”

He also states upon other pages—

“The first band of emigrants, consisting of about 200 gentlemen of considerable rank and fortune, professing the Roman Catholic faith, with a number of inferior adherents, in a vessel called *The Ark and Dove*, sailed from England.

“It had been proclaimed from the very beginning by the proprietary that religious toleration should constitute one of the fundamental principles of the social union over which he presided; and the Assembly of the province, composed chiefly of Roman Catholics, now proceeded by a memorable Act concerning religion to interweave this noble principle into its legislative constitutions.”

Mr. Bancroft, in his valuable and fascinating history, is not a whit less eulogistic. He describes the first Lord Baltimore as “a man of such moderation that all parties were taken with him, sincere in his character, disengaged from all interests, and a favourite with the royal family.” He also states—

“Christianity was by the charter made the law of the land, and no preference was given to any sect; and equality in religious rights, not less than in civil freedom, was assured.”

Alluding to the departure for America, he says—

“About 200 people, most of them Roman Catholic gentlemen and their servants, in *The Ark and the Dove*, a ship of large burden, set sail for the northern bank of the Potomac.”

Upon another page he adds—

“It is strange that religious bigotry could ever stain the statute-book of a colony founded on the basis of the freedom of conscience. An apprehension of some remote danger of persecution seems even then to have hovered over the minds of the Roman Catholics, and at this session [1639] they secured to their Church its rights and liberties. Those rights and those liberties, it is plain from the charter, could be no more than the tranquil exercise of the Romish worship.”

Again he writes—

“The Roman Catholics of Maryland, with the earnest concurrence of their governor and the proprietary, determined to place upon their statute-book an Act for the religious freedom which had ever been sacred on their soil.”

These statements from fair-minded historians are evidently the result of a hasty study of the charter, or of reliance upon some careless authority.

If we would understand the principles of the Maryland Charter, it is desirable to know something of the man in whose interest it was framed. Sir George Calvert, the first Lord Baltimore, it is said, was the son of a respectable Yorkshire grazier. At an early

age he became a student of Trinity, Oxford, and in February, 1596-7, graduated. His talents, industry, and executive force quickly gave him position under Sir Robert Cecil, the efficient Secretary of State. He had just attained manhood when, in 1606, he represented Bossiney, Cornwall, in Parliament. About the year 1608 he was made clerk of the Privy Council, where he attracted the attention of the pedantic as well as coarse-mouthed King James; and in 1612 assisted his royal master in writing the tractate against Vorstius, the successor of Arminius in the University of Leyden.

Five years later he was made a knight, and in 1619 he became a Secretary of State, and thus learned much relative to the colonization of America.

As early as April, 1619, he informs the Virginia Company of London that the King wishes to transport a man suspected of deer-stealing, and the following November is in earnest consultation with the members relative to the speedy despatch of fifty convicts in Bridewell to the new settlements on the banks of the James River.

After meeting with considerable opposition, because he was the King's secretary and a non-resident, he was in 1620 elected a member of Parliament for Yorkshire. The session began January 30th, 1620-21, and from the first day he stood up as advocate of the royal prerogative, in opposition to Pym, Coke, and other leaders of the party of the people. It was at this period, before he became a Roman Catholic, that he began his Newfoundland plantation. Sir William Alexander, Secretary of State for Scotland at that time, quaintly wrote—

“Master Secretary Calvert hath planted a company at Ferriland, who both for buildings and making trial of the ground has done more than was ever performed by any in so short a time, having on hand a brood of horses, kowes, and other beastials, and by the industry of his people, he is beginning to draw back yearly some benefits from thence.”

In the year 1622, the death of his wife and the marriage of his eldest son, Cecil, to Anna, the beautiful daughter of Arundel, a Roman Catholic earl, caused the formation of new associations which had a potent influence upon his future. From that time he grew more intimate with Gondomar, the Spanish, and Tillieres, the French ambassador, and was much occupied in preparing articles of agreement for the marriage of Prince Charles with the Infant of Spain. When this plan failed, Calvert became increasingly unpopular with the majority of Parliament, and it was necessary for the King to make him less prominent. “Secretary Calvert,” says a letter written on August 7th, 1624, to Sir Dudley Carleton “droops and keeps out of the way.”

A royal favourite a few months later, he was permitted to see

his secretaryship, and about two weeks before the death of James I. was created Baron of Baltimore, with a grant of land in the county of Longford, Ireland. Goodman, once the Protestant Bishop of Gloucester, after he joined the Church of Rome, writing of Calvert, said—

“As he was the only secretary employed in the Spanish match, so undoubtedly he did what good offices he could therein for religion's sake, being infinitely addicted to the Roman Catholic faith, having been converted thereto by Count Gondomar and Count Arundel, whose daughter Secretary Calvert's son had married.”

After a brief retirement in Ireland, Lord Baltimore determined to visit the American plantation, which he had begun before his adherence to the Church of Rome.

While in London, he wrote on May 21st, 1627, to his father's friend, Sir Thomas Wentworth—

“I am heartily sorry that I am farther from my hope of seeing you before my leaving this town, which will now be within these three or four days, being bound for a long journey to a place which I have had a long desire to visit, and have now the leave and opportunity to do it.

“It is Newfoundland I mean, which it imports me more than in curiosity to see; for I must either go and settle it in better order than it is, or else give it over, and lose all the charges I have been at hitherto for other men to build their fortunes upon. And I had rather be esteemed a fool by some for the hazard of one month's journey than to prove myself one, certainly for six years bypast, if the business be now lost for the want of a little pains and care. At Michaelmas I hope to be with you again, God willing.”

The autumn found him in London again, and in the spring of 1628 he departed with his family for Newfoundland. The next winter proved very severe, and on August 19th, 1629, he wrote to the King—

“Have met with grave difficulties and incumbrances here, which in this place are no longer to be resisted, but enforce me presently to quit my residence and to shift to some other warmer climate of this new world. Not knowing how better to employ the remainder of my days than with other good subjects to further the best I may the enlarging of your Majesty's empire in this part of the world, I am determined to commit this place to fishermen that are able to encounter storms and hard weather, and to remove myself with some forty persons to your Majesty's dominion, Virginia, where, if your Majesty pleases to grant me a precinct of land, with such privileges as the King your father was pleased to grant me here, I shall endeavour to the utmost of my power to deserve it.”

Before he received a reply, he sent back his children to England, and with his lady and servants sailed for Virginia, and early in October landed at Jamestown. He found John Pott, a Master of Arts and Physician-General, the acting Governor, and probably the same person who with him and Thomas West, afterwards the Lord Delaware, had in 1605 received the degree of A.M. at

Oxford. As he desired to settle, the colonial authorities offered the usual oath of allegiance, which was declined. The Virginia officers report to the Council in England:—

“According to the instructions from your Lordships and the usual course held in this place, we tendered the oaths of supremacy and allegiance to his Lordship and some of his followers, who, making profession of the Romish religion, utterly refused to take the same, a thing which we would not have doubted in him, whose former employments under his late Majesty might have ensured a persuasion he would not have made denial of that, in point whereof consists the loyalty and fidelity which every true subject oweth unto his Sovereign.

“His Lordship offered to take the oath, a copy whereof is included, but in true discharge of the trust imposed upon us by his Majesty, we could not imagine that so much latitude was left for us, to decline from the prescribed form, so strictly exacted, and so well justified, and defended by the pen of our late Sovereign, King James, of happy memory.”

Baltimore's determination to dwell in Virginia was not dampened by this rebuff, and he proceeded to England to confer with his friend Charles I. The Duke of Norfolk, the brother of his son Cecil's wife, the same year contemplated a settlement, and the Virginia legislature, in acknowledgment of the intention, created the present county of Norfolk. In 1631, Baltimore obtained a grant of land south of James River, but the opposition of Francis West, who was Lord Delaware's brother, and others, was so decided that it was cancelled. He still persevered, and in 1632, just before his death, was promised a charter for lands alleged to be unoccupied by Englishmen, north and east of the Potomac River.

When Charles I. asked what the country ceded should be named, Baltimore said that Carolana, a good name, had been already given to the province of Attorney-General Heath. “Let us then,” said the King, “name it after the Queen. What think you of Mariana?” He was reminded that this was the name of the Spanish historian who taught that the will of the people was greater than the law of tyrants. Still disposed to comply with the Queen, the King then said, “Let it be Terra Mariæ,” which translated Maryland.

When we examine the Maryland Charter it is found to contain neither the elements of civil nor religious liberty, but to be just such an instrument as the friend of James and his son Charles would wish.

To him and his successors is given full and absolute power to ordain, make, and enact laws, with the advice, assent, and approbation of the freemen of the province, but they could not make without his permission, and until they met he was empowered to make wholesome laws. He had authority also to appoint judges, justices, and constables.

There is not a line in the whole instrument which indica

toleration in religion. In all charters of that age granting lands in uncivilized countries there is a reference to the extension of Christianity. The Virginia Charter of 1606 was given by King James, to use its words, because—

“So noble a work may, by the providence of Almighty God, hereafter tend to the glory of his Divine Majesty, in propagating of the Christian religion to such people as yet live in darkness and miserable ignorance of the true knowledge and worship of God, and may in time bring the infidels and savages living in those parts to human civility, and to a settled and quiet government.”

The instructions to the first Virginia expedition conclude thus —

“Lastly and chiefly the way to prosper and achieve good success is to make yourselves all of one mind, for the good of your country and your own, and to serve and fear God, the Giver of all goodness, for every plantation which our Heavenly Father hath not planted shall be rooted out.”

In the Maryland Charter there is only a slight reference to the extension of Christianity, and that is a transcript of the Carolana Charter of 1629 :—

CAROLANA.

“Whereas our trusty and well-beloved subject, Sir Robert Heath, our Attorney-General, being excited with a laudable zeal for the propagation of the Christian faith.”

MARYLAND.

“Whereas our well-beloved and right trusty subject, Cecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore, etc., being animated with a laudable and pious zeal for extending the Christian religion.”

But the Maryland Charter, while recognizing Christianity in general terms, confined its development within the Church of England.

The proprietary had the patronage of all churches, “*and of causing the same to be dedicated and consecrated according to the ecclesiastical laws of our Kingdom of England.*”

This examination clearly proves the error of those who assert that by this charter “equality in religious rights not less than in civil freedom was assured.”

We will now proceed to consider the inaccurate statements concerning the first company of Maryland settlers.

It was not until the autumn of 1633 that Cecil Lord Baltimore gathered a company to begin a plantation.

On October 29th, one hundred and twenty-eight persons were on board of the *Ark* at anchor near Gravesend, and to them Hawkins, the searcher for London, administered the oath of allegiance. This vessel of 350 tons, and the *Dore*, a pinnace of 50 tons, sailed in November, with about three hundred persons, including the crews.

At the Isle of Wight, where there was not a close watch, they stopped, and here came on board the Jesuits Andrew White and John Altham, *alias* Gravener, with two associates, John Knowles and Thomas Gervase, as assistants.

White was over sixty years of age, but still vigorous. Gravener and Gervase had both been members of the Jesuit College at Clerkenwell, which had been broken up by the English authorities.

Before the vessels reached Chesapeake Bay, Cecil Lord Baltimore, on January 10th, 1633-34, writes to Wentworth:—

“I have, by the help of some of your Lordship’s good friends and mine, overcome these difficulties, and sent a hopeful colony into Maryland, with a fair and favourable expectation of good success, however, without any danger of any great prejudice unto myself in respect that many others are joined with me in the adventure. There are two of my brothers gone, with very near twenty other gentlemen of very good fashion, and three hundred labouring men, well provided in all things.”

This statement is very different from that of modern historians. Grahame magnifies “very near twenty gentlemen,” both Protestant and Roman Catholic, into “about two hundred gentlemen, of considerable rank and fortune, professing the Roman Catholic faith.” Bancroft, more guarded, says, “Two hundred people, most of them Roman Catholic gentlemen, and their servants.”

The number that took the oath of allegiance, and other facts, prove that from the first the colony was chiefly Protestant. On the voyage twelve died, but only two confessed to the Jesuits, and acknowledged that they were Roman Catholics.

The two commissioners of the colony were Thomas Cornwallis and Jerome Hawley. They were the leading minds—men of experience.

Cornwallis, described in a pamphlet of that day as “a noble, right valiant, and politic soldier,” was the son of Sir William and grandson of Sir Charles, once ambassador to Spain. He was the father of the Rev. Thomas Cornwallis, Rector of Ewarton, Suffolk, whose son and grandson also became Presbyters in the Church of England. This Cornwallis of Maryland was also the ancestor of the gifted and learned authoress of “*Small Books on Great Subjects*,” Frances Cornwallis, who died in the year 1858.

Hawley was the brother of the Governor of Barbadoes, and was soon made treasurer of Virginia.

Leonard Calvert and his associates reached the mouth of the Potomac in March, 1634, and the *Ark* and the *Dove* stopped for a few days at an island.

Maryland had already been explored, and to some extent occupied. About the year 1619, Ensign Savage explored it

Chesapeake Bay. Fuller, in his "Worthies of England," states that Edward Palmer, of Leamington, who died before 1625, resolved to found an academy in Virginia, "in order whereunto he purchased an island called Palmer's Island," which was in that bay near the mouth of the Susquehanna river. Kent Island in the same bay was represented in the Legislature of Virginia before Calvert's arrival. The waters of the Potomac also had for years been resorted to by New England vessels. Henry Fleet, a Protestant, had for ten years established trading posts at Indian villages, and Calvert in the pinnace went up the river to ask his advice. Fleet came back with him, and recommended Yeacomaco as a place for settlement, an Indian town, one of his old posts. Hither the colonists came, and, before the 1st of April, all had landed, and the town was henceforth called St. Mary.

At an early period Lord Baltimore and the settlers came into collision. Like their Virginian neighbours, they enacted in their Assembly a body of laws, and sent them to England for his approval, but he showed that he had the same views as to the rights of the people as when a leader of the King's party in Parliament, and rejected them. He courteously upheld the position of James I.—"It is the King that makes the laws, and ye are to advise him to make such as will be best for the commonwealth," and pointed to the monarchical power of originating all the laws vested in him by the Charter.

It was not until 1638 that they were allowed to have another Assembly to advise and consult on the affairs of the province. It met on the 25th of January, and the Rev. John Lewger, formerly a rector of the Church of England, now a Roman Catholic, lately arrived, appeared as the first secretary of the province.

Laws prepared by Baltimore were presented, and the independent colonists refused to receive them, and the body dissolved. In February they came together again, and Cornwallis led them in opposition to Governor Calvert; and they decided to separately consider each law proposed, and it was at last resolved that all laws should be read three times, on three several days, before a vote was taken; and declared their wish that all bills for Acts should emanate from a committee of their own body.

Lord Baltimore, finding he could not exercise the arbitrary power claimed, in 1639 called a third Assembly, and they emphatically declared that the colonists of Maryland were to have all the liberties Englishmen had at home, and then adopted the statute of England that "Holy Church shall have all her rights and liberties." The Holy Church was that of the Charter, the Church of England.

The political agitation seemed more prominent than the religious, because no Church of England ministers accompanied the colonists.

The only ecclesiastics appear to have been those already mentioned. They were active, devoted servants of their order. They taught that there was no salvation outside of the Church of which the Pope was the visible head. With the governor in sympathy they could not have had a more desirable field, and they used their opportunity. Even the Indians were influenced by their teachings. They relate the following story in their narrative lately printed by the Maryland Historical Society:—

The chief of the Piscataways, who lived but a few miles below the present city of Washington, the capital of the Republic, told Father White that he dreamed that he saw his dead parent worshipping a dark and *hideous spirit*; then appeared a ludicrous demon accompanied by one Snow, “an obstinate heretic from England;” at length Governor Calvert and Father White came, in the company of a beautiful god of exceeding whiteness and gentle demeanour, and since that time, said the Indian warrior, he had been drawn by the cords of love toward the black-robcs, the Jesuits. The interpretation of the dream was plain. The hideous and repulsive spirit was heathenism; the ludicrous demon was Protestantism; the tender divinity of exceeding whiteness was Romanism.

The “obstinate heretics” were not satisfied with the condition of things, and as early as December 26th, 1635, at a meeting of the Privy Council, at the palace of Charles I., Archbishop Laud being present, it was reported that one Rabuet, of Saint Mary, had declared that it was lawful to kill a heretic king, and that public mass was held in Maryland.

But the Jesuits did not abate their zeal. Their journal says—

“On Protestants as well as Catholics we have laboured, and God has blessed our labours, for of the Protestants who came from England this year [1637-8] almost all have been converted to the faith, besides many others, with four servants that were bought for necessary use in Virginia. And of five workmen we hired, we have in the meantime gained two.”

When the news reached England of the open violation of the laws by the Jesuits, there was a good deal of indignation at their tampering with the religion of the colonists, and it received the attention of Parliament.

In the remonstrance of the House of Commons on December 1st, 1641, presented to Charles I. at Hampton Court, the complaint was made that he had permitted “another State moulded within this State, independent in government, contrary in interest and affection, secretly corrupting the ignorant or negligent professors of religion.”

After this Lord Baltimore acted as if he thought the zeal of the Jesuits was without knowledge, or ashamed of his friends, for on March 7th, 1642, quite in the intolerant spirit of that age, he wrote these words:—

“Considering the dependence of the State of Maryland on the State of England, unto which it must as near as may be conformable, no ecclesiastic in the province ought to expect, nor is Lord Baltimore nor any of his officers, although they are Roman Catholics, obliged in conscience to allow such ecclesiastics any more or other privileges, exemptions, or immunities for their persons, lands, or goods than is allowed by his Majesty or other officers to like persons in England.”

The next year also he sends to Boston and invites the Puritans to settle in Maryland, but none accepted the offer.

Parliament on the 26th of August, 1644, commissioned Captain Ingle, of the ship *Reformation*, to transport ammunition and supplies to the Chesapeake Bay. Appearing at Saint Mary, Governor Calvert refused to recognize his commission, and as a result he was forced to fly into Virginia, and Ingle carried Father White a prisoner to England, where he was tried and found guilty of teaching doctrines contrary to the statutes. He remained in Newgate Prison, but on January 7th, 1648, the House of Commons “did concur with the Lords in granting the petition of Andrew White, a Jesuit, who was brought out of America into the kingdom, by force, upon an English ship,” and he was ordered to be discharged, provided he would leave the country in fifteen days.

England now was convulsed with internal dissensions. Baltimore's old friend Wentworth, who had become Earl of Strafford, had lost his head, and in a little while Charles I. walked to the scaffold, and in his dying speech reiterated the political maxim of his party, that the liberty and freedom of the people consisted not in having their share in the government.

During these troubles, began to be announced for the first time in England the doctrine of toleration in religion. In 1644 Roger Williams published a book which the learned Featley, the rector of Lambeth, said contained “much ratsbane,” as it declared “that civil states with their officers of justice are not governors or defenders of the spiritual and Christian State and worship; that the doctrine of persecution in case of conscience maintained by Calvin, Beza, Cotton, and the ministers of the new English churches is guilty of all the blood of the souls crying for vengeance under the altar.”

About the time that Williams visited England, Sayle, formerly governor of Bermudas, was there, with another delegate, pleading for the Rev. Patrick Copland and others, who had left the Church of England and formed an independent church. Parliament was urged to provide that particular and private, as well as public, congregations should have protection, and “to prove themselves loving fathers to all sorts of good men, bearing respect unto all, and so inviting an equal assistance and affection from all.”

This agitation for liberty of conscience resulted in the House of Commons, on October 27th, 1645, ordering “that the inhabitants

of the Summer Islands, and such others as shall join themselves to them, without any molestation or trouble, shall have and enjoy the liberty of the conscience in matters of God's worship, as well in those parts of America where they are now planted, as in all other parts of America where hereafter they may plant." The first island near the American coast discovered by Columbus was San Salvador. In sight of this there is an islet not much larger than Patmos where the Apostle John had most exalted visions of heaven, and to this lone spot Copland, the beloved friend of the Rev. Nicholas Ferrar, the gentle Ritualist of Little Gidding, retired with others to found a Congregational Church; and in view of the entire freedom of worship, called the place Eleuthera, a name still retained on the map.

About the year 1645 the Rev. Thomas Harrison, who had been a High Churchman, and chaplain of Berkeley, the governor of Virginia, became a Nonconformist, and, leaving Jamestown, cast in his lot with the Puritans dwelling on the banks of the Elizabeth and Nansemond rivers. While here, these settlements were visited by Governor Sayle and invited to migrate to the isle of Eleuthera, where they would have freedom of conscience; but the Virginia Puritans declined the offer.

Governor Berkeley was determined they should not stay in Virginia unless they conformed to the Book of Common Prayer, and procured the passage of a law in 1647 to that effect, and then gave them a certain time to leave the colony.

After Charles I. was imprisoned, Lord Baltimore began to curry favour with the dominant party in England, and he displaced the Roman Catholic governor of Maryland and appointed William Stone, of Virginia, a strong Protestant and a friend of Parliament, in his stead. The new governor entered into negotiations with the Puritans of Nansemond, who consented to settle in Maryland upon the conditions that they should have liberty of conscience and choose their own officers. Soon after they arrived on the shores of the Chesapeake Bay, in April, 1649, the Legislative Assembly met and passed the memorable Act of Toleration, embodying the spirit of "that golden apple, the ordinance of toleration," passed by Parliament, to which their former pastor, Harrison, alludes in a letter to Governor Winthrop.

It has generally been supposed that Lord Baltimore prepared the Act, but in the statement of his case, published at London in 1653, it is distinctly asserted that this and other laws were first enacted in Maryland, and were not engrossed and approved by him until August, 1650.

The members of the Assembly of 1649 were largely Protestant, and the majority Puritan. Hammond, a Baltimore partisan, asserts that it consisted of Puritans and other Protestants, and "*a few*

Papists." The Assembly of 1649 also "overhauled the oath of *fidelity*," says another writer of the day, and added a clause that *liberty of conscience should not be infringed*.


Charles II., an exile, was indignant at the political trimming of Lord Baltimore, and commissioned Will. Davenant, the poet, to act as governor; but he was captured on the sea by a Parliament ship.

He never expected to see his father's friend a professed adherent of Parliament, and the defenders of his claim to Maryland writing words like these :—

"It is notoriously known that by his express direction his officers and people did adhere to the interests of the Commonwealth, when all other plantations, *except New England*, declared against the Parliament."

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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN ENGLAND.

THE earlier history of this kingdom affords comparatively few materials for the study of legal capital punishment. It is full of experiences of the illegal application of that penalty.

Amongst the Anglo-Saxons death-sentences were rare. Murder itself was punishable with a fine, varying in amount with the rank of the slain, from two hundred shillings for the life of an ceorl, to six hundred for the life of a thane, and twelve hundred for the life of a king's thane. Family blood feuds flourished under such a system, and capital punishment privately inflicted, in the shape of assassination or of open assaults, was common enough. But the law itself pronounced no death-sentences. On the contrary, it strove to find excuses for the many homicides committed under its eye, and a law of Alfred's awarding capital punishment in cases of wilful murder was inoperative, being contrary to the national feeling.

The genius of the Normans, their indifference to non-Norman human life, and the necessities of a military occupation, caused that capital punishment was largely introduced into England after the Conquest. Capital punishments reflected the terror of daily life among the conquered, and filled up the measure of their misery. It may be said that little could be added to the afflictions of a people of whom the Anglo-Saxon chronicler wrote that the Normans—

“Took those whom they suspected to have any goods, by night and by day, seizing both men and women, and they put them in prison for their gold and silver, and tortured them with pains unspeakable, for never were any martyrs tormented as these were. They hung some by their feet, and smoked them with foul smoke; some by their thumbs, or by the head, and they hung burning things on their feet. They put a knotted string about their heads, and twisted it till it went into the brain. They put them into dungeons, wherein were adders and snakes and toads, and thus wore them out. Some they put into a crucet house—that is, into a chest that was short and narrow and not deep, and they put sharp stones in it, and crushed the man therein, so that they broke all his bones. . . . Many thousands they exhausted with hunger. . . . The earth bare no corn; you might as well have tilled the sea, for the land was all ruined by such deeds, and it was said openly that Christ and His saints slept.”

But the law, as such, had no part in these things, any more than it had in the slaughter of the hundred thousand men whom William the Conqueror slew in revenge for a rising in Northumberland and Yorkshire, or than it had in cutting off the hands and feet of resisters to military commanders, and leaving them to perish. These and many more deeds of violence were perpetrated in the name, and by the might, of the strong hand, ruling in barbarous military wise till the advent of fixed law and Magna Charta. Force was king, till the twenty-ninth, or “nullus liber homo” clause of the Charter declared that—

“No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold or liberties or free customs, or be outlawed, exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.”

In what “the law of the land” consisted during the one-will period of government, it were hard to tell with exactness, but that capital punishment had grown, since Saxon times, to be part of it, is not doubtful. It was awarded for murder, for rebellion, for some forms of robbery, for bigamy, breaking prison, and, judging from Henry the Third’s *Charta de Forestâ*, chap. x., for killing the king’s deer. Custom, obtaining for a hundred and fifty years of Norman rule, had brought about a Common Law, or unwritten “law of the land,” by which capital punishment, hateful to and unpractised by Anglo-Saxons, became domesticated in England.

That it was freely applied, there is abundant evidence—so freely that even the moral sense of the thirteenth century caused restrictions to be imposed upon it. Under the title of murder, all kinds of homicide seem to have been included, and death was awarded alike in cases of treacherous slaying and “where it is found misfortune only.” The 52 Henry III. c. 25 ordered that “Murder from henceforth shall not be judged before our justices, where it is found misfortune only, but it shall take place in such as are slain by felony, and not otherwise.” By this statute the

law ceased to be the instrument of private vengeance, and a man who slew another by misadventure, or, as a later statute added, "in his own defence," was no longer liable to the pains of felony at the instance of the friends of the slain—"the King shall take him to his grace, if it please him."

Edward the First, whilst adding the crime of rape to the list of capital felonies, and taking means to avoid, by recourse to the *Hue and Cry*, the partiality of jurors, who "had rather suffer strangers to be robbed . . . than to indite the offenders, of whom great part be people of the same country," laid down the principle of immunity for officers of the Government who slew men in executing their duty. A law of his decreed that "foresters, parkers, and warreners, in the King's peace," were "not to be troubled," but "shall enjoy the King's peace as they did before," though they slew or wounded trespassers intending to do damage within their district. But with a keen appreciation of the abuses to which the unrestrained application of this immunity might give rise, the protecting statute went on to say:—

"Notwithstanding, let all such foresters, parkers, warreners, and all other beware, that by reason of any malice, discord, debate, or other evil will had before time, they do not maliciously pretend against any person passing through their liberties, that they came thither for to trespass or misdo, when of truth they did nothing, nor were not found as trespassers, and so kill them. For if they do, they shall be tried and have judgment as ordinary murderers."

The felony list increased with Edward the Third, and at the same time steps were taken to prevent the indiscriminate pardoning of felons, which seems to have taken place when general pardons were issued. These general pardons were often given in return for a grant of money, by Parliament—a form of recognition which one would think, considering the prevalence of violent crimes, should have sealed up the pockets of the taxpayers for ever. But be that as it may, the 2nd Edward III. c. 1 recites that "offenders have been greatly encouraged, because the charters of pardon have been so easily granted in times past," and confines the pardoning power of the King to cases "where the King may do it by his oath—that is to say, where a man slayeth another in his own defence, or by misfortune." The pressure put upon the Crown to grant pardons seems, however, to have continued. Twelve years after the passing of the above law complaint was made in Parliament that—

"Charters have been granted without number to divers felons and manslaughterers, to the evil example and fear of good people and lawful; whereby thieves, felons, and offenders be comforted to do their robberies and manslaughter, and the same do from day to day."

It was difficult to resist the applications made by powerful men

n behalf of their friends or dependents. Some doubt as to the propriety of thinning off the population by an exact application of the law in all capital cases, may also have operated. But on complaint of those most interested, this leaning to mercy's side was stopped, the old laws were put in force, and new capital offences were defined. Thus it became an offence punishable with death—always saving benefit of clergy—to carry wool out of the kingdom; for a gaoler to compel his prisoner to turn approver; for those that “be so hardy to bring false and ill money into the realm;” for a custom-house officer willingly to let in false money, or to let out good silver; for a man to forestall or ingross Gascony wine coming to England; for people to concert measures which may turn to a disturbance of the staple.

Notwithstanding all this severity crimes of violence do not seem to have abated, but rather to have increased. In 1354 “great clamour and grievous complaints” were made that “merchants and other passing through the realm of England with their merchandises and other goods, be slain and robbed, and namely now more than they were wont.” The unwillingness of the district folk to convict, and the technical difficulties raised in cases of flight from the scene of the offence to other places in the county, were charged as the direct cause of this evil state of things. For remedy it was ordered “that immediately after felonies and robberies done, fresh suit be made from town to town, and from county to county;” and if the bodies of the offenders were not found and surrendered to justice within forty days after commission of the offence, the district, town, hundred, or county was to make good the damage.*

After the Black Death had swept away half the population of the kingdom, wiped out for ever industries which had been domesticated in particular localities, prevented, through failure of labourers, the tilling of the soil, and brought want home to the appreciation of every one, it is not surprising that deeds of violence abounded, or that it should have been thought necessary to take stringent measures for checking them. The sheriffs and their men had full occupation, and the gallows throve upon the misery of the people. Indeed, so easy was it to secure the intervention of capital punishment, that private vengeance seems to have found a safe outlet by setting in force against enemies some of the many death-dealing laws in the repertory. An Act of the forty-second year of Edward the Third recites “the mischiefs and damages” done to divers subjects “by false accusers, which

* Side by side with this Draconic spirit in the law was a desire on the part of the Government to do justice to the accused; and in view, probably, of some high-handed proceedings under colour of the numerous death-dealing laws, it was ordered by 28 Edward III. c. 3, that “no man of what estate or condition that he be be put to death without being brought in answer by due process of the law.”

oftentimes have made their accusations more for revenge and singular benefit than for the profit of the King or of his people ;” and forbids proceedings otherwise than by presentment before magistrates, “or by due process and writ original, according to the old laws of the land.”

Capital offences were numerous enough under the first line of Plantaganet kings, but if these slew their thousands, their successors slew their tens of thousands. Under Henry the Fourth and his two immediate successors, large additions were made to the list of high treasons enumerated in the statute of Edward the Third. Breakers of truces or safe conducts; clippers, filers, or washers of coin; prisoners indicted for high treason, but escaping; Welshmen carrying away Englishmen or their goods into Wales, or detaining them there, were made liable to the pains of treason. It was also made a capital felony to commit any of the following offences—viz., to cut out the tongue, or pull out the eyes of the king’s liege people; to bring any Galyhalpens (Welsh halfpence), seskyns, or doydekyns, or any Scotch money into the kingdom; for Bretons to remain in England, where they learn “the secrets of the kingdom and discover them to the Bretons, who are the great enemies of king and kingdom;” for soldiers to quit their captains in war without leave; for servants who embezzle their master’s goods after his death, “to the impediment of the execution of the will of their said lords and masters, and to the great displeasure of God;” for those prototypes of Whiteboyism and Ribbandism who in parts of Essex and around Canterbury send letters to divers persons, threatening to burn their houses unless large sums of money be placed in certain places, “where the said malefactors can easily carry them off without being taken or perceived.”

Reasonable as some of these provisions were in the then state of society, outrageous as were some of the others, they all shrink into obscurity, viewed from a moral standpoint, beside the death-providing statute of heresy passed by Henry the Fourth. A bad title to the crown sought for support in the suffrages of the clergy, and a despotic king who identified religious dissenters with rebels, was glad of an occasion to punish by one operation the double sin of rebellion and schism. Till this time English kings, though loud enough in their professions of orthodoxy, had not only not helped the clergy in the capacity of religious police, but had thundered out laws which made it outlawry for them to seek enfranchisement from the royal control. Times had changed since Edward the Third declared that “he that purchaseth a provision in Rome for an abbey shall be out of the King’s protection, and any man may do with him as with the King’s enemy;” and since the same king put down by other means than ecclesiastical process

the uprisings of malcontents. The 2 Hen. IV. c. 15 is a blot even in the history of legal capital punishment. After reciting the orthodoxy of the Church of England in matters of faith, and lamenting the existence of those who oppugned the same, this law directed that persons refusing to abjure, or relapsing after abjuration, were to be delivered to the secular arm, and the sheriff "the same persons after such sentence promulgate shall receive, and them before the people in an high place see to be burnt, that such punishment might strike fear into the minds of others, whereby no such wicked doctrine and heretical and erroneous opinions, nor their authors nor fautors in this realm and dominion, against the Catholic faith, Christian law, and determination of Holy Church, be sustained or in any wise suffered." Under the powers of this statute many hundreds perished, some for what might be called the original sin of heresy, others for modifications of the offence so wide as to include orthodox and backslider in the same condemnation. So far as the present subject is immediately concerned it is only to be observed that the Statute of Heresy provided a mode of execution new to the people. "Hanging and heading" were the legal media sanctioned hitherto for giving men a passage from this world to a better. The Heresy Laws invented the punishment of death by fire. It is perhaps more correct to say they introduced it into England, for in more favoured countries the Church had long before set up its standard of right and wrong thought, tried folks by it, and handed the bodies of shortcomers over to Satan, "that their souls might be saved in the day of the Lord." "Satan" seems to have suggested fire and burning—to have suggested also that by this method of slaughter ecclesiastical justice might be done without violation of the Canon Law which forbade the shedding of blood. Blood dried up and baked in the veins could evidently not be spilt or shed, and though in the process it lost its efficacy as a fluid bearing life through the organisms of the body, the sacred law was none the less respected. There was no more reason to complain of the upholders of this doctrine than of those earlier churchmen who taught that if a man swore by the altar it was nothing, but if he swore by the gift upon the altar he was a debtor to his oath.

Such was the position of the law in reference to capital punishments, such were the offences capitally punished, when the Wars of the Roses, with their strong assertion of the *droit du plus fort*, came to an end. Speaking of the time when Henry the Seventh ascended the throne, Mr. Hallam says:—

"The laws against theft were severe, and capital punishments unsparingly inflicted. Yet they had little effect in repressing acts of violence,

to which a rude and licentious state of manners and very imperfect dispositions for preserving the public peace, naturally gave rise."

It is not easy at this distance of time to ascertain and enumerate all the faults capitally punished. Still less easy is it to estimate the numbers who were put to death under sanction of law. The Sheriffs kept scanty records, and there was no one to collect statistics.

But it should be borne in mind when trying to estimate the proportion of executions to sentences, or rather the proportion of convictions to offences for which capital sentences were provided, that at this time, and indeed till 1827, benefit of clergy was part of the machinery of English law, and mitigated its severity. The claim to this benefit was sometimes pleaded as a plea, but was oftener put forward after conviction, in arrest of judgment. A witness of that perennial struggle between Church and State, which in England was fought by the earlier Plantaganet kings, it was a monument also of the compromise into which the State victory at Clarendon was turned, by the stupid murder of a Becket at Canterbury.

It is not, perhaps, too much to say that had no revulsion of feeling been caused by the death of the popular archbishop, the position taken up by the Crown when it insisted on the absolute equality of layman and cleric before the criminal law, would have been maintained, and the anomaly of benefit of clergy would never have availed either *bonâ fide* clerks or those who were allowed to pass for such because they could read a line of what used to be termed the neck verse. The claim to benefit of clergy was based on the assumption of superior sanctity in the priesthood, and upon twisted applications of such Scriptural exhortations as "Touch not mine anointed," and other mandates equally non-applicable to a criminal, whether priest or other. There was inducement enough to fight for the privilege in the fact that the Church professed to shed no blood, so that whoever could manage to escape into her fold from the stern grip of the criminal law, saved his life whatever other punishment he might receive, and (originally) whatever crime he might have committed. Probably the compassion of the Church, mixed with a desire on her part to triumph openly over the secular courts, early led to laymen being included in the category of clerks, if in open court they could show *primâ facie* proof of being what they claimed to be.

The unlettered had judgment without mercy, on conviction, but of him who could manage to spell out a line in the volume put before him, it was said, "*Legit ut clericus*," and forthwith he was admitted to his benefit of clergy. This benefit consisted at first in his being simply handed over to the bishop to make pur-

gation, by means of such discipline, religious or secular, as that authority might see fit. In the case of clerks this was often notoriously inadequate to the offence, and though lay prisoners—who, especially if good masons, or good verderers, were no bad acquisition, on the free gift system, to any ecclesiastical house—were punished more severely, it was a matter entirely within the control of the bishop how far punishment should go even in their case.

Remonstrances and threats on this score were made, from time to time, by the Sovereign; but the scandal continued till Henry the Seventh provided (4 Henry VII. c. 13) that so far as laymen were concerned they should be allowed benefit of clergy only once, and even on that occasion should be branded in the hand as proof of the grant. Henry the Eighth took away benefit of clergy from all persons, not actual clerks, who had committed murder, from certain felons who “bear them bold of their clergy, and live in manner without fear or dread.” Later in his reign he abolished the privilege in cases of robbing from the person, arson, and *petit treason*, and also required that in the case of clerks in orders being admitted to their benefit, the ordinary should keep them imprisoned for life. To assist in enforcing this it was subsequently declared felony without benefit of clergy to break out of such prison. Elizabeth (18 Eliz. c. 7) abolished the practice of handing over to the ordinary, and sent cleric and layman alike to the common gaol, whilst still allowing the immunity of actual clerks from capital offences, except those specially excepted by her father.

James the First (21 James I. c. 6) allowed women who had till then been excluded, equal claim with men to “clergy.”*

The moral sense of the community gradually revolted against the abuses to which the privilege was liable, against the injustice done to those who could not read and who perished out of hand for offences which were allowed to be venial when committed by those whose claim to mercy consisted in the fact that they were better educated, and presumably therefore should have known better. Queen Anne’s statute allowed the benefit to all, whether they could read or not, and whether clerks or laymen, and till 1827 this mitigation of the severity of law remained as the loophole out of which first offenders might escape if they had a mind to repent. When claimed it had the effect of forfeiture simply on true clerks, no matter how many times they offended; but on lesser persons, substituted punishment involved, besides forfeiture, burning in the hand, whipping, fine, imprisonment, or transportation.

The additions made to the list of capital felonies by Tudor Kings and Queens were large enough to constitute in themselves

* A clerk had the right, if he chose to abandon his claim to clergy, to stand his trial at common law. “And note,” says Lord Coke, “when he knew himself free and innocent, then hee would be tryed by the common law; but when hee found himselfe fowle and guilty, then would hee shelter himselfe under the priviledge of his clergy.”

a formidable code, and it has been estimated that during the reign of Henry the Eighth, seventy-two thousand persons were executed under judicial sentences. So intolerable indeed was the weight of the criminal code under this prince that one of the first acts of his successor was to procure a law ordaining that all offences made felony by statutes since the first year of the "late King Henry VIII., not being felony before . . . shall from henceforth be repealed and utterly void, and of none effect." These laws were very numerous, and though some of them were revived at later periods, being thought in the opinion of the rulers necessary for the commonwealth, it was deemed better in 1547 to uproot them bodily, so closely were their roots intertwined with English jurisprudence.

Henry the Seventh made capital the offences of hunting by night disguised "to the intent the offenders should not be known;" carrying off and marrying against their will women owning property, to the "disparagement of the said women, and utter heaviness and discomfort of their friends;" conspiring to destroy the King, or any Lord Councillor, or great officer of State; forging the coin of other countries current in England.

Henry the Eighth added to all that had gone before, the following list, quitting the King's service without leave; embezzling employers' goods to the value of forty shillings and upwards; poisoning; breaking prison after admission to benefit of clergy; calling the King "heretick, schismatick, tyrant, infidel, or usurper of the crown;" refusing the oath renouncing the authority of the Bishop of Rome; fishing with nets at night, by "many light and unreasonable persons of this realm, being of no good rule nor honesty;" departing the kingdom in order to avoid obedience to the King's proclamation; poaching in any of the royal parks or warrens, or taking "in the King's ground any egg or bird of any faulcon, goshawk, or laner, out of the nest," or detaining in possession any of the King's hawks; stealing deer or conies in a lawful warren or park, "with vizards or painted faces or otherwise disguised;" maintaining the validity of the King's marriage with Anne of Cleves; practising "conjurat[i]on, witchcraft, enchantment or sorcery, to get money, or to consume any person in his body, members, or goods, or to provoke any person to unlawful love;" declaring a false prophecy; preaching, teaching, or maintaining by spiritual persons, for the third time, "anything contrary to the King's instructions and determinations, made or to be made;" burning, cutting, or destroying "frames of timber prepared and made by the owners thereof, ready to be set up and edified for houses."

* This is described in the 37 Hen. VIII. c. 6, as a "new damnable kind of vice, displeasure, and damnifying of the King's true subjects," by men "of evil and perverse dispositions, seduced by the instigation of the devil."

“**V**aliant beggars and sturdy vagabonds,” who having for the **f**irst offence of begging and wandering been whipped, and for **t**he second having had “the upper part of the gristle of the **r**ight ear cut off,” were, by 27 Hen. VIII. c. 25, ordered to be “**a**djudged and executed as felons.” At the same time it was a **c**apital offence to deny the King’s supremacy in matters of religion, to reject the doctrine of Transubstantiation, or to persist in denying **t**he necessity of confession and priestly absolution. The only **d**istinction between the effect of conviction for capital felony and for heresy was this—that in the former case forfeiture of property followed death, whilst heresy worked no forfeiture except where **s**pecially provided. The common law awarded no forfeiture in **s**uch case, though some of the statutable heresies invented by **H**enry the Eighth expressly gave it.

Whilst thus adding terrors to the law, in the shape of death for **n**umerous offences hitherto considered venial, or worthy of milder **p**unishment, Henry the Eighth added to the severity of the existing **l**aws by taking away benefit of clergy from many offences which **t**ill his time, were considered entitled to it. Murderers, petit **t**raitors, robbers of churches, robbers from the person in dwelling-**h**ouses, highway robbers, house-burners, and burners of barns **h**aving grain in them, pirates, and abjurors in petit treason, were **b**y statute deprived of benefit of clergy, whilst many of the newly-**m**ade felonies were expressed to be capital “without benefit of **c**lergy.” With all these traps to catch erring subjects it is not **w**onderful that the number of capital sentences should have **m**ounted, as has been estimated, to seventy-two thousand during **t**he thirty-six years that Henry the Eighth was King.

The abolition of benefit of clergy proceeded apace under **E**dward the Sixth and Mary; and, as already stated, an early Act **o**f Edward repealed and made void all the statutable felonies so **m**ade by his father. The new offences made capitally punishable **b**y these rules were few, and for the most part revivals merely of **s**ome necessary laws included in the general repeal made by **1** Edward VI. c. 12. The capital punishments which made Mary’s **r**eign so notorious were in pursuance of sentences under the **h**eresy laws of Henry the Fourth. These included in three years **t**he deaths of five bishops, twenty-one clergymen, and two hundred **a**nd forty-seven laymen and women.

Great as this number seems, and horrible as it really was, it **p**ales into insignificance beside the performances of Charles the **N**inth on the eve of St. Bartholomew, or of Charles the Fifth’s **l**ieutenants in the Netherlands. It is estimated that there were put **t**o death in the Low Countries during the reign of Charles the Fifth **n**o less than fifty thousand people for politico-religious causes only:

Elizabeth, while providing a death-penalty for several newly-

made treasons, and restoring to the Crown its ecclesiastical supremacy, proceeded to build up a formidable pile of felonies on the fabric of the statute-book. It became a capital felony "for wicked lucre or gain's sake" to clip, wash, round, or file any of the current coin of the realm, or coin of other realm current in this kingdom, and to indulge, after 1562, in "the wicked, pernicious, and dangerous practice of making, forging, and publishing false and untrue charters, evidences, deeds, and writings, which hath of late time been very much more practised, used, and put in use in all parts of this realm than in times passed."* The 14 Eliz. c. 5 directed that—

"A vagabond above the age of fourteen years shall be adjudged to be grievously whipped and burned through the gristle of the right ear with a hot iron of the compass of an inch, unless some credible person will take him into service for a year. And if, being of the age of eighteen years, he after do fall again into a roguish life, he shall suffer death as a felon, unless some credible person will take him into service for two years. And if he fall a third time into a roguish life, he shall be adjudged a felon."

It became a capital offence to convert any to the Romish religion, or to be reconciled thereto; on a second offence, maliciously to "speak any false and slanderous news or tales against the Queen that now is;" to "wish or desire the death or deprivation of the Queen;" to seek to find out by casting nativities or by witchcraft "how long the Queen shall live, or who shall reign as King or Queen after her decease;" for any Jesuit, seminary priest, "and other such like disobedient persons" to remain in England forty days after the end of the session of Parliament in 1585; to receive or relieve a Jesuit, "priest, deacon, or religious or ecclesiastical person" thus ordered to quit; to embezzle arms, habiliments of war, and victuals provided for the Queen's soldiers; to be an accessory in horse-stealing; to refuse either to abjure all foreign ecclesiastical authority or to quit the realm; to levy "in Cumberland, Northumberland, Westmoreland, and the Bishoprick of Duresme" a tax or "consideration commonly there called by the name of Black Mail."

The 39 Eliz. c. 17 recited that—

"Divers lewd and licentious persons, contemning both laws, magistrates, and religion, have of late days wandered up and down in all parts of the realm under the name of soldiers and mariners, abusing the title of that honourable profession to countenance their wicked behaviours, and do con-

* This offence was capital only on repetition. The punishment for a first offence was payment to the aggrieved person of double costs and damages, forfeiture of rents from lands or tenements during life, and imprisonment for life. And also it was ordered that the offender "shall be set upon the pillory in some open market town, or other open place, and there to have both his ears cut off, and also his nostrils to be slit and cut and seared with a hot iron, so as they may remain for a perpetual note or mark of his falsehood."

tinually assemble themselves weaponed in the highways and elsewhere in troops, to the great terror and astonishment of Her Majesty's true subjects."

The Act proceeded to authorize the seizure and execution as felons of all such "old soldiers," unless they could show testimonials of service and discharge from their late commanders. It also made it a capital felony to forge such testimonials.

This statute was doubtless intended to supersede, and at the same time to legalize, the proceedings under a commission issued by Elizabeth two years before to Sir Thomas Wilford—a commission of which Mr. Hallam says, "No other measure of Elizabeth's reign can be compared to it in point of violence and illegality." The Queen's letter, dated in July, 1595, recites that

There had been of late "sundry great unlawful assemblies of a number of base people in riotous sort, both in the city of London and the suburbs, for the suppression whereof (for that the insolency of many desperate offenders is such that they care not for any ordinary punishment by imprisonment) it was found necessary to have some such notable rebellious persons to be speedily suppressed by execution to death, according to the justice of martial law"—

a law unknown to the constitution of England. Sir Thomas was specially directed to arrest persons wandering about the highways, and to hang "upon the gallows or gibbet those whom the justices might certify to be" most "notorious and incorrigible offenders."

Sir Alexander Cockburn, when citing this case in his charge to the grand jury in *Reg. v. Nelson and Brand*, declared that this commission was altogether unconstitutional, "and beyond any power and prerogative of the Crown." He added—

"But I am glad to say nobody was put to death under that proclamation. Sir Thomas Wilford did indeed proceed to take up a certain number of the rioters. But wiser counsels prevailed. They were not put to death by martial law; they were brought before the ordinary tribunals of the country and punished according to the nature of their offences."

The bloody character of the legal sanctions provided by the Tudor princes departed with them, and was conspicuous by its absence in fresh legislation under the Stuarts. Under James the First it was made a capital felony to commit bigamy, and for a mother to conceal the death of her bastard child, whether born dead or not; but the tendency of legislation between 1602 and 1688 was in restraint rather than in promotion of severity. The presenters of Petition of Right and of Grand Remonstrance, overthrowers of Star Chamber and High Commission, members of the Long Parliament, abolishers of feudal tenures, promoters of the Habeas Corpus Act, destroyers of the writ *de hæretico comburendo*, and settlers of the Bill of Rights, were not likely to co-operate in giving larger powers to the law than it already possessed. The

wonder is that more was not done towards abating the powers in possession; but people engaged in great constitutional struggles affecting the very life of the nation were not likely to give much time to the reform of domestic and social law. Gallows and gibbet bore abundance of fruit, from seed in inherited laws, especially those which echoed the Mosaic injunction against allowing witches to live, but no fresh recruiting medium was provided.

With the House of Hanover came back something of the Tudor spirit.* The 9 George I. c. 22 provided for the suppression of the "Blacks," or people who blacked their faces and went armed and disguised to steal deer, rabbits, and fish, and to cut down trees. One section says that—

"If any person or persons shall unlawfully and maliciously kill, maim, or wound any cattle, or cut down or otherwise destroy any trees planted in any avenue, or growing in any garden, orchard, or plantation, for ornament, shelter, or profit; or shall forcibly rescue any person being lawfully in custody of any officer or other person for such offence; or shall by gift or promise of money, or other reward, procure any of his Majesty's subjects to join him or them in any such unlawful act," he or they shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and suffer death without benefit of clergy.

An Act of George II., made perpetual by 37 George III. c. 124, recites the frauds often committed by bankrupts, and orders that, after the 14th of May, 1729, all bankrupts not surrendering within forty-two days after notice, or subsequently concealing or embezzling their goods to the value of £20, shall suffer as felons without benefit of clergy or the benefit of any statute made in relation to felons." The 10 George II. c. 32 provided a death-penalty for malicious firing of mines, breaking sea walls, and taking of deer with violence to the keeper.

This was the state of things at the time the Young Pretender was marching south from Scotland. Blackstone, writing in 1765, said—

"It is a melancholy truth that among the variety of actions which men are daily liable to commit, no less than a hundred and sixty have been declared by Act of Parliament to be felonies without benefit of clergy, or in other words, to be worthy of instant death."

Owen Ruffhead, the learned editor of the "Statutes at Large," writing about the same time, said in his preface, and as the reflection suggested by his reading—

"It may not be improper to observe that our statute laws, with respect to criminal offences, seem to breathe too much the spirit of Draco's;

* Those who took money to assist thieves were made felons equally with the thieves. Death was the reward of those who assisted in any riot, or who opposed process in the liberty of the Mint, Southwark; for those who blew up, pulled down, or otherwise tended to destroy the new bridge "from the New Palace Yard in the City of Westminster to the opposite shore in the county of Surrey;" for those who maliciously broke down any turnpike.

all degrees of offence being confounded, and all proportion of punishment destroyed: whence many delinquents are, with cruel precipitancy, hurried out of the world for slight transgressions, who, by prudent and adequate correction, might be made useful to themselves and to society."

He quotes Montesquieu to show that extraordinary severity has never produced any lasting effect, and Tacitus to prove that corruption in States is accompanied by multitudes of laws. But while he expresses the opinion that "it would be a task well worthy the wisdom of the legislature, so to model the laws that they may better answer the true ends of government, which are to prevent rather than to punish crimes," he considers that the subject requires ampler treatment than he can give it, and "may well demand a treatise of itself." This was in 1762.

George the Third's statute roll shows, in spite of the above excellent moralizings, some very ugly additions to the capital felony list. Persons indicted for felony or piracy, and refusing to answer when arraigned were, *ipso facto*, convicted and sentenced. Prisoners escaping from penal servitude; forgers of acceptances or receipts for payment of money; returners from transportation before expiration of sentence; wilful shooters, stabbers, or cutters with intent to kill or maim; wilful firers of house, shop, or barn; those who entered a factory with force and destroyed serge or woollen goods or silk in the looms, linen or cotton goods, or the instruments of manufacture for such articles; and those who gave poison with a view to procure miscarriage, were punishable with death. In 1812 an Act in amendment of existing laws relating to the collection of the revenue, declared it to be punishable with death for any servants of the Post-Office to "secrete, embezzle, or destroy any letter or packet, or bag or mail of letters" entrusted to them; for any one to take from such employes letters or packets, or to assist them in secreting or stealing; for forgers of stamps or of certificates for redemption of land tax; and for any assisting "to the number of three or more, armed with firearms or other offensive weapons," any one to export wool or other goods liable to duty; for helping smugglers; for maliciously shooting at any officer of navy, customs, or excise.

The singular ferocity of English law, and the flagrantly absurd ways in which that law was evaded, excited the attention of public men for some years before George the Third's death. Sir James Mackintosh, Sir Samuel Romilly, and Mr. Brougham, fought what was for a long while a losing fight in behalf of criminal law reform. But on 2nd March, 1818, Sir James Mackintosh carried, against the Government, by 148 to 128 votes, a motion for a Select Committee on Capital Punishment, and from that time the work of cleansing the statute-book went briskly forward.

The total number of committals, for seventeen classes of offences

not including murder, which were capital in 1830, was 7,276 in the five years ended in 1832; but the executions in those years were 196 only. Out of 1,231 persons convicted in the same quinquennial term, for sheep-stealing, only 11 were hanged; out of 990 for horse-stealing, only 37; out of 1,829 convicted of robbery, only 17; out of 296 for forgery, only 17. For high treason, 8 out of 81; for piracy, 2 out of 52; for coining, 8 out of 44.*

The explanation of these great disproportions, and at the same time an argument for reform in the system which established them, is to be found in the words of Sir W. Blackstone, though these were written of the law as it existed sixty years before the date of the above statistics. Blackstone says:—

“So dreadful a list [of capital offences] instead of diminishing, increases the number of offenders. The injured, through compassion, will often forbear to prosecute; juries, through compassion, will sometimes forget their oaths, and either acquit the guilty or mitigate the nature of the offence; and judges, through compassion, will respite one-half of the convicts, and recommend them to the royal mercy. Among so many chances of escape the needy and hardened offender overlooks the multitude that suffer; he boldly engages in some desperate attempt to relieve his wants or supply his vices; and if unexpectedly the hand of justice overtake him, he deems himself peculiarly unfortunate in falling at last a sacrifice to those laws which long immunity has taught him to contemn.”

A Parliamentary paper, presented in 1818, furnishes valuable information on the subject of capital punishment, the offences for which it was awarded, and the extent to which it was carried out during the period which includes the years of greatest blood-thirstiness in English law. The paper contains an abstract of the number of persons who were capitally convicted, and of those who were executed in London and Middlesex from the year 1749 to 1817, inclusive.

An analysis of this paper shows twenty-five offences for which people had been tried, besides an ominous heading of “Various: the nature of which not ascertained.” This “Various” heading shows only three executions between 1749 and 1771, but in the following eleven years it scores three hundred and forty-five subjects. Averaging the convictions and executions for seven years over the period included in the return, it appears that the annual averages were as follows:—

* Between 1838 and 1852 inclusive, 998 persons were convicted in England and Wales, for fifteen classes of offence. Of these only 152 were hanged. Of the rest, 617 were transported for life, and others were condemned for periods from 7 to 15 years.

Between 1 January, 1859, and 1 January, 1864, there were 208 capital convictions in England and Wales.

Of 52 convicted in 1859, sentence was executed on	9
„ 48 „ 1860, „	12
„ 50 „ 1861, „	15
„ 29 „ 1862, „	15
„ 29 „ 1863, „	22

In the same five years there were in Ireland 21 convictions and 11 executions; in Scotland, 11 convictions and 2 executions.

				Convictions.	Executions.
1.	1749 to 1755.	Peace	61	43
2.	1756 to 1762.	War	25	15
3.	1763 to 1769.	Peace	52	26
4.	1770 to 1776.	Peace	81	38
5.	1777 to 1783	{ War for 6 years } { Peace for 1 year }		95	39
6.	1784 to 1790.	Peace	113	54
7.	1791 to 1797	{ Peace for 2 years } { War for 5 years }		75	20
8.	1798 to 1804	{ War for 6 years } { Peace for 1 year }		86	14
9.	1805 to 1811.	War	85	11
10.	1812 to 1817	{ War for 3 years } { Peace for 3 years }		158	20

These statistics are very remarkable in respect of the extraordinary difference in the gallows death-rate between the years of war and peace. They almost justify the supposition that the executioner's flock was mainly recruited from those not "unspotted soldiers" "that have before gored the gentle bosom of peace with pillage and robbery," and who yet had eluded the chastisement of war, which Henry the Fifth declared to be God's beadle, appointed for the apprehension of these very men. This view receives marked confirmation from an examination of the offences for which the people included in the above-quoted return suffered. In the first seven years there were forty-seven executions for burglary and housebreaking, and a hundred and forty-one for robbery from the person; and in the following seven years, which were years of war, there were but eight and thirty-four executions for these offences respectively. Between 1777 and 1783 the case appears yet stronger. Six of those years were years of war and there is no entry on the return of executions for either housebreaking or highway robbery during that time; but in the seventh year, a year of peace, the gallows in London and Middlesex owned fifteen burglars and thirteen highway robbers. Throughout the return this fact appears, not only with regard to these two crimes, but with regard to offences like forgery and coining. Murder appears to have held its own pretty equally in time of war as in time of peace. Larceny almost disappeared in time of war.

The apparently disturbing element in this calculation, so far as the comparative averages are concerned and without which the average for the two septennial periods ended in 1783 would show much lower, is to be found in the high death-rate—if the expression may be allowed—under the "Various" heading in those

periods. This is so high, with a corresponding decrease in the rates under specified offences, as to suggest the absence of detailed information for these periods, and the consequent lumping of results under the miscellaneous heading. At the same time it is to be observed that the years from 1770 to 1783 showed the several additional crimes to which the death-penalty was attached.

The immediate result of the efforts of the criminal law reformers was the abolition, through Sir Robert Peel's Acts in 1824-29, of a large number of capital felonies, and the repeal of certain statutes which had taken benefit of clergy from a large class of offences. These were followed in 1827 by the abolition of benefit of clergy, and by an Act which forbade execution under sentence of death unless for some felony which was excluded from benefit of clergy on the first day of the session of 1827. But as if to prove convincingly that the old Tudor spirit in law was not dead, the very next statute to this conciliatory one declared that death should be the punishment for house-thieves of chattels or money, equal in value to £5 (£2 had been the value hitherto); for stealers of horses, mares, bull, cow, or calf, of ram, ewe, sheep, or lamb; and for those who slew any of these animals for sake of stealing the skin or carcase. This precious relic of the spirit of the "good old times" was repealed by 2 & 3 William IV. c. 62.

Notwithstanding discouragements like those afforded by this statute, the men of action in the line of law reform went on their way, won the appointment of a Royal Commission on the criminal law, which made its eight reports between 1834 and 1845, and from time to time had the satisfaction of seeing the fruit of their labour in wholesome legislation. Out of the seventy-five offences under which crime was classified in 1827 thirty-one were capital. But in 1832 capital punishment was abolished for cattle, horse, and sheep stealing, for larceny in a dwelling-house, for coining and forgery (except forgery of wills and of powers of attorney to transfer stock). In 1833 it was abolished for house-breaking; in 1834 for returning from transportation;* in 1835 for sacrilege and for letter-stealing by post-office servants.

In June, 1836, the Criminal Law Commissioners made their second report, dealing expressly with capital punishment and with the not inferior question of allowing prisoners for capital felony to be defended by counsel. It is hardly credible that less than thirty years ago prisoners on trial for their lives for felonies under the degree of high treason were denied the advantage of speeches by counsel. Liberty was given for cross-examination of witnesses for the prosecution by counsel, who was yet debarred

* As an instance of the disuse of capital punishment for particular offences, long before the actual abolition of it by statute, it is to be noted that the last execution of unauthorized return from transportation was in 1810. The law abolishing the penalty passed in 1834.

from addressing the jury, "contrary to the practice in all other judicial proceedings, as well criminal as civil." This power of cross-examining might be, and often was, mischievous instead of helpful to the prisoner, especially if, as necessarily often happened, his defence had been written out beforehand and in the absence of information brought out only by the cross-examination. How many of the readers of these pages would be competent off-hand to defend themselves against a charge having some circumstantiality, and preferred by a practised advocate, whose function and whole duty it is to establish his charge? How many of them, supposing they had followed and watched the effect of cross-examination on their prosecutor's witnesses, would have the power to apply that effect and to sum up on their own behalf on the facts evolved?

"It frequently happens," say the Commissioners, "that hardened villains possess more coolness and composure than the innocent; and that the latter, instead of having even their ordinary reason and speech at command, are deprived of their usual presence of mind, and exhibit a degree of confusion which might seem to indicate a consciousness of guilt." They adduce "the case of a woman charged (though innocent) upon circumstantial evidence with the murder of her illegitimate offspring. Those whose painful duty it has been to witness such distressing trials can well bear testimony to the state of the wretched culprit, who, overpowered with a sense of shame, disgrace, and fear, is yet expected to make a defence which may require the most watchful attention to the evidence."

Alderman Harmer, whose practice and experience were vast and varied, testified in the most emphatic manner to the wickedness of the practice which allowed the whole weight of the prosecution, pushed with every advantage, to be brought to bear against those innocent men whom he said he had always found "the least capable of defending themselves." He said—

"I have known certainly instances in which I had not a particle of doubt the men were innocent, who have been convicted and executed, and where if a counsel had been permitted to address the jury on their behalf, I think a different result might have been anticipated."

He added that in none of the three cases to which he was referring was the prisoner capable of defending himself. "Certainly not."

The notion was that the judge discharged the office of counsel for the prisoner, and there were found not a few, Mr. Serjeant Hawkins among them, who asserted and doubtless believed, that an innocent man gained by this arrangement. They averred that the judicial summing up sufficiently protected the prisoner, whilst the absence of a demonstrative address in his behalf tended to keep the mind of the Court equable and firm. How false and absurd this reasoning is will appear to any one who has closely followed a case in any court. How good is one story until another is told! How often has a half-formed conviction been turned into undoubted instinct of acquittal, when the speech of counsel for the prisoner has cut between the joints of the prosecuting counsel's harness!

Surely, as regards the Court in its function of counsel, Sir Robert Shower was right when he wrote in 1682, "that the Court is counsel for the prisoner can be no effectual reason, for so they are for each party, that right may be done."

The report of the Commissioners from which the foregoing extracts are taken was issued in June, 1836, and forthwith an Act (6 and 7 Will. IV. c. 114) authorized defence by counsel and copies of the depositions. In the following year, the first year of the Queen, capital sentences were abolished for all but twelve crimes, including murder, and attempts to murder; high treason; showing false signals to cause shipwreck; setting fire to Her Majesty's ships of war; burglary with violence to the person; and robbery attended with cutting and wounding. In 1841 capital punishment was abolished in cases of embezzlement by servants of the Bank of England; and in 1861 by the Criminal Law Consolidation Acts—a series of statutes forming a completely new criminal code—it was abolished for every crime whatever except high treason and murder. For these offences the death-sentence remains.

As regards the methods by which capital punishment has been carried out in England at various times, it seems that—with the exception of death by fire which was provided for heretics, and for offenders against quasi-ecclesiastical laws, *e.g.*, the laws against witchcraft; and also (till 1829) for women who committed either high or petit treason—the method of execution adopted was hanging or beheading. For common crimes hanging was prescribed, though drawing on a hurdle to the gallows and beheading and quartering were sometimes added. In high treason this was always the sentence, though the royal consideration generally allowed to peers and peeresses dispensation from all but beheading. For less favoured convicts it was, till 1814, ordered that they should

"Be drawn on an hurdle to the place of execution, and there be hanged by the neck, but not until they are dead, but that they should be taken down again, and that when they are yet alive, their bowels shall be taken out and burned before their faces, and that afterwards their heads should be severed from their bodies and their bodies be divided into four quarters, and their heads and quarters to be at the King's disposal."

The 54 Geo. III. c. 146 authorized hanging till death, and gave the King power to remit drawing on a hurdle, and to substitute beheading for hanging if it so pleased him. In this position the law stands at the present moment in cases of high treason, but for less crimes death by hanging, accompanied in certain cases, till 1834, with chains and fetters on the body, was ever the punishment in this country. By a grim species of joke Henry the Eighth ordered a cook of the Bishop of Rochester's household, who had poisoned some folk, to be boiled to death, borrowing the idea from the man's calling; but the precedent was not followed, and the hang-

man's art prevailed, and still holds sway, in all cases of capital felonies. The English have ever been conservative in the modes of punishment, and never borrowed the German and the French plan of breaking on the wheel, or used torture with the intention of causing death.

The demoralization caused by the sight and by the concomitants of public executions had been the theme of moralists and social philosophers from Fielding's time to our own, and popular opinion was so much agitated by the consideration of it, that the question was dealt with by Royal Commission in 1864. One result of that Commission's labour was that on 29th May, 1868, was passed "An Act for carrying out of Capital Punishment within Prisons." The recital states that "it is expedient that capital punishments should be carried into effect within prisons," and the first enacting clause directs that—


"Judgment of death to be executed on any prisoner sentenced after the passing of this Act on any indictment or inquisition for murder, shall be carried into effect within the walls of the prison in which the offender is confined at the time of execution."

The sheriff charged with the execution, the gaoler, chaplain, and surgeon of the prison, and such other officials as the sheriff may require, are ordered to witness the execution; the surgeon is directed to certify in writing to the act of death, and the coroner of the jurisdiction to which the prison belongs is required to hold an inquest on the body within twenty-four hours of death. The finding of the coroner's jury, the certificate of the prison surgeon, and of the official witnesses of the execution, are ordered to be sent "with all convenient speed by the sheriff to one of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State." Printed copies are to be exhibited for twenty-four hours on or near the chief entrance to the prison where judgment has been executed.

Other clauses empower the Secretary of State to make regulations for guarding against any abuse at the execution, for "giving greater solemnity to the same," and for making known outside the prison the fact that the execution is taking place. The sheriff is empowered to admit certain people, relatives of the offender and others, to be present at the execution.

It is to be observed that there is nothing in this Act applicable to capital cases of high treason. As convicts for this offence may still be sentenced to an exceptional punishment, may still be drawn on a hurdle to the place of execution, and decapitated and quartered after death by hanging,—so they may still suffer the execution of this sentence publicly, on Tower Hill, at Newgate, or in the market-place of the town where their treason was committed.

FRANCIS W. ROWSELL.



THE CHURCHMANSHIP OF JOHN WESLEY.

THE Methodism of to-day will never be understood until the history of its founder is rightly understood; and neither the history of Wesley himself, nor the character of his life-work, can ever be understood, until it is recognized that his life was divided into two distinct, and in many respects sharply-contrasted, periods—the period preceding and the period following the spring of 1738. Much confusion and error have arisen from failing to recognize the critical changes and the momentous developments which have marked the course of some of our own statesmen, who have been unjustly accused of treachery, of holding at one and the same time a medley of conflicting opinions, and of having no honest and real principles at all. Similar confusion has arisen as to Wesley's opinions and principles from failing to observe the fact to which I have referred. The opinions of his earlier years have often been attributed to him as his permanent convictions and principles, although he had abandoned them fifty years before his death, while the real principles which guided all his course as the founder of Methodism have apparently never been apprehended at all by many who have undertaken to pronounce on the subject both of Wesley himself and of the community which he founded. It is my present purpose to exhibit as clearly as I can what Wesley was, as a Churchman, before the turning-point in his history, and what he afterwards became, and to indicate also, at least in part, how the Methodism which he founded was

moulded by the principles which he adopted after the spring of 1738.

Wesley's parents were of the Church of England: but their ancestors, so far back as we can trace, had been Puritans. The Wesleys or Westleys, were a line of Puritan clergymen in Wessex (Dorsetshire seems to have been their centre), men of decided views, but of liberal culture, Oxford being their hereditary University. Both the father and the grandfather of the Epworth rector had suffered for their opinions, the father in particular (John Westley) having been much harassed, and more than once imprisoned. Susanna Wesley, the rector's wife, came of a courtly and town-bred race of Puritan clergy; and her father, Dr. Annesley, though a leader among the Nonconformists, seems to have suffered little personal hardship. Both the rector and his wife, however, had in their early youth abandoned Puritanism, or rather Dissent. The father became a strict, but yet, like many of the clergy of that period, a time-serving Churchman, the colour of whose ecclesiastical opinions always matched the shade which for the time found favour at Court. He was naturally much disliked by the Dissenters as a deserter from their camp, and, in his earlier life, he returned their dislike in full; but, in his old age, he and they appear to have come to something like friendly terms. Wesley's mother, on the other hand, was throughout life a Jacobite High-Churchwoman, whose ecclesiastical creed was a matter of passionate sentiment and affection, and was cherished as warmly under Low Church William as during Queen Anne's High Church *régime*. Both parents were strict disciplinarians: the rector in his parish, where loose livers were taught to fear the Church courts; and the mother in her family, where, however, she seems to have united, in a remarkable manner, the minimum of punishment with the maximum of authority and order.

Coming from such a stock, and having been bred up in habits of frugal stint as well as strict discipline at home, and of patient and hardy endurance at the Charterhouse School, Wesley went to Oxford in 1720, and, having taken orders in 1725, appears to have begun his clerical course as a moderate theologian. His first theological counsellors were, naturally, his parents. The rector was never a High Church theologian, whatever ecclesiastical line he might, at certain periods, take in Convocation. Nor did his mother's Jacobitism affect her theology. She believed in the divine right of kings, and probably also of bishops, but she did not accept the theology of Laud or of Sheldon. From the first the younger Wesley rejected Calvinism, and insisted also that Christians in a state of salvation must be happily conscious of the fact. He distinctly rejected also the doctrine, extensively held at that day, of the "conversion of the elements," the modern

“Anglo-Catholic” doctrine of the “real presence.” He said, twenty years later, of his own preaching and belief at this time (1725—1729)—

“I preached much, but saw no fruit of my labour. Indeed it could not be that I should, for I neither laid the foundation of repentance nor of preaching the Gospel, taking it for granted that all to whom I preached were believers, and that many of them needed no repentance.”*

In 1729, however, having been deeply impressed by reading Law’s “*Serious Call*,” Wesley joined the original Methodist company at Oxford, which, during his absence in Lincolnshire, where he had been serving his father’s rectory of Wroote (held with Epworth), had been founded by his brother Charles and by some other University men, chiefly undergraduates. From this time Wesley’s doctrine became more intense and more severe. He laid now, as he himself wrote in 1746,† “a deeper foundation of repentance,” but he knew nothing as yet of the “evangelical” doctrines of “reconciliation” and “justification.” He insisted—following in this his teacher Law—on a high standard of religious consecration and personal holiness, both active and passive. He presently united with these views not a little of the High Church doctrine and discipline.

Mr. Tyerman’s interesting volume, entitled “*The Oxford Methodists*,” enables us to trace with great distinctness the stages by which Wesley’s religious earnestness developed into punctilious and ascetic Ritualism. William Morgan, one of the very first Methodists—a true Keltic devotee—was an intense ascetic. Wesley learnt his asceticism from Morgan, who, however, died in 1732. In the same year John Clayton joined the Methodist company. From his example, and the influence of the friends to whom he introduced Wesley, especially Dr. Deacon, a learned High Church Jacobite, of repute in his day, Wesley seems to have imbibed what would now be called Ritualism in an extreme form. Mr. Tyerman publishes a curious correspondence with Clayton, which brings this out very clearly. The close intimacy of Wesley and Clayton covers the interval 1732—1735, and their warm friendship lasted till 1738, when Wesley adopted the doctrines of “salvation by faith.” Through Clayton and Deacon, Wesley was led for a time to follow the guidance in matters ecclesiastical of the pretended *Apostolical Constitutions*. Clayton, as well as Deacon, was an intense Jacobite. We have already noted that Wesley’s mother was a Jacobite Churchwoman.

But there was another influence besides that of Ritualism which told powerfully upon Wesley between 1732 and 1735, the in-

* Works, viii. 430.

† Ibid. viii. 451.

fluence of the Mystics, to whose fellowship he had been introduced through William Law. Law was himself a Jacobite and a Nonjuror; and this fact may have helped his influence over the minds of such men as Clayton, and, in some measure also, over that of Wesley. The main cause, however, of his influence over Wesley was undoubtedly his "Serious Call" and his "Christian Perfection," both of which are books of extraordinary power—the former having been the means of profoundly impressing the mind not only of Wesley but of Dr. Johnson. Once established, Law's influence thoroughly penetrated Wesley, so that for some years Law was to him as an oracle.

Wesley was already an ascetic, when in 1732, several years after reading the "Serious Call," he first paid a personal visit to Law; he was also fast drifting into extreme Ritualism. Nevertheless, the influence of Law must, on the whole, have been contrary to that of Clayton, and was no doubt really more profound, although for some years Ritualism appeared to be in the ascendant. Mysticism is often united with asceticism, with which indeed it would seem to have a natural affinity, but it is unquestionably opposed to a servile ritualism. Whether Mystic or Ritualist, Wesley was ascetic, and ascetic he remained after he had forsworn the fellowship alike of his early oracle Law and of his Jacobite High Church guide Clayton. Law recommended Wesley to read Tauler's works, the *Theologia Germanica*, and other similar writings. In reading them he must have found himself in a very different atmosphere from that of the *Apostolical Constitutions*.

Wesley has himself furnished us with an instructive comparative summary of the effects produced on his own mind and character, on the one hand by the acceptance of patristic traditionalism, as held by Clayton and his fellows, and on the other hand, by yielding to the spell of Law's mystical teachings.

"I had," he says, "bent the bow too far in that [in the former] direction by making antiquity a co-ordinate rather than a subordinate rule with Scripture; by admitting several doubtful writings; by extending antiquity too far; by believing more practices to have been universal in the ancient Church than ever were so; by not considering that the decrees of a provincial synod could bind only that province, and the decrees of a general synod only those provinces whose representatives met therein; that most of those decrees were adapted to particular times and occasions, and consequently, when those occasions ceased, must cease to bind even those provinces." "These considerations," Wesley adds, "insensibly stole upon me as I grew acquainted with the mystic writers, whose noble descriptions of union with God and internal religion made everything else appear mean, flat, and insipid. But in truth they make good works appear so too."*

Under this singular combination of influences, partly ritualistic,

* Southey's Wesley, vol. i. p. 94.

partly mystical, and whether ritualistic or mystical, always ascetic, Wesley remained during his "Methodist" life—his University and pre-evangelical Methodist life—at Oxford. It was during this precise period that he was in love and in correspondence with the fascinating and celebrated Mrs. Pendarves, afterwards Mrs. Delany, a most interesting episode in his history, shedding a curious and unexpected light on his primary disposition and character. I have sketched this episode in one of the chapters of a small volume lately published,* but must not dwell upon it here.

Wesley himself, a few years afterwards, described his manner of life at this time as a "refined way of trusting to his own works and his own righteousness," and says that he "dragged on heavily, finding no help or comfort therein."† He also speaks very distinctly as to the nature of the struggle within him between mysticism and a scrupulous practical conscience.

"Though," he says, "I could never fully come into this [the quietude of mysticism] nor contentedly omit what God enjoined, yet, I know not how, I fluctuated between obedience and disobedience. I had no heart, no vigour, no zeal in obeying, continually doubting whether I was right or wrong, and never out of perplexities and entanglements. Nor can I at this hour give a distinct account how I came back a little toward the right way; only my present sense is this—all the other enemies of Christianity are triflers; the Mystics are the most dangerous; they stab it in the vitals, and its most serious professors are most likely to fall by them."

So Wesley wrote in the beginning of 1738, on his return from America, but before he had fully embraced the doctrines of "salvation by faith" as afterwards expounded by himself and his followers. It appears to have been during his residence in America that Wesley finally broke with mysticism. There can be no doubt, however, that the element of truth in the mystical teaching remained by him; and that his philosophy and theology were permanently elevated and enriched through the familiarity which he had gained with some, at least, of the writers to whom Law had introduced him, as well as through the direct influence of Law himself.

One conclusion results from all the evidence on this subject, viz., that though Wesley was a High Church Ritualist at Oxford, he was never a fully-persuaded or single-minded Ritualist. With him it was during these years a struggle between ritualism and mysticism; and that struggle was not finally ended until he found in the personal Christian faith of an Evangelical Arminian Churchman that which, to him at least, afforded the real and abiding rest which mystic quietism could but simulate; and came under the sway of that "law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus" which kept

* The Living Wesley.

† Works, iii. p. 72.

alive the continual spirit of devotion, and sustained from within that outward service of Christian worship and beneficence which he had previously struggled to maintain in full energy by an almost unintermitted round of self-imposed observances and duties.

No part of Wesley's life is more interesting to the student of character and its development, or to one who desires to trace the actual growth of his opinions, than that which immediately followed this period at Oxford—the interval, namely, which he passed in America and on the voyages to and fro. Here, again, I must abstain from more than a passing reference to his celebrated “affair of the heart” with Miss Hopkey in Georgia. It is needful, however, to mention the fact that Wesley's failure to prosecute his love-suit with Miss Hopkey involved him in an ecclesiastical law-suit, and was to him the beginning of troubles in the colony. Enemies rose up against him, and he was publicly indicted as having been guilty of sundry illegal and injurious acts of ecclesiastical despotism. The law-suit entirely broke down, but the indictment, taken in connection with his own admissions and comments, instructs us as to the character of his churchmanship at this period. The resemblance of his practices to those of modern High Anglicans is, in most points, exceedingly striking. He had early and also forenoon service every day; he divided the morning service, taking the Litany as a separate service; he inculcated fasting, and confession, and weekly communion; he refused the Lord's Supper to all who had not been baptized by a minister episcopally ordained; he insisted on baptism by immersion; he re-baptized the children of Dissenters; and he refused to bury all who had not received episcopalian baptism. One thing only was wanting to make the parallel with our moderns complete; there is no evidence that he believed in the “conversion of the elements” by consecration, or in their doctrine of the real presence.

It is well known that Wesley refused the Lord's Supper to one of the most exemplary Christians in the colony, John Martin Belzhus, the pastor of the Salzburgers, because he had not been, as Wesley insisted, canonically baptized. His entry in his journal in reference to this matter, written many years later, is very noteworthy. It ends with the words, “Can High Church bigotry go further than this? And how well have I since been beaten with mine own staff.” In regard to this matter there is the following entry in Wesley's unpublished journal under date, Sunday, July 17, 1737:—“I had occasion to make a very unusual trial of the temper of Mr. Belzhus, in which he behaved with such lowliness and meekness as became a disciple of Jesus Christ.”

With all his High Church intolerance, however, Wesley in Georgia was inwardly melting. His intercourse with Moravians,

on the voyage out and in the colony, deeply impressed him. He did not admire or approve all their peculiarities, but they seemed to have found the rest which he had so long sought in vain. He remarked with special admiration that they were delivered even from the fear of death—a fear which continually overcast Wesley at this time of his life, although afterwards he was so completely delivered from it. He learnt something also, in Georgia, from the Lutheran Salzburgers. Moreover, he attended a Presbyterian service at Darien, and there, to his great astonishment, heard the minister offer a devout and appropriate extempore prayer. He gathered a meeting of the clergy of the province, at which, he says in his diary, “there was such a conversation, for several hours, on ‘Christ our Righteousness and Example,’ with such seriousness and closeness as I never heard in England, in all the visitations I have been present at.”

“I entirely agree with you,” thus he wrote to a friend, “that religion is love, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost; that as it is the happiest, so it is the cheerfulest thing in the world; that it is utterly inconsistent with moroseness, sourness, severity, and indeed whatever is not according to the softness, sweetness, and gentleness of Christ Jesus. I believe it is equally contrary to all preciseness, stiffness, affectation, and unnecessary singularity. I allow, too, that prudence, as well as zeal, is of the utmost importance in the Christian life. But I do not yet see any possible case wherein trifling conversation can be an instance of it. . . . I am not for an austere manner of conversing—no; let all the cheerfulness of faith be there, all the joyfulness of hope, all the amiable sweetness, the winning easiness of love. If we must have art, ‘*Ilæc mihi erunt artes.*’”*

It was, in fact, the gradual rise within him, even in Georgia, of evangelical views and sympathies—I need hardly say that I use the word *evangelical* in no narrow sense—which slowly dispelled the mystical confusion which had so long beclouded him. During the latter part, at any rate, of his American experience, it is evident that underneath the outward rule which was maintained with such unrelenting severity, both of rubrical observance and of ascetic discipline—and, perhaps, with all the more severity because of his inward rebellion against the yoke—there was welling up within him a fountain of true Christian self-knowledge and a passionate longing after a new life.

He left Georgia “a sadder and a wiser man” than he had entered it. His voyage home was a season of sorrowful review and self-searching. He had good right, indeed, to feel humbled. As yet he seemed to have failed in everything he had had at heart since he took his fellowship. At Oxford he had much personal influence, but his labours there seemed to have borne but little permanent fruit. He had left no “school of the prophets” behind him at the university. His career in Georgia had been an almost ignominious

* Tyerman's *Life of Wesley*, vol. i. p. 138.

failure. His bitter confessions, written during the voyage home, and immediately after his return, are well known. "One thing I have learnt in the ends of the earth, that I who went to America to convert the Indians was never converted myself."

Wesley himself, in after-life, took a less severe view of his own case and character at this period. He would hardly, in 1770, have maintained, as he affirmed in 1738, that he was an unconverted man during all the time he was in Georgia. But to his life's end he held that he was in many and important respects an unenlightened man, and that he was wanting in that filial and evangelical faith and in that spiritual power which belong to the character and experience of a Christian in the highest sense of the word. Nor is it possible to understand in the least his after-life, unless it be apprehended that, in 1738, a vital and critical change passed on his experience, and one which transformed, in many ways, his character for all his following course.

Already, before he had landed at Deal on February 1, 1738, he had definitively adopted the doctrine of "Salvation by Faith." In this respect, his voyage home, with his unbroken and solitary reflections on all that he had seen and learnt during the two years which had passed since his leaving England, seems to have borne decisive fruit. But before he met with Böhler—which, however, was but a few weeks after he landed,—he still regarded faith as largely a question of creeds and of the intellect. Böhler taught, on the contrary, that faith was critically and essentially a moral act and habit of the heart and soul, exercised through the help of the Divine Spirit, and bearing no necessary *ratio* or relation whatever to the *quantum* of a man's creed, or to any intellectual process or attainment. Having once accepted this doctrine, Wesley never afterwards forgot it.

I know of no writer who has shown more insight in dealing with this part of Wesley's history than Miss Wedgwood. It is remarkable that, standing distinctly apart from the theology of Wesley, she has yet appreciated so justly the spiritual *momenta* of his development as a man of faith and power.

"Wesley's homeward voyage in 1738," says Miss Wedgwood, "marks the conclusion of his High Church period. He abated nothing of his attachment to the ordinances of the Church, either then or to the last day of his life; and he did not so soon reach that degree of independence of her hierarchy and some of her rules which marks his farthest point of divergence; but his journals during this voyage chronicle for us that deep dissatisfaction which is felt wherever an earnest nature wakes up to the incompleteness of a traditional religion; and his after-life, compared with his two years in Georgia, makes it evident that he passed at this time into a new spiritual region. . . . 'By Peter Böhler, in the hand of the great God,' he writes in his journal, 'I was, on March 5th, fully convinced of the want of that faith whereby we are saved.' . . . But the reader cannot but ask, What is the meaning of this conversion? No candid

person can read the account of Wesley's life before and after the change he so described and doubt that something did really happen then. . . . It is the most memorable of all events when any one wakes up to the conviction that besides all the men and women he sees round about him there is a Person who is not seen, but who is just as real as they, and an agent in a sense in which they are not; when he comes to feel that certain results are due to the will of God, not only in the sense in which any one must believe in it who believes in Him at all—that He is almighty, and could prevent it if he chose—but in that same direct, personal sense in which a man's lifting his hand is the result of his choosing to do so. It is literally and simply a new life. An element is come into the man's dealings with his fellow-men which alters everything, and which, in the words of one who will always be remembered among the best exponents of this change (St. Augustine), makes it delightful to escape from that which before it was unendurable to give up, and impossible to avoid that which it was before impossible to do. . . . The witness that the direct influence of God upon the spirit of man was not confined to a remote past or a mysterious future, but was an actual fact in the lives of all who truly deserved the name of Christian, came home to Wesley and to many others of that day as the one force that was to bind a society together and to give new life to the individual soul. . . . The birthday of a Christian was shifted from his baptism to his conversion, and in that change the partition line of two great systems is crossed."

Such is Miss Wedgwood's philosophical explanation, in general terms, of what took place at this crisis of Wesley's life. Wesleyans say—as Wesley himself would have said—that the explanation is so vague and general as to be essentially defective. There is not a word here of that deep sense and conviction of sin and helplessness which lay at the root of Wesley's conversion; nothing of the atoning work of Christ. Nevertheless, it is true as far as it goes; and it marks very justly the critical character of the change, of the "conversion," through which Wesley now passed.

At the first with Wesley, as with most men of that age, faith had meant the intellectual acceptance of the creeds, together with the submission of the will to the laws and services of the Church. Of course, after 1730, when his attention had been directed to the rubrics and to the teachings of tradition, his faith, thus regarded, included in its scope much more of ecclesiastical observance than it did at an earlier period. Presently, to the two elements I have noted was added a third, that, viz., of intense contemplation with a view to realize the mystical union of the soul with God. This latter element, it must be observed, was theosophical, not evangelical. The mystical ideas of contemplative union with God began, however, in Georgia to give place to the thought of spiritual union with Jesus Christ. Mysticism faded away by degrees—he himself says he could hardly tell how—and evangelical ideas and desires took possession of him instead. These grew and deepened during his voyage home. Still, until he met with Böhler, he had not embraced, scarcely, it would seem, had conceived, the idea of faith as being, in its main element,

personal trust and self-surrender, as having for its central object the atonement of Jesus Christ, and as inspired and sustained by the supernatural aid and concurrence of the Holy Spirit. As yet faith in his view was a union of intellectual belief and of voluntary self-submission, acted out day by day, and hour after hour, in all the moralities of ordinary life, and in all the prescribed means and services of the Church, Christ being held in view as the Saviour of the race, and as the Exemplar for all men. From this conception of faith the element of the supernatural was wanting, and equally that of personal trust for salvation on the atonement of Jesus Christ.

Now the work of Peter Böhler was to convince Wesley that such faith as this was, after all, but a man's own work, the result of his own logic and will, and not in any sense the true vital faith of a Christian. Wesley, after many days of close controversy, was at length convinced that the Moravian was right. "*Mi frater, mi frater,*" said Böhler, "*ista philosophia tua excoquenda est.*" It was no easy matter to accomplish this task, but once effected, it seems to have been done for ever. Wesley confessed that Böhler's teaching was true Gospel teaching. He now believed himself for the first time to understand the words of St. Paul, when he said, "I am crucified unto the world, and the world is crucified unto me. Nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me, and the life that I now live in the flesh is by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave Himself for me." Such faith as this, and such only, he conceived could be said to be "faith of the operation of the Holy Ghost." In one place he describes the faith of the believer as "the loving, obedient sight of a present and reconciled God." He believed himself now to understand for the first time the meaning of the Apostle when he speaks of the inward kingdom of God as "righteousness and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost."

If I have seemed somewhat to labour this point, it is because it is simply impossible to understand either Wesley's character or his course without understanding the critical and vital change which at this time passed upon him. Here ended really his High Church stage of life. Here began his life as an evangelist and a Church revivalist. All dates from his final and decisive acceptance of Böhler's teaching as to the nature of faith, and from that which followed on the 24th day of May, as described in his own words, when he "felt his heart strangely warmed; felt that he did trust in Christ, Christ alone for salvation," and had "an assurance given him that Christ had taken away his sin, and saved him from the law of sin and death."*

* This "assurance" was what Wesley, in his mature and settled theology, spoke of as the "Witness of the Spirit." It was an inward persuasion of present acceptance and

From this time forth Wesley was no longer characteristically a priest; his vocation was pre-eminently that of a preacher. He was never again to be a settled pastor; he was henceforth to be an itinerant evangelist. Though for some time yet he retained his rubrical scruples and punctilios as to the necessity of episcopalian baptism, and even went so far, on at least one occasion, contrary to the counsel of the Bishop of London, as to re-baptize Dissenters, yet henceforth the sacraments, according to his teaching, were to be regarded only as means and seals of grace, not as fountains of supernatural power, ministered by the hand of the priest.

It is remarkable, indeed, how very little is found on the subject of baptism in the fourteen volumes of Wesley's works. He revised and reissued, under his own name, in 1756, the treatise on that subject which his father had published more than half a century before, and which teaches "baptismal regeneration" after the mildest type of the doctrine, and much as it had been taught by the Puritan divines of the Church of England. Elsewhere all that Wesley says on the subject, besides two sentences in his "Notes on the New Testament," to which I refer in a note below, is in two sermons, and amounts altogether to but a few lines. He allows that infants are made children of God in baptism. "It is certain," he says, "our Church supposes that all who are baptized in their infancy are at the same time born again; and it is allowed that the whole office for the baptism of infants proceeds upon this supposition." "But yet," he insists, "there may be the outward sign, where there is not the inward grace." "Whatever be the case with infants, it is sure all of riper years who are baptized are not at the same time born again."*

favour; but, unlike the Calvinistic "assurance," had no distinct reference to the final perseverance and acceptance of the believer. It was not for some years that Wesley's views as to the "Witness of the Spirit," its meaning, and its relations became definite and settled. Moravian statements of experience seem at first to have left him in much perplexity. Here, in a note, I may refer to another specially Wesleyan doctrine, which it is beside my plan to discuss or analyze in the text—what Wesley was accustomed to speak of as "Christian perfection," or "perfect love." Wesley did not at all mean "sinless perfection." But his analysis of human nature seems to have been metaphysically inadequate; and for this, as well as other reasons, his statements of this doctrine, however glowing, appear to be philosophically obscure, if not sometimes inconsistent. There has always been some difference of view among Methodists, both as to the nature of Christian perfection, and the manner or the stages of its attainment. John and Charles Wesley, indeed, did not always agree on the matter. In the main, however, this Wesleyan tenet must be regarded as a protest against extreme Calvinistic views, amounting sometimes to gross antinomian perversions, on the subject of "imputed righteousness" and indwelling and abiding sin. A catena of eminent writers, beginning with Clement of Alexandria, and including both saintly Catholics and high mystics of different nations, have built on the teaching of St. John and St. Paul an exalted doctrine of Christian perfection.

* In his "Notes on the New Testament," which volume is not included in the general edition of his "Works," but is sold separately, Wesley thus expresses himself as to the point touched in the passage quoted in the text. Writing on Acts xxii. 16, he says, speaking of adults, it must be remembered: "Baptism administered to real penitents

These words occur in the sermon on the "New Birth." In his sermon on "The Marks of the New Birth" he only refers to the subject at all in order to rebut the pretensions of those who claimed to be Christians on the strength of their baptism when infants. He allows that as infants they were regenerated, but asks vehemently and repeatedly of what avail that fact can be in the case of those who are now beyond question living godless and wicked lives. Higher than this John Wesley's baptismal doctrine never went, so far as his writings show. The most remarkable thing, indeed, in regard to Wesley's teaching on baptism, is his reticence. Many, probably most, of his preachers no less than of his people, during his lifetime rejected altogether the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, and he never required any of them to receive it. He made no sign except to republish the treatise to which I have referred, and to make the brief and merely incidental references to the subject which I have noted in two of his sermons. To this day Wesleyan Methodism remains destitute of any explicit doctrine on the subject of baptismal grace. There are still, I believe, a few Wesleyan ministers who receive the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. There are probably many more who believe in what Wesley and his father spoke of as a "principle of grace" imparted to the soul of the infant in baptism; but there can be no doubt that the prevalent conviction within the "Connexion" is strongly against the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. I imagine that the variety and general balance of opinion on this subject in modern Methodism are not very different from what existed in early Methodism after the Connexion was fully and widely organized. What is very remarkable is, that Wesley made no effort to convert his people to his own opinions. Indeed, it has been contended, not without considerable show of reason, that Wesley must, in his later years, have ceased to hold, or at least have come to doubt of, the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. In 1784 he prepared and published, originally for the use of the offshoot Methodist Church in America, "The Sunday Service of the Methodists, with other Occasional Services," a volume which still holds an authorized and honoured place among Methodist formularies, although the abridged Sunday service here given is seldom preferred by Wesleyans to the full Church Service in English Wesleyan chapels

is both a means and seal of pardon. Nor did God ordinarily, *in the primitive Church*, bestow this on any except through this means." Compare also the note on John iii. 5. It cannot be said that there is any necessary contrariety between what I have now quoted, and the passage quoted in the text. I may here remark that, in his "Bampton Lectures," Mr. Curteis cites, as from a sermon of Wesley's, a passage which is not to be found in any of his sermons, so far as I know. I have searched through them in vain to find it. It is indeed quite unlike all he has written on the subject. Nor does the reference to vol. xix. at all help me. The standard editions of "Wesley's Works" only contain fourteen volumes.

where the Liturgy is in use. In this volume are contained, instead of the Thirty-nine Articles, twenty-five Articles of Religion, which are now the authoritative standard of the largest Protestant Church in the world—the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States. These articles are for the most part substantially the same, or nearly so, with those of the thirty-nine to which they correspond. In some cases, however, they are materially abridged. This is the case in particular with that which relates to baptism, in which all that is taught as to the nature of baptism is, that, besides being a sign of the Christian profession, it is "also a sign of regeneration or the new birth." As to baptism as an instrument, as to the effects of baptism, not a word is said. This article proves, at all events, that Wesley had in 1784 concluded not to insist on the doctrine of baptismal regeneration in any sense.

As to the Lord's Supper the case is still plainer. Here he has in various places clearly and fully expressed his views, and those views were certainly not what would in the present day be regarded as High Church. It appears, indeed, as I have already noted, to be more than doubtful whether, although he always to his latest day insisted on frequent communion indeed, on "constant communion," that is, communion at every opportunity—he at any time of his life held really high doctrine as to the Lord's Supper. In 1788 he published a sermon which he had written at Oxford, "for the use of his pupils," fifty-five years before—that is, in 1733—when he carried to the utmost his rubrical Anglicanism at the University. He says, in the brief preface to this publication, "I have added very little, but retrenched much, as I then used more words than I do now. But I thank God I have not yet seen cause to alter my sentiments in any point which is therein delivered." The only phrase in the sermon which looks like high sacramental doctrine is one in which he speaks of the Lord's Supper as the "Christian sacrifice." But that he uses this phrase in a merely figurative sense is certain and evident from the explicit statements which precede and follow. He says: "As our bodies are strengthened by bread and wine, so are our souls by these tokens of the body and blood of Christ." "The design of this sacrament is, the continual remembrance of the death of Christ by eating bread and drinking wine, which are the outward signs of the inward grace, the body and blood of Christ." "As the apostles were obliged to bless, break, and give the bread to all that joined with them in these holy things, so were all Christians obliged to receive those signs of Christ's body and blood. Here, therefore, the bread and wine are commanded to be received in remembrance of his death to the end of the world."

There are distinct indications that at the time John Wesley published this old Oxford sermon he was, in different ways, returning in his extreme old age (84—85) to the love of his youth. His brother Charles, whose strong Anglican bias had led Wesley to take the other side, in order to hold the balance safely and wisely with his preachers, had been some years dead; his anti-Church of England preachers—he had many such—respected his great age and waited for his death to assert their own ideas and claims; his enemies, on all sides round, were now at peace with him; he was no longer proscribed or attacked by any section of the clergy, but was publicly honoured by very many, including men of the highest distinction; and he was not altogether superior to the fond clingings and idolatries of age, which lead men to look back so lovingly to the memories and affections of their youth. Hence he became in the last few years of his life more Anglican in his feelings than he had been at perhaps any time since his conversion. And yet he came no nearer to high Anglican doctrine as to the real presence, as to sacramental mysteries and efficacy, than may be understood from the foregoing quotations.

The sermon from which I have quoted is not included among the standard sermons which all Methodist preachers are required to read and to accept, as containing the general system of Methodist theology. All he says on the subject in his standard sermons is contained in the one on “The Means of Grace,” and is altogether contrary to the teaching of modern sacramentarian “Anglo-Catholics.” “‘He said, Take, eat: this is My body’—that is, the sacred sign of My body.” “‘He took the cup, saying, This cup is the new testament’ or covenant, ‘in My blood:’ the sacred sign of that covenant.” “‘As oft as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do show forth the Lord’s death till He come:’ ye openly exhibit the same by these visible signs, ye manifest your solemn remembrance of His death, till He cometh in the clouds of heaven.”

There is other evidence of Wesley’s doctrine on this subject which, though indirect, is yet decisive, and in entire harmony with what has thus far been before us. He sanctioned in his middle-age the publication of extracts from Dr. Brevint’s tractate on “The Christian Sacrament and Sacrifice,” as a preface to his brother Charles’ “Hymns on the Lord’s Supper.” “The Lord’s Supper,” Dr. Brevint teaches, “was chiefly ordained for a Sacrament (1) to *represent* the sufferings of Christ which are *past*, whereof it is a *memorial*; (2) to *convey* the first fruits of these sufferings in *present* graces, whereof it is a *means*; and (3) to assure us of glory to come, whereof it is an infallible *pledge*.” And, as to the crucial point, on the second of these heads he thus explains himself more

precisely : " His body and blood have *everywhere*, but especially at this Sacrament, *a true and real presence*. . . . Since *He is gone up*, *He sends down to earth the graces* that spring continually both from His everlasting sacrifice, and from the continual intercession that attends it."* Perhaps it might be inferred from the last passage cited that Dr. Brevint believed in the Lutheran dogma of the ubiquity of our Lord's bodily presence. But it is evident that he did not believe in the real corporeal presence of our Lord in and under the elements of bread and wine, in virtue of the priestly consecration. Brevint's doctrine Charles Wesley transfused into ecstatic hymns, which are full of the " real presence " indeed, but contain no trace of any doctrine equivalent to the modern High " Catholic " teaching as to the corporeal presence of the incarnate Christ in the consecrated bread and wine of the Eucharist.

It seems evident, accordingly, that however extreme may have been Wesley's High Churchmanship at Oxford, he held no high Anglo-Catholic tenets as to the sacraments during his after-life. It is even doubtful whether, on the subject of the Eucharist at least, he had at any time held doctrine which would now be regarded as high. At Oxford he was full of devotional ritualism ; he had a great reverence also for primitive symbolism and for ancient tradition generally, and accordingly at one time would have the sacramental wine mixed with water. He insisted strongly on baptism, as he did on every rubrical requirement, however minute or punctilious. As a loyal and obedient Churchman he conceived himself bound by his ordination vows to make a conscience of all these matters. He laid great stress on " constant communion," and on full and close preparation for such communion, including confession to the minister. But he did not even in Oxford believe in any such doctrine as that of the mystical and supernatural bodily presence of the Lord Jesus in the consecrated elements, as now taught by advanced High Churchmen.

For many months before his " conversion "—in Georgia, on the voyage home, and in the interval after his return—a process of undermining had been going on, which had left his system of High Church habits and observances almost without a foundation. After his conversion, the undermined fabric fell into manifest ruins, although some fragments of it were left standing for several years afterwards. What passed immediately after his conversion between himself and his friends the Huttons is very significant, although it must be remembered that the Huttons are the narrators, and may perhaps have represented what took place more sharply and startlingly than it would appear if we possessed Wesley's own

* The Poetical Works of J. and C. Wesley, vol. iii. pp. 186, 197.

account. Mr. Hutton, let me explain, was a retired clergyman, who had been long a particular friend of the Wesley brothers, having been intimate with Samuel Wesley when he was one of the masters at Westminster School, and his near neighbour. Mr. Hutton's house was in College Street, Westminster. Here, a few days after Wesley's "conversion"—the hour, that is, when, as he himself describes it, his heart was "strangely warmed," and he found rest and peace through faith in Christ for salvation—Mr. Hutton was reading to a company in his study a sermon of Bishop Blackall's, when Wesley stood up and told those present that five days before he was not a Christian. "Mr. Hutton," to quote Mr. Tyerman's account, "was thunderstruck, and said, 'Have a care, Mr. Wesley, how you despise the benefits received by the two sacraments;' but Wesley repeated his declaration, upon which Mr. Hutton answered, 'If you have not been a Christian ever since I knew you, you have been a great hypocrite, for you made us all believe that you were one.' To this Wesley rejoined, 'When we renounce everything but faith and get into Christ, then, and not till then, have we any reason to believe that we are Christians.'"

The language Wesley used may have been crude or unguarded, or perhaps only an imperfect account of it may here be given, but there can be no reasonable doubt as to the substantial accuracy of this relation nor as to its meaning. As Miss Wedgwood says, in words already quoted, to Wesley's transformed apprehension, "the birthday of a Christian was shifted from his baptism to his conversion, and in that change the partition line of two great systems is crossed." The date of Wesley's Christian birthday, according to this reckoning, was, as we have noted, May 24, 1738. Let that date be well marked. Wesley's inner and essential ultra-High-Churchmanship belongs to the period preceding this date. After this period he may have been in a certain sense a High Churchman—it is certain he was never a Low Churchman in the modern sense, he was indeed rather broad than low—but his High Churchmanship in after-life, and through the space of half a century, included neither high sacramentarian doctrine nor servile veneration for rubrics, nor any belief in either the virtue or the reality of what is commonly called "the apostolical succession."

Wesley's conversion took place at a religious fellowship-meeting, held in Aldersgate Street, connected with one of those Societies organized within the Church of England, with which the names of Dr. Horneck and Dr. Woodward are associated, and the propriety and special value of which had been defended so vigorously by the Rector of Epworth forty years before. It was while one was reading Luther on the Galatians that the critical change took

place. It is no wonder that fellowship-meetings henceforth were inseparable from the spiritual life of the Wesleys.

"When Wesley returned from America," says Miss Wedgwood, "these societies formed the natural organization for one who desired fellowship in a religious body more developed and coherent than the Church of England, and it was in these societies that all the chief peculiarities of Methodism took their rise. The Methodist class-meeting was no more than 'the weekly conference among young communicants' recommended by the earlier body, thereby to 'admonish and watch over one another, and to fortify each other against those temptations which assault them from the world and their own corruptions' (Dr. Woodward's Account, p. 75). And these persons, knowing each other's manner of life and their particular frailties and temptations, partly by their familiar conversation, and partly from their own inward experience, can much better inspect, admonish, and guard each other than the most careful minister usually can." Here we have an exact description of a Methodist class-meeting, written about four years before Wesley was born (1699). Like the early Methodists, too, the religious societies were distinguished by their frequent communion, and the reverence paid by them to this rite; they had also their charitable fund, and their stewards elected yearly."

These earlier Societies however, were, as Miss Wedgwood proceeds to say, distinctively *Church Societies*. Their spirit and tone were in conformity with the views and feelings of the Wesleys before they had embraced Peter Böhler's teaching as to the "righteousness of faith." Orthodoxy, the instituted means of grace, and beneficence—summed up for these societies all that appertained to the Christian character and profession. Of the "new heart" and the "new life" their members knew nothing. "The spirit of the older societies," as Miss Wedgwood says, "was not only unlike that of Methodism, it was the very spirit from which Methodism was a reaction." Hence the ideas and experience of the Wesleys after they had become disciples of their Moravian teacher were to these societies as new wine to old bottles. Some of the members, no doubt, followed the Wesleys and became partakers of the like experience. But many were filled with alarm and dismay. It was probably at a meeting of one of these societies that Wesley, at Mr. Hutton's house, startled his host and hostess in the manner which has been described.

Wesley did not at once, perhaps never did formally, separate himself from these Church societies. From many of them he was before long excluded; of that there can be no doubt. And, though he continued for a time to attend some of them, and to try to do good through them—as did his brother Charles likewise, who had "found peace through believing" some days earlier than himself—yet he found the Moravian Society more congenial; at first indeed, he seemed to find there just what he needed. Accordingly he became a member of the Moravian Society, and attended its meetings at Fetter Lane. He could do this without affecting his

position in the Church of England. The Moravian Society was one thing, the Moravian Church another. To this day there are in Russia many members of the Greek Church who are also members of the Moravian Society. Indeed there have been not a few Roman Catholics, and, I believe, there still are some, included within the Moravian Societies. It is but a few years since the distinction between members of the Society and of the Church came to an end in this country. Till within the last twenty years there were still lingering in London a few ancient members of the Moravian Society who had never ceased to be members of the Church of England. In this respect the relations of the Moravian Society in England to other Churches strictly resembled the relations of Wesley's own Methodism to other Churches, as those relations were defined a few years later. Moravianism in this, as in so many other points, furnished a model for Methodism. As to the *Moravian Church*—an ancient and hierarchical community—with many peculiar and some very primitive-seeming customs and usages—that was and is a strict and seclusive fellowship into which none can obtain entrance except with solemn form and ceremony.

But Wesley could not remain a mere Church of England Moravian. If the English Moravian Society had not been led away—as for a season it undoubtedly was—into the worse than foolish vagaries which were taught by such men as Molther and Spangenberg, it is certain that Wesley must before long have been constrained to found and organize his own societies. As it was, after long and patient forbearance he separated himself in 1740 from the Moravians, and organized a society of his own at the Foundry, Moorfields, an old place which he had a short while before secured for his own use, and had repaired and fitted up for the purpose of religious meetings. This was the real beginning of Wesleyan Methodism, as an organized system. The private fellowship-meeting—a little later organized systematically as a class-meeting—was its nucleus, its “germ cell,” as it has been truly called by Wesleyan writers.

Such meetings as these, however, could be of little avail apart from the work of preaching. Preaching, indeed, was the characteristic force of the new movement of which the Wesleys had become chief lights and leaders. Whitefield had already given evidence of this. Himself formerly one of Wesley's Oxford pupils and religious disciples, he had, as all men know, embraced the doctrines of evangelical faith and experience, and passed into the enjoyment of the “new life” before either of the brothers. As an immediate consequence he had become a preacher—a preacher of extraordinary power and unbounded popularity. He, however, was in America during the early months which followed

the conversion of the brothers. Now the Wesleys, having passed through a similar experience to that of Whitefield, had, like him, become preachers. In popularity they presently became the rivals of Whitefield, while as respects decisive and permanent results, John Wesley's power as a preacher was even superior to that of Whitefield.*

In all that I have now described we see evidences of the essential change in ecclesiastical bias which had passed upon Wesley. Henceforth his dominant tendency was altogether different from what it had been before. His face was now set in an opposite direction.

Wesleyan writers take their stand here. None have shown so distinctly and fully the rigid and excessive Churchmanship of Wesley up to the date 1738. But they insist that, from that date, everything was essentially different, and that the essential difference very swiftly developed into striking results.

The High Churchman, they argue, makes salvation to be directly dependent on sacramental grace and apostolical succession. Whereas the Evangelical believer, the man who has received the doctrine of salvation by faith, as it was taught by Peter Böhler, and as it is understood by the Reformed Churches in general, learns from St. Paul that "faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the Word of God." Hence, according to his conviction, the Christian salvation—justification, regeneration, and sanctification—must be realized by means of the "truth as it is in Jesus." Truth and life are for him indissolubly associated. He cannot forget the words of the Word Himself, "Sanctify them through Thy Truth; Thy word is Truth;" and again, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life;" nor the words of St. Paul, when he speaks of himself and his fellow-workers as "by manifestation of the truth commending themselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God." It is the truth in the sacraments, according to his view, which fills them with blessing to those who receive them with faith; they are "signs and seals," eloquent symbols and most sacred pledges; but they are not, in and of themselves saturated with grace and life; they are not the only organ and vehicle through which grace flows to the members of Christ's mystical body, altogether irrespective of any divine truth apprehended and embraced by the mind and heart of the believer.

They admit that, up to 1738, Wesley had been a High Church Ritualist, but they insist that all his life afterwards he taught the Evangelical doctrine of salvation by faith; that he very soon, and once for all, discarded the "fable," as he called it, of "apostolical succession," and that he presently gave up all that is now under-

* I may be allowed here to refer to the chapter on "Wesley the Preacher," in my "Living Wesley."

ood to belong to the system, whether theological or ecclesiastical, of High Church Anglo-Catholicism. "The grave-clothes of dualistic superstition," they say, "still hung about him for a while, even after he had come forth from the sepulchre, and had, in his heart and soul, been set loose and free; and he only cast them off gradually. But the new principle he had embraced led," they affirm, "before long to his complete emancipation from the principles and prejudices of High Church ecclesiasticism."

Such language as this may seem to High Churchmen harsh, and perhaps uncharitable, but the one question really is, how far it is warranted by the history and the recorded sentiments of Wesley himself after the year 1738. Modern Wesleyans cannot be expected to be more High Church than their founder. I propose, accordingly, to show now in some detail what Wesley did actually claim and hold as to matters ecclesiastical during the half-century which followed his "conversion." Ecclesiastical claims and theories are founded on theological dogmas. We shall see how the newly-received doctrines of grace and of faith gave colour and form to the ecclesiastical principles of the founder of Methodism.

It is hard to conceive views as to the public ministry of the word, and the government and discipline of the Church, more hazardous and untenable, according to the standard of High Churchmen, than those which were maintained by John Wesley.

He held, as I will presently show, after the year 1745, that, the office of presbyter or priest and that of bishop being originally and essentially one, he, as a presbyter, had the abstract and essential right to ordain presbyters, in a new sphere—a sphere of his own creation, so to speak—if by his so doing neither he nor they whom he ordained became intruders into other communions, or trespassers within other jurisdictions. Acting on this principle, he ordained "presbyters," and even "superintendents" or bishops, for America; he ordained presbyters for Scotland; and eventually even conceived himself to be constrained and given to ordain presbyters to assist him in administering the sacraments to his own societies in England, one of his strong pleas being that the clergy in many instances would not admit his people to the Lord's Supper. Indeed there is high authority—the authority of Samuel Bradburn, one of his ablest and most eminent preachers—for saying that Wesley went so far, at the Conference of 1788, as to consecrate one of his English preachers as "superintendent," or bishop. The Methodist Conference did but extend this principle to its obvious consequences when, a few

* In Wesley's time, the senior preacher in charge was called "assistant," not as now "superintendent," and the junior preachers "helpers." "Superintendent," in Wesley's ecclesiastical nomenclature, meant "bishop;" he held, of course, that his "superintendents," or "bishops," were not in order, but only in office, distinguished from presbyters.

years after his death, those of them whom Wesley had already ordained were presumed to have the power to share their prerogatives with their brethren and partners in common charge of the societies, so that all the societies which desired it might receive the sacraments from their own preachers.

Quite as radical, indeed, as any opinion of a modern Methodist on these points, and far more startling, as coming from John Wesley, is the following passage contained in the Minutes of Conference for the year already noted, 1745 :—

“ Q. 1.—Can he be a spiritual governor of the Church who is not a believer nor a member of it ?

“ A.—It seems not : though he may be a governor in outward things by a power derived from the King.

“ Q. 2.—What are properly the laws of the Church of England ?

“ A.—The rubrics ; and to those we submit as the ordinance of man, for the Lord's sake.

“ Q. 3.—But is not the will of our governors a law ?

“ A.—No ; not of any governor, temporal or spiritual. Therefore, if any bishop wills that I should not preach the Gospel, his will is no law to me.

“ Q. 4.—But what if he produce a law against your preaching ?

“ A.—I am to obey God rather than man.

“ Q. 5.—Is Episcopal, Presbyterian, or Independent church government most agreeable to reason ?

“ A.—The plain origin of church government seems to be this. Christ sends forth a preacher of the Gospel. Some who hear him repent and believe the Gospel. They then desire him to watch over them, to build them up in the faith, and to guide their souls in the paths of righteousness.

“ Here, then, is an *Independent* congregation subject to no pastor but their own ; neither liable to be controlled in things spiritual by any other man or body of men whatsoever.

“ But soon after, some from other parts, who are occasionally present while he speaks in the name of Him that sent him, beseech him to come over to help them also. Knowing it to be the will of God, he consents, yet not till he has conferred with the wisest and holiest of his congregation, and, with their advice, appointed one or more who have gifts and grace to watch over the flock till his return.

“ If it pleases God to raise another flock in the new place, before he leaves them he does the same thing, appointing one whom God has fitted for the work to watch over these souls also. In like manner, in every place where it pleases God to gather a little flock by His Word, he appoints one in his absence to take the oversight of the rest, and to assist them of the abilities which God giveth. These are *deacons*, or servants of the church, and look on the first pastor as their common father. And all these congregations regard him in the same light, and esteem him still as the shepherd of their souls.

“ These congregations are not absolutely *independent* ; they depend on one pastor, though not on each other.

“ As these congregations increase, and as their deacons grow in years and grace, they need other subordinate deacons or helpers, in respect of whom they may be called *presbyters* or elders, as their father in the Lord may be called the bishop or overseer of them all.

“ Q. 6.—Is mutual consent absolutely necessary between the pastor and his flock ?

“ A.—No question. I cannot guide any soul unless he consent to be guided by me. Neither can any soul force me to guide him if I consent not.

“ Q. 7.—Does the ceasing of this consent on either side dissolve that relation ?

“ A.—It must, in the very nature of things. If a man no longer consent to be guided by me, I am no longer his guide : I am free. If one will not guide me any longer, I am free to seek one who will.” *

This remarkable extract contains implicitly the whole theory of Methodist government and discipline, regarded as an organization created and controlled by Wesley for the purpose of converting souls and of watching over his converts. Wesley regarded himself as a sort of bishop, his “assistants” or chief preachers in charge as quasi-presbyters, and the junior or probationary “helpers” as a sort of deacons. If he never carried out this conception thoroughly in practice and especially never conceded to his chief preachers generally the distinct status of presbyters, it was because he cherished, more or less, though with heavy doubts and misgivings, the hope that the bishops of his Church might be brought to give virtual effect to his desires, and that Methodism might become an affiliated branch of the Church of England.

It is true, indeed, and it is very singular, that even at the time he penned the remarkable extract just given, Wesley still retained some considerable relics of his ecclesiastical High Churchmanship. The date of the minute is August, 1745. On December 27th of the same year he prints in his journal a letter to his brother-in-law, Hall—a letter well known and often quoted by Churchmen—in which he upholds the doctrines of apostolical succession, and of the threefold order of the ministry. On the very next page of his journal, however, under date January 20, 1746—and no doubt the juxtaposition was calculated and intended by the journalist—he declares and publishes his definitive renunciation of these selfsame views, as the result of reading Lord (Chancellor) King’s “Account of the Primitive Church.” From this conclusion he never afterwards swerved. It is well known that in a letter to his brother Charles many years afterwards (1785) he spoke of “the uninterrupted succession” as “knowing it to be a fable, which no man ever did or can prove.”†

During his subsequent course he repeatedly speaks of himself as “a Scriptural Episcopos;” and, as we have seen, he acted on this persuasion.

In the “Disciplinary Minutes” for 1746‡ it is said that the Wesleys and their helpers may “perhaps be regarded as extraordinary messengers, designed of God to provoke the others to

* Minutes of Conference, vol. i pp. 26, 27. Last edition.

† Jackson’s Life of Charles Wesley, vol. ii. p. 395. Twenty-four years before this, in 1761, he had said the same thing in a letter to the *London Chronicle*, in reply to a tract entitled, “A Caveat against the Methodists.”—*Works*, iii. 42 (Journal, Feb. 13—20, 1761).

‡ Minutes, vol. i. pp. 30, 31.

jealousy." The following suggestive question and answer are also given in the same Minutes. "Why do we not use more form and solemnity in the receiving of a new labourer?—We purposely decline it: first, because there is something of stateliness in it; second, because we would not make haste. We desire to follow Providence as it gradually opens." The Minutes for 1747 contain the following decisive series of questions and answers:—

"Q. 6.—Does a church in the New Testament always mean a single congregation?"

"A.—We believe it does. We do not recollect any instance to the contrary.

"Q. 7.—What instance or ground is there then in the New Testament for a *National Church*?"

"A.—We know none at all. We apprehend it to be a merely political institution.

"Q. 8.—Are the three orders of bishops, priests, and deacons plainly described in the New Testament?"

"A.—We think they are; and believe they generally obtained in the churches of the apostolic age.

"Q. 9.—But are you assured that God designed the same plan should obtain in all churches throughout all ages.

"A.—We are not assured of this; because we do not know that it is asserted in Holy Writ.

"Q. 10.—If this plan were essential to a Christian church, what would become of all the foreign Reformed Churches?"

"A.—It would follow they are no parts of the Church of Christ; a consequence full of shocking absurdity.

"Q. 11.—In what age was the divine right of Episcopacy first asserted in England?"

"A.—About the middle of Queen Elizabeth's reign. Till then, all the bishops and clergy in England continually allowed and joined in the ministration of those who were not episcopally ordained.

"Q. 12.—Must there not be numberless accidental varieties in the government of various churches?"

"A.—There must, in the nature of things. For as God variously dispenses His gifts of nature, providence, and grace, both the offices themselves and the officers in each ought to be varied from time to time.

"Q. 13.—Why is it that there is no determinate plan of church government appointed in Scripture?"

"A.—Without doubt, because the wisdom of God had a regard to this necessary variety.

"Q. 14.—Was there any thought of uniformity in the government of all churches until the time of Constantine?"

"A.—It is certain there was not, and would not have been then had men consulted the Word of God only."*

So far Wesley had travelled since 1738, so thoroughly different were his views in 1747 from what they had been in 1735. So profound was the contradiction between the principles of the Oxford Methodist, and of the founder of the Methodist Connexion of societies. The former was a priest and pastor among "the

* Minutes, vol. i. p. 86. Last Edition.

schools of the prophets," devoted to the rubrics and order of his Church; the latter was an itinerant evangelist for his nation and the world, loving his National Church indeed, but regarding it as a "political institution," and always prepared to sacrifice, if it were necessary, his churchmanship to what he regarded as his higher and wider mission as a preacher and teacher of the Gospel to all men. Nearly forty years later, in 1785, in the letter to his brother Charles, lately referred to, Wesley reaffirms all that he had said in the "Minutes" I have quoted, and even speaks more decisively as to the definition and character of the Church of England.* It is true that one of his latest sermons, that on "The Ministerial Office," preached in 1790, flames with indignation against unauthorized intruders into the office of the "priesthood," whom he compares to Korah and his fellows. But it must be remembered that he regarded ordination by himself, conferred on one of his preachers, as equally valid with any that might have been bestowed by the hands of any Bishop of whatever Church. What he objected to in some of his preachers was that they had presumed to administer the sacraments when he had not appointed them. "Did we ever appoint you?" he asks in this sermon, "to administer sacraments, to exercise the priestly office?" "Where did I appoint you to do this? Nowhere at all!"

Nevertheless in 1775, writing to a Tory statesman, Wesley described himself as "a High Churchman, the son of a High Churchman;" and this fact is sometimes brought forward as evidence that he retained through life, substantially unchanged, the principles of his Oxford ritualistic churchmanship. The more, however, the question is investigated, the more untenable will any such view appear. Wesley was never a political Low Churchman. He had no Dissenting predilections or Puritan punctilios or latitudinarian laxity. He was a Tory in Church and State. But during the last forty or fifty years of his life he altogether abandoned the positive principles of High Churchmanship, both in theology and in relation to ecclesiastical government. The letter to which I have referred was, however, one in which he was justified in putting prominently forward his Toryism, as regarded from a political point of view, in order that he might the better commend the argument of his letter to the attention of a Tory statesman. He was writing to Lord North on behalf of the revolted American colonists, urging counsels to which it would have been well if the Government had listened. He was writing on a political question to a politician. Accordingly he says, "Here all my prejudices are against the

* *John Wesley's Life of Charles Wesley*, vol. ii, pp. 894-6.

Americans; for I am a High Churchman, the son of a High Churchman, bred up from my childhood in the highest notions of passive obedience and non-resistance." These words indicate the scope and bearing of the High Churchmanship of which he speaks. And yet it is curious how he goes on to illustrate, even in the political sphere, the independence and the liberal tone of his Toryism. He proceeds thus—"And yet in spite of all my long-rooted prejudices, I cannot avoid thinking, if I think at all, these, an oppressed people, asked for nothing more than their legal rights, and that in the most modest and inoffensive manner that the nature of the thing would allow."^{*}

(His actual position in regard to High Church and Low Church, to Anglicanism and Nonconformity, is very clearly indicated in the following passages. In his journal, under date Friday, March 13, 1747, he writes, "In some of the following days I snatched a few hours to read 'The History of the Puritans.' I stand in amaze; first, at the execrable spirit of persecution which drove those venerable men out of the Church, and with which Queen Elizabeth's clergy were as deeply tinctured as ever Queen Mary's were; secondly, at the weakness of those holy confessors, many of whom spent so much of their time and strength in disputing about surplices and hoods, or kneeling at the Lord's Supper."[†] In April, 1754, again, he writes, "I read Dr. Calamy's 'Abridgement of Mr. Baxter's Life.' In spite of all the prejudices of education, I could not but see that the poor Nonconformists had been used without justice or mercy, and that many of the Protestant bishops of King Charles (the Second) had neither more religion nor humanity than the Popish bishops of Queen Mary."[‡] But still more decisive, perhaps, as to the limited and modified sense in which alone Wesley could be regarded as a High Churchman, even when he described himself as such, is the following passage, written two years later than his letter to Lord North, viz., in 1777. In it he is, notwithstanding his letter of 1775, appealing to Dissenters to show loyalty to the King in the struggle then going on with the revolted colonies; and he exclaims, "Do you imagine there are no High Churchmen left? Did they all die with Dr. Sacheverell? Alas! how little you know of mankind! Were the present restraint taken off, you would see them swarming on every side, and gnashing upon you with their teeth. . . . If other Bonners and Gardiners did not arise, other Lauds and Sheldons would, who would either rule over you with a rod of iron, or drive you out of the land."[§]

^{*} Smith's History of Methodism, i. 700.

[†] Compare also what he says in his letters to "Mr. John Smith" (Archbishop Secker) and "Mr. Cartwright" and "The History of Puritans in that age" (Works, xi. 82).

[‡] Works, vi. 237.

[§] Works, xi. 132, 133.

These passages seem to settle the question as to Wesley's High Churchmanship. A Low Churchman he was not, nor would he have been in sympathy with modern Low Churchmanship, if he were living to-day. He disliked Calvinism; he loved the cathedral service. But far less would he have been in sympathy with the Romanizing Churchmanship of the present time.*

We have seen how far Wesley had travelled since 1738. The investigation which we have thus far conducted is fundamental to any correct view of the relations of Methodism to the Church of England. There are some who still hope that a violent and entire breach between Methodism and the Church of England may yet be averted. But of this there can be no hope, if the position and the principles of Wesley himself are for ever to be misunderstood. Those who at the same time summon Methodists, on the authority of their founder, to return to the fold of the Church of England, and deny to their pastors and preachers the status of ministers, both mistake the facts of the case, so far as Wesley himself was concerned, and do all that lies in their power, so far as modern Methodism is concerned, to widen separation into alienation, to harden and provoke independence into animosity and antagonism. Wesley had plans—dreams many may think them—by which he conceived that the Methodist organization, as such, might in great part have been attached to the Church of England, might have been the means of largely reviving that Church, of absorbing not a little of explicit and professed Dissent, of making the Church living and national throughout the land. He feared that, if this did not come to pass, if nothing were done by the rulers of the Church towards meeting his views, his people would, after his death, become a separate people. In his independent organization of American Methodism, he embodied in general his own ideal of an independent Methodist Church. He knew full well the mind of many of his leading preachers, headed by Dr. Coke, as to the high benefit and desirableness, if not the

(* How far Wesley was, in taste and sympathy, from that kind of Low Churchmanship which might have been described as Dissent in the wrong place, and which aimed at making the Church service and worship resemble as much as possible, in style and spirit, the service of the Calvinistic meeting-house, will be seen from the following outburst in a letter addressed, in 1778, to one of his most esteemed correspondents, Miss Bishop:—

“But to speak freely, I myself find more life in the Church prayers than in any formal extemporary prayers of Dissenters. Nay, I find more profit in sermons on either good tempers or good works than in what are vulgarly called Gospel sermons. The term has now become a mere cant word. I wish none of our Society would use it. It has no determinate meaning. Let but a pert, self-sufficient animal, that has neither sense nor grace, bawl out something about Christ or His blood, or justification by faith, and his hearers cry out, ‘What a fine Gospel sermon!’ Surely the Methodists have not so learned Christ.”—*Works*, xiii. 34.

Perhaps, on the whole, Wesley in his intermediate and indeed isolated position as a Churchman, resembled the late Archdeacon Hare, in his relation to parties in his generation, as much as any other man that might be named. But it is impossible to find a good analogy for a position which in reality was quite unique.)

necessity, of Methodism in England becoming an independent organization. But he desired to postpone such a consummation as long as possible, and to prevent it if possible; he was bent upon securing for his own Church the utmost space and opportunity for effecting an organic union with his Societies. He endeavoured so to use his influence to the last as to keep as many of his people attached to the Church as possible, and at least to preclude a separation on dissenting principles. It is wonderful how long and how far his influence has extended. Even such a policy as that represented in the pastorals of the Bishop of Lincoln, and exemplified in the outrage recently inflicted by the vicar of Owston Ferry, has not fully availed to drive Methodism to make a breach with the Church of England. It may yet be possible, by a wise and generous policy, to retain many friends in the Methodist Connexion who hold that it is well, apart from all voluntary communions, to have a liberal Protestant Established Church, or who, at all events, are opposed to a disestablishment agitation. But it is no more possible, by quoting the authority of Wesley, on the one hand to win back, than it is by petty persecutions on the other to drive back, any appreciable number of Methodists into the ranks of the Church. All that such conduct can do is to irritate and alienate at large.

In fact the principles which Wesley embraced in 1738 determined all his future course, and every step he afterwards took looked towards separation and independence, unless, in good time, Methodism could somehow be taken up into organic union with the Church of England and yet left as a system in its substantial integrity. It is evident, from the terms of the Deed Poll, by which, in 1784, he legally constituted the Conference, that Wesley contemplated the possibility of the chief ministers in some of his circuits being stationary ordained clergymen of the Church of England, with and under whom itinerant Methodist Evangelists might do the work of the "circuits." The limitation of a preacher's labours in connection with the same chapel to a period of three years as provided by that Deed does not apply, according to the terms of the Deed Poll itself, in the case of an ordained clergyman. Wesley's dream, probably, was that a number—an increasing number as years passed on—of Methodist preachers might be appointed to benefices situated respectively at the head place or in the centre of the "circuits" of Methodism, and that, living there, they might act as the chief ministers of such circuits, having unordained itinerants as their subordinate colleagues and coadjutors. The celebrated Mr. Grimshaw, vicar of Haworth, and the still more celebrated Fletcher of Madeley, did thus act as the chief ministers of Methodist circuits, and had their names as such upon the "Minutes of Conference." If this process had gone on, these or

dained Methodist clergy being members of the Conference, there might conceivably have been a Methodist order and organization within the Church of England, of which the members, distinguished by zeal and activity, might have been extending their lines and labours in all directions. I can see no necessary reason why something like this might not have taken place; the orders of the Church of Rome have done a work somewhat analogous, have had their own assemblies, their special organization and discipline, their generals. Wesley had early studied closely, and has left on record his admiration of, the genius and discipline of Loyola. And it was, perhaps, his highest desire to do, in a frank and evangelical sense and spirit, for the Church of England a work somewhat resembling what Loyola had organized with such marvellous success for the Church of Rome. Whatever, however, might have been his ideas in regard to this matter, they were not to be fulfilled; and, apart from such fulfilment, the steps he successively took were directly bent, as I have said, towards one goal—the goal of separation, of organized independency.

I may, perhaps, be allowed here to quote what I have elsewhere written on this subject, inserting a few dates.

"When (in 1739) Wesley organized a system of religious societies, altogether independent of the parochial clergy and of Episcopal control, but dependent absolutely on himself, he took a step towards raising up a separate communion, especially as the 'Rules' of his Societies contained no requirement of allegiance to the Established Church. When (in 1740) he built meeting-houses, which were settled on trustees for his own use, and began (with his brother) to administer the sacraments in these houses, a farther step was taken in the same direction. Calling out lay preachers (in 1741) wholly devoted to the work of preaching and visitation, was still a step in advance towards the same issue. The yearly conferences (begun in 1744) tended obviously in the same direction. The legal constitution of the Conference in 1784, and the provision for vesting in it [for the use of the "People called Methodists"] all the preaching places and trust property of the Connexion, was a most important measure, giving to the Union of the Societies a legally corporate character and large property rights. The ordination of ministers, even for America,* as Charles Wesley pointed out forcibly at the time, could hardly fail to conduct towards the result which Wesley had so long striven to avert—viz., the general ordination of his preachers in Great Britain. If it was necessary to ordain for America, they would plead that it was highly expedient to ordain for England. The principle was conceded, the only question was one of time and fitness as to its more extended application. The ordinations for Scotland† were refused by Wesley so long as he could refuse them with either safety or consistency. Without them his people would, in very many cases, have been left quite without the sacraments, as the Calvinistic controversy had become embittered, and Wesley and his followers were accounted heretics by the orthodox in Scotland. Nevertheless, ordaining for Scotland could not but hasten the day when preachers must be ordained for England. It was hard to require that Mr. Taylor should administer in Scotland and hold himself fort fidei, and unable to administer in England. And when at length Wesley was compelled to ordain a few ministers for England,‡ it could

* In 1784.

† In 1785.

‡ In 1787.

not but be seen that what had been done in the case of the few could not always be refused as respected their brethren at large. As little could it be expected that while for various reasons, in addition to London and Bristol [which had enjoyed this "privilege" from the beginning] more and more places were allowed to enjoy the privilege of preaching in church hours, the concession of the same privilege to other places which might desire it could be permanently denied."*

In weighing this summary of facts, Churchmen are also bound in justice to remember that it was the continued refusal of the clergy in Bristol to administer the Lord's Supper to the Methodists, and even to the Wesleys themselves, which drove them to administer it to their Societies in their own meeting-house. Similar conduct constrained Wesley to allow separate services in more and more places, and, in the end, to ordain some of his own preachers to assist him in administering the sacraments to his Societies even in England.

Much is made by many of the clergy of the injunctions which Wesley so often gave to his people down to his last days, not to separate from the Church of England. There can be no doubt that he had a passionate desire to keep them as long as possible, and as many of them as possible, within that fold; but no injunctions or entreaties on his part could change the logic of facts or alter the necessary consequences of the course he himself pursued so steadily for fifty years. Besides, his sayings on the other side were sharp and strong, and cannot but have the more weight as having been wrung from him in spite of himself, in spite of the strongest bias in the other direction. Writing to his brother Charles, Wesley says in 1755: "Joseph Cownley says, 'For such and such reasons I dare not hear a drunkard preach or read prayers.' I answer, *I dare*, but I cannot answer his reasons." And again, writing still to his brother thirty years later, in 1786, he says: "The last time I was at Scarborough I earnestly exhorted our people to go to church, and I went myself. But the wretched minister preached such a sermon that I could not in conscience advise them to hear him any more."†

It is truly said, and much stress is laid upon it, that Wesley urged his preachers and people not to hold their services in church hours. This was his rule; but it is equally true that in London and Bristol, his chief centres, the services had almost from the beginning been held in church hours, that he sanctioned many other exceptions to the rule, and that the number of exceptions increased as the years went on, until at length, in 1788, general liberty was given to hold such services wherever the people did not object, except only on sacrament Sunday. This exception was absolutely necessary, because, as a rule, Methodists could

* The Relations of John Wesley and of Wesleyan Methodism to the Church of England, pp. 59, 60.

† Works, xii. 109, 144.

only obtain the sacrament at church. As yet but few of the preachers were ordained. Wesley and Coke, Wesley's lieutenant after his brother Charles ceased to itinerate, could rarely visit any given place, and they never visited some places. Local preachers supplied the pulpit, leaders met the classes; but neither could administer the sacraments.

Wesley's views as to the Established Church were very lax. Regarded as a national Church we have seen that he defined it to be merely a political institution. He seems to have considered that every one who believed the main doctrines of the Church of England and lived a Christian life, according to his best lights and opportunities, so long as he did not consciously or deliberately dissent from that Church, was to be regarded as a member of it.* We must bear this in mind if we would understand how it was that Wesley, at the same time, earnestly desired and entreated his people generally to remain as closely as possible attached to the Church of England, and yet, whenever any usage, or customary right, or even law, of that Church seemed to come into conflict with what he regarded as the spread of evangelical truth and life, was prepared to make an entire and unhesitating sacrifice of it. He regarded the Church of England, indeed, and all belonging to it as only a means to an end. Hence, in 1755, when his brother Charles was trembling and indignant in the prospect, as he foreboded, of a speedy and organic separation of many of the preachers and of the Societies from the Church, Wesley wrote to him thus:—

“Wherever I have been in England the Societies are far more firmly and rationally attached to the Church than ever they were before. I have no fear about this matter. I only fear the preachers' or the people's leaving, not the Church, but the love of God, and inward or outward holiness. To this I press them forward continually. I dare not, in conscience, spend my time and strength on externals. If, as my Lady (Huntingdon) says, all outward Establishments are Babel, so is this Establishment. Let it stand for me. I neither set it up nor pull it down. But let you and I build up the city of God.”†

Again, still more notable are his words as follows:—

“My conclusion, which I cannot yet give up—that it is lawful to continue in the Church—stands, I know not how, without any premises to bear its weight. I know the original doctrines of the Church are sound; I know her worship is, in the main, pure and Scriptural. But if the ‘essence of the Church of England, considered as such, consists in her orders and laws (many of which I can myself say nothing for) and not in her worship and doctrines,’ those who separate from her have a far stronger plea than I was ever sensible of.”‡

Again, in 1786, writing to his brother, Wesley said, “As you

* Wesley's letter to his brother Charles in 1785, already twice referred to.

† Works, xii. 110.

‡ Works, xiii. 185-6. The date is 1755.

observe, one may leave a church (which I would advise in some cases) without leaving *the* Church. Here we may remain in spite of all wicked or Calvinistic preachers." In the same year, a month earlier, he had written, also to his brother, "Indeed, I love the Church as sincerely as ever I did; and I tell our Societies everywhere, 'The Methodists will not leave the Church, at least while I live.'" *

The limitation intimated in the last clause quoted is not without significance. But there were occasions on which Wesley contemplated the possibility of actual Dissent, even on his own part, although assuredly no alternative, no extremity could well have been more repugnant to all his tastes and feelings. The Bishop of London having excommunicated a clergyman for preaching without a license, Wesley wrote respecting this, "It is probable the point will be now determined concerning the Church, for if we must either dissent or be silent, *actum est*." "Church or no Church," again he wrote, "we must attend to the work of saving souls." †

It was at last brought to the sharp issue which Wesley dreaded—so far as many, and in the end all, of his congregations were concerned. They were obliged either to *dissent or be silent*. One of Wesley's latest letters, addressed to a bishop, relates to this subject. The Methodists found themselves forced either to register their meeting-houses as "Protestant Dissenting" places of worship, or else to forego all the protection and benefits of the Toleration Act. I give the Methodist patriarch's letter entire. He was eighty-six years old when he wrote it.

"My Lord,—It may seem strange that one who is not acquainted with your lordship should trouble you with a letter. But I am constrained to do it; I believe it is my duty both to God and your lordship. And I must speak plain, having nothing to hope or fear in this world, which I am on the point of leaving.

"The Methodists, in general, my lord, are members of the Church of England. They hold all her doctrines, attend her service, and partake of her sacraments. They do not willingly do harm to any one, but do what good they can to all. To encourage each other herein, they frequently spend an hour together in prayer and exhortation. Permit me, then, to ask, *cui bono?* For what reasonable end would your lordship drive these people out of the Church? Are they not as quiet, as inoffensive, nay, as pious as any of their neighbours, except perhaps here and there a hare-brained man who knows not what he is about? Do you ask, who drives them out of the Church? Your lordship does, and that in the most cruel manner, yea, and the most disingenuous manner. They desire a license to worship God after their own conscience. Your lordship refuses it, and then punishes them for not having a license! So your lordship leaves them only this alternative, 'Leave the Church or starve.' And it is a Christian, yea, a Protestant bishop that so persecutes his own flock. I say persecutes, for it is a persecution to all intents and purposes. You

* Works, xii. 144, 145.

† Stevens' History of Methodism, i. 303.

do not burn them, indeed, but you starve them, and how small is the difference ! And your lordship does this under colour of a vile, execrable law, not a whit better than that *De Hæretico Comburendo*. So persecution, which is banished out of France, is again countenanced in England.

“O my lord, for God’s sake, for Christ’s sake, for pity’s sake, suffer the poor people to enjoy their religious as well as civil liberty. I am on the brink of eternity. Perhaps so is your lordship too. How soon may you also be called to give an account of your stewardship to the great Shepherd and Bishop of souls ! May He enable both you and me to do it with joy ! So prays, my lord,

“Your lordship’s dutiful son and servant.” *

Thus were the Methodists compelled, against their own will, as well as sorely against the will of their founder, to become, in legal construction, Protestant Dissenters.

Nevertheless, it is remarkable how slowly the process of actual separation proceeded. The date of the letter just quoted was June 26, 1790, a few weeks before the last Conference at which Wesley presided. What effect the new condition of things might have produced on his views or conduct if he had been a younger man and had lived a few years longer, it is impossible to conjecture. He was still hoping for relief from this stringent and impolitic application of the Conventicle Act up to the date of his death. But it is certain that the Dissenting party within the Conference and among the Societies (by no means a small or feeble party) must have been stimulated and strengthened by finding themselves forced into the legal position of Dissenters. Nevertheless, the spirit of Wesley prevailed in the councils of his followers after his death to a degree which, all things considered, is really surprising.

In 1787 Wesley had said, “When the Methodists leave the Church of England, God will leave them ;” in 1788, that the “glory” of the Methodists had been “not to be a separate body,” and that “the more he reflected the more he was convinced that the Methodists ought not to leave the Church ;” in 1789, that they would “not be a distinct body ;” in 1790, that “none who regarded his judgment or advice would separate from the Church of England.” And as a matter of fact, notwithstanding the enforcement of the Conventicle Act, the Conference after Mr. Wesley’s death did not “separate from the Church of England.”

What Wesley dreaded first and most in separation was its want of charity, its schismatic temper and tendency. Many passages might be quoted to prove this. His whole soul revolted from the thought of his people deliberately, for reasons assigned, and upon a manifesto of dissent and separation, severing themselves from the Church. If there were to be separation, his determination all through life was, that the separation should be imposed

* Works, xiii. 137.


and forced upon, not sought or determined by, the Methodists. He could not but be aware, moreover, that the conscious and deliberate organization of his people into a separate Church would be in many ways a hazardous and precarious experiment. He was persuaded that the express adoption of the status and principles of a Dissenting sect would bring disorganization and ruin to Methodism.

The Conference, as I have said, after Wesley's death acted in harmony with the spirit of their founder. Even the enforcement of the Conventicle Act, the hardships of which were not removed till 1812, when Lord Liverpool passed an Act repealing the obnoxious and oppressive restrictions on the liberty of preaching, did not drive them into any extreme course. They suffered indeed, between 1791 and 1795, the peace of the Connexion to be most seriously embroiled, and allowed many of their Churches to be brought to the verge of dissolution before they consented to permit even the gradual extension of separate services in church hours and of sacramental administration by their own preachers for the members of their Societies. In giving this guarded permission they still did but follow the precedent of Wesley, and act in conformity with his spirit and principles. They never at any time decreed a separation of Methodism from the Church of England; that separation was effected by the particular Societies distributively and the individual members personally, not at all by the action or on the suggestion, but only by the permission of the Conference. The Wesleyan Conference did not in fact recognize and provide for the actual condition of ecclesiastical independency into which the Connexion had been brought until that condition had long existed; and Methodist preachers abstained from using the style and title appropriate to ordained ministers, and from assuming in any way collectively the language of complete pastoral responsibility, until by the universal action of the Connexion their people had, of their own will, practically separated themselves from the Church of England and forced their preachers into the full position and relations of pastors—pastors in common of a common flock, who recognized them alone as their ministers and amongst whom they itinerated by mutual arrangement.

Looking at the whole evidence, it appears to be undeniable that, as it has been said, so far as respects the separate development of Methodism, "Wesley not only pointed but paved the way to all that has since been done, and that the utmost divergence of Methodism from the Church of England at this day is but the prolongation of a line the beginning of which was traced by Wesley's own hand." It is idle to attempt to purge Wesley of the sin of schism in order to cast the guilt upon his followers.

It is manifestly now too late to think of the reabsorption of Methodism into the Church of England, for English Methodism is not only itself now a large and consolidated communion, but it has been the fruitful mother of many other communions—of the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States, by far the largest Protestant Church in America (perhaps in the world), and of Colonial Methodist Churches and Mission Churches almost without end,—not to mention the seceding Methodist Churches in both hemispheres. With such a family of Churches derived from itself, that parent stock of Methodism which claims direct descent from John Wesley, and which has hitherto walked more strictly in his counsels than any of the offshoot Churches, is never likely to consent to merge its own identity or annul its historical position.

JAMES H. RIGG.



THE AMERICAN BENCH.

IN 1775 Edmund Burke said of our American colonies, "In no country, perhaps, in the world is the law so general a study. All who read—and most do read—endeavour to obtain some smattering in that science." These words are still true of the United States, and have been so ever since Burke uttered them. No department of knowledge has been so widely cultivated in the States as law; we may also add that none has been cultivated with so much success. The young country has in this field of learning equalled, if not surpassed, her parent. It is not merely that America has produced forensic orators or clever legal tacticians, such as Choate and Wirt and Pinkney and Otis, and many others, living and dead, who might perhaps be named not inappropriately in the same breath with Erskine and Scarlett. She has produced a race of great judges and some scientific jurists, whose fame chiefly rests on the breadth and solidity of their learning. The scientific study of law was pursued in some of the American schools at a time when it was chiefly a matter of ridicule in this country. The United States have never wanted a succession of really learned lawyers. Foreigners may treat the greater part of American native literature as a literature of promise and attempts, rather than of mature and prosperous fulfilment; it may be said—it is perhaps too often said—that their poets and essayists are scarcely equal to the best names of contemporary English literature, and are marked chiefly by imitative excellences. But that "certain

condescension on the part of foreigners," over which Mr. Lowell has made merry, is out of the question in regard to legal literature. Very many of the classical works in jurisprudence—the authorities most frequently cited in English courts—are American. Mr. Justice Story's various treatises are as much esteemed, and as often referred to, here as on the other side of the Atlantic. Duer's work on "Marine Insurance" is still perhaps the ablest among a crowd of competitors. Mr. Sedgwick's treatise on the "Measure of Damages" discusses the subject in a higher philosophical region and with wider erudition than is the case with any English work; and it would be difficult to point, in the whole range of legal literature, to works of greater learning than Chancellor Kent's "Commentaries," or Dr. Parsons' "Law of Contracts." What works (always excepting those of Austin and Bentham) are characterized by more originality than those of Livingston, who prepared the Criminal Code of Louisiana? What works show greater knowledge of case law than those of Mr. Justice Story? It is a rather surprising circumstance that in a country where law libraries are rare, and, with a few exceptions, far from complete, where the oldest reports do not go back much further than a century,* where few endowments exist for the purpose of encouraging the scientific study of law, an unfailing succession of erudite works should appear. It is equally surprising that this literature should be marked, even at a time when the memory of the struggle for independence was still fresh, by a curious veneration for the traditions and decisions of Westminster Hall. "Shut your ports against our Common Law as you would shut them against the plague," said Bentham to our colonists; but they did not heed such exhortation. They would not put up with the political institutions of England; why were they so curiously tenacious in their attachment to the bulk of her laws? It is not merely that the legal literature of America has been marked by great ability; a line of judges, of whom any country might be proud, has never been wanting in the Supreme Court and in the tribunals of some of the New England States. Few of them may have possessed the ripe classical culture of certain English judges; we can recall none with accomplishments like those of Baron Alderson, who delighted to turn off translations or adaptations of Anacreon, or versify favourite morsels of the Anthology. None of them have been erudite lawyers in the sense in which Pothier and D'Aguesseau, and several other French magistrates, were erudite. But a large number of the Chief Justices and Associate Judges have been men of wide legal knowledge, with a marked genius for the study of law.

* The first case in Dallas' Reports is dated 1754. It is in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Only a few cases decided before the Revolution are reported. The Maryland Reports, it is true, begin at 1700.

De Tocqueville was struck when he visited the United States with the influence possessed by lawyers; he saw in the circumstance much political significance; he spoke of them as "the most powerful, and perhaps the only, counterpoise to the democratic element."* No one can, indeed, help noting the important part played by them in public life. Perhaps a fourth or fifth of the members of Congress have been lawyers. Most of the chief statesmen, Northern and Southern, at one time or other were lawyers by profession; this is true of almost all the Presidents and Vice-Presidents.† Now, how comes it to pass that so much of the intellectual life of the country has flowed into this channel? Why is it that the theory and practice of law have been pursued with so much eagerness and success in America? The bias of the American mind to legal investigations and to the legal profession is undoubted; what is the explanation of it?

I put these questions, and leave the full discussion of them to others better acquainted than I am with the United States. At the same time, some considerations which probably enter into the true explanation may here be suggested. In the early days of the United States the lawyers comprehended most of the men of culture, certainly most of those who had any skill in speech. It

* See the same idea developed by Mr. Choate, perhaps the ablest of American advocates, in his address to the Law School at Cambridge, on the "Position and Functions of the American Bar, as an element of Conservatism in the State."

† The following story, told me by a valued friend, well-informed and accurate, at once illustrates what is said in the text, and mentions an event in President Lincoln's life not stated, so far as I know, by any biographer:—

"An important patent case (McCormick's Reaper) was to be tried; Mr. Harding of Philadelphia was retained on one side by a Mr. Watson, who had the management of the case on that side. Harding wished Mr. E. M. Stanton engaged to lead in the case, who was older in the profession than himself; Harding being especially a *patent* lawyer. The next step was to retain a lawyer in Illinois: the list of that State was looked over, and a particular man was selected. But it was found he could not be had. Then Abraham Lincoln's name was canvassed; he had occasionally had to do with patent cases. Mr. Watson made a journey to Springfield, Illinois, to see him and decide. He arrived after dark—was directed to a two-story frame-house; knocked; a window above was opened. Mr. Lincoln was engaged—could not be seen. 'Oh! but,' said Watson, 'I have come all the way from the East to consult with him about an important case.' There was a pause; and the voice said Mr. Lincoln would come down. He did descend; received Mr. Watson in his shirt-sleeves—he had been putting up a bedstead. Mr. Watson conferred with him, and reported he thought he would do. He was accordingly engaged. Watson, Stanton, Harding, and Lincoln, went at the appointed time to Cincinnati where the case was to be tried before the United States Circuit Court. They met at the hotel. Lincoln's appearance was uncouth, and Stanton especially was disturbed by it. 'Suppose we go up to the Court in a gang,' said Lincoln. Stanton made no reply, but walked off with Harding. In the Court-room Lincoln's appearance caused remark, and Reverdy Johnson, who was engaged on the other side, thought he could gain something by making sure of a speech from his uncouth opponent; he accordingly, addressing the Court, said he hoped that all of the counsel on the other side would speak; that although but two counsel were engaged on his (Johnson's) side, that need not prevent the three from speaking on the other side. Stanton instantly saw what Reverdy Johnson was aiming at, and sprang to his feet. He was much obliged to his learned friend for the interest he showed in their management of their case; but they preferred to direct it themselves. There would only two speak on that side. Accordingly, Stanton opened, and then Harding spoke for three days. Lincoln did not speak. That side won; and the fee Lincoln received was the money he used in stamping Illinois, in 1859, against Douglass. Stanton became Secretary of War, Watson Assistant Secretary; Harding was offered office, but declined."

was usual for any ambitious young American lawyer at the end of last century to visit England; there the alumnus of Harvard heard the great Parliamentary orators, took notes under Mansfield, saw the world, and came back with ideas wider than those of his home-staying contemporaries. This was the mode in which Jared Ingersoll, and William Rawle, and Tilghman, and Rutledge, and many others trained themselves to be accomplished advocates. The clergy of the time were not learned; the medical profession offered few inducements to scientific study; journalism was in its infancy; half a century ago almost all the persons whose avocations carried them into liberal studies were lawyers. But there were other reasons for this peculiarity. The wide range of large and novel problems in jurisprudence which it fell to the Courts, and especially the Supreme Court in its early days, to solve, could scarcely fail to educate a race of accomplished lawyers. No Court was ever called upon to adjudicate upon more important points—points, too, upon which the file of precedents of the Common Law threw feeble light—than the Supreme Court during Chief Justice Marshall's long term of office. It was not merely matters affecting private rights which came before him and his successors. Under the guise of technical questions, large political issues have often been raised in that Court; the Dred Scott case, bringing into sharp relief the position of slavery in the States, and decided upon a demurrer to a plea in abatement, is but a sample of many. The Supreme Court has been always armed with large powers, such as perhaps belonged to no other tribunal. The fact that, to quote the words of Chief Justice Chase, "acts of Congress not made in pursuance of the Constitution are not laws," and that the legislation of the various States is subject to review in the Supreme Court, necessitates the frequent discussion before it of abstruse constitutional questions. Clay and Webster discussed the very same questions before the bench of the Supreme Court as they did in the Senate; the arguments which they employed were to a large extent the same—arguments drawn from the region of political speculation; arguments taken more frequently from the *Federalist* than from the Year Books or legal reports. Webster's much-admired and famous argument in the Dartmouth College case makes excursions into domains far outside municipal law. The arguments of Wirt, Webster, and Pinkney in the case of "McCulloch v. the State of Maryland," which established the right of the Federal Government to incorporate the Bank of the United States, and laid it down that the individual States could not tax its branches, were abstract disquisitions upon the nature of Federal government, the origin of corporations, and the true theory of taxation. We may say that until the outbreak of the Civil War all the great political discussions occupying the public mind moved along legal

lines, and that the Supreme Court was almost as much the arena of political disputes as Congress itself. All the questions respecting slavery and State rights which were ultimately brought to the sharp issue of battle were debated before Marshall, Story, and Taney. It is no wonder that Americans sometimes speak of the Supreme Court, the forum of such discussions, in rather inflated terms, and that they are apt to think it "the highest tribunal on earth—a tribunal more august than the Amphictyonic Council."* Whether these considerations sufficiently explain the interest and avidity with which legal studies have been pursued in America, and the fact that so much of the genius of the country has flowed into that channel, I do not know; but it is certain that the study of law has always offered rare opportunities to ambition; that it has naturally attracted members of the cultivated class; that it has combined the inherent attractions of a legal career with those which are peculiar to politics.

It is to be feared that most Englishmen form their notions of the American Bench from unfavourable and unfair specimens of it. They have heard much of Judge Barnard and Judge McCunn. They are persuaded that it is not impossible or extraordinary for a wealthy client to "keep" a judge, and to purchase an injunction at pleasure. The scandals connected with the unreformed New York Bench acquired world-wide fame: it was not always borne in mind by commentators upon these scandals that the men who disgraced the Bench were exceptions, and the product of a mode of election really alien to the constitution of the United States. The newspapers tell us about the rough-and-ready procedure and unjudicial language in vogue in Western tribunals. It is not often made matter for inquiry whether the judges of American comic literature are exceptions, and whether casual extravagances on the part of some so-called "judges" might not be paralleled by the behaviour of our lawless Unpaid or absurd Coroners. Few critics care to distinguish between the judges of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts, the true equivalents of the Superior Judges of this country, and the members of inferior State Courts; and the consequence is perhaps a prejudice against the American Bench such as is not justified by a fair comparison. Americans resent, and not without cause, these assumptions and criticisms. They are proud of many of their judges; they are apt to think these harsh judgments a proof of "effete" insularity and ignorance. I do not intend to examine the matter in any thorough way; I merely propose to show that they have good grounds for their pride, and to call attention to some honourable peculiarities of the American Bench.

The greatest judicial name of America is no doubt that of Chief

* Preface to second volume of 8th Circuit Reports.

Justice Marshall, the fourth Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The friend and biographer of Washington, Marshall was not unlike him in many ways. In temperament, opinions, and general turn of mind, they resembled each other; both were cautious, cold in demeanour, manly and unostentatious in all their habits, conservative in their instincts, firm upholders of what may be called the non-democratic side of the American Constitution, men of blameless integrity. Both are regarded with almost equal veneration by cultivated Americans. Marshall was the son of a Virginian gentleman. He served with distinction as an officer in the War of Independence; he enjoyed Washington's confidence and friendship; he was offered various high offices, diplomatic and others. He at last found his true place, when in 1801 he was appointed Chief Justice, as successor to Oliver Ellsworth. It does not appear that, previous to his elevation to the Bench, he had much time to devote to the study of law; he was too much immersed in military and political affairs; his early life was altogether too stirring to permit of his being a widely read and learned lawyer at the time when he was raised to the Bench. But his own native powers supplied any lack of book learning. He was a born judge—a man who, it has been well said, would have been Chief Justice anywhere. He discovered and followed out juridical conceptions as naturally and unerringly as some men excogitate geometrical conceptions. He was not affected by extra-judicial influences. His mind travelled instinctively towards truth along the recognized highways of jurisprudence. Its laboured maxims were the expressions of his own natural way of looking at things. Subtle, orderly in his manner of thought, and master of a precise style, he was in many ways a model judge. He never became a great case lawyer, though he had time in the thirty-four years during which he sat on the Bench to read extensively; he rarely cited authorities, and his judgments, as reported in *Cranch* and *Howard*, present in this respect a marked contrast to those of his erudite colleague, Mr. Justice Story. To some extent, no doubt, his fame is due to the rare opportunity which was given him. Perhaps no court ever had, or ever again will have, so important and varied duties to perform. This was inevitable under the Constitution of the United States, which invested the Supreme Court with peculiar powers—powers so peculiar that most Englishmen find a slight difficulty in conceiving it possible for any tribunal to possess them. In England Parliament says the last word in all political questions. It can decide what is, and what is not, constitutional at will; there are no legal limitations to its authority. But the theory of the American Constitution is quite different and less democratic; neither Congress nor the State Legislatures are supreme; “the will of the people,

as declared in the Constitution, is the first law ;” and it is the business of the Supreme Court to construe that Constitution, and to declare whether any impugned law is in conformity with it. This Court was therefore the judge of Parliaments. It was necessarily appealed to in many political struggles. Minorities that had been defeated in the Legislatures and at the ballot-boxes often sought for an ally in the Supreme Court. Obviously a position of this kind was of a very delicate character. No one in truth could fill it with universal satisfaction, and Marshall’s judgments affecting constitutional points gave much offence to Jefferson and his followers ; but we may well doubt whether it was possible to arbitrate in this difficult position with more discreetness and unoffending firmness than Chief Justice Marshall displayed. If a Court was to be invested with wide and anomalous powers, such as those given by the Constitution, he was born to be its leader. To state all the important decisions in which he took part would be to review the many volumes of *Cranck’s* and *Howard’s* reports, in which his decisions are contained, and I need not say that this is out of the question. But some of his chief judgments may be referred to. It fell to him to decide many momentous constitutional questions. He had frequently to repel the invasions of the States Legislatures into what he conceived to be matters outside their jurisdiction. It was he more than any other man—perhaps Hamilton alone excepted—who formed the creed of Americans in the mould of the *Federalist* with respect to the meaning of the Constitution. “The common consent of your countrymen has admitted you,” said Justice Story, “to stand without a rival in constitutional law.” There is no doubt also, as one high authority says, that “the Constitution of the United States owes as much to Marshall as to any single mind for the foundations on which it rests, and the exposition by which it is to be maintained.” It was he who in his judgments in “*Marbury v. Madison*” and the “*Bank of Hamilton v. Dudley’s Lessees*,” first emphatically and clearly laid down the doctrine that the Constitution is not to be overridden or disregarded by State legislation. It fell to him to determine many novel points of private jurisprudence. For instance, in one famous case he had to determine the nature of the rights of the Indians in the lands which they occupied and their capacity to give valid grants : in a luminous review of the whole subject he

* Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, p. 4. See also Sedgwick on Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law, p. 125, where the author seeks to show that according to old legal conceptions, the English Parliament was under similar restraints. Of course, the Privy Council is sometimes obliged to decide questions resembling those which come before the Supreme Court—e.g. when it is called upon to decide whether the respective provinces of the Parliament of Canada and of the local legislatures have been observed, and, as Mr. Justice Markby points out in his “*Philosophy of Law*,” p. 2, the Indian Courts, in determining the legality of acts of the Governor-General’s Council, are obliged to exercise functions akin to those of the Supreme Court at Washington.

decided that the Indians had only "a right of occupancy," and that they could not give titles. A somewhat similar question arose in the case of the "Cherokee Nation v. the State of Georgia." The Cherokees had filed a bill for the purpose of preventing the carrying out of certain laws passed by the State of Georgia, and this novel suit led to a discussion of the legal status of the Indian tribes, the conclusion being that they were "domestic, dependent nations" in a state of tutelage. The maritime wars carried on during his term of office led to a discussion of many interesting and delicate questions: difficulties with respect to salvage, capture and recapture, the immunity of foreign vessels in American waters, required the display of great judicial ability; and Marshall was equal to the task. All his decisions on points of maritime law are received with respect, but probably he showed himself to most advantage in connection with constitutional law. His opinions were clear and decided; his bias was a desire to maintain in all its integrity the doctrines of the Constitution, which he regarded as "a bill of rights for the people of each State."

It may be doubted, however, whether all his judgments were wise and have been beneficial; and with reference to one of them, full of immense consequences to the community, a distinct reservation must be made. The tenth section of the Constitution of the United States declares any law to be unconstitutional which impairs the validity of a contract. In one case which came before the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall gave this provision a very wide interpretation. A grant of land had been made by the State of Georgia, and by subsequent legislation on the part of the same State this grant was interfered with. By an artificial process of reasoning—containing, as it seems to me, the same fallacy as that which lies at the root of Rousseau's "*Contrat Social*"—Marshall arrived at the conclusion that a grant was really a contract—an executed contract—and that any interference with it was open to the objection of being such an interference with contracts as was deprecated by the Constitution. The consequences of this doctrine were not in the particular case very alarming or serious; but the true nature of the decision began to come to light in the discussion of the Dartmouth College case. A certain Dr. Wheelock had endowed Dartmouth College in New Hampshire, and a charter of incorporation had been granted by the Crown to the College in 1769. The Legislature of New Hampshire passed various acts to amend the charter and enlarge and improve the constitution of the College. When the matter came before the Supreme Court, it decided, in accordance with the reasoning of the Chief Justice in the case previously mentioned, that the Act passed by the New Hampshire Legislature was unconstitutional and null. The evil results involved in this decision did not for some time

become fully apparent; the judges who were parties to it had in their eyes chiefly colleges and schools, and believed that they were merely protecting the pious founder. They did not foresee a time when their artificial construction of the Constitution would be used by railway companies and industrial corporations as an answer to all proposals to touch or alter pernicious monopolies. Charters granted thoughtlessly or with little regard to the interests of future ages, and perhaps from corrupt motives, were crystallized by this decision. Monopolies affecting whole cities, nay, States, were handed over to corporations; and in a young country vested interests came to be treated with a degree of tenderness unknown here. The State Courts have tried to evade or attenuate the effect of the Dartmouth decision, and the Grangers' agitation is partly directed towards mitigating some of its evil consequences.

Taney, the next Chief Justice, was in every way Marshall's inferior. He was not so learned. He never acquired the ascendancy over the Associate Judges which Marshall exercised; sitting along with McLean and Curtis and Nelson, he was far from *facile princeps*; and the want of unity and the tendency to dissent, which has always been a defect of the Supreme Court, became painfully evident in his time. Under Taney the tendency of the Court to ventilate political opinions in legal judgments became too visible. The Dred Scott case did much to shake confidence in the impartiality of the tribunal; the opinions of the majority were too obviously coloured by their Southern bias. Still Taney had many judicial virtues. Painstaking, acute, attentive to counsel's arguments, courteous, and possessed of dignified simplicity of manners, he might, in calmer times and in a less elevated station, have been remembered as a remarkably good judge. He overcame the prejudices of many who believed that he was elected as a political partisan and from his fitness to be "the pliant instrument" of General Jackson. He was not a Mansfield or a Marshall, as his Southern admirers would make him out to be. But he did nothing consciously to squander or impair the good name of the Court over which he presided. There was much in Taney that was attractive. I know few autobiographies more interesting than the simple pages in which he describes his early life in Maryland, his school adventures, his fox-hunting, his legal education, and his contemporaries. Every sentence impresses you with the idea of the truthfulness of the man. One who knew him well describes him in his early days as "an open and fair practitioner," and his candour did not cease when he was transferred to the Bench.

Then came Chase. Like Taney he had been Secretary of the Treasury. He was perhaps more a financier than a lawyer. He had not time or opportunity to build up a great judicial reputa-

tion. He came late to the bench. I do not recall any judgment of much ability or importance, unless perhaps the judgment which he delivered in the legal tender cases—"Hepburn v. Griswold"—and in which he pronounced against the legality of a measure with which his name is inseparably connected.

These are only a few of the ornaments of the American Bench. I might mention Justice Story, Chancellor Kent, Chief Justice Shaw, and Mr. Redfield as men who might have adorned any English tribunal. They, however, are here known by their writings and otherwise, and I pass them by in order to say one word of a judge whose name is too little known outside America, but who seems to have been in every way a memorable judge. One of the dissentients from the view of the majority in the Dred Scott case was Mr. Benjamin R. Curtis, of Massachusetts, brother of another well-known lawyer. His judgment, marked by singular ability, was generally accepted as the best statement of the arguments of those who believed that a person of African descent might be a citizen, and that the restrictions imposed on the spread of slavery by the Missouri Compromise were constitutional. That judgment was much read, and is still remembered, in England. Its acuteness and learning won for it high encomiums. The Abolitionist party, not without reason, regarded it as unanswerable. It is only one of many similar judgments pronounced by Mr. Justice Curtis.*

Many things connected with the American Bench strike the English lawyer as odd. No one in this country who has filled a judicial office thinks of returning to the bar after he has retired from judicial life; perhaps only one exception could be named, the case of Mr. Winslow, who was Commissioner in Bankruptcy, and who after the abolition of his post returned to practice. In America, however, this is quite a common occurrence. Men serve their time of office, and then return to practise in the Courts over which they presided, or, like Parker, Chief Justice of New Hampshire, become law lecturers. Again, in this country no judge thinks of editing the law reports of his own Court; but this is quite common in America. The Bench and the bar are in many respects not so sharply divided as is the case here.

There are frequent complaints about the delay in the course of justice in the Supreme Court. It is said to be not uncommon for causes not to come on for hearing for one or two years. Perhaps a still more unfortunate peculiarity of the Court is its proneness to deliver judgments from which a large minority of members dissent—a peculiarity which, it is needless to say, strips the decisions of the Court somewhat of that moral weight which ought to characterize the decisions

* See reports of First Circuit from 1851 to 1856.

of a final tribunal. To show how frequent are the judicial differences, I may state that in nineteen cases taken at random from "Wallace's Reports" I find only eleven in which the judgment of the Court was adopted by all the judges; in one case a member of the Court who agreed with its decision differed as regards the reasons; in the remaining seven cases there were dissents. It is needless to say that this indicates a state of matters not paralleled, in recent times at all events, in the history of our final Court of Appeal. Perhaps Englishmen will feel that the most unsatisfactory feature of the judgments of the Supreme Court is the rhetorical and exalted style in which they are occasionally expressed. We miss the simple lucidity marking the best English judicial styles—that of Lord Westbury and Mr. Justice Willes, for example. A slight love of gaudy ornaments is too often discernible. It was said of Dexter, a famous American lawyer, that in a certain trial for murder his junior "confined his reasoning to the law strictly; Dexter soared beyond it all, and reasoned upon that code of honour which God had written upon the heart of man." This is a sentence descriptive of some judges as well as of Dexter. The American Bench perhaps "soars" rather too high and too often. As regards more essential things, knowledge of law in particular, it would be rash to make any sweeping statements; but I may say that the best American judges appear to show an aptitude and willingness to develop the principles of the Common Law so as to meet the exigencies of modern commerce. Two examples closely allied occur to me. While the English Law Courts have laid down subtle, if not conflicting, principles with respect to the transfer of delivery orders, difficult for merchants to comprehend, the American Courts have gone far to lay down the clear intelligible principle that delivery orders pass the property in the goods to which they relate whenever it is impossible or impracticable to pass the goods themselves. Again, while the English Courts have been indisposed or reluctant to develop the rigid rules of the Common Law with respect to negotiable documents, the Supreme Court has always shown extreme readiness to make these rules conform to commercial usages and convenience.


The Constitution requires the various Federal judges to be appointed by the President, with the consent and advice of the Senate; and, like English judges, they hold their offices *quamdiu se bene gesserint*. On the other hand, there is great diversity in the mode of appointment and status of the judges of the State Courts. Sometimes the nomination is in the hands of the Governor and Senate, sometimes in those of the Legislature; and in some States, where the principles of Jefferson, as opposed to those of the *Federalist*, on the subject of judicial appointments have acquired

ascendency, there is what Horace Binney called "a leasehold elective tenure." The Revised Constitution of the State of New York, adopted in 1846, made eight years the term of office of judges of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.

On the whole, the Bench of the United States is an institution of which they have good reason to be proud. There may have been exceptional instances of corruption or incapacity—what country has not suffered such humiliation? English lawyers may be struck, and perhaps offended, by a tendency on the part of the American Bench to air the gleanings of discursive reading, indulge in ambitious talk, or, as it has been euphemistically expressed, to dwell "among questions of the first magnitude." Perhaps American judges are too fond of aiming at higher qualities than accuracy and precision; loose scraps of poetry, and snatches of *nisi prius* eloquence, are introduced too frequently to satisfy one whose notions of judicial propriety have been moulded on the style of the English Bench. But these are partial and superficial defects. Good sense and accuracy, a strong desire to make technical rules bend to meet the requirements of modern life, and yet a veneration of the Common Law, are the chief characteristics of the American Bench.

Had all the States remained faithful to the principles governing judicial appointments propounded by Hamilton, and never listened to the sophisms of Jefferson, none of them would have verified, in shame and humiliation, Marshall's saying that "the greatest scourge an angry heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and sinning people was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent judiciary."

JOHN MACDONELL.



EASTERN AFFAIRS AT THE CLOSE OF THE SESSION.

TWO months ago I tried, by an article in this REVIEW, to call the attention of my countrymen to the innumerable difficulties which environ those who seek to "solve the Eastern Question" and to point out—

1. That no "solution" could ever be arrived at by cut and dried formulas about Ottoman barbarism or the duty of Christian nations to "balayer les Turcs."

2. That the so-called "Eastern Question" is a tangled skein made up of numerous threads, each of which must be patiently unravelled by him who attempts to "solve it."

3. That no one in this country, including the authorities at the Foreign Office, possesses the necessary information to unravel these threads.

4. That the Foreign Office should take steps to be better informed, and that we should all meanwhile, as far as possible, keep our minds in an anti-anti-Turk and an anti-anti-Christian attitude.

I propose on the present occasion briefly to review the recent debates on the subject, to examine how far the events which have occurred during the last few weeks in the Eastern Peninsula have thrown any light upon the future, and to notice various matters of collateral interest.

The discussions relative to the "Eastern Question," with which I mean to deal, fall into two groups.

The first comprises the debate of July 31st on Mr. Bruce's

motion; that in the Lords the same night, the conversation which took place subsequently to these in the House of Commons upon the Bulgarian atrocities, and the debate of August 11th introduced by Mr. Ashley.

The second comprises the discussions relating to Mr. Cave's mission and the purchase of the Suez Canal shares.

And first of Mr. Bruce's motion.

The speech of the member for Portsmouth showed a long acquaintance with the subject, and although his experience had been gained from a Turkish standpoint, no fair advocate of the interests of the non-Turkish part of the Sultan's subjects had any reason to complain of his mode of statement.

On re-reading his speech, all of which I heard, I note, as especially worthy of consideration, his observations about the inconveniences caused by the multiplication of small weak states.

The whole tendency of things, as Niebuhr long ago pointed out, is, in these latter days, towards the massing of men in great bodies. The planet itself has, for all practical purposes, become much smaller since those of us who have passed middle life have lived upon it, and to fill the Eastern Peninsula with half-a-dozen Servias, heartily hating each other and ready to go to war at a moment's notice, would be but a poor improvement of the present state of things.

Again, Mr. Bruce did good service by reminding people that talk about driving the Mussulman out of Europe is not only wicked but dangerous talk. Any attempt to perpetrate such an iniquity is, of course, out of the question; but if it once gets into the heads of the Mussulman world that there is an idea of attempting it, Heaven help the scattered Christian communities in Western Asia!

Further, Mr. Bruce did well in pointing out the cruel commercial position of the provinces of Turkey which are cut off from the Adriatic by the long line of Dalmatia. Many reasons would induce us to wish to see them united to Austria, and I believe that the annexationist feeling at Vienna has been rather on the increase in the last few weeks; but the objections to such a course, some of which I pointed out in the pages of the *CONTEMPORARY*, are obviously extremely great.

Very good, too, was the illustration of the credibility of the reports coming from Eastern Europe, which Mr. Bruce gave us on the authority of the late Mr. Finlay, whose books so much deserve re-perusal at the present juncture.

Mr. Finlay took the pains to examine carefully the news from Crete, and found that well-nigh *seven million Turks* had lost their lives in the insurrection which took place in that island, if, that is, the Greek bulletins could be believed!

Valuable also was the reminder that the Softas had shown no signs, in their famous demonstration, of wishing for exclusive advantages for their co-religionists. This is really an important fact, when we remember who these Softas are and what has been their up-bringing—a matter in connection with which the following passage from Mr. Palgrave deserves attention:—

“No traveller through the inlands of the Levant but must have met on his way more than one band of these thinly-clad, pale-faced youths, wending slowly on their long foot journey to some distant but renowned centre of learning, half pilgrims, half beggars, and more than half starved and wearied out. ‘There is no god but God; I bear witness that there is no god but God,’ lay gasping one whom we ourselves once, on a hot summer day among the dusty hills of Southern Anatolia, found by the road-side dying of sheer exhaustion, amid half-a-dozen companions, travelling students like himself, unable to afford him any help but the support of their own lean arms and the repeated assurance of Paradise. One of our attendants hastened to fill a leathern cup from a neighbouring fountain, and put it to the mouth of the lad, if that might revive him. ‘There is no god but God,’ repeated he, as the water he vainly tried to swallow trickled back from his lips. A few instants later he was dead. We rode on to give the news at the nearest village, and in its cemetery he now rests.”

Mr. Bruce's temperate remarks were followed by a very spirited speech from Mr. Hanbury, one of the most rising men in his party, who would, I imagine, have been much less Turkish in tone if he had not felt indignant at the scant justice which his clients sometimes receive. He was of use in calling attention to the fact that the Circassians, who were but yesterday the pets of Europe, the patriotic defenders of their country against the ambition of Russia, had made themselves an intolerable nuisance in Asiatic Turkey, and had acted only according to their nature in making themselves odious in Bulgaria. It was good, too, that we should be reminded that Turkish fanaticism, when the Turk is left alone, takes a far less active shape than other fanaticism does in a good many countries of the West, and that the question is in most parts of Turkey not a question between religions, but between rich and poor. The book which has just been published by Mr. Evans, son of the distinguished geologist, who travelled across the Eastern Peninsula, from Brod on the Save to the Adriatic, passing by Serajevo and Mostar, just as the Bosnian insurrection was breaking out, should be looked at for many reasons, and not least for the light which it throws on the cruel oppression practised towards the poorer Christians by the Greek clergy in Bosnia.

The evil influence of these ecclesiastics, and others like them, is a thing to be constantly kept in view if we wish to use a just measure in these countries. The Christian communities in Turkey constitute so many little theocracies, managing their own affairs to a very great extent, untroubled by the Turk, who says to

himself, according to the old story, "If hog eat dog, or dog eat hog, what matter is it to the Sublime Porte?"

The waves of oppression would chafe far over the heads of their humbler members if it were not for the oppression of their own bishops and rich men.

Surely, however, Mr. Hanbury made a slip of the tongue when he spoke of the Austrian Slavs as homogeneous.

Poles and Ruthenians, Slovacks and Croats, Czechs and Servians, with so many more! In what sense are they homogeneous?

Then, again, he mentioned as the result of his experience in a recent journey, that no Slav in Turkey suffered worse treatment at the hands of the Mohammedan Government than the Slavs in Hungary endure under Austro-Hungarian rule. That seems to me a statement requiring great confirmation.

I thought that, in spite of the struggle between the Hungarian Government and the *Omladina*, we had at least got a long way past the deadly hatreds of the year 1848-49 which were reflected in the proclamation, truly or falsely, attributed to Damjanich, an Austrian Servian who had taken the Hungarian side, and who in marching against his countrymen expressed himself in the following language, which I have always thought a model of completeness in its kind: "I come to sweep you from the face of the earth one and all—utterly; and when I have done so I mean to put a bullet through my own head that there may not be a Servian left in the land of the living."*

The divergence of interest and temper between the Magyar, the Slav, and the Rouman in Hungary must always be very great, and will, but too probably, one of these days cause grievous calamities in that country, which has already endured so many; but I must hope that in using the strong language he did, Mr. Hanbury was looking for a moment through *Frondeur* spectacles.

Sir H. Drummond Wolff objected to the discrepancies, which existed between the statements made by a leading personage of his own party, out of doors, and the papers presented to Parliament.

"The same course had been taken," he said, "with regard to the Suez Canal Shares.

"We were told at one time that a great political act had been performed, and at another it was said to be a mere purchase of shares."

The same point of the Janus-like character of the foreign policy of the Government—Lord Derby giving one version of its conduct

* Another story by the way, equally true or untrue I dare say, but more creditable to this commander, lingers in my memory from those days, to the effect that when some one was led out before him for execution, at Arad, he said, "Sonst war ich doch immer der Erste!"

and the Premier another—was pressed from the Liberal Benches by Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, but Sir H. Drummond Wolff is a Conservative.

Mr. Gladstone at great length explained the origin and results of the last struggle with Russia, did a most useful work in recalling the real history of the phrase “drifting into war,” which I (and I fancy most of his hearers) had utterly forgotten, and came, while showing much sympathy, which all Liberals must feel, for the Slavs of Turkey, to the following conclusion :—

“I am not ashamed to say that I desire the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire. I do not see how, if that is broken up, we can avoid very serious difficulties and dangers. On the other hand, I believe that if we can get rid of the difficulties of local administration by a power which is wholly incompetent to conduct it, especially from Constantinople, we attain the very practical object of good government. Gentlemen have spoken of the formation of a Southern Slav State, *but depend upon it it is much more easily said than done. And if it were established it would be found to raise up a new set of difficulties and dangers.* Within these limits, to which I think there is no inconsiderable approximation among the various speakers in this house, I most earnestly hope that her Majesty’s Government may be able to discover a solution of this question—a solution which may have the effect of giving us the consolatory assurance that all our efforts and sacrifices made at the time of the Crimean War were not made in vain—a solution which may adjourn, perhaps, for a long time the raising of a greater question as to the presence of the Turkish Power in Europe, which we feel to be fraught with serious and grave considerations of uncertainty, and perhaps of danger; and a solution which above all may afford to a population that has suffered long and suffered much a hope of gaining at length the benefits of rational government and civilized life.”

The Prime Minister wholly failed to show that he and Lord Derby had given the same account of the same transactions, but the most interesting part of his speech was that in which he indicated the real reasons why the fleet was sent to Besika Bay.

For a fuller explanation of the possibilities of mischief which were present to the mind of the Cabinet, we shall doubtless have to wait till the interest of these transactions has passed away.

Lord Hartington wound up the debate in a speech marked by his usual moderation, in which he very correctly represented the general sentiments of those members of the Liberal party who are not very far gone in anti-Turkish enthusiasm.

Meanwhile a similar discussion had been going on in the House of Lords, in which Lord Granville had no difficulty in justifying the wise alteration in the Treaty of 1856 with reference to the Black Sea, and maintained that even Lord Palmerston had treated its neutralization as merely a temporary arrangement.

His general views as to the future were summed up in the following words :—

“I entirely approve the noble Earl’s policy of non-intervention and of

his at the same time not binding himself to non-intervention in any possible contingencies. I approve his taking no steps to destroy the Treaty of 1856 or to accelerate the fall of the Ottoman Empire. If all Europe were agreed, it would not be an easy task to settle the problem of what should take its place. With the different ambitions and interests that exist, to attempt to do so in anticipation of events would be full of danger. On the other hand, I trust that he will hasten rather than delay the moment when Europe, in concert, can by diplomatic action put an end to a state of things which is fatal for the Christians, ruinous to the Turks, and which the longer it lasts may the more readily give rise to European complications ; and in any such arrangements I trust that every care will be taken to secure the welfare and good government of our fellow religionists in Turkey. Where the inhabitants of a province are chiefly Christians there can be no real difficulty in allowing them a share of government subject to the sovereignty of the Porte. Where the races are more equal in number the difficulty is great, but ought not to be insuperable."

The most important sentences of Lord Derby's reply were those in which he pointed out that Lord Granville seemed rather to underrate these difficulties. If the positions of the two speakers had been reversed—if Lord Granville had been at the Foreign Office and Lord Derby had been leading a Conservative Opposition—they would probably have made each other's speeches. There is hardly a *nuance* between them, and Lord Hammond did not differ materially from either orator.

The conversation brought on by Mr. Anderson on the 7th of August about the Bulgarian atrocities was important in three ways.

First, it showed how powerful a diversion in favour of the Servians had been made by the extremely ill-judged—not to say infatuated—proceedings of the Turks in sending against the Bulgarian insurgents irregulars badly held in hand instead of the best regular troops that could be spared.

It has been said that the regular troops were elsewhere engaged, and that it was absolutely necessary to trample down the rising with such means as were at hand ; and this statement again has been stoutly denied. I do not know where the truth lies, but as I indicated in my last, it has not been made clear to me that Midhat Pacha, who passes for the most intelligent man in the present Turkish Ministry, is what would be called a statesman if judged by a Western standard. I should have thought him to be just the kind of man who, seeing clearly enough within his range, would not be far-sighted enough to perceive what a frightful advantage he and his colleagues would give to their enemies by any over-severity in Bulgaria, let alone wholesale massacres. An Englishman talking to Midhat Pacha would involuntarily apply to him the same standard that he would apply to an enlightened politician at a native court in India. The same person talking to the Khedive or to Nubar Pacha would apply equally involuntarily a quite different standard.

Secondly, the conversation of the 7th August showed that Sir Henry Elliot had been very badly informed; and *thirdly*, it drew from the leader of the Opposition the following most significant, and, as I trust, fruitful observations:—

"It does appear to me that Sir Henry Elliot does not possess the means which he ought to possess of being made aware of what is going on in the provinces of Turkey. If Sir Henry Elliot had had at his disposal more full and trustworthy sources of information, I cannot help thinking a knowledge of these proceedings would sooner have reached him, and through him the Government. I cannot but think that if the right hon. gentleman at the head of the Government had been in possession of information which ought to have reached him, he would not have treated the question put in this House in the manner he did."

The tone of a discussion like this should be well weighed on the Continent of Europe, where it is so much the fashion to suppose that the Radical party in England is so very peaceful, and that it consists of such stout followers of what is called the "Manchester School." Who were the principal speakers? Mr. Anderson, who represents Glasgow; Mr. Taylor, who represents Leicester; Mr. Cowen, who represents Newcastle; Mr. Jacob Bright, who represents Manchester; and Mr. Mundella, who represents Sheffield. The last went so far as to say—

"He was not an advocate of war, but it was unworthy of England that she had not said to these Turks, one of whom had died of the scissions and another of whom was dying of something worse, 'Bring this to an end, or we will point our guns at your palaces.' We were once governed by a man named Cromwell, who in a similar case uttered a word which brought the massacre to an end. He trusted the Prime Minister would shake off some of his present lethargy. It was high time that England awoke to her responsibility as a great Christian power."

Now I should like some of my friends on the other side of the water to take note of this, and to remember that while the Ministerial view, whatever party is in power, will usually be in favour of non-intervention, and founded, whether knowingly or unknowingly, upon the principles of the "Manchester School" properly understood, all prudent Ministers will always emulate the caution of Lord Granville, in the passage I quoted a little ago, and not commit themselves too absolutely to non-intervention, because they have to reckon with one of the most naturally impulsive people on the face of the earth, although it is a people which, happily for mankind, has given greater hostages to fortune than any other, and is therefore bound over in heavy recognizances not to break the peace.

The debate on Mr. Ashley's motion enforced the same lessons, but it added little or nothing to what was already known to all who had read the papers which had been laid on the table of Parliament. It was as far as possible from being, as the French

say, *bien nourri* with fresh facts, while the indignation of the country at the Bulgarian massacres had found sufficient vent in the far shorter and equally effective speeches of the 7th August.

In another respect it was, however, important. Speaker after speaker on both sides of the House condemned the conduct of Sir Henry Elliot, some with, some without apologies for attacking an absent servant of the Crown. These apologies were quite unnecessary. Sir Henry Elliot was present by his natural defenders on the Treasury Bench. The only thing he could possibly have advanced in bar of a discussion was, that it was raised at very short notice—a misfortune which, under the circumstances, was inevitable.

When however I come to ask whether the criticisms of Sir Henry Elliot's doings were *just*, I can hardly answer in the affirmative. No one of Sir Henry Elliot's friends would, I suppose, claim for him a place in the first rank of our diplomatists; but he is a very fair specimen of a class of men, who are most maligned by those who know least about them, our average English representatives.

People blame him for not being a match in intrigue for Ignatieff. Well, would they like the British Ambassador at Constantinople to bear the reputation of that distinguished individual? and after all, has the success of Russia in the game which she has been playing on the Bosphorus been as remarkable as some of Sir Henry Elliot's critics thought that it was a year ago?

I could name perhaps several men in the diplomatic service who would, in my judgment, have been better fitted for the post which Sir Henry Elliot fills, but that is not much to say, and when one hears people complain that he did not exercise the authority of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, why do they not in fairness remember that he had a very different force behind him? Lord Stratford de Redcliffe energized in a day when a "spirited foreign policy" was popular, but for how many months has a "spirited foreign policy" been popular since Sir Henry Elliot went to Constantinople? It has been as bitterly as truly said of the present attitude of England, "England wills energetically in the East, but she does not know what she wills." There are few harder tasks for a diplomatist than to trim his sails in such unsteady weather.

Then again, people do not reflect how much less power is in the hands of an ambassador since communication by telegraph was so widely extended.

The fault is much more with the Foreign Office than with Sir Henry Elliot, and the House of Commons must share some of the blame that falls primarily upon the shoulders of the Foreign Office.

Why did not the Foreign Office provide Sir Henry Elliot with a

sufficient number of "ambulant eyes and ears?" The ordinary staff of his embassy has enough to do with its ordinary duties, but where would have been the difficulty during the last few years, where is the difficulty now, of picking out some of the clever young men, clear of head, strong of limb, anxious to distinguish themselves in all honourable ways, whom the life-giving reforms of Lord Cardwell are bringing so rapidly into the army, and of sending them out to Turkey to fulfil the functions which I explained in my last?

If Sir Henry Elliot had had at his beck and call a young man of the right kind, who had travelled all over the districts in which Bulgarian is spoken, districts, be it remembered, far wider than what we commonly call Bulgaria, and who had acquired the language, would he have been as much behindhand as he was in the information which he sent home to his Government, or would it have been necessary to send Mr. Baring's commission?

If such a class of men as I have indicated were in existence, the ambassador would merely, when the first rumours of mischief came, have ordered one of them to the spot where the mischief was said to have been occurring, and he would soon have made his already established local connections useful to his Government, by obtaining all the information it could desire. Who can say that that information would not have saved many lives?

In all human probability it would.

That Sir Henry Elliot not having such an *adlatus* should have been very sceptical about the first rumours that reached him, surely only proves that he knew the East pretty well.

Most truly did Lord Strangford say—

"It should be acknowledged that a certain meridian traversing the E.C. district of Europe gives the line of *perpetual truthlessness*, just as we have the line of perpetual snow at certain elevations in given latitudes: not falsehood, for that is a positive term, but lack of truth.

"No reports coming from the east of such a line should be treated as susceptible of having either truth or untruth predicated of them to the exclusion of the other."

Even now we are very imperfectly informed as to what has really occurred, and it is difficult to exaggerate the want of knowledge of what goes on, even in a province so near as Bulgaria, which you must expect in your Constantinople Embassy, at the beginning of troubles, as long as you only take, in such a country, the same steps for enabling your ambassador to be informed which would be amply sufficient in countries like Belgium or Holland or even France.

This trouble has come upon us quite unprepared, but we shall have plenty others like it in Turkey, and our generation will be extraordinarily fortunate if we have not other troubles like it in

Austria, where they will find us equally unprepared. Would it not be a much more practical course than abusing Sir Henry Elliot to take care that he, and those who come after him, should have some additional tools to work with?

I have said that the House of Commons must share some of the blame which falls primarily on the shoulders of the Foreign Office. No doubt the first uninformed thought of the House of Commons, and more especially of the party to which I belong, is to reduce the diplomatic estimates; but will any fair-minded man deny that a good many of the items that have been retrenched were useless items, and will any one maintain that a Secretary of State would have serious difficulty in increasing the diplomatic estimates, *if* he could show that a distinct gain would be derived by doing so? It may be that there is some answer to my proposal, but it has never been put forward. The function of the class of men I wish to create would be totally different from that of the consular body in the East, though we have here and there a consul who does, when called upon, work of the kind I suggest, very well.

Lord Odo Russell, in his evidence before the last diplomatic committee, used some words which I have quoted before at Elgin, but which cannot be quoted too often, in reply to questions from Lord Arthur Russell and Mr. Cartwright:—

“The more feelers you have all over the civilized world, the better informed you are, and the more influence you can exercise; and I think that through an organization of that kind you are more likely to establish peace and goodwill amongst Christians, than you are through armies, Armstrong guns, breech-loaders, Minié bullets, and so on.

“You look upon diplomacy then as a great international agency?—I think that is what it will become in course of time; I think that diplomacy is still in its infancy.

“You think that it will become an agency for the propagation of international doctrines?—That is what I believe.”

There is the true view of diplomacy. But the Foreign Office, conscious of small peccadilloes, such as the silly little scandal with which the House of Commons was entertained some years ago about the fund out of which a portion of Lord Hammond's salary was paid, has never had the courage to claim for itself the position which it ought to occupy. The Foreign Office and diplomatic service, if they were only put on a thoroughly good footing, might ask from the State, if necessary, even twice the money they now receive, all the best members of the so-called Manchester school taking the lead in voting it. For the outcome of a greatly improved diplomatic service and Foreign Office could hardly fail to be, as the years went on, a considerable diminution of direct expenditure upon armaments, and a vast increase of national wealth through the opening of new markets. Four or five men added to the staff of the Foreign Office to rank just below the two

Under-Secretaries of State, charged with no departmental work, but having access to all the papers, and bound at every moment to be able to give the Secretary of State by word of mouth full information about the state of affairs in the countries with which they had to deal, the fruit of personal knowledge and of keeping up constant acquaintance with what was going on in them, would save their salaries many times over.

The introduction of such a class of men, for which we have precedents both in Berlin and Vienna, is only one of many much-needed reforms. But shall we have this or any other reform?

It is so much easier for members of Parliament to abuse an individual like Sir Henry Elliot, and so much easier for a Government, if hard pressed, to make a scape-goat of him, than to set on foot a great reform, to see the bearings of which takes some little pains, and which does not readily connect itself with the recognized clap-trap of any section of politicians.

It is only the very foremost of our diplomatists who have risen to Lord Odo Russell's conception of their profession and its future. Inferior men tremble for its fate, believing it to be incompatible with the advance of popular government.

Nothing, however, can be less true.

All that is wanted is for the Foreign Minister to carry the people along with him. Just consider what an instantaneous effect was produced by Lord Derby's speech to the deputation headed by Mr. Bright. Why has the English people often gone wrong in its foreign sympathies? Because it has had no guidance from those whose business it was to guide it.

How far must we go back to find a precedent for Lord Derby's speech? I do not mean for a speech like it having been made to a deputation, but for its having been made at all.

But if the Foreign Minister were conscious of being as much better informed than he now is, as he would be if the assistance I wish to see provided for him were at his command, he would be much more willing to come forward to try to lead public opinion right.

Democracy is a new force, and diplomacy, if it means to live alongside of it—much more if it means to grow greater in its presence—must learn to manage it; and it can only be managed in one of two ways—by the tongue or by the pen.

Another criticism of a different kind requires to be met. If you make the Foreign Office too good, you will make it too strong for the House of Commons. I defy you. As against the House of Commons, the Foreign Minister, the creation of the House of Commons, can have no strength whatever except by being right and by making the nation think that he is right. I should shrink with horror from the proposal to give the assistants which I

suggest for him the slightest vestige of *power*. They should have a high position and great influence, but of *power* they should not have an atom more than a clerk in the Foreign Office has now.

Those who press on me this kind of criticism propose, as an alternative, absolute non-intervention. By all means, if you can bring it about; but listen to Mr. Mundella's speech quoted above and to its echoes in all directions.

How are you to arrive at *absolute* non-intervention unless you tow England far out into the South Atlantic? How even then unless you can abrogate many existing treaties?

My formula would be the maximum of non-intervention compatible with our engagements, and with the feeling of the country *after* the Foreign Secretary has put at its command the best information which money and careful investigation can secure.

I pass now to the discussions on the Egyptian policy of the Government.

That of the 5th August was interesting in two ways. It drew from Mr. Cave a statement which, in so far as it dealt with Egypt generally, and avoided matters in dispute between the two sides of the House, was really valuable, and it gave Mr. Lowe an opportunity of accurately describing the famous mission and its results as a drama in five acts—Requisition, Intrusion, Inquisition, Suppression, and Repudiation.

The discussion of the 8th on the Suez Canal completed the dissection of the most astonishingly muddled piece of business in modern English history.

I will try to condense in a few paragraphs the upshot of these and previous debates on the intermeddling of her Majesty's present advisers with the affairs of Egypt.

Nothing, as it seems to me, has shown that the nation was not right in thinking rather well of the purchase of the shares when it was *first announced and before it was explained*, for the nation naturally took it for granted that the price paid was not absurd, and that the operation had been carried into effect in a business-like and reasonable way.

Now, however, would it not be justified in turning round on the Government and saying: "What, I should like to know, is the net result of all your dealings with Egypt?"

"Is the safety of the Isthmus transit one whit more secured than it was last September? Is there any doubt about its safety now? Was there any doubt about its safety then?"

"But perhaps you have advertised to the world that I am much occupied about the safety of the Isthmus transit? Well, the sensible part of the world knew that before—knew that I con-

sidered it a matter of paramount importance, and would uphold it, if necessary, against all comers.

"But some one may say that it was worth while impressing the same lesson upon the non-sensible part of the world. Possibly, though hardly at the price that has been paid for it, for the mere sending of the fleet to the mouth of the Dardanelles, has advertised my interest in those regions in a far more striking and incomparably cheaper way.

"Well, then, have you improved the position of Egyptian finance? I am afraid the Egyptian bondholders would hardly say so.

"Have you made the Khedive more safe in his own dominions? On the contrary, for the first time I hear of attempts at exciting a revolutionary spirit in what used to be the most tranquil of countries.

"Have you, then, made the Khedive more friendly to you? Certainly not. Many good authorities will have it that he is much less friendly.

"Have you advanced the prestige of English administration? Has the mission of a high officer of State, the right hon. member for Shoreham, brought order out of chaos, and made people say, 'Ah! when it comes to a matter of financial arrangement these English are the people to call in?'

"Have you, perhaps, improved English credit? Why, for the first time in the memory of the oldest inhabitant, England has borrowed at the rate of 15 per cent.

"Or have you, perhaps, increased the confidence which is felt in English public men and in their communications to Parliament? No, I have seen the Prime Minister come down to the House and inform its members that the Messrs. Rothschild had *purchased the Suez shares, and had run great risk by doing so; whereas, in deed and in truth, the Messrs. Rothschild had not purchased the Suez shares, and had not run any such risk.*

"Or, perhaps, a good example has been set of the way in which delicate pecuniary transactions should be managed by a Prime Minister? On the contrary, an example has been set which might be turned to very evil account, for have I not seen a Government send for a capitalist whose name has always been most closely connected with the head of that Government, and borrow from him at 15 per cent., when money could have been had on good mercantile bills at 3, or less than 3, per cent.?

"Have you then got any hold over the canal proportionate to the number of shares that you bought? On the contrary, you have got three directors in a large council—that is, in return for more than four millions of public money. You have got precisely what M. de Lesseps would like to show before the English people

paid one farthing, in other words, '*the appearance of importance without its actual possession.*'

"Have you then been able to make favourable terms for British vessels or others using the canal? On the contrary, you have made concessions which make their position worse, not better.

"If the policy with regard to Egypt for the last year has done none of the good things about which I have asked questions, what good things has it done, and who will show cause that it has not been a policy of makeshift and blundering—a policy inspired not by a desire *to advance*, but to *seem to advance*, the interests of the country, a policy which might be summed up in the saying which has been the political cognizance, as it will be the political epitaph of the Prime Minister, '*Populus vult decipi et decipiatur?*'"

Looking then at the Eastern policy of the Government generally, I come to this conclusion, that in Turkey, where the chief burden and heat of the day has been borne by Lord Derby, there is little to complain of except things the responsibility of which must be shared to a great extent by previous Governments. I see no evidence that if Sir Henry Elliot had had the means of keeping her Majesty's Ministers fully informed about what was going on, they would not have reflected exactly the feeling of the country.

Their Egyptian policy, on the other hand, which is so utterly unlike Lord Derby that I cannot believe him to have had much to do with it, was entered into without due consideration, was partly carried into effect through a transaction of which the Prime Minister, unchecked by his Chancellor of the Exchequer, gave to the House of Commons an account which no ingenuity* can reconcile with the history of the same transaction as described in the papers presented to Parliament, and has been up to this moment a mere failure.

While these discussions have been going on in Parliament, events have been taking their course in Eastern Europe.

The national sentiment in Servia, over-excited by sympathizers in Austria and Russia, at last became uncontrollable; and Prince Milan, surely not with his own goodwill, was hurried into war. We have all read his proclamation in the newspapers, and a less satisfactory document has seldom been penned.

Nor is the matter mended by other explanations which are

* On the night of Feb. 8, Mr. Disraeli said, "The House of Rothschild did not merely advance four millions. We said, Will you *purchase* these shares on our engagement we will ask the House of Commons to take them off your hands? They *did* so. —as a great risk, and I believe they would not have undertaken it if they had not ~~it~~ was of great consequence to the country that they should do so."

Rothschild write on Nov. 25, 1875, to the Chancellor of the Exchequer:—
as is made on the distinct understanding that Her Majesty's Government will be able to apply to Parliament for a grant of money to enable Her Majesty's Government to pay the said advance."

forthcoming. An acquaintance of my own, a man of high position and long political experience, writes to me from Belgrade at great length upon the condition of his country, and with reference to the war speaks as follows :—

“The Eastern Question, as it exists at this moment, can only be resolved by the annexation of Bosnia to Servia, both being placed under the suzerainty of the Porte. Our intentions are misstated probably on purpose, when we are accused of wishing to infringe on the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and to break the ties which unite it. Such is not our idea. On the contrary, we shall labour at the consolidation of the Empire, in establishing peace, order, and good administration in a province perpetually in a state of trouble and effervescence.

“We have been reduced to the unfortunate necessity of declaring war against Turkey, because the maintenance of the *status quo* had become impossible and even dangerous to the order and tranquillity of Servia; but we will lay down our arms the day that Europe consents to do us justice. No doubt we should modify our demands, if the Porte imposed great sacrifices of life and money upon us in continuing hostilities; but I emphatically repeat that at the moment when war was declared we demanded nothing but the annexation of Bosnia.”

It is curious to compare with this language, or with Prince Milan's proclamation, the following extract from the *Daily News* correspondence. This is what is too apt to come from cutting knots instead of untying them, but it does not often come so quickly :—

“It was a horrible nightmare, that march from Saltehar. Cannon roaring, flames lighting up the valley, gusts of thick smoke driven athwart the hill faces, the heavens' lightning flashing against the lightning of man, a narrow, steep road, crammed with fugitives fleeing from the cannon thunder, blazing smoke, women clamouring wildly that the Turk is close behind them, children shrieking or sobbing; animals, oxen, sheep, goats, swine, poultry in an inextricable entanglement on the *Via Dolorosa*. Ask these miserable, panic-stricken fugitives—crushing forward as if the plague chased them—how they like war. No. Ask this man with knitted brow and quivering lips, who, musket on one shoulder, child on the other, strides on through the mud, thinking of the crops on his acres that he leaves behind, already golden with harvest hues. Ask these two soldiers, each with bullet-hole through the right hand, how they relish war now, as they tramp homewards, certainly not to glory. Is it not time to interfere in a struggle which is not war, breast to breast, man to man, weapon to weapon, but agony unspeakable to fugitive women and children?”

High time indeed, if the right lesson has been learned. But surely the experience of the present generation of Servians ought to have shown them that point after point was to be won for the Christian subjects of the Porte, by watching, and waiting, and using opportunities. My view remains what it was in 1858, when I said a few words in the House in favour of Mr. Gladstone's motion with reference to the Danubian Principalities. I think, as I said then, that we ought to endeavour to act towards Turkey the part both of the family physician and of the family

solicitor. We are bound by treaty to do all that we can to preserve a health which is daily sinking, but failing that, we should take such means as are in our power to secure the sick man's rich inheritance to his natural heirs—the Christian populations who are subject to his rule.

It is, however, no kindness to these populations, but, on the contrary, a very great unkindness to encourage them to premature action.

Contrast the results to the Danubian Principalities of the moral support given by Mr. Gladstone in his well-judged opposition to the Conservative Government, assisted in this particular matter by Lord Palmerston, eighteen years ago. Contrast the action of those who pressed some years later for the evacuation of the Servian fortresses with the proceedings of the mischief-makers who got up the insurrection in Bulgaria, or who urged Servia into the present war.

Let the issue of existing complications be what it will, how long will it be before either Servia, or the recently disturbed part of Bulgaria, are recompensed for the sufferings they have gone through? Read Mr. Blunt's reports from Adrianople in the papers presented in 1867. Read the account of a journey made two or three years ago from Belgrade to Constantinople, given by Dr. Sandwith in a recent number of *Fraser*.

Do these documents describe countries which can be with impunity plunged in war? Do they not rather describe countries where what you want is tolerably enlightened government, enforced by the presence of well-informed ambassadors at Constantinople?

Up to the date at which I write, we know nothing absolutely conclusive about the origin of the Bulgarian insurrection; but we may, judging from what has occurred before, guess that it was to some extent the work of a Bulgarian revolutionary committee at Bucharest* taking advantage of the proceedings of tax-gatherers, always bad in Turkey, as in Greece, and probably, in the financial circumstances of the Porte, worse this year than ever.

Whoever they may be who must bear that responsibility, a terrible one it is, for the more we hear of the massacres the worse they seem, and their hideous details may give rash orators, who think of nothing but reflecting the opinion of the moment, and raising a silly cheer, some notion of the unspeakable misery that would fall on the whole population of Turkey in Europe, and Turkey in Asia, if once the ruling minority became persuaded that the long-expected death-struggle had come.

And let us lay no flattering unction to our souls. If we indulge the natural feelings of rage and disgust caused by the atrocity of

* See Selected Writings of Lord Strangford, vol. i. pages 191, 197, 213.

the Turkish proceedings so far as to insist, as the *Economist* seems to fear, on a change of the cautious policy with regard to Turkey, in which Lord Granville, Lord Derby, Lord Hartington, and even Mr. Gladstone join, nothing that we can do, by any expenditure of blood and treasure, can prevent terrible calamities.

The intervention of the great Powers to effect a mediation, and patching up with improvements of the miserable *status quo*, is the only end to the present perplexity that has received the approval of any serious politician. A one-sided intervention of either Austria or Russia would in all likelihood lead to a bloody and desperate war, with what results who can say?

Public feeling in both these countries is extremely roused, and no wonder.

I mentioned above that annexationist ideas had of late been coming more into favour at Vienna, but it is hardly possible to believe that the Government can allow itself to be carried away by them. People may murmur that it is better to buy a field which you don't want, though it marches with your estate, rather than let a neighbour build on it a gunpowder factory. The danger, however, of annexing Bosnia would be that Austria would at once have on her territory an ill-regulated gunpowder factory close to other gunpowder factories, which as it is she can just manage to oversee and keep harmless. The gain then would not be great.

Among the worst symptoms in the state of the Empire at present are the strange and desperate counsels that receive support from serious people. More than once Count Andrassy would seem to have done his utmost to bring on a war with Russia, and many persons must have observed in a paper in *Fraser*, sent from Vienna (which excited deserved attention in July, although, being a most curious amalgam of truth and error, it requires to be read with great caution), the following astounding declaration of opinion:—

“No one thinks of the Empire, no one respects it, for all modern historical memories are associated with defeats, from the wars with the first French Republic down to Sadowa. The choice therefore only remains to Austria to wage a successful war during the course of the next ten years or to perish. Patriotism must be roused at whatever cost, or else the army must acquire fresh confidence to be able to break the power exercised by the provinces. To perish in war would be more honourable than to crumble slowly to atoms in peace.”

Quem Deus vult perdere! The one hope for Austria is peace. Even with peace her difficulties are enormous, but if that goes we may make up our minds for far worse calamities than those which we are now witnessing in the East. The *status quo* is not indefinitely maintainable, but it is, at least, better than playing a game with a hundred chances to one against you.

In Russia the very natural irritation of the people has up to this time been under the control of the Government, which is sincerely anxious for peace and convinced that a *replâtrage* is the only course conformable either to the interest of Russia or of any one else. How long this attitude might continue if the successes obtained by the Turks led to overweening confidence on their part and to acts repugnant to humanity in the course of their invasion of Servia is another question, more especially as it is said that the clergy have recently shown symptoms of restlessness at the defeats of the Orthodox.

What the state of opinion in Germany may be on the questions now open in the East it is difficult to say. Some months ago the talk was all in favour of letting things take their course in the belief that German interests were not directly affected by anything that could happen in the Balkan Peninsula. Then there was a strange outburst in the press against England, as if she were taking the anti-Liberal side.

All this is very strange, but we must not forget that, as Mr. Klaczko well brings out in his interesting book, "*Les Deux Chanceliers*," personal influences and relations are still of quite enormous importance in the politics of the three empires, and nowhere more than in Germany. It would really seem as if events in the last ten years had gone too quick for a solid and sober-minded country, as if Germans had for a time lost the habit of applying to politics the same mental habits with which they approach other subjects—hence, perhaps, the strange phenomenon of the nation seeming to vary its view with the view of one singularly capricious and impulsive politician.

Far removed from the scene of the contest, belonging to another race and to a widely different creed, for there is no sect in this country which has much in common, either with Mohammedanism or with the Fetish-worship which passes but too often for Christianity amongst the lower classes in the East, we ought to be able, while feeling just indignation at the horrors committed by both sides, and most of course by the most powerful, to keep our heads cool, and not to exhibit to Europe the absurd spectacle of changing our policy, as we were urged to do by some speakers in the House of Commons the other day, because Turkish irregulars and perhaps frightened Turkish populations have acted as they have always acted before.

If good to the subjects of the Porte is to come out of the present miseries, it cannot be but by the most anxious and watchful care on the part of the statesmen of Europe, poorly furnished as most of them are with the information which they ought to have.


Those of us who recollect the Crimean war often laughed at the

Buono-Johnny enthusiasm of those days. It would be a pity if we were to witness a *Cattivo-Johnny* enthusiasm now.

Any indulgence of enthusiasm, indeed, on either side, would be miserably out of place, and we cannot do better than remember the exhortation* of Mahmoud to his Vizier, at the outbreak of the war of 1828—"Keep your wits together, for Allah knows the danger is great."

M. E. GRANT DUFF.

* Quoted by Moltke in the book on the Russian operations of 1828-9, which he published in 1845, when the world little dreamt that the Prussian major, who so carefully criticized the operations of Diebitsch, was to be himself the greatest master of the Art of War.



THE VIVISECTION ACT.

A PRACTICE has sprung up, especially since the advent to power of the present Government, which cannot be too energetically deprecated. It may be described as the art of turning public Bills into private ones. A measure is introduced which has two aspects: it involves problems of the largest and most important kind; it raises questions of the highest moral significance. But, besides, it touches and alarms some powerful and well-organized body. Symptoms of a strong and pertinacious opposition arise, the Press takes the alarm, deputations are organized, meetings are called; the Government find it is necessary, if they mean to carry anything, to come to terms. The interest endangered makes its demands, which, after more or less haggling, are agreed to. From this time the measure is looked upon as passed. It is postponed to unearthly hours, when debate is difficult and reporting impossible. The conciliated interest—fearful lest, if the matter be deferred to another Session, a worse thing may befall them, and anxious to realize the fruits of their work in the way of agitation—lend their full support to the Government. The consequence is that the voice of those who would speak for the public is stifled, and there is nothing left but submission to whatever it may please the two high contracting powers to dictate.

If any one desires to see a typical instance of this method of legislation by compact, with no reference to any consideration

except the convenience of a Government and an adverse interest, he will find an admirable illustration in what we are improperly directed to call (for its very title is a compromise and a misnomer) "The Act for Amending the Law relating to Cruelty to Animals." If such a Bill was to pass at all, we had no reason to expect that it would be any very creditable addition to the statute-book. The agitation which ended in the introduction of this Bill, took its rise in feelings which are honourable to human nature, but which are rather sentimental and sympathetic than those of the legislator or the jurist. Mere compassion never yet made good laws. She dwells too much upon particular cases: what is near works upon her much more powerfully than what is equal and fair. She is much influenced by concomitant circumstances, which add to the pity and terror, but not to the pain. Thus we do not doubt that the cool and business-like manner in which experiments are performed, the fastening down the victim, the recording the exact nature of the injuries inflicted, the minute account of the behaviour of the poor animal during his sufferings, have a great deal to do with the sympathy felt, though they do not increase the pain, and are calculated to excite, and do actually excite, more pity than the horrors of a Servian or Turkish hospital unprovided with the most ordinary means for the alleviation of misery. The prerogative instance of this is the good Bishop Las Casas, who was so shocked at the miseries which the Spaniards inflicted on the American Indians, that he set up the African slave-trade to relieve his favourites at the expense of another equally innocent and equally hapless race, who became in their turn the objects of an almost equally exclusive devotion.

The Bill of Lord Carnarvon certainly left the most extreme votaries of the suppression of physiological experiments very little to desire. To understand the full effect of this measure, we must do what the framers of the Bill seem never to have done. We must ascertain what is the existing law on the subject of cruelty to animals, and then consider how it bears upon the new Act. The law, when disentangled from some rather intricate statutes, is this:—Any person who shall cruelly overdrive, abuse, or torture any domestic animal, shall either be fined five pounds or sent to prison for two months, at the discretion of the Court. This law does not properly meet the case of scientific experiments, and that for two reasons—first, the penalty is too small, and the amount of imprisonment quite disproportioned to it. It is evidently meant only for the poor. For them there is some proportion between the fine and the imprisonment. To the rich the fine is nothing, while the imprisonment would be a terrible infliction. A second fault in the Act is, that it is confined to domestic animals only. The enacting part speaks only of animals—

but a definition introduced at the end of the Act, and apparently an after-thought, limits the word animal as employed in the Act to domestic animals only.

If the Government measure had been in the hands of persons legislating under the ordinary conditions of calmness and deliberation, the course would have been extremely simple. The amount of pecuniary penalty which might in the discretion of the Court be imposed would have been increased to say £100, and the word domestic would have been struck out, thus placing all animals under the protection of the law against cruel abuse and torture. Then would have followed such provisions as might be judged proper to protect persons making scientific experiments from the penalties of the law on compliance by them with such conditions as might be considered necessary. Such a law would have been equal, logical, and merciful; it would have marked an era in the advance of civilization, and would have been fairly entitled to the title of a charter of mercy to the brute creation. In order to see why this was not done, why this great opportunity was missed, we must go back to transactions of an earlier date.

A very considerable sensation had been created by the efforts of a number of benevolent persons who interested themselves in the supposed tortures endured by animals subjected to physiological experiments. As it was a matter of feeling and compassion, of course no mercy was shown to the supposed delinquents—

“ And every woe a tear can claim
Except a vivisector's shame.”

Little distinction was made between old and new experiments, between what was done in England and abroad. By mixing all these things together, and keeping out of sight the modern discovery of anæsthetics which has entirely altered the bearing of the whole subject, so considerable an effect was produced on the public mind that the Government very wisely referred the whole matter to a Royal Commission. The Commission heard very fairly and impartially all that was to be said, and had not the least difficulty in arriving at the conclusion which every calm and impartial person anticipated. They entirely acquitted English physiologists of the charge of cruelty. They pronounced a well-merited eulogium on the humanity of the medical profession in England. They pointed out that the medical students were extremely sensitive on the infliction of pain on animals, and that the feeling of the public at large was penetrated by the same sentiment.

The question that naturally presented itself would seem to have been, “ Under such favourable conditions, is any legislation at all necessary, and, if so, how can we most efficiently avail ourselves of the excellent disposition already manifest on every side, so as

to obtain the greatest amount of relief and mercy for the animal creation?" Not so thought the Commissioners. The question which they put in the face of their own finding of complete acquittal was, strange to say, not whether matters should be left alone, but whether experiments on living creatures should be entirely prohibited. Having resolved this point in the negative, they then proceeded to consider to what restrictions they should subject the humane and excellent persons in whose favour they had so decidedly reported. Their proceeding was very singular. They acquitted the accused and sentenced them to be under the surveillance of the police for life. We presume if there had been any justification for this extraordinary proceeding the Commissioners would have given it; but they have offered none, and we therefore can only suppose that it was done to appease popular clamour.

We now return to the Bill of the Government in which the recommendations of the Commission were in substance embodied.

By this Bill the subjecting any animal to an experiment calculated to give pain was declared an offence punishable in the first instance by fine, and in the second by fine and imprisonment, unless a number of conditions were complied with. Among these were the following: that the operator should hold a license from the Secretary of State for the Home Department; that the place where experiments are made should be licensed, and that it and he should be liable to inspection; that the operator should report to the Secretary of State; that anæsthetics should be used, and that the animal should be destroyed before returning to a sense of pain. Dispensations from the use of anæsthetics and from other conditions were to be had by obtaining a certificate from certain persons that such a dispensation ought to be made. This was in substance the Bill introduced by the Government into the House of Lords, and a measure more objectionable can hardly be conceived. It is levelled exclusively at persons capable of performing physiological experiments, that is, against men who must, from the very nature of their employment, be possessed of considerable knowledge, and that in abstruse and difficult subjects. The trying an experiment presupposes an exact knowledge of what is already known, the boundaries of which the operator is seeking to expand. Intellectually, such persons are entitled to the highest respect from all, including Secretaries of State and Parliaments themselves. Do they then labour under any moral taint? Their occupation is, if considered with reference to its end, the most humane that can be imagined, for it is the alleviation, by means of the discovery of new laws of nature, of the sufferings of mankind, and of the brute creation themselves. To the success which has attended these efforts the Commissioners themselves bear ample testimony.

Is it then true that with us the desire of knowledge has overpowered the feelings of humanity, and that these great results have been bought at an unnecessary amount of suffering to the creatures experimented upon? The Commissioners report directly to the contrary. It is, therefore, distinctly shown that there is nothing in the character, conduct, or attainments of the persons whom this Bill subjects to these degrading restrictions which justifies their exclusion from the ordinary right of an English subject to follow his own pursuits in his own way.

A second capital fault in the Bill was one which exposed it not only to criticism but to ridicule. A new offence was created. In what did that offence consist? It is no offence, according to the law as it stands, merely to give pain to an animal if the element of cruelty, that is, of a wicked mind, be wanting. The law as it stands is clearly just and reasonable.

As we cannot reason with animals, the most humane man in the world cannot object to such moderate infliction of pain as may be required to subdue them to the use of man, nor is the infliction of pain wrong because it is inflicted in the effort to acquire knowledge for the purpose of alleviating the sufferings not only of mankind but of animals themselves; yet out of an innocent act done for an innocent, nay, even a praiseworthy motive, our legislators, by a kind of Parliamentary chemistry, have compounded a crime. It might seem a sufficient condemnation of a law that it is levelled against some of the most intelligent and useful members of the community for labours undertaken on the behalf of that community itself; or, if any further defence were needed, it might be found in the fact that the acts thus punished are in themselves innocent. But there is more; the measure is flagrantly unequal.

“Dat veniam corvis, vexat censura columbas.”

While the man of science must not inflict the least pain on any animal for the most beneficent object, any one else may inflict the most exquisite tortures on any non-domestic animal—that is, on ninety-nine hundredths of the brute creation—without any punishment at all. If he can show that the torture was inflicted from cruelty, from gluttony, for money, for amusement, for any motive in fact except a desire to do good by extending knowledge, he enjoys the most perfect impunity; but woe to him if in his infliction of pain there is any alloy of science or philanthropy.

*“Marked out by dangerous parts he meets the shock,
And fatal learning leads him to the block.”*

Another objection to the Bill was the slur cast by it upon the whole medical profession. The possession of a medical degree has hitherto been considered to entitle its holder to the general

confidence of mankind. It is a certificate of fair skill, knowledge, and capacity. This qualification, respected everywhere else, is totally disregarded by the narrow and hysterical sentiment to which the Bill owed its origin, and in deference to which the Commission recommended restrictions which they themselves had convincingly proved to be utterly superfluous. In the Bill a medical degree is treated as of no value at all, and for it is substituted a license from a Secretary of State. Of course his knowledge can only be second-hand, and his responsibility merely nominal. And yet to him is entrusted the power of closing the path of knowledge, so invaluable to mankind, to those who might prove its most ardent and successful votaries. Youth is especially the time for discovery, while the thirst for knowledge is fresh and ardent, and the faculties, especially the imagination, the inventor's faculty, in full force and vigour. And yet the principal result of requiring a license will probably be the exclusion of youth, of the unknown and untried. As far as the Bill has any effect, the performing experiments will become a monopoly, and a young and untried man will probably find it his easiest course to perform his experiments in some place where the Home Secretary has no jurisdiction. Another great mischief is that an experimenter will, with penal consequences hanging over his head, be very slow to make known the exact nature of his experiments. While he is only thinking of what he has discovered, he may be furnishing against himself evidence which may form the ground of a criminal prosecution. This suppression of the details of experiments has two evil results. It limits the area of the advantage obtained, — by limiting publicity, and has a direct tendency to injure the lower animals by needlessly multiplying experiments, which might have been avoided if the results of former experiments had been known. Such substantially was the Bill of the Government as it left the House of Lords, with a single addition, which we mention as another illustration of the utterly unstatesman-like spirit in which the measure was conceived and conducted. It really seems as if the promoters of the Bill were afraid that it should be taken and accepted as a measure springing from a true and cosmopolitan spirit of benevolence towards the whole animal kingdom, instead of a sickly and sentimental eclecticism.

It was actually proposed and carried in that grave deliberative assembly that cats and dogs should be absolutely excluded from being made the subjects of physiological experiment. It was in vain pointed out that these animals, from certain similarities in their structure and functions to those of man, were peculiarly adapted for experimental purposes having reference to his disorders. One painful experiment on a ~~man~~ ^{dog} would be decisive while many might be required if

similarity to man were used, and even then with less certainty of success. If the real motive that caused the introduction of the Bill had been that just and catholic feeling of humanity which every cultivated mind ought to entertain towards all animals, such a clause could never have been proposed, or if some one was rash enough to propose it, it would have been negatived with indignation a little modified by contempt. That it should pass the House without a division was a convincing proof, if any further proof were needed, that the Bill was not introduced with any large or humane view, but merely for the purpose under the cloak of humanity of taking care of that rather restricted and exclusive class of the animal kingdom known under the name of pets. One cannot but be amused at the exquisite justice and humanity of a law, which, in order to save the life and sufferings of one creature, directs the physiologist to select another for torture and death in its place, because the legislator has a liking for some individual of the class to which the exempted animal belongs.

We have said enough to show how overwhelming are the objections to this Bill, but by none of all these things was the Bill endangered. Its existence was, indeed, at one time seriously threatened, but not for what we may venture without arrogance to call any of the unanswerable objections which we have urged against it.

The danger to the Bill arose from the fact that it offended, and in our opinion most justly offended, the susceptibilities of a great, powerful, and highly respected profession. The medical profession of the United Kingdom naturally felt aggrieved at the way in which they were treated by the Legislature. They knew they had not deserved it; they knew also that the Royal Commission had after a careful and impartial inquiry entirely acquitted them of any charge or even suspicion of inhumanity; they had the consciousness that by these very researches members of their body had conferred benefits on the human race, the amount of which can hardly be over-estimated; and yet they found notwithstanding all this that they were singled out for treatment to which no Government ever before thought of exposing any respectable trade, much less a highly-educated, liberal, and honourable profession. A remonstrance to the Home Secretary was signed by three thousand members of the medical profession. In this document they repudiated with a just indignation the idea of placing them under inspection, of requiring that they should take a license from the Home Secretary before they could legally act at all, and a certificate before they could exercise a discretion in the conduct of their experiments of which they felt quite competent to judge. Representations to this effect were made by a very large deputation with a vigour and ability which left nothing to be desired.

The profession also requested that instead of placing them under the Secretary of State, and subjecting them to license, certificate, and inspection, Parliament would reconsider the law of cruelty to animals, and deal with the whole subject in a large and comprehensive spirit. This excellent remonstrance, strong in the authority of those who signed it, and stronger still in its wise and humane recommendations, could not fail to produce a great effect on the mind of the Minister. The result was a negotiation and a compromise. Both parties had it must be admitted very strong grounds for making mutual concessions. It was impossible for the Government to carry their measure during the Session then drawing to a close without conciliating the very formidable opposition which had been provoked. On the other hand, persons deeply engaged in physiological experiments, and, indeed, the whole medical profession, were equally interested in putting an end to a state of things peculiarly harassing to busy men continually brought in contact with the public and subject to much vexation, annoyance, and misrepresentation. They had also to dread an organized agitation carried on during the winter with unlimited supplies of money furnished by honest, if mistaken, enthusiasm. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at, if, as the Irish attorney said, a reconciliation broke out between the parties; nor were the terms of such a reconciliation difficult. The remonstrance signed by three thousand of the medical profession pointed out distinctly the only course which could with propriety be pursued.

It would have been easy to amend the present law by increasing the penalties and applying them to all animals instead of confining them to domestic animals only. Then might have followed a proviso exempting persons making physiological experiments from punishment, provided they were intended *bonâ fide* for the advancement of science, and were conducted with as little pain as is consistent with success.

It must, however, be admitted that such a step on the part of the Government would have involved an admission which it would be naturally unwilling to make, an admission that the Bill which had been carried with so much ease through the House of Lords was a mistake, and required a complete reconstruction. Public interest stood on one side, and the interest and credit of the Government on the other. We cannot pretend to be much surprised that the interest of the Government triumphed. Jupiter extended his golden scales, and the cause of good sense, of humanity, and of justice to a great profession, descended.

The Government could not remodel their Bill, but they could neutralize it. The terms agreed on were two. The Bill was to retain almost all its obnoxious and inquisitorial provisions, but was to remain a dead letter as far as the penal part of it was con-

cerned, unless permission to prosecute were given by the Secretary of State. Secondly, the Bill was not to apply to cold-blooded animals. These provisions were liable to the gravest objections. The Secretary of State is made first grand inquisitor, and then grand jury to a court of petty sessions. A prosecution instituted by him in this double capacity will carry with it such overwhelming weight that a stronger tribunal than a bench of magistrates might feel great difficulty in dismissing a case brought forward under such auspices. It throws on the Minister a purely judicial responsibility. We may readily believe that this responsibility will be seldom or never incurred. The effect therefore is, that the Bill, as far as the penal part of it goes, will remain a dead letter, and that Government, in order to buy off the medical opposition, and to make an appearance of passing something, have virtually surrendered the repression, as far as punishment is concerned, of experiments on animals. This, no doubt, is an immense concession to the opposition which arose against the Bill, but, in our judgment at least, the concession has been dearly purchased.

There are bargains in which each of the high contracting parties overreaches the other—and himself. The price paid for the immunity has been nothing less than the submission on the part of the medical profession to conditions most galling to its honest pride and most injurious to its position in public estimation. Physiologists have been induced by the bribe of impunity to submit to be treated as persons whose misconduct is to be presumed until those whose duty it has now become to watch them are satisfied of their innocence. There are always to be found what are called practical men, who think any concession of mere honour and estimation worth making for the sake of a solid and immediate advantage. But we confess to the belief that the valuation which the public sets on a person or a profession is apt to be very nearly proportioned to the value they appear to set upon themselves, and that it will be very difficult to persuade others that people do not deserve measures of coercion, inspection, and tutelage to which they are found voluntarily submitting.

The second condition, that of excluding cold-blooded animals from the protection of the Act, is open to grave objection. To justify the law, it must be assumed that animals stand in need of protection. To justify this exemption it must be assumed that it is right to withdraw all protection from one class of animals, and by so doing to offer a premium for their torture and destruction.

However, the agreement was concluded, and from that moment the Bill was virtually passed. We have argued to little purpose indeed, if we have not convinced our readers that, beyond the **interests** of the Government and the physiologists, there are

involved in the Act important questions relating to the duties of the Legislature and the protection due to all animals; but from the time that the agreement was made these questions were virtually excluded from consideration. The Bill was treated as a private one, that is, the opposing interest having been conciliated, the passing the measure through the House became a mere form. The debate on the second reading was confined to a period far too short for the importance of the subject, and the discussions in Committee, taking place after midnight, were not reported at all. Two things, however, worthy of note, appear to have happened. First, the promise to exempt cold-blooded animals from the Bill appears to have been broken by the substitution of the word invertebrate for "cold-blooded," by which, among other things, uncontrolled power over the frog is lost to physiologists, and their absolute dominion is restricted to creatures of structure and functions very far removed from the human race. We shall leave others to mourn over this disaster, and content ourselves with the remark that one objection to the plan of legislation by contract is that the terms when agreed upon do not appear to be always punctually observed.

The second thing worth notice is that a motion to extend the law which forbids the cruelly abusing or torturing any domestic animal to animals non-domestic, and to increase the penalty to a level with the penalty imposed for performing a painful experiment, was lost by a large majority, the Government voting against it.

The efforts, therefore, of the two Houses of Parliament to introduce humanity into our law as regards animals stand thus:—

1. Absolute liberty to torture all non-domestic animals except by way of scientific experiment.

2. Practical liberty for any one who can afford to pay five pounds to torture domestic animals, except by way of scientific experiment.

3. No punishment for painful experiment except by leave of Secretary of State.

It is, perhaps, not very unreasonable to ask, to whom will such a state of the law give satisfaction? Scarcely, we should think, to the physiologist. He is licensed, certificated, inspected, and liable to be compelled to criminate himself; and of the two conditions for the sake of which he has submitted to such hard usage, one seems to have been violated. He has made great sacrifices for security, but it remains to be seen whether that security has been really secured. The medical profession can scarcely be satisfied, for they have been distinctly informed that their degree does not confer upon them even a *primâ facie* right to be considered persons of ordinary skill and of ordinary humanity, nor protect

them from being placed under the strictest regulations of a police especially created to watch them. The Government can hardly be satisfied when they reflect that they have introduced a Bill which they have only been able to carry by forbidding the public to put it in force, and which, after all their concessions, appears to leave upon them the imputation of a breach of faith. The Royal Commission, and the zealous and kind-hearted persons in deference to whose enthusiasm the Commission made their Report, can hardly be satisfied with proceedings which seem to have adopted their report only the more effectually to nullify its provisions. And lastly, those who, like ourselves, are really anxious to do as much as the present state of feeling allows, not merely for the prevention of cruel experiments, but of all wanton and unnecessary cruelty to any animal, cannot but feel aggrieved and indignant at the levity with which the measure was taken up and then almost cancelled, and at the refusal of the Government to admit the principle that no animal, whether domestic or not, should be cruelly and wantonly tortured.


We do not believe, for these reasons, that the legislation of this year is destined to be permanent, and we hope that the leisure of the recess will be employed in a careful reconsideration of the whole subject. The whole country is agitated by a transport of just and righteous indignation at the horrible cruelties recently practised in Bulgaria. There is no selfishness in the case. It is wholly and entirely a question of the purest moral feeling. We can hardly bear even to read the details of the tortures that have been inflicted.

“ Mollissima corda
Humano generi dare se natura fatetur
Quæ lachrymas dedit, hic nostri pars optima sensus.”

We all of us know only too well the sensation of physical pain and the passion of fear. But why should we limit our sympathies to the human race? The difference in this respect between man and brute is one of degree, not of kind. Can any reason be suggested why we should draw the line at human beings and withhold our sympathy from all below them. The golden rule, in its reason at least, does not stop with the human race. We can, by a very slight effort of imagination, place ourselves as easily in the position of a tortured animal as of a tortured man. If so we are bound to do so and to act accordingly. When the principle is thus stated in its general terms, how low, paltry, and worthless do the distinctions with which we have been dealing appear! We will protect from pain animals, the objects of property, the subjects of experiments. We will protect from torture domestic animals; but for all other animals—that is, for ninety-nine hundredths of them—we have no pity whatever. They were

given us even as the green herb, and as the green herb we will use them. We know that "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth together till now," but we also know that a portion at least of that misery is occasioned by ourselves, and can be prevented if we please. We shall not, we believe, when the matter is again brought before Parliament, hesitate to do what is in our power to remove the portion of that misery for which human cruelty is responsible.

ROBERT LOWE.



AUTOMATISM AND EVOLUTION.

PART II.

"Je co's ordinairement, que les hommes, aux faicts qu'on leur propose, s'amusent plus volontiers à en chercher la raison, qu'à en chercher la vérité."
MONTAIGNE, liv. III. chap. XI.

DOCTRINES which, like those under discussion, reject the ultimate *data* of consciousness as untrustworthy, oppose the aggregate convictions and experience of men, and ignore the fundamental principles upon which society is constituted, are not necessarily to be rejected as false for these reasons, nor on account of any other "logical consequences" whatever,* however serious

* It is well, however, not to lose sight of the "consequences," seeing that they serve as an incentive to investigation, and also as a preventive to feeble attempts at compromise, and at harmonizing views between which there is and must ever be an unresolvable discord—attempts which work nothing but evil to the cause they are intended to serve. The following quotations from Dr. Buchner's "Force and Matter" (*Kraft und Stoff*) will indicate the tendency of what is to-day called "philosophical thought":—

"That the world is not *governed*, as frequently expressed, but that the changes and motions of matter obey a necessity inherent in it, which admits of *no exception*, cannot be denied by any person who is but superficially acquainted with the natural sciences."
—*Translation by J. F. Collingwood, p. 5.*

"Matter is the origin of all that exists; all natural and mental forces are inherent in it." (P. 32.)

"What this or that man may understand by a governing reason, an absolute power, a universal soul, a personal God, &c., is his own affair. The theologians, with their articles of faith, must be left to themselves." (P. 43.)

"Nature, the all-engendering and all-devouring, is its own beginning and end, birth and death. She produced man by her own power, and takes him again." (P. 88.)

"There exists a phrase, repeated *ad nauseam*, of 'mortal body and immortal spirit.' A closer examination causes us with more truth to reverse the sentence. The body is certainly mortal in its own individual form, but not in its constituents. It changes not merely in death, but also . . . during life; however, in a higher sense it is immortal, since the smallest particle of which it is composed, cannot be destroyed. On the contrary, that which we call '*spirit*' disappears with the dissolution of the individual material combination; and it must appear to any unprejudiced intellect, as if the concurrent action of many particles of matter had produced any effect which ceases with the cause. 'Though' (says Fechner) 'we are not *annihilated* by death, we cannot save from death our previous mode of existence. We return visibly to the earth from which we were taken.'" (P. 13.)

they may appear; unless such consequences involve a *reductio ad absurdum aut impossibile*. If science declares them true, they *must* be accepted as such, *ruat cælum*; there is no appeal. But if they are only advanced on the authority of *scientific men*, however eminent, the case is different. They *may* still be true; there is a certain presumption in their favour; but to insure acceptance they must be supported by irrefragable scientific *proof*.

Mr. Huxley affirms the Automatism of man; and brings to the support of his views a wealth of learning and illustration, a force and grace of style, and a dialectic skill, which make him a most formidable champion of any doctrine that he may propound. His arguments are chiefly derived from four sources:—(1) from physiology, in relation to molecular changes in nerve and muscle, during action; (2) from pathology, as illustrated by the case of the French sergeant; (3) from comparative physiology, as in certain automatic actions of the frog; and (4) from considerations connected with man's origin and history.

If, in this discussion, precedence and prominence have been given to the last division of the argument, it is for this reason, that this alone can lead to a final and decisive result. The greater includes the less; and the doctrine of Evolution, if itself demonstrated, will prove all that the rest could hope to accomplish, and very much more. The history of the frog gives an instructive and interesting view of Automatism in a concrete form, but has no bearing upon general action. The case of the French sergeant is full of interest and mystery; but will afford at least *as* powerful an argument against general human Automatism, as in its favour; as may be inferred from the following extract from his history. He had been wounded in the head, and had been paralyzed for two years. He recovered to a great extent, but from that time he began to live

“two lives, a normal life and an abnormal life. In his normal life he is perfectly well, cheerful, and a capital hospital attendant, does all his work well, and is a respectable well-conducted man. That normal life lasts for seven-and-twenty days, or thereabouts, out of every month; but for a day or two in each month—generally at intervals of about that time—he passes into another life, suddenly and without any warning or intimation. In this life he is still active, goes about just as usual, and is to all appearance just the same man as before, goes to bed and undresses himself, gets up, makes his cigarette and smokes it, and eats and drinks. But in this condition he neither sees, nor hears, nor tastes, nor smells, nor is he conscious of anything whatever, and has only one sense-organ in a state of activity, viz., that of touch, which is exceedingly delicate. If you put an obstacle in his way, he knocks against it, feels it, and goes to the one side; if you push him in any direction he goes straight on, illustrating, as well as he can, the first law of motion. You see I have said he makes his cigarettes, but you may make his tobacco of shavings or of anything else you like, and still he will go on making his cigarettes as usual. His action is purely mechanical. And what is the most remarkable fact of all is the modifica-

tions which this injury has made in the man's moral nature. In his normal life he is one of the most upright and honest of men. In his abnormal state, however, he is an inveterate thief. He will steal everything he can lay his hands upon ; and if he cannot steal anything else, he will steal his own things and hide them away."*

It may fairly be urged, if this man in his *abnormal* state, seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling nothing, acting mechanically, and being an "inveterate thief" is an automaton, what is he when he has all his senses in full operation, and when he is an upright and honest man? Surely something very different from an automaton—as are all other men who comport themselves in a manner so opposed to this kind of Automatism.

The argument from the physiology of the nervous system, if pursued to the uttermost, would probably only lead to a "drawn battle," in a scientific aspect ; and then the general tendency of men to *think* that they possess some power of voluntary action would turn the scale against Automatism. In Mr. Huxley's essay on the "Scientific Aspects of Positivism," the position is thus stated, in the writer's peculiarly forcible and nervous style:—

"As the ages lengthen, the borders of Physicism increase. . . . Even theology, in her purer forms, has ceased to be anthropomorphic, however she may talk. Anthropomorphism has taken stand in its last fortress—man himself. But science closely invests the walls ; and philosophers gird themselves for battle upon the last and greatest of all speculative problems—Does human nature possess any free volitional or truly anthropomorphic element, or is it only the cunningest of all nature's clocks? Some, among whom I count myself, think that the battle will for ever remain a drawn one, and that, for all practical purposes, this result is as good as anthropomorphism winning the day."†

But the final struggle of Automatism, and what is here called Anthropomorphism, will have to be fought on the field of Evolution, and the battle cannot be a drawn one. Being in direct opposition to the instincts and convictions of humanity, the aggressive doctrine must *prove* its right to acceptance, or it will infallibly be rejected. If, on the other hand, the doctrine of Evolution, as now set forth, be a true doctrine, I see (and wish to see) no escape from its logical and inevitable corollary, Automatism, in its fullest sense. Mr. Huxley's conclusion, from his own premises, is equally cogent and perspicuous. "But," says he, "I bid you beware that, in accepting these conclusions, you are placing your feet on the first rung of a ladder which, in most people's estimation, is the reverse of Jacob's, and leads to the antipodes of heaven. It may seem a small thing to admit that the dull vital actions of a fungus, or a foraminifer, are the properties of their protoplasm, and are the direct results of the nature of the

* *British Medical Journal*, August 24th, 1874.

† *Lay Sermons*, &c., pp. 163-4.

matter of which they are composed. But if, as I have endeavoured to prove to you, their protoplasm is essentially identical with, and most readily converted into, that of any animal, I can discover no logical halting-place between the admission that such is the case, and the further concession that all vital action may, with equal propriety, be said to be the result of the molecular forces of the protoplasm which displays it.* The "conclusions" referred to in the opening of this passage were those noticed at the end of the first part of this inquiry, and it becomes necessary now to examine them further.

Mr. Huxley proposes† to demonstrate that "a three-fold unity—namely, a unity of power or faculty, a unity of form, and a unity of substantial composition"—pervades the whole living world. In expanding the first idea as to unity of power or faculty, he affirms that "all the multifarious activities of man are comprehensible under three categories. Either they are immediately directed towards the maintenance and development of the body, or they effect transitory changes in the relative positions of parts of the body, or they tend towards the continuance of the species;"—that is to say, all the faculties of man consist in nutrition, motion, or reproduction of the species. And this classification is propounded as exhaustive, and not excluding "intellect, feeling, and will, which we rightly name the higher faculties, . . . inasmuch as to every one but the subject of them they are known only as transitory changes in the relative position of parts of the body."

It might not be inopportune here to inquire whether Mr. Huxley — has borne in mind, in this most marvellous of statements, his own — far-famed canon, that "it is the first duty of a hypothesis to be — intelligible." In the absence of any explanation, or any attempt — at proof, unless Goethe's well-known epigram be intended for — either, it is difficult to conjecture what the passage may mean. It seems equally to defy exegesis, commentary, or criticism. **IF** the meaning be, as superficially considered it would appear, **that** mental operations are identical with muscular motion, because without this latter the former cannot be communicated to others, I confess my entire inability to discuss it. If it possesses any more recondite meaning, it must be such as has no close bearing upon the doctrine in question, inasmuch as there is no further reference to it; and it is only illustrated by some interesting details of contraction in animal and vegetable tissues.

By a "unity of form," Mr. Huxley seems to imply that all organisms, at some period of their existence, present themselves as particles of protoplasm, with or without a nucleus. If the position means more than this it is untenable. It appears to have but

* Lay Sermons, &c., p. 138.

† Op. cit. p. 122.

little doctrinal force or application, but it will be called upon hereafter as "evidence for the defence."

Finally, Mr. Huxley predicates a "unity of substantial composition" in all living beings, an all-important truth, the significance of which it would not be easy to over-estimate. It may be confidently asserted, without any paradox, that this one incontestable fact of itself overthrows or devitalizes the entire doctrine which is founded upon it. For, if it be true, as asserted, that "all vital action is the result of the molecular forces of the protoplasm that displays it;" if "the properties of protoplasm result from the nature and disposition of its molecules;" and if, again, there is no "substantial difference" between the protoplasm of the lobster and that of man, then should the functions of the protoplasm in both be identical; whereas we find them in the lobster strictly confined to the three categories of nutrition, motion, and reproduction; whilst in man they are found subservient to all his "multifarious and complicated activities," which include certainly "intellect, feeling, and will;" and that these are *not* to be comprehended under either nutrition, motion, or reproduction, is too obvious to require, or even to admit of, proof. The dilemma is serious, and cannot be explained away by an appeal to any idea of greater complexity of structure or aggregation, which would only afford an answer to the ear, and not to the understanding. If language has any definite meaning, and if logical sequence has any force, the difficulty can only be solved by a frank acknowledgment that every form of life has its own special forces and endowments, concerning which science can tell us nothing at present with any certainty, except that they are assuredly not to be explained by any theory of the molecular possibilities of protoplasm.

Mr. Huxley's ideas as to the composition of protoplasm have already been noticed, and it has been shown that they are clearly opposed to the known facts of science. Here a simple alternative presents itself; either Mr. Huxley is familiar with the elementary facts of organic chemistry, in which case he would be aware of the impossibility of such a composition; or he is not so, on which supposition it was at least indiscreet to found an important practical doctrine like that of human Automatism on a purely fanciful chemical theory. Which alternative is to be adopted may perhaps receive some illustration from a parallel passage in the essay "On the Formation of Coal,"* where, referring to the burning of coal, it is said:—

"Heat comes out of it, light comes out of it, and if we could gather together all that goes up the chimney, and all that remains in the grate of a thoroughly-burnt coal-fire, we should find ourselves in possession of a

* Critiques and Addresses, p. 109.

quantity of carbonic acid, water, ammonia, and mineral matters, *exactly equal* in weight to the coal!"

It requires but the most elementary acquaintance with the subject to recognize that the "quantity" of these products would be at least twice, probably thrice, as great as the original weight of the coal. A due consideration and comparison of these facts will enable the reader to estimate at its true value the *science* from which such stupendous consequences are so confidently deduced.

Leaving now this branch of the subject, I revert to some considerations respecting the nature and tendencies of this doctrine. We are told that one great object of the essay on "Protoplasm" was to show "that what is called *Materialism* has no sound philosophical basis."*

Indeed, both Mr. Huxley and Professor Tyndall, whilst avowedly adopting a "materialistic terminology," seem to evince a somewhat morbid objection to being considered materialists; overlooking the most obvious first principle of nomenclature, that "names are to know things by." By common consent it has been agreed to know that school of philosophy which relegates all thought and intelligence to the domain of matter, by the name of "Materialistic"—not as a term of reproach, but as a distinctive epithet. Materialism is quite as good as any other *ism*, if it be *demonstrably true*—personally, I should say *better*, always under this limitation.

Mr. Huxley says, "This union of materialistic terminology with the repudiation of materialistic philosophy, I share with some of the most thoughtful men with whom I am acquainted." This simply amounts to a confession that Mr. Huxley's words are not intended to express his ideas, and that other "foremost thinkers" make an equally deceptive use of words. But it has become customary of late years to consider it immaterial what language is used to express, or it may be to conceal, our ideas. Thus Mr. Huxley continues that—

"In itself it is of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit; or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter; matter may be regarded as a form of thought; thought may be regarded as a property of matter: each statement has a certain relative truth. But with a view to the progress of science, the materialistic terminology is in every way to be preferred." (P. 146.)

Language is indeed of "little moment," if it be true that thought may be "regarded as a property of matter;" but to assert this is to assume the whole point in dispute,—to beg the entire question. Mr. Herbert Spencer thinks the

"question is scarcely worth deciding; since either answer leaves us as completely outside of the reality as we were at first.

* Yeast, p. 96.

“Nevertheless, it may be as well to say here, once for all, that were we compelled to choose between the alternatives of translating mental phenomena into physical phenomena, or of translating physical phenomena into mental phenomena, the *latter alternative* would seem the more acceptable of the two.”*

If all this be merely “padding,” it is perhaps legitimate enough. If it be intended for science or philosophy, or to convey any kind of information, it would appear to be a failure. One single illustrative example would be worth volumes of such rhetorical artifice as this. Hard, soft, round, angle, curve, colour, form, and a host of similar words are known as “terms of matter.” Thought, will, feeling, perception, idea, reason, and the like, are generally known as “terms of spirit or mind.” Now when Mr. Spencer has defined an epicycloid curve in “terms of mind,” or when Mr. Huxley has expressed a misapprehension or an error of judgment in “terms of matter,” then, and not until then, will we believe that terminology is a thing of “little moment,”—and until then we will also believe that there is something we call matter, and something else which is *not* matter, and which we are accustomed to call mind, which are not to be confounded or mistaken one for the other; and the phenomena of each of which respectively are not to be expressed in terms of the other, except by an arbitrary departure from the recognized and accepted meaning of words.

But whilst the terminology made use of is confessedly materialistic, some process of reconciliation with a spiritualistic philosophy is obviously required; and accordingly Mr. Huxley states† that he had led his readers into “the materialistic slough” in which they were now plunged, in order to point out “the sole path” by which, in his judgment, “extrication was possible.” I confess to some disappointment on traversing this path. I hoped for a rational, or at least plausible, dialectic account of some method by which matter could assume consciousness and volition. But such is not to be found. The method of extrication is certainly summary enough, if not either new or satisfactory. It consists wholly and solely in refusing to recognize any difference between matter and spirit, on the remarkable ground that we know nothing with certainty about either, and that it is of no consequence! And this is all, except a fragment of morality, which only makes “confusion worse confounded.”

“Why trouble ourselves about matters of which, however important they may be, we do know nothing, and can know nothing? We live in a world which is full of misery and ignorance, and the plain duty of each and all of us is to try to make the little corner he can influence somewhat less miserable, and somewhat less ignorant, than it was before he entered it.”‡

A very excellent doctrine, without doubt, and one upon which,

* *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 159.

† *Lay Sermons*, p. 139.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 145.

it may be freely acknowledged, the learned and eloquent speaker has ever strenuously, consistently, and successfully acted. But may it not be asked, "What does it all mean? If I am an automaton, how can I have any *duties* to perform? Conversely, if I have any *duties*, how can I be an automaton? What is duty? and *why* and how shall I do it?" I can only solve this and all cognate difficulties by supposing that it is with Automatism as with Materialism; that Mr. Huxley unites the use of the automatic terminology with the repudiation of the automatic philosophy;—and that, in fact, "what is called" Automatism "has no sound philosophical basis." I cannot more appropriately conclude this notice of the doctrine of "The Physical Basis of Life" than with an extract from the author's own anthology of criticism, where, speaking of the theory of creation, he says—

"That such verbal hocus-pocus should be received as science will one day be regarded as evidence of the low state of intelligence in the nineteenth century, just as we amuse ourselves with the phraseology about nature's abhorrence of a vacuum, wherewith Toricelli's compatriots were satisfied to explain the rise of water in a pump."*

The general doctrine of Evolution, so far as it bears upon human Automatism, involves three propositions:—

1. That the earliest organisms were the natural product of the interactions of ordinary inorganic matter and force.
2. That all the forms of animal and vegetable life were successively and gradually developed from the earliest and simplest organisms.
3. That man is only a higher animal, and the lineal descendant of a family of apes; or, quoting the words of Professor Tyndall, "the doctrine of Evolution derives man, in his totality, from the interaction of organism and environment through countless ages past."†

It would be manifestly impossible, within any reasonable limits, to enter exhaustively into an examination of the various topics involved in these propositions—the conservation of force, spontaneous generation, the origin and transformation of species, the genealogy of animals, man's position in nature, and the whole domain of metaphysics and psychology. This would require many volumes, instead of a few pages. What I propose to do, for the present, is to notice the latest utterances on the subject, and to attempt to gather from them whether there is any evidence for these three branches of the doctrine of Evolution, of sufficient weight and cogency to satisfy even those whose interest it is, in a philosophical point of view, to accept such evidence; or whether, on the contrary, they are founded upon assertion and conjecture

* Lay Sermons, p. 285.

† Belfast Address.

as to what may, might, could, or would occur under circumstances that cannot be defined, or conditions that cannot be fulfilled.

Professor Tyndall is the latest and unquestionably the most philosophical expositor of the properties of matter. Profoundly versed in physical science, endowed with an almost unrivalled faculty for experimental investigation and demonstration, skilled in weighing evidence, candid in argument, and open to the reception of the arguments of others, his guidance towards the formation of an opinion as to the origin of life cannot be otherwise than valuable. Let us therefore hear what he says, both in his character of philosopher and of man of science; for there is at least an *apparent* antagonism in the two forms of doctrine.

As a philosopher, Professor Tyndall discerns in matter* “the promise and potency of all terrestrial life.” He sees the earth, “once a molten mass, now not only swathed by an atmosphere, and covered by a sea, but also crowded with living things” (p. 351). He believes with Mr. Herbert Spencer† that this “life under all its forms has arisen by an unbroken evolution, and through the instrumentality of what are called natural causes;” and has no doubt that “were not man’s origin implicated, we should accept without a murmur the derivation of animal and vegetable life from what we call inorganic nature. The conclusions of pure intellect point this way and no other.”‡ He sees, with the eye of the imagination, a primitive “nebular haze,” gradually contracting into a “molten mass,” in which are “latent and potential” not only all the forms of life, noble and ignoble, “but the human mind itself—emotion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena . . . all our philosophy, all our poetry, all our science, and all our art;” all are “potential in the fires of the sun.”§ A fuller and more uncompromising expression of the doctrine can scarcely be imagined.||

Now, what does the man of science respond to all this?

* P. 524. This and the following references are to the pages in the last edition of the “Fragments of Science.”

† Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 464.

‡ Introduction, p. 352.

§ Scientific Use of the Imagination, p. 453.

|| Professor Huxley not only discerns all this in the “cosmic vapour,” but considers it “no less certain . . . that a sufficient intelligence could, from a knowledge of the properties of the molecules of that vapour, have predicted, say the fauna of Britain in 1869, with as much certainty as one can say what will happen to the vapour of the breath in a cold winter’s day.”—*Genealogy of Animals*. This is worth a moment’s attention. In a homogeneous vapour, as this is supposed to be, the probability of the combination of any one atom with any other is defined by the number of the atoms contained in that vapour. This number defies even approximate determination. Any unit we could select, however multiplied, would give no idea whatever on the subject. To say that all the men that ever lived could not count the possible combinations of these atoms, were they to do nothing but count for myriads of æons, is to say little. And as I suppose, that no man, however “sufficient” his intelligence might be, would venture to predict the position of three balls on a billiard-table after ten ordinary strokes; it baffles all imagination to think what the intelligence referred to by Professor Huxley could be.

“Without *verification* [he says] a theoretic conception is a mere figment of the intellect. The region of theory . . . lies behind the world of the senses, but the verification of theory occurs in the sensible world. To check the theory we have simply to compare the deductions from it with the facts of observation. If the deductions be in accordance with the facts, we accept the theory: if in opposition, the theory is given up.”*

A truly philosophic method, preparing us for what follows, a scientific *judgment* which claims the most earnest and thoughtful consideration:—

“If you ask me whether there exists the *least evidence* to prove that any form of life can be developed out of matter, without demonstrable antecedent life, my reply is, that evidence considered perfectly conclusive by many has been adduced; and that were some of us who have pondered this question to follow a very common example, and accept testimony because it falls in with our own belief, we also should *eagerly close* with the evidence referred to. But there is in the true man of science a desire stronger than the wish to have his beliefs upheld; namely, the desire to have them true. And this stronger wish causes him to reject the most plausible support, if he has reason to suspect that it is vitiated by error. Those to whom I refer as having studied this question, believing the evidence offered in favour of ‘spontaneous generation’ to be thus vitiated, cannot accept it. . . . In reply to your question, they will frankly admit their inability to point to any satisfactory experimental proof that life can be developed, save from demonstrable antecedent life.”†

But further than this; the researches of Pasteur, justly termed by Mr. Huxley “models of accurate experimentation and logical reasoning,” and the brilliant and conclusive demonstrations of Professor Tyndall himself, as related in his essay on “Putrefaction and Infection,” have simply proved, beyond doubt or dispute, that without the presence of germs (that is, of antecedent life), no organisms ever originate under the conditions specified by the supporters of the theory of “spontaneous generation.”

Here then is a distinct want of accordance between philosophical theory and scientific observation. But it is obvious that it could not rest here. In the interests of the Evolution hypothesis, it was necessary to reconcile this antagonism, or to represent it as only apparent and temporary; and this has been done by crediting matter in the distant ages of the past with powers and faculties which it does not possess, or cannot be shown to possess, in these times. The method is worthy of some attention, in detail.

Mr. Huxley, in his essay on “Biogenesis and Abiogenesis,” one of the ablest and most lucid expositions ever given of that problem, says, that although he thinks “it would be the height of presumption for any man to say that the conditions under which matter assumes the properties we call *vital* may not some day be artificially brought together,” yet he sees “no reason for believing that the fact has been accomplished yet.” But he continues—

* Fragments of Science, p. 469.

† Belfast Address, p. 525.

“Were it given to me to look beyond the abyss of geologically recorded time to the still more remote period when the earth was passing through physical and chemical conditions, which it can no more see again than a man can recall his infancy, I should expect to be a witness of the Evolution of living protoplasm from not-living matter.”*

In like manner, Professor Tyndall believes that if a planet were “carved from the sun, set spinning round an axis, and revolving round the sun at a distance from him equal to that of our earth,”† one of the “consequences of its refrigeration” would be the development of organic forms; for “who will set limits to the possible play of molecules in a cooling planet?”‡

Doubtless these conjectures are worthy of respectful consideration, in deference to the high authorities whence they emanate; but still they are only conjectures of the vaguest possible kind, and would require very much explanation to give them any scientific value.

What (it might be asked) were those “conditions” through which the earth was passing? Was there any different matter present at that time? That is not contended. Was there any now unknown kind of force in operation; or were the same forces acting in greater intensity? The latter would seem to be the idea suggested; but it can scarcely be considered plausible, since surely we have at our command forces *at least as* intense as any that could be compatible with the development or continuance of life. If organic matter could be originated by the interactions of moisture, and inorganic matter in a cooling state, with any amount or any combination of heat, light, and electricity, surely we ought to be able to imitate the process. I cannot see that a cooling planet would be much more likely to produce minute organisms than a cooling flask; and Dr. Bastian’s question is full of force and pertinence when he asks:—

“If such synthetic processes took place then, why should they not take place now? Why should the inherent molecular properties of various kinds of matter have undergone so much alteration?”§

When we are told that our earth was once a nebulous haze, then a fiery cloud, then a molten spheroid, and afterwards passed through various different physical conditions as it cooled, we

* Critiques and Addresses, p. 239.

† Vitality, p. 464.

‡ Ibid. p. 644.

§ Beginnings of Life, Preface, p. x. Dr. Bastian is the latest, and certainly by far the most formidable, of the champions of the doctrine of “Spontaneous Generation.” His volumes are full of the records of arduous, thoughtful, and conscientious work, and must ever retain a conspicuous place in the literature of biological science. It is not within my present scope of purpose to enter into the details of this question; they are too extensive to be introduced under the present plan. And, moreover, the time is not the most favourable for justice to be done to such works as those alluded to. The investigations of M. Pasteur and Professor Tyndall have, for the time being at least, satisfied the majority of scientific men that the hypothesis of Abiogenesis or Archeobiosis is not necessary to account for the facts in question. It is a subject obviously open to experimental demonstration, and perhaps the last word has not yet been said.

accept the history as at least possible, or even highly probable, because in each of its steps there is something that falls in with our previous knowledge of physical law and action ; and because each of these hypothecated changes in physical condition can be imitated experimentally as often as we wish. Very many, if not most of the forms of matter can be manifested in a solid, a fluid, or a gaseous state, according to temperature, pressure, and other conditions ; so far therefore there is nothing either incredible or unlikely in such a history of the physical development or evolution of the earth.

It is otherwise when we are authoritatively told that the same forces that rounded the planet have developed the organism. We ask for an illustration, or an imitation of the process, but in vain ; nay more, it is demonstrated to us that such an imitation is absolutely impossible. The seeker after truth then naturally replies, " You have doubtless other reasons for holding to this doctrine ; as it stands at present, it is but an ' unverified theoretic conception,' and as such can have no scientific value, or certainly not one of sufficient weight to entitle you to found upon it so important a practical doctrine as that of human automatism."

Professor Tyndall *has* other reasons, profound, beautiful, and philosophical ; whether conclusive or not, it remains to be seen. Having premised that the strength of the doctrine of evolution does not consist in experimental demonstration, but in its general harmony with scientific thought, he proceeds :—

" Those who hold the doctrine of evolution are by no means ignorant of the uncertainty of their data, and they only yield to it a provisional assent. They regard the nebular hypothesis as probable, and in the utter absence of any evidence to prove the act illegal, they extend the method of nature from the present into the past. Here the observed uniformity of nature is their only guide. Within the long range of physical inquiry, they have never discerned in nature the insertion of caprice. Throughout this range, the laws of physical and intellectual continuity have run side by side. Having thus determined the elements of their curve * in a world of observation and experiment, they prolong that curve into an antecedent world, and accept as probable the unbroken sequence of development from the nebula to the present time."†

A truly refined conception ; and a perfectly legitimate method of supplementing the lack of direct evidence, where this is obviously unattainable. But we must be careful not to be led away either by force of thought or grace of style into forgetfulness of whither we are going. It must be remembered that this is the last stronghold of the theory of the material origin of life, involving the most essential and radical principle of evolution, and its necessary

* " From a few observations of a comet, when it comes within the range of his telescope, an astronomer can calculate its path in regions which no telescope can reach in like manner, by means of data furnished in the narrow world of the ourselves at home in other and wider worlds, which can alone."—*Fragments of Science*, p. 71.

† *Scienti*

corollary, Automatism. Observation has failed to give any support to the doctrine; experiment has demonstrated its present impossibility; conjecture is valueless; but the "law of continuity" has still to be tested. Let us inquire what it tells us.

Going backwards from generation to generation into the far distant ages, and passing "from the highest to the lowest organisms," each form of life in long succession declares, in inarticulate but unmistakable language, "I derived my life from antecedent life." But we may imagine ourselves finally to arrive at the period when the *first* organisms appeared on our globe. What do they tell us? If there be any such "laws of physical and intellectual continuity" as have been spoken of, extending across this line, then *they also* to our interrogation, "Whence came ye?" must reply, "From antecedent life." If instead of this they say, "We are the natural product of the interactions of inorganic matter and force," then the "continuity" of thought is no longer possible—the curve is broken, or becomes "transcendental," not to be defined by any mental equation. A possible verbal resource here might be to indicate a gradual and insensible transition from the organic to the inorganic. Apparently pointing in this direction, Professor Tyndall continues:—

"On tracing the line of life backwards, we see it approaching more and more to what we call the purely physical condition. We come at length to those organisms which I have compared to drops of oil, suspended in alcohol and water. We reach the *protogenes* of Haeckel, in which we have a type distinguishable from a fragment of albumen only by its finely granulated character."*

This is a profoundly important statement—one demanding the utmost attention, and one in which, unless I am greatly mistaken, there is a misapprehension of so serious a nature as to vitiate the entire argument. The *protogenes* is minute, and *apparently* insignificant; it is also nearly homogeneous; but who knows so well as Professor Tyndall, or who has so clearly and beautifully demonstrated as he, that *apparent* homogeneity is no argument for the absence of structure? This little organism is either living or not living; we know of no transition forms; there are none such; this would involve a contradiction in terms. If living, as it is by the terms of the case, it is a fragment of living "*protoplasm*," which protoplasm, as Mr. Huxley has demonstrated, has the same "powers and faculties," the same "form," and the same "substantial composition," whether seen in the "dull foraminifer," in those "broad discs of glassy jelly which may be seen pulsating through the waters of a calm sea," or in "the flower which a girl

in her hair, and the blood which courses through her
L"

* Belfast Address, p. 524.

There is nothing to justify us in concluding that in the *protogenes* there is any approach whatever to the "purely physical condition." The line of demarcation between this "fragment of albumen" and any inorganic matter is as defined, if not as wide, as between the eagle and the rock on which the eyry is built. The protoplasm of the *protogenes* is, organically at least, as active* as that of any other organism; its formation from inorganic matter equally defies our efforts; its functions are as incapable of expression by any physical formula. On what grounds, then, scientific or transcendental, can we expect to hear this form of life declare, "I came direct from the universal mother who brings forth all things as the fruit of her womb,† and I own no other parentage?" Surely in this we should be able to discern no "unbroken sequence of development from the nebula to the present time!" and what has become of the "observed uniformity of nature?"

But in nothing is the weakness of this doctrine more manifest than in the nature of the attempts so constantly made to justify a belief, that chemistry will in the future be more successful in forming organizable matter from inorganic elements than it has been in the past. Professor Tyndall, who may reasonably be expected to make the best of the case, finds nothing more to say than this:—

"The matter of the animal body is that of inorganic nature. There is no substance in the animal tissues that is not primarily derived from the rocks, the water, and the air. Are the forces of organic matter, then, different in kind from those of inorganic matter? The philosophy of the present day negatives the question. It is the compounding, in the organic world, of forces belonging equally to the inorganic, that constitutes the mystery and the miracle of vitality. Every portion of every animal body may be reduced to purely inorganic matter. A perfect reversal of this process of reduction would carry us from the inorganic to the organic and such a reversal is at least conceivable!!" ‡

An organism that has to exist, and derives its means of continuance from the external world, must of necessity consist of the same matter (in part) as that world, under whatever theory of ontology it is supposed to exist. By no logical process, however, can this fact be considered as absolutely determining the nature of the forces operating upon it, or inherent in it; that is an altogether independent question. But the concluding sentence of the last quotation contains certainly one of the most marvellous of all the conceptions ever set forth in scientific guise. If we imagine a crystal vase dashed to myriads of atoms on the ground,

* "Nor are such organisms insignificant by reason of their want of complexity. It is a fair question whether the protoplasm of those simplest forms of life, which people an immense extent of the bottom of the sea, would not outweigh that of all the higher living beings which inhabit the land put together."—*Lay Sermons*, p. 128.

† Belfast Address, p. 524.

‡ Vitality, p. 463.

a manuscript burned to ashes, a living body killed by a fall of a thousand feet from a balloon, an exploded barrel of gunpowder; a "perfect reversal" of any of these events or processes, would be in every way as practicable as that which is here pronounced "at least conceivable." * The cause must indeed be considered hopeless into the service of which such suppositions as this are pressed.

And thus it is seen that observation and reason, experiment and analogy, alike refuse any support to the doctrine that derives life from the interactions of inorganic matter and force. Pending the production of additional evidence, we are entitled, at least, to hold it as "not proven," and absolutely to reject, as a baseless conception, any other doctrine, as that of human Automatism, which is built upon it.

But is this negative conclusion all that can be arrived at? Is there nothing positive to be known concerning the origin of life on the earth? I think there is; and that it can be shown with tolerable certainty that there is a break in the "curve" so often alluded to; and that the appearance of the earliest organic forms was attended by phenomena which admit of no explanation by any combination of inorganic forces.

"Not with the vagueness belonging to the emotions, but with the definiteness belonging to the understanding, the scientific man has to put to himself these questions regarding the introduction of life upon the earth. . . . As far as the eye of science has hitherto ranged through nature, no intrusion of purely creative power into any series of phenomena has ever been observed."†

I will not further complicate a sufficiently involved question by insisting that absolute scientific evidence can be produced to prove a "purely *creative* power" as intruding at any period of the world's history. This, however, may be affirmed with certainty, that at a certain epoch in that history a *new* power or force was manifested, a force that was not a continuation or modification of any one that had previously existed, nor, so far as can be shown, was it any combination of these. To avoid unnecessary verbiage and repetition, I will at once call this the "Organic Force," not as suggesting a theory, but merely for a name by which it may be known.

Why is this "organic force" entitled to be called a *new* power or force? For this reason, that we know absolutely nothing of force but from its effects, and that this force produces effects that

* "The first quantitative analyses of organic bodies were made by Gay-Lussac and Thénard. The substance to be analysed was mixed with a known weight of chlorate of potassium, and made up into small pellets, which were dropped one by one through a stop-cock of peculiar construction, into an upright glass tube heated to redness, the gas thereby produced escaping by a lateral tube, and being collected over mercury," &c., &c. Such is the beginning, and only a very small part of the process described in Watts' Dictionary of Chemistry, a "perfect reversal" of which we are asked to consider as conceivable. The modern practice is almost indefinitely more complex. See also CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for September, pp. 556-8.

† Apology for the Belfast Address, p. 547.

no other known force or combination of forces can accomplish. To take but one simple instance, the organic force in vegetable tissue can decompose carbonic acid, at ordinary temperatures, into carbon and oxygen. Now this cannot be effected by the intensification of any one, or by any combination, of the ordinary forces of the inorganic world, and therefore we are not only entitled, but if we would be consistent we are compelled, to recognize that with the first forms of vegetable life, there was manifested an *intrusion* of some new power into the world by whatever name, "creative" or otherwise, it may be called. Assuredly at this point in the world's history there was a most noteworthy disturbance of the laws and direction of matter and force,—*sudden* and *catastrophical*, not gradual and imperceptible; for we know of no gradual transition from death to life; and unless we can suppose ordinary matter itself spontaneously to assume powers, or faculties *exactly opposite* to those previously inherent in it, we are impelled to believe that this disturbance, this institution of an entirely new order of energy, this inauguration of a new epoch, this clothing of the earth with a living garment, was the direct result of a fiat from without, a power which was "certainly not mechanical."

I do not know how any candid inquirer can close his eyes to so patent a fact as this introduction of a new force. It is customary to evade this necessity by calling it *chemistry*. Be it so; the name will do as well as any other for those who, to satisfy the exigencies of an "unverified theoretic conception," will be content to classify the most opposed phenomena in one and the same category. If life force be chemistry, it is a chemistry unknown in our laboratories; producing effects exactly the reverse of most of the chemistry with which we are acquainted; and residing only in an organic structure, which is indebted for its properties to a special endowment, handed down to it through countless generations and ages of antecedent life.

Whatever test we apply to this force, it is found to differ *toto cælo* from all known inorganic forces. All these can be demonstrated and made evident to the senses; they can be made to pass from one mass of matter to another, by contact, by impulse, by radiation, by transmission; they can be measured by our instruments; they can for the most part be collected in volume, or in some other way accumulated, and stored up for use at will. Can we effect anything even remotely resembling all this with the organic force or energy? Can we collect it, or its component parts—if it be "compounded" of inorganic forces—as it leaves the dying organism? No, all this is impossible. And if the "mystery and miracle of vitality" be merely "the compounding, in the organic world, of forces equally belonging to the inorganic,"* it is evidently due from those

* Vitality, p. 562.

who assert this doctrine, that they should show at least some resemblance or analogy between the two classes of actions, or that they should give some hint as to how any possible or conceivable combination of inorganic forces can be made, even in thought, to represent the actions of a living organism. As this has never been done and can never be done, the assertion must pass, amongst the rest, as indicating a relation which *ought to be* true in order to support the theory of Evolution; but which, in the present state of our knowledge, does not seem to have any scientific foundation.

One point remains to be noticed, which will still more clearly mark the difference between vital or organic, and any form of inorganic, force; which will, in fact, if demonstrated, prove the existence of a chasm between the two orders of energy that cannot, even dialectically, be bridged over. I refer to certain considerations connected with the great discovery of modern times, the doctrine of the conservation and correlation of forces. It will be necessary briefly to state what these doctrines are, and then to inquire what are their relations to organic force. With regard to the "Conservation of Force," Helmholtz thus formulates it:—

"The total quantity of all the forces capable of work in the whole universe remains eternal and unchanged throughout all their changes. All change in nature amounts to this—that force can change its form and locality without its quantity being changed. The universe possesses, once for all, a store of force which is not altered by any change of phenomena, can neither be increased nor diminished, and which maintains any change which takes place on it."*

An important position, and one that is susceptible of scientific demonstration, so far as observations on finite quantities can determine the conditions of the infinite. But we are more particularly interested in the question of the Correlation of forces, a doctrine the beauty and importance of which can scarcely be over-estimated—one that forms the basis of all modern philosophical thought on physical subjects, and that is associated almost as a "household word" with the name of our distinguished countryman, Sir W. R. Grove. In his own words, its bearing and tendency are thus sketched:—

"Light, heat, electricity, magnetism, motion, and chemical affinity, are all convertible material affections; assuming either as the cause, one of the others will be the effect; thus heat may be said to produce electricity, electricity to produce heat, magnetism to produce electricity, electricity magnetism, and so of the rest. Cause and effect, therefore, in their abstract relation to these forces, are words solely of convenience. We are totally ~~intended~~ with the ultimate generating power of each and all of them, shall ever remain so; we can only ascertain the *normæ* of

* Popular Lectures, p. 360.

their action; we must humbly refer their causation to one omnipresent influence, and content ourselves with studying their effects, and developing, by experiment, their mutual relations."*

Following out in a little fuller detail the application of this doctrine, we learn that, beginning with any one of these physical forces, we may form cycles of greater or less comprehensiveness, each one bringing us back to the point whence we started. Thus beginning with mechanical motion, we can observe its conversion into heat; and this heat may be either at once reconverted into motion, or it may give rise to light, to electricity, or to chemical affinity. The cycles may embrace two, three, or all of these forms of force. Motion may produce heat or light; light or heat may produce chemical affinity; this in turn may produce electricity, and this magnetism; whence, again, we may derive mechanical motion. The order of the elements of the cycle may be almost indefinitely changed. Probably, were our means of investigation perfect, we might observe the immediate production of any one term of the series by any other. The quantities of the resultant forces are also definite and constant.

It is in attempting to incorporate organic force into this cycle of transformations that by our entire failure we arrive at the conviction that life, in its essence, is something beyond any combination of physical forces; in short, that LIFE HAS NO PHYSICAL CORRELATE.

For, in the first place, no one will contend that the organic force is directly interchangeable with any *one*† term of the series, therefore in so far at least it differs from any physical force; for in the cycles alluded to one force only was required to produce another, not a combination of several. But is the organic force *interchangeable* with any number or any combination of the other forces? This requires careful consideration; the negative answer, however, cannot be doubtful.

Each individual *action* of an organism will have its physical correlate; the motion of an organism will produce heat not the less that it is an organism; chemical changes will produce electric conditions in the organism as well as outside it; but the force itself which underlies, originates, combines, and utilizes all these single manifestations, is something which has no known or conceivable correlative.

It may be objected to this that "life" is but the sum of the individual actions of an organism, and that the sum of the corre-

* The Correlation of the Physical Forces. Preface to 5th edition, p. xiv.

† Oken certainly asserts that "galvanism is the principle of life," and that "there is no other vital force than the galvanic polarity."—*Physiophilosophy*, sec. 884. He also proceeds to say that "organism is galvanism residing in a thoroughly homogeneous mass . . . a galvanic pile, pounded into atoms, must become alive. In this manner nature brings forth organic bodies." But these instructive details were written under "a kind of inspiration."

lates of these would represent the correlate of a living organism. The position is untenable; but a full discussion of it would lead us away into irrelevant issues. It is not contended by the most ardent believers in evolution that we can trace with any accuracy the correlations of living force.

But granting, for the sake of the argument, everything that can be claimed, it is still evident that there is no true "correlation," in any definite or scientific sense, between life and any of the forces commonly known as *inorganic*. For whilst organic force can give origin to, or, we may even say, can be converted into, the various forms of physical force, the converse does not hold good; no physical force or combination of forces can be reconverted into organic force; so that whilst the relations of the ordinary physical forces represent a closed curve or cycle continually returning upon itself, the introduction of organic force into any point in the series carries the line off into infinitude, and renders the curve as incapable of closure as a parabolic projection. The "reciprocity" is one-sided.

Mr. Herbert Spencer deals with this question in his own peculiar manner, of which we have already seen one or two examples. He commences by acknowledging candidly the difficulty of the subject, and thus continues:—

"Involved as are the phenomena of evolution, it is not to be expected that a definite quantitative relation can in each case, or indeed in any case, be shown between the forces expended in successive phases. We have not adequate data for this; and probably shall never have them. . . . The most we can hope is to establish a qualitative relation, that is indefinitely quantitative—quantitative in so far as involving something like a due proportion between causes and effects. If this can be done, however, some progress will be made towards the solution of our problem."*

After some details of evolution of inorganic bodies under conditions for which "it is impossible to assign a reason,"† but which are all traced ultimately to a "still progressing motion" of the substance of the sun and of the earth towards their respective centres of gravity, he sets forth this position—"That the forces exhibited in vital actions, vegetable and animal, are similarly derived, is so obvious a deduction from the facts of organic chemistry, that it will meet with ready acceptance from readers acquainted with those facts."‡

And it must be acknowledged that this acceptance will follow most naturally from these "*facts of organic chemistry*" as known and set forth by Mr. Herbert Spencer. One of these so-called facts refers to the decomposition of carbonic acid and water by vegetable tissue, and is stated as follows:—"To overcome the

* First Principles, chap. ix.

† Ibid. p. 266.

‡ Ibid. p. 271.

powerful affinities which hold their elements together, requires the expenditure of force, and this force is supplied by the sun.”*

On such science and on such facts is the modern “Constructive Philosophy” built up! The plain and simple answer to this statement is, that the sun *does not* supply the required force. The sun might beat for thousands of years upon carbonic acid and water without altering their chemical constitution in the least. The analytic force is inherent in an organism, which performs what no combination of inorganic forces can effect. The sun’s rays stimulate and favour this action, but are not even *essential* as an accessory to their production. Hear Mr. Huxley:—

“Take, for example, the singular fact that yeast will increase indefinitely when grown *in the dark*, in water containing only tartrate of ammonia, a small per-centage of mineral salts, and sugar. Out of these materials the *torulæ* will manufacture nitrogenous protoplasm, cellulose, and fatty matters, in any quantity, although they are wholly deprived of those rays of the sun, the influence of which is essential to the growth of ordinary plants. There has been a great deal of speculation lately as to how the living organisms buried beneath two or three thousand fathoms of water, and therefore in all probability almost deprived of light, live. If any of them possess the same powers as yeast (and the same capacity of living without light is exhibited by some other fungi), there would seem to be no difficulty about the matter.”†

Mr. Spencer proceeds to state that “the *irresistible inference* is that the forces by which plants abstract the materials of their tissues from surrounding inorganic compounds—the forces by which they grow and carry on their functions—are forces that previously existed as solar radiations” (p. 272). From that point there is naturally but little difficulty in arriving at a *qualitative* correlation, at least, for the organic force; and after traversing a dense jungle of verbiage, in which revelations of the same scientific value as that just quoted abound, Mr. Herbert Spencer emerges into the open country with a declaration concerning “the forces called vital, which *we have seen* (!) to be correlates of the forces called physical.”‡

Subsequently, by virtue of much repetition, the doctrine is considered to be so far established that it may serve as a basis for further argument; and is referred to in these terms:—

“Now that the transformation and equivalence of forces is *seen* by men of science to hold not only throughout all inorganic actions, but throughout all organic actions; now that even mental changes are recognized as the correlatives of cerebral changes, which also conform to this principle; and now that there must be admitted the corollary, that all actions going on in a society are measured by certain antecedent energies, which disappear in effecting them, while they themselves become actual or potential energies from which subsequent actions arise; it is strange that there should not

* *Lec. cit.*

† *Critiques and Addresses*, p. 90.

‡ *Op. cit.* p. 278.

have arisen the consciousness that these highest phenomena are to be studied as lower phenomena have been studied—not, of course, after the same physical methods, but in conformity with the same principles.”*

It is somewhat amusing that this passage, perhaps as full of unverified assumptions as any equal number of words in the English language, occurs in a chapter especially devoted to holding up to reprobation and ridicule the practice of forming and expressing opinions before having duly considered the grounds on which any such opinions should be based, or without having the power to estimate the facts which bear upon them. From what has been said before it is obvious that until the convertibility of inorganic into organic force can be demonstrated, no “correlation” between the two can be recognized, and therefore can only be “*seen* by men of science” in the form of an assertion or a theoretic conception. It is still more certain, if possible, that “mental changes” are not “*correlatives*,” in any demonstrable or scientific sense, of “cerebral changes;” but the whole domain of psychology I wish to defer to a future occasion, as it is too important and extensive to be treated as a mere collateral issue; and the same considerations apply to the sociological question introduced in the third clause. It must suffice here to say, that Mr. Spencer has hitherto failed to adduce any valid evidence, or even any strong inferential reason for believing, that either life or thought have any definable correlative in the inorganic world.

In concluding this branch of the inquiry, I wish to institute a comparison between the mode in which I have attempted to establish the existence of a special “organic force,” and certain methods now of universal application in physical science.

In all modern investigations into the nature and properties of the imponderables, especially light and heat, we find a certain ETHER occupying a prominent position as the substratum of these phenomena, concerning which I will quote a few sentences from Professor Tyndall’s lectures on “Heat as a Mode of Motion”—lectures which will be esteemed models of scientific thought and demonstration so long as science is remembered.

“According to the theory now universally received, light consists of a vibratory motion of the molecules of the luminous body; but how is this motion transmitted to our organs of sight? Sound has the air as its medium, and a close examination of the phenomena of light, by the most refined and demonstrative experiments, has led philosophers to the conclusion that space is occupied by a substance almost infinitely elastic, through which the pulses of light make their way. . . .

“The luminous ether fills stellar space; it makes the universe a whole, and renders possible the intercommunication of light and energy between star and star. But the subtle substance penetrates further; it surrounds the very atoms of solid and liquid substances. . . .”

* The Study of Sociology, p. 6.

This ether also, "whose motions are the light of the universe," is itself invisible; it is imponderable and impalpable; it cannot be isolated, nor compressed, nor attenuated, nor exhausted, nor excluded from any space. It is of "almost infinite tenuity," and yet its "properties are those of a solid rather than of a gas. It resembles jelly rather than air."*

But how, it may be asked, do we arrive at a knowledge of the existence and properties of this ether? By a perfectly legitimate and philosophical process, which consists in reasoning backwards from effects to causes or substrata—from phenomena to that which underlies them. Light and heat are demonstrated to be modes of motion, tremors, undulations, or vibrations. But where motion is, there must be something that moves; what is that something in the case of light? Sound consists of movements of air; but undulations of air will not account for the phenomena of light, nor will any form of motion of any of the ponderable matters with which we are acquainted. Thought following thought in this manner, at last brings the investigator face to face with the inevitable supposition that all space is filled with this substance "of almost infinite tenuity;" not because he can *demonstrate* it; but because *nothing else will fulfil the conditions or account for these phenomena.*

Now suppose an objector says, "Matter I know, and force I know, but what is this? You call it substance, but that cannot be allowed. All the substance with which I am acquainted can be weighed, or measured, or handled, or in some other way be made evident to the senses in a concrete form. Nature is uniform in her action, and does not produce matter with such negative qualities as those of ether, because the exigencies of your hypothesis require it. Your ether is an incomprehensible and therefore intolerable paradox. You say that light cannot be accounted for by the undulations of any known ponderable matter. That is possible in the present state of science; but no doubt sometime you will know better how to arrange ordinary matter so as to produce the necessary undulations. *Therefore the theory of ether is an extinct belief.*"† What would be the effect of such a remonstrance as this? Without doubt it would be treated as altogether unworthy of an answer, and very justly so treated.

Mutatis mutandis, the argument may apply to the theory of a vital or organic "substance" or force. We meet with certain phenomena differing most widely from, and in many cases opposed to, those of the inorganic world—undulations, vibrations, motions, special chemical powers, to say nothing of more obscure and com-

* Fragments of Science, p. 4.

† It is a favourite formula of Mr. Herbert Spencer's, when speaking of the doctrine of Special Creation, to say that it belongs to a family of extinct beliefs.

plicated manifestations. We know (or think after many attempts that we know) that no arrangement or combination of any of those matters or forces which we call inorganic will produce these effects. We hypothecate, in consequence, another *special* force, not correlated to those of the inorganic world in the same way that these are correlated to each other; and as a name to know it by we call it the VITAL or ORGANIC FORCE. Is this in any way more unphilosophical than the hypothesis of an ETHER?


And when we go back far beyond the records of geological time, and stand in imagination on the line that marks the beginning of life on our earth; when we see on one side of this line matter obeying only simple and easily formulated laws, and on the other the same matter assuming complex forms and functions not to be imitated by any human skill or science, not reducible to any mechanical formula, not explicable by any play of molecular attractions and repulsions; when we are unable to comprehend that this matter can have spontaneously assumed these wondrous faculties and endowments, it is, perhaps, not an unphilosophic spirit that leads us reverently to trace in these phenomena the presence of a power that—

“Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent.”

And whilst lost in wonder at the infinitely varied forms of beauty everywhere arising, and the ever-changing yet ever-perfect adaptations of structure to function, of organism to environment, telling of an intelligence and a constructive power in comparison with which the most exalted of human faculties are but vanishing quantities; were we then permitted to ask this new-sprung life whence it came and what was its origin, it would be in no spirit of superstition or vain belief, but in accordance with the strictest rules of inductive philosophy, that we should expect to hear the answer, “The Hand that made us is Divine.”

CHARLES ELAM.

P.S.—I have but just discovered that I owe an apology to Mr. Herbert Spencer for an unintentional misrepresentation of his views at p. 546 of my previous paper. The passage in question was unfortunately taken at second-hand from a work of high character, where it was especially emphasized as illustrating the mode of development of *living from non-living matter*. It really refers to the action of light upon already formed organic matter. That it is but little more comprehensible when so read, can neither excuse nor extenuate the grave literary fault of using an unverified quotation, for which I express my sincere regret.



THE DETERIORATION OF BRITISH SEAMEN.

A REPLY TO MR. BRASSEY.

IT is of importance that men of the position and independence of Mr. Brassey should interest themselves in matters which affect the well-being of our Empire, and which, as with the subject under discussion, are closely identified with the very foundations of our national greatness. In Mr. Brassey we have one who conscientiously desires so to hold the balance between conflicting opinions as may enable him to form a correct judgment, and though we may differ with him on some points, we cannot but respect his arguments and convictions, and especially as his conclusions on the social part of the seaman question are equally shared in by us—that “there is, therefore, large room for improvement, and it will be a reflection on our age of advanced civilization if nothing effectual is accomplished for their amelioration.”

The esteem in which I hold Mr. Brassey, and the respect I have for his judgment, would deter me personally from controverting his arguments; but holding the position of Honorary Secretary to that Committee which has, perhaps more than any other association or individual, dealt with this question, I should fail in my duty did I not endeavour to point out what I believe to be erroneous conclusions in the paper contributed by Mr. Brassey to the *CONTEMPORARY* for August—nor should I hesitate, seeing he and we are at one in our aims to ameliorate and improve the condition socially and professionally of the British merchant seamen.

The general tendency of Mr. Brassey's arguments is towards

the conclusion that the British merchant seaman has not deteriorated. I quite agree with him that the genuine trained and disciplined seaman is as good as ever he was. We have only to see what discipline and training have done for the Royal Navy, and when we find in the mercantile marine men who have adopted sea life as a profession, and who have been brought up to it, there are not better seamen afloat. These are as good as ever they were. So far we agree; but in the argument, "Has the British seaman deteriorated?" we deal with the sailors as a body, and on this question of deterioration I am bound to credit the evidence submitted to my Committee.

Mr. Brassey has given the first position in point of evidence to the Committee I have the honour to represent; but, in order that the constitution of this Committee may not be misunderstood, as it has often been called a Shipowners' Committee or a Committee of Shipowners, and, therefore, liable to take a one-sided view of the question, I may point out that it consists of shipowners (sail and steam), merchants, underwriters, most intelligent shipmasters, and others, and I may say of these, they are all men who are not likely to be influenced by other than stern facts and evidence. Without repeating figures from my Committee's reports, and which have been already freely quoted by Mr. Brassey, it is enough to say that the evidence tendered to us overwhelmingly proves that seamen have seriously deteriorated, professionally, physically, and morally. Mr. Brassey says (page 399), "As a general rule it will be found that complaints proceed from ship-captains advanced in years, and from the owners of sailing ships." He is correct in saying the "complaints" proceed mainly from the owners of sailing ships; they have every reason to complain; they are the only trainers of seamen, yet do not get the benefit thereof, as their best men go into steam. But I must beg leave to correct his other statement that these complaints proceed as a general rule "from ship captains advanced in years." Our most intelligent and dispassionate evidence is not from such at all.

The Report of the Royal Commission on unseaworthy ships supports the deterioration view likewise.

Mr. Brassey refers to Messrs. Gray and Hamilton's Report to Parliament in 1872, but Mr. Gray's utterances since then are entirely opposed to his 1872 conclusions, and one can but ascribe this to his views being entirely changed on a further examination into the subject; and all the more honour to him that he permits his new convictions to overrule his former conclusions.

Mr. Brassey also refers to the views of steamship owners, and especially to those of Mr. Burns, of Glasgow, respecting their seamen, the pick, let it be observed, of the mercantile marine. But Mr. Burns's recent utterances through the press, and especially

his advocacy of training ships in the *Times* of 11th January, 1876, most clearly point to an opposite conclusion. Some of the managers of the large steamship lines out of Liverpool declare the men are incompetent. One of the largest steamship owners told me recently that some years ago he was disposed to question the correctness of the conclusions of this Committee, but now he considers they are not overstated. The managing director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company states that that company was obliged to supplant their English sailors to the extent of about 5,000, by Lascars, because the British sailors were so inefficient and insubordinate.

One of the resolutions passed at the meeting of shipowners of the United Kingdom at the London Tavern, in February last—the greatest meeting of shipowners ever held in this country, and representing both steam and sail—declared that a large proportion of the annual casualties at sea occur through the negligence, inefficiency, and intemperance of seamen, and that heavy losses are sustained by their constant desertions.

Mr. Brassey gives the opinion of the Consular Body in reply to the Board of Trade Circular of 1869, the majority of whom declare seamen have deteriorated; but he attaches great weight, favouring his own views on the subject, to Sir Philip Francis's observations, at least "that these in his judgment convey a more reasonable conclusion." Now Sir Philip Francis's conclusion is (p. 400):—

"My personal experience runs over a period of ten years only, and my opinion is, I fear, of small value; yet I think it is true that the character of the British seaman, whether better or worse, is open to improvement."

This is reasonable; for whether many of us can go back thirty or fifty years or not for the comparison, we, and I am glad Mr. Brassey likewise, can come to no other conclusion than that the character of the British sailor is open to improvement. Since the consular evidence above referred to we have others later: for instance, Acting-Consul Corfield, of Pernambuco, in his report on trade, navigation, and commerce for the year 1875, says:—

"Hitherto it is a matter of astonishment in a vast number of cases how it is that vessels reach their destination. . . . The question of unseaworthy seamen demands serious attention and improvement."

Another authority, and one considered of great weight by Mr. Brassey, as opposed to the deterioration theory, is Captain Furness. Now against this authority I should place the late Captain Mr. R.N.R., Superintendent of the Shipping Office at Liverpool, who had equal opportunities of judging, and whose judgment to use Mr. Brassey's own words, "appointed as he is to

equal justice between the seamen and their employers, may be accepted with the more implicit confidence." Captain Mott frequently in public, and to myself, expressed himself very strongly on the point, and declared that not only are seamen insubordinate and inefficient, but that they are much deteriorated as a body from what they were many years ago. To show the weight attaching to Captain Furnell's opinion, Mr. Brassey states that there were shipped through his office in 1873, 17,000 seamen, 1,800 mates, and 1,100 apprentices; now the office under Captain Mott shipped in that same year 117,579 seamen, 5,716 mates, and 1,355 apprentices. If the weight of authority is based upon observation, I should conclude it lies with Captain Mott.

The Liverpool Seamen's Protective Society numbering 3,000 practical sailors, a large proportion of whom are married men and members of the Royal Naval Reserve, in its petition to the House of Commons in February last, states that "a large proportion of loss of life and property at sea is the result of ships being partially manned by men who are not sailors, and the large number of foreigners." It (the petition) refers to the supply by crimps "of vagrants, tramps, and other incompetent men, which accounts for the inefficiency and insubordination so much complained of," and further proceeds to point out remedies "that will secure a more efficient and competent class of seamen" than now exist. This is in harmony with the universal opinion expressed to the writer by most of the respectable *bonâ fide* seamen he has spoken to on the subject.

Although it is scarcely within my province to meet the comments of a writer in the *Quarterly* for July last, yet as Mr. Brassey quotes the writer in support of his argument, I may be permitted briefly to refer to the same. The writer says that "the evidence before the Royal Commission on unseaworthy ships consists chiefly of individual opinion, which is in itself of little value." This is scarcely correct, for though the evidence was given by individuals, these individuals represented associations, being deputed by them to give evidence; for instance, the Shipowners' Association of Liverpool, the Liverpool Mercantile Marine Service Association, and the Liverpool Committee of Inquiry. The writer refers to one bright feature—the better and steadier class of men in steam. The fact is undoubted, for the pick of our seamen go into steam; but this is not "the extremely important feature in the case" he assumes, because these better men had all to be trained in sail; the training of the men is more important than the fact named. Nor is the statement by the writer quite correct, "how large a proportion they form of the whole service,"—that there were 74,843 seamen in steam in 1874, and that these form one-third of the whole of the mercantile marine. The real number

is roundly about 37,000 seamen, or about one-fourth of the whole *seamen* in the mercantile marine. No doubt the proportion is increasing, while it is decreasing in sail; but this fact will tend to make the difficulty all the greater, as there is and can be no professional training in steam; those better and steadier men are brought up in sailing ships.

Mr. Brassey's further argument, based upon his yachting experience, can hardly be accepted as bearing on the question: the men who form our yachts' crews are not likely to desert, and especially from such yachts as Mr. Brassey's, even in New York or Quebec; desertions from British ships in these ports are not the exception but the rule, as any master or shipowner can testify. I regret also having to take exception to Mr. Brassey's remark (p. 399):—

“The instances are happily rare where the British seaman has failed to do his duty in tempestuous weather at sea. The seaman-like qualities and courage of our nation are seldom wanting whenever an emergency arises.”

The bulk of evidence that has come before my Committee, and before the British public of late, clearly demonstrates the opposite to be the fact. I do not speak of the few genuine, good-trained men, who are as good as ever they were, but of the bulk of the men that constitute the crews in the forecastles of sailing ships: in dirty weather they have to be hounded out of their bunks; they hang back in every emergency, and if it were not for the pluck and seaman-like qualities of one or two good men, of the officers and boys, many a good ship would never come to land. Testimony to this state of things is constantly pouring in upon us.

I submit that in the foregoing I have shown that the *data* upon which Mr. Brassey bases his arguments are weak against the stronger evidence in favour of deterioration, and on the whole that the alleged deterioration of the British seaman is conclusively established.

Now leaving aside the question of comparison between their present condition and that of a remote past, it is without question a fact that our seamen are not what they should be, professionally, physically, or morally, and are not what the exigencies of our commerce and the maintenance of our maritime supremacy demand, and, in Mr. Brassey's own words (p. 403), “there is therefore large room for improvement,” and it is to men such as Mr. Brassey, whose sole aim is the good of all classes of his fellow-countrymen and to maintain the supremacy and honour of England, that we look to assist in remedying these evils.

In coming to right conclusions it is necessary to have proper *data* to guide us. Now there is no greater blunder in all this

question than to take the figures presented to Parliament, simply, without analysis. Many public speakers refer to the 300,000 seamen in the United Kingdom (this is taking the whole empire), and others to the 200,000 seamen (the number of men given in the Returns of the Registrar-General of Seamen, in all the vessels registered in the United Kingdom), but neither are correct. For instance, in 1875, the actual number of *bonâ fide* seamen in the British Mercantile Marine, including apprentices, was about 150,330; and if we deduct foreigners, the actual number of British seamen, including apprentices, is only about 130,330. One other great fallacy, and one very generally accepted, is that because of the gigantic increase in shipping, the demand has outstripped the supply of sailors, and hence the deterioration. Now take the year 1860 (I take it as it is sufficiently remote for my purpose, and is prior to that immense impetus given to our shipping in consequence of the American War); in that year we possessed 4,251,739 tons of shipping, while in 1875 we had 5,891,692 tons, or an increase of about $37\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., while of *bonâ fide* seamen, including apprentices, we had 143,992, or of British hands 129,713, against the respective figures of 150,330, and 130,330, in 1875, or an increase of seamen of about $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., but an increase of British seamen of only one-half per cent.; so that though our tonnage has increased $37\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in that time, we do not require many more sailors to work our tonnage. The reasons are obvious to any practical man looking to the figures I append at foot, and also taking into account the better appliances and arrangements for handling ships, their greater size (for though the total tonnage is so much greater, we have far fewer sailing ships in 1875 than in 1860), and also that while a ship of 500 tons has one first officer, one second officer, one carpenter, one boatswain, one sailmaker, one cook, and one steward, so the ship of 1,500 tons carries no greater number of these hands, and therefore arguments in favour of the efficiency of our seamen because our ships are now worked with fewer hands per 100 tons than before, are perfectly illusory.

But, it may be asked, wherefore all this hue and cry about an increased supply of seamen, if no more are required now than fifteen years ago? I would answer to this that no intelligent shipowner has complained of the scarcity of *men*—they are plentiful and abundant enough; but there is a dearth, and a great one, of *real* SEAMEN. We shall never want for “hands” so long as the crimp and the advance-note exist. The evil of the latter is represented by Mr. John Burns as “probably the most fruitful source of the deterioration of British Seamen.” This naturally leads to an inquiry into the causes of the present unsatisfactory condition of our seamen.

It appears the character of our men has undergone a change for the worse since 1854, and in this I am inclined to agree with the late Mr. Graves and Mr. Lamport, but the quality of our forecastles was getting deteriorated before then. There can be no question that the gold discoveries, first in California and afterwards in Australia, had much to do with this phase of the question. For years we did an enormous trade with these countries, and whole ships' crews invariably deserted for the diggings; the vacuum thus created had to be filled rapidly and repeatedly, and it was filled with the residuum of our populations; the demoralization which then set in, has continued more or less, and to this day it is the rule for men to desert in the colony, San Francisco, and elsewhere—in fact, it is notorious that this is the method adopted by many to get to the colony. In this the crimp and false discharges play a not inconsiderable part; it requires no argument therefore to show how we have few good seamen. The evil is doubtless increased by the abolition of the compulsory apprenticeship system, as fewer boys are now being trained on board ship; but it would be impolitic as well as impossible to revert to that system now. Many sailing shipowners are doing their duty by training apprentices, but the yearly addition from this source to the sailor hands is very limited, and fails to affect the general character of our forecastles; nevertheless, if apprenticeship and the training of boys could be extended, it would go far to increase the supply of a much-needed article. Shipowners might do much themselves; beyond this I can only look for improvement to an extended connection between the Royal Navy and the Mercantile Marine, by a comprehensive system of training for reserves, which, with the abolition of advance-notes and other matters that Mr. Brassey will no doubt deal with in a further paper, would in time alter the whole character and condition of our seamen. This end is attainable with little difficulty if shipowners, the Admiralty, and the Government would heartily and unitedly resolve to deal with the subject, and it will be a lasting disgrace if we do not avail ourselves of the material which is abundant and at hand for making the finest seamen in the world. We have but to look at what discipline and training have done for the Royal Navy to give us hope in what a modified form of these will do for the Mercantile Marine.

JOHN WILLIAMSON,

*Hon. Sec. to Liverpool Committee of Inquiry into the
Condition of our Merchant Seamen.*

[NOTE.]

THE DETERIORATION OF BRITISH SEAMEN. 755

OTE.—

360.—Total men employed in Steam and Sail, exclusive of
masters 171,592

ANALYSIS.


Men in <i>Sail</i>	145,487	
Off 10 per cent. for cooks and stewards who are not sailors ...	14,548	
	<hr/>	130,939
Men in <i>Steam</i>	26,105	
Off 50 per cent. for engineers, stokers, cooks, and stewards ...	13,052	
	<hr/>	13,053
<i>Total Sailor hands</i>		143,992
Less Foreigners		14,280
		<hr/>
Total <i>British</i> Seamen		129,712
And if we deduct Apprentices		23,041
		<hr/>
Leaves British Forecastle hands A.B.s and O.S.s ...		106,671
		<hr/>

375.—Total men employed in Steam and Sail, exclusive of
masters 199,667

ANALYSIS.

Men in <i>Sail</i>	126,240	
Off 10 per cent. as above	12,624	
	<hr/>	113,616
Men in <i>Steam</i>	73,427	
Off 50 per cent. as above	36,713	
	<hr/>	36,714
<i>Total Sailor hands</i>		150,330
Less Foreigners, say		20,000
		<hr/>
Total <i>British</i> Seamen		130,330
And if we deduct Apprentices		17,000
		<hr/>
Leaves British hands A.B.s and O.S.s		113,330
		<hr/>

MEM.—These per-centages for deduction of non-sailor hands are
rived at after careful observation, and are considered by practical men
approximate as possible.



IMPERFECT GENIUS: WILLIAM BLAKE.

DEFINITIONS of genius have been frequent enough to render it inexcusable for any writer to add to their number. Whether it be the exaltation of one faculty or another above the rest, with congenital aptitude for a special function, or the total symmetry of the faculties collectively, of which the bias may be determined by circumstances in any given direction, it scarcely seems material to inquire, so long as the phenomenon itself is capable of recognition by uniform signs. If we subject to a common standard of comparison a few typical men who by universal consent are entitled to the highest rank of genius in their several spheres of art—Homer, Phidias, Raffaello, Shakespeare, Milton, Beethoven—it is easy to discern that certain qualities have been possessed by all alike, and are legibly stamped upon their work. Chief among these *indicia* will admittedly be reckoned the qualities of originality, fertility, equability, coherence, and articulateness.

The term originality hardly needs explanation. We understand by it that spontaneity and freshness of force, which, however indebted it may be to antecedent or contemporary influences, assimilates them so thoroughly, and moulds their results into such novel combinations, that it never betrays its obligations. The materials with which he has to deal are the same to the man of genius as to any of his fellows, but the secret of their arrangement is his own. He may often have to work, as did Shakespeare, upon the trite lines of an old design, but the

touches of grace and colour which he adds to the detail, and the new aspect in which he sets the whole conception, bear the inimitable impress of his power, and give to his handiwork a substantive existence which obliterates the memory of all previous attempts. Bastard originality is often distinguished with difficulty, owing to the ingenuity with which it pieces together incongruous parts into fantastic or grotesque wholes, and puts forth extravagances of manner and style. Whereas it is of the essence of real genius to conform to Nature, detect undiscovered beauties in the commonest objects of sight, and make

“ Wonders familiar start
In its decisive light ;”

its counterfeit aims at overstepping Nature, making the unfamiliar common, and creating monsters. These novelties have often the *primâ facie* semblance of creation, but under careful analysis will usually yield up the device of their manufacture, and suggest their sources of derivation.

By fertility we understand an abounding fruitfulness of idea, by no means identical with and not necessarily involving mere productiveness of work. Exhaustless variety and versatility of invention, as opposed to mannerism and repetition of well-worn themes, will sufficiently express the characteristic hereby intended.

By equability we mean fulness and maintenance of power, which is consistent with gradation and growth from crudity to maturity, but, when that standard is reached, varies in its manifestation only within narrow limits ; the reverse of a fitful inequality which oscillates between the extreme of sublimity and the extreme of meanness. Macaulay has noted in a fragment of criticism two striking instances in which this characteristic is displayed. Speaking of Schiller's “Don Carlos,” he says that it is the turning-point of his artistic power, as “Romeo and Juliet” is of Shakespeare's. “After ‘Romeo and Juliet,’ Shakespeare never went back, nor did Schiller after ‘Carlos.’”^{*} No such turning-point is discoverable in the work of imperfect genius.

Coherence and articulateness are well-nigh inseparable, and answer in effect to the perfection of theory and practice. In a mind that is complete and self-consistent, ideas have a systematic interdependence or mutual relevance. The artist's aim being clear to himself, his utterance is so distinct as to make it clear to others. Now and then, owing either to a momentary lapse of power, or an accidental defect in the instrument of transmission, details of his meaning may be left obscure ; but in every work of his hand regarded as a whole the purpose is unmistakeable and the language intelligible. It is especially to this gift of articulate-

^{*} Life and Letters, ii. 229.

ness that the great poets owe their universal acceptance as teachers; that Shakespeare, for example, is equally oracular to the most deeply and the most superficially cultivated of his hearers. The one may find a wider and profounder meaning in his words than the other, but each can appreciate what is of value to himself, and both have a common ground of interest in their lucidity and directness. A teacher who delivers his message in an unknown tongue has no *raison d'être*, and may as well be silent. The message itself may be "a hard saying," and in some or all of its bearings "caviare to the general." For this the inspired teacher is not responsible, but his responsibility must extend to the form of utterance selected by him, which he is bound to make distinct if he have a genuine reverence for his calling, and desire to influence a wide and permanent audience.

Few will probably be found to dispute the theoretical soundness of these canons, but the application of them in practice is a matter of some difficulty. The imperfect may fall short of the perfect type of genius in one or more of the five particulars named, and the symptoms of defect in each instance may be obscured by individual peculiarities which mislead the observer. It obviously requires a special culture to ascertain whether an artist's power be original or derived; and hasty observation is a common source of mistake. Fertility is apt to be confounded with productiveness, and self-repetition is often ignored as without significance. One is scarcely less liable to be deceived by appearances in regard to equability.

"What the world calls genius," says Edgar Poe, "is the state of mental disease arising from the undue predominance of some one of the faculties. . . . The proportion of the faculties in a case where the mental power is inordinately great gives that result which is the true genius, but which on account of the proportion and seeming simplicity of its work is seldom acknowledged to be so."

In regard to coherence and articulateness the student is very apt to be misled by his sympathies either with the prophet at whose feet he sits, or with the supposed drift of his utterances. The distinction between perfect and imperfect genius may here be illustrated by a familiar comparison. The one answers to a planet, which pursues a fixed orbit and emits a permanent, clear light; the other to a comet, whose orbit is eccentric and whose flame is fitful and nebulous. Attractive to all minds by its strange and splendid irregularity, the cometary type of genius has a special fascination for some minds when its possessor is persuaded that he has a mission, and announces himself as a teacher. The persuasion may be genuine from first to last, but the want of systematizing power renders him insensible to the general effect of his teaching; and the temptation must be well-nigh irresistible to retain the

audience he has secured, by increasing the elements of attraction, and wrapping up his thought in ever-thickening veils of enigmatic symbolism which may give it the aspect of revelation. There has been, of late years, a growing tendency to the worship of indefiniteness in art, and the supply of candidates for divine honours is likely to grow with the demand. It would be curious to inquire how many reigning favourites—poets, painters, and musicians—owe their celebrity to the skill with which they have shrouded their ideas in a mystery which is credited with sublimity. The cultivated classes, wherein most of their devotees are to be found, cannot of course be suspected of mistaking *ignotum pro magnifico*. But genius of the cometary type is characterized by flashes of splendour which, while they last, outshine the brightness of the planetary light, and leave an impression behind, upon the faith of which much actual haze is accepted as potential brilliance. Upon some minds another and still stronger influence comes into operation, viz., the exquisite fascination of belonging to the esoteric circle of disciples, of being among the privileged few who have discovered an unrecognized treasure, and possess the secret of a charm denied to the multitude. That there is no novelty in the discovery, or value in the secret, apart from the imagination of the disciple, does not detract from his enjoyment so long as he believes in it. Like his master's self-persuasion, his confidence increases with repeated iteration and the satisfaction that accompanies the sense of abiding acquisition. There is no want of charity in ascribing this pride to the school of which we speak, for it proclaims itself too palpably in the scornful words which they delight to fling at the Philistines and Boeotians, who will not, or cannot, join them in adoration. The zeal of the disciples is likely to be redoubled if their master have failed of obtaining recognition in his lifetime, and it rests with them to carry on the work which he left unfinished, and procure for him the glory of apotheosis in a more reverent generation than his own. In times when the planetary type of genius is far from abundant, such zeal has a chance of ephemeral success. Should the teacher have been a prophet of revolutionary ideas, it may have a still better chance in days of unsettled opinion. The wilder his dreams and the more extravagant his utterances, the more likely are they to be accepted as gospel by those who find beauty in chaos, and have no scruple about upsetting social fabrics which they cannot rebuild.

These considerations may dictate a little more caution than is commonly shown in accepting the credentials of fashionable and loudly trumpeted genius. The preliminary questions which it seems reasonable to put are these—Does he as artist or teacher come up to the prescribed standard of originality, fertility, equability, coherence, and articulateness attained by those

whose claims have stood the test of time, and to whom without contradiction has been accorded a place in the Pantheon of the world? If he come short of this standard in one or more particulars, are there any special qualities of attraction in such gifts as he possesses which may serve to explain the fascination he has exercised upon his admirers and the erroneous impression they have formed of his powers? If the answers elicited by these questions should prove a safeguard to some who are not sufficiently armed against the allurements of idolatry by habitually worshipping at the altars of true gods, the inquiry ought not to be shirked under an apprehension of being accounted unfashionable or of entailing upon one's self a torrent of contemptuous abuse from the champions of the reigning idol.

We venture to propound these questions in reference to the claims which, during the last few years, have been advanced on behalf of William Blake, and urged by a few of his advocates with such strenuous persistence as to secure his provisional apotheosis. Thanks to their exertions, we have already a small library of Blakeian literature, which threatens to become larger every year, and the limited circle within which his designs used to be known has recently been widened by the exhibition of them in a collected form. The enthusiasm excited by his name is still confined to a comparatively select school, but what it lacks in breadth is made up in intensity, and any amount of neglect shown during his lifetime has been more than atoned for by the fervour which has attended his disinterment and rehabilitation.

His advent as a poet, at the particular period of the eighteenth century when it took place, has been pronounced by one enthusiast after another to be an unique phenomenon, and his early poems have been adduced as conclusive evidence of genius. His biographer and quasi-discoverer, the late Mr. Gilchrist, affirmed it difficult to realize how some of the poems contained in Blake's first volume (printed in 1783), with "their unforced simplicity, their bold and careless freedom of sentiment and expression, came to be written at all in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, the age of 'polished phraseology and subdued thought'—subdued with a vengeance. It was the generation of Shenstone, Langborne, Mason, Whitehead, the Wartons, of obscurer Cunningham, Lloyd, and Carter."* Mr. Swinburne follows suit by calling attention to the marvel that—

"At a time when the very notion of poetry, as we now understand it, and as it was understood in older times, had totally died and decayed out of the minds of men; when we not only had no poetry, a thing which was bearable, but had verse in plenty, a thing which was not in the least bearable; a man hardly twenty years old yet turns up suddenly with work in

* *Life of William Blake, &c.* (1868), vol. i. p. 23.

that line already done, not simply better than any man could do then: better than all except the greatest have done since; better, too, than some still ranked among the greatest ever managed to do.”*

Even a critic usually so dispassionate as Mr. William Rossetti repeats the same expression of astonishment in language somewhat less rhetorical.† Proceeding to details, Mr. Swinburne affirms Blake to be “the single Englishman of supreme and simple poetic genius born before the closing years of the eighteenth century;” declares some of the lyrics in the first volume of “Poetical Sketches” comparable with those of Beaumont and Fletcher, Webster and Mr. Tennyson, and heaps upon his lyrical work generally a profusion of epithets of which “faultless,” “perfect,” “supremely noble,” and “absolutely right,” are average specimens.‡ Another uncompromising admirer, Mr. Saintsbury, writing in the *Academy*, selects Blake as “the greatest poet of the eighteenth century.” Mr. Dante Rossetti, to whose skilful editing Blake’s verse is mainly indebted for such reduction into order and freedom from glaring blemishes as it displays in the second volume of the “Life,” expends much warmth of admiration upon the “exquisite metrical gift and rightness in point of form which constitute Blake’s special glory among his contemporaries, even more eminently, perhaps, than the grander command of mental resources which is also his,” and “such qualities of pure perfection in writing verse as he perpetually without effort displayed,” which “he alone possessed then, and possessed in clear completeness.”§

As a prophet Mr. Swinburne vindicates Blake’s title to the reverence of mankind by devoting 150 octavo pages to the detailed analysis of his oracles; affirming (notwithstanding many damaging admissions), and being highly indignant with Mr. Gilchrist for doubting, that Blake had a distinct and coherent system, and denying that there are evidences of any radical contradiction in it (pp. 187, 188, 217, &c.). Mr. W. Rossetti, while bound to admit that, as a whole, Blake’s prophetic books are “neither readable nor even entirely sane performances,” attaches sufficient importance to them to believe that in the judgment of other intelligent persons they may be “among the most inspired as certainly among the most uncommon productions of the human intellect,” recommends that an investigation should be made into the relation between the speculations of Blake and those of other mystics, and selects a scholar whom he thinks specially competent for the work (pp. 81, 122).

As a designer Mr. Gilchrist proclaims Blake, at the outset, as an “Original Genius” of the highest order, affirming the “pose

* William Blake: A Critical Essay (1868), p. 8.

† Memoir of Blake, prefixed to Aldine edition of Poems (1875), p. 115.

‡ Critical Essay, pp. 1, 9, &c.

§ Life, vol. ii. p. 77.

and grouping of his figures" to be "often expressive and sublime as the sketches of Raffaele and Albert Dürer," certain of his "Inventions to the Book of Job" to be "grand as Michael Angelo," pure and tender as Fra Angelico;" others as "having more affinity with Orcagna than with any other of the greatest men," and reminding one "also of Giotto."* Mr. William Rossetti speaks of his "splendid, terrible, and daring imagination," and avers that—

"To see one of his finer tempera or water-colour pictures, or of his partly colour-printed, partly hand-coloured engraved designs, or of his designs engraved by himself on the ordinary system, is a new experience; one that you cannot prepare for nor forestall. The mysterious meaning of the work, its austere intensity of presentment, the rush (as it were) of spiritual and vital force into all its forms, animating them with strange fires of life and frenzies of endeavour, the rapture of effort and of repose, the stress and the hush, give these works a different character from aught else."—*Memoir*, p. 95.

Mr. Dante Rossetti scarcely less emphatically talks of him as a "central derivative man" from whom his contemporaries borrowed ideas and execution, and refers to his "colour, the true patent of nobility in painting," as giving him "a rank which cannot be taken from him."†. Lastly, Mr. W. B. Scott, in his introductory remarks to the Catalogue of the recent Exhibition of Blake's works at the Burlington Club, affirms that—

"The astonishing insight and poetic force of his pure inventions, as shown, for instance, in 'The Soul hovering over the Body, taking reluctant leave;' in 'The Genius looking at the Spirit visiting the Grave;' in 'The Reunion of Soul and Body'—all illustrations to 'Blair's Grave'—or in the preternatural birth of the Divine Child born to the Virgin Mary, in the small picture in our Exhibition (No. 89), are beyond all question and beyond all praise, excite wonder that fails to find words fully to express itself. His originality is unmistakeable. These inventions and many others are like revelations."

In another passage he is designated as "an inventor, a stupendous designer, a poet with the pencil as with the pen." Respecting his artistic works generally, Mr. Scott contends that he is "seldom insoluble or even difficult to understand, if we recognize that he believed in and acted from intuitions and visions such as no artist before in any age asserted he saw or attempted to embody."

These are "brave words," and it is a thankless task to stem the current of generous praise by aught that has the semblance of depreciation. But though enthusiasm is beautiful it is not so beautiful as justice, nor because a man has been unduly neglected by his own generation is it incumbent upon the next to exalt him

* *Life*, vol. i. pp. 2, 4, 200.

† *Ibid.* vol. ii. pp. 77, 118.

to celestial rank and celebrate his glory in heroics. *Est modus in rebus*. We cannot assume to offer a comprehensive estimate of an artist and a teacher so prolific as Blake, some of whose works we have had no opportunity of studying. Judging him only by such as have been made public or are readily procurable, we venture to suggest that there is another point of view besides that in which his admirers have regarded him, and that their fervid zeal is likely sooner or later to provoke reaction. Before this sets in, it may be worth while to inquire upon what grounds the lofty language we have quoted can be justified, and if it is not possible to arrive at an estimate of his powers which, though less glowing than that now in vogue, may chance to be more durable.

To do anything like justice to Blake it is requisite to deal separately with his pretensions as poet, prophet, and designer. His earliest appearance before the world was as a poet. Commencing with the question of originality, can it be justly claimed for him that his ideas and language are substantially underived, or that he has so assimilated the influences which he imbibed that their sources are undiscoverable? Remembering the language in which his first volume of "Poetical Sketches," printed in 1783, but said to be written between 1768 and 1777, has been extolled as a literary phenomenon, not less unique than astonishing, we turn to the reprint in the Aldine edition of his works, and invite the unprejudiced reader to accompany us. If he be tolerably familiar with earlier English poetry, especially of the Elizabethan period, we shall be strangely mistaken if he does not pronounce the quality of the verse to be essentially imitative. That Blake was from boyhood a student of Elizabethan literature we know as a fact, upon the authority of Malkin,* whose information was derived from Blake himself. Traces of imitation Mr. Gilchrist does not deny, but would have us believe them superficial, and due to "involuntary emulation" of the great models which the youth set before him; while Mr. Swinburne throws a little critical dust in our eyes by suggesting comparisons which distract attention from the real nature of the resemblances. To show this adequately, we ought to put the whole volume in evidence, but the main proofs lie near the surface. The unfinished drama of "King Edward the Third" reads like a boy's crude effort to assume the manner and tone of Shakespeare. The types of character are drawn from his. The scene before Cressy is a modification of that before Agincourt ("Hen. V.," Act IV.), the imitation being carried to the point of mimicking Fluellen's Welsh brogue. Some of the master's most characteristic and hackneyed phrases are reproduced almost unaltered, sprinkled with others from

* A Father's Memoirs of his Child. Preface, p. 34.

Milton and Ben Jonson. "Pass over as a summer cloud, unregarded," "deathly dust," "beaten brass," "rich as midsummer," "native seats," "feathered angels," "ribs of death," "silver Thames," are notable instances. Turning to the songs, we find still larger contributions levied from Shakespeare and Beaumont and Fletcher. "My silks and fine array," in point of form and tone, is modelled upon "Come away, come away, Death," Fletcher's "Constancy" ("Maid's Tragedy"), and "Dirge for the Faithful Lover" ("Knight of the Burning Pestle"). The lines—

"Bring me an axe and spade,
Bring me a winding-sheet"—

are simply copied from the Grave-digger's song in "Hamlet." In the song of "Memory," "Tune your merry notes" is borrowed from "As You Like It;" "watery glass" from "A Midsummer Night's Dream;" and "fish for fancies" was probably suggested by a phrase of Gratiano's in "The Merchant of Venice" (I. i.). Three other lines, "Places fit for woe," and

"Walking along the darken'd valley,
With silent melancholy,"

are adapted from a dirge in "The Nice Valour" of Beaumont and Fletcher—

"Places which pale passion loves."

"Then stretch our bones in a still gloomy valley;
Nothing's so dainty-sweet as lovely melancholy."

The "Mad Song," so rapturously praised for its originality by Mr. Gilchrist and Mr. Swinburne, is really a mosaic of reminiscences. The opening lines—

"The wild winds weep,
And the night is a-cold"—

were surely suggested by the scene in "Lear" (III. iv.), where Edgar, "disguised as a madman," enters, in a stormy night, with the words:

"Through the sharp hawthorn blows the cold wind.
. . . . Poor Tom's a-cold."

The next lines—

"Come hither, Sleep!
And my griefs entold"—

remind of the invocation to Sleep in Beaumont and Fletcher's "Woman-hater." The two next lines—

"But lo! the morning peeps
Over the Eastern steeps"—

are obviously a remembrance of Milton's

"Ere the blabbing Eastern scout,
The nice Morn on the Indian steep,
From her cabin'd loophole peep."

“The vault of paved heaven” is Shakespeare’s, almost word for word. “Like a fiend in a cloud” is from Hecate’s speech in “Macbeth” (III. v.)—

“My little spirit, see,
Sits in a foggy cloud.”

Either Beaumont and Fletcher or Shakespeare suggested another line, “I turn my back to the east;”^{*} while its fellow, “From whence comforts have increased,” is from Desdemona’s “comforts should increase” (“Othello,” II. i.) In some of the other poems, especially those addressed to the seasons, we have reminiscences of Spenser and of the eighteenth-century poets who followed him in their love of personification. The description of summer in the “Faery Queene” (“Canto of Mutabilitie”) as “dight in a thin silken cassock,” no doubt prompted the line, “Throw thy silk draperies off.” That of autumn as “laden with fruits” occurs in the same canto. Such property-epithets as “jolly,” “lusty,” “dewy,” “buskined,” and the like, are borrowed from the same master. The description of morning—

“Roused like a huntsman to the chase, and with
Thy buskined feet appear upon our hills”—

is identical with Collins’s picture of “Cheerfulness” in “The Passions,” who also speaks of “Winter yelling” (Ode to Evening)—a phrase reproduced in Blake’s invocation to that season. Milton’s “Comus” supplied the phrase, “chambers of the east,” which occurs both in “Morning” and “To the Muses.” The opening verses of “I love the jocund dance” are a diluted paraphrase of a passage in “L’Allegro.” To point out the evidences of Ossianic influence in other parts of the volume would be superfluous, since none of Blake’s commentators have ignored them.

We are far from intending to disparage the real merits of these verses. Imitative to the verge of plagiarism as they are, they are often so skilfully composed, and relieved by such graceful touches of fancy and sweet snatches of melody, as to confer genuine pleasure in defiance of critical analysis. Here Blake’s artistic power makes itself felt, nor need we grudge him the praise that belongs to it because his panegyrists perversely claim for him honours to which he is not entitled. It was most creditable to his taste that he rejected the inferior models of contemporary poetry in favour of the great masters, but from the pother that Mr. Gilchrist and Mr. Swinburne make about it, one would suppose that he was the only one of his generation who manifested

^{*} “I turn thy head unto the east.”—*Faithful Shepherdess*. “We must lay his head to the east.”—*Cymbeline*.

such sympathy. In fact, his was an age of poetic revival, and he did but worship at shrines newly set up by others. It was an age of active Shakespearian criticism and study of Elizabethan literature, the age of Warburton, Tyrwhitt, Birch, Farmer, Johnson, Garrick, Steevens, Warton, and Malone. The middle of the century witnessed the publication of Dodsley's "Old Plays." New editions of Beaumont and Fletcher appeared in 1750 and 1778, of Ben Jonson in 1756. Percy edited the poems of Surrey in 1763, and his "Reliques," including many of the choicest sixteenth and seventeenth-century lyrics, appeared in 1765. Gray and Collins were disciples of Spenser and Milton; and avowed imitations of the former were written by Thomson and Shenstone. In 1770, Chatterton, whose influence on Blake is recognized by Mr. Gilchrist, put forth his elaborate mystifications; the product of an enthusiastic imagination kindled at antique fires. Was it very extraordinary that another youth of susceptible fancy and studious habit should display similar tendencies?

In Blake's next volume, the "Songs of Innocence," printed in 1789, it would be needless to seek for proofs of originality, as it was avowedly addressed to children, for whom any but the tritest themes and simplest language would have been unsuitable. It bears evidence in its purity of style that his husbandry in the fields of classical English had not been profitless. There is little or no imitation of his old models, save that the "Laughing Song" is evidently prompted by Shakespeare's in "Troilus and Cressida," or Beaumont and Fletcher's in "The Nice Valour." On the other hand there is a flavour of the style of Dr. Isaac Watts, whose "Divine and Moral Songs for Children" were popular enough to have attracted Blake's notice, had he not been certain to meet with them in the Nonconformist circle in which he was bred. That this skilfully designed machinery for instilling Calvinistic ideas into infant minds suggested the plan of Blake's work seems probable, and perhaps no better method could have been devised of counteracting their influence than by competing in the choice of subjects and language, while substituting the ideas of a milder Theism and a larger humanity. On comparing the "Cradle Hymn" of the one series with the "Cradle Song" of the other, it is tolerably clear that this motive was present to his mind. Of the strange tenets put forth in his later works there is but the faintest trace in these verses, their prevailing sentiment being pitched in the amiable Theo-philanthropic key then in vogue among his republican associates. Pope's "Universal Prayer," modified to the capacities of children, might be a pattern for such poems as "The Divine Image" and "On Another's Sorrow," and probably Blake had this too in his mind when writing them.

In the "Songs of Experience" such proofs as there are of

his originality must, we think, be sought, but we are unable to allow that the "find" is a large one. The design of the series is antithetical to that of the "Songs of Innocence," most of the poems being addressed to youths upon subjects therein commended to the attention of children. The "Lamb" is thus contrasted with the "Tiger;" the "Little Boy Lost" and "Found," with the "Little Girl Lost" and "Found;" the "Divine Image," with the "Human Abstract," &c. To show by this comparison the "two contrary states of the human soul" was Blake's avowed object; and admitting from his point of view that he was justified in thus attempting to disillusionize the minds of his young disciples, the plan was ingenious. Of the new ideas hereby conveyed, which are substantially identical with those of the prophetic books, we shall speak presently; but it may suffice to say here that they are not of Blake's minting. The language, however, is his own, and in three or four poems reaches a high pitch either of condensed force or musical sweetness. Other poems, of which the meaning is enigmatical or the language weak, are redeemed by a melodious quatrain or graceful phrase. Taken together, however, these make up scarcely a ninth part of the whole, and, except for its unique flavour of heresy, there would be nothing to distinguish the little volume, in point of poetic originality, from many another collection of fugitive verse.

The majority of Blake's occasional poems, whether introduced into his prophecies or scattered among his note-books and letters, are so coloured by his peculiar notions of religion and morals that they cannot be considered apart. Herein, while there is no evidence of originality, its counterfeit, grotesqueness, does duty in its stead. No preliminary acquaintance with Blake's creed is requisite for the reader's appreciation from an artistic point of view of the following verses:—

"The fields from Islington to Marybone,
To Primrose Hill and St. John's Wood,
Were builded over with pillars of gold,
And there Jerusalem's pillars stood.

"The Jew's Harp house and the Green Man,
The pond where boys to bathe delight,
The field of cows by Welling's farm,
Shine in Jerusalem's pleasant sight."

We doubt if many will be persuaded by Mr. Swinburne's ingenuity that any intention on the writer's part to indicate "the hidden spirit and significance of which the flesh or building is a type," and to vindicate the truth that "suburbs or lanes" have not less of a "soul than continents,"* can succeed in elevating ludicrous doggrel into serious poetry.

* Critical Essay, p. 197.

Of the non-prophetic poems some are so hopelessly dark in their general drift that it is idle to discuss the language of isolated passages. A few outbursts of song, however, in spite of their frequent obscurity, attest Blake's possession of a genuine lyrical gift: "Night and Day," "The Land of Dreams," "The Wild Flower's Song," and "Day-break," are almost the only examples of completed lyrics. His epigrams, couplets, and other fragments, show some talent for coarse, vigorous invective, but in point and terseness of expression he falls far short of Wolcot, who was obviously his model.

Fertility we should suppose none of Blake's admirers will venture to claim for him as a poet. Setting aside the imitative attempts, love is almost the only theme which inspires his first volume. "The Songs of Innocence" range over a small compass of subjects, to which the "Songs of Experience" add little more than will serve to mark the antitheses required. In the latter he rings the changes upon a few favourite ideas, theological, moral, and artistic, which reappear in his prophetic books and occasional pieces. "Earth's Answer" sums up the drift of "Urizen;" "The Garden of Love" and "Little Girl Lost," that of "The Visions of the Daughters of Albion" and "America;" "The Human Abstract" and "To Tirzah," that of "The Gates of Paradise" and other works. "The Everlasting Gospel" does but elaborate a passage in "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell." Elsewhere a substantial identity of theme lurks under a superficial change of language. Compare, *e.g.*, "Riches" with "Mammon," and "Broken Love" with the passage in "The Everlasting Gospel" touching the adulteress. Reading Blake's "Epigrams" side by side with his "Descriptive Catalogue" and "Public Address," one finds many similar examples of self-repetition. This extends to his very language. Quatrains and couplets which have done duty in one poem are tacked on to a second with scarcely a verbal alteration. "The Two Songs" repeats six lines of "The Human Abstract;" "The Grey Monk," four lines of "To the Deists;" "The Everlasting Gospel," four lines of "Auguries of Innocence" and two of "The Keys of the Gates;" "The Mental Traveller," two lines of "Riches;" "Auguries," two lines of "The Keys." Catching images and phrases in his earliest poems such as "like a fiend hid in a cloud," "ruddy limbs and flaming (or flourishing) hair," and "chartered streams" or "Thames" are served up again in his latest. As will be seen when we have to speak of his works of design, this habit of riding an idea to death is among the most marked of Blake's characteristics. Selecting the poetic instrument upon which he is heard to most advantage, one has only to contrast the boundless invention of the great lyrist to see how far he stands below the highest rank.

Poetic equability, we suppose, Blake's advocates will as little venture to claim for him as fertility. The disparity between the poems included in his first volume, when the age at which they were written is considered, would not deserve notice but for the high value which has been attached to them, and the indication they afford of the writer's mental calibre. In certain qualities already adverted to, this volume exhibits his poetic power more favourably than his adult productions. The delicacy of touch visible in such lines as those from "To the Evening Star,"

"Let thy west wind sleep on
The lake; speak silence with thy glimmering eyes,
And wash the dusk with silver,"

is scarcely discernible elsewhere; and he has written no lyrics more musical than "My silks and fine array," "How sweet I roamed," and parts of "Fair Eleanor." There are traces, too, in such a phrase as "the red brow of storms," and a couplet such as

"For Ignorance is Folly's leasing nurse,
And love of Folly needs none other's curse,"

of the terseness and vigour which remained with Blake to the last as a redeeming quality of style. Of the tumidity and bombast with which he contrived to obscure it there are plentiful signs in the "Sketches," the result, as all his critics are content to allow, of his sedulous study of Ossian, in Macpherson's presentment of whom as authentic he never ceased to place implicit faith. Such passages as these—

"When confusion rages, when the field is in a flame,
When the cries of blood tear terror from Heaven,
And yelling Death runs up and down the ranks;"

"An angel from the fields of light entered the house;
His form was manhood in the prime,
And from his spacious brow shot terrors through the evening shade"—

are examples of the forcible-feeble style which culminates in the prophetic books. Of undisguised feebleness, "Edward the Third" offers ample proofs to any who care to look for them.

The fragmentary character of so many of these sketches might be attributed to the fitfulness of youthful ambition, or a want of sustained energy, rather than to a congenital defect of artistic constitution; but the clear evidences of Blake's inaccurate and uncertain ear are not to be explained on any other supposition. The versification of most of the songs is excellent, and the rhythm of one or two deliciously musical. The construction of the blank verse, on the other hand, is only correct by accident, and for the

most part is simply lawless and execrable. It is difficult to understand how such lines as these—

“ My Lord Bishop, you would recommend us agriculture ?”

“ He will still move onward to plan conveniences ;”

“ Till hope grew feeble and was ready to give place to doubting ”—

could be produced by the same youth who, before the age of fourteen, had written the following verse :—

“ He showed me lilies for my hair,
And blushing roses for my brow ;
He led me through his garden fair,
Where all his golden pleasures grow.”

But the same opposition of sensibility and dulness characterized Blake's metrical gift so long as he continued to write verse at all, becoming only more prominent as the artist succumbed to the prophet.

The “ Songs of Innocence ” and the “ Songs of Experience ” exhibit a more level standard of excellence than his other works, probably because the range is lower, but there is still considerable inequality. In the former series “ Infant Joy,” “ A Cradle Song,” “ Night,” and “ A Dream,” are marked by an unforced simplicity, a tenderness of feeling, and charm of melody which only Wordsworth surpassed ; and other pieces show more or less clear traces of the same qualities. In the latter series, “ The Introduction,” “ The Tiger,” and “ The Human Abstract ” are entitled to all the praise that has been bestowed on their compressed vigour of language or charm of lyrical cadence. To apply the same praise to the collection as a whole would be extravagant. There is but one step between the simple and the puerile, and that step Blake is apt to take, straying here into the swamp of namby-pamby as he elsewhere tumbles into the pit of doggrel. “ Spring ” in the first series, and “ The Little Girl Found ” in the second, are instances in point. The versification of the “ Songs of Experience ” is generally accurate, but there are signs of incorrectness or carelessness in the choice of rhymes which were formerly wanting. “ Fast ” and “ lost,” “ joy ” and “ by,” “ face ” and “ dress,” “ distress ” and “ peace,” “ lambs ” and “ hands,” “ girl ” and “ small,” “ kiss ” and “ peace,” “ reason ” and “ teasing,” are blemishes that occur too often. The fragmentariness observable in the “ Sketches ” is less evident in the first series of “ Songs,” but is a conspicuous characteristic of the second. These faults, though trifling in themselves, and availing little to detract from the enjoyment which the “ Songs ” collectively confer, are not insignificant as testifying to that decadence in poetic power which set in with Blake's fatal adoption of the prophetic

mantle. The "Songs of Experience," as we have said, contain the first striking indications of the new influence which henceforth dominated his mind. All his later verse exhibits the rapid progress of artistic decline. Form is sacrificed to idea, the luxuries of grace and music to the urgent necessities of utterance and denunciation.* At times, as by dint of pristine habit, the gifts of metre and colour to which Mr. D. G. Rossetti points as Blake's insignia of poetic rank, assert their presence, but either speedily vanish or are so contradicted by simultaneous evidences of dissonance and uncouthness, that one is tempted to doubt whether, after all, the music and the grace may not be the result of accident. Such shambling couplets as these—

"And in depth of icy dungeons
Closed the father and the sons ;"

"Earth groan'd beneath and heaven above
Trembled at discovery of love ;"

such lines of blank verse as

"And I asked a watcher and a Holy One
Its name? He answered, "It is the wheel of religion ;"

such rhymes as "Meletus" and "curse," "in" and "worshipping," "Newton" and "button," seem to have fallen from a pen that has never been guided by an ear. But foremost among the signs that under the stress of dæmonic possession the artistic nature has been overcome are the presence of an incoherence and inarticulateness which have hitherto been strangers to Blake's verse, although plainly foreshadowed by increasing symptoms of incompleteness and obscurity. To adduce proofs would be almost superfluous, for any pretensions to credit his later poems with organic consistency or lucidity of meaning are either frankly abandoned by his advocates or set at rest by their mutually contradictory interpretations. What rudiment of system can a writer have possessed, who, without preface or note touching the nature of the doctrines he was desirous to propagate, employed lyrical poetry as the vehicle for thrusting a cento of Gnostic heresies and revolutionary ethics upon youthful minds bred up in the orthodoxy of the eighteenth century? What hope of making himself intelligible to such an audience can he have entertained who apostrophized as "Tirzah," and after the following fashion, an abstraction which (according to Mr. Swinburne) signified "the mere separate and human nature, mother of the perishing body

* In spite of these signs which seem to us so legible of an overruling didactic aim in Blake's work, it is from this text that Mr. Swinburne has seen fit to preach ~~rate~~ discourse on the doctrine of "Art for Art's sake !"

and daughter of the 'religion' which occupies itself with laying down laws for the flesh?"

" TO TIRZAH.

" Whate'er is born of mortal birth
Must be consumed with the earth,
To rise from generation free,
Then what have I to do with thee?
* * * * *

" Thou, mother of my mortal part,
With cruelty didst mould my heart,
And with false self-deceiving tears
Didst bind my nostrils, eyes, and ears."

If this, which occurs in the comparatively lucid "Songs of Experience," be esteemed dark, what light is perceptible in "The Crystal Cabinet," "The Mental Traveller," or "Broken Love"? Happily we have no need to show, for of the first, Mr. D. G. Rossetti gives one explanation, Mr. Swinburne a second, and Mr. William Rossetti a third; while of both the others two different explanations are offered by the same authorities, between which the anxious reader is invited to choose. Mr. William Rossetti, indeed, (like the sailor who, when offered the choice of three drinks, said he would take the beer now, and be drinking the grog while her ladyship was mixing the punch) seems to hold that all three interpretations of "The Crystal Cabinet" may be correct. Mr. Swinburne, on the other hand, while he "gravely suspects" that his own interpretation of "Broken Love" is the right one, counsels his readers to reject it in favour of Mr. D. G. Rossetti's as "a splendid exposition," even though the "illumination" be "*none of the author's kindling*."* This display of chivalrous courtesy to a rival critic could not be too highly commended if it did not involve such a grievous neglect of the interests of their common client. The concluding admission is refreshing in its candour, and suggests a new canon of literary criticism. An author's meaning in an obscure passage is immaterial, provided it afford a favourable occasion for the exercise of his editor's ingenuity!

It must be acknowledged that no writings offer a wider scope for the exhibition of this talent than Blake's. With few exceptions, the unpublished verses which Mr. D. G. Rossetti has rescued from his MS. notebook are a succession of riddles, whole or fragmentary. Rays of meaning gleam out from masses of what seems to be intended for allegory but may be simply vapour, and here and there pages of harsh and pointless doggrel are redeemed by a stray song or a smart epigram. This disproportionate intermixture of chaff and grain seems enough to stimulate some critics into eager research, but we confess to an imperfect sympathy with

* Critical Essay, p. 279.

them. As respects the interest of ordinary readers in such investigations, we much doubt whether Blake's poetical reputation would not have stood on a securer footing if Mr. Rossetti's notebook had remained in MS.

Blake's claims to genius in the capacity of prophet can scarcely be dissociated from his artistic pretensions. Under the head of originality it may be worth while for a moment to inquire what we are to understand by his own assertion that his prophecies were the records of "visions" communicated to his spirit by supernatural agency, and in the nature of allegories which he either transcribed by inspiration or which were dictated to him as a "secretary," without his "premeditation, and even against his will." A similar assertion which he made respecting the source of some, if not all, of his designs, he qualified by the admission that the visionary faculty was not peculiar to himself, but that his artist-friends might equally display its possession if they would only "trust or cultivate it" as he did, and "work up imagination to the state of vision."* This use of the word "vision" simply resolves itself, as Mr. Gilchrist allows, into a claim to "the poet's special endowment," a faith in the substantial reality of things pictured by the God-given imagination. "Inspiration" (which Blake, in his notes on Sir Joshua Reynolds' discourses, associates with "vision" as his "element" and "eternal dwelling-place" of artistic life) is a not less ambiguous term, which may be divested at pleasure of its originally supernatural meaning, and applied to the intense impulse which animates the artist in embodying his conceptions and the thinker in uttering his convictions. Did Blake mean more than this when he asserted that his prophecies were inspired or transcribed under supernatural dictation? The language of enthusiasm in all ages has been the same, and firm believers have immemorially invested their utterances with Divine sanction, without regard to the risk that the world may understand their hyperboles literally. More than one passage of his writings lead us to think that in his calmer moments Blake was desirous to explain away his fervid figures of speech, especially that in the "Marriage of Heaven and Hell," where in an imaginary interview with the prophets Isaiah and Ezekiel he makes them justify their assertion that "God spoke to them" on the ground of their "firm persuasion" that "the voice of honest indignation is the voice of God." In the address "to the public" prefixed to the "Jerusalem," he blends indiscriminately the language which befits a divinely-commissioned prophet with that which might be adopted by any author writing under the stress of his own earnest assurance. Whether, however, Blake entertained a belief

* Gilchrist, i. p. 321.

in his supernatural guidance or not, the evidences for it were demonstrable to himself alone, and, with the doubtful exception of Mr. Gilchrist, none of his worshippers have affected to place any reliance on them. Mr. William Rossetti makes a little subdued fun of the idea that he saw "visions" in any but a subjective sense, and no one will suspect Mr. Swinburne of endorsing a theory of "inspiration" that involves a supernatural assumption. If, then, Blake's credentials in this respect are no higher than those of other artists and teachers in all ages, what justification is there for the emphasis so persistently laid upon them? Why should we be so often assured of his "visionary" faculty and "INSPIRED" utterance,—that "in the light of his especial faith all visible things were fused into the intense heat, and sharpened into the keen outline of vision,"—that his hardest facts were the vaguest allegories of other men,"—that "possessed to the inmost nerve and core by a certain faith, consumed by the desire to obey his instinct of right by preaching that faith, utterly regardless of all matters lying outside of his own inspiration, he wrote and engraved as it was given him to do, and no otherwise,"*—that "he believed in and acted from intuitions and visions such as no artist ever before in any age asserted he saw or attempted to embody?"†

This exalted language, in its literal acceptance, must mean that Blake possessed some rarer gift than the "vision and the faculty divine" which is the birthright of every true poet, and was elevated to some loftier region than Milton when "rapt above the pole." If there is extraneous evidence to support this presumption, let it by all means be produced. If it rests upon nothing but the evidence of Blake's own works, the use of such highflown eulogy is misleading, and serves only to set a transiently fictitious value on what must after all be measured by ordinary standards.

In tracing the genesis of the ideas which are embedded in the prophetic books, and the media through which Blake obtained them, we have expended less research than Mr. William Rossetti is of opinion that they deserve, but enough to be quite satisfied that more would be thrown away. All Mr. Swinburne's ingenious subtlety and redundant eloquence has failed to convince us that Blake had any definite system that can be submitted to analysis. A few leading ideas seem to have attracted his mind in youth, and thenceforth constituted his stock-in-trade. They recur perpetually, both in his prose and verse, though the terms in which he clothes them are as perpetually shifted. Beyond the general direction which they may serve to indicate, we can discern little but vague aspiration and turgid rhetoric. Often there is nothing discernible at all in the wild turmoil of words and ideas.

* Swinburne, *Critical Essay*, pp. 40, 41, 277.

to were current coin before Blake's time, and there is no difficulty in pointing to the sources whence he is likely to have derived them. The most prominent are identical with the basis of the chief Gnostic systems. A work so common as Mosheim's "Institutes of Ecclesiastical History" (of which an English translation was published in 1764), or Dr. Nathaniel Lardner's "History of the Heretics of the Two First Centuries" (published in 1780), either of which Blake might have met with in his Nonconformist circle, would have readily supplied an outline of the tenets attributed to Marcion, Basilides, Valentinus, Carpocrates, and other sectaries of the second century after Christ. The system of Marcion, as Mr. William Rossetti points out, bears the strongest resemblance to many of Blake's notions.

"Marcion taught," says Mosheim, "that there are two first causes of all things—the one perfectly good, the other perfectly evil. Between these two deities is interposed the Architect of this lower world which men inhabit, and who is the God and law-giver of the Jews. His nature is neither perfectly good nor perfectly evil, but mixed. . . . The Jews are the subjects of the Creator of the World, who is a very powerful spirit. The other nations, which worship many gods, are under the Author of Evil. Each is an oppressor of rational souls, and holds them in bondage. In order, therefore, to end this war, and give freedom to the souls which are of divine origin, the Supreme God sent among the Jews Jesus Christ, who is of a nature very similar to himself, or his Son, clothed with the appearance or shadow of a body to render him visible, with commission to destroy both the kingdom of the World's Creator and that of the Evil Principle, and to bring back souls to God." (Part ii. c. 5.)

"Marcion wrote a treatise called 'Antitheses,' composed of contrasted passages from Law and Gospel, in order more plainly to show the inconsistency of the two systems. . . . He willingly dwelt, too, on the Saviour's anti-Mosaic acts, his laxity in Sabbath-observance, his touching the unclean, his patronage of publicans, Samaritans, and Greeks." *

So much of this system as amounted to a belief in a Supreme Deity and Author of Good, either the Father of, or identical with, the Saviour, whose Gospel of love is antithetical to the moral law imposed by the Creator of the World, and to the hatred of which Evil, or Satan, is the author, Blake seems to have adopted as the nucleus of such theology as he had. Urizen, the "jealous god," the "god of restraint, creator of prohibitions, whose laws are forbearance and abstinence," † who figures so prominently in the prophetic books, unmistakeably answers to the Demiurgus. The direct intention to violate the moral and Mosaic law which Marcion discerned in the acts of Christ, Blake has made the subject of a passage in the "Marriage of Heaven and Hell," which is expanded in the "Everlasting Gospel." Beyond this point, however, ~~argue~~ ^{argue}. Cognate and opposed systems have evidently

* *His Rise and Progress of Christianity*, p. 118.
† *ibid.*, p. 246.

been laid under contribution; but he has collected shreds from so many different quarters, and labelled them with such fantastic names, that none of the heresiarchs or mystics from whom they were borrowed would recognize his own property. We can but suggest the sources of a few of the larger fragments. The doctrine which Carpocrates is said to have deduced from the words of Christ, "that nothing is essential to salvation but faith, love, or charity;" the proposition to which Augustine committed himself in his controversy with Pelagius, that among the "many things appearing indisputably real and certain to the superficial eye of man which in the higher view of Omnipotence exist not," is evil; that "it is not an effect, but a defect; without it, as in a picture without shadows, there could be no beauty, no adequate appreciation of good;"* and the tenet attributed by their adversaries to the Antinomian sectaries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, "that a person may live as he will and break the law by sinning at his pleasure, provided he holds to Christ and embraces his merits by faith," together with the logical consequences of each, Blake unhesitatingly appropriated. "Mutual forgiveness of each vice" is the motto over his "Gates of Paradise." The "Jerusalem" is frankly admitted by Mr. Swinburne to be "a fervent apocalyptic discourse" on the themes of "love without law and against law, virtue that stagnates into poisonous dead matter by moral isolation, sin that must exist for the sake of being forgiven, forgiveness that must always keep up with sin, must even maintain sin, that it may have something to keep up with and to live for. . . . Only by worship of imaginative impulse, the grace of the Lamb of God which admits infinite indulgence in sin and infinite forgiveness of sin, only by some such faith as this shall the world be renewed and redeemed" (p. 277).

That the restraints of religion and law upon sexual appetite, embodied in the rite or bond of marriage, were the imposition of the "jealous Urizen," and that humanity would never attain freedom until they were broken asunder, is insinuated in the "Book of Thel" and "Songs of Experience," and taught without disguise in the "Marriage of Heaven and Hell," "America," the "Visions of the Daughters of Albion," and the "Song of Los." Though it is probable from the connection in which we find him using them that he derived his notions on this subject from one of the sources above indicated, he had not to travel beyond the political circle in which he moved for testimony to the undiminished vitality of tenets so comfortable to the flesh. In the Revolutionary gospel "free love" was as much an article of faith as "free

* Mackay, *ut supra*, p. 228.

speech." At the table of his patron, the bookseller Johnson, where he was in the habit of meeting the leading English apostles of "Liberty," Godwin, Mary Wollstonecroft, Paine, and Holcroft, he must have heard extreme views on this topic bruited a score of times. Of Mary Wollstonecroft, whose theoretic and practical disdain of marriage must have made her a prominent and attractive figure in this circle, Blake doubtless saw a good deal, as she was "the favourite and protégée" of Johnson, who employed him in 1791 to illustrate her "Tales for Children" and another work.* Her eloquent discourse upon the wrongs and "Rights of Woman" in this province of social economy may be reasonably conjectured to have furnished material for the declamatory utterances which Blake has put into the mouth of Oothoon, the typical woman whose rebellion against religion and law, and aspirations after unlimited love, form the theme of the "Visions of the Daughters of Albion."† The fragments of political theory floating in the yeasty sea of rhetoric which fills the "Europe," "America," and the "Song of Liberty," must be traced in like manner to his desultory readings of the literature or reminiscences of the catch-words in circulation among his republican associates.‡

Such rudimentary and loose notions of metaphysics as he had Blake seems to have mainly derived from Berkeley, who was "one on the list of his favourite authors,"§ and to have developed out of antagonism to the system of Locke, whom he associated with Bacon and Newton as a special agent of Urizen or of Satan in imposing upon mankind. The "Emanations," which play so prominent a part in his prophetic dramas, betray their Gnostic origin in their name; but Blake, if his interpreter is to be trusted, used the term in a metaphysical rather than a theological sense.¶ Some digest of Greek philosophy doubtless

* Gilchrist, i. p. 90.

† Blake's abortive attempt to carry out his theory on this subject into practice deserves passing mention. It is said, "truly or falsely," observes Mr. Swinburne, that "once in a patriarchal mood" he proposed "to add a second wife" to his household. Mrs. Blake, though in other respects a most dutiful and unselfish wife, appears on this occasion to have lamentably fallen short of the ideal standard proposed for her imitation in Oothoon, to have been strangely unconscious of her alleged wrongs, and disposed to be tenacious of the illusory right conferred upon her by the laws which her husband spent his life in denouncing. Under the stress of her "tears," according to Mr. Swinburne, or to put an end to what Mr. William Rossetti with greater probability terms the "grave conflicts of feeling and of will" which thereupon arose, Blake "seems to have sacrificed this one hopeful and plausible design with a good grace." *Swinburne*, pp. 14, 15. *W. Rossetti, Memoir*, pp. 22, 23.

‡ Two of his hugbears at this period, "Old Rome" and "the Priests," became his pets at a later date — *Gilchrist*, i. 303. *W. Rossetti*, p. 80. He is said to have been so disgusted by the "Terror" that he threw off the *bonnet rouge* which he had worn in witness of his sympathy with the French Revolution, but continued to the last to call himself a republican and "enemy of kings and war." This may be true, as Blake had a supreme contempt for consistency, but his dedication of "The Grave" to Queen Charlotte as "the Shards of England's Fall" wherein he represents himself as "flowing before his apostrophe" and "the spiritual form" as "guiding Leviathan," suggests a different view.

§ Gilchrist, i. p. 191.

¶ Swinburne, p. 232.

furnished him with his favourite idea that the senses, which ought to be man's chief "inlets of spiritual perception," have become clouded and untrustworthy. From the time of Xenophanes downwards, this has been the common property of metaphysicians. To Swedenborg, whose works he is also known to have studied,* and of whose doctrines he must have heard much from his friend Flaxman, who was a proselyte, Blake was greatly indebted, although in the "Marriage of Heaven and Hell" he ungratefully repudiates his creditor as the retailer of doctrines alike old and false. The speculation that the "spiritual" clothes itself with the "natural," as a man with a garment, which is elaborated in the "Gates of Paradise" and repeated in other works; and the theory of "concordances" between spiritual and natural objects which is expounded in the "Jerusalem" and the "Vision of the Last Judgment,"† are substantially those of Swedenborg.‡ The language in which Blake invests his borrowed ideas sometimes gives them a novel aspect, as when he identifies the spiritual world with imagination,—“The world of imagination is the world of eternity,”—but at other times he adopts the very phraseology of his master. The statement which Crabb Robinson records having heard from him about the “spiritual sun” which he had seen “on Primrose Hill”§ may be matched by a parallel passage from Swedenborg in the work cited. The “Marriage of Heaven and Hell,” in its general structure and tone, if we omit the “Proverbs” of which Lavater’s aphorisms admittedly furnished the hint,|| and the Ossianic “Song of Liberty,” is a caricature of Swedenborg’s method and style in the same work and that on “Conjugal Love.” His interviews with angels and records of visions are imitated or burlesqued, and to his “Memorable Relations” Blake opposes “Memorable Fancies.” From the same source were no doubt borrowed some of his odd terms—“Satans” for example, the generic name which he gave to the representatives of evil upon earth. Jacob Behmen, another mystic whose works he is known to have studied in Law’s translations,¶ will probably be found to have supplied him with other ideas, and the language in which they appear in his prophecies. One of his favourite expressions, “Gate” (in the sense of explanation), is repeatedly used in Behmen’s “Aurora” in the same sense. Diligent reading of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures—especially the prophecies of Ezekiel and Daniel, the books of Job and Revelation—added not a little to his store of reminiscence. Mr. Swinburne (p. 284) admits the correspondence

* A copy of Swedenborg’s “Angelic Wisdom,” annotated by Blake, was exhibited at the Burlington Club.

† Gilchrist, ii. 163.

‡ See “Intercourse between Soul and Body.”

§ Reminiscences, cited in Gilchrist

.p. 6

¶ Crabb Robinson in Gilchrist, i. Heaven and Hell.”

between the later chapters of Ezekiel and the passage in the "Jerusalem" relating to the building of Golgonooza. The thirty-ninth chapter of Job will be found in like manner to have been the model for a striking passage in the "Visions of the Daughters of Albion." Such characteristic phrases and words as "a watcher and a holy one," "thoughts that have been hid of old," "fat of lambs," "wine-press," "wild ass," "golden bowl," "beryl," and the like, tell their own story. A smattering of Hebrew, or access to some commentary in which the significance of words in that language was explained, apparently helped Blake to several of his names. Tirzah, which, as has been seen, he used to mean "the mere separate human nature, mother of the perishing body," he must have found in Canticles vi. 4, "Thou art beautiful, O my love, as Tirzah;" and its signification of "pleasantness" fitted well with the construction he put on the claims of sense. Rahab, by which, according to Mr. Swinburne, he meant to brand the harlotry of "moral law," besides being the name of the woman who admitted the spies of Israel into Jericho, stands in the poetic language of Isaiah and David (Isaiah li. 9 and Psalm lxxxvii. 4) for Egypt, a metaphor no doubt suggested by its etymological sense of "insolence or fierceness," either of which would commend it to Blake's purpose. Other Hebrew words, such as Beulah (married), Hara (mountainous), Tel (hill), Tiria (fear), Ur or Uri (light, light of the Lord), he either adopted bodily or modified into Urizen, Tiriël, and Har, although the senses in which he employed them were perverted or ironic, if they had any significance at all. Other names, as Mr. William Rossetti suggests (p. 121), were copies or anagrams of Greek and Latin words, as Hyle, Enitharmon, Los, and Orc. Random readings of poetry, history, and mythology, together with newspapers and gazettes, furnished several more. Albion (as a person), Antamon, Ariston, Manethu, Kox, Bowen, Quantock, &c., may be thus identified. The chief source of his meaningless names was Ossian, from which he freely imported them, with merely syllabic alteration. Uthorno thus reappeared as Urthona, Lutha as Leutha, Oithona as Oothoon, Tonthormod as Theotormon, Brumo as Bromion, Berrathon as Benython, Gelchossa as Golgonooza, &c., &c. The influence of this work, moreover, upon Blake's style, cannot be over-estimated. Its profuseness of fulsome epithet, its disjointed method of expression, and perpetual introduction of apostrophe and ejaculation, he accepted as rhetorical canons, not less authoritative than those which he deduced from his Biblical models. In endeavouring to reconcile the two he succeeded in effecting as unreadable an

- to be found in our literature.

And of Blake's prophetic fertility, we have little to
 said in connection with his poems. From

the "Book of Thel," issued in 1789, to the "Ghost of Abel," issued in 1822, the series of epical or dramatic oracles repeats one little round of ideas with wearisome iteration. The names of his personages are indeed varied with the most puzzling adroitness; but all speak in the same strain, and the interest and action of all his plots revolve upon similar motives. In the "Book of Thel," which represents in a mild allegorical fashion the yearning of the human spirit for a solution of the riddle of its destiny, the idea is first vaguely put forth that while all other animate and inanimate things are happy in the conscious discharge of their earthly function, man suffers from the perversion of his senses by some tyrannical agency and the cruel restraint put upon their healthy enjoyments. Fuller expression is given to this idea in the "Marriage of Heaven and Hell," which differs from its successors in form, and condenses in its "Proverbs of Hell," "Voice of the Devil," "Memorable Fancies," and "Song of Liberty," the principal propositions which they subsequently elaborate to tenuity. Thus the "Visions of the Daughters of Albion" exemplifies in an allegorical disguise the aphorisms which in the "Marriage of Heaven and Hell" preach the duty of self-indulgence, and denounce religion and law as the tyrannical oppressors of sexual liberty:

"He who desires but acts not breeds pestilence."

"Prisons are built with stones of law, brothels with bricks of religion."

"As the caterpillar chooses the fairest leaves to lay her eggs on,
So the priest lays his curse on the fairest joys."

Regard for the reader's delicacy prevents us from extracting the passages wherein Blake has illustrated the practical working of his views. Though the language is put into the mouth of a woman, nothing can exceed their grossness. "America" chants in strains of revolutionary fervour the triumph of "free love" in the New World, and "Europe" foreshadows the advent of kindred emancipation to the old. The hints thrown out in the "Book of Thel" and the "Marriage of Heaven and Hell," that the senses have been choked by the perverse rule of Urizen, are expanded into a laboured passage in the "Europe." The "Book of Urizen" repeats this notion, and further expounds, so far as its frenzied speech can be interpreted, the Gnostic theology of which Blake had as yet put forth only abrupt intimations. The "Song of Los" is another dithyrambic chant, apparently having for its burden the slavery imposed by Urizen on mankind by means of laws, creeds, and metaphysical systems. The "darkening the five senses" is here again deplored as the source of human error, and the philosophers, who have been Urizen's agents effecting the mischief, may be identified with certain mon-

in a mill, of whom a vision is afforded us in the "Marriage of Heaven and Hell," employed in the operation of tearing one another's bodies to pieces. Aristotle, whom Blake singles out for obloquy in the earlier book, here yields his place in the pillory to Newton and Locke. The "Milton" and "Jerusalem"—so far as we can follow any thread of meaning in them, for to read either consecutively with a clear understanding we conceive to be impossible—appear to enlarge upon the foregoing ideas with the addition of those embodied in the "Gates of Paradise" and "Everlasting Gospel." That free indulgence in sin is essential to the Divine forgiveness, and that the eternal mission of Jesus is to proclaim this truth, which Urizen and Satan have combined to obscure, the one by instituting a "moral law" and a theory of virtue, which stands in the place of impulse and love, the only essentials of "good;" the other by giving sanction to this spurious morality and accusing mankind of its breach; and that the supreme God, who is represented by if not identical with Jesus, will consummate the eventual redemption of the world by forgiving not only sin but "virtue" and the selfishness and cruelty which are incarnated in the type of Satan; such, divested of its cumbersome machinery of allegory and myth, seems to be the gist of these companion oracles. We need not adduce further evidence of what must be patent to all readers of Blake, and is admitted by the most uncompromising of his advocates, that "one vein of fiery faith runs through all the prophetic books, and one passionate form of doctrine is enforced and beaten in upon the disciple again and again."*

The prophet's case in regard to the three remaining requisites of complete genius is surrendered by all his adherents with regretful unanimity as incapable of demonstration. Mr. Swinburne, indeed, makes frantic efforts to contend for some sort of "coherence" in the master's deliverances, but is driven to admissions which effectually neutralize them. A writer who so far "alternates between lyrical invention and gigantic allegory" that "it is hard to catch and hold him down to any form or plan" (p. 195); who "uses the current terms of religion now as types of his own peculiar faith, now in the sense of ordinary preachers, impugning, therefore, at one time what at another he will seem to vindicate" (p. 212); who "at one time speaks of Nature as the source of moral law . . . origin of religious restrictions, and the worship of abstinence, mother of 'the harlot modesty,' and spring of all hypocrisies and prohibitions," and "at another time . . . will pl—
 i half of 'natural energies,' and set up
 a enjoyment and gratification

of all desires, against moral law and government of the creative and restrictive deity" (p. 280)—may be as inspired as his interpreter pleases, but cannot be credited with consistency and intelligibility in any recognized sense of these words. Inequality, incoherence, and inarticulateness are inadequate terms to express the disproportion between sense and sound, beauty and uncouthness, to be found in this mass of prophetic lore; the wandering of purpose and looseness of handling apparent in almost every book; the hopeless obscurity in which the meaning of sentence after sentence is hidden. That the literary result of Blake's prolonged and extensive dredging in remote waters of heresy and mysticism, when collected together and aided by an art of corresponding strangeness and extravagance, is often extremely curious, we are not intending to dispute. Fine thoughts and picturesque descriptions may undoubtedly be found in the heap, but the diligence shown by Mr. Gilchrist and Mr. Swinburne in picking out these gems has given far too favourable an impression of its general quality. Conditions of space render it impossible to demonstrate this, but a specimen must be furnished of the rubbish which the intending student of Blake must make up his mind to turn over before he lights upon a treasure. The following passage from "Jerusalem" presents at the outset a semblance of definite and consecutive meaning which arrests attention, but it rapidly drifts into impenetrable fog:—

"O Saviour, pour upon me thy spirit of meekness and love,
 Annihilate the selfhood in me; be thou all my life,
 Guide thou my hand, which trembles exceedingly, upon the Rock of Ages,
 While I write of the building of Golgonooza and of the terrors of Enithuthon;
 Of Hand and Hyle and Coban, of Kwantok, Peachey, Brereton, Sleyd, and Hutton;
 Of the terrible sons and daughters of Albion and their generations.
 Scafield, Kox, Kotope, and Bowen revolve most mightily upon
 The Furnace of Los: before the Eastern Gate bending their fury—
 They war to destroy the Furnace; to desolate Golgonooza,
 And to devour the Sleeping Humanity of Albion in rage and hunger;
 They revolve into the furnaces southward, and are driven forth northward—
 Divided into male and female forms time after time,
 From the Twelve all the families of England spread abroad.
 The Male is a Furnace of beryl; the Female is a golden loom;
 I behold them, and their rushing fires overwhelm my soul
 In London's darkness: and my tears fall day and night
 Upon the Emanations of Albion's sons; the daughters of Albion,
 Names anciently remembered, but now continued as fictions,
 Although in every bosom they control our vegetative powers.
 These are united into Tirzah and her sisters on Mount Gilead,
 Cambol and Gwendolen and Gonwenna and Cordella and Ignoge;
 And these united into Rahab in the Covering Cherub on Euphrates—
 Gwinniverra and Gwinifred and Gonorill and Sabrina beautiful,
 Estrild, Mephetabel, and Ragan, lovely daughters of Albion—
 They are the beautiful Emanations of the twelve sons of Albion."

The average reader will probably have had enough of this, but there is abundance of the same sort in the "Jerusalem" and "Milton" for any appetites that find it palatable. For our own

part we can only echo the despairing comment of the learned Lightfoot on some dark passages of the Talmud—"What all this means it is impossible to imagine—scarcely possible to imagine what any part of it means; nor is an Œdipus here to solve the doubt!" Nonsense it might be rash to call it, for certain ideas have been discerned looming through the haze, and as a portion of the work is obviously allegory, the presumption might be charitably extended to the rest. A little study of our prophet, however, suffices to dispel the hope that this interpretation can be put upon a considerable number of his utterances. When the fire of declamation is once kindled, a name or phrase is enough for fresh fuel, and his thoughts run on from one set of ideas to another until the frenzy has burnt itself out. Take such a passage, for example, as that in the "Milton" (cited by Mr. Swinburne, p. 270), which describes in imagery borrowed from the Hebrew prophets the "treading of the wine-press of war." One press suggests another, and the oracle darts off into new symbolism. "This wine-press is called War on earth; it is the printing-press of Los; there he lays his words in order above the mortal brain, as cogs are formed in a wheel to turn the cogs of the adverse wheel." The names of the places in which he has lived, and of the persons with whom he has come in contact, are forcibly dragged into juxtaposition with localities and characters drawn promiscuously from the Hebrew Scriptures and contemporary literature. Thus we have such amazing collocations as these:—

"When Los joined with me, he took me in his fiery whirlwind,
My vegetated portion was hurried into Lambeth's shades,
He set me down in Felpham's vale and prepared a beautiful
Cottage for me
Walking in my cottage garden, sudden I beheld
The virgin Ololon, and addressed her as a daughter of Boulah."—*Milton*.

"Kox * is the father of Shem, and Ham, and Japheth; he is the Noah
Of the flood of Udan-Adan. Ham is the father of the Seven
From Enoch to Adam; Schofeld† is Adam who was now
Created in Edom."—*Jerusalem*.

In one passage the twelve tribes of Israel are allotted as types of the twelve counties of Wales: in another, devotional ejaculations are jumbled with popular shouts—"Amen! Huzza! Selah!"

The prophecies of the late Mrs. Elizabeth Cottle with which some of our readers may have chanced to meet, present precisely analogous features to those here noted. That they are symptoms of a specific condition of mental disease which, though distinguishable from absolute insanity, cannot be better described than as **religious monomania**, we have no doubt whatever, and this conclusion is


* Mr. Coxe, the historian.

† Schofield, the soldier who accused Blake of using seditious
at Chichester.—*Gilchrist*, ii. p. 198.

not shaken by any amount of evidence adduced by Blake's surviving friends, that in all the ordinary concerns of life he was perfectly sane. Upon this question opinions may reasonably differ, but respecting Blake's *status* as a teacher any serious discussion would be unprofitable. Can Mr. Swinburne or any other of his disciples deliberately contend that a prophet capable of maundering, and who does continually maunder, in the fashion above shown, ought to be ranked even approximately with the great ethical thinkers or religious teachers of mankind? We feel it an insult to their venerable names to suggest the bare possibility.

Blake's claim to the highest qualities of genius as a designer must be reserved for separate consideration.

HENRY G. HEWLETT.



PERSONALITY AND THE INFINITE.

IT is one of the most noticeable facts in the history of opinion that speculative doctrines, which become sharply antagonistic when carried to their legitimate results, are found to harmonize at a common root. There they may even touch each other; and in their origin be no more than a way of throwing emphasis on this or that phase respectively of an accepted fact, while their developed conclusions may be wide as the poles asunder. And the history of philosophy, which exhibits the ceaseless swing of the pendulum of thought toward opposite sides,—a movement which we have no reason to wish should ever end, for its cessation would imply the paralysis of the human mind,—shows how easily differences, which are trivial at their first appearance, develop into distinctive schools of opinion, and are confirmed by the reaction and antagonism of rival systems.

The question, whether the Supreme Being, or ultimate Existence, within the universe, is in any sense personal, whether it can be legitimately spoken of and interpreted by us in the terms in which we speak of and interpret our own personality, is as old as the discussions of the Eleatics in Greece; and from Parmenides to Hegel it has been solved in one way, while from the Jewish monotheists, through the entire course of Christian theology, it has been answered in another.* If the most recent discussions of

* National temperament, or racial tendency, must have had their influence in determining the character of these answers. The instinct of the Semitic races has tended in one direction; that of the Aryan, or Indo-European, in another.

the subject in contemporary literature contribute no fresh data to this controversy of the ages, they have the merit of presenting the perennial problem in a singularly clear light; and they prove how the most abstract questions of human knowledge continue to fascinate the heart of man, and to tax the efforts of his intellect, while they directly affect his practical life.

The late David Frederick Strauss and Mr. Matthew Arnold have each written strongly against the notion of personality in God; the former consistently developing the Hegelian doctrine, which he has applied to the problems of religious history; the latter endeavouring to lay the basis of a new reverence for the Bible, through a phenomenal psychology and doctrine of ignorance, in those unsystematic papers contributed to this REVIEW, full of delicate and happy criticism, though dashed too much with *persiflage*, and scarcely grave enough when the radical importance of the question is considered in connection with the literature of solemn speculation on the subject.

Our apostle of culture has been telling us that we must give up and renounce for ever the delusion that God is "a person who thinks and loves." We are to recognize instead "a stream of tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being;" a "power that lives and breathes and feels," but not "a person who thinks and loves." We are directed, as all the world knows, by dint of unwearied repetition, to "the eternal not-ourselves that makes for righteousness." But does this curious entity, this "eternal not-ourselves," present a more adequate notion to the intellect than that which it is meant to displace? Is it less ambiguous, or less hypothetical? We are asked to substitute for the exploded notion of a personal God a negative entity of which all that can with certainty be affirmed is that it is "not we ourselves," that it is beyond us and eternal. All else is to be set aside as personification and poetry, or "extra-belief." But an "eternal-in-ourselves" making for righteousness would be a more intelligible, an equally relevant, and verifiable notion. And how do we know it to be "eternal," but by an *à priori* process, which the new philosophy would disown? We are supposed to be conducted by the help of this definition out of the dim regions of theological haze, to the *terra firma* of verifiable knowledge. Is it, then, less intricate and confusing than the old historic conception which it is intended to supplant? No one, it is said, "has discovered the nature of God to be personal, or is entitled to assert that God *has conscious intelligence*." But we are told to look to "the constitution and history of things," where we find an "eternal tendency" at work "outside of us, prevailing whether we will or no, whether we are here or not;" and we shall find that this eternal *non-ego* "makes for righteousness." The special

merit which this new definition claims for itself is that it is a luminous one, and within the range of experience, where it can be tested and verified. In this demand for verification Mr. Arnold either wishes our religious philosophy to be recast in terms of the exact sciences, and nothing accepted in the sphere of psychology and metaphysic, which cannot be reached as we reach conclusions in mathematics; or he is stating the most trite of philosophical commonplaces, viz., that moral truth is not susceptible of demonstrative evidence. Are not the terms he makes use of, however, both loose and deceptive? This "making for righteousness" is meant to describe the action of a vast impersonal tendency everywhere operative towards that end. But surely all our experience of "tendency" in the direction of righteousness is personal. Observation of the results of human action, and consequences of wrong-doing and of righteous conduct respectively, shows that certain causes, set in motion by ourselves or by others, issue in certain subjective effects. If we confine ourselves to the sphere of experience, we not only get no further than the observation of successive phenomena, but all the succession we observe is personal; because it is the field of human conduct alone that is before us. Further, in thus limiting ourselves, another fact arrests our notice. If there be a stream of tendency not ourselves that makes for righteousness, there is also a stream of tendency not ourselves that makes for wickedness. There are two main streams of tendency flowing through the universe, into one or other of which all the lesser rills of moral influence flow. We can trace their fluctuating course from the earliest ages to the present time; but what the better are we of either, as a solution of the ultimate problem of the universe? If we confine ourselves to the limited area open to inductive inference and the verifications of experience, we cannot reach the conclusion that there is but a single stream of tendency, not ourselves, and beneficent, which makes for righteousness alone. If some phenomena warrant such an inference, counter-appearances suggest, with equal force, the operation of a malignant power, making persistently for evil; and with two antagonist forces in perpetual collision, "the conditions of ditheism are complete."

Returning to the formula against which Mr. Arnold has directed so many shafts of sarcasm, viz., that God is "a person who thinks and loves," I have no hesitation in accepting it as a substantially accurate definition of what is held by the majority of theists; though few perhaps would state it in these terms, and it is liable to misconception, through the use of the indefinite article. If Mr. Arnold were merely cautioning his generation against identifying its notion of what constitutes personality in God with its concept of personality in man—if his teaching on this point were but a

warning against the popular tendency to assume either that our human nature was an adequate measure of the Divine, or afforded our only light as to its characteristics—it would be most salutary; though only a continuation of the familiar message of the seers of Israel—a modern echo of the prophetic voices of the Hebrew Church, when they affirmed that He is “not altogether such an one as ourselves.” It amounts, however, to much more than this. It is an echo of the dogma which lies at the heart of every monistic system of speculation, that there is a radical inconsistency or contradiction between the notions of the Personal and the Infinite, so that we cannot combine both in a concept which conserves the characteristics of each; but must, in logical consistency, surrender the one or the other of them; in short, that if God be a person He cannot be infinite, and if infinite He must be impersonal. Personality is regarded as, in all cases, essentially limited, and necessarily bounded. In the human race, the personality of each man is supposed to consist in the isolation from his fellows; and it is inferred that all personality consists in a gathering together of self at a centre or focus of individuality, and that it is realizable and real only in its separation from, and exclusion of, other things; while it is affirmed that the Absolute and Infinite are all-embracing, all-surrounding, excluding nothing, but enfolding within themselves the totality of existence. Therefore it is said, if there be an infinite and absolute Being in the universe, nothing else can exist beside him. He will take up and include within himself all being whatsoever; but in so doing he cannot be personal: for the personal is always the bounded, the fenced, the separate, the enclosed.

To put the difficulty which the theistic solution presents in its strongest light, I restate the problem thus. Endeavouring to realize the infinite, whether in space or in time, we may begin by imagining circles beyond circles, systems vaster and still vaster, lines of continuous succession unbroken by any point or interval. We rise on the wings of imagination, and pursue the journey till our thought sinks paralyzed. But in so doing, we have never really got one step beyond the finite. By such imaginative flights along the lines of sequence or over areas of space, we never approach one whit nearer to the Infinite, because the vastest conceivable aggregate of finites is not really liker it, than is the unit from which we start in the process of multiplication. The one is but the other “writ large.” Therefore we may not only reach the notion as well before the journey of finite thought commences; but if we reach it at all, it must be by a process wholly different from an expansion of the finite, and by the exercise of another faculty. We may do so, however, in a moment, not by a multiplication of the finite, but by its elimination—not by enlarging the

notion, but by abolishing it. All conceivable finites being before the mind as an indefinite quantity, we may say with Herder, "These I remove, and thou [the Infinite] liest all before me." Thus our thought of the Infinite is not a pictorial or concrete realization of it as a mental image, built up out of elements furnished by sense-experience, or imaginatively bodied forth on the inner horizon of the mind. We do not attain to it by a synthetic process, piecing together a multitude of finites, sweeping round them, and imagining them in their totality. But we at once and directly think away all limitation, and abolish the finite by excluding individual determinate things from a field preoccupied by thought. Now, with this idea of the Infinite, as the negation of the finite, it seems difficult to conjoin the notion of anything whatever that is personal; for personality manifests itself to us familiarly under the restrictions of finite form; and as the one notion grows clear, the other is usually dim. It is difficult to conjoin the notion of personality even with that of the indefinitely vast. As you approach the latter, the former seems to recede. Is there an intellectual stereoscope through which the two notions may be seen, blent in the unity of a single conception? The defined idea of personality, and the shadowy notion of the infinite, may be bracketed together under a common term which expresses them both; can they be also *thought* in conjunction? and have we any warrant for the inference that they do actually coalesce in the supreme existence which we call God?

All that we seem warranted to affirm is that personality is one of the characteristics under which the Supreme Being manifests Himself, not that it is exhaustive of the phases of manifestation that are either possible or actual. With entire consistency, therefore, we may affirm at once the personality and the transcendency of God; that is to say, we may affirm that He is a person as we understand the term, and that He is *more* than a person, as we understand it. If we believe that everything distinctive of human personality exists in God in more exalted phases, we are also forced to believe that infinitely more that is different from it co-exists within that nature. In other words, though we recognize certain features within the Divine Infinitude analogous to the personality of which we are conscious, it does not follow that we may identify the two, and take the human as the measure of the Divine.

What then is our warrant for assuming an *analogy* which does not amount to an *identity*, and in thus affirming the existence of a Personality that is at once real and transcendent, or (if we may venture on the distinction) human though not anthropomorphic?

The radical feature of personality, as known to us, whether apprehended by self-consciousness, or recognized in the other beings who surround us, is the survival of the permanent self

under all the fleeting or deciduous phases of experience, the personal identity which is involved in the assertion, "I am." While my thoughts, feelings, acts, pass away and perish, I exist, continue to live, and grow in the fulness of experience. Beneath the shows of things, the everlasting flux and reflux of phenomenal change, a substance or interior essence survives. Now, limitation is not a necessary adjunct of *that* notion. There may not only be an everlasting succession of thoughts, emotions, and volitions, acts of consciousness in perpetual series, while the substantial and permanent self remains underneath the evanescent phenomena; but the thought, feeling, &c., may have an infinite range, and be all-pervasive and inter-penetrating at every spot within the universe. Limitation does not directly enter into the notion of personality. The *action* of a personal being is limited by the material on which he works, by his surroundings and circumstances; and our personalities are limited by other things because they surround us; but if we surrounded them, and pervaded all finite things by omnipresent energy, the limitation would be simply a mode of action and a condition of activity. It does not therefore follow from our experience of limitation that in being conscious, the conscious nature must be limited by the presence and environment of others. It may be unlimited in act, unshackled by conditions, spontaneous in all it does, though it acts through the instrumentality and agency of others.

To state the question otherwise: Is separateness from other existences equivalent to finitude? Does the one notion carry the other with it or within it? All finite existences *are* separate from another, but it does not follow that all existence that is separate from others is finite. That infinite existence which we conceive as the simple negation of the finite may, nevertheless, pervade it in an unlimited manner; and the idea of a fence or boundary is not involved in the notion of Personality in the abstract, though it is involved in the notion of finite personality. It does not therefore follow that if a being is personal, it must on that account be simply one out of many—differentiated from others by reason of its personality. Its personality is not the cause of its separateness and differentiation. It cannot exist out of all relation to other beings; for all existence (or the emergence of being in definite forms and relations) implies separateness from others. But though particular existence is what it is in virtue of other existences determining and conditioning it, and we, in our limitation, cannot be conscious of our own personality, except under the condition of a *non-ego* beside us, it is quite an illegitimate inference from this to affirm that personality cannot exist at all, or be consciously realized at all, except under the condition of a limiting *non-ego*. It is conceivable that the *non-ego* would vanish

in the case of a being that was transcendent and a life that was all-pervasive. That the dualism involved in all finite consciousness should vanish in the case of the Infinite may be difficult to realize; but to affirm that in all cases self-consciousness implies a centre, or focus, at which the scattered rays of individuality are gathered up, is assuredly to transgress by the unwarranted use of a physical analogy.

I quote from Strauss, who always states his case with force and clearness:—

“The modern monotheistic conception of God has two sides, that of the Absolute and that of the Personal, which, although united in Him, are so in the same manner as that in which two qualities are sometimes found in one person, one of which can be traced to the father’s side, the other to the mother’s. The one element is the Hebrew Christian, the other the Greco-philosophical contribution to our conception of God. We may say that we inherit from the Old Testament the ‘Lord-God,’ from the New the ‘God-Father,’ but from the Greek philosophy the ‘Godhead,’ or the ‘Absolute.’”*

So far well, and excellently put. But if it be so, that these notions, seemingly incompatible, are united in our modern monotheism, “in the same manner as two qualities are sometimes found in one person,” does not that mitigate the difficulty of realizing both as uniting in one transcendent Personality? As two streams of hereditary influence unite to form one river of personality in a single individual, and as two great conceptions of God have survived in the world, and alternately come to the front in the mind of the race (call them, for distinction’s sake, the Hebraic and the Hellenic), cannot these be supposed to unite in one vast stream of Transcendent Being? And are not the two conceptions merely different ways of *interpreting* that supreme Existence which both equally recognize? But if we inherit these notions from the sources which Strauss so happily indicates, why proceed to disown one half of the inheritance, and cast out the Jewish as airy and unverifiable, while the Greek is retained as the real and the scientific? If we are indebted to both, why refuse one half of the legacy, or construe it as the ghostly shadow, and the other as the enduring substance? Was not the monotheism of the Jew at least a historical discipline to the human consciousness in the interpretation of a real side of the mystery, which, in its fulness, eluded him, as it baffled the Greek ontologists? Was it not at least as luminous and satisfying a translation of that mysterious text which the ever-changeful universe presented to both? If we admit that the Jewish notion of personality degenerated at times into an anthropomorphism that was crude and scarcely more elevated than the polytheism which it supplanted; nevertheless, the emphasis which it laid on the distinction and

* Old and New Faith, p. 121.

separateness of God from the world was part of the historic education of the race, just as the emphasis which the Greek mind laid on the unity which underlies all separateness was another part of that many-sided education.

But the supposition that "personality implies a limit" is largely due to the physical or semi-physical notions that have gathered round the idea of a throne on which a monarch is seated. If we give up this notion of a throne, "a court," and "a retinue of angels," and even renounce that of a local heaven as an "optical illusion," we shall not thus "lose every attribute of personal existence and action," as Strauss tells us we must. Every rational theist, nay, every thoughtful man, understands that these ideas of a "throne," &c., are the mere symbolical drapery which has been wrapped around the spiritual notion by the realistic imagination of the Jews. The whole of the sensuous imagery under which the Divine Nature is portrayed, as well as the material figures which are inlaid in every sentence in which we speak of the spiritual, are mere aids to the imaginative faculty—the steps of a ladder on which we rise in order that we may transcend these symbols (just as we find that a realization of indefinite areas of space or intervals of time helps us in the transcendent act by which we think away the finite and reach the infinite). But that God is, to quote the ancient formula, "all in the whole and all in every part" (as the soul is in the body), not localized at any centre—this is one of the commonplaces of theology. The notion of the Oriental mind, which has coloured much of our Western theology, that such symbols as those associated with royalty must be taken literally, and not as the "figures of the true," is expressly rejected in some of the definitions of the Church itself. And further, there is scarcely an idea connected with the monotheism of the Jews, such as king, judge, lawgiver, father, in reference to which there are not express statements within the sacred books of the nation, cautioning it against a *literal* application of these terms to the Infinite. The prophets saw their inadequacy and felt their poverty while they used them. Yet they could not avoid using them. They could not speak to the mass of the nation in other than symbolic language, any more than the leaders of the Greek schools could have dispensed with their esoteric, and made the crowds in the agora understand their speculations on pure being. If we are to speak of God at all in human words, we must employ the inadequate medium of metaphoric speech; and "jealousy to resist metaphor" does not, as Francis Newman says, "testify to depth of insight."* In their horror of anthropomorphism,

* "To refuse to speak of God as loving and planning, as grieving and sympathizing, without the protest of a *quasi*, will not tend," he adds, "to clearer intellectual views (for what can be darker?) but will muddy the springs of affection."—*The Soul*, p. 29.

our ontologists have rarefied their notion of the ultimate principle of existence into a mere abstraction, a blank formless essence, a mere vacuum. But in making free use of anthropomorphic language, we are aware that it is necessarily partial and wholly inadequate: and we exclude from our notion of personality which it thus imperfectly describes every anthropomorphic feature that savours of limitation, while we retain the notion of a Being that is personal and yet infinite.

That personality cannot co-exist with infinity is a groundless assumption, without speculative warrant or experiential proof. Let us see. It is essential to all personality that the person "thinks and loves," as Mr. Arnold puts it. But are thought and emotion only susceptible of finite action, and adequate to effect finite ends? Or, if the stream to which they give rise be limited, may not the fountain whence they flow be infinite? Can we not realize the existence of a Supreme Personality, within which the whole universe lives, moves, and has its being, and which has that universe as an area in which to manifest its thought, feeling, and purpose? May not that intelligence, traces of which we see everywhere in the physical order—that purpose, in the manifestation of which there is no gap or chasm anywhere—be the varying index of an omnipresent Personality? Into thought and emotion themselves the idea of restriction does not enter; although, whenever they appear in special acts or concrete instances, they assume a finite form. They are then limited by each other, and by their opposites, as well as by every specific existence in which they respectively appear. But to themselves in the abstract the idea of limitation no more appertains, than it is necessarily bound up with the notion of power or energy. This, however, is to anticipate.

We are deceived when we carry the analogy of a bodily centre and a physical circumference, by which our own personality is "cabined and confined," over into the realm of nature and the infinite. To the Infinite there can be neither centre nor circumference; or we may say the centre is everywhere, and the circumference nowhere. But if the attributes of mind or intelligence are revealed throughout the whole extent of the universe open to our inspection, is it impossible to conjoin with the notion of their infinite range the idea of a Person to whom they belong, in whom they inhere, and of whose essence they are the many-sided manifestation? Is there any greater difficulty in supposing their conjunction over the whole universe than in realizing their coincidence at any one spot within it? It is assuredly not the mere extent of the area that constitutes the difficulty of their conjunction.

We thus come back to what has somehow lain at the root of

every theistic argument. Is the universe in any sense intelligible? Can it be read, understood, and interpreted by us at all? or does it present an "untranslatable text," which we in vain attempt to decipher? When we say that phenomena are *organized*—what do we mean by the statement? When we speak of them as correlated, reciprocal, ordered, the parts of a whole—what do we mean by these terms? We are not projecting our own thoughts outwards on the face of external nature; we are engaged in deciphering an inscription that is written there. We are interpreting an objective reality. Even in the simplest act of perception, distinguishing one phenomenon from another, we virtually assume the presence of mind within the universe; and in our knowledge of an external world, we have an experience suggesting the theistic inference.

A solution of the problem of theism may thus be found in the answer we give to the question, Are we warranted in interpreting the universe in terms of intelligence? We are accustomed to think, both popularly and scientifically, that we know something of nature; and we co-ordinate our knowledge in the several sciences. But they all start from the presupposition, that we do not project our own thought into nature, but that natural phenomena are themselves intelligible to us. And all the departmental groups of human knowledge take for granted a general doctrine of the knowable. We speak as aimlessly in our most exact and scientific language as if we talked at random, if we do not find thought and reason within all natural phenomena as their substrate, their essence, their presupposition. Even if we profess ourselves agnostics, and take refuge in a confession of ignorance, under the seeming modesty which disclaims insight, there lurks a latent doctrine of knowledge. If we hold that all knowledge reaches us through the senses, and that we possess nothing higher than "transformed sensations," still behind this theory of the origin of our ideas by experience lies the uneliminable element which transcends it, and which is unconsciously taken for granted in every theoretical explanation of things as they are. If therefore mind be legible in nature, and we cannot construe a single phenomenon or group of phenomena otherwise than in terms of intelligence, our interpretation is not the result of unconscious idealization. It is the discernment of objective reality, the recognition of the eternal mind in the everlasting processes of manifestation.

Finding everywhere the signs of mind in the correlations and successions of phenomena, we interpret the whole series as the manifestation of a personal essence underlying it; for of mind that is impersonal we cannot form a notion. Do not all the forms of finite being, the specializations of existence, and the succes-

sions of phenomena, lead to the conclusion that there is a Supreme Essence in which all specialization is lost, a whole in which all succession is merged? Does not every series or succession of parts lead the mind directly to a "unity where no division is?" It cannot rest in the particular and the fragmentary, because these are evanescent. But if it interprets the individual and the fragmentary in terms of intelligence, it cannot cease to do so when it rises to the supreme Unity in which these are abolished.

It is to be conceded that we do not know what constitutes the inmost essence of personality under all the shifting phases of experience; and, on that account, there is an element of vagueness attaching to the idea. But we are aware of our own identity or self-hood, surviving while the successive waves of experience rise and fall: and that the eternal essence or everlasting Substance of the universe should be supremely conscious of self, through the ceaseless change and turmoil of creation, is conceivable enough. It may be that infinitude alone supplies the condition for a perfect consciousness of personality, and that our finiteness, as Lotze teaches, is "not a productive condition of personality, but rather a hindering barrier to its perfect development."* If there be difficulty in thus conceiving of a personality which can dispense with a *non-ego*, as the condition of its activity—which does not necessarily involve the distinction between self and not-self—and if, in consequence, we are unable to compress our belief in the Divine Personality within the mould of a logical formula, "let it" (as Mr. Greg says of the belief in immortality), "let it rest in the vague if you would have it rest unshaken;" "it is maintainable so long as it is suffered to remain nebulous and unoutlined." The very grandeur of the term "God" consists in the fact that it includes not less, but so much more than any specific description could embrace within it. The reality transcends every definition of it; and our various theoretical explanations of the fact, which appeals to our consciousness unceasingly, and in forms so manifold, are just as many ways by which we successively register our own insight. We put into intelligible shape a conviction which, the moment we define it, is felt to transcend our definitions immeasurably.

But are our definitions ever correct? Are they accurate so far as they go, while admittedly incomplete? They may be so, without claiming to be either final, or exhaustive of that which they endeavour to define. They are the result of the efforts of the reason to formulate, or reduce to intellectual shape, a conviction which has several distinct roots, but which is not invariable,

* *Microcosmus*, iii. p. 575.

or steadily luminous, or always irresistible. If we can, by reason, scatter the *à priori* difficulties which seem to gather round the idea of the Divine Personality, it may be left to the workings of intuition to reveal the positive fact, *à posteriori* in the flash of occasional inspiration. If the Divine presence were obtruded upon the inward eye, as material objects appeal to the sense of sight, the faculties that recognize it would be dazzled, and unable to note or register anything besides. And therefore, that there should be endless discussion, and the perpetual shock of controversy in reference to it, is only to be expected. If the aspects under which God is revealed vary perpetually, if He at once surrounds and pervades us, yet withdraws from our gaze, the everlasting controversy of the ages, and the rise and fall of systems that now assert and now dispense with His presence, are most easily explained; and the perpetual resuscitation of debate (after solutions have been advanced by the score) is proof of the working of an instinct which rises higher than these proofs themselves. They are all of them (ontological, cosmological, teleological, and the rest) merely historical memorials of the efforts of the human race *to vindicate to itself the existence of a Reality of which it is conscious, but which it cannot perfectly define*. In their completest forms, they are simply the result of the activity of the reason and the conscience combined to account for, and to defend to others, the existence of that Reality.

Thus that our consciousness of the Divine Personality is often dormant, says nothing against its reality or trustworthiness when it is stirred to life. It rather tells the other way. What is ceaselessly obtruded on our notice is not more true, by reason of its obviousness, than what is flashed upon it in moments of transient ecstasy or insight. We are not always on the mountain-tops. We cannot breathe the ethereal air for ever, or live in the white light of a never-ceasing apocalypse. But these are surely the supreme moments of discernment. No one can rationally affirm that the duller flats of mental life, in which our powers are arrested and distracted by a multiplicity of objects surrounding them, our thoughts embarrassed by contingency and change, are more significant of the truth of things, than those in which our faculties are kindled into life by the sense of a reality appealing to them, and yet concealing itself from their scrutiny. Nor will the general consciousness of the race admit that these are times of mere idealistic trance and poetic illusion. Rather are they times of inspiration, in which we see beyond appearances, and beneath all semblance, into the inner life of things.

The question has so many sides that, at the risk of some repetition, it may be restated thus. It is said that a definite limitation is involved in all activity, and that if there be an infinite Personality

it is doomed to everlasting repose without act or sign of energy ; for to act is to be limited by the conditions of activity. It is said that every specific mode of energy which takes shape in a determinate form is *ipso facto* limited ; that power emerging from its latent state, and *showing itself* in the theatre of finite existence, limits itself by its relation to the things on which it operates ; and that therefore it is only the indeterminate that is strictly the unlimited and infinite. But in the first place, is not power in its latent state (*i.e.* unmanifested, unspecialized, in a concrete form) more limited in its retirement, and hampered by its seclusion, than it would be in its energy and activity ? *Character* is not limited by the special acts in which it is revealed. On the contrary, the more varied its features, the greater and fuller is the character. It is not the absence of definite characteristics that proves one nature to be richer than another, but their number, their intensity, their manifoldness, and their range. (2.) A limit may be self-imposed, and if so it is simply one of the conditions under which alone power can manifest itself. Resistance reveals power, by giving an opportunity for energy to overcome the barrier. Power unresisted is power unmanifested, and may be conceived of as latent heat ; but it is the presence of some obstacle to be overcome that shows the power of that which subdues it, in the act of yielding and being overthrown. It may be conceded that whenever power is put in exercise, and results in a definite act, inasmuch as the act immediately becomes one of the million links in the chain of finite things, it is limited by its relation to the rest. But the fountain-head of energy whence the act has come forth to play its part in the theatre of existence is unaffected by that limitation. In short, the act may be limited, while the Agent is not. (3.) The actual conditions under which we live, and under which our personality works, prove that the very existence of a barrier in some directions enlarges, deepens, and widens our personality in other directions (*e.g.* the limitation or restriction involved in all duty). And this is not because of any mere law of compensation, and that what is lost on one side is gained on another, but because without the limit or constraint, the highest form of activity could not possibly exist.

But perhaps the chief difficulty is experienced, not when we attempt to construe to our minds the existence of the Divine Personality alone, but when we try to conceive it in its relation to humanity, in fact when we endeavour to realize the *co-existence* of the Infinite with the finite. So long as we think only of the Infinite, there is no logical puzzle, and the intellectually consistent scheme of pantheism emerges ; so long again as we think only of the finite, there is no dilemma, though we seem locked in the embrace of an atheistic system. But try to combine the infinite

with the finite (the former being not the mere expansion of the latter, but its direct negation), and in the dualism which their union forces upon us, a grave difficulty seems to lurk. What is the relation which the innumerable creatures that exist bear to the all-surrounding Essence? It cannot be similar to that which the planets bear to the sun, round which they revolve; for the sun is only a vaster finite, like its satellites. And God + the universe is not a sum of being, equivalent to that of the sun + the planetary bodies. How then can there be two substances, a finite and an infinite? Does not the latter necessarily quench the former by its very presence? As a child of four years once put it, "If God be everywhere, how could there be any room for us?"

We must admit that if God be "the sum of all reality" (as the Eleatics, the later Platonists, Erigena, Spinoza, and Hegel have maintained), then, since we are a part of that sum, we are necessarily included within the Divine essence. Further, if there be but one substance in the universe, and all the phenomena of the human consciousness, together with those of the external world, are but the varying phases which that single reality assumes, then it matters not what it is called—a force, a cause, a person, a substance, a life, God—all that *is*, is *of it*. This is the pantheistic solution of the problem, which has fascinated so many of the subtlest minds. It has, of course, been met by the doctrine of a creation in time, or the commencement of finite existence at a particular instant by the fiat of a Creator. Many believe this to be essential to theism, and are afraid that if we allow a perpetual cosmos, we dispense with an eternal God, except as an *opifex mundi*; that if we do not affirm the origin of the universe *ex nihilo*, we are unable to maintain the separateness of God from it, and his transcendency. I see no warrant for this. To affirm that if there were no absolute start of existence, out of blank nonentity into manifested being, we have no evidence of God at all, or only the signs of an eternally hampered Deity (a mere supplement to the sum of existence) is altogether illegitimate. For the evidence of Divine action would then be dependent on the signs of past effort, or the occurrence of a stupendous stroke, crisis, or start of energy. Why may not the story of the universe be rather interpreted as the everlasting effect of an eternal cause? Do we need an origin in time, if we have a perpetual genesis, a ceaseless becoming, co-eval with the everlasting cause? Which is the grander, which the more realizable notion, to suppose Nature at one moment non-existent, and the next "flashed into material reality at the fiat of Deity," or to suppose it eternally plastic under the power of an Artificer who is perpetually fashioning it through all the cycles of progressive change? It is not the actual entrance or the possible exit of existence that

we have to explain, but its manipulations, the rise of organizations and their decay, the evolution and succession of varied types of life; and it is these which attest the presence of an indwelling and immediately acting God.

Dualism, therefore, finds its speculative warrant, not in any assumed act of creation, but in the eternal necessities of the case, in the double element involved in all knowledge, and such experiential facts as those of sense-perception and intuition generally.

To get rid of the dualism of monotheistic theory, which seemed to him to limit the Infinite, Spinoza adopted the old monistic position; holding God and nature to be but the eternal cause and the everlasting effect, *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. This theory, however, affords no explanation of how the mind of man blossoms into a consciousness of the Infinite, how the finite knower reaches the conception of the Infinite. Whatever is attained by the mind of the knower is itself a development of the infinite, a psychological act of recognition by a being which is itself only a wave on the sea of existence. Dualism explains the apprehension of the one by the other, in its affirmation that all our knowledge is obtained under the conditions of contrast and difference, and thus reaches us in pairs of opposites. It does not affirm that in order to the consciousness of personality in the Infinite there must of necessity be a recognition of self and not-self, of self and the universe; but it affirms that to the finite knower it must be so; that to him subject implies object, and *ego* the *non-ego*; that the two are given together, and are realizable only in union. On every monistic theory of the universe, however, the question "Where is God to be found?" is meaningless; the "search for God" is a contradiction in terms; because the seeker and the search, the quest and the *quæditor*, and the *quæsitum*, are all manifestations of one and the same substance. Dualism is involved in the very notion of a search.

Further, to take for granted that the infinite is that which quenches the finite, which abolishes and absorbs it, is to beg the whole question in debate. This supersession of the finite by the infinite is speculatively as illegitimate as is the acosmism of Spinoza. It is true that we reach the *idea* of the infinite by removing the finite out of the way. But then the act of exclusion or absorption, being an act of thought, constitutes one term of a relation. If we can think of the infinite at all, we have a mental concept which stands contrasted with that of the finite, and thus again dualism emerges. Though our conception of the infinite is reached by the abolition of the finite, it does not follow that if an Infinite Being exists, no finite can co-exist with it. For the latter is not only given as the prior fact of consciousness, but when we proceed to eliminate it, the act of thinking it away, being finite,

supplies us with the uneliminable element of dualistic relation and difference.

In all thought and consciousness dualism emerges, because there is invariably a subject and an object, a knower and a thing known. But do these limit each other? How so? We always know in part; but the object we discern may be recognized by us as infinite, in the very act of knowing it in part. We may be aware that the thing we apprehend in its inmost nature transcends our apprehension of it; while the latter fact does not abolish the former or reduce our supposed knowledge to ignorance. While, therefore, all our knowledge enters the mind under dualistic conditions, this psychological fact does not relegate every object known by us to the category of the finite, or prevent the direct knowledge of God in His infinity and transcendency. Nor does it follow that, with a double element in all cognition, the one is positive and the other negative, as some of the advocates of nescience contend. They are both equally positive and equally negative, since each is antithetic of the other, and yet its supporting background in the field of consciousness. One of the two may be prominent and proximate at a particular moment, but the other is invariably present behind it, giving it form and character. The relativity of human apprehension does not cut us off from a direct and positive knowledge of the Infinite. As admirably expressed by Dr. Martineau, "we admit the relative character of human thought as a psychological fact: we deny it as an ontological disqualification."*

The most direct suggestions of Personality in alliance with infinity reach us, however, through the channel of the moral faculty. They are disclosed in the phenomena of conscience, and also of affection.

Before indicating how these suggestions arise, I return to the teaching of Mr. Arnold on the subject. He has made us all so much his debtors by the light he has cast on sundry historical problems, and his rare literary skill in handling these, that any critic of his work who differs from him on so radical a point as the nature of God finds the task neither easy nor congenial. In addition to the obscurity which the subject itself presents, there is a special difficulty in adequately estimating a writer by whose criticism one is alternately attracted and repelled.

But admiration is one thing, assent is another. Mr. Arnold wishes us all to use the Bible fruitfully, and his contributions to its fruitful use have been neither few nor slight. Yet in his attack on what he terms the "God of metaphysics," in his elaborate critical assault—lacking neither in "vigour nor in rigour"—on the notion of Personality in God, he removes the

* *Essays, Philosophical and Theological*, p. 234.

very basis of theology, and the whole superstructure of the science becomes fantastic and unreal. He is sanguine of laying the basis of a "religion more serious, potent, awe-inspiring, and profound than any which the world has yet seen" (p. 109*), but he builds it on the ruins of the theistic philosophies of the past. These, therefore, must in the first instance be levelled with the ground and the *débris* removed. We are to find "the elements of a religion—new, indeed, but in the highest degree hopeful, solemn, and profound" (p. 109)—only when we renounce the delusion that "God is a person who thinks and loves," regarding it as a "fairy tale," as "figure and personification," and of the same scientific value as the personification of the sun or the wind. Religion, however, being the expression of dependence, involves and carries in its heart the recognition of an Object on whom the worshipper depends; and, as he is personal, and his personality is most distinctly evinced in his religion, the Object on whom he depends and whom he recognizes must be personal also. Without personality—or its archetype and analogue—in God, religion is reduced to a mere poetic thrill or glow of emotion, such as the beauty of nature evokes. From it, recognition is absent. It is both blind and dumb, inarticulate and vague. But, as was happily said of the system of Comte, "the wine of the real presence being poured out," he would have us "adore the empty cup."

The readers of this REVIEW do not need to be told that theoretical science or Speculative Philosophy, in the grand historic use and wont of the term, is to Mr. Arnold a barren region, void of human interest; and intellectual travel over it is pronounced by him to be resultless. His dismissal of the metaphysical arguments for Divine personality "with sheer satisfaction" "because they have convinced no one, have given rest to no one, have given joy to no one, nay, no one has even really understood them" (pp. 104-5), is curious as coming from so distinguished an advocate of a rich and many-sided culture. Curious, when one remembers that from the schools of speculative philosophy all the great movements of opinion in other departments have originally sprung, and that every question raised in these departments must ultimately run up into the region of metaphysic. On a first perusal of these delightful papers, one feels that he is being led by the most charming of guides into the regions of light and of certitude. By-and-by he finds that his guide is a warrior who intends "boldly to carry the war into the enemy's country, and see how many strong fortresses of the metaphysicians he can enter and rifle"

* The above paper was written nearly two years ago, when Mr. Arnold's *Essays* appeared in this REVIEW. I quote from them as now collected in the volume entitled "God and the Bible."

(p. 96). He becomes the leader of a new crusade against our English notions about God, our crass metaphysics, and our unverifiable theology, and would prepare the way for a "religion more serious, potent, awe-inspiring, and profound than any which the world has yet seen" by first cleverly chaffing the old philosophy out of the way.

But this disparagement of the whole region of metaphysic, because it deals with the questions of "being" and "essence," is not so surprising as is Mr. Arnold's attempt to find, in the simple etymology of words, a clue to those mysteries which baffle the ontologist. In this investigation, interesting as it is, he has started on a journey which ends in a *cul de sac*. To discover the origin of the terms Being, Essence, Substance, by getting hold of the primitive Aryan root whence the Greek, Latin, French, or English words have been derived, will not help us in the inquiry which concerns the origin of the ideas expressed by these terms. *Abstracta ex concretis* may be the law of linguistic derivation, and by etymological study we may learn how the human race has come to make use of certain terms, and to attach particular meanings to them. In following the course of that curious river of linguistic affinity, we may trace the process by which the notions of movement, growth, and permanence have (possibly) grown out of the "breathe," "grow," and "stand" of the old Aryan root. But the most exact knowledge of the subtlest windings of this river will not solve, will not even give us the materials for solving, the ulterior question, whether the human mind has imaginatively transformed the concrete into the abstract, or has been all the while interpreting to itself an objective reality. "By a simple figure," says Mr. Arnold, "these terms declare a perceived energy and operation, nothing more. Of a subject that performs this operation they tell us nothing" (p. 82). These "primitives" have been "falsely supposed to bring us news about the primal nature of things, to declare a subject in which inhered the energy and operation we had noticed, to indicate a formal category, or supreme constitutive condition, into which the nature of all things whatsoever might be finally run up" (p. 82). No one, so far as I am aware, maintains this, as Mr. Arnold puts it. Let it be conceded that our abstract terms arose out of concretes; that as the act of perception preceded that of generalization, in the race, as in each individual, the words employed to express abstract ideas were first used to describe individual or concrete things; and the etymological research which unravels for us the intricate processes of growth, adaptation, and change in the *usus loquendi* of terms is one of the most fruitful branches of inquiry. But, supposing the entire course of linguistic development traced for us by an unerring hand and in precise scientific detail, the whole question re-emerges subse-

quent to such research, and confronts us as before—viz., What has the human mind really done in making use of these concrete terms to express its abstract notions? To express them it must use *some* word; and that it selects one which originally described an individual or concrete thing tells nothing against the fact that it is now able to abstract from these particulars, to generalize and fitly to record its generalization, or to describe by means of the adopted term ideas which have not entered the mind by the gateway of the senses.

Mr. Arnold speaks of the words “is” and “be” as “mysterious petrifications which remained in language as if they were autochthons there, as if no one could go beyond them or behind them. Without father, without mother, without descent, as it seemed, they yet were omnipresent in our speech, and indispensable” (p. 83); whereas he has shown that the terms really arose out of our sense-experience of concrete things. Let us suppose that he is correct in his account of the process by which the product has been reached. He merely exhibits to us a genealogical chart, or tree of derivation. A out of B, B out of C, C out of X. But the real question lies behind the genealogy. We may imagine our Aryan forefathers in their infantine gaze over the ever-changing world of phenomena, describing what met the eye and ear and senses generally, by certain words, mostly imitative of the sounds of nature. Then, as their intelligence grew, with the repetition of the old and the occurrence of new experience, if they wished to express the notion of a thing existing, they made use of a term which they had previously used to describe its operation, viz., “breathing.” Were this statement of the origin and pre-historic usage of abstract terms found correct (a point which must be determined by specialists in the domain of archaic etymology), the investigation would not have really guided us one step towards the solution of the graver problem, the origin of the ideas with which the terms deal. We would have been merely moving on the surface-plane of phenomenal succession, of historic sequence and development; and the most accurate account of that process would no more explain the source of the ideas to which the mind has affixed the old terms, than the discovery of all the links of a chain would explain its origin or method of construction.

Mr. Arnold would persuade us that, because the terms which now describe our abstract categories were originally used to describe objects known by sense-perception, the ideas came in also by that outward gateway. Is it not a better explanation of these “mysterious petrifications,” *is* and *be*, that the notions which they represent, the categories which they describe, are themselves autochthons *in the human mind*, and spring up out of the soil of the consciousness whenever that soil is made ready for their

growth by the scantiest intellectual husbandry? Indigenous to the spirit of man, though latent in its inmost substance till evolved by the struggle of mind with its environment, it is not surprising that in afterwards naming them, the simple words once used to describe the operations of nature or of man should be invested with new meanings, or in the course of ages broadened out into general and abstract terms.

But if etymology, or a study of the origin and growth of language, affords no help in determining the origin of our ideas, neither will a knowledge of "pre-historic man" avail us in solving that ulterior question. Suppose it proved that man has arisen in the long struggle for existence out of elements inferior to himself, and that his present beliefs have been evolved out of lower phases of thought and feeling, this will not determine—it does not even touch—the problem of the reality of that existence to which the present beliefs of the race bear witness. The question of chief interest is not the genealogical one of how we have come to be endowed with these, but the metaphysical one of their present validity to the individual and to the species. Are they, as they now exist, competent witnesses to an outstanding fact and reality? It matters little how a belief has been reached, if its final verdict be true; and the method of its development casts no light on the intrinsic character and trustworthiness of its final attestation. The evolution of organic existence out of the inorganic, and of the rational out of the organic (supposing it scientifically demonstrated, and every missing link in the chain of derivation supplied), would only tell us of a law, or method, or process of becoming. It would give us no information as to the character of the fountain-head out of which the stream of development has flowed, and is flowing now. What has been evolved, in the slow uprise and growth of innumerable ages, is the outcome and manifestation of an

"Eternal process moving on"

in lines of continuous succession, an ever-advancing stream of physical, intellectual, and moral tendency. But the questions remain—Is this onward movement a real advance? Is it progressive as well as successive? And are the later conceptions of the universe which have been evolved out of the guesses of primeval men really "higher" because more accurate interpretations of the reality of things? or is the whole series of notions from first to last an illusory process of idealization and personification, and therefore mere conjecture or guess-work? Grant that out of nature-worship all our theology has grown: has the growth been a progressive and progressively accurate interpretation of what is? If out of the animal sensations of our childhood, the concep-

tion of a spiritual Presence has emerged, and out of the fantastic notion of primitive religion the subtlest analyses of our Western theology have sprung, the question of absorbing interest lies behind this concession and is unaffected by it. Are our present adult notions like a mirage in the desert, or

“The clouds that gather round the setting sun,”

half the glory of which lies in the changefulness of their form and hue? or has the race had an intuition of reality varying in accuracy, yet valid and authentic, at each stage of its progress? If not, wherein consists its advance? And have not the guesses of the child, at the foot of the ladder of inquiry, an equal scientific value with the surmises of the most educated at the top?—*i.e.*, neither have any scientific value at all. If there be any meaning in a rudimentary stage of human history, when the notions formed of the universe were chaotic and unoutlined or distorted, and if this gave place by gradual steps to a time when “the ideas of conduct or moral order and right had gathered strength enough to establish and declare themselves” (p. 135), what meaning are we to attach to the progress spoken of, unless in the later period there was a more accurate reading of the objective reality of things? The “native, continuous, and increasing pressure upon Israel’s spirit of the ideas of conduct and its sanctions” Mr. Arnold calls “his intuition of the eternal that makes for righteousness.” But whence came this pressure, this appeal from without, this solicitation and revelation? All that we are told is that “Israel had an intuitive faculty, a natural bent for these ideas” (p. 139). But the scientific investigator of the laws of historic continuity at once raises the farther question of whence? and how? If these things pressed upon the national mind or consciousness of Israel, it must either have been from behind (*i.e.*, from tradition, the unconscious heritage of past experience working in the blood of the people), or from an eternally present power disclosing itself to that particular race in a progressive series of manifestations. But does the inferior state ever create the superior? It precedes it in time. But is the lower directly causal of the higher? We are told that the “usage of the minority gradually became the usage of the majority” (p. 147). So far we are simply recording facts which have occurred. We are dealing with history, with the successions of phenomena. We are explaining nothing. But Philosophy essays an explanation of history. It is not satisfied with statistics. If we ask how the selfish and wholly animal tendencies of primitive society gradually gave place to others that were generous or elevated, and are merely directed to habit, custom, or usage, our director is

simply veiling our ignorance from us by a repetition of the question proposed. It is an explanation of the usage, not a restatement of it, that we desire. Habit merely tells us that a thing done once was done again. We want to know why it was done again—why it was done at all. How the bent of the race was determined this way rather than that, in favour of righteousness rather than its opposite, is therefore altogether unexplained by custom and association. It is the custom, association, and usage that call for explanation. But the progressive recognition of an eternally righteous source or moral centre of the universe may explain it: the discernment by the spirit of man of a supreme ethical principle arising out of his relation to a transcendent moral Personality. On any other theory, the uprise from rudimentary perceptions to the state which we now agree to call the “moral order”—with the sanctions of society superadded to the customs of our ancestors—is unaccountable. In other words, we cannot validly affirm that the process of historic evolution has, after long conflict and struggle, brought to the front principles of conduct and action which can be called the real elements of moral order or of the constitution of society, if these have not proceeded from, and are the gradually clearer manifestations of, an eternal moral Nature. If they are the product of a blind strife amongst rival competing tendencies, at what point do they become a rule for posterity? At what stage of evolution are we warranted in saying that “the perception, and the rule founded on it, have become a conquest for ever, placing human nature on a higher stage; so that, however much the perception and the rule may have been dubious and unfounded once, they must be taken to be certain and formed now” (p. 153)? At no stage could this be affirmed, because what has been formed by the strife must alter with the continued action of the forces that have made it what it is. The child of contingency remains contingent, and may itself become the parent of endless future change. Unless, therefore, the law of evolution ceases to operate, and the process of development abruptly closes, the possible alteration of the canons of morality, after the conquest has been made, is not only as conceivable as it was before the struggle commenced, but as certain. Farther, the possible reversal of the canons, or their disappearance before some future conqueror, is involved in their very origin, if that origin be merely the “survival of the fittest” in the long struggle for existence.

To put it otherwise, and in detail: suppose that the family bond has arisen out of the selfish struggles of primitive man, that reverence for parents and love for children have been slowly evolved out of tendencies that were originally self-regarding, why call the later stage a more perfect one for the race at large? **It**

may be more perfect for those who have attained to it; but it would have been out of place if earlier in the field. Is it not an essential part of the process of development that every successive stage is equally necessary and equally perfect with all its antecedent and subsequent stages? Unless a point is reached when conduct becomes intrinsically excellent—excellent in virtue of its conformity to a rule that is not the product of evolution, and which cannot be superseded by anything to be evolved millenniums hence—how can we speak of monogamy and self-restraint as “the true law of our being” in contrast with the earlier promiscuousness which it succeeded? Evolution, in short, tells us nothing of a moral goal, because it gives us no information of a moral Source. It supplies us with no standard, because it points to no Centre; and it brings with it no ethical sanction higher than custom at any stage. “It has come about” is all that it tells us of any phenomenon. Now, not to speak of the fluctuating moral verdicts of the world and the obstinate reversions from later to earlier standards—that which has stood at the front and dominated for a while, falling again to the rear and being disregarded—how can we speak of one stage of human progress as dim and rudimentary, of another as disciplined and mature, if there be no absolute standard or moral goal towards which the efforts of the race are tending and should tend? It is not merely that the ethical habit of to-day may not be a “conquest for ever,” but only a chance victory in the skirmish of circumstance, which the next great conflict may reverse. It is much more than this. If the later state be the creation of the former, and evolved out of it, all the stages being of equal moral value as cause and consequence, the very notion of an ethical struggle disappears. The successive moments of moral experience are reduced to the category of states merely prior and posterior in the stream of development. And conscious effort to reach a higher standard, or to realize a nobler life, becomes unnatural discontent. It might even be construed as rebellion against the leadings of instinct; the actual legitimately crushing out the ideal. And with the stimulus of aspiration gone, and the sense of control removed, the drift of the race would be towards the easiest pleasures and the satisfactions of the savage state.

The emergence of the conscience is one thing, its creation is another. Its rise out of lower elements, its consequent flexibility, and its possible transformation in the course of ages into a much more delicate instrument, sensitive to all passing lights and shades and fine issues of conduct, is perfectly consistent with its being a competent witness to a Reality it has gradually succeeded in apprehending, and which it has not merely idealized out of its own subjective processes. If the sentiment of duty arose slowly

out of an experience at first as entirely devoid of it as that of the

“Baby new to earth and sky,”

who

“Never thinks that this is I,”

the obscure genesis of those convictions which finally assume shapes so transcendent cannot invalidate or even affect their trustworthiness. In short, the story of the race is but the story of the individual writ large. When the moral sense first awakens in a child under the tutelage of its parents or seniors, the influences to which it is subjected do not create its conscience: they evoke it. The child simply opens his eye, and sees; though the process of learning to see accurately may be a much longer one in moral than in visual perception. If it is so with the child, why not similarly with the race? Why not *necessarily*? Be the processes of growth, therefore, what they may, the source of the moral faculty lies hid beyond these lines of historical investigation, and the authority of the developed product is not invalidated by the discovery of its lineage.

What evidence, then, have we that in the phenomena of conscience we come upon the traces of a principle

“Deep-seated in our mystic frame”

that is not evolved out of the lower elements of appetency and desire? Do these phenomena disclose results which are more easily explained by the presence of an *alter ego*, “in us, yet not of us?” Can we trace it working within us, yet mysteriously overshadowing us, and suggesting, in the occasional flashes of light sent across the darker background of experience, the action of another Personality behind our own?

Our account of the phenomena of conscience is not exhausted when we affirm that certain moral causes set in operation by ourselves or others must issue in certain subjective effects upon the character. To say that definite consequences result from specific acts is only to state one half of the case, and that the least important half. How are our actions invested with the character of blameworthiness or the reverse? Moral worth and moral baseness are not only two points or stages in the upward or downward stream of human tendency. The merit and the demerit are respectively due to the character of the stream as determined at the moment, by the act and choice of the individual. It would be out of place to raise at this point the large question of the freedom of the will, its moral autonomy. Let it suffice to affirm that the theoretical denial of freedom will always be met by a counter

affirmation, springing from a region unaffected by inductive evidence. It will also be always met by the recoil of the feelings of mankind from the doctrine of non-responsibility for action, the logical outcome of that denial. It may be safely affirmed that, allowing for hereditary tendency, and the influence of constraining circumstances, the race will continue to apportion its praise and its blame to individuals on the ground that human action might take shape in either of two contrary directions, according to the choice and determination of the will. No action ever arises absolutely *de novo*, unaffected by antecedent causes, both active and latent; neither is any action absolutely determined from without or from behind. In each act of choice the causal nexus remains unsevered, while the act itself is ethically free and undetermined. In other words, affirming the moral autonomy of the will, we deny the liberty of libertarian indifference; and affirming the integrity of the causal nexus, we reject the despotism of necessitarian fate: and maintain that in so doing we are not affirming and denying the same thing at the same time, but are true to the facts of consciousness, and preserve a moral eclecticism which has its evidence in the personality of the agent. The two rival schemes of Liberty and Necessity, both "resistless in assault, but impotent in defence," are practically overthrown by the ease with which each annihilates the other. To exhibit the *rationale* of this would require a long chapter. Leaving it, therefore, and assuming the freedom we make no attempt to demonstrate, the speciality of the conscience which legislates in the region of mixed motive and variable choice is at once its absoluteness and its independence of the individual. It announces itself, in Kantian phrase, as the "categorical imperative." It is ours, not as an emotion or passion is ours. We speak in a figure of the *voice* of the conscience; implying, in our popular use of the term, its independence of us. It is not our own voice; or, if the voice of the higher self, in contrast with the lower which it controls, it is an inspiration in us—the whispered suggestion of a monitor "throned within our other powers." If it were merely the remonstrance of one part of our nature against the workings of another part, we might question its right to do more than claim to be an equal inmate of the house. In any case disregard of it would amount to nothing more serious than a loss of harmony, a false note marring the music of human action, or a flaw in argument that disarranged the sequence of thought. But in the moral imperative which commands us categorically, and acts without our order, and cannot be silenced by us, which is in us yet not of us, we find the hints of a Personality that is girding and enfolding ours. As admirably expressed by Professor Newman—

"This energy of life within is ours, yet it is not we.
 It is in us, it belongs to us, yet we cannot control it.
 It acts without our bidding, and when we do not think of it.
 Nor will it cease its acting at our command, or otherwise obey us.
 But while it recalls from evil, and reproaches us for evil,
 And is not silenced by our effort, surely it is not *we* ;
 Yet it pervades mankind, as one life pervades the trees."*

It is not that we are conscious of the restraints of law, of a fence or boundary laid down by statute. But in the most delicate suggestions and surmises of this monitor we are aware of a Presence "besetting us" (as the Hebrews put it) "before and behind," penetrating the soul, pressing its appeals upon us, yet withdrawing itself the moment it has uttered its voice, and leaving us to the exercise of our own freedom. The most significant fact, if not the most noticeable, in the relation of the conscience to the will, is its quick suggestion of what ought to be done, and the entire absence of subsequent compulsion in the doing of it. When the force of the moral imperative is felt most absolutely, the hand of external necessity is withdrawn, that we may act freely. Consciously hemmed in and weighed down by physical forces which we are powerless to resist, the pressure of this girding necessity is relaxed within the moral sphere, and we are free to go to the right hand or the left, when duty appeals to us on the one side and desire on the other. This has been so excellently put by Mr. Richard Hutton, in his essay on "The Atheistic Explanation of Religion," that I may quote a sentence which sums up the ethical argument for the Divine Personality better than any other that I am aware of:—

"Accustomed as man is to feel his personal feebleness, his entire subordination to the physical forces of the universe, . . . in the case of moral duty he finds this almost constant pressure remarkably withdrawn at the very crisis in which the import of his actions is brought home to him with the most vivid conviction. Of what nature can a power be that moves us hither and thither through the ordinary course of our lives, but withdraws its hand at those critical points where we have the clearest sense of authority, in order to let us act for ourselves? The absolute control that sways so much of our life is waived just where we are impressed with the most profound conviction that there is but one path in which we can move with a free heart. If so, are we not then surely *watched*? Is it not clear that the Power which has therein ceased to *move* us has retired only to *observe*? . . . The mind is pursued into its freest movements by this belief, that the Power within could only voluntarily have receded from its task of moulding us, in order to keep watch over us, as we mould ourselves."†

Thus the distinction or dualism which is involved in all our knowledge comes out into sharpest prominence in its moral section. We rise at once above the uniformity of mere pheno-

* Theism, p. 13. Cf. Fénelon, *De l'Existence de Dieu*, Part I. c. 1, § 29; also J. H. Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, Part I. c. 5, § 1.

† *Essays, Theological and Literary*, pp. 41, 42.

menal succession, and out of the thralldom of necessity, by our recognition of a transcendent element latent in the conscience. We escape from the circle of self altogether in the "otherness" of moral law. It is in the ethical field that we meet with the most significant facts, which prevent us from gliding through a seductive love of unity into a solution of the problem of existence that is pantheistic or unitarian. The fascination of the pursuit of unity through all the diversities of finite existence has given rise to many philosophical systems that have twisted the facts of consciousness to one side. But unity by itself is as unintelligible as diversity minus unity is unthinkable. If there were but one self-existing substance of which all individual and particular forms of being were mere tributary rills, the relation of any single rill to its source, and to the whole, would be merely that of derivation. Moral ties would thus be lost in a union that was purely physical. On this theory, the universe would be one, only because there was nothing in it to unite; whereas all moral unity implies diversity, and is based upon it. There must be a difference in the things that are connected by an underlying and under-working affinity. And we find this difference most apparent in the phenomena of the moral consciousness. While therefore the moral law legislates and desire opposes, in the struggle that ensues between inclination and duty we trace the working of a principle that has not grown out of our desires and their gratification. We discover that we are not, like the links in the chain of physical nature, mere passive instruments for the development of the increasing purpose of things; but that we exist for the unfolding, disciplining, and completing of a new life of self-control, and the inward mastery of impulse, through which at the crises of our decision a new world of experience is entered.


We cannot tell when this began. Its origin is lost in the golden haze that is wrapped around our infancy, when moral life is not consciously distinguishable from automatic action. But as the scope of our faculties enlarges, a point is reached when the individual perceives the significance of freedom, the meaning of the august rules of righteousness, and the grave issues of his voluntary choice. It is then that conscience

"Gives out at times
A little flash, a mystic hint"

of a Personality distinct from ours, yet kindred to it, in the unity of which it lives and has its being. Whence come those suggestions of the Infinite that flit athwart the stage of consciousness, in all our struggle and aspiration after the ideal, if not from a personal source kindred to themselves? We do not create our own longings in this direction. On the contrary, as we

advance from infancy to maturity, do we not awaken by progressive steps to the knowledge of a vast overshadowing Personality unseen and supersensible, recognized at intervals, then lost to view—known and unknown—surrounding, enfolding, inspiring, and appealing to us, in the suggestions of the moral faculty? In addition, our sense of the boundlessness of duty brings with it a suggestion of the infinity of its source. We know it to be beyond ourselves and higher than we, extra-human, even extra-mundane; while on other grounds we know it to be also intra-human and intra-mundane. We find no difficulty in realizing that the Personality revealed to us in conscience may have infinite relations and affinities, because in no district of the universe can we conceive the verdict of the moral law reversed. Nowhere would it be right not “to do justly, and to love mercy,” though the practical rules and minor canons of morality may, like all ceremonial codes, change with the place in which they originate, and the circumstances which give rise to them. If, therefore, the suffrage of the race has not created this inward monitor, and if its sway is co-extensive with the sphere of moral agency—its range as vast as its authority is absolute,—in these facts we have corroborative evidence of the union of the Personal with the Infinite.

WILLIAM KNIGHT.



PROFESSOR CAIRNES ON VALUE.

MOST members of the Political Economy Club must be familiar with an anecdote of Sydney Smith, who not many months after joining the club announced his intention to retire, and, on being asked the reason, replied that his chief motive for joining had been to discover what Value is, but that all he had discovered was that the rest of the club knew as little about the matter as he did. That this sarcasm, however severe, was probably not unmerited, may be inferred from the haze with which the object of Sydney Smith's curiosity is still surrounded, and from the, at best, but very partial success of the recent attempt made by so powerful a thinker as my lamented friend, the late Professor Cairnes, to pierce the cloudy envelope.

In common parlance, the word Value has more than one signification, but, at the outset of his "Leading Principles,"* Cairnes represents all economists as agreed that in economic discussion, the term should be restricted to "expressing the ratio in which commodities are commercially exchangeable against each other"—against *each other*, be it observed, not against some selected commodity—and this ratio he proposes to call "exchange value." Evidently, according to this definition, "a general rise or a general

* Some Leading Principles of Political Economy newly Expounded. By J. E. Cairnes, M.A. Macmillan & Co.

fall of values is," as Cairnes says, "an impossibility, or rather a contradiction in terms," for, "if," as he continues, "A rise in relation to B, B must fall in relation to A : A and B cannot both rise or both fall in relation to each other : and what is true of two commodities is true of any number and of all commodities." Nevertheless, and although, according to his view, value "expresses simply a relation," Cairnes adds that "we may without impropriety use such expressions as 'a sum of values,' or, 'an increase or diminution in the aggregate amount of values.'"

"Where," he says, "the quantity of valuable things possessed by a community has been increased, the conditions of production remaining the same ; or where, the quantity remaining the same, the conditions of producing commodities have been so altered as to cause a given quantity to exchange for a larger quantity than before of commodities of which the conditions of production have remained constant ; in either of these cases we may not improperly say that the sum of values or the aggregate amount of values has increased."

Here, however, it may naturally be asked, if there be such a thing as sum of such values as are here in question, how is that sum to be expressed ? Suppose that, butter being commercially exchangeable for twice its weight of beef and six times its weight of bread, Thomson have one pound of each of those three articles of food, how can we, consistently with the definition, express their aggregate value otherwise than by saying that it consists of twice the beef's worth or six times the bread's worth of butter, half the butter's worth of beef, and one-sixth of the butter's worth of bread ? But by such language not the faintest idea of totality is conveyed. For, if the quantity of Thomson's provisions should be doubled, if instead of one pound he became possessed of two pounds of each of the commodities named, the sum of their exchange values would remain unaltered, being still twice the beef's worth or six times the bread's worth of butter, and half the butter's worth and one-sixth of the butter's worth of beef and bread respectively ? Again, if while as yet Thomson had consumed no part of his stock of food, butter's exchangeable value doubled, it would by no means follow that the sum of Thomson's values had increased, because his butter was now worth twice as much beef or bread as before, if, on the other hand, his beef and bread had each become worth only half as much butter as before.

Cairnes imagines that use of the terms "sum of values," and "increase or diminution in the aggregate amount of values," may be illustrated and justified by analogous expressions employed with reference to power.

"Power, like value," he says, "expresses a relation, and a general increase of the power of individuals or of nations in relation to each other is, of course, an impossibility. But this does not prevent our saying that

the aggregate power of any given number of individuals or nations has increased, meaning thereby, not that their relative position has been altered, but that the elements which go to support power in them have been multiplied. We should thus say that the power of European nations has greatly increased within the last century. In a precisely similar sense we may speak, and it will often be convenient to speak, of an increase or diminution of aggregate values, value being only another name for purchasing power."

But here Mr. Cairnes overlooks an important distinction. Power in general, although like every other quality it may be relative, is not a mere relation, but an independent entity. The power of any given individual or nation would not the less be a reality even though there were no other individual or nation with whose power it could be compared, and would not the less be susceptible of augmentation or diminution. But exchange value, according to the definition, is a relation pure and simple, and nothing else; and, as Mr. Cairnes had just before conclusively shown, the relation of one thing to other things cannot possibly increase without being accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the relation of those other things to it. If then it be true that political economy takes cognisance of no other value than "exchange value," and if the foregoing definition of exchange value be, as I believe it to be, strictly accurate, political economy plainly can no more recognize an increase or diminution in the aggregate amount of values than it can a general rise or a general fall of values.

Cairnes seems to me to have complicated the question and to have deceived himself by pronouncing "exchange value" to be but another name for "purchasing power." For he had already accepted "exchange value" as but another name for "ratio of exchange," and purchasing power is obviously not simply ratio of exchange, but also, or rather, to use Cairnes' own words, "the sum of the conditions which determine that ratio." Understood in this enlarged sense, the purchasing power of the whole world not only may, but must, increase or decrease simultaneously with any increase or decrease in the total quantity of purchasable commodities existing in the world, inasmuch as it must necessarily coincide with that total quantity. But, as we have seen, the quantity of each of the commodities might be doubled, and their aggregate exchange value nevertheless remain unaltered, since the value of any commodity could not increase in respect of any other without the value of that other decreasing in precisely the same proportion in respect of it. Wherefore, "exchange value" and "purchasing power" are clearly not synonymous terms. Nay, if they were, it would on that very account be absolutely impossible to sum up the total purchasing power of the world in any such language as would convey the smallest notion of its amount. Nothing, for example, would be gained by simply saying that it

was equal to so much more of butter than of beef or bread, or to so much less of silver or gold than of butter.

Yet there can be no doubt that economists, when speaking of value, are often, and indeed generally, thinking of a quality the aggregate amount of which may increase or diminish, and may also be expressed in words or figures. Undoubtedly they do generally use the term in a sense according to which, if one man possess twice as much of precisely the same articles as another man, the value of the first man's possessions is double that of the second's. Moreover, if it be desired to state the total value of the property of either of the two, that may readily be done, all that is requisite for the purpose being to specify for how much of butter, or of gold, or silver, or of any other selected commodity, the whole of the property might be exchanged. But evidently the sense in which the term value is used on such an occasion is very different from that to which Cairnes' definition would restrict it. The fact is that not in common parlance only, but also in economic discussion, value signifies not one thing but two things, indicating sometimes what Cairnes calls "exchange value," sometimes what he calls "price," but for which I would suggest in preference the name of "pecuniary value," as denoting not merely the exchangeable relation between any given commodities and metallic or paper money, but also the same relation between them and whatever commodities were selected as the instrument of exchange—as, for instance, *pecudes*, heads of cattle or sheep, from whose employment in primeval Italy for the purpose of commercial valuation the word "pecuniary" is derived. Of this second species of value Cairnes speaks as follows:—

"Though commodities in general cannot rise or fall simultaneously in relation to each other, they may rise or fall in relation to any selected one amongst the number, and if gold or silver be the one selected, commodities in general may rise or fall in relation to gold or silver. The value of other commodities in relation to a commodity thus selected is called price. It is plain, then, that while a general rise or a general fall of values is a contradiction in terms, a general rise or a general fall of prices is a perfectly possible, as indeed it is a not uncommon event."

When Cairnes has taken such pains to distinguish between exchange value and price, we ought not hastily to suspect him of afterwards inadvertently confounding them; yet it is certain that he has confounded them so far as to attribute to one a faculty which, according to his own showing, belongs exclusively to the other. He has unconsciously attempted the impossible feat of including two distinct things within one and the same definition. His definition of exchange value is unimpeachable while confined to its proper subject, but it cannot be stretched beyond its legitimate domain without involving palpable inconsistencies.

Obviously enough, prices or pecuniary values may be summed up into a total, and that total may subsequently increase or diminish ; but sums total of and augmentations or diminutions of general exchange values are, quite as obviously, impossible conceptions.

Yet, distinct as exchange value and pecuniary value are in one essential particular, there are three conditions common to both—three conditions indispensable to the existence of either in any commodity. There must be—first, utility, in the sense of ability real or imaginary of conducing to the gratification of some human desire ; secondly, difficulty of acquisition, since no one will give that which cannot be obtained without trouble for a thing which he can obtain by simply wishing for it ; thirdly, transferability, since it is impossible to exchange a thing of which the owner cannot divest himself, and which he cannot make over to another person. These propositions are palpable truisms, affording no ground for intelligent controversy ; but as to what constitutes utility, there has been and still is sufficient doubt among economists to require that a word or two should be said on the subject, though for the sake of brevity, I shall, without referring to the opinions of others, restrict myself to indicating my own.

By utility, whether the term be used colloquially or in economic discussion, is invariably to be understood the quality of conducing to the gratification of some human desire. Such utility is commonly independent of the ease or difficulty of acquiring a commodity. Water, for instance, would equally quench thirst, and perform most of its other offices, whether obtainable for nothing or obtainable only at a great expenditure of labour. Sometimes, however, the utility of an article is partly due to the difficulty of acquisition, its utility in that case consisting partly in gratification of its owner's vanity. If diamonds were to become as common as pebbles, they would still be equally pleasing to the eye ; but, the possession of them having ceased to be a distinction, there would no longer be the same desire to possess them, the ability to gratify which desire constitutes great part of their present utility. Difficulty of acquisition therefore, besides being always an indispensable condition of exchangeability, is sometimes a principal element in utility likewise.

Thus much being premised, let us now attempt a somewhat higher strain *paulo majora canamus* : warning being at the same time given that we are about to enter the high latitudes of the science, where closer attention than the reader may perhaps be much disposed to bestow will be requisite in order to steer clear of rocks and breakers. He should remember, however, that it is the track taken by Professor Cairnes through these ill-explored regions which I propose to examine, and that the navigation must needs

be more than ordinarily intricate where so skilful a pilot has, as I expect to be able to show, fatally mistaken his course.

In a digression which he finds it necessary to make into the region of supply and demand, Cairnes begins by pointing out, more clearly than had ever been done before, what only needs to be pointed out in order to be forthwith perceived to be true in one special set of circumstances, that

“Conceived as aggregates, supply and demand are not independent phenomena of which either may indefinitely increase or diminish irrespective of the other, but phenomena strictly connected and mutually dependent; so strictly connected and interdependent that (excluding temporary effects, and contemplating them as permanent and normal facts) neither can increase or diminish without necessitating and implying a corresponding increase or diminution of the other.”

As long as commercial transactions are confined to barter—as long, that is, as no selected commodity is employed as a medium of exchange, supply is the quantity of commodities offered for sale, demand the quantity of commodities which customers offer or are about to offer to purchase. But to offer either to sell or to buy is to propose that certain kinds of goods shall be exchanged for other kinds. Every offer to sell is therefore equally an offer to buy, and every offer to buy is equally an offer to sell. The sum total of goods which customers offer to purchase is consequently identical with the sum total offered for sale. Of any particular commodity, indeed, either the supply may increase without any increase in the demand, or the demand may increase without any increase in the supply. But “aggregate demand cannot increase or diminish without entailing a corresponding increase or diminution of aggregate supply; nor can aggregate supply undergo a change without involving a corresponding change in aggregate demand.”

All this is self-evident as soon as stated,* but the truth which it embodies is rather curious than important, and, moreover, ceases to be truth when extended, as it is by Professor Cairnes, beyond the domain of barter. Cairnes has most seriously misapprehended and underrated the changes consequent on the adoption of a medium of exchange, or, in other words, of money in any of its various forms. He does indeed observe, and in this instance also he was, I believe, the first to make the observation, that under a monetary *régime* supply and demand become distinguishable, which they previously were not. He very justly points out that.

* It may possibly be objected that among the articles offered for sale, may be some for which, on account of their having become obsolete, or for any other cause, there may be no demand, in which case aggregate supply will be in excess of aggregate demand. But to such hypercriticism Mr. Cairnes might fairly have replied that articles which have ceased to be objects of human desire have likewise ceased to be, in an economic sense, goods or commodities, and cannot therefore really form a portion of supply.

after money has come into general use, money may without much inaccuracy be regarded as *representing* "general purchasing power," inasmuch as every proposal to sell is now an offer of money, while every proposal to sell still continues to be an offer of goods. No doubt, therefore, it now becomes possible to distinguish between aggregate supply and aggregate demand, the former consisting of all goods offered for money, the latter of all money offered for goods. But Cairnes is surely mistaken in regarding money as not merely the representative, but also the *measure*, of purchasing power, and therefore the measure likewise of demand, for the supply of money in circulation, or even in existence at any given time and place, is almost always worth many times less than the whole quantity of goods on sale, and requires to be used over and over again in order to effect the purchase of that whole quantity; and large purchases, too, are continually made upon credit by persons who have no money in hand. A yet more serious mistake on his part is that of supposing that the entire *supply* of goods still continues to represent an equal *demand* for goods. No doubt equally under a *régime* of barter and under a monetary *régime* every offer to sell is at the same time an offer to buy, the only difference being that under the one *régime* it is an offer to buy one or more of all the various commodities in the market, and in the other to buy only the particular commodity or commodities which have been selected to serve the purpose of money. No doubt, therefore, under a monetary *régime* the aggregate supply of goods constitutes a precisely equivalent demand for money in exchange for goods; but it by no means follows that there is a corresponding demand for goods in exchange for money. Purchasing power is not, as Mr. Cairnes supposes, identical with demand. The possessor of purchasing power is not, as he tacitly assumes, bound forthwith to exercise the power. Neither the actual holders of money, nor those persons who may if they please successively obtain money on credit, necessarily require immediately as much of the whole stock of goods in the market as they have the means of immediately purchasing; and, if not, they will probably content themselves with purchasing as much as will suffice for their immediate requirements, and will reserve part of their money or credit for the satisfaction of subsequent requirements. Perhaps it may be objected that, according to this view, the employment of money may diminish the demand for goods, and it may be asked, How can this be, seeing that money is merely the instrument of exchange, and that goods and services alone are ultimate objects of exchange? Of course money can have no such effect. Of course the same total of goods will be bought and sold, whether money be or be not used in aid of the operation. Yet there is a real and material difference between the two cases,

for in the one the aggregate of goods brought to market would be greater than in the other. While trade was carried on by barter no dealer would offer goods for sale unless he desired certain specific goods in return ; neither would he offer more than he supposed sufficient to procure for him the quantity which he needed of those specific goods, whereas under a monetary *régime* a dealer would offer for sale whatever quantity of goods he expected to be able to sell at a remunerative price for money, whether he were or were not prepared immediately to lay out the whole of the expected sale proceeds in the purchase of other goods. I submit, then, in direct opposition to Mr. Cairnes, that the relation of general supply and general demand to each other is very materially affected by the employment of a circulating medium, and becomes essentially different under a monetary from what it was under a barter *régime*. I submit that, under the former, supply and demand *are* "facts of a different order," not indeed "incapable of comparison and measurement," but still "independent facts which may increase or diminish irrespectively of each other." Cairnes stigmatizes all assumptions to this effect as "baseless and absurd." Cairnes did not often permit himself to indulge in such hard words, and it would have been as well if on this occasion also he had adhered to his habitual sobriety of language.

On the strength of the reasoning cited above, Cairnes proceeds to object to the definitions of supply and demand given by Mr. Mill, viz., *the** quantity supplied and *the* quantity demanded, and proposes to substitute the following :—

* Demand : the desire for commodities or services, seeking its end by an offer of general purchasing power. Supply : the desire for general purchasing power, seeking its end by an offer of specific commodities or services."

Among other arguments urged by Cairnes in support of this view is this: that the element of desire involved in both supply and demand is "in each case indefinite and practically unlimited." Now doubtless there is no bound to the quantity of "general purchasing power" (money) which any one offering commodities for sale would be glad to receive in exchange. If he have ten sheep to sell, and expects to get £30 for them, he will not, because he finds he can sell them for £4 instead of £3 apiece, content himself with selling five and withdraw the other five from the market. But on the other hand, if any one who requires ten sheep, and is prepared to pay £40 for them, finds he can get them for £30, he will not necessarily buy thirteen instead of ten, but will more probably prefer to spend only £30 on sheep, and retain the other £10 for subsequent expenditure. Although, therefore, in supply the

* The definite article is here italicized, because Cairnes inadvertently represents Mill as pronouncing supply and demand to be each simply *a* quantity.

element of desire be unlimited, in demand it is not so. Among other reasons why Mill's disciples may hesitate to accept Mr. Cairnes' definitions in lieu of those of their master is this, that with Cairnes general purchasing power and money are synonymous terms, and that consequently the form of words suggested by him could apply only to a monetary *régime*, leaving the *régime* of barter unprovided for.

On a basis thus shown to be unsound, Cairnes proceeds to build up a superstructure which, in spite of the excellence of portions of the workmanship, necessarily partakes largely of the character of the foundation. The fabric consists of somewhat novel theories of cost of production and normal value; but to point out in regular order the several errors which these conceal, might be too severe a tax on the patience of the reader, whose convenience will perhaps be better consulted by my confining myself for the most part to an exposition of what I myself conceive to be the truth of the matter under discussion. I may, however, observe at the outset that, even if Cairnes' novelties were perfectly correct, they would be rather illustrative and amplificatory of, than antagonistic to, the teaching of Mill. It is indeed simply astounding that Cairnes should have so completely misapprehended the meaning of his great predecessor as to suppose the latter to have confounded the *cost* with the *results* of production—the *sacrifices* which productive labour exacts with the *reward* which the same labour confers. It is really almost incredible that whereas Mill merely says that, *to the capitalist*, the cost of production consists of the wages and profits which he, the capitalist, *pays* or *advances*, he should be represented as declaring it to consist of the amount which the capitalist ultimately *receives* for the finished product.

Of all commodities whatsoever, the actual exchange or market values are liable to indefinable fluctuations. In regard, however, to such commodities as are capable of indefinite multiplication, and which moreover are not subjects of monopoly, these fluctuations, to whatever distance they may extend in opposite directions, always tend after a while to return to an intermediate level, called by Adam Smith *natural* price, by Mill *necessary* price, and by Cherbuliez and Cairnes *normal* price. This level can, I think, be shown to be determined exclusively and invariably by cost of production, because no one will voluntarily persevere in an occupation the products of which do not usually yield him at least the full equivalent of what they have cost him, so that if they do not yield this equivalent, they will cease to be produced; and, further, because no one will persist in an occupation a given quantity of the products of which commonly exchange for a smaller quantity of the products of some other occupation, in which he is at liberty to engage, than he could procure for himself if he did engage in

that other occupation. Whenever, therefore, the vicissitudes of supply and demand cause earnings to differ very sensibly in different employments, capital and labour will be attracted from the worse to the better paid occupations, until, by reason of diminished supply of the products of the former, and augmented supply of those of the latter, both sets of products come to be exchanged in proportion to their respective costs of production.

The essence of the question, however, is barely touched by these remarks. The main point at issue is, whether demand is "measured by the quantity of purchasing power offered in support of the desire for commodities," or by the quantity of "particular commodities for which such purchasing power is offered," and the importance of the point cannot easily be overrated, for on it depends the truth or falsity of the wages fund dogma. Now there are "three capital theories in economic science"—those of "wages, money, and foreign trade, in each of which supply and demand form the pivots of the doctrine, the two poles on which the exposition turns." Let us then inquire whether it be true, as Cairnes maintains, that in those theories "demand is in every instance regarded as represented and measured, not by the quantity of commodities or services demanded, but by the purchasing power offered."

At the threshold of the inquiry it may be observed parenthetically, in regard to commodities proper—in regard, that is, to commodities as distinguished from services—that except when they are put up for sale by auction, an offer of anything in exchange for them is rarely made, it being usually the owner of the commodities who offers to sell them at a certain price, which may be and often is less than the customer would, if necessary, have consented to pay. In respect of commodities proper, then, the price which the customer agrees to pay is no measure of the intensity of his demand, no indication of the maximum amount which he would have been prepared to pay for the gratification of his desire. It is otherwise, indeed, with regard to services. It is usually the employer in quest of labour who offers in the first instance a certain wage; but besides that his first offer is determined with reference to the rate which he supposes the labourers would have demanded if they had taken the initiative, he is often compelled to raise the rate originally proposed by him, yet still may not have to raise it so high as he would have been prepared to do rather than not have secured the services he required. As then of commodities proper, so likewise of services, the price finally agreed upon does not measure or constitute demand.

For money, indeed, the demand is undoubtedly identical with the quantity of goods offered for sale. It is so for a reason assigned by Mr. Mill. Every dealer in goods is at the same time

a customer for money—not, however, for any definite sum, for he desires to obtain as much as he possibly can ; and though he commonly names a price at which he is prepared to sell, that price is always the highest at which he expects to be able to sell. Neither is there any price so low that he will not consent to sell at it if he is convinced that by holding out he will not obtain a higher. Clearly, then, demand for money cannot be the quantity demanded, for there is no such quantity, and it must consequently be admitted to be the fact that the sole measure of the demand for money, if it have any measure, is the supply of goods ; but this is likewise a fact to which we cannot attribute much importance without great risk of deceiving ourselves. We were but just now priding ourselves on the discovery that the introduction of money enables us to discriminate between aggregate supply and demand, by regarding the former as an operation of dealers in goods, and the latter as an operation of customers for goods. But if, after drawing this distinction, we proceed to treat supply of goods as demand for money, we shall be not discriminating but confounding. We shall be using the same term in senses directly opposed to those just before assigned to them. If, to use Cairnes' own words, demand be simply "desire for commodities or services seeking its end by an offer of general purchasing power," "desire for general purchasing power seeking its end by an offer of specific commodities or services" cannot be demand. Besides, we must never forget that commodities and services alone are ultimate objects of exchange, and that money is merely the medium of exchange. If we choose to consider money as a final object of demand, and if we also treat the entire supply of goods as the measure of demand for money, then the quantity of money in circulation must be equal in value to the entire quantity of goods on sale, whereas it is almost always of far less value. Although, then, the entire supply of goods is in one sense the measure of demand for money, it is so only in a sense in which the terms cannot be employed without manifest inconsistency.

We come now to foreign trade, in regard to which the question that here concerns us is whether a country's "exports represent the force of its demand for foreign products." Now if the country's foreign trade were carried on exclusively by barter, they might at first sight appear to do so. The immediate object of the exporter from any country—say, from England—would then be to exchange the whole of the exports for foreign products, and, however much smaller than he had expected might prove to be the quantity of the latter obtainable in exchange for the former, he might probably accept that smaller quantity rather than be at the trouble and expense of sending home again any part of the English exports. It must be admitted that here demand could

not be the quantity demanded, for no definite quantity was demanded. The exporter's desire was to obtain at least the quantity he expected; but, also, if possible, a larger quantity, and the largest quantity possible. It may thus be that even "as the imports of each country represent in relation to it the measure of foreign supply, so its exports represent the force of its demand for foreign products." But it is on the other hand to be noted that although the desire involved in demand for foreign products is not desire for a definite quantity, inasmuch as what the exporters wish for is the very largest quantity obtainable in exchange for their exports, it is yet a quantity not less than would have sufficed to render the exporting operation remunerative. The exporter may indeed be compelled to accept a quantity smaller than this, but if so, the cause is simply that he has miscalculated. If he had foreseen that the quantity obtainable would not be large enough to yield him a profit on resale, he would certainly not have exported so largely, while, contrariwise, he would have exported still more largely if he had hoped thereby to obtain a proportionably larger quantity of foreign products and to be able to resell that larger quantity advantageously. The actual quantity of exports was offered in support of a desire, not for the particular quantity of foreign products actually received in exchange, but for some larger quantity, so that even if it showed—which it does not—what was the maximum of English goods which the exporters were willing to give in exchange for foreign goods, it would still only show that they were willing to exchange this maximum for a quantity large enough to compensate them for the trouble and expense they were incurring—not for any quantity, however small. The total of exports cannot, therefore, with any accuracy be said to represent the force of demand. Rather, and much more appropriately, even if without perfect propriety, may demand, in accordance with Mill's view, be described as the quantity of foreign goods demanded, inasmuch as that quantity, albeit not a definable quantity, is at any rate not less than some certain definite quantity.

And if Cairnes' definition of demand does not hold good in connection with foreign trade under a *régime* of barter, still more obviously is it inapplicable under a monetary *régime*. What is then the immediate object of exporters is to sell their exports for money; but whether they subsequently expend the whole of the sale proceeds on the purchase of foreign goods for importation into the originally exporting country depends upon whether or not they believe that they will be able advantageously to resell in that country the entire stock of goods so purchased. If they do not believe this, such of them as are resident in the originally exporting country will cause part of the sale proceeds to be remitted

thither, where the consequent influx of money will tend to raise the prices of home produce at least as much as the efflux of money from abroad will tend to lower in foreign countries the prices of foreign products, and where, therefore, the demand for foreign products will be at least as likely to be checked as to be stimulated. Clearly, in such circumstances, the total quantity of exports from any country will not necessarily represent that country's demand for foreign products.

Thus, of the three cases cited, one, that of money, is not a case in point, while in neither of the other two—labour and foreign trade—does Cairnes' definition hold good. I have elsewhere* stated reasons for considering that even Mill's definitions require some addition in order to render them strictly correct, and that supply or demand is not simply the quantity supplied or demanded, but the quantity supplied or demanded at some specified price. With these emendations, to which I have reason to believe that Mr. Mill did not object, his definitions would apply universally—would apply perfectly in regard to labour, and sufficiently in regard to foreign trade. Cairnes himself admits that it is “frequently highly convenient and, perhaps, even necessary” to use the terms in question in Mill's sense, but I submit that it would be not simply unnecessary, but utterly erroneous and hopelessly misleading, ever to use them in any other sense. Most unfortunate would it be if there were any real need to use terms of such prime importance in opposite senses. True, it might, as Mr. Cairnes says, be “only requisite to distinguish them in thought,” but this simple necessity would infallibly prove to be in practice a simple impossibility. No extremest care could prevent the two senses from being continually confounded even by the same thinker, and still less by different thinkers, to an extent which would furnish abundant justification to the numerous scoffers with whom economical discussion is already but another name for endless and barren logomachy.

Here it may not be superfluous to observe—palpable truism as the observation is—that cost of production “means sacrifice, and cannot, without risk of hopelessly confusing ideas, be identified with anything that is not sacrifice;” that “it represents what man parts with in the barter between him and nature, which must be kept eternally distinct from the return made by nature upon that payment.” Neither is it simply not superfluous, it is highly desirable, to point out that in the earliest of industrial stages the sacrifice in question consists exclusively of the toil and fatigue, the privations and sufferings of whatever sort, involved in the act of labour. Such is its composition when a savage, nourished and invigorated solely

* On Labour, Book ii. chap 1, 2nd edition.

by berries or cockles of his own collecting, and aided solely by implements of his own manufacturing, runs down and kills a stag. The stag's cost of production consists entirely of labour—partly of the huntsman's previous labour that had provided him with hunting tackle and with food for sustenance during the chase, partly of that which he had undergone in the chase itself, but still solely and exclusively of labour. Now, if this huntsman, returning to his wigwam laden with the day's spoils, should meet a tribesman similarly wending homewards with the product of a day's fishing, and if the two should desire to barter part of their respective acquisitions, the principle on which the exchange would take place would be that of the labour ordinarily required for similar acquisitions. The huntsman would expect in return for his venison as much fish as, with the same labour as the venison had cost him, he might probably himself have caught if he had gone fishing instead of hunting; the fisherman in exchange for his fish would expect as much venison as, with the same labour as his fish had cost him, he might probably have captured if he had gone hunting instead of fishing. For even though the huntsman had persuaded some companion, whom he had noticed to be cleverer than himself at making darts or bows and arrows, to undertake that operation for him on condition of being subsequently paid with venison for his pains, the venison's cost of production would still consist entirely of labour—partly of the actual huntsman's labour, partly of that of the acquaintance who had equipped him for the field. Before this second case could occur, however, industry must have made an important step in advance of its primitive stage. The entire savage community could no longer be living from hand to mouth. One savage at least must have become capable of abstinence enough to lay by for future use part of the produce of his labour instead of consuming the whole of it upon his immediate lusts, and so to be able to engage in a lengthened sedentary occupation. By so storing up food and materials for the sustenance and exercise of future labour, this provident savage had already created capital, had already become an embryo capitalist: nay, more, had already discovered a mode of profitably investing his capital. For he would scarcely have consented to stay at home making implements for another, unless by so doing he had expected to save himself some trouble. Rather than do that he would have preferred basking in the sun until his provisions were consumed, and then have gone out hunting again on his own account. As he insists upon being paid for his bows and arrows with somewhat more venison than he could himself have obtained with the same inconvenience as it costs him to make the bows and arrows, the difference between the quantity which he receives from his customer and that which he might probably have procured for

himself constitutes profit on his capital. As society advances, and individuals engage largely in agriculture and manufactures, the number of capitalists goes on increasing, until at length the industrial portion of the community becomes divided into two great classes—to wit, of capitalists who, whether working for themselves or not, employ others to work for them, advancing to these all the prerequisites of labour, on condition of being repaid with the entire produce of the labour of the employed; and of labourers working for employers, without prospect of further benefit to themselves than that of the remuneration which the employers have advanced or promised to them. When this state of things is reached, the conditions of production have lost their original simplicity, and have become exceedingly complex. No act of production is now the act solely of the labourer immediately engaged in it, for its performance involves the use of tools, materials, and perhaps of buildings which previous producers had provided. Thus the cloth-weaver would be helpless without the loom, for which he is indebted to the miner, the ironfounder, and the machine-maker, or without the yarn, for which he has to thank the shepherd, the wool-comber, and the spinner, not to speak of the carriers who have conveyed the raw materials and manufactured articles from place to place.

Moreover, the miner, ironfounder, and the rest were probably all in the employment of capitalists, who advanced to them the prerequisites and also the remuneration of labour, and who did this only for the sake of profit, which profit must have been included in the total expenditure incurred by the final employer before he could set the weaver to work. In these circumstances the cost of production must be regarded from a new point of view, from which it assumes a very different aspect from that which it previously presented. In one sense, indeed, it still, as much as ever, consists exclusively of the amount of labour of different kinds which has taken part in production; but, understood in this sense, it no longer has any direct bearing upon normal value. To raise twenty tons of coal from the mine requires far more and far severer toil than to make a gold watch; any one competent to perform both operations would find himself much more exhausted in body and mind after the former than after the latter; yet the market value of the coal at the pit's mouth would probably be less than half of that of a fairly good watch in the shop of a wholesale dealer, and the market values of the two exhibit no tendency towards a level at which they will correspond with the quantities of labour required respectively for the production of coal and of watches. The reason is that the capitalists, to whom the coal and the watch in the first instance belong, have had to pay at very different rates for the labour employed

upon them, and cannot, therefore, afford to offer them for sale at the same price. All labourers, as Cairnes has well shown, are divided into unskilled and skilled groups, the skilled, again, being subdivided into groups requiring for their several avocations very different degrees and very different kinds of skill, the acquisition of which, demanding as it does opportunity, leisure, and ability to pay for special education, is practically open to comparatively few. Within each group, individuals can compete freely with each other for employment, thereby keeping wages at about the same level throughout the group, but competition between members of different groups is always difficult and sometimes impossible, so that, in different groups, the rate of wages may vary indefinitely. If, indeed, these variations become exceedingly large, more labour will be attracted to the better paid employments, in which the rate of wages will consequently be somewhat reduced, whereas, in the worse paid employments, owing to the diminished influx of labour, the rate will somewhat rise; for, even though none of the labourers actually engaged in the worse paid employments should feel themselves fitted to compete for superior work, there are always plenty of young labourers growing up and as yet undisposed of, whereof a larger proportion than before will endeavour to qualify themselves for whatever kind of work has of late become unusually well paid. As already explained, however, only comparatively few will have the means of thus qualifying, and the rate of wages, therefore, in different employments, although prevented from varying to an unlimited extent, may continue to vary as much as it previously did. Such variation obviously implies that the irksomeness of labour has ceased to be the measure of labour's remuneration; that the sacrifice made by the labourers who have produced a commodity no longer represents that commodity's normal value. The whole pecuniary cost of production is now defrayed by capital, which will not continue such expenditure except in the belief that the finished product will exchange for the equivalent of the cost, together with profit at the current rate thereon. If, in any employment, this profit cease to be obtainable on the average of transactions, capital will eschew that employment, and will betake itself in preference to some other. True, of the capital already invested, so much as is locked up in buildings, machinery, or the like, may be incapable of transference; but, as of labour, so also of capital, there is always a considerable quantity as yet undisposed of, and the whole of this, unlike labour, is able to enter with equal ease into any and every employment from which it is not shut out by legal barriers. Whenever, therefore, owing to fluctuations in market value, the rate of profit, or of the net return obtained by the capitalist for his sacrifices of every sort, varies

materially in different employments, capital will be attracted to the more profitable employments and repelled from the less profitable, and production will increase in the former and decrease in the latter, and prices of commodities of all kinds will tend to become such as to equalize profits in all employments. For this reason, Mill, and indeed all economists, with no other exception, I believe, than Cairnes, ordinarily treat cost of production as meaning nothing but the sacrifices made by the capitalist; and, understood in this sense, it obviously is, within one and the same country, the sole arbiter of normal value, with which the sacrifices of the labourer have nothing whatever to do, or at least have no direct connection. The truth of this conclusion is in no degree invalidated by the fact which Mr. Cairnes was the first to bring to notice, and on which he has thrown a great deal of very valuable light, of the distribution of labourers into numerous non-competing groups. This fact does indeed most seriously affect the wages of labour, but it has no direct influence on the normal value of commodities, which is determined, not by what the labourer has suffered, but by what the capitalists pays. The capitalist advances all the pecuniary expenses of production, and the mutual competition of capitalists necessarily gives to the market values of commodities a tendency to correspond with the pecuniary expense of producing them. Within one and the same country, then, every portion of whose capital can freely compete with every other portion, the "law" of normal value, if the word law were here permissible, would be that normal value depends absolutely and exclusively on cost of production. Operation of reciprocal demand, which Cairnes calls in as an auxiliary, is here altogether out of place. What the *law* would be in respect to commodities interchanged between different countries, whose respective capitals are not in competition with each other, is a different question, and one of great interest and intricacy, which I hope to find some future occasion for discussing, but upon which we need not at present enter.

Of the three epithets, "natural," "necessary," and "normal," employed to denote a particular species of value, the first and earliest, the one adopted by Adam Smith, is perhaps the least objectionable. The exchange value which a commodity could not fail to possess if supply and demand did not interpose their disturbing influence may, without much impropriety, be termed its "natural" value; whereas that surely is not *necessary* value with which actual value *need* never coincide, nor is that *normal* value which, as a rule, always differs more or less from actual value. Nevertheless, normal value being the term selected by Mr. Cairnes, it may as well be adhered to in an examination of that economist's teaching.

As to actual or market value—the value for which, at any given time and place, a commodity is actually sold or offered for sale, all economists until lately—indeed, if I may presume without undue egotism to say so, until the publication of my own book “On Labour”—were agreed that it depends on the proportion between supply and demand, falling when supply exceeds demand, and rising when demand exceeds supply, and subsiding at last to a point at which supply and demand are equalized. This opinion I undertook to refute, admitting indeed that, provided goods be offered unreservedly for sale, price must fall if supply exceeds demand, but showing that even then it need not rise because demand exceeds supply; that it may either rise or fall, although supply and demand remain unaltered; and that, whether it rise or fall, the price finally resulting need not be one at which supply and demand will be equalized. Mr. Cairnes accepts my refutation as complete, but declares himself dissatisfied with the theory proposed by me in substitution of the one which he acknowledges me to have displaced. Now what I contend for may be briefly summarized as follows. It is competition alone, and primarily and mainly the competition of dealers, that regulates market value, the activity of competition depending upon and varying with—not the actual relations of supply and demand—but the varying estimates formed of those relations by competitors of very various degrees of sagacity, and the more or less powerful influence exercised by those estimates on competitors subject to very different degrees of necessity. The object of every dealer is to get in exchange for his whole stock the largest aggregate price which he can get within the period during which it will suit him to keep part of his stock unsold. If there were but one single dealer, he would probably ask the highest price at which he thought all his goods would be purchased within the period; but if there be several dealers, each must guard against the danger of being undersold. All dealers, therefore, while considering at what price they shall offer their goods, consider, each for himself, the actual state and future prospects of the whole market. Each takes stock, as well as he can, of the quantities already in hand of the commodity he deals in; estimates, as well as he can, the additional quantities likely to be brought in within the period during which he can manage to wait, and also the quantities which, within the same period, customers will be likely to take off at different prices; and conjectures, as well as he can, to how low a price rival dealers will be obliged to descend in order to get rid, within that period, of the portions of their respective stocks which they will respectively be impatient to sell. He then considers whether at that price he will be able, within the time, to get rid of the whole of his own present stock. If so he adopts that price. If not he adopts one

still lower. In this manner each frames his own calculation, and judges for himself what will be the best price to ask; but different dealers in the same market, of every gradation of experience, shrewdness, and neediness, may calculate differently, or may draw different inferences from the same calculations. Some may estimate lower than others both the quantities that will be brought into the market and the quantities that will be demanded at different prices; or may think that the same estimate requires a lower price; or some may not be able to wait so long as others, and may be compelled to adopt a price which will enable them to dispose of their goods more rapidly than others would care to do. But whatever be, for whatever reason, the lowest price at which any resolve to sell, that price becomes, for the time being, the current price, and what causes it to be so is competition. What caused certain dealers to adopt that price in the first instance was the fear that otherwise competition would prevent their selling as fast as they desired. What prevents other dealers from asking higher prices is the knowledge that they will be undersold by their competitors if they do. Plainly, then, it is competition, and competition alone, that regulates price; and equally plain is it that competition is not regulated by supply and demand, for, in precisely the same relations of supply and demand competition may vary indefinitely. What then does regulate competition? My answer is simply, Nothing. There is no regularity about competition—competition is not regulated at all. If it can properly be said to depend upon anything, it depends partly upon individual necessity, partly on individual discretion; and, as for the first of these there is proverbially, and for the second manifestly, no law, so likewise is there no law of competition. Neither, if there be no law of competition, and if competition be, as it has been shown to be, the determining cause of price, can there be any law of price.

This being my view, Cairnes declares himself altogether dissentient. He will not admit that there is no law for individual necessity, possibly supposing that such a law might be adequately expressed by the words "What must be must be." Neither will he admit that there is no law for individual discretion, and he is satisfied that, "whether we are able to discover it or not, there is a law of market price, just as there is a law of normal price, as there is a law of wages, of profits, of rent, as there are laws of the winds and tides and seasons, and of the phenomena of external nature." His conviction of the existence of this law is in no wise shaken by perception of the non-existence of any "constancy of relation between the proportion of supply to demand and market price, such that, knowing the relation in any given case, we should be able to predict what the price would be in the event of a change

in the conditions of the market." He acknowledges that the "idea of a proportion between demand and supply as furnishing a clue to the connection of demand and supply with market price must be abandoned," yet while acknowledging this he proceeds to lay down "the nearest approximation he can make to the law of market price," and in so doing simply expresses sentiments which in substance are always either absolutely coincident, or at least perfectly consistent with mine, the sole point of difference between us being one of nomenclature.

He begins by pointing out that there is in every market a price, designated by him *proper price*, "a price at which it is desirable," in the interest of dealers as well as consumers, "that the commodity, whatever it may be, should sell at that time and place." Price is "too low" when, by excessively stimulating consumption, it threatens to cause the existing stocks to be taken off before fresh supplies, adequate to what will then be the demand, can come in. It is "too high" when, by needlessly checking consumption, it threatens to cause part of the existing stock to remain on hand on the arrival of those fresh supplies. In either case "the error is in time discovered." In the former case, competition among dealers slackens, and prices are augmented; in the latter, competition quickens and prices are reduced; augmentations and reductions alike converging towards the *proper price*—the "price just sufficient, and no more than sufficient, to carry the existing supply over to meet the new supplies forthcoming."

"Dealers, while thus simply pursuing their own interests, are unconsciously performing for the community a service of first-rate importance—a service which has been well compared by Archbishop Whately to that rendered by the captain of a ship, who, taking account of the stock of provisions at his disposal and the length of his intended voyage, adjusts to these conditions the rations of his crew. Such is the tendency of the speculation of the market, and the end is attained in proportion to the intelligence and the knowledge of those who engage in the pursuit. Of course mistakes are often made, sometimes very serious mistakes; and then we have reaction, oscillation, and perhaps commercial crisis. But under all circumstances the price in the market is determined by the operations of demand founded upon their knowledge of demand and supply—of dealers pursuing their interests under circumstances which, in proportion to the intelligence and knowledge at their command, favour the establishment of the proper market price."

Such is Cairnes' exposition, which he prefaces with an intimation that he is utterly unable to agree with me, but with which nevertheless, I find myself almost unreservedly agreeing. How can I help agreeing in the main with what is little else than a repetition or expansion of what I myself had previously said. Cairnes does not describe *proper* market price as one with which *actual* market price need ever necessarily coincide, but only as one towards which it always tends, and towards which it will

“approximate in proportion to the intelligence and knowledge of the dealers.” But while as yet only in course of approximation to proper price, actual price must needs be *improper* price, and, whether proper or improper, Mr. Cairnes pronounces the price in the market to be under all circumstances determined by the opinions of the dealers in the market founded upon their knowledge of supply and demand. It is these opinions which quicken competition when price is “too high,” and slacken it when price is “too low,” thereby causing prices to fall in the one case and permitting them to rise in the other. Is there, then, some pregnant distinction between opinions of individuals founded on knowledge and varying with intelligence, and the “individual discretion” of which I have myself spoken, and which I have coupled with “individual necessity” because it would be anything but discretion if it did not take account of such necessity? If not, Cairnes and I are so far at one, and only using different words to express the same idea. We both agree that competition is the immediate arbiter of market price, and that competition depends upon what I call individual discretion, the sole difference between us being that, whereas he styles our common conclusion an economic *law*, I refuse to accord to it so dignified an appellation. To the question of nomenclature thus arising, the answer obviously depends upon what economic or other scientific law really is. According to Cairnes, it consists in the “constancy of the relation between facts and the conditions that produce them.” Now, of course, all conditions being precisely the same, precisely the same consequences must ensue, and if this “constancy of relation” be a law, it is a law of universal application, holding good in every department of science, and therefore in the region of economics among the rest. But I submit that this is not so much a scientific law as the principle which serves as basis to all scientific laws whatsoever. In order to constitute a scientific law it is indispensable to specify the conditions from which certain specified facts will infallibly result, and Cairnes, as we have seen, admits this to be impossible in regard to market value. He admits that exactest knowledge of the proportion between supply and demand would not enable us to predict what would be the actual market price at any given time and place. *That*, he says, would depend on the opinions of the dealers, and these again upon their intelligence. Is there, then, any law of opinion or of intelligence? No doubt two persons, the conditions of whose birth and training, and likewise whose experience, had been precisely the same, would, if placed in precisely the same circumstances, form precisely the same opinions and adopt precisely the same line of action. But it is equally indubitable, not merely that there cannot possibly be two such persons, but also

that one and the same person cannot possess precisely the same intelligence at two different periods, for this, if for no other reason, that some addition must have been made to his experience during the interval between the two periods. Cairnes and I agree that although actual market prices are almost always what he would call *improper* prices, their tendency is always towards proper price. This tendency of theirs is by Cairnes affirmed, and by me denied, to be the *law* of market price, and I feel that I am risking little in asking the impartial reader to decide which of us is in the right.

Cairnes ends his investigation of value with a chapter on some of its derivative laws; but without dwelling upon this further than to observe that it will be found to be exceedingly profitable reading, I will now bring the present paper to a close by briefly recapitulating its principal conclusions.

Value, in economic language is of two distinct kinds, and cannot therefore be brought within the limits of a single definition. Sometimes it signifies *exchange* value, or the ratio in which, in open market, any commodities, or all commodities whatsoever, are exchanged against each other; sometimes it signifies *pecuniary* value, or the ratio in which any commodities, other than some one selected commodity, are exchanged against the one selected. Sum of pecuniary values—increase or decrease of the aggregate amount of pecuniary values—are perfectly intelligible and highly useful, indeed indispensable, expressions, signifying the total quantity of, and any augmentation or diminution of the total quantity of, some selected commodity which may be had in exchange for the total of all other commodities. But sum of exchange values, and increase and decrease of the aggregate amount of exchange values, are unmeaning phrases and impossible conceptions; for every rise in the ratio of any one commodity to any other, or to all other commodities, is necessarily counterbalanced by a precisely proportionate fall in the ratio of that other or those others to it.

Supply is the total quantity of commodities offered for sale at a given time and place, at specified prices. Demand is the total quantity of the same commodities which customers are prepared to purchase at the prices specified.

Value of either species, exchange or pecuniary, is subdivisible into market value and *natural, necessary, or normal* value. Market values are the prices at which commodities are anywhere actually offered for sale. Normal values are values towards which market values, whatever be their intermediate fluctuations, always tend eventually to return; and these normal values, within one and the same country, are determined invariably and exclusively by cost of production.

Cost of production consists solely of the sacrifices which production exacts; and these, in the earliest of industrial stages, consist exclusively of the labour engaged in production. In all subsequent stages, however, they generally consist less of labour itself than of payments made by employers of labour; they often consist wholly of payments by employers, and always consist in part of payments on account of labour other than that engaged in the final act of production. In short, except in the very earliest industrial stage, the sacrifices that constitute the cost of production which determines natural or normal value are made in far larger measure by employers of labour than by actual labourers, and are generally made entirely by employers. The sacrifices of labourers may be as great or greater than ever, but they have ceased to enter into cost of production in the economic sense of that expression.

Market price is determined by the competition of dealers, the keenness of which competition depends upon the estimates made by different dealers of the actual and prospective condition of supply and demand. But as these estimates and the lines of action suggested by them are made by dealers of very various characters and tempers and also very differently circumstanced, they cannot be depended upon as being the same on any two separate occasions. There cannot, therefore, be any law of competition, nor, consequently, any law of market price.

The foregoing conclusions differ essentially from those of Professor Cairnes; neither are they strictly coincident with those of Mr. Mill. They are, however, in complete accordance with these latter, from which they differ chiefly in being somewhat amplified and expanded.

W. T. THORNTON.



THE ANTAGONISMS OF CREEDS.

THE BIBLE AND THE CREED.

THE Bible is the Word of God to man ; the Creed is the answer of man to God. The Bible is the book to be explained and applied ; the Creed is the Church's understanding and summary of the Bible. The Bible contains the truth itself, fresh, unerring, and unalterable, from the mouth of its author ; the Creed is a human statement of the truth, more or less imperfect, fallible, and subject to improvement with the progressive knowledge of the Church. The Bible is the truth in the form of life and fact ; the Creed is the truth in the form of logic and dogma. The Bible is the only and sufficient rule of faith (*norma credendi*) ; the Creed is the rule of public doctrine (*norma docendi*) derived from the Bible, and guarding it against heretical perversion and corruption. The Bible contains all that is necessary to salvation ; the Creed ought not to contain any article that is not clearly revealed. The authority of the Bible is divine and absolute ; the authority of the Creed is ecclesiastical and relative. The Bible is the rule and corrective of the Creed, and must for ever remain the final tribunal for the settlement of differences of creeds.

In the present divided state of Christendom there are as many creeds as there are Churches and sects. They all profess to be derived from the Bible, or at all events to be consistent with it ; while yet they differ, and in part are antagonistic and apparently irreconcilable. Let us first briefly review them in their historical

order, and then see how far they agree and disagree, and how they may be harmonized.

THE CONFESSION OF PETER.

The first and fundamental creed, which must ever constitute the beating heart of every other, is Peter's answer to his Master's question, "Whom say ye that I am?" It is the confession of his personal faith that the man Jesus of Nazareth is the promised Messiah, the Son of the living God.

This confession came not from flesh and blood, but was revealed to the mind and heart of Peter by our heavenly Father, through his Holy Spirit. This confession is the immovable rock on which Christ, the divine architect, built his Church. This confession is the standard and rule of every creed, which is true or false in proportion as it agrees with or departs from its spirit. Christ, the God-Man, the promised Saviour, is the beginning, the middle, and the end of our Christian faith and spiritual life. Every other article must cluster around this Christological centre. The creed of the reunited Church of the future will be but an expansion of the confession with which it started. Gold and silver, and many precious stones of divine truth, have been built upon this foundation, and they will remain with it; but the hay and stubble of error will be burned (1 Cor. iii. 12—15).

THE BAPTISMAL CREEDS OF THE EARLY CHURCH.

From the confession of Peter, in connection with the baptismal formula, have legitimately grown the rules of faith or baptismal creeds of the ante-Nicene Church. We find them incidentally mentioned in the writings of Irenæus, Tertullian, Origen, Novatian, Cyprian, Rufinus, Augustine, Jerome, and others, as expressing the general faith of Catholic Christendom in distinction from Judaism and Heathenism, and the pseudo-Christianity of heretics. They were at first not committed to writing, but orally transmitted, and taught the catechumens shortly before baptism, as a part of "the secret discipline," which concealed the sacraments of baptism and the eucharist from the profanation of the heathen. They vary considerably in form and extent, but they all substantially agree, and resolve themselves into three articles in conformity to the Trinitarian basis of the baptismal formula, viz., belief in

God the Father Almighty,
And in Jesus Christ His Son, our Lord,
And in the Holy Ghost.

The other articles are arranged under these three heads; to

the Father being ascribed the creation, to the Son the redemption, and to the Holy Ghost the sanctification, which will be completed in the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting. In all these forms the second article is made the most prominent, and includes the principal facts in the life of Christ from His supernatural conception to His ascension and return from heaven to judge all men.

THE ŒCUMENICAL CREEDS.

These are only an expansion of the ante-Nicene rules of faith, and superseded them for all practical purposes. The Western or Latin forms, matured in what is called the APOSTLES' CREED, the Eastern or Greek forms in the NICENE CREED of 325, with the additional clauses of the second Œcumenical Council held in Constantinople, 381. They are likewise Trinitarian and predominantly Christological; they profess the same faith—in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth; and in Jesus Christ his Son, our Lord, who became man for our salvation, suffered and died on the cross, rose again from the dead, and ascended to heaven, from whence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead; and in the Holy Ghost, who applies the benefits of Christ to the believer in the Holy Catholic Church through the means of grace.

The Nicene Creed differs from that of the Apostles only in this: it is more theological, and emphasizes more clearly and forcibly the divinity of Christ and His essential coëquality (*homousia*) with the Father, in opposition to the Arian heresy which agitated the Eastern Church for half a century, and was the occasion of the first two Œcumenical Councils held in the East.

These two venerable Creeds are to this day the common doctrinal bond of union between the three great branches of Christendom—the Greek, the Latin, and the Evangelical—and between the different ages of the Church. They can never be abolished or superseded. They carry with them an authority and force as no other confession.

“ . . . The faith of the Trinity lies,
Shrined for ever and ever, in those grand old words and wise;
A gem in a beautiful setting; still, at matin-time,
The service of Holy Communion rings the ancient chime;
Wherever in marvellous minster, or village churches small,
Men to the Man that is God out of their misery call,
Swelled by the rapture of choirs, or borne on the poor man's word,
Still the glorious Nicene confession unaltered is heard;
Most like the song that the angels are singing around the throne,
With their 'Holy! holy! holy!' to the great Three in One.”

It is true the famous clause *filioque*, inserted in the Latin text of the Nicene Creed since the year 589, is still a bone of contention between the Eastern and Western Churches; the former, looking

chiefly to the divine unity and the dignity of the Father, strictly adheres to the single procession, while the latter, in its zeal for the equality of the Son with the Father, teaches the double procession of the Holy Spirit. But this insertion ought never to have been made, as even Pope Leo III., in 809, admitted (herein differing from his infallible successors),* and it ought to be given up for the sake of union. The difference may be left to the school, and need not disturb the peace of the Church.

Besides the Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed, two others justly claim Œcumenical authority, at least in a secondary degree, namely, the Christological decision of CHALCEDON, 451, asserting against the Nestorian and Eutychian errors the inseparable and yet unmixed unity of the divine and human natures in the one Person of our Lord; and the so-called ATHANASIAN Creed of much later origin, which is the clearest and fullest creed statement of the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation, but is marred by the warning or damnatory clauses, which have, from time to time, roused opposition to its public use in the Anglican Church, although so far without effect. The Irish Episcopal Church has recently proposed to omit the objectionable clauses in the public use. The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States escapes the difficulty by omitting the Athanasian Creed from the Prayer Book altogether. The other Protestant Churches, although they expressly approve its doctrine, have never prescribed its use in public worship.

THE GREEK CREED.

We now come to the conflicting Creeds of the Greek Catholic, the Roman Catholic, and the Evangelical Protestant Churches, which have grown up during the middle ages and modern times.

The Greek, or Oriental Creed, to which also the Orthodox Church of Russia adheres, embraces, first of all, the doctrinal decisions of the seven Œcumenical Councils—from 325 to 787—and more particularly the Nicene Creed, which is made the basis of all catechetical instruction; in the next place, a number of confessions and catechisms, drawn up since the Reformation period, in opposition both to Romanism and to Protestantism. The most important of these are the orthodox confession of Peter Mogila, 1643, the Eighteen Decrees of the Synod of Jerusalem, 1672, and the Larger Catechism of Philaret, sanctioned by the Holy Synod of Russia, 1839.

The Greek Church dissents from the Roman Catholic mainly in

* When appealed to by the delegates of Charlemagne in behalf of the *filioque*, Leo caused the original Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, in Greek and Latin, to be engraved on two tablets of silver and suspended in the Basilica of St. Peter, as a perpetual protest against the innovation, although he approved the doctrine of the double procession.

the doctrine of the double procession of the Holy Spirit (the clause *filioque*) and the doctrine of the Papacy. In rejecting the claims of the Papacy she sides with Protestantism, but from a different standpoint. In all other distinctive doctrines she is much nearer the Roman than the Protestant Church. The Greek Church teaches, in common with the Roman, tradition as the joint rule of faith with the Scriptures (although rejecting Papal infallibility); justification by faith *and works*; seven sacraments or mysteries (with minor differences on confirmation and extreme unction); transubstantiation (less clearly defined) and the unbloody sacrifice of the mass; a middle state and place of purification, with prayers for the dead; the worship of Mary (though protesting against the Papal dogma of the Immaculate Conception), of saints, angels, images, and relics.

The Greek and Russian Creed, then, is essentially un-Protestant. It includes many post- and extra-Scriptural additions, which we can never accept. But it should be remembered that the Greek Church, while she is considerably behind the Roman in culture, vitality, and energy, yet, on account of her comparative stagnation and isolation, is not so fully committed to some of these traditions and to the condemnation of Protestantism, that she is less intolerant, and allows and encourages—at least, in Russia—the circulation of the Bible in the vernacular. Moreover, by disowning infallibility (except in a general abstract way), she leaves the door open for a possible reformation of doctrine as well as discipline.

THE ROMAN CREED.

This is the most fully developed and clearly defined of all, rising, like a Gothic cathedral, with a forest of turrets and statues, with painted windows, lofty pillars, side naves, chapels and altars, and many strange mythological figures of idols and demons. It took many centuries to build it; fathers, schoolmen, mystics, popes, and councils helped to rear the imposing structure until it finally reached its completion in the Vatican dogma of Papal infallibility. It has the tenacity and durability of the *urbs æterna*. It has its infallible interpreter in the oracle of the Vatican. It claims universal and absolute authority equal to the Word of the living God.

The doctrinal standards of Romanism may be divided into two classes—the Tridentine and the Vatican.

The Tridentine symbols are the decrees and canons of the Council of Trent, the Profession of Pius IV., or Profession of the Tridentine Faith, and the Roman Catechism. They date from the middle of the sixteenth century, and are directed against the Protestant Reformation. They fix the dogmas of Scripture

and tradition as a joint rule of faith, the extent of the Scripture canon including the Apocrypha, the authority of the Latin Vulgate (leaving its text in confusion), the primitive state and original sin, justification by works as well as faith, meritorious works, seven sacraments, transubstantiation, the withdrawal of the cup from the laity, the sacrifice of the mass for the living and the dead, auricular confession and priestly absolution, extreme unction, purgatory, indulgences, and obedience to the Pope as the successor of Peter and Vicar of Christ. All these dogmas were previously prepared by patristic and scholastic speculations, but more or less disputed in the Latin communion itself, until they received the solemn sanction of the Council of Trent.

The Vatican symbols are the definition of the Immaculate Conception (1854), the Papal Syllabus (1864), and the decrees of the Vatican Council (1870). They were issued under Pope Pius IX., either alone or in connection with his Vatican Council, just three hundred years after the Tridentine standards. They are directed partly against the infidelity of the nineteenth century, which has affected the Roman Church even more than the Protestant, partly against Liberal Catholicism (Gallicanism). They declare war against civil and religious liberty and the reigning spirit of modern civilization, and proclaim the dogma of the sinlessness of Mary, Papal absolutism, and Papal infallibility, which had hitherto been open and disputed questions among Romanists. They have occasioned the secession of the Old Catholics—the largest since the sixteenth century, and vastly outnumbering the Anglo-Catholic secession to Rome. They have provoked a new conflict between the Empire and the Papacy, which forebodes a new religious war in Europe. May Providence avert it; but, if it is to come, may it terminate in thirty days instead of thirty years, and lead to the universal triumph of religious liberty.

THE EVANGELICAL PROTESTANT CREED.

The Evangelical Creed is the result of the great Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century in its conflict with the unscriptural doctrines and usages of the mediæval Papacy. It produced a split in the Western Church deeper and more comprehensive than the previous separation of the Latin and Greek Churches. It started from the common basis of the Œcumenical Creeds, and expressly asserted its hearty consent to the ancient doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. But it opened a new chapter in anthropology and soteriology, especially in those doctrines which relate to the subjective application of the Christian salvation, which had not yet been symbolically settled. Here

the Reformers followed the lead of Augustine, the greatest among the fathers, in his views on sin and grace in opposition to the Pelagian and semi-Pelagian views which, though condemned, came practically to prevail in the mediæval Church.

But the Reformers went beyond the teaching of the ancient Church to the fountain-head of Christianity itself, and derived their creed directly from the New Testament, which was now more deeply and clearly understood and apprehended than ever before. Luther and Calvin republished the gospel of a free and full salvation, and renewed the protest of the Apostle of the Gentiles against the Romish Judaism, which depended upon outward observances and human performances, and by its innumerable traditions obscured and almost neutralized the word of the living God and the all-sufficient merits of Christ.

The Evangelical Creed, in all its essential features, is identified with the Bible, from which it is derived; and hence it can never be destroyed. It is an undeniable fact that Protestantism encourages, while Romanism discourages, the popular distribution of the Scriptures, and this fact can be rationally explained only from the congeniality of Evangelical Christianity with Bible Christianity, and the want of harmony of Roman traditionalism with the same. The British and Foreign Bible Society, and the American Bible Society, alone circulate probably a greater number of copies of the Scriptures in one year than the entire Roman Church has done within the last three centuries. The Popes have more than once denounced Bible Societies as pests of society.

The fundamental doctrines of the Evangelical Creed, as distinct from the Greek and the Roman, are these three:—

First, The sovereign authority of the Word of God, as the only and sufficient rule of the Christian faith, to which all ecclesiastical traditions must be subordinated. This is the objective (less properly called the formal) principle of Protestantism.

Secondly, Justification by the sole merits of Christ, as apprehended by faith, without works of our own, which are indeed necessary as fruits or evidences, but not as conditions, of justification. This is the objective (or material) principle.

Thirdly, The general priesthood of believers, and their right and privilege of a direct access to God in Christ and to His Word, without the restraining intervention of a special priesthood, the intercession of saints, and the teaching of tradition. This may be called the ecclesiastical or social principle.

From this common positive basis the Evangelical Creed protests against the tyranny and misbelief of the Papacy, on the one hand, and the licentiousness and unbelief of ancient and modern heresies on the other. But it claims no perfection and infallibility—hence it requires no blind and absolute submission. It

bows before the sovereign authority of God's revelation, and, believing in a progressive understanding and application of the Bible, it keeps itself open to new and better light.

LUTHERANISM AND REFORM.

The Evangelical Creed is divided into the Evangelical Lutheran and the Evangelical Reformed. They differ on the doctrines of the Lord's Supper and Predestination, but agree substantially in almost every other article of faith, and hence they admit of a union. The Lutheran Creed is mainly laid down in the Augsburg Confession of 1530, Luther's Small Catechism of 1529, and the Formula of Concord, 1577; that of the Reformed Churches in the Second Helvetic Confession of 1566, the Heidelberg Catechism, 1563, the French, Belgic, and Scotch Confessions, all of the same age, the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, the Decrees of the Synod of Dort, and the Westminster Confession and Catechisms. The Reformed Confessions, owing to the many geographical and national divisions they represent, are more numerous than the Lutheran; they yet agree as fully in every article, as was shown long ago in an interesting work, "The Harmony of the Orthodox and Reformed Churches," which was prepared under the direction of Theodore Beza, and appeared at Geneva, 1581.*

LATER EVANGELICAL CREEDS.

The Reformation has proved a fruitful mother of many daughters; and, with her laxer notions of Church unity, she allows them to set up independent households. We must admit, however, that every Protestant Church establishment has shown more or less intolerance against dissenters, which crops out of selfish human nature, independent of its creed, wherever it has the power.

Since the sixteenth century there have grown up within the Protestant communion, especially in England, a number of separate denominations, such as Congregationalists, Baptists, Arminians, Quakers, Methodists, Moravians, and a few others, which hold fast to the supreme authority of the Bible and the

* "*Harmonia Confessionum Fidei Orthodoxarum et Reformatarum Ecclesiarum quæ . . . sacram evangelii doctrinam pure profitentur*," &c. An English translation was published at Cambridge, 1586, then at London, 1643, and a revised edition by Peter Hall in London, 1842. The work grew out of a desire for one common creed of the Reformed Churches, but took the shape of a selected harmony, which presents, under nineteen sections, full extracts from all the leading Reformed, and also from three Lutheran Confessions (viz., the Augsburg, the Saxon, and the Wurtemberg Confessions), with a view to show their agreement on all the important articles of faith. It is the first attempt at a system of comparative symbolics and Evangelical irenics. It was intrusted to Beza, Daneau, and Salnar, and executed mainly by Salnar. The same irenical aim prompted the collection and publication of the *Corpus et Syntagma Confessionum Fidei*, Geneva, 1612; second ed. 1654.

principles of the Reformation, yet differ from the Lutheran and Calvinistic Creeds in minor points of doctrine or discipline, and are fulfilling an important and useful mission of their own. God has blessed them just as much as He has blessed the older communions, from which they either voluntarily seceded or have been expelled. Their growth and success entitle them to a full recognition among the regular divisions of Christ's army, and demand a revision of the traditional terminology in ecclesiastical geography and statistics. The Continental division of all orthodox Christendom into three Churches — the Catholic (Greek and Roman), the Lutheran, and the Reformed—and the odious designation of all the rest as mere *sects*, will answer no longer. The English distinction between Churchmen (or Episcopalians) and Dissenters (or Nonconformists) has no meaning in the United States, where all Christian denominations are independent of the civil government, and on a perfect equality before the law. For any one of these Protestant denominations to call itself *the* Church, and all the rest *sects*, is simply absurd, and implies a degree of presumption or ignorance, or both, which is unworthy of serious refutation. Such exclusiveness may do for Romanists, with whom it is natural and consistent; but among Protestants it is a solecism and barbarism.

We must recognize, then, in our common Protestant Christianity, a number of distinct types, which are equally Protestant and Evangelical, and equally necessary and useful in the particular fields of labour which the Great Head has assigned them. There is an abundance of work for them all.

THE PROBLEM OF REUNION.

How shall these conflicting creeds be harmonized, and a reunion of divided Christendom be brought about?

This question has challenged the attention of Melancthon, Calixtus, Grotius, Leibnitz, Bossuet, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Döllinger, and other eminent divines and philosophers. It has called forth many conferences between Greeks and Latins, Protestants and Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists, Calvinists and Arminians, Anglo-Catholics and Russo-Greeks. So far all the attempts at a reunion have failed, or resulted in greater alienation, or in partial and temporary compromises. They have been, at best, only noble efforts in a noble cause. The Old Catholics, under the lead of Dr. Döllinger, who, before the Vatican Council, was esteemed the first divine among the Roman Catholics of Germany, have taken up the mighty problem as a part of their peculiar mission, and have held a union-conference in Bonn, September, 1874, with Greek Catholics and Anglicans, which resulted in a tentative

formula of agreement on fourteen disputed articles; but so far this formula has no sort of official sanction or ecclesiastical authority.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF UNION.

The different modes of bringing about a doctrinal consensus of Christendom may be reduced to four:—

1. An *absorptive* union of all creeds in one. This is the view of the Roman Church. She claims the monopoly of Christian truth, and regards all other creeds as heretical and schismatical. She will never yield an iota of her teaching, and cannot do it without giving up her claim to infallibility. There are also narrow-minded sectarians among Protestants, who hold up their own creed as the standard which all others ought ultimately to adopt.

But it is an idle dream to suppose that the Greeks and Protestants will ever submit to the authority of the Pope, or that Romanists, *en masse*, will ever become Protestants, or that all Protestants will become either Lutherans, or Episcopalians, or Presbyterians, or Congregationalists, or Methodists, or Baptists. Some minor sects, which have no historical basis and no special mission, will no doubt disappear—the sooner the better; but the leading denominations will last to the millennium.

2. A *negative* union, which would give up all distinctive creeds and adopt the Bible alone.

This would undo the whole history of Christianity, which is impossible, and would require a reconstruction and repetition of the whole process of the past, with no prospect of a better result, unless human nature and the laws of historical development were radically changed. For as soon as we begin at the beginning and explain the Bible, the same questions of interpretation which led to different theological schools, denominations, and creeds, will come up again, one by one, and produce the same divisions. History is no child's play, but a steadily-progressing development of God's own plan, and the great storehouse of wisdom and experience for all time to come.

3. An *eclectic* union, composed of fragments from all creeds.

This would be a syncretistic patchwork or mechanical compound of heterogeneous elements, and satisfy no party. A creed must be an organic growth, a living unit, the product of a certain inspiration.

4. A *conservative* union, which recognizes, from a truly broad and comprehensive evangelical catholic platform, all the creeds in their relative rights as far as they represent different aspects of divine truth, without attempting an amalgamation or organic union of denominations.

The Evangelical Alliance, formed in 1846, in the City of London, aims to promote and manifest Christian union, in close connection with religious freedom, by way of intercommunion of individual brethren from different Churches and creeds, without interfering with their confessional conscience, their denominational preference and loyalty. Its brief history has shown that a free union of individual Christians is possible and real, notwithstanding denominational distinctions; and its occasional manifestation in general conferences, such as have been held in London, Paris, Berlin, Geneva, Amsterdam, and New York, has proved a great blessing to all who took part in them. But the movement must go further. The personal union and harmony must gradually pervade the Churches, and lead to an official recognition and intercommunion, without obliterating their distinctive features, or diminishing their separate work. We must build from the bottom, but not stop until we reach the top. The Alliance, moreover, is confined in its operation to the limits of what is popularly called Evangelical Protestantism, and has not been able to attract the more churchly elements of Protestantism, much less has it gone beyond the limits of Protestantism, but has maintained so far a hostile attitude towards the Latin and Greek Churches. If there is to be "one flock and one shepherd," if all followers of Christ are to be "perfectly one" in Him, as He is one with the Father, we cannot give up the hope of an ultimate reconciliation of all the historical creeds of Christendom in a higher and universal harmony.

THE DOCTRINAL CONSENSUS ALREADY EXISTING.

We must recognize, first of all, an already existing and well-established historical basis of union among Christians. All true believers are one in Christ, their common Lord and Saviour, one in saving faith, one in love, one in hope, one in their spiritual life. This unity existed from the beginning in all ages, and is only marred and interrupted, but not destroyed, by ecclesiastical and sectarian divisions. The nearer we approach to Christ in prayer and devotion, the nearer we approach one another. The more Christ-like we become, the more we esteem and love the brethren. All Christians read the same Bible, drink from the same spiritual rock, can join in the same Psalms and the same *Te Deum* and *Gloria in excelsis*; Calvinists and Arminians forget their theological quarrels when they sing "Rock of Ages," of the Calvinist Toplady, and "Jesus, lover of my soul," of the Arminian Wesley. Moreover, there is not only a union of life and sentiment, but also a doctrinal union already at hand, which we must never lose out of sight.

1. In the first place we have, as already remarked, a common *œcumenical* basis in the *Apostles' Creed* and the *Nicene Creed*

(waiving the disputed *filioque*), which we hold and profess even with Greek and Roman Christians in distinction not only from all followers of false religions, but also from heretics and infidels. In our controversy with Rome, we should ever remember that we believe in the same Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the same Divine-human Christ, and all those fundamental facts of our salvation which are set forth so plainly and forcibly in the venerable creeds of the undivided Church, our common mother. It is of the utmost importance to emphasize this fact in opposition to the fearful power of infidelity which has of late grown up in all sections of nominal Christendom, and threatens to overthrow the very foundations of our holy Catholic faith.

It is true, as *Protestant* Christians, we can never cease to protest against the spiritual tyranny and the unscriptural and dangerous innovations and corruptions of Popery. Yet even in this righteous and necessary warfare we should always remember that there is a material distinction between Catholicism and Popery, as there was between the Old Testament religion and the Jewish hierarchy at the time of Christ, and that there is no Romish error without an underlying truth from which the error derives its vitality and force, and which must be truly appreciated, in order successfully to refute the error. The great fault of Romanism is not that it denies the Bible, but that, like Pharisaism of old, it obscures and weakens its force by the human traditions accumulated upon it.

2. In the next place there is an *evangelical* consensus in all the Protestant creeds. All believing Protestants profess, as we have seen, the same fundamental principles, the supremacy of the Bible, justification by faith, direct communion with Christ, the universal priesthood of believers, and other important doctrines, with a corresponding negation of errors which are inconsistent with it. This consensus can easily be ascertained by a comparison of the different Lutheran and Reformed confessions, which agree much more than they disagree.

It is very desirable that this evangelical consensus should be clearly and briefly formularized in a way that could be adopted by the Protestant Churches as a bond of union.

The Evangelical Alliance has made an attempt in its Nine Articles, without claiming for them any binding authority; for the Alliance is no Church and has no power of discipline. These Articles, adopted at the first meeting in 1846, have answered a good purpose as a temporary expedient, but they are a dry skeleton, without flesh and blood, too broad for some, too narrow for others, and lack the inspiration and spiritual unction of a genuine creed. We need a rich evangelical creed that may be confessed as an act of faith and worship, and answer the same

purpose for all Protestants as the Apostles' Creed does for all Christians.

SUGGESTIONS FOR PROMOTING A FREE UNION.

But what shall be done with the differences still remaining?

1. We must dismiss all idea of a perfect uniformity of belief. This, even if it were possible, would not be desirable. God's truth is infinite, and cannot be fully comprehended by any one Church or denomination, much less by an individual. God has constituted men's minds differently. No two are precisely alike. Every disciple reflects a peculiar lineament of the Great Master of all. Unity is not uniformity, but implies freedom and variety. It takes many sounds to produce a harmony, and many flowers of different shape, colour, and flavour to make a garden.

The New Testament itself exhibits the greatest variety in the unity of spirit. Every one of the four Gospels has a marked individuality in conception, plan, and style, and presents some peculiar aspects of the image of Christ. How different from Matthew, Mark, and Luke, is John who leaned on the Master's bosom; and yet his incarnate God is the same person with the Divine Man of the Synoptists. And if we examine the Epistles, we can clearly discern three distinct types of doctrine: the conservative Jewish Christian type of James and Peter, the progressive Gentile Christian type of Paul, and the higher union of the two in John. There is an apostle of hope, an apostle of faith, and an apostle of love. The harmony and the difference of the Old and New Testaments, the principle of authority and the principle of freedom, divine sovereignty and human responsibility, justification by grace and the necessity for personal holiness, are alike set forth in the apostolic writings, not as contradictory but as supplementary truths.

2. We must distinguish between truth and dogma. Truth is the divinely-revealed substance, dogma the human form and logical statement of it. Truth alone can save, not the dogma. Many may sincerely believe the truth as exhibited in the Word of God, and yet feel unable to accept as binding any dogmatic formula. Theoretical orthodoxy is not always connected with living piety. It may be dead and worthless before God. "The devils also believe, and tremble." To feel right and to act right is as important as to think right and to believe right.

3. Another important distinction must be made between religious and theological differences. Learned Christians of different denominations, or of the same denomination, may be at perfect harmony in their inward spiritual life, and yet they may widely dissent in their theology. Most of the differences of the orthodox creeds are not religious, but theological, and hence

secondary or non-fundamental. It was a serious mistake of an intensely theological age to introduce so much logical and metaphysical theology into the creeds, and thus to intensify and perpetuate controversy, bigotry, and hatred. A creed is not a system of scientific theology. Many of our Confessions of Faith would be far better for being shorter, simpler, and more popular. But changes in public documents, once accepted, are inexpedient, and lead to endless trouble and confusion, as the history of the *filioque*, and the altered Augsburg Confession, abundantly prove.

4. We must cultivate a truly evangelical catholic spirit, a spirit of Christian courtesy, liberality, and charity towards all, of whatever creed, who love our Lord and Saviour. We must subordinate denominationalism to catholicity, and catholicity to our common Christianity. We must be Christians, or followers of Christ, first and last, and followers of Luther, Calvin, Knox, Wesley, only so far as they themselves follow Christ. *Christianus mihi nomen, Lutheranus sive Reformatus mihi cognomen. Christianus sum, nihil Christiani a me alienum puto.* Let us remember that we are saved not by our human notions of divine truth, but by the divine truth itself—not by what separates us, but by what we hold in common, even Him who is above us all, and for us all, and in us all.

In the present divided state of the Church, we must needs belong to a particular denomination, and are bound to labour for it with honest loyalty, zeal, and energy. But our steady aim should be, through our denomination, to serve and promote the kingdom of Christ alone. While living in one story and in one apartment of the great temple of God, as we must do if we are to live in the temple at all, we may maintain the most friendly and fraternal relations to our neighbours who occupy different apartments, yet worship and glorify the same God and the same Saviour. It is wicked to hate and curse those whom God loves and blesses. We should rejoice in every victory won for Christ, in the erection of every new church or chapel, whatever name it may bear. If we love Christians of other creeds only as far as they agree with us, we do no more than the heathen do who love their own. We must love them also *because* of their peculiarities and differences, as far as these represent aspects of truth, and are prospered by God. Man admires and loves a woman for her *womanly* qualities, and woman admires and loves a man for his *manly* qualities. We must rise to a higher platform, from which we can recognize and bid God speed to every corps and division of the army of the great Captain of our salvation. Let our theology be as broad as God's truth and God's love, and as narrow as God's justice. Let us think more!


ourselves. Let humility and love be our cardinal virtues. Thus shall we prove true disciples of Him who died and rose for us all, and whose first and last command is to love God with all our heart, and our neighbour as ourselves.

Neither circumcision nor uncircumcision, neither Lutheranism nor Reform, neither Calvinism nor Arminianism, neither Episcopacy nor Presbytery, nor any other human distinction, availeth anything before God and at His judgment-seat, but a new creature in Christ Jesus. To Him we belong, in His name we are baptized, by His blood we are saved, Him alone let us love and serve as long as life lasts; and when we shall see Him as He is, not through a glass darkly, but face to face, in all His loveliness and majesty, we shall reach in Him the solution of all perplexing problems on earth, the divine harmony of all discordant human creeds.

5. Finally, let us never cease to pray for a Pentecostal outpouring of the Holy Ghost upon all the Churches which profess the holy name of Jesus. God's Spirit alone, who is the spirit of union and peace, can heal the divisions of Christendom, destroy the evil spirit of bigotry, hatred, and jealousy, fill us with divine love, and overrule all sectarian divisions for a deeper and fuller harmony.

God speed the blessed time when we shall no more see Peter and Paul and Apollos standing in the foreground, but "Jesus alone," and be in Him and He in us, even as He is in the Father and the Father in Him!

PHILIP SCHAFF.



WORKING MEN AND THE EASTERN QUESTION.

I.

I SHALL not claim any special understanding of this question for the working men of Great Britain. All I insist on is, that, as a class, they know as much of its merits as any other class of the community. In truth, taking all classes together, it may be said that of the whole range of subjects calling for the attention of our politicians, there is not one more dimly seen, or less understood on its real merits, than the question so fervently discussed just now and comprehended in the general term the "Eastern Question."

Before the recent lamentable outrages, nine out of every ten who now talk very earnestly on this Eastern Question, if asked what it meant, would have been puzzled to give an intelligible answer on any one of the many points that, taken all together, constitute this most puzzling political riddle; and now that the nation's attention is so strongly drawn in that direction, it is not the real Eastern Question as concerning Turkey and her provinces, Russia and her designs, that is seen, but a complication of horrors, of personal violence and wrong, that like a foul exhalation has arisen and spread itself over the whole matter; so altering its general appearance as to give it an aspect most fantastical and unreal. The political relation of Turkey to her provinces is not a new question, whilst the ordinary conduct of Turkish rulers to the inhabitants of these provinces has been a constant theme of discussion. Our writers and our speakers, when occasion presented itself, have never failed to blame the Turkish Government; but

our people have never troubled their heads much about the matter. And indeed, if they had they would have found themselves, as a rule, in the wrong, as those who undertook to instruct them were themselves profoundly ignorant of the exact condition of things in the Turkish provinces. The man whose bent was strongly religious had much to say about the unity of the Christian provinces, with the view of excluding Moslem rule, and constituting a kingdom on the borders of Turkey that might be a barrier against evil or wrong of any kind meditated by the Turks against the Christians. Whilst the political philosopher, with an anthropological turn of mind, dilated on the necessity of gathering together and uniting into a solid autonomy the populations of all these Turkish provinces, as a strong Slavonic state, which, with a distinct race, possessing similar ideas, and one in faith, would be important in the future for the safety of Western Europe.

But Governments cannot be expected to carry out the dreams and desires of men troubled with religious or philosophic fervours, and even should British statesmen in power desire to commit the nation to any particular enterprise of this kind, they are bound first to take note of the obstacles in the way, and the cost of removing them so as to secure success; and even supposing the practicability of any scheme they may undertake, it is their duty to forecast the advantage likely to be derived from it, and measure this with the cost of the undertaking. It is a fair presumption that the succession of statesmen we have had since Servia was severed, or partly severed, from Turkey by the revolt of 1804, under Kara George, have had this matter of the Turkish provinces many times under consideration. But as a practical fact these provinces remain still subject to Turkey. We have had in England a succession of ministers of the Crown, varying in wisdom and courage, and representing every political shade of thought, from extreme conservatism to a shadowy and uncertain radicalism; and I do not think that any one of them ever contemplated a war with the view of setting up a Slavonic nation as a barrier against the Turk in Europe, or with the view of obtaining a larger measure of justice or liberty for the inhabitants of these Turkish provinces. Would it not, I ask, be worth while to inquire why this has not been attempted? If it is a right thing to do now, it would have been a right thing any day during the last seventy years. There are, it is true, moments of supreme passion when nations, roused by some unbearable wrong, sweep away the barriers of law and custom, and assert some new principle in government at any risk of life or any cost in money. These revolutions peoples and nations make sometimes for themselves; but they never ought to be attempted by one nation or people on behalf of another. It is only the extremity of the suffering that justifies the act, and

this being the case, though outsiders may sympathize and help those who are struggling against oppression, they have no right of initiation, nor is it for them to lead such struggles one step beyond or beside where the principal authors and actors mean them to terminate.

In this Servian case what we should have to discover before we attempted to act, is what Serbia really desires, and how far the other provinces are prepared to act with her in resistance to Turkish rule, or in the creation of a political autonomy that would render the new power self-sustaining, and sufficiently agreed in policy to act effectively against the common enemy. It may be very true, as Mr. Gladstone says, on page 10 of his pamphlet, that the "Turk represented force as opposed to the law, yet not even a government of force can be maintained without the aid of an intellectual element, such as he did not possess." I admit this, and I imagine there is not a thoughtful Englishman living who possesses even the slightest knowledge of history, but will admit that there must be an intellectual element in physical force; or government, which means a general adaptation of moral forces for the production of particular ends, could not be carried on. But when Governments are established, and have been working through centuries with certain understood and acknowledged agencies, however limited or however distributed the intellectual element, they cannot be ordered out of existence at a moment's notice. It is very well to say, as Mr. Gladstone does on page 31 of his pamphlet—

"I entreat my countrymen, upon whom far more than perhaps any other people of Europe it depends, to require, and to insist, that our Government, which has been working in one direction, shall work in the other, and shall apply all its vigour to *concur with the other States of Europe in obtaining the extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria*. Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely by carrying off themselves. Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbachis, their Kaimakams and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned. This thorough riddance, this most blessed deliverance, is the only reparation we can make to the memory of those heaps on heaps of dead; to the violated purity alike of matron, of maiden, and of child; to the civilization which has been affronted and shamed; to the laws of God or, if you like, of Allah; to the moral sense of mankind at large."

I ask unreservedly whether there is any man in his sober senses who believes that a Government can be ordered out of its possessions in this fashion. A revolution could do this; a general rising amongst the Slav populations might effect it; but England could not do it. It is all very well to tell the Sultan, his muftis, viziers, and pashas, to pack up their traps and be off out of Europe as an abomination and defilement unbearable any longer

by civilized men; but would the Turk pack up and go? Looking at the language used by Lord Derby when addressing the working men's deputation, I ask, would it be safe to issue such an order, and proceed to enforce it were it not immediately complied with?

Regarding the matter from even a philanthropic point of view, should we not gravely compromise the Christian population in Asiatic Turkey if we gave such an order? Lord Derby said very truly—and it cannot be believed but that the most earnest amongst those who are crying out most loudly for extreme measures against Turkey will acknowledge this when they think the matter seriously over—

“If they” (the Turks), said his Lordship, “believed all Europe would be in league against them, if they believed there was to be a combination of all Christian provinces to drive them back to Asia, that would be exactly the circumstance that would lead them to break out into excesses prompted by revenge and despair—outbreaks such as are abstained from even by savage races so long as they have anything to lose, but which they indulge in freely when they know their cause is hopeless, that everything is lost, and that they have nothing more to look to except the gratification of revenge.”

The crisis is grave and complicated; our indignation is natural, and cannot be considered as beyond what such abominable crimes call for. Englishmen of every class cannot but feel that the commission of such crimes, under any kind of provocation, is an unpardonable offence, to be stamped for ever with the severest reprobation. But when action for the punishment of such a crime is asked for by such deliberate measures as it would be necessary for a Government to adopt, then circumspection and thoughtfulness are necessary, lest a weak Government, anxious to satisfy the rash demands of an excited public, should enter on a policy that might unsettle order and destroy peace throughout Europe.

And after all in the strong demand of Mr. Gladstone there is the sentence I have marked by italics. It will be seen that, even in this most passionate part of his appeal, he only demands that our Government shall act with the concurrence of “the other States of Europe in obtaining the extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria:” a saving clause which throws the whole question for settlement into the hands of our European diplomats; and we all know that when these gentlemen have it fairly at their mercy, any passion, extravagance, or extremeness we may now give utterance to, will be covered over, lost sight of, and forgotten under heaps of diplomatic jargon such as may be found in any Blue Book containing the correspondence of those who habitually deal with great questions of international importance. I believe the present popular pressure is nevertheless good, not for the purpose of procuring absolutely the severance of her European

provinces from Turkey, as that would render necessary the settlement of questions many of which it would be most difficult to settle just now. But there is a chance of doing practical good to the Servians, Bulgarians, and, it may be, to the people of the other provinces, which ought not to be lost sight of in aiming at objects utterly unattainable except at the risk of a great European war. It clearly cannot be speedily decided what shall be done with the Turkish provinces if separated from that country. But if England in concert with the other European powers interfere, not to readjust an empire, but to secure partly-subject populations from inhuman outrage, there is much that may be done to check the conduct of unscrupulous agents acting for the Turkish Government in its European provinces. Turkey is financially weak at the present moment—in truth she is weak in many ways. Promises of amendment could no doubt be easily obtained from her; but in these it would be very difficult to obtain belief. This sort of thing has been tried over and over again, and almost absolute unbelief in any reforms the Turkish Government may promise is the result. This, however, is not fairly chargeable against the Turkish Government so much as a want of power on its part to control the action of its subordinates entrusted with the government of the separate districts into which the empire is divided. The reforms needed are not altogether reforms to be made at the centre. A wise and pure administration of affairs at Constantinople would be a most desirable thing, but even this would not secure the people of the European provinces from the wrong-doing of local Turkish officials, or the unrestrained ferocity of Turkish troops. The true reform would be, whilst acknowledging the suzerainty of the Porte, and arranging clearly for the due fulfilment of all duties the relationship belonging to it imposed on the provinces, to insist on the simplifying of civil government, and the withdrawal of troops wherever their presence was a menace, or wherever it created a risk to the public peace or to the safety of the people. We think we may venture to say that something of this kind may be practicable, and that the late outrages justify such a demand; and whether it was urged by the British Government alone or in concert with the Governments of the other European nations, it could not be regarded as an intrigue for the purpose of aggrandising any one power to the exclusion of the others.

Beyond this, it is difficult to see what the British Government can do. The talk of an autonomy in regard to these Turkish provinces is simply waste of time, inasmuch as it has no relation to facts. The people themselves are not of one blood, do not speak one tongue, and are in no way strongly united by common thoughts or sympathies. We have been for many years trying to persuade ourselves that this was the case; but the more

the matter has been examined into by intelligent inquirers, the more clearly it comes out that the several European provinces of Turkey have no common agreement amongst themselves, have never been able to act cordially together, and if put together now would, in spite of any outside influence, fall off from each other in a very short time. If any common feeling existed, any common sympathy with each other, any common hatred of the Sultan and his Government, there ought by this time to have been some evidence of it. Instead of this we read, not only of indifference, but of action calculated to weaken Serbia, and throw her in helplessness at the foot of her Moslem master. We believe this to be the state of the case so far as the provinces themselves are concerned, and therefore we are convinced that the best policy to pursue, not only in the interest of the Servians, but in the interest of the Christians generally throughout the Turkish Empire, would be to insist upon a diminution of the danger that seems to be chronic when the Turks and their Christian subjects in these provinces are face to face, by the withdrawal of troops where their presence was not actually necessary, and the reform of the civil administration wherever the existing condition of things called for it; and beyond this, to insist on the punishment of the parties most seriously implicated in the recent atrocities, as well as upon compensation for those who have suffered seriously by outrage or spoliation. This may be done, though the creation of a Slav nation may be impossible. Offenders may be punished, and sufferers may be compensated; but a national autonomy cannot be made as a shoe is made, by hammering, stitching, and nailing its various parts together. There is no doubt that when the present excitement has subsided, a sober and rational feeling will prevail amongst the masses of the English people. They will not hate less the dreadful crimes that have been committed, nor cease to regard with horror the perpetrators of these crimes; but they will see that every evil has its appropriate remedy, but that it would be no safe remedy to seek to turn a number of separate provinces into an united nationality, lacking almost every one of those elements by which nations attain to individuality of existence, by bonds of blood, thought, sympathy, common interests, and all else that constitutes the basis, the binding power, and the nutriment of national life.

In this agitation so far, however strongly some persons may have talked, nobody has gone so far as to ask for war; though if sufficient cause existed the English people would not hesitate. Mr. Bright, on being appealed to relative to these Turkish atrocities, took occasion to remind the public of the mistake committed when England last went to war with Russia. We are not aware that Mr. Bright, under any set of circumstances, however

much the provocation, however imminent the danger, would or could consider that war against any nation at any time was justifiable. John Bright is an honest and consistent man, and from infancy to manhood he was taught to believe all war wrong. This, however, rightly or wrongly, is not the conviction of Englishmen generally, and this Eastern Question is one of the questions on which war, if necessary, has always been considered justifiable. Our statesmen consider the safety of Turkey in her present position a matter of the gravest importance; and if our commerce is to be cared for, as well as our relationship to India, it cannot but be admitted that possession of Constantinople has a meaning that must not be misunderstood by British statesmen, if England is to continue as a powerful and prosperous nation in the future.

That the Crimean war was wasteful, costly, and barren of great results, does not prove that it was unnecessary or unjustifiable. At its opening, liberal men possessed pretty generally the conviction that it would lead to the reconstitution of Poland as a nation, as a strong barrier to Russian aggression, and one of the most effectual checks to Russian designs against the peace of Europe. This, however, would have favoured too directly those democratic ideas begotten in the Polish mind by imperial oppressions, as well as by the exile in which the best and bravest of her sons had passed so large a portion of their lives. A Polish revolution would have taken Galicia from Austria, and we were then very anxious to be in the strictest alliance with that country; and hence we avoided one of the plainest duties a nation ever had set before it, and went away into a corner with our ally to fight Russia, where, after much trouble, bloodshed, loss of life by disease, and general mismanagement, we beat her, and made her acknowledge she was beaten. As for the rest, it may be said to be not worth talking about. We scored up, as a matter of course, several millions of debt; but we left no permanent mark of our triumph—little, if anything, beyond a parchment treaty written in ink that time has made invisible.

The Eastern Question was not settled by that war, nay, it was scarcely altered in any of its principal features; and, if we ask ourselves at this moment what the Eastern Question is, we shall find it difficult to furnish an answer, and no answer that can be returned will justify the belief that the massacres in Bulgaria or the general character of the Turkish Government towards its Christian subjects in these European provinces form any important part of it. The Eastern Question is not an Eastern question at all. It is not made by Easterns, it is not discussed or understood by them: they do little one way or another, consciously, to give it a meaning; and therefore, whatever it may be at any moment, those who

move in it and influence its aspect, those whose interests are so involved in it as to give it at any moment definite meaning, are European Governments and European peoples. In this way it is a large question, and it is especially important to England and Russia. It is said that England in regard to this Eastern Question is foolishly troubled with what is called a Russophobia. It is as unwise as it is unpatriotic to utter such statements. On this Eastern Question the exercise of every sound quality of statesmanship is requisite; a constant watchfulness, a ready promptitude, and a courage capable of instantaneous acceptance of the gravest responsibilities. We do wrong if we try in any way to add anxiety to the thoughts of a minister charged with the care of our interests at a point where a single false step might seriously and permanently compromise the nation's best interests.

It is not for civilians to discuss military matters, but we presume sound military opinion may be brought in to support the views of a civilian on a matter beyond his proper field of action. Nobody can doubt that Russia is greatly interested in Turkish affairs, as a mere glance at the map will show what a magnificent addition Constantinople, the Bosphorus, and certain adjoining portions of Turkish territory, would be to a nation like Russia, seeking to find her way out into the world. The Baltic and Black Seas united cannot give Russia the kind of fleet she wants, but the waters and the shores at present in possession of the Turk would help greatly in this way; and when the temptation is considered, the wonder is that Russia has not done more to secure such important additions to her territory.

Referring to Marshal Marmont's work on the Turkish Empire, we shall have no difficulty in seeing how much within the grasp of Russia Constantinople lies, and how easily, by a surprise, she might put her hand on that city; and, once in possession, we are assured that England, France, and Austria united could not dispossess her. Marshal Marmont shows how possession might be taken, the number of troops necessary, and the mode of their disposition. The danger, he insists, however, is in *first possession*: failing this, the Russian advantages would disappear, and a fleet and army, belonging to an alliance of Great Britain, France, and Austria, could easily, by judicious action, foil Russia in any attempt to seize Constantinople and its adjuncts.

What effect any advantage on the part of Russia might have on the position of England as a great European power may be judged of by those who have given thought and study to this Eastern Question. That it would be most damaging must be plain to the most careless. How it would affect us commercially cannot easily be misapprehended by thoughtful men who have noted the various channels through which our mighty trade finds its way to the

most remote corners of the earth, and those who look into history may discover the many expedients a jealous rival nation may resort to for purposes of obstruction. In fact, the rival interests of the various European nations which have made this Eastern Question a standing difficulty for many years are still unreconciled; and I hold that it would be a grave mistake on the part of the British people if they made the Bulgarian outrages—which, horrible as they are, are but accidents in the case—lead to any action in regard to our foreign policy that might compromise us seriously on a question every point in which at the present moment is the outcome of years of careful and, on the whole, I think it may be said, wise handling. It ought to be said to the English people generally that our foreign policy is that part of the business of the State that is least affected by party predominance. However much a Whig and a Tory may differ on measures of domestic policy, an English statesman, when he comes to deal with the interests of his country in connection with those of foreign states, ceases to be Whig or Tory, and becomes an Englishman every inch, sacrificing, except by his stupidity, nothing his country is entitled to, and insisting on whatever may add to its honour, its power, or its welfare. In regard to questions of foreign policy we should insist that they are only touched by wise hands, by men of vigour and decision, with unquestioned clearness of vision; and having secured such men, the game should be left in their hands, seeing that as a rule the diplomatists they have to deal with rank amongst the ablest and, it may also be said, frequently the most unscrupulous men in the world. It is true that the extremest watchfulness is a duty on the part of the British people, and where any great moral question is involved, even though it might slightly embarrass the political situation, it is their duty to speak out boldly and frankly, as they have done in the present case. They should leave no mistake in the mind of any Foreign Minister, or any minister whatever, that there are things they cannot sanction, acts they must in the strongest way condemn; but in the nice playing of a difficult diplomatic game it is the rashness of folly to interfere, under whatever excitement, to influence a result that may, if not carefully arrived at, be permanently injurious.

But the nation is bound, as a solemn duty, to listen to Mr. Gladstone on this question; and if his words are capable of proof, Parliamentary action ought to be taken as soon as possible. He says on pages 11 and 12 of his pamphlet—

“In the discussion of this great and sad subject, the attitude and the proceedings of the British Government cannot possibly be left out of view. Indeed, the topic is from the nature of the case so prominent, and from the acts done so peculiar, that I could hardly be excused from stating in

express and decided terms what appear to me its grave errors; were it only that I may not seem, by an apparent reserve, also to insinuate against them a purposed complicity in crime, which it would be not only rash, but even wicked, to impute. The consequences of their acts have been, in my view, deplorable. But as respects the acts themselves, and the motives they appear to indicate, the faults I find are these. They have not understood the rights and duties, in regard to the subjects, and particularly the Christian subjects, of Turkey, which inseparably attach to this country in consequence of the Crimean War, and of the Treaty of Paris in 1856. They have been remiss when they ought to have been active; namely, in efforts to compose the Eastern revolts, by making provision against the terrible misgovernment which provoked them. They have been active, where they ought to have been circumspect and guarded. It is a grave charge, which cannot be withheld, that they have given to a maritime measure of humane precaution the character of a military demonstration in support of the Turkish Government. They have seemed to be moved too little by an intelligent appreciation of prior obligations, and of the broad and deep interests of humanity, and too much by a disposition to keep out of sight what was disagreeable and might be inconvenient, and to consult and flatter the public opinion of the day in its ordinary, that is to say, to narrow, selfish, epicurean humour. I admit that, until a recent date, an opinion widely prevailed, and perhaps was not confined to any particular party, that this game had been played with success and even brilliancy, and that, amidst whatever mishaps and miscarriages elsewhere, the Government stood high upon its foreign, that is, its Eastern policy, in the approval of the country."

If this be the case, the sooner it is brought home to the mind of the nation the better. If there be anything more in this than ordinary party indictments contain—and it is not unfair to assume there is, considering its source—the country is bound to institute such an inquiry as may settle for ever how far the acts of the Government have given encouragement or sanction, either by unintentional blunder or evil design, to the foul atrocities English men and women of every class and condition have, to their honour, so indignantly protested against. Mr. Gladstone's statement has a serious meaning, but when it is read side by side with the following explanation, its meaning is not quite so grave. Lord Derby's words when addressing the working men's deputation, as reported in the *Times*, are as follows:—

"Now, if the people who argue in that way will only take the trouble—and it is not much to ask—to look into the narrative of what actually happened, they will see that that theory is rendered untenable by the simple fact of the dates of the various events occurring. We had, in the winter, so far from supporting Turkey, agreed in the Austrian proposition, which was naturally very unpopular with the Porte. Our refusal to join in the Berlin Memorandum, which arose from something I will refer to presently, was not announced until the 16th of May, and it was not reported by Sir Henry Elliot until the date of the 19th of that month. The fleet, which was sent for by Sir Henry Elliot—sent for, I need scarcely remind you, with the concurrence of all the other ambassadors, who also telegraphed for their fleets to come also, and sent for the express purpose of protecting the unarmed population against the outbreaks possible at that moment—did not begin to arrive until the 26th of May; to the best of

my recollection only two or three ships had arrived by that date, and the rest of the squadron came afterwards. Now, the great bulk of these wretched excesses occurred in the early part and in the middle of the month of May, according to the statements before us—that is, some days before the British fleet had been sent for, or before anybody could possibly have known that it had been sent for, and before our refusal to assent to the Berlin Memorandum could possibly have been known.”

Were it only for the satisfaction of history, it ought to be sifted out where the truth lies. Clearly if the Government in its acts has not blundered, there has been some wild talk on the part of the person who stands at its head. And, taken altogether, it appears impossible to acquit Lord Beaconsfield of having treated the subject, when brought under the notice of the House of Commons, with an inexactness and a flippancy for which it would be impossible to find a reasonable excuse. “There is no doubt,” said Mr. Disraeli, as reported in the *Times* of July 16th, and as reproduced by Mr. Gladstone on page 15 of his pamphlet, “that the acts on *both sides*, as necessarily would be the case under such circumstances, were *equally* terrible and atrocious.” There is here ignorance or, what is worse, carelessness as to facts; and it may be added, that so far as any utterance of Lord Derby gave countenance, or was even in the slightest way in agreement with the language of his chief, such utterance ought to have weight against him in the judgment of the public.

At any rate there is much that needs clearing up in the recent conduct of the Turkish Government; and the British public ought to know distinctly how far the British Government is responsible for any act in connection with the present war, or any attitude the Government of Turkey may have assumed towards the people of Bulgaria or Servia. Perhaps on the whole the best thing to urge at such public meetings as may yet be held is a winter session. When the time for prorogation came last month, the members of the House, Liberals and Conservatives, were glad to get away. Much time had been wasted, much confusion of mind had been created, by discussions of no practical value; and when this Eastern Question came on, the Prime Minister, no doubt, thought it would settle itself, and as his forte lies in neat wordy criticism—in well-trimmed sententious commonplaces, mixed with a dash of haphazard assertion—he thought very likely that he had staved off troublesome discussion when he declared that the acts on *both sides*, as “necessarily would be the case under such circumstances,” were *equally* terrible and atrocious. “Necessarily” such actions in the extremeness of their atrocity were not naturally to be looked for from either side; and as they belong specially—I need not say exclusively—to one side, and as the conduct of our Government is suspected of having in some way supported that side, I say again no time should be lost in sifting the matter carefully to the bottom,

and finding out exactly how our Government stands in relation to the whole thing. It may be added that it is of equal importance that the nation should speak by its representatives in regard to the settlement of matters between the Turkish Government and its insurgent subjects. All that can be said by public meetings has been said. The platform has its uses, but it cannot supersede legitimate Parliamentary action, and in this case a clearer knowledge of facts is needed by the public; and the Ministry itself, however strong its case, would be nothing the worse of Parliamentary sanction, and, so far as such a thing is admissible, Parliamentary direction, in regard to its future policy.

One duty we think is plain on the part of the British public, and that is to distinguish very clearly between the present war in Servia, and the bloodshed and other incidents belonging to it, and that more permanent and important question—so far as Great Britain is concerned—called the “Eastern Question.” These should be as widely separated as possible. What the present administration may have done in reference to the present war in Servia should be freely canvassed, and, if calling for censure, loudly and vigorously censured. If one life has been lost, or the honour of one woman stained, through any blunder or negligence of the Cabinet, the men of England should hold the ministers of the Crown responsible, and make them feel that severe reprobation is due for any act that may have in any way led to barbarities so revolting to the consciences and hearts of men.

But outside and beyond this, in anything the Foreign Minister may have done in regard to what may be considered the “Eastern Question” proper, it would be impolitic, nay, most unwise, to hamper the action of the administration in any way assignable to party motives or interests. The working men of England are beyond all rational question thoroughly Liberal. They know well that what is called the Conservative working man, though not absolutely non-existent, is certainly an unimportant force, standing by himself, in influencing the political thought and action of the country. The men amongst the working classes who act with power are Liberal, and their power lies in the reality of their convictions. Whatever may be said of them, they are not heedless and headlong, nor by any means given to the dangerous exercise of taking leaps “in the dark.” They have come to understand that on the Continent of Europe our Government is not likely to embroil us in huge and expensive wars in the interest of aristocratic institutions. Our governors have sense enough now, after a long, an expensive, and a painful schooling, to allow people on the Continent and elsewhere to settle for themselves whether they will retain their kings, or send them on their travels in the infinite future in the direction of nowhere. Under such circum-

stances our working men, not without watchfulness, may trust an English ministry, of whatever complexion, with the management of the foreign affairs of the country; and whilst doing so, they should refrain from meddling at moments of emergency in matters with the details of which they are not fully acquainted, and where harm and not good would be almost a certain result. So far as they fight the battles of party they will, we think, direct their attention to questions they are much better acquainted with, and where blunders on their own part, or on the part of the Government, may be repaired. They will readily admit, as they did in their address to Lord Derby, that the responsible ministers of the Crown must be better acquainted with the particulars of such questions as the Eastern Question than they are. But on home questions, in all of which they are more or less directly concerned, they will have the manliness to think and act for themselves. When in past years they asked to be admitted within the pale of the constitution as free citizens, and were told by certain members of Parliament and others that they were not to be trusted with political power because of their ignorance and their disposition to use such power if they possessed it for the purpose of despoiling their more fortunate fellow-citizens, they knew themselves and their intentions too well to hesitate in face of such an imaginary danger. In all their political conduct they have disappointed those half-witted Cassandraes who dreaded the working people simply because they themselves were ignorant of everything as thought or habit of thought in the mental constitution of working men. And I think I may say here with confidence that I am speaking the truth when I assert that the working men—even the most liberal amongst them—will refuse to make these Bulgarian atrocities a question between the Ministerial *ins* and the Opposition *outs*. If the liberal party is to be reconstituted and brought into effective discipline, other and very different questions will have to be chosen as a programme for a Liberal party. And the leaders of that party, as well as large numbers of their following, will have to stand before the country for the purpose of carrying questions which the working men thoroughly understand, and which have a direct bearing on their lives and the interests of their lives.

The speech of Lord Beaconsfield at Aylesbury has added to the excitement of the public mind. It cannot in any way tend to clear up the difficulties by which the questions in dispute are surrounded; whilst it will beyond all doubt increase what there is of party anger mixed up in the discussion. The “serene atmosphere” into which he has been transferred has not as yet had time to operate. His Aylesbury utterances were not serene in temper or dignified in tone, whilst in some respects they

may be said to be scarcely decent, when it is considered against whom some of his strongest sentences were directed.

When the following sentence was uttered there is only one man in Great Britain Lord Beaconsfield could have in his mind:—

“The danger at such a moment is, that designing politicians may take advantage of such sublime sentiments [the protests of the British people against the Bulgarian atrocities] and may apply them for the furtherance of their sinister ends. He who at such a moment would avail himself of such a commanding sentiment in order to obtain his own individual ends, suggesting a course which he may know to be injurious to the interests of the country and not favourable to the welfare of mankind, is a man whose conduct no language too strongly can condemn. He outrages the principle of patriotism, which is the soul of free communities. He does more—he influences in the most injurious manner the common welfare of humanity. Such conduct, if it be pursued by any man at this moment, ought to be indignantly reprobated by the people of England; for, in the general favor and ruin which it may bring about, it may, I think, be fairly described as worse than any of those Bulgarian atrocities that now occupy attention.”

The application of language like this by the person who at present holds the office of First Minister of the Crown, to his predecessor in office, cannot admit of justification; and though extreme partisans may try to find some excuse for it, I am disposed to think that Lord Beaconsfield's best friends will regret most that he so far forgot himself as to use it towards a political rival whose motives, with the vast majority of his countrymen, are above question or suspicion. As a politician, even Liberals differ from Mr. Gladstone; but as a man aiming in a patriotic spirit to promote the welfare of the country we should say that even the extremest Tory—presuming ordinary intelligence—would hold him free from the entertainment of any but the highest and most honourable motives.

It is very much to be regretted that Lord Beaconsfield should have allowed personal feeling to carry him so far astray in regard to the man whom he regards, and whom the public regard, as his personal rival. But Lord Beaconsfield's extravagance on this point is not so much to be regretted as the utter—I might say ridiculous—wildness of assertion he indulged in when he spoke of the secret societies of Europe. Disparaging remarks made in regard to Mr. Gladstone are rendered inoperative for mischief by the knowledge the public possess of him as a private gentleman and an illustrious statesman; but we have no means of checking or valuing the statements of Lord Beaconsfield in regard to secret societies. His words are worth noting:—

“Serbia declared war upon Turkey: that is to say, the secret societies of Europe declared war upon Turkey. I can assure you, gentlemen, that in the attempt to conduct the government of this world there are new elements to be considered which our predecessors had not to deal with. We have now to deal not merely with emperors, with princes, and with

ministers. There are the secret societies—an element which we must take into account, and which at the last moment may baffle all our arrangements—societies which have regular agents everywhere, which countenance assassination, and which, if necessary, could produce a massacre.”

Coming from the lips of the Prime Minister of England, this statement is startling ; but surely there cannot be a man in the empire—who is not a farmer in Buckinghamshire—that can believe it. Lord Beaconsfield cannot have invented it, but no madness of Lord George Gordon or Mr. Whalley ever went beyond this. These secret societies answered as causes of alarm whilst Joseph Mazzini was alive ; but to revive them now, with the dreadful adjuncts of assassination and massacre, ought to be too much for even the Buckinghamshire farmers. They are active in Servia, according to Lord Beaconsfield ; but it is unfortunate for him that the assassinations and massacres and the other fiends’ delights we have read of have been suffered by the Christian inhabitants of the Turkish provinces, not inflicted by them.

Lord Beaconsfield’s denunciation of Servia was vigorously delivered, and the statement of his opinion that every principle of international law, every principle of public morality, every principle of honour, was outraged by Servia in going to war with Turkey, without any accompanying statement as to the atrocities practised by the Turks in carrying on the war, justifies more than anything else the charges made against our Government. The language of Lord Beaconsfield indicates more than a physical break-down, and it more than justifies all that has been said against the Government in regard to these Bulgarian atrocities. Before this speech was delivered, serious blundering on the part of Her Majesty’s Government was suspected ; now, an animus has become evident, calculated to deepen every suspicion, as well as to almost justify every charge of complicity and encouragement on the part of the English Government towards that of Turkey in the prosecution of the present war.

GEORGE POTTER.

II.

MR. GLADSTONE, in his noble and eloquent address on Blackheath, said—

“The working men first raised that flag under which we are now marching. I rejoice that they did it. They have acted in the right spirit, and have struck the right chord, though they are not artful and astute politicians. They are as much attached to British interests as anybody, but their practice is to look at the promotion of British interests on the noble rule of doing that which is just and right.”

When I heard those words uttered, I knew full well that he would be roundly abused by a portion of the Press, because he took moral ground, or, as they would say, sentimental ground, instead of looking at the question from the more official point of view surrounded by the red-tape-ism of the Foreign Office.

This is not the first time that Mr. Gladstone has raised a howling storm of denunciation and abuse for having made use of words which appeal to men's moral sense of right and wrong, as contradistinguished to the purely diplomatic phrases of artful and astute politicians. It will be remembered that he once dared to use the expression “our own flesh and blood” when speaking of the franchise as a right which ought to be extended to the masses of his fellow-countrymen; and it cannot be forgotten that these words formed the subject for jokes in the humorous publications of the day, and of sneers on the platform, in Parliament, and in the Press.

When Mr. Gladstone said that “working men were not artful and astute politicians,” I never understood him to mean that there were not among them capable and shrewd politicians—men competent to look at, and of dealing with, great questions from a national and even international standpoint—of taking the highest and broadest view from the vantage-ground of the statesman; but rather that as a rule the great mass of the people look at these questions direct and straight from the moral point of view, or, as some will persist in calling it, a sentimental standpoint, rather than judge of the case by mere precedent, or from the officialism of diplomacy.

In attempting to solve what is called the
may differ as to the precise means, or a
settlement; and, whenever the Govern

Question

policy which the nation think adequate, they will receive the best support of the masses of the people ; but these will judge of its adequacy by its justice, so far as it is possible to act upon it in its highest sense. Prudence, expediency, and diplomacy may have other methods to propose, but the people will judge of them by their sense of justice.

We sometimes hear from the lips of working-class politicians the bald expression that " Turkey shall be blotted out of Europe ;" but this must be interpreted to mean that she ought to be blotted out of Europe as a just punishment for her diabolical outrages. It is the indignant sentence of outraged humanity against the perpetrators of those horrible crimes committed in Bulgaria and Servia, crimes which disgrace even the usages of war, cruel as these frequently are. The great mass of the people are impatient of the equivocations and delays of mere officialism, and if they attempt to cut the Gordian knot by demanding that the Turks shall be expelled from Europe, it is but the just resentment of an indignant people against their horrible cruelties and despotic rule. And who disputes the justice of this condemnation ?

We have said that working men look at this question first and foremost from a moral standpoint, and they can see only justice in this demand. Of course there may be a thousand reasons good, bad, and indifferent why such a policy could not be carried out, but if it could, who would deny its justice ? Working men are well acquainted with the principles of association and discipline ; they are used to both, and they are as well qualified to look at all great questions from the practical point of view as other classes ; but the principle of abstract right and justice is at all times a prominent feature in all their deliberations, because they judge closely and by the simple rules of right and wrong.

This sentiment pervaded the entire address which was presented to Lord Derby by the working-class leaders on September 11th, and was so well expressed that we give two or three sentences. It should, perhaps, be stated that the address was prepared and finally agreed to before Mr. Gladstone had spoken on Blackheath, and it will be seen how admirably he understood and expressed the feelings and impulses of the people. The address said—

" We believe, too, that you desire strongly to maintain the nation's honour, to promote her interests, and to make her power legitimately felt in promoting the progress and general welfare of other nations and peoples."

" ~~It~~ it is to be the duty of our Government to leave nothing necessary to prove to the Government and people of this instinct, every determination of Englishmen's hearts, prompt them to cry out indignity ; and that should such actions be insist on their Government taking such

action, in concert with other civilized Governments in Europe, as may be required to control a power chiefly felt by its abuse, to restrain a Government which seems to be degenerating into an organization of imbecility and crime."

"We feel that the British nation is degraded and compromised by even the slightest apparent toleration of a Government capable of permitting without reprobation and punishment such crimes as have been perpetrated by the Turks in the villages of Bulgaria and Servia."

"We wish it to be understood at the same time that no consideration of policy or of class interest can ever obtain from us sanction or approval, or anything but the most determined opposition, to any Government or policy that equivocates with such awful wickedness as the Turks have enacted in Bulgaria and Servia. Whatever else Turkey may be, she is not strong as a nation deprived of the countenance and support of England; and whatever these may be worth, so far as we can prevent it, we are determined they never shall be used in support of evil-doing, whoever the actor or actors."

"Our final word is—No complicity with crime, no official inaction, when outrages against liberty or humanity call for suppression."

These are not the wild phrases of harum-scarum politicians, but the well-expressed determination of British workmen. To deride this popular enthusiasm shows but a shallow mind, and renders the man who does so unfit to hold a high position as an English statesman. Humanity is above policy, and a wise statesman will shape his course accordingly; for the popular impulse of to-day will be the thought of the statesmen of to-morrow. Mr. Disraeli cannot understand this: that is the reason why he has never evoked enthusiasm. Mr. Gladstone always does, when his great heart leaps to its noblest thought, and thus he is often more popular when out of office than he is when trammelled by official *régime*.

Our great national poet has said, "The evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft interred with their bones." In the case of Mr. Gladstone this will be reversed, for, as he passes away from the stormy arena of party politics, his errors will be forgiven and forgotten, and he will resume his place in the minds of men as a popular idol. In the case of another living statesman, his rival, we venture to predict that the words of Antony will still hold good. Why is this? Because Mr. Gladstone understands the popular impulse; he is warmed by it; he grasps the situation and makes it his own; he rides aloft on the wave, calm and serene, but withal its master, and with an indomitable courage and will he bends his energies to control the surging torrent and direct its course, so that the nation's barque shall be anchored in a safe and well-protected bay.

It is no wonder that he, of all living statesmen, should be the champion of the nation's impulse at this time. The horrible cruelties of the Turks have "touched" the fibre which has vibrated throughout Europe in every people's heart, whatever their peculiar creed, wherever there is freedom to show

When a national sentiment is thus formed, statesmen will do well to understand it, to look at it not as a mere sentiment to be despised and contemned, but as the expression of a nation's highest thought, intensified by outraged feelings caused by the horrible details of atrocities that cannot find adequate expression; it is the thought of men acting from impulse and instinct, but whose impulse is generally right and whose conclusions are generally sound.

If a statesman will look at this aright he will see that the nearer he comes to this point in his mode of settlement, the sounder and more permanent will that settlement prove to be. It is his duty to find the means: these will have to be modified by many considerations and circumstances which are unknown to the great mass of the people; but in all such cases he must remember that he will be successful in proportion as he approaches the abstract justice of each particular case.

It will surprise many persons to hear that in those great associations of workmen called trade unions, the simple principles of justice and right are those which underlie and form the basis of all those great organizations, and that all questions are tested by these general principles. They are oftentimes called selfish, and some portions of their policy appear to have self-interest as their only guiding principle, when tested by public writers who only see in them a kind of passionate antagonism to employers of labour. But after all this comes from the doctrines taught by capitalists of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest market, and of unlimited competition, principles not often discussed in these unions, and very inadequately understood by the professors who try to teach them outside.

The very principle of the existence of those unions is not the selfish one, but the protection of the weak as against the strong. This is why the cream of the British artisans submit to a general price, or to what is called by them a minimum price for their labour, instead of trying to exact all they can for themselves, and leaving their weaker brethren to the cruel fate of unlimited competition. The good workman agrees to accept an average wage, and to work a short day, to give all men of his own particular craft a chance to live. They not only do this, but in the better-organized and richer associations they vote money from their funds to help their poorer and less competent fellow-workers. They do this without stint, and, when unable to give, they grant assistance, simply upon the note of hand of the officers

of these unions, we may cite the following as an advance of wages, and they apply to engineers, as a rule, are well paid: the members of the Engineers'

This is also the reason why workmen have often inclined to what is called socialism, not in the sense too often attributed to them of seeking to level all stations, and to redistribute and equalize all property, but rather of trying to give to all men a share of this world's goods. Socialism has never had any widespread influence in this country, because we are a practical people; but the sentiment is more general than many suppose. On what is this based? Simply upon their general sense of justice, and upon the fact that a comparatively few have too much, and that the many have too little. This feeling, instead of meriting the strong denunciations and abuse often heaped upon it, deserves credit and even respect. The thing for statesmen to do is to teach the people how best to use their opportunities, and how to prudently call to their aid those expedients or compromises which will enable them to reconcile clashing interests in such a way as to give satisfaction in the present, and at the same time to march forward towards the goal of justice and equity in the future. But, it might be asked, if our statesmen pay attention to those appeals for abstract justice and right, where would it land them? In what would it result? History, we think, will give a pretty fair answer to these questions. To go no further back than Free Trade, the American War, the outbreak in Jamaica, the questions of the suffrage, national education, the disestablishment of the Irish Church, the ballot, the removal of the criminal disabilities of the labour laws, factory legislation, and many others, the national instinct was in advance of the Government; and the successful issue of these agitations is the best possible proof that the instincts of the people were right and true, and that their demands, from a sense of justice, were the soundest policy. What is true of the past is equally true in the present, and the present Government will do well and act wisely in having due regard to this outburst of national sentiment against Turkish rule in Eastern Europe, and especially in reference to her continued oppression of the Christian populations of the insurgent provinces.

Working men are as proud of their country as any other class: they are prepared to pay and fight to maintain their proud pre-eminence among the nations; but they would protest, they do protest, against purchasing this power at the expense of justice to other peoples, so far as they are able to see the question in its

Society, inquiries are made into the facts and circumstances of the case. They want to know how far they try to help themselves; the state of their funds; how many require aid; the probable extent of the struggle both as to numbers and as to time. But they never ask themselves whether as a result of the contest they will have to pay more for their clothes. If the agricultural labourers apply for help, those to whom they apply never stop to inquire whether the price of bread or of vegetables will be increased; no, the simple question is,—Is the strike a fair and legitimate one? If so, the aid is given. It is no answer to this to say that help is often given for purposes which would not bear strict investigation: as a matter of equity as between the employer and the employed they judge of it by their own light.

natural light of justice and humanity. With them the question is not as to whether Turkey is necessary in order to maintain our highway to India, or as to whether the Sublime Porte has been to us as a sort of house-dog set to guard our interests on the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, but rather "Has Turkey done right to the Christians in the Slav provinces?" If not, then the mass of the working people would declare, in a voice of thunder, *Make her do it*, and we will settle the question as to the right of way to India afterwards.


They know full well that in the event of war they would be the first and the greatest sufferers; they know that the rank and file would have to be provided by them, that taxes would be increased, that provisions would become scarce and dear, that employment would become more and more difficult; but in spite of all this they would still cry out, Let us do right, though the heavens should fall! Not that they want war: they detest it; but they believe—and there is no sound reason for disputing this belief—that if the English Government were to put their foot down resolutely and firmly, other European Governments would act in concert with them in "controlling a power chiefly felt by its abuse, and in restraining a Government which seems to be degenerating into an organization of imbecility and crime." There can be no doubt but that in considering and concluding any settlement of the Eastern Question other European nations would have to be consulted, and other interests considered besides those of Great Britain; but the people here have reason to know that the same instinct of justice and humanity prompts the people of other European nations as that which beats in the hearts of Englishmen, and they know full well that this natural as well as national instinct is sound, just, and right.

It forms no part of my intention to discuss any of the plans which have been mooted for the limitation of Turkish power in Europe, or to suggest here which is the best or fittest for the Government to adopt. There may be political reasons for this or that course, but I trust that I have shown that the outburst of indignation is just; that it has its source in the deepest feelings of the human heart; that the demand for reparation and punishment of the offenders is but the merest act of justice; that the enthusiasm and unanimity with which the people declare for the expulsion of the Turk from Europe is the result of a conviction that the Ottoman power is incapable of being restrained within proper limits, or of yielding to the civilization of the West, and that it is a menace to the peace and progress of Europe.

Those who love to style themselves practical politicians may sneer at these sentimental yearnings, but they find an echo in every heart that is free from mere partisanship, they form the strongest

and the most permanent of all convictions; peoples have fought for them, suffered for them, died for them; and, as Italy had her Mazzini, so she found her Cavour. If the Slav provinces are so placed that their Cavour is impossible, some European statesmen will be found bold enough and strong enough to solve this difficult problem; our desire is that England shall not be found wanting when the day of reckoning comes. We do not desire her to be the Don Quixote of nations, but we do desire that her power shall be legitimately exercised and felt in every struggle for freedom in Europe.

GEORGE HOWELL.



RUSSIAN POLICY AND DEEDS IN TURKISTAN.

Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja. By EUGENE SCHUYLER, Ph.D. Two Vols. 8vo. London, 1876.

THIS book is invested at the present moment with interest, both special and general, by its title, and by its authorship. The title, indeed, fails to cover a very important portion of the contents, namely, the campaigns against Khiva and the Turkomans in 1873, and against Khokand in 1875-6, for of them the author has no personal knowledge; but the work on the whole appears to be, in its class, one of the most solid and painstaking works which have been published among us in recent years. The name of Mr. Schuyler has obtained a great celebrity in England from his having made inquiries last summer, on behalf of the American Government, in Bulgaria, and his having first given that authentic corroboration to the early indications* of the *Spectator*, and the large and detailed disclosures in the *Daily News*, of the demoniacal orgies of the Turks, which alone was wanting to stir the mind of England in accordance with the long-suppressed promptings of its heart.

The question of Turkistan, in its largest aspect, bears on the solution of one among the world-wide problems of politics and morality, the regulation of the relations between superior and inferior races or communities when brought locally into contact.

* A previous statement of mine (*Bulgarian Horrors*, p. 21), is not quite accurate. The *Spectator* of June 8, appears first to have opened the subject. It was rapidly followed by the *Daily News* of June 8. On June 23 appeared the first of the series of communications, which have coloured the whole subsequent course of the Eastern question.

Again, it exhibits the character of Islam apart from the peculiar circumstances in which it is presented to us by the very peculiar case of Turkey. To our countrymen it offers a third source of interest in its bearing, real or supposed, on the tenure of our power in India. But it is also important for us, and for Europe, to know what light is thrown by such a work as this upon the moral standard of Russian action, as exhibited in the treatment of the Asiatic tribes, with whom she has lately had to deal in a course of very difficult undertakings.

The name Turkistan may be said roughly to embrace the great basin of the rivers called Syr Darya and Amir Darya respectively, which were the Taxartes and Oxus of the ancients; it being, however, borne in mind that the Oxus, which now more feebly trails into the Sea of Aral, is believed in olden times to have found its way, through a bed still traceable, and with a more powerful stream, as far as the Caspian. Rivers which lose themselves in marshes, or in lakes which they scarcely seem to feed, form a marked feature of this portion of the globe. It is believed by some high authorities that the Caspian, which through the Volga and the Ural draws so largely on the watery resources of the North, has lost much of its ancient area, and is still in course of contraction. If the flood of water available in the aggregate for irrigation, for vessels, and for direct human use, is diminishing in Turkistan, this incidental feature adds to the many items of "cold obstruction" which seem to beset the future of this region.

It is a region, from and through which have passed multitudes of Huns, Tartars, Turks, and Mongols on their westward course; into which the Great Alexander penetrated, to leave upon it the ineffaceable tradition of his mighty name; and which may be called the original head-quarters of Zenghis and of Timour. It is bounded by the Caspian on the west, by Persia and the Affghans on the south, by the long stretch of Siberia and by the Chinese Empire on the north and east. The central and more fertile parts are settled, and are inhabited by various Mohammedan races and communities, modelled in the rude manner of Asiatic society, with a sprinkling of foreign stocks. The outer ring is held, or rather ranged, by nomad tribes; to the southward the Kirghiz proper and the Kiptchahs, to the west and south-west the fierce and predatory Turkomans, to the north and north-west the nomad race called Kirghiz or Kajak Kirghiz by the Russians, of whom we learn from Schuyler and from Gregorief (Schuyler, ii. Appendix, 405) that, when first brought into contact with the Russians, they were not Mahometans but Shamanists, and that they have become Mahometan through being treated by Russia as if they were already such. This Tartaric basin, though it does not occupy on the map so large a space as British India, and is less

defined in boundary, may be three-fourths of its size; but probably has not a fortieth part, either of its wealth or its population.

It is divided between the Russian provinces of Syr Daria and Semiretch, under the Governor-General at Tashkent, the Russian capital, and the Khanates (from the west eastward) of Khiva, of Bokhara, and (Khokand having been absorbed in 1875) of Kashgar.

Such is a general and imperfect sketch of the region, which the laborious work of Mr. Schuyler exhibits to us in very full detail.

The relations of Russia with this country are of old date. In the time of Peter the Great, the Kirghiz on the northern and western steppes applied for Russian protection. Long before that time Kalmuks and Moguls abounded within the frontier of Russia. Her intimacy of relation with tribes, whose habits are adverse to local limitation, does not appear to have been of her own seeking. She had begun by having herself to shake off a Tartaric influence. The low social organization of these stocks, their bloody wars among themselves, the alienation of subjects from rulers, that disposition of the party worsted in conflict between two to call in a third, which chiefly built up the overgrowth of power of the mediæval Popes, the want of common terms and ideas, and the difficulty of establishing fixed relations, seem to have made it impossible for Russia to place a positive limit upon her Asiatic territory. Causes analogous to those, which have brought about step by step the construction of our vast empire in India, have led Russia onwards into the heart of Asia; but perhaps with more of necessity, and certainly with much less of inducement.

The organization of the Empire, efficient for many purposes, does not appear to secure effective control from the head over the more distant members. At different periods, our own Central Government has had occasion to feel the insufficiency of its restraining force. A notable example occurred in 1843, when Scinde was conquered by Napier under the auspices of Lord Ellenborough. That conquest was disapproved, I believe unanimously, by the Cabinet of Sir Robert Peel; of which I can speak, as I had just entered it at the time. But the Ministry were powerless, inasmuch as the mischief of retaining was less than the mischief of abandoning it; and it remains an accomplished fact. So Tashkent was taken by General Tcherniaieff in 1864 against the orders of the Russian Government; but that officer, of whose capacity and courage the perusal of this work leaves a deep impression, suffered for it accordingly. All along, there has been, in Schuyler's opinion, a tendency on the part of civil and military officers to increase their honours and emoluments by the enlarge-

ment of the Russian borders; but all along the Central Government appears to have offered a steady, and sometimes, if not always, an effectual resistance to such expansion. When Shahrizabs was conquered in 1870, it was given back to the Amir of Bokhara (Schuyler, ii. 74), and this in spite of the desire of the people to be ruled by Russia. The same happened in the case of Karshi.

“The surrender to the Amir of Shahrizabs, as that of Karshi previously, was made against the wish, and in spite of the protests, of the native population, who much preferred to remain under Russian rule, than to be under that of Mozaffar Eddin.” (ii. 308.)

This sovereign was completely at the mercy of the Russians after a complete defeat in the battle of Zara-balak, when they voluntarily replaced him on the throne (ii. 304). So in the case of the province of Kuldja. It had been lost by China, which was unable to recover it from hopeless anarchy. The Russians conquered it in 1871.

“The Foreign Office immediately informed the Chinese Government of the occupation of the province, and declared its readiness to restore it to China whenever a sufficient force could be brought there to hold it against attacks, and preserve order.” (ii. 188.)

The ruler of Khokand, whom the Russians expelled, and also sheltered, was a consummate scoundrel, repeatedly driven out by his subjects; and there seems no reason to doubt that, in the case of Khiva, it would have been quite as easy for them, when they had taken the city, to depose the Khan, as to treat with him.

In a word, the entire detail, as we draw it from the pages of Schuyler, after allowing for a certain local eagerness for action, of which from our own history we could easily supply parallels, exhibits, on the part of the Emperor and his Government in St. Petersburg, a career of marked moderation and prudence, and a rather reluctant submission to the inexorable causes which drove them forward in an anxious, costly, and uninviting career.

It is in Tashkent, and at the nearest neighbouring points, that we can best estimate the views and action of Russia as to her social and moral mission; for here she has had some few years of established possession, and here, too, the incidents of conquest at once settled down into a stable quietude, much aided by the liberality and personal fearlessness of General Tcherniaieff; who, on the evening of the surrender, rode through the streets of the town, attended by only two or three Cossacks, and took a native bath. Immediately afterwards one of the crowd that followed him offered him a bowl of tea, which he drank without the slightest hesitation (i. 116). There is a legend that, on the anniversary of the capture, people go to the gate which he stormed, and pray for his soul. An excellent feeling seems to prevail at this place between Russians and natives.

Surveying the facts upon what I hope has been a dispassionate perusal, I find the prospect a mixed one; the intentions and endeavours of Russia substantially good, but her success doubtful. She has paid to the Mahometan religion, which she found firmly held by the people, a respect so perfect, that missionary efforts are actually put down (i. 162): a measure which we do not adopt in India, but possibly, under a Russian Government, there would be difficulties which our system does not present, in distinguishing between State and private action when both covered by the same tongue and nationality. Again with respect to slavery. The present Sovereign of Russia, by the emancipation of serfs, said to reach forty millions in number, has placed himself in the first rank of the philanthropic legislators of the world. It was justly to be expected that in Turkistan his representatives would not mar the recollection of this glorious work either by a discordant policy or by neglect. Accordingly, wherever the flag of Russia has been planted, slavery, and the accompanying trade in slaves, have been abolished.* Nor is this all; for all the influence of Russia has been perseveringly used to bring about its total abolition in Bokhara (Schuyler, ii. 100); and, on the entrance of the army into Khiva, the Khan, by Russian direction, issued an order to the same effect. The temper and humanity of Russian proceedings with the native races for ordinary purposes cannot fairly be disputed; while the gallantry of the soldiers and the skill of their commanders seem to have been well calculated to inspire both admiration and fear. And yet the task of Russia in establishing law and order among this very limited and scattered population of two millions and a-half (ii. 202) appears to be one of scarcely measurable difficulty.

This difficulty may in part be traced to the nature of Islam. The Anglo-Indian Government exercises sway over a vastly larger number of Mahometans than inhabit all Turkistan; but they form a minority fused and scattered in the different portions of an enormous population, which we have been able in the course of several generations to weld into something like a political and civil unity. In Turkistan, Islam may be said to reign alone. It is neither in moral subordination, as in India, nor in a forced and unnatural ascendancy, as in European Turkey. Of all the tests that can be applied to the true spirit and capacity of a religion, perhaps none is so severe as when its professors are invested with political domination over races and countries of another faith. After a long course of doubtful history, the experience of the nineteenth century seems to give ground for the expectation that Christianity will bear this test, and offer a solution of the problem

* See for example, the case of Khokand, ii. 364.

of just and equitable guardianship. At the other pole of the subject, after much endurance, and perhaps some indifference, we are compelled to admit the miserable failure of the Ottoman Government in its at least nominal attempt to constitute anything like legal and orderly polity for its European provinces. Its materials are—first, a minority incapable of true progress, and basing its ascendancy upon arms; and, secondly, a large majority, from which the Government withholds effectual guarantees both of civil equality, and even of personal security in life, property, and honour, yet to which it has to look for the chief resources of its treasury, for the main stock of its intelligence, and for nearly the whole of its agricultural and industrial activity. It would be very unfair to judge of the social character and capacities of Islam from an instance where it holds a position so radically false. Upon the whole, history seems to show that the system has developed itself best and most congenially among Semitic races. Still there is much in it that may tend to good wherever its purely theocratic character finds field for its exercise upon a community which owns its divine extraction and authority. Such was its case in Turkistan. The Russians seem to have availed themselves of the moral stringency, by which in certain respects its precepts are distinguished. In a most curious proclamation, issued by Tcherniaeff after the capture of Tashkent, but written for him (i. 115) by the moderate party among the Mahometans of the place, it is said—

“We hereby declare to the inhabitants of the city of Tashkent, that they must in everything act according to the commands of Almighty God and the teaching of the orthodox religion of Mohammed, on whom and on whose descendants be the blessing of God, not departing from them one iota.”

Among Mahometans living peaceably together there is to be found much of “hospitality, self-respect, personal cleanliness, temperance, even toleration;”^{*} and no aversion to popular instruction. With these dispositions on both sides, we seem to have much promise of social good. But we must look at the other aspect of the case. These Mahometan communities, based upon the Koran and the traditionary law which has grown up around it, live under a system which, instead of beating the sword into the ploughshare and the spear into the pruning-hook, leans so much towards war as a normal state of existence, that they are ever tempted to beat their ploughshares into swords, and their pruning-hooks into spears. Hence it happens that, when fanaticism breaks out, or when its tone is assumed to cover worldly aims, it at once assumes the tone of unquestionable, nay divine, authority. The terrible campaign, which led to the annexation of Khokand in 1875, seems to have grown out of political necessities, but it

^{*} Mr. Bosworth Smith's *Mohammed and Mohammedanism*, 2nd ed. p. 309.

assumed all the character of a religious war, and it was waged from the native side under the authority of a remarkable proclamation. I subjoin the chief part (ii. 283) :—

“By our Shariat we are bound to fight with you : so says the All-high God. If we win, we shall be warriors for the faith ; if we die, we shall be martyrs. We strive for one or the other. By our Shariat, *it is necessary once to ask you to accept Islam*. If you wish to turn to the true way, and become Mussulmans, then you will become our brothers, and more than our brothers. *If you do not consent to this, we shall fight*. At the present time we advise you to accept Islam. If you consent, then, using the mercifulness of God and of the Prophet, we grant you life, and will be merciful towards you, and will raise you even higher than you are. But if you say that you are not content to become Mussulmans, *and shall ask us to grant you mercy, and allow you to remove with your families in (to?) your former place of abode, we will consent even to this*. But if in obstinacy you do not consent, and you have a desire to fight, then we will fight, and one side or the other shall be turned to ashes. This is the aim of our wishes. By our law and custom we cannot refuse this. Our God and our word are one. Consider, as becomes you, the profit and the harm which will be to you. Send an answer quickly.”

Thus the Russians have to carry the torch of civilization amidst barrels of gunpowder. They deal with societies which, as Mr. Freeman points out in his most able lectures on the Saracens, are fundamentally polygamous, arbitrary, non-progressive ; while they bring to those societies, though not in its most Western form, a system which is essentially monogamous, legal, and progressive.

Thus far I have spoken mainly of religious influences. But I apprehend that, in all countries, by far the larger part of human action is, as matter of fact, prompted by causes other than religious. Of these Schuyler has spoken abundantly. He thinks the Russians have been premature and unwise in introducing the principle of election for local administrative councils (ii. 210 and elsewhere) ; that they have perplexed and unsettled the popular mind, with its simple and stationary ideas, by the operations of a complicated bureaucracy, and by constant changes of regulation ; that the corps of officers is morally defective (ii. 220) ; that there is great weakness, due to distance, in the administrative control, and with this weakness an impurity, which even taints the administration of justice and of high patronage. Into these subjects I do not further enter. But there is another topic, more fruitful of difficulty perhaps than any, and also more easy to understand.

The Russians can hardly have been drawn into Turkistan by the expectation of making money there. Tchernaiëff seems to have begun at Tashkent by a remission of taxes, and by a promise of more remission. But Russia is a country poor in comparison with its vast extent, and the calls which that extent involves ; and its acquisitions in Turkistan have entailed upon it fresh and heavy burdens. The annual deficit of Turkistan (ii. 213), which in 1868 was over three million roubles, in the year 1872, though the revenue

had increased from 1,200,000 roubles to two millions, had passed five and a-half. In spite of the protestations and efforts of the Finance Department of St. Petersburg, the expenses of all establishments grew with an incredible rapidity. Besides the sums stated above, there were spent the revenues of the Zarafshem district, which amounted in 1872 to 1,400,000 roubles. The total income for 1875, including (as I read the text) these revenues, was estimated only at two and a-half million roubles. In the case of Khokand, Schuyler thinks that for the first time an annexation has been made, which is likely, from the richness of the Ferghana valley, to pay its way (ii. 301). On the other hand, the Governor-General of Orenburg has stated that it will be necessary for many years to repeat campaigns against the Turkomans of the territory taken from Khiva, and that region will be to Russia a second Caucasus (ii. 370). What seems worst of all in its bearing on the future is that, naturally enough, efforts have been made to meet this growing deficit by increase of taxation, and that this increase, if Schuyler is right, has produced much disaffection towards Russian rule in quarters where it had been originally met with welcome (ii. 233, 234).

But our author does not on this account desire or contemplate the recession of Russia from her task. Many wars, he says, will constantly be made, and the Russians will have to go further on, not with the desire of conquest, but from circumstances over which they have no control (ii. 218). He thinks the relations with the Turkomans will compel an advance as far as Merv, to the acquisition of which he gives none of the importance assigned to it by the English press (ii. 385, 386). Kashgar, Bukhara, the whole Turkoman country, must either be annexed or brought into a positive subordination. Russia will then have arrived at a true ethnical and political boundary (ii. 388). And he advisedly sums up by declaring that her rule "is on the whole beneficial to the natives, and it would be manifestly unjust to them to withdraw her protection, and leave them to anarchy and to the unbridled rule of fanatical despots" (ibid.).

I have next to consider briefly whether the establishment and advance of Russian rule in Turkistan has any, and what bearing, on the tenure of British power in India. The belief in such a bearing, and in its more or less menacing character, is vaguely, but not inconsiderably, spread in this country. That if it does not exist it should not be imagined, that if it does it should not be exaggerated, but calmly and coolly measured, appertains to our self-respect, and to our general hold on the respect of the civilized world, more than many of us seem to imagine. A fussy and fretful jealousy of the territorial acquisitions of others, entertained in a country which exceeds all others in its multiplied

annexations all over the globe, is not a little detrimental, as I think, to our dignity, and is peculiarly odious, and even not a little despicable, in the eyes of other nations.

Many are inclined to hold, that the addition of territorial surface to a country is necessarily addition of power. There is not a proposition of politics, which in its general form is more hollow and unsafe. Could we fish up another contiguous Great Britain from the Atlantic and the German Ocean, it would at once, or at an early date, add very greatly to our power. But the multiplication of remote transmarine possessions, however necessary or noble the tasks which it may open to us, is much more truly a deduction from than an addition to our available strength as a nation. Continuous extension, indeed, is not always attended with the same difficulties, as extension which is sporadic and remote. The progressive extension of the great American Republic brings on the whole a proportionate increase of force; but here we have the notable vantage-points of advanced intelligence, great vigour of political organization, and absolute or approximate unity of race. So much for two marked, and widely different, illustrations of the effect of territorial enlargement on national power.

The third great case, on the surface of our globe, of extended and extending empire is the case of Russia. I know not whether it is the opinion of her people, or of her rulers, that her Asiatic extensions carry with them an increase of strength. I offer my own opinion with submission to better judgments: but it is a decided one. The measureless expanse of Siberia looks well upon the map, as does that of British North America in its higher latitudes; but of both, I apprehend, it may be said, with no great departure from the truth, that they are at present quite harmless in being nearly useless. Siberia has served to draw forth the admiration of an exiled Affghan pretender (ii. 312), who lately made his appeal to the Russian power: "I place my hope in you, because I know very well that the possessions of the White Tsar are much larger than those of the French, Germans, and English taken together." Now England, taken alone, would make a much better fight than this great geographer imagines; but I will not contest the point. The present question is as to the recent series of Asian annexations. The possession of Turkistan seems to me to be a burden laid on Russia rather than a boon granted to her. Were it otherwise, I should not grudge it her; for it seems to be the opinion of all rational observers, that Providence has committed in that country a civilizing mission to her care. I do not share in those fears of her, which supply for us the exciting *pabulum* of a Russian panic alternately with a French, an American, or a German panic; these four being the only countries to

which we stoop to pay so great a compliment. But, if Russia be formidable with Turkistan, she would be more formidable without it. For her, it is cost, it is care, it is liability to attack, it is responsibility. It is also space. But the space she has been gaining on the line towards the half-ruined village (ii. 386) of Merv, on the way to Herat, is an expanse of desolate sands, ranged by savage Turkomans. It must be long before the possession of such a country can answer to possession in the sense we attach to the term; and longer before the means of transport available for military operations will be organized in such a region. It is industry and commerce, following in the wake of military repression, which alone can quickly change the face of a country of this character. But Russia, though full of the idea and speculation of trade, may be said to have hardly commenced its practice; and I fear her steps in it will be feeble, and her progress slow, until she has unlearned the doctrines of artificial preference and privilege, and trusts boldly to a free commercial system to develop the energies of her people.

I know of no reason why Afghanistan and Herat should not for an indefinite time separate Russian from Indian Asia; no reason for imputing to Russia an ambition of aggressiveness, which, in my opinion, is not less absurd than guilty; no reason for believing, but every reason for disbelieving, that if that odious imputation is to be made, and also to be verified, and if a military contest were to arise, her means of conducting it are either superior or even equal to our own.* The subject might be pursued still further. If Russia deserves the advantages of trade with India, they are by law just as open to her at this moment, as they are to us. If she looks to possession as the means of establishing protection or monopoly, and thereby slackening the progress of British India to wealth and prosperity, that surely is an evil prospect to offer to the 200,000,000 of its inhabitants who will have something, I trust a good deal, to say to the question.

In the meantime it is satisfactory to observe the relations exhibited in this volume between the Russian and the British authorities, in matters of reciprocal concern. With regard to charges which have been made against Russia in the case of Khiva, I shall not now enter upon the question whether Russia is chargeable with any and what offence against us, in the measures taken by her against the Khan. At any rate, the Khivans sent an envoy to Lord Northbrook to ask for help against the Russians. "The Viceroy, as was to be expected, advised them to make peace with Russia, obey her demands, and give no cause for further dissatisfaction" (App. V., vol. ii.

* See, among other authorities, the striking letter of Major-General Sir John Adye, in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of April 28, 1876.

p. 424). Again Abdurrahman Khan, imploring General Kauffmann to bring him back to Affghanistan, receives for answer that the ruler of that country is recognized by England, which is in friendship with Russia, and, while keeping the peace on the frontier of Bokhara, he cannot be treated as an enemy. "Between us," as he expressed it in writing to Shir Ali, "there cannot be any misunderstanding, and we, although distant neighbours, ought to live in peace and amity" (ii. 312, 313). This was the result of communications between the late Government of this country and the Government of Russia. I trust that, through similar care and prudence, similar relations are still maintained.

Thus far we have been able to proceed in the examination of this interesting case without encountering any burning question. But the British public has recently been startled by an announcement in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, and I believe elsewhere, that the wicked excesses of the Turks in Bulgaria, which were thought to be without parallel, unless in the bloodstained, and as we hoped repudiated examples set by the same people, had been equalled and even exceeded by the Russians in Turkistan. Nothing could have been so well calculated as such a discovery, or until detected, such an invention, to cross the high purpose of the British people formed upon learning the true nature of the facts so long kept from their view, and of the political necessities which they disclosed. To a certain extent this announcement served its purpose, not in reversing a resistless current, but in bewildering the public mind. It was partly a discovery, and partly (I use the mildest word) an invention. It was a discovery that, in the case of one particular operation, Schuyler had charged General Kauffmann and the officers and troops acting under him with gross inhumanity; upon evidence which has great appearances of weight. The rest was invention: and to assist in determining the proportions between the two, as well as to do justice to the accused, I shall set forth to the best of my ability, without reserve and without exaggeration, the evidence which is before me; observing, however, at the outset that Schuyler was not an eye-witness, that he made no local inquiry, that his work, which appears to be of perfect impartiality as regards the Russians generally, seems also at a variety of points to exhibit, from some cause or other, a bias adverse to General Kauffmann, so far as bias can operate upon a man of manifest honour and intelligence; and that we have no means of knowing whether the charges of Schuyler have been brought the knowledge of those whom they affect, so that they might be met by defence or contradiction.

I shall now give in substance:—

1. The accusation, from the work of Schuyler.
2. The defence, so far as I find it supplied by a letter recently

published in the *Daily News*, with the signature of "A Russian," which, as I learn from a friend, has the sanction of General Gorloff, Russian military *attaché* in London.

3. The representation of the case by the Editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*.

4. The evidence which was before him, when he made that representation.

1. After the taking of Khiva, and the conclusion with the Khan of the new arrangements, owing to the restless ambition of the officers, General Kauffmann intimated to the Yomud Turkomans, on the 17th of July, 1873, that out of the war indemnity to be paid they must find 300,000 roubles or £41,000 in cash within nineteen days. This they promised after some hesitation. He detained as hostages twelve among the elders whom he had himself invited to Khiva to receive the announcement. He placed a force under General Golovatschef in close proximity to the Yomuds, and prescribed, by an order dated July 18, No. 1,167, of which Schuyler gives the translated words, that, if they assembled with a view to resistance, or even to leaving the country, they and their families should be completely destroyed, and their herds and property confiscated. General Golovatschef also said, "You are not to spare either sex or age: kill all of them." On the 31st General Kauffmann arrived at Ilyali. At this time "the butchery and destruction by the troops had been so great" (of this no details are given beyond the burning of villages along the road) "that the Turkomans showed signs of yielding." It was agreed to take half the amount in camels; for the other half (of 310,000 roubles) the women had to sell their ornaments at forced prices* in the Russian camp. The time had been extended to August 14. On that day only one-third of the sum had been paid, and the troops proceeded to act upon their orders. The numbers of the tribe, the amount of execution, are nowhere stated; but the Cossacks cut down everybody, "seemed to get quite furious," and "cut down everybody, whether small child or old man." This was on August 19. The Turkomans in their irregular manner, availing themselves of every covert, resisted bravely, but in vain. Schuyler, in this part of his statement, quotes the statement made to him by a Russian eye-witness, Mr. Gromoff (ii. 359), who saw several such cases; saw one dead woman, one dead and one wounded child; and relates on two later days, when the Turkomans had attacked and been repulsed—

"We burned, as we had done before, grain, houses, and everything which we met; and the cavalry, which was in advance, cut down

* MacGahan, however, says that they were taken by Kauffmann's order at twenty-five roubles to the pound of silver.

every person, man, woman or child. . . . They were generally women and children whom we met. I saw much cruelty." (ii. 361.)

2. My next duty is to give the most material allegations of fact in reply from the paper of "A Russian." He states :—

a. That this campaign of eleven days was one of most severe and desperate fighting against formidable warriors: the General (Golovatschef), and nearly all his staff, were wounded, Prince Leuchtenberg twice barely escaping death. The Russians, he appears to convey, were enormously outnumbered.

This statement as to the character of the campaign is not inconsistent with, but is in some degree supported by, Schuyler's narrative. "A Russian" also refers largely to MacGahan's "Campaigning on the Oxus."*

b. That in the movement of these military nomads, the wives and children were mixed with the men, and often in the midst of the mortal struggle. "The French in suppressing the Commune certainly killed a much larger number of women and children than in that Turkoman campaign." But some were slain unavoidably and inadvertently.

c. That all the Turkomans except the Bagram Shali (Schuyler uses the name of Yomuds) were left unmolested by the expedition.

d. That after a bloody battle near the Uzbeg village of Ilyali, in which the Russians suffered severely, the Uzbeg inhabitants were not molested (MacGahan, p. 392).

e. That on the submission of the Turkomans, all operations ceased; that the wounded and prisoners were well cared for.

f. Noticing some positive errors of date in Schuyler's account of Gromoff's statement, he thinks there are probably errors of fact also. The statement is not endorsed by Gromoff.

g. "A Russian" relies implicitly on the evidence of MacGahan, as an impartial American who actually went through the operations of the campaign. He is quoted (pp. 363—365) to the effect that, himself present in the action of the first day, he saw the Cossacks pass by a group of twenty or thirty women and children. One left the ranks, and aimed his piece at them; but it missed fire, when MacGahan himself struck him across the face with his riding whip and ordered him back to his place.† The man obeyed: and with this exception "there was no violence offered to women and children." But he saw a young Cossack officer punish one of his men with his sword for "having tried to kill a woman." The apologist does not believe that there was or could

* Sampson Low. London, 1874.

† It is, perhaps, fair to give the counterpart to this truth. "It was curious to see a Cossack stop from his work of plunder to give a child a piece of bread or a drink of water from his flask, in the gentlest manner possible, and then resume his occupation." P. 406.

have been such an order as that ascribed by Schuyler in his translation to Kauffmann; and he points out that the destruction of property, not of life, was the true way of striking an effectual blow at the refractory tribe.

h. He questions upon grounds which he sets forth, the soundness of Schuyler's translations, and thus, the genuineness of the citations. I may add that the later battle, one of great severity, is described in MacGahan, chap. x. He tells of women cowering in silent dread—"They expected to be treated as they knew their own husbands, brothers, and lovers would have treated the vanquished under like circumstances," p. 399; of a woman holding her dying husband's head; of children sitting in the baggage carts, or crying, or crawling about among the wheels; of a child laughing at General Golovatschef's banner; of an old woman wounded in the neck, "but she might easily have been taken for a man, as she wore no turban. . . . *This was the only woman I saw wounded, though I was told there were three or four other cases.*" He mentions, however, in p. 400, another woman, "with bleeding face," seen by himself.

MacGahan's account of the orders given is in conflict with Schuyler's. "The orders were to give the *men* no quarter, whether they resisted or not," p. 401. On the other side, he tells of a Russian picket of six, probably surprised by the Turkomans, and all found naked and headless, p. 376. In p. 400 we have a general summing up:—

"I must say, however, that cases of violence towards women were very rare; and although the Russians here were fighting barbarians, who commit all sorts of atrocities upon their prisoners, which fact might have excused a good deal of cruelty on the part of the soldiers, their conduct was *infinitely better than that of European troops in European battles.*"*

3. I have next to set forth the representation of the case as it was given in the *Pall Mall Gazette* of October 5, in its leading article, under the head of Russian Atrocity. Atrocity, when imputed to Russia, of course did not require the inverted commas, which in the case of the Bulgarian acts had been boldly used for denoting disbelief. In this leading article, the proof is at once treated as complete. With this promptitude we may compare the reserve maintained on the "sentimental" side, which for weeks and weeks declined to assume the truth of the reports from Bulgaria, until official attestation had been obtained, the accusation made known to the parties, and ample time for contradiction allowed.

It was boldly asserted that the proceedings offered "an almost exact parallel to the Turkish atrocities:" "differing *only* from them in some circumstances which make them less excusable."

* MacGahan, humanely carrying off a little girl, meets an officer of the staff doing the same, and makes the remark, "The Yomuds seem to have abandoned their girls with less reluctance than their boys." Cf. pp. 403—411.

Let us see what these circumstances of difference are.

(1.) "The tribes" (Schuyler mentions a tribe, the Yomuds) were 'virtually independent communities, which had sometimes submitted to intermittent control from the Khan of Khiva.' They were nomad subjects of the Khan, ranging over parts of his dominions, included in his treaties, constantly interfering in his government, and independent only in the sense in which Donald Bean Lean (see "Waverley") and his Highlanders, 120 years ago, were virtually independent of the King of England.

(2.) These Turkomans had "given no special offence." It may be hard to say what is a "special offence" on the part of a race whose common non-special occupation is that of pillage and slave-dealing, with the murders attendant upon them. In the very account from which the *Pall Mall Gazette* was quoting, is given a specimen of conduct which deserves notice :—

"There were a large number of Persian slaves in Khiva. On taking the town the Russians declared slavery at an end. The Persians were to be sent back to their country [Schuyler, ii. 353] in parties of five or six hundred. They desired to go by Mashad, but the route by Krasnovodeh was preferred, *that they might escape the Turkomans*. Two parties were sent accordingly by this safe route. One of them was attacked by the Turkomans, and the Persians either killed or reinslaved." (ii. 364.)

The special offence, as towards the Russians, seems to have been that, while the Turkomans were the bravest and most truthful, they were also the fiercest and most intractable of the inhabitants of Khiva; that they alone offered the Russians a keen resistance; and that, rightly or wrongly, a measure of great severity against the largest of their tribes was judged to be indispensable for the establishment of anything like peace or order in the country. According to MacGahan, these Yomuds, from what he learned after his arrival in Europe, fell upon their Uzbek neighbours, and pillaged them, by way of compensation for their losses from the Russians (p. 410).

(3.) General Kauffmann, says the journal, issued his orders.

"Here they are. 'I order you immediately to move on the settlements of the Yomuds, . . . and to give over the settlements of the Yomuds and their families to complete destruction, and their herds and property to confiscation.'"

This is *part* of a sentence; the commencement, which is omitted, completes the sense by supplying the condition. Before the words just extracted come these words (ii. 357): "If your Excellency sees that the Yomuds are not occupying themselves with getting together money, *but are assembling for the purpose of opposing our troops*, or perhaps even for leaving the country, I order you," and so forth. It seems to have been thought well to represent the Turkomans as an innocent, unresisting race; and for this purpose a conditional order is turned into one without conditions.

(4.) Certainly the officers (Schuyler, ii. 355) praised the Turkomans for honesty and straightforwardness; and they had been kind and hospitable to certain Russian exploring parties (*ibid.*); and so had all the inhabitants (ii. 354). But it is the cheerful submission of to-day, followed by the deadly assault of to-morrow, that constitutes one of the greatest difficulties of a position like that of the Russians among these Asiatic tribes. That these wild piratical tribes were trustworthy in their ordinary dealings is quite possible. Schuyler does not give his authority for these statements, but I do not doubt them.

(5.) It does not so greatly touch the conduct of Gen. Kauffmann, but as regards the Russian Government and people, an impartial observer might take note that the responsibility is not quite the same for what was done in a land of railways, at less than 200 miles from the capital, to a peasantry foreign to the ordinary use of arms, and one of the most pacific in the world, but stirred by long and incurable oppression, and for what was done to a tribe of robbers, at ten times the distance, in the heart of the Asiatic deserts, with the channels of information slow, and the central power of administration wholly without share in the particular transaction.

(6.) It is very strange that this newspaper-writer should fail to notice that the climax of Turkish iniquity in Bulgaria does not lie in mere slaughter; but in the combination, without protest or resistance from any, of widespread destruction of life with exquisite refinements of torture, and with the wholesale indulgence of fierce and utterly bestial lusts. We can hardly conceive that these features of the case, which raise or sink it from the human to the diabolical, are absolutely of *no* account in the view of the *Pall Mall Gazette*.

We seem, then, to have before us, first, as well established, an unsparing slaughter in hard-fought action of the brave warriors of a marauding tribe, down to the time of their submission. I am not able to say whether this was necessary or not. MacGahan seems to have thought the measure ill-advised, if not more. But I hold that we English are not in a condition to condemn it either as a Bulgarian atrocity, or as any other: unless upon the principle, too often, I am sorry to say, tolerated, that there is to be one rule for us, and another for other nations. I will here refer only to the slaughter of the Dyaks in their boats, less than thirty years ago, by Rajah Brooke and a British naval force. They were pirates; but they offered (I speak from memory) no resistance. They had no alternative of submission offered. The case was discussed in England and in Parliament, and the conduct of Rajah Brooke was approved by the majority. Lord Herbert and Mr. Hume were among the small number who condemned it.

Secondly, we have alleged orders of General Kauffmann, conditional it is true, but, as set out by Schuyler, commanding the extermination of the women and children, as well as the men, of the marauding tribe. It cannot, I hope, be long before we know incontrovertibly whether this order has been correctly understood and given by Schuyler. If so, it can find no apologist here; but the mere issue of it, whether executed or not, will stand, though as a perfectly isolated, yet as a brutal and shameful act, deserving, as was well said in the *Daily News*, every censure except that bestowed on, and so richly due to, the Turkish proceedings in Bulgaria, and the Government which rewarded their authors.

Thirdly, as to the fact whether the women and children were slaughtered or were spared. We have here a distinct and singular conflict of evidence. Schuyler, founding himself on the verbal statement of Gromoff, a Russian eye-witness, which he took down "from his lips" (p. 359), affirms it. MacGahan, the friend of Schuyler, trusted by him, and himself an eye-witness on foot and horseback of the whole campaign, not less distinctly denies it, and affirms that the conduct of the Russian soldiery, under most trying circumstances, was "infinitely better than that of European* troops in European battles."

On every ground we must hope that this contradiction will be cleared up. As between the two, I cannot but think the testimony in MacGahan, who is an eye-witness, and writes in very full detail, preferable to that of Schuyler, who only reports one, and gives us a rough hasty sketch; and also because it has been much longer before the world. I can charge no unfairness upon others who may think otherwise. But what are we to say of the enlightened anti-sentimental newspaper, which gives and exaggerates the statement in Schuyler, and passes without notice, in its judicial work, the evidence of MacGahan long ago set before the world?

But, fourthly and lastly, the Editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette* did more: he suppressed and garbled evidence material to the case from the very book, the very pages, he professed to quote. Of this we have already seen something; but not nearly all.

a. He suppresses the case of Kuldja. This town was occupied by the Russians after a campaign of eleven days, with two battles. Before the entry into the city one of the tribes in Kuldja, exasperated at the surrender of the Sultan, massacred more than 2,000 of the others. The Russians entered; and here is the account of their conduct, reported by a Chinese agent to his Emperor.

"The Dzian-Dziun† of Semiretch, quieted in every way those who remained in Suidun, both Mautchoos and Chinese, both soldiery and

* The Cossacks engaged in these actions appear to have been Cossacks of the Kirghiz country, distinct from and (Schuyler, ii. 232), inferior to the well-known Cossacks of the Ural and the Don.

† General Kolpakofsky.

civilians, as well as the Chinese Mussulmans, not harming any one: not even a single blade of grass, nor a single tree, not a fowl, nor a dog, received any harm or injury; not a hair was touched. All this is owing to the orders of the Dzian-Dziun of Semiretch. . . .”

And again at the close—

“The leader of the Great Russian Empire, the Dzian-Dziun of Semiretch, with his army, inspired with humanity and truth, has quieted every one. This petty foreign power saved the nation from fire and water, it subdued the whole four countries without the least harm, so that children are not frightened, and the people submitted not without delight and ecstasy.” (ii. 186—188.)

b. In the opening of the article of October 5, I find this passage—

“In the early part of his work on Turkistan, he (Schuyler) expressly compliments the Russians on their humanity in Central Asia, *probably then not knowing what stories he should have to tell before he had done.*”

This is a garbling which simply amounts to falsification. It means, if it means anything, that Schuyler’s compliment refers to the early part of his experience, and could not have been given when it was completed; as if the work were a journal in which the remarks are to be taken with respect to the date at which they are given. It is nothing of the sort. The passage occurs in connection with the capture of Tashkent. It will be found in vol. i. p. 75:—

“It is said that the bazaar was sacked, and many of the inhabitants massacred. If so, this was an exceptional case; for *the Russian movements in Central Asia have been marked by great discipline and humanity.*”*

The writer in the *Pall Mall Gazette* had evidently read the passage, of which he gives an account (without a reference) that it would be weakness to call anything but dishonest. It has nothing to do with earlier or later experience. At Tashkent, he had no experience at all, for his visit was some nine years after the capture; and he takes occasion, from a rumour he heard there, to give a general judgment on the operations of the Russians in direct contradiction to the charges which the *Pall Mall Gazette* has to make, and in complete accordance with the testimony of MacGahan.† Hence the passage had to be let alone or falsified; and the latter of the two was chosen.

c. Even yet I have to give another instance of this Editor’s wonderful faculty of suppressing evidence:—

In vol. ii. p. 354, on the page containing the commencement of

* I ought, perhaps, to state that I have read the whole of Schuyler’s book, and that I am not aware of any passage in it, apart from what is treated in this article, which can in any way impugn this strong and general commendation.

† A week later, in a review of Schuyler’s book—in the literary, not the political department of the paper (written as a literary and not a political article), it is stated that “in some instances” we have “ample evidence” from his book that “the Russians have not always pursued a barbarous or heartless policy.” This is a little better, if it be not indeed a little worse—as providing a sort of quotable passage in defence of any accusation of disingenuousness—a passage be it observed, however, late enough not to interfere with the effect of the previous falsification, for which no sort or kind of apology is made.

the Turkoman narrative which he quotes, we find the account of the massacre of the Persians, which he suppresses; and in pp. 352, 353 the account of the capture of Khiva and the fearfully severe discipline enforced on the Russian soldiery:—

“These arrangements being made, General Kauffmann declared to the population of the Khanate the mercy of the Emperor, on condition that they should live quietly and peaceably, and occupy themselves with their business and with agricultural labour. . . . Strict orders were given at the same time to the soldiers to send out no foraging parties, and to take nothing from the inhabitants, but to pay cash for everything at the bazaars. . . . In one case a soldier was sentenced to be hung for stealing a cow. The evidence of the native accuser had been accepted without other proof, and he was only able to escape because his comrades and the officers of his company proved that the cow had followed the company ever since crossing the Amir Darya. At another time, six soldiers were sentenced to be shot; but these severities were exercising such discontent among the troops, officers as well as soldiers, that at the personal request of the two Grand Dukes the men were pardoned.”

On what principle of justice, charity, or decency is General Kauffmann to be deprived of the benefit of this remarkable testimony? But the introduction of this passage immediately preceding would have sadly marred the telling and needful parallel between Khiva and Bulgaria, and this, too, was suppressed accordingly.

Such is the “information” supplied, at this epoch of blazing light, in a most great and solemn cause, to millionaire drawing-rooms, to the loungers in arm-chairs at clubs, to Tory members of Parliament,* greedy for something to say to constituencies, but recently astounded by the discovery of a huge iniquity, too long kept back from them. And this by a Journal which in the faintest perfume of humanity smells a dangerous fanaticism. But what means are not sanctified by their end, when the purpose is, not indeed to whitewash Islam in Bulgaria, for that is now despaired of, but to do the next best thing, namely to black-wash the country which is its historical antagonist? To expose cruelty is good: but there are other things besides cruelty which ought to be exposed, and among these is the deliberate fraud of a trusted or, in its own chosen phrase, a responsible† adviser. Untruth, even when used for beneficial ends, is bad and base. It is here used for no good end. It is not meant to draw forth tears for Turkomans, not undeserving of them though in some respects they be. It is meant to sow strife, with the risk of bloodshed; and the end in view, and the means employed, are worthy of one another.

W. E. GLADSTONE.

* See, for example, the speech of Sir Thomas Bateson, M.P., a few days ago, at Belfast; and the speech of Mr. Hanbury, M.P., at Hanley. “Mr. Schuyler went also into Central Asia with the Russian Army, and he narrated how precisely the same atrocities had been committed by the Russians in Central Asia.”—*Staffordshire Daily Sentinel*, October 18, 1876. The sentences would be correct, if the word “not” were inserted in each of them. It is truly a royal road to learning, when research begins and ends with the leading article of a newspaper.

† *Pall Mall Gazette*, October 23, p. 9: “Immunity in Politics.”



A PSYCHOLOGICAL PARALLEL.

WHOEVER has to impugn the soundness of popular theology will most certainly find parts in his task which are unwelcome and painful. Other parts in it, however, are full of reward. And none more so than those, in which the work to be done is positive not negative, and uniting not dividing; in which what survives in Christianity is dwelt upon, not what perishes; and what offers us points of contact with the religion of the community, rather than motives for breaking with it. Popular religion is too forward to employ arguments which may well be called arguments of despair. "Take me in the lump," it cries, "or give up Christianity altogether. Construe the Bible as I do, or renounce my public worship and solemnities; renounce all communion with me, as an imposture and falsehood on your part. Quit, as weak-minded, deluded blunderers, all those doctors and lights of the Church who have long served you, aided you, been dear to you. Those teachers set forth what are, in your opinion, errors, and go on grounds which you believe to be hollow. Whoever thinks as you do, ought, if he is courageous and consistent, to trust such blind guides no more, but to remain staunch by his new lights and himself."

It happens, I suppose, to most people who treat an interesting subject, and it happens to me, to receive from those whom the subject interests, and who may have in general followed one's treatment of it with sympathy, avowals of difficulty upon certain points, requests for explanation. But the discussion of a subject,

more especially of a religious subject, may easily be pursued longer than is advisable. On the immense difference which there seems to me to be between the popular conception of Christianity and the true conception of it, I have said what I wished to say. I wished to say it, partly in order to aid those whom the popular conception embarrassed, partly because, having frequently occasion to assert the truth and importance of Christianity against those who disparaged them, I was bound in honesty to make clear what sort of Christianity I meant. But having said, however imperfectly, what I wished, I leave, and am glad to leave, a discussion where the hope to do good must always be mixed with an apprehension of doing harm. Only, in leaving it, I will conclude with what cannot, one may hope, do harm : an endeavour to dispel some difficulties raised by the *arguments of despair*, as I have called them, of popular religion.

I have formerly spoken at much length of the writings of St. Paul, pointing out what a clue he gives us to the right understanding of the word *resurrection*, the great word of Christianity ; and how he deserves, on this account, our special interest and study. It is the *spiritual* resurrection of which he is thus the instructive expounder to us. But undoubtedly he believed also in the miracle of the physical resurrection, both of Jesus himself and for mankind at large. This belief those who do not admit the miraculous will not share with him. And one who does not admit the miraculous, but who yet had continued to think St. Paul worthy of all honour and his teaching full of instruction, brings forward to me a sentence from an eloquent and most popular author, wherein it is said that " St. Paul—surely no imbecile or credulous enthusiast—vouches for the reality of the (physical) resurrection, of the appearances of Jesus after it, and of his own vision." Must then St. Paul, he asks, if he was mistaken in thus vouching, which whoever does not admit the miraculous cannot but suppose, of necessity be an "imbecile and credulous enthusiast," and his words and character of no more value to us than those of that slight sort of people? And again, my questioner finds the same author saying, that to suppose St. Paul and the Evangelists mistaken about the miracles which they allege, is to "insinuate that the faith of Christendom was founded on most facile and reprehensible credulity, and this in men who have taught the spirit of truthfulness as a primary duty of the religion which they preached." And he inquires whether St. Paul and the Evangelists, in admitting the miraculous, were really founding the faith of Christendom on most facile and reprehensible credulity, and were false to the spirit of truthfulness taught by themselves as the primary duty of the religion which they preached.

Let me answer by putting a parallel case. The argument is

that St. Paul, by believing and asserting the reality of the physical resurrection and subsequent appearances of Jesus, proves himself, supposing those alleged facts not to have happened, an imbecile or credulous enthusiast, and an unprofitable guide. His own vision we need not take into account, because even those who do not admit the miraculous will readily admit that he had his vision, only they say it is to be explained naturally. But they do not admit the reality of the physical resurrection of Jesus and of his appearances afterwards, while yet they must own that St. Paul did. The question is, does either the belief of these things by a man of signal truthfulness, judgment, and mental power, in St. Paul's circumstances, prove them to have really happened; or does his believing them, in spite of their not having really happened, prove that he cannot have been a man of great truthfulness, judgment, and mental power?

Undeniably St. Paul was mistaken about the imminence of the end of the world. But this was a matter of expectation, not experience. If he was mistaken about a grave fact alleged to have already positively happened, such as the bodily resurrection of Jesus, he must, it is argued, have been a credulous and imbecile enthusiast.

I have already mentioned in this REVIEW Sir Matthew Hale's belief in the reality of witchcraft. The contemporary records of this belief in our own country and among our own people, in a century of great intellectual force and achievement, and when the printing press fixed and preserved the accounts of public proceedings to which the charge of witchcraft gave rise, are of extraordinary interest. They throw an invaluable light for us on the history of the human spirit. I think it is not an illusion of national self-esteem to flatter ourselves that something of the English "good nature and good humour" is not absent even from these repulsive records; that from the traits of infuriated, infernal cruelty which characterize similar records elsewhere, particularly among the Latin nations, they are in a great measure free. They reveal, too, beginnings of that revolt of good sense, gleams of that reason, that criticism, which was presently to disperse the long-prevailing belief in witchcraft. At the beginning of the eighteenth century Addison, though he himself looks with disfavour on a man who wholly disbelieves in ghosts and apparitions, yet smiles at Sir Roger de Coverley's belief in witches, as a belief which intelligent men had outgrown, a survival from times of ignorance. Nevertheless, in 1716, two women were hanged at Huntingdon for witchcraft. But they were the last victims, and in 1736 the penal statutes against witchcraft were repealed. And by the end of the eighteenth century, the majority of rational people had come to disbelieve, not in witches only, but in ghosts also. Incredulity had become the rule, credulity the exception.

But through the greater part of the seventeenth century things were just the other way. Credulity about witchcraft was the rule, incredulity the exception. It is by its all-pervadingness, its seemingly inevitable and natural character, that this credulity of the seventeenth century is distinguished from modern growths which are sometimes compared with it. In the addition to what is called spiritualism, there is something factitious and artificial. It is quite easy to pay no attention to spiritualists and their exhibitions; and a man of serious temper, a man even of matured sense, will in general pay none. He will instinctively apply Goethe's excellent caution: that we have all of us a nervous system which can easily be worked upon, that we are most of us very easily puzzled, and that it is foolish, by idly perplexing our understanding and playing with our nervous system, to titillate in ourselves the fibre of superstition. Whoever runs after our modern sorcerers may indeed find them. He may make acquaintance with their new spiritual visitants who have succeeded to the old-fashioned imps of the seventeenth century—to the Jarmara, Elemauzer, Sack and Sugar, Vinegar Tom, and Greezel Greedigut, of our trials for witchcraft. But he may also pass his life without troubling his head about them and their masters. In the seventeenth century, on the other hand, the belief in witches and their works met a man at every turn, and created an atmosphere for his thoughts which they could not help feeling. A man who scouted the belief, who even disparaged it, was called Sadducee, atheist, and infidel. Relations of the conviction of witches had their sharp word of "condemnation for the particular opinion of some men who suppose there be none at all." They had their caution to him "to take heed how he either despised the power of God in His creatures, or vilipended the subtlety and fury of the Devil as God's minister of vengeance." The ministers of religion took a leading part in the proceedings against witches; the Puritan ministers were here particularly busy. Scripture had said: *Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live.* And, strange to say, the poor creatures tried and executed for witchcraft appear to have usually been themselves firm believers in their own magic. They confess their compact with the devil, and specify the imps, or familiars, whom they have at their disposal. All this, I say, created for the mind an atmosphere from which it was hard to escape. Again and again we hear of the "sufficient justices of the peace and discreet magistrates," of the "persons of great knowledge," who were satisfied with the proofs of witchcraft offered to them. It is sufficiently clear that to take as solid and convincing, where a witch was in question, evidence which would now be accepted by no reasonable man, was in the seventeenth century quite compatible with truthfulness of disposition, vigour of intelligence, and penetrating judgment on other matters.

Certainly these three advantages—truthfulness of disposition, vigour of intelligence, and penetrating judgment—were abundantly possessed by the famous Chief Justice of Charles the Second's reign, Sir Matthew Hale. Burnet notices the remarkable mixture in him of sweetness with gravity, so to the three forenamed advantages we may add gentleness of temper. There is extant the report of a famous trial for witchcraft before Sir Matthew Hale.* Two widows of Lowestoft in Suffolk, named Rose Cullender and Amy Duny, were tried before him at Bury St. Edmunds, at the Spring Assizes in 1664, as witches. The report was taken in Court during the trial, but was not published till eighteen years afterwards, in 1682. Every decade, at that time, saw a progressive decline in the belief in witchcraft. The person who published the report was, however, a believer; and he considered, he tells us, that "so exact a relation of this trial would probably give more satisfaction to a great many persons, by reason that it is pure matter of fact, and that evidently demonstrated, than the arguments and reasons of other very learned men that probably may not be so intelligible to all readers; especially, this being held before a judge whom for his integrity, learning, and law, hardly any age either before or since could parallel; who not only took a great deal of pains and spent much time in this trial himself, but had the assistance and opinion of several other very eminent and learned persons." One of these persons was Sir Thomas Browne, of Norwich, the author of the "*Religio Medici*" and of the book "*On Vulgar Errors*."

The relation of the trial of Rose Cullender and Amy Duny is indeed most interesting and most instructive, because it shows us so clearly how to live in a certain atmosphere of belief will govern men's conclusions from what they see and hear. To us who do not believe in witches, the evidence on which Rose Cullender and Amy Duny were convicted carries its own natural explanation with it, and itself dispels the charge against them. They were accused of having bewitched a number of children, causing them to have fits, and to bring up pins and nails. Several of the witnesses were poor ignorant people. The weighty evidence in the case was that of Samuel Pacy, a merchant of Lowestoft, two of whose children, Elizabeth and Deborah, of the ages of eleven and nine, were said to have been bewitched. The younger child was too ill to be brought to the Assizes; but the elder was produced in Court. Samuel Pacy, their father, is described as "a man who carried himself with much soberness during the trial, from whom proceeded no words either of passion or malice, though his children were so greatly afflicted." He deposed that his younger daughter, being lame and without

* Reprinted in "*A Collection of Rare and Curious Tracts relating to Witchcraft*:" London, 1838.

power in her limbs, had on a sunshiny day in October “desired to be carried on the east part of the house to be set upon the bank which looketh upon the sea.” While she sat there, Amy Duny, who as well as the other prisoner is shown by the evidence to have been by her neighbours commonly reputed a witch, came to the house to get some herrings. She was refused, and went away grumbling. At the same moment the child was seized with violent fits. The doctor who attended her could not explain them. So ten days afterwards her father, according to his own deposition, “by reason of the circumstances aforesaid, and in regard Amy Duny is a woman of an ill-fame and commonly reported to be a witch and a sorceress, and for that the said child in her fits would cry out of Amy Duny as the cause of her malady, and that she did affright her with apparitions of her person, as the child in the interval of her fits related, did suspect the said Amy Duny for a witch, and charged her with the injury and wrong to his child, and caused her to be set in the stocks.” While she was there, two women asked her the reason of the illness of Mr. Pacy’s child. She answered, “Mr. Pacy keeps a great stir about his child, but let him stay until he hath done as much by his children as I have done by mine.” Being asked what she had done to hers, she replied that “she had been fain to open her child’s mouth with a tap to give it victuals.” Two days afterwards Pacy’s elder daughter, Elizabeth, was seized with fits like her sister’s; “inso-much that they could not open her mouth to preserve her life without the help of a tap which they were obliged to use.” The children in their fits would cry out: “There stands Amy Duny” or “Rose Cullender” (another reputed witch of Lowestoft); and when the fits were over, would relate how they had seen Amy Duny and Rose Cullender shaking their fists at them and threatening them. They said that bees or flies carried into their mouths the pins and nails which they brought up in their fits. During their illness their father sometimes made them read aloud from the New Testament. He “observed that they would read till they came to the name of *Lord* or *Jesus* or *Christ*, and then before they could pronounce either of the said words they would suddenly fall into their fits. But when they came to the name of *Satan* or *Devil* they would clap their fingers upon the book, crying out, ‘This bites, but makes me speak right well.’” And when their father asked them why they could not pronounce the words *Lord*, or *Jesus*, or *Christ*, they answered: “Amy Duny saith, I must not use that name.”

It seems almost an impertinence nowadays to suppose that any one can require telling how self-explanatory all this is, without recourse to witchcraft and magic. These poor rickety children, full of disease and with morbid tricks, have their imagination possessed by the two famed and dreaded witches of their native place,

of whose prowess they have heard tale after tale, whom they have often seen with their own eyes, whose presence has startled one of them in her hour of suffering, and round whom all those ideas of diabolical agency, in which they have been nursed, converge and cluster. The speech of the accused witch in the stocks is the most natural speech possible, and the fulfilment which her words received in the course of Elizabeth Pacy's fits is perfectly natural also. However, Sir Thomas Browne (who appears in the report of the trial as "Dr. Brown, of Norwich, a person of great knowledge") being desired to give his opinion on Elizabeth Pacy's case, and that of two other children who on similar evidence were said to have been bewitched by the accused,—Sir Thomas Browne

"was clearly of opinion that the persons were bewitched; and said that in Denmark there had been lately a great discovery of witches, who used the very same way of afflicting persons by conveying pins into them, and crooked as these pins were, with needles and nails. And his opinion was that the Devil in such cases did work upon the bodies of men and women upon a natural foundation, . . . for he conceived that these swooning fits were natural, and nothing else but what they call *the mother*, but only heightened to a great excess by the subtlety of the Devil, co-operating with the malice of these which we term witches, at whose instance he doth these villainies."

That was all the light to be got from the celebrated writer on "Vulgar Errors." Yet reason, in this trial, was not left quite without witness:—

"At the hearing the evidence, there were divers known persons, as Mr. Serjeant Keeling, Mr. Serjeant Earl, and Mr. Serjeant Bernard, present. Mr. Serjeant Keeling seemed much unsatisfied with it, and thought it not sufficient to convict the prisoners; for admitting that the children were in truth bewitched, yet, said he, it can never be applied to the prisoners upon the imagination only of the parties afflicted. For if that might be allowed, no person whatsoever can be in safety; for perhaps they might fancy another person, who might altogether be innocent in such matters."

In order, therefore, the better to establish the guilt of the prisoners, they were made to touch the children whom they were said to have bewitched. The children screamed out at their touch. The children were "blinded with their own aprons," and in this condition were again touched by Rose Cullender; and again they screamed out. It was objected, not that the children's heads were full of Rose Cullender and Amy Duny, and of their infernal dealings with them, but that the children might be counterfeiting their malady, and pretending to start at the witch's touch, though it had no real power on them. .

"Wherefore to avoid this scruple it was privately desired by the judge that the Lord Cornwallis, Sir Edward Bacon, Mr. Serjeant Keeling, and some other gentlemen then in Court, would attend one of the distempered persons in the further part of the hall, whilst she was in her fits, and then to send for one of the witches to try what would then happen, which they did accordingly. And Amy Duny was conveyed from the bar and brought to

the maid; they put an apron before her eyes, and then one other person touched her hand, which produced the same effect as the touch of the witch did in the court. Whereupon the gentlemen returned, openly protesting that they did believe the whole transaction of this business was a mere imposture."

This, we are told, "put the court and all persons into a stand. But at length Mr. Pacy did declare that possibly the maid might be deceived by a suspicion that the witch touched her when she did not." And nothing more likely; but what does this prove? That the child's terrors were sincere; not that the so-called witch had done the acts alleged against her. However, Mr. Pacy's solution of the difficulty was accepted. If the children were not shamming out of malice or from a love of imposture, then "it is very evident that the parties were bewitched, and that when they apprehend that the persons who have done them this wrong are near, or touch them, then their spirits being more than ordinarily moved with rage and anger, they do use more violent gestures of their bodies."

Such was the evidence. The accused did not confess themselves guilty. When asked what they had to say for themselves, they replied, as well they might: "Nothing material to anything that had been proved." Hale charged the jury. He did not even go over the evidence to them:—

"Only this he acquainted them: that they had two things to inquire after. First, whether or no these children were bewitched; secondly, whether the prisoners at the bar were guilty of it. That there were such creatures as witches he made no doubt at all. For, first, the Scriptures had affirmed so much; secondly, the wisdom of all nations had provided laws against such persons, which is an argument of their confidence of such a crime. And such hath been the judgment of this kingdom, as appears by that Act of Parliament which hath provided punishments proportionable to the quality of the offence. And he desired them strictly to observe their evidence, and desired the great God of Heaven to direct their hearts in this weighty thing they had in hand. For to condemn the innocent, and to let the guilty go free, were both an abomination to the Lord."

The jury retired. In half-an-hour they came back with a verdict of *guilty* against both prisoners. Next morning the children who had been produced in court were brought to Hale's lodgings, perfectly restored:—

"And Mr. Pacy did affirm, that within less than half-an-hour after the witches were convicted, they were all of them restored, and slept well that night; only Susan Chandler felt a pain like pricking of pins in her stomach."

This seems to have removed all shadow of doubt or misgiving:—

"In conclusion, the judge and all the court were fully satisfied with the verdict, and thereupon gave judgment against the witches that they should be hanged. They were much urged to confess, but would not. That morning we departed for Cambridge; but no reprieve was granted, and they were executed on Monday, the seventeenth of March (1664) following, but they confessed nothing."

Now, the inference to be drawn from this trial is not by any means that Hale was an "imbecile or credulous enthusiast." The whole history of his life and doings disproves it. But the belief in witchcraft was in the very atmosphere which Hale breathed, as the belief in miracle was in the very atmosphere which St. Paul breathed. What the trial shows us is, that a man of veracity, judgment, and mental power, may have his mind thoroughly governed, on certain subjects, by a foregone conclusion as to what is likely and credible. But I will not further enlarge on the illustration which Hale furnishes to us of this truth. An illustration of it, with a yet closer applicability to St. Paul, is supplied by another worthy of the seventeenth century.

He is very little known, and I rejoice to have the opportunity of naming him. *John Smith*—the name does not sound promising! He died at the age of thirty-four, having risen to no higher post in the world than a college-fellowship. "He proceeded leisurely by orderly steps," says Simon Patrick, afterwards Bishop of Ely, who preached his funeral sermon, "not to what he could get, but to what he was fit to undertake." John Smith, born in 1618 near Oundle in Northamptonshire, was admitted a scholar of Emanuel College at Cambridge in 1636, a fellow of Queen's College in 1644. He became a tutor and preacher in his college; died there, "after a tedious sickness," on the 7th of August, 1652, and was buried in the college chapel. He was one of that band of Cambridge Platonists, or *latitude men*, as in their own day they were called, whom Burnet has well described as those "who, at Cambridge, studied to propagate better thoughts, to take men off from being in parties, or from narrow notions, from superstitious conceits, and fierceness about opinions." Principal Tulloch has done a good work in seeking to re-awaken our interest in this noble but neglected group. But in his recent account of them he has given, I cannot but think, far too much space to their Platonic philosophy, to their disquisitions on spirit and incorporeal essence. It is not by these that they merited to live, or that, having passed away from men's minds, they will be brought back to them. It is by their extraordinarily simple, profound, and just conception of religion. Placed between the sacerdotal religion of the Laudian clergy and the notional religion of the Puritans, they saw the sterility, the certain doom, of both; inasmuch as Christianity was not what either of them supposed, but was a *temper*, a *behaviour*.

Their immediate recompence was a religious isolation of two centuries. The religious world was not then ripe for more than the High Church conception of Christianity on the one hand, or the Puritan conception on the other. The Cambridge band ceased to acquire recruits, and disappeared with the century. **Individ**

knew and used them; Bishop Wilson of Sodor and Man, in particular, had profited by them. But they made no broad and clear mark. And this was in part for the reason already given, in part because what passed for their great work was that revival of a spiritualist and Platonic philosophy, to which Principal Tulloch, as I have said, has given too much prominence. By this attempted revival they could not and cannot live. The theology and writings of Owen are not more extinct than the "Intellectual System" of Cudworth. But in a history of the Cambridge Platonists, works of the magnitude of Cudworth's "Intellectual System of the Universe" must necessarily, perhaps, fill a large space. Therefore it is not so much a history of them which is wanted, as a republication of such of their utterances as show us their real spirit and power. The remains of Hales of Eton, the sermons and aphorisms of Whichcote, the sermon preached by Cudworth before the House of Commons, with the sermon printed as a companion to it, single sayings and maxims of Henry More, and the "Select Discourses" of John Smith—there are our documents! In them lies enshrined what the Cambridge Platonists have of value for us. It were well if Principal Tulloch would himself extract it and give it to us; but given some day, and by some hand, it will surely be.

For the Cambridge Platonists here offer, formulated with sufficient distinctness, a conception of religion true, long obscured, and for which the hour of light has at last come. Their productions will not take rank as great works of literature and style. It is not to the history of literature that Whichcote and Smith belong, but to the history of religion. Their contemporaries were Bossuet, Pascal, Taylor, Barrow. These are, indeed, religious writers, yet it is in the history of literature that they are mainly eminent. What counts in the history of religion, is to give what at critical moments the religious life of mankind needs and can use. And it will be found that the Cambridge Platonists, although neither epoch-making philosophers nor epoch-making men of letters, have in their conception of religion a boon for the religious wants of our time, such as we shall look for in vain in the soul and poetry of Taylor, in the sense and vigour of Barrow, in the superb exertations of Bossuet, or in the passion-filled reasoning and rhetoric of Pascal.

The "Select Discourses" of John Smith, collected and published from his papers after his death, are, in my opinion, much the most considerable work left to us by this Cambridge school. They have a right to a place in English literary history. The neglect to republish them is even on that ground inexcusable. Yet the main value of the "Select Discourses" is religious, not literary. Their grand merit is that they insist on the profound *natural truth* of ~~Christianity~~ and thus base it upon a ground which will not

crumble under our feet. Signal and rare indeed is the merit, in a theological instructor, of presenting Christianity to us in this fashion. Christianity is true, but in general the whole plan for grounding and buttressing it chosen by our theological instructors is false; and, since it is false, it must fail us sooner or later. I have often thought that if candidates for orders were simply to read and digest Smith's great discourse "On the Excellency and Nobleness of True Religion," together with M. Reuss's "History of Christian Theology at the time of the Apostles," and nothing further except the Bible itself, we might have, perhaps, a hope of getting, as our national guides in religion, a clergy which could tell its bearings and steer its way, instead of being, as we now see it, too often conspicuously at a loss to do either.

Singularly enough, about fifteen years before the trial at Bury St. Edmunds of the Lowestoft witches, John Smith, the author of the "Select Discourses," had in those very eastern counties to deliver his mind on the matter of witchcraft. On Lady-Day every year a Fellow of Queen's College, Cambridge, was required to preach at Huntingdon a sermon against witchcraft and diabolical contracts. Smith, as one of the Fellows of Queen's, had to preach this sermon. It is printed tenth and last of his "Select Discourses," with the title: "A Christian's Conflicts and Conquests; or, a Discourse concerning the Devil's Active Enmity and Continual Hostility against Man, the Warfare of a Christian Life, the Certainty of Success and Victory in this Spiritual Warfare, the Evil and Horridness of Magical Arts and Rites, Diabolical Contracts, &c." The discourse has for its text the words: "Resist the devil, and he will flee from you."

The preacher sets out with the traditional account of "the prince of darkness, who, having once stained the original beauty and glory of the divine workmanship, is continually striving to mould and shape it more and more into his own likeness." He says—

"It were perhaps a vain curiosity to inquire whether the number of evil spirits exceeds the number of men; but this is too, too certain, that we never want the secret and latent attendance of them. . . . Those evil spirits are not yet cast out of the world into outer darkness, though it be prepared for them; the bottomless pit hath not yet shut its mouth upon them."

And he concludes his sermon with a reflection and a caution, called for, he says, by the particular occasion. The reflection is that—

"Did we not live in a world of professed wickedness, wherein so many men's sins go in open view before them to judgment, it might be thought needless to persuade men to resist the devil when he appears in his own colours to make merchandise of them, and comes in a formal way to bargain with them for their souls; that which human nature, however enthralled to sin and Satan in a more mysterious way, abhors, and none admit but those who are quite degenerated from human kind."

And he adds the caution, that—

“The use of any arts, rites, or ceremonies not understood, of which we can give no rational or divine account, this indeed is nothing else but a kind of magic which the devil himself owns and gives life to, though he may not be corporeally present, or require presently any further covenant from the users of them. The devil, no question, is present to all his own rites and ceremonies, though men discern him not, and may upon the use of them secretly produce those effects which may gain credit to them. Among these rites we may reckon insignificant forms of words, with their several modes and manner of pronunciation, astrological arts, and whatsoever else pretends to any strange effects which we cannot with good reason either ascribe to God or nature. As God will only be conversed withal in a way of light and understanding, so the devil loves to be conversed with in a way of darkness and obscurity.”

But between his exordium and his conclusion the real man appears. Like Hale, Smith accepted the belief in witchcraft and in diabolical contracts which was regnant in his day. But it was his nature to seek a firm ground for the ideas admitted by him; above all, when these ideas had bearings upon religion. And for witchcraft and diabolical operation, in the common conception of them as external things, he could find no solid ground, for there was none; and therefore he could not use them. See, therefore, how profoundly they are transformed by him. After his exordium he makes a fresh departure:—“When we say the devil is continually busy with us, I mean not only some apostate spirit as one particular being, but that spirit of apostasy which is lodged in all men’s natures.” Here, in this *spirit of apostasy which is lodged in all men’s natures*, Smith had what was at bottom experimental and real. And the whole effort of the sermon is to substitute this for what men call the devil, hell, fiends, and witches, as an object for their serious thought and strenuous resistance.

“As the kingdom of heaven is not so much without men as within, as our Saviour tells us; so the tyranny of the devil and hell is not so much in some external things as in the qualities and dispositions of men’s minds. And as the enjoying of God and conversing with him consists not so much in a change of place as in the participation of the divine nature and in our assimilation unto God; so our conversing with the devil is not so much by a mutual local presence as by an imitation of a wicked and sinful nature derived upon men’s own souls. . . . He that allows himself in any sin, or useth an unnatural dalliance with any vice, does nothing else in reality than entertain an *incubus demon*.”

This was by no means a view of diabolical possession acceptable to the religious world and to its Puritan ministers:—

“I know these expressions will seem to some very harsh and unwelcome; but I would beseech them to consider what they will call that spirit of malice and envy, that spirit of pride, ambition, vain-glory, covetousness, injustice, uncleanness, &c., that commonly reigns so much and acts so violently in the minds and lives of men. Let us speak the truth, and call things by their own names; so much as there is of sin in any man, so much there is of the diabolical nature. Why do we defy the

devil so much with our tongues, while we entertain him in our hearts? As men's love to God is ordinarily nothing else but the mere tendency of their natures to something that hath the name of God put upon it, without any clear or distinct apprehensions of him, so their hatred of the devil is commonly nothing else but an inward displacency of nature against something entitled by the devil's name. And as they commonly make a God like to themselves, such a one as they can but comply with and love, so they make a devil most unlike to themselves, which may be anything but what they themselves are, that so they may most freely spend their anger and hatred upon him; just as they say of some of the Ethiopians, who used to paint the devil white because they themselves are black. This is a strange, merry kind of madness, whereby men sportingly bereave themselves of the supremest good, and insure themselves, as much as may be, to hell and misery; they may thus cheat themselves for a while, but the eternal foundation of the Divine Being is immutable and unchangeable. And where we find wisdom, justice, loveliness, goodness, love, and glory in their highest elevations and most unbounded dimensions, that is He; and where we find any true participations of these, there is a true communication of God; and a defection from these is the essence of sin and the foundation of hell."

O fortunate Huntingdon Church, which admitted for even one day such a counterblast to the doctrines then sounding from every pulpit, and still enjoined by Sir Robert Phillimore! Finally (and I quote the more freely because the author whom I quote is so little known),—finally our preacher confutes even his own exordium:—

"It was the fond error of the Manichees that there was some solid *principium mali*, which, having an eternal existence of its own, had also a mighty and uncontrollable power from within itself whereby it could forcibly enter into the souls of men, and, seating itself there, by some hidden influences irresistibly incline and inforce them to evil. But we ourselves uphold that kingdom of darkness, which else would tumble down and slide into that nothing from whence it came. All sin and vice is our own creature; we only give life to them which indeed are our death, and would soon wither and fade away did we substract our concurrence from them."

That a man shares an error of the minds around him and of the times in which he lives, proves nothing against his being a man of veracity, judgment, and mental power. This we saw by the case of Hale. But here in our Cambridge Platonist we have a man who accepts the erroneous belief in witchcraft, professes it publicly, preaches on it; and yet is not only a man of veracity and intelligence, but actually manages to give to the error adopted by him a turn, an aspect, which indicates its erroneousness. Not only is he of help to us generally, in spite of his error; he is of help to us in respect of that very error itself.

Now, here is really a most striking analogy between our little-known divine of the seventeenth century and the great Apostle of the Gentiles. St. Paul's writings are in every one's hands. I have myself discussed his doctrine at length. And for our present purpose there is no need of elaborate exposition and quotation. Every

one knows how St. Paul declares his belief that "Christ rose again the third day, and was seen of Cephas, then of the twelve; after that, he was seen of above five hundred brethren at once." Those who do not admit the miraculous can yet well conceive how such a belief arose, and was entertained by St. Paul. *The resurrection of the just* was at that time a ruling idea of a Jew's mind. Herod at once, and without difficulty, supposed that John the Baptist was *risen from the dead*; the Jewish people without difficulty supposed that Jesus might be one of the old prophets, *risen from the dead*. In telling the story of the crucifixion men added, quite naturally, that when it was consummated "many bodies of the saints which slept *arose and appeared unto many*." Jesus himself had in his lifetime spoken frequently of his own coming resurrection. Such beliefs as the belief in bodily resurrection were a part of the mental atmosphere in which the first Christians lived. It was inevitable that they should believe their Master to have risen again in the body, and that St. Paul, in becoming a Christian, should receive the belief and build upon it.

But Paul, like our Cambridge Platonist, instinctively sought in an idea used for religion a side by which the idea could enter into his religious experience and become real to him. No such side could be afforded by the mere external fact and miracle of Christ's bodily resurrection. Paul, therefore, as is well known, by a prodigy of religious insight seized another aspect for the resurrection than the aspect of physical miracle. He presented resurrection as a spiritual rising which could be appropriated and enacted in our own living experience. "If One died in the name of all, then all died; and he died in the name of all, that they who live should no more live unto themselves, but unto him who died and rose again in their name." Dying became thus no longer a bodily dying, but a dying to sin; rising to life no longer a bodily resurrection, but a living to God. St. Paul here comes, therefore, upon the very idea of death and resurrection which was the central idea of Jesus himself. At the same moment that he shares and professes that popular belief in Christ's miraculous bodily resurrection by which our Saviour's own idea of resurrection has been overlaid and effaced, he seizes also this other idea or is seized by it, and bears unconscious witness to its unique legitimacy.

Where, then, is the force of that *argument of despair*, as we called it, that if St. Paul vouches for the bodily resurrection of Jesus and for his appearance after it, and is mistaken in so vouching, then he must be an imbecile or credulous enthusiast, untruthful and unprofitable? We see that for a man to believe in preternatural incidents, of a kind admitted by the common belief of his time, proves nothing against his general truthfulness and sagacity. Nay, we see that even while affirming such preternatural

incidents, he may with profound insight seize the true and natural aspect of them, the aspect which will survive and profit when the miraculous aspect has faded. He may give us, in the very same work, current error and also fruitful and profound new truth, the error's future corrective.

But I am treating of these matters for the last time. And those who no longer admit, in religion, the old basis of the preternatural, I see them encountered by scruples of their own, as well as by scruples raised by their opponents. The partisans of miracle require them, if they refuse to admit miracle, to throw aside as imbecile or untruthful all their instructors and inspirers who have admitted it. And they themselves are sometimes afraid, not only of being called inconsistent and insincere, but of really meriting to be called so, if they do not break decidedly with the religion in which they have been brought up, if they at all try still to conform to it and to use it. I have now before me a remarkable letter, in which the writer says—

“There is nothing I and many others should like better than to take service as ministers in the Church as *a national society for the promotion of goodness*; but how can we do so, when we have first to declare our belief in a quantity of things that every intelligent man rejects?”

Now, as I have examined the question whether a man who rejects miracles must break with St. Paul because he asserted them, so let me, before I end, examine the question whether such a man must break with the Church of his country and childhood.

Certainly it is a strong thing to suppose, as the writer of the above-quoted letter supposes, a man taking orders in the Church of England who accepts, say, the view of Christianity offered in “*Literature and Dogma*.” For the Church of England presents as science, and as necessary to salvation, what it is the very object of that book to show to be *not* science and *not* necessary to salvation. And at ordination a man is required to declare that he, too, accepts this for science, as the Church does. Formerly a deacon subscribed to the Thirty-nine Articles, and to a declaration that he acknowledged “all and every the articles therein contained to be agreeable to the word of God.” A clerk, admitted to a benefice with cure, declared “his unfeigned assent and consent to all the matters contained in the Articles.” At present, I think, all that is required is a general consent to whatever is contained in the Book of Common Prayer. But the Book of Common Prayer contains the Thirty-nine Articles, and the Eighth Article declares the Three Creeds to be science, science “thoroughly to be received and believed.” Now, whether one professes an “unfeigned assent and consent” to this Article, or merely “a general consent” to

it, one certainly, by consenting to it at all, professes to receive the Three Creeds as science, and as true science. And this is the very point where it is important to be explicit and firm. Whatever else the Three Creeds may be, they are not science, truly formulating the Christian religion. And no one who feels convinced that they are not, can sincerely say that he gives even a general consent to the Eighth Article, or can at present, therefore, be ordained a minister of the Church of England.

The obstacle, it will be observed, is in a test which lies outside of the Ordination Service itself. The test is a remnant of the system of subscriptions and tests once employed so vigorously, and was meant as a reduction and alleviation of that old yoke. But it has a great power of exclusion. If it were possible for Liberal politicians ever to deal seriously with religion, they would turn their minds to the removal of a test of this sort, instead of playing with political dissent or marriage with a deceased wife's sister. The Ordination Service itself, on a man's entrance into orders, and the use of the Church services afterwards, are a sufficient engagement. There are things in the Ordination Service which one might wish otherwise. Some of them are matters of taste. The introduction of the Oath of Supremacy is a part, no doubt, of all that *lion and unicorn* business which is too plentiful in our Prayer Book, on which Dr. Newman has showered such exquisite raillery, and of which only the Philistine element in our race prevents our seeing the ridiculousness. If the Oath of Supremacy is to be taken at all, it should be taken before the civil magistrate. But apart from such mere matters of taste, there is the requirement, in the Ordering of Deacons, of a declaration of unfeigned belief in all the canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament. Perhaps this declaration can have a construction put upon it which makes it admissible. But by its form of expression it recalls, and seems to adopt, the narrow and letter-bound views of Biblical inspiration formerly prevalent—prevalent with the Fathers as well as with the Reformers—but which are now, I suppose, generally abandoned. I imagine the clergy themselves would be glad to substitute for this declaration the words in the Ordering of Priests, where the candidate declares himself "persuaded that the Holy Scriptures contain sufficiently all doctrine required for eternal salvation through faith in Jesus Christ." These words present no difficulty, nor is there any other serious difficulty, that I can see, raised by the Ordination Service for either priests or deacons. The declaration of general consent to the Articles is another matter; and probably in the present temper of men's minds it could not easily be got rid of.

The last of Butler's jottings in his memorandum-book is a prayer to be delivered "from *offendiculum* of scrupulousness." He was quite right. Religion is a matter where scrupulousness has been

far too active, producing most serious mischief, and where it is singularly out of place. I am the last person to wish to deny it. Those who declared their consent to the Articles long ago, and who are usefully engaged in the ministry of the Church, would in my opinion do very ill to disquiet themselves about having given a consent to the Articles formerly, when things had not moved to the point where they are now, and did not appear to men's minds as they now appear. "Forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth to those things which are before," should in these cases be a man's motto. The Church is properly a national society for the promotion of goodness; for him it is such; he ministers in it as such. He has never to use the Articles, never to rehearse them. He has to rehearse the prayers and services of the Church. Much of these he may rehearse as the literal, beautiful rendering of what he himself feels and believes. The rest he may rehearse as an approximative rendering of it—as language *thrown out* by other men, in other times, at immense objects which deeply engaged their affections and awe, and which deeply engage his also; objects concerning which, moreover, adequate statement is impossible. To him, therefore, this approximative part of the prayers and services which he rehearses will be poetry. It is a great error to think that whatever is thus perceived to be poetry ceases to be available in religion. The noblest races are those which know how to make the most serious use of poetry.

But the Articles are plain prose. They are a precise profession of belief, formulated by men of our own nation three hundred years ago, in regard, amongst other things, to parts of those services of the Church of which we have been speaking. At all points the Articles are, and must be, inadequate; but into the question of their general inadequacy we need not now enter. One point is sufficient. They present the Creeds as science, exact science; and this, at the present time of day, many a man cannot accept. He cannot, then, profess to accept it; cannot, consequently, take orders.

But it is easy for such a man to exaggerate to himself the barrier between him and popular religion. It is not so great as he may suppose; and it is expedient for him rather to think it less great than it is than more great. It will insensibly dwindle, the more that he, and other serious men who think as he does, strive so far as they can to act as if it did not exist; it will stand stiff and bristling the more they act as if it were insurmountable. The Church of our country is to be considered as a national Christian society for the promotion of goodness, to which a man cannot but wish well, and in which he might rejoice to minister. To a right-judging mind, the cardinal points of member or the minister of such a society are *by righteousness* and *Righteousness by*

righteousness—there is the sum of the Old Testament; Righteousness by Jesus Christ—there is the sum of the New! For popular religion the cardinal points of belief are a good deal more numerous. Not without adding many others could it manage to benefit by the first-named two. But the first-named two have its adherence. In the very effort to benefit by them it has added all the rest. The services of the Church are full of direct recognitions of the two really essential points of Christian belief: *salvation by righteousness* and *righteousness by Jesus Christ*. They are full, too, of what may be called approximate recognitions of them; efforts of the human mind, in its gradual growth, to develop them, to fix them, to buttress them, to make them clearer to itself, to bring them nearer, by the addition of miracle and metaphysic. This is poetry. The Articles say that this poetry is literal truth. But the Articles are no more a real element of the Prayer Book than Brady and Tate's metrical version of the Psalms, which has now happily been expelled. And even while the Articles continue to stand in the Prayer Book, yet a layman can use it as if they and their definitions did not exist. To be ordained, however, one must adhere to their definitions. But will a layman, since he is free, would a clergyman, if he were free, desire to abandon the use of all those parts of the Prayer Book which are to be regarded as merely approximative recognitions of its two central truths, and as poetry? Must all such parts one day, as our experience widens and this view of their character comes to prevail, be eliminated from our public worship? The question is a most important one.

For although the Comtists, by the mouth of their most eloquent spokesman, tell us that "'tis the pedantry of sect alone which can dare to monopolize to a special creed those precious heirlooms of a common race," the ideas and power of religion, and propose to re-make religion for us with new and improved personages and rites and words, yet it is certain that here as elsewhere the wonderful power of habit tells, and that the power of religious ideas over us does not spring up at call, but is intimately dependent upon particular names and practices and forms of expression which have gone along with it ever since we can remember, and which have created special sentiments in us. I believe, indeed, that the eloquent spokesman of the Comtists is mistaken; that the power of religion does of nature belong, in a unique way, to the Bible and to Christianity, and that it is no pedantry of sect which affirms this, but experience. Yet even were it as he supposes, and Christianity were not the one proper bringer-in of righteousness and of the reign of the Spirit and of eternal life, and they were to be got nowhere, had learnt all we know about be taught them in some

other guise, by some other instructor, would be almost impossible. Habits and associations are not formed in a day. Even if the very young have time enough before them to learn to associate religion with new personages and precepts, the middle-aged and the old have not, and must shrink from such an endeavour. *Mane nobiscum, Domine, nam advesperascit.*

Nay, so prodigious a revolution does the changing the whole form and feature of religion turn out to be, that it unsettles all other things too, and brings back chaos; and when it happens, the civilization and the society to which it happens are disintegrated, and men have to begin again. This is what took place when Christianity superseded the old religion of the Pagan world. People may say that there is a fund of ideas common to all religions, at least to all religions of superior and civilized races, and that the personages and precepts, the form and feature, of one such religion may be exchanged for those of another, or for those of some new religion devised by an enlightened eclecticism, and that the world may go on all the while without much disturbance. There were philosophers who thought so when Paganism was going out and Christianity coming in. But they were wrong. The whole civilization of the Roman world was disintegrated by the change, and men had to begin again. So immense is the sentiment created by the things to which we have been used in religion, so profound is the wrench at parting with them, so incalculable is the trouble and distraction caused by it. Now, we can hardly conceive modern civilization breaking up as the Roman did, and men beginning again as they did in the fifth century. But the improbability of this implies the improbability of our seeing all the form and feature of Christianity disappear, of the religion of Christendom. For so vast a revolution would this be, that it would involve the other.

These considerations are of force, I think, in regard to all radical change in the language of the Prayer Book. It has created sentiments deeper than we can see and measure. Our feeling does not connect itself with *any* language about righteousness and religion, but with *that* language. Very much of it we can all use in its literal acceptation. But the question is as to those parts which we cannot. Of course those who still take them literally will still use them. But for us also, who no longer put the literal meaning on them which others do, and which we ourselves once did, they retain a power, and something in us vibrates to them. And not unjustly. For these old forms of expression were men's sincere attempt to set forth with due honour what we honour also, and the sense which that attempt gives a beauty and an emotion to the words as to them poetry. The Creeds are in this way an attempt at the utmost, by assigning to him all the characteristics which kind seemed to confer exaltation, Jesus Christ.

Apostles' Creed the popular science of Christianity, and the Nicene Creed its learned science; and in one view of them they are so. But in another and a better view of them they are, the one its popular poetry, the other its learned or—to borrow the word which Schopenhauer applied to Hegel's philosophy—its *scholastic* poetry. The one exalts Jesus by concrete images, the other by an imaginative play of abstract ideas. They are the august amplifications and high elucidations, which came naturally to the human spirit working in love and awe upon this inexhaustible theme of profound truth: *salvation through Jesus Christ*. As such they are poetry for us, and poetry consecrated, moreover, by having been on the tongue of all our forefathers for two thousand years, and on our own ever since we were born. As such, then, we can *feel* them, even when we no longer take them literally; while, as approximations to a profound truth, we can *use* them. We cannot call them science, as the Articles would have us, but we can still feel them and still use them. And if we can do this with the Creeds, still more can we do it with the rest of the services in the Prayer Book. As to the very and true foundations of the Christian religion—the belief that salvation is by righteousness, and that righteousness is by Jesus Christ—we are, in fact, at one with the religious world in general. As to the true object of the Church, that it is the promotion of goodness, we are at one with them also. And as to the form and wording of religion, a form and wording consecrated by so many years and memories, we need not break with them either. They and we can remain in sympathy. Some changes will no doubt befall the Prayer-Book services as time goes on. Certain things will drop away, other things will replace them. But such change will happen, not in a sweeping way; it will come very gradually, and by the general wish. It will be brought about, not by a spirit of scrupulosity, innovation, and negation, but by a prevalent impulse to express in our Church services somewhat which is not sufficiently expressed there already.

After all, our great confirmation in believing that the cardinal points of our religion are far fewer and simpler than is commonly supposed, is that such was surely the belief of Jesus himself. And in like manner, the great reason for continuing to use the familiar language of the religion around us, as poetry and as approximative language, although we cannot take it literally, is that such was the practice of Jesus. For evidently it was so. And evidently ~~again, the immense misapprehension~~ of him and of his meaning, by ~~such~~ having been his practice.

^ of its plainly leading to such

^ it was the best way

^ new religious

^ popular

religion could be transformed ; but by keeping the old language and images, and as far as possible conveying into them the soul of the new Christian ideal.

When Jesus talked of the Son of Man coming in his glory with the holy angels, setting the good on his right hand and the bad on his left, and sending away the bad into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels, was he speaking literally, and did he mean that all this would actually happen ? Popular religion supposes so. But very many religious people, even now, suppose that he was but using the figures of Messianic judgment familiar to his hearers, in order to impress upon them his main point: what sort of spirit and of practice did really tend to salvation, and what did not. And surely almost every one must perceive, that when Jesus spoke to his disciples of their sitting on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel, or of their drinking new wine with him in the kingdom of God, he was adopting their material images and beliefs, and was not speaking literally. Yet his thus adopting their material images and beliefs could not but confirm the disciples in them. And so it did, and Christendom after them ; yet in this way, apparently, Jesus chose to proceed. But some one may say that Jesus used this language because he himself shared the materialistic notions of his disciples about the kingdom of God, and thought that coming upon the clouds and sitting upon thrones and drinking wine would really occur in it, and was mistaken in thinking so. And yet there are plain signs that this cannot be the right account of the matter, and that he did not really share their beliefs, or conceive the kingdom of God as they did. For they manifestly thought, even the wisest of them, and after their Master's death as well as before it, that this kingdom was to be a sudden, miraculous, outward transformation of things, which was to come about very soon and in their own lifetime. And they themselves report Jesus saying what is in direct contradiction to all this. They report him describing the kingdom of God as an inward change requiring to be spread over an immense time, and coming about by natural means and gradual growth, not suddenly, miraculously. He compares it to a grain of mustard seed and a handful of leaven ; he says : "So is the kingdom of God, as a man may cast seed in the ground, and may go to bed and get up night and day, and the seed shoots and extends he knoweth not how." He told his disciples that the good news of the kingdom had to be preached *to the whole world*. The whole world must first be evangelized, no work of one generation, but of centuries ; and then, but not till then, should *the end*, the last day, the grand transformation of which their heads were so full, finally come. True, they also make him speak as if he fancied this end to be as near as they did. But it is quite manifest that he spoke to them,

at different times, of two *ends*; one, the end of the Jewish state and nation, which any one who could "discern the signs of that time" might foresee; the other, the end of the world, the instatement of God's kingdom; and that they confused the two ends together. Undeniably, therefore, he saw things in a way very different from theirs, and much truer. And if he uses their materializing language and imagery, it cannot have been because he shared their illusions. And yet he uses it.

And the more we examine the language of the Gospels, the more we shall find it to be not language all of the speaker's own, and invented by him for the first time, but to be full of reminiscence and quotation. How deeply the speakers' minds are inoculated with the contents of one or two chapters in Daniel, everybody knows. It is impossible to understand anything of the New Testament, without bearing in mind, that the main pivot on which all that is said turns, is supplied by half-a-dozen verses of Daniel. "The God of heaven shall set up a kingdom which shall never be destroyed, and shall stand for ever. There shall be a time of trouble, such as never was since there was a nation even to that time. I beheld till the thrones were cast down, and the Ancient of days did sit; and, behold, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of days; the judgment was set and the books were opened. And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." The language of this group of texts, I say, governs the language of the New Testament speakers. The disciples use it literally; Jesus uses it as poetry; but all use it.

The texts from Daniel every one knows. But unless a man has a very close acquaintance with the prophets, he can have no notion, I think, how very much in the speeches of Jesus is not original language of his own, but is language of the Old Testament—the religious language on which he and his hearers had been nourished—adopted by him, and with a sense of his own communicated to it. There is hardly a trait in the great apocalyptic speech of the twenty-fourth chapter of St. Matthew, which has not its original in some prophet. Even where the scope of Jesus is most profoundly new and his own, his phrase is still, as far as may be, old. In the institution of the Lord's Supper his *new covenant* is a phrase from the admirable and forward-pointing prophecy of the thirty-first chapter of Jeremiah. The *covenant in my blood* points to Exodus, and probably, also, to an expression in that strange but then popular medley, the book of Zechariah. These phrases, familiar to himself and his hearers, Jesus willingly adopted.

But if we confine to the Old Testament alone our search for parallel passages, we shall have a quite insufficient notion of the

extent to which the language of Jesus is not his own original language, but language and images adopted from what was current at the time. It is this which gives such pre-eminent value to the Book of Enoch. That book—quoted, as every one will remember, in the Epistle of Jude—explains what would certainly appear, if we had not this explanation, to be an enlargement and heightening by Jesus, in speaking about the end of the world, of the materialistic data furnished by the Old Testament. If he thus added to them, it may be said, he must surely have taken them literally. But the Book of Enoch exhibits the further stage reached by these data between the earlier decades of the second century before Christ, when the Book of Daniel was written, and the latter decades to which belongs the Book of Enoch. And this further growth of Messianic language and imagery it was, with which the minds of the contemporaries of Jesus were familiar. And in speaking to them he had to deal with this familiarity. Uncanonical, therefore, though the book be—for it came too late, and perhaps contains things too strange, for admission into the Canon—it is full of interest, and every one should read it. The Hebrew original and the Greek version, as is well known, are lost; but the book passed into the Æthiopic Bible, and an Æthiopic manuscript of it was brought to this country from Abyssinia by Bruce the traveller. The first translator and editor of it, Archbishop Laurence, did his work, Orientalists say, imperfectly, and the English version cannot be trusted. There is an excellent German version; but I wish that the Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, who is, I believe, an Æthiopic scholar, would give us the book correctly in English.

The Book of Enoch has the names and terms which are already familiar to us from the Old Testament: Head or Ancient of days. Son of man, Son of God, Messiah. It has in frequent use a designation for God, *the Lord of Spirits*, and designations for the Messiah, *the Chosen One*, *the Just One*, which we come upon in the New Testament, but which the New Testament did not get from the Old. It has the angels accompanying the Son of Man to judgment, and the Son of Man “sitting on the throne of his glory.” It has, again and again, the well-known phrase of the New Testament: *the day of judgment*; it has its outer darkness and its hell-fire. It has its beautiful expression, *children of light*. These additions to the Old Testament language had passed, when Jesus came, into the religion of the time. He did not make them, but he found them and used them. He employed, as sanctions of his doctrine, his contemporaries’ ready-made notions of hell and judgment, just as Socrates did. He talked of the outer darkness and the unquenchable fire, as Socrates talked of the rivers of Tartarus. And often, when Jesus used phrases which now seem

to us to be his own, he was adopting phrases made current by the Book of Enoch. When he said : "It were better for that man he had never been born;" when he said : "Rejoice because your names are written in heaven;" when he said : "Their angels do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven;" when he said : "The brother shall deliver up the brother to death and the father the child;" when he said : "Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father," he was remembering the book of Enoch. When he said : "Tell it to *the church*;" when he said to Peter : "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build *my church*, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it"—expressions which, because of the word *church*, some reject and others make the foundation for the most illusory pretensions—Jesus was but recalling the Book of Enoch. In that book the expression, *the company* or *congregation* (in Greek *ecclesia*) *of the just* or *righteous*, the destined rulers of the coming kingdom of the saints, has become a consecrated phrase. The Messiah, the founder of that kingdom, is the Just One; "the company of the just" are those who follow the Just One, his company or *ecclesia*. When Peter, therefore, made his ardent declaration of faith, Jesus said : "Rock is thy name, and on this rock will I build my company, and the power of death shall not prevail against it." Behold at its source the colossal inscription round the dome of St. Peter's : *Tu es Petrus, et super hanc petram ædificabo ecclesiam meam !*

But the practical lesson to be drawn from all this is, that we should avoid violent revolution in the words and externals of religion. Profound sentiments are connected with them; they are aimed at the highest good, however imperfectly apprehended. Their form often gives them beauty, the associations which cluster around them give them always pathos and solemnity. They are to be used as poetry; while at the same time to purge and raise our view of that ideal at which they are aimed, should be our incessant endeavour. Else the use of them is mere diletantism. We should seek, therefore, to use them as Jesus did. How freely Jesus himself used them, we see. Yet what a difference between the meaning he put upon them and the meaning put upon them by the Jews! In how general a sense alone can it with truth be said, that he and even his disciples had the same aspirations, the same final aim! How imperfectly did his disciples apprehend him; how imperfectly must they have reported him! But the result has justified his way of proceeding. For while he carried with him, so far as was possible, his disciples, and the world after them, and all who even now see him through the eyes of those first generations, he yet also marked his real meaning so indelibly, that it shows and shines out, to satisfy all whom, as time

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goes on, and experience widens, and more things are known, the old imperfect apprehension dissatisfies. And it is not to be supposed that a rejection of all the poetry of popular religion is necessary or advisable now, any more than when Jesus came. But it is an aim which may well indeed be pursued with enthusiasm, to make his true meaning, in using it, emerge and prevail. For the immense pathos, so perpetually enlarged upon, of his life and death, does really culminate here: that Christians have so profoundly misunderstood him. And perhaps I may seem to have said in this essay a great deal about what was merely poetry to him, but too little about what was his real meaning. What this was, however, I have tried to bring out elsewhere. Yet for fear, from my silence about it here, this essay should seem to want due balance, let me end with what a man who writes it down for himself, and meditates on it, and entitles it *Christ's religion*, will not, perhaps, go far wrong. It is but a series of well-known sayings of Jesus himself, as the Gospels deliver them to us. But by putting them together in the following way, and connecting them, we enable ourselves, I think, to understand better both what he himself meant, and how his disciples came with ease, taking the sayings singly and interpreting them by the light of their preconceptions, to mistake them. We must begin, surely, with that wherewith both he and they began—with that wherewith Christianity itself begins, and wherein it ends: "the kingdom of God."

The time is fulfilled and the kingdom of God is at hand; change the inner man and believe the good news.

He that believeth hath eternal life. He that heareth my word, and believeth Him that sent me, hath eternal life, and cometh not into judgment, but hath passed from death to life. Verily, verily, I say unto you, The hour cometh and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live.

I am come forth from God and am here, for I have not come of myself, but He sent me. No man can come unto me except the Father that sent me draw him; and I will raise him up in the last day. He that is of God heareth the words of God; my doctrine is not mine but His that sent me. He that receiveth me receiveth Him that sent me.

And why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not what I say? If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them. Cleanse that which is within; the evil thoughts from within, from the heart, they defile the man. And why seest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but perceivest not the beam that is in thine own eye? Take heed to yourselves against insincerity; God knoweth your hearts; blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.

Come unto me, all that labour and are heavy-burdened, and I will give

you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me that I am mild and lowly in heart, and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is kindly, and my burden light.

I am the bread of life; he that cometh to me shall never hunger, and he that believeth on me shall never thirst. I am the living bread; as the living Father sent me, and I live by the Father, so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me. It is the spirit that maketh live, the flesh profiteth nothing; the words which I have said unto you, they are spirit and they are life. If a man keep my word, he shall never see death. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me, and I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish.

If a man serve me, let him follow me; and where I am, there shall also my servant be. Whosoever doth not carry his cross and come after me, cannot be my disciple. If any man will come after me, let him renounce himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the sake of the good news, the same shall save it. For what is a man profited, if he gain the whole world, but lose himself, be mulcted of himself? Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life that I may take it again. A new commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another. The Son of man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life a ransom for many.

I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth on me, though he die, shall live; and he that liveth and believeth on me shall never die. I am come that ye might have life, and that ye might have it more abundantly. I cast out devils and I do cures to-day and to-morrow; and the third day I shall be perfected. Yet a little while, and the world seeth me no more; but ye see me, because I live and ye shall live. If ye keep my commandments ye shall abide in my love, like as I have kept my Father's commandments and abide in His love. He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him. If a man love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him and make our abode with him.

I am the good shepherd; the good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep. And other sheep I have, which are not of this fold; them also must I bring, and they shall be one flock, one shepherd. Fear not, little flock, for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom.

My kingdom is not of this world; the kingdom of God cometh not with observation; behold, the kingdom of God is within you. Whereunto shall I liken the kingdom of God? It is like a grain of mustard-seed, which a man took and cast into his garden, and it grew, and waxed a great tree, and the fowls of the air lodged in the branches of it. It is like leaven, which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal, till the whole was leavened. So is the kingdom of God, as a man may cast seed in the ground, and may go to bed and get up night and day, and the seed shoots and extends he knoweth not how.


And this good news of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world, for a witness to all nations ; and then shall the end come.

With this construction in his thoughts to govern his use of it, Jesus loved and freely adopted the common wording and imagery of the popular Jewish religion. In dealing with the popular religion in which we have been ourselves bred, we may the more readily follow his example, inasmuch as, though all error has its side of moral danger, yet evidently the misconception of their religion by Christians has produced no such grave moral perversion as we see to have been produced in the Scribes and Pharisees by their misconception of the religion of the Old Testament. The fault of popular Christianity, as an endeavour after *righteousness by Jesus Christ*, is not, like the fault of popular Judaism as an endeavour after *salvation by righteousness*, first and foremost a moral fault. It is much more an intellectual one. But it is not on that account insignificant. Dr. Mozley urges, that "no inquiry is obligatory upon religious minds in matters of the supernatural and miraculous," because, says he, though "the human mind must refuse to submit to anything contrary to moral sense in Scripture," yet "there is no moral question raised by the fact of a miracle, nor does a supernatural doctrine challenge any moral resistance." As if there were no possible resistance to religious doctrines, but a resistance on the ground of their immorality! As if intellectual resistance to them counted for nothing! The objections to popular Christianity are not moral objections, but intellectual revolt against its demonstrations by miracle and metaphysics. To be intellectually convinced of a thing's want of conformity to truth and fact is surely an insuperable obstacle to receiving it, even though there be no moral obstacle added. And no moral advantages of a doctrine can avail to save it, in presence of the intellectual conviction of its want of conformity with truth and fact. And if the want of conformity exists, it is sure to be one day found out. "Things are what they are, and the consequences of them will be what they will be;" and one inevitable consequence of a thing's want of conformity with truth and fact is, that sooner or later the human mind perceives it. And whoever thinks that the ground-belief of Christians is true and indispensable, but that in the account they give of it, and of the reasons for holding it, there is a want of conformity with truth and fact, may well desire to find a better account and better reasons, and to prepare the way for their admission, and for their acquiring some strength and consistency in men's minds against the day when the old means of reliance fail.

But meanwhile the ground-belief of all Christians, whatever account they may give to themselves of its sou

itself an indestructible basis of fellowship. Whoever believes the final triumph of Christianity, the Christianization of the world, to have all the necessity and grandeur of a natural law, will never lack a bond of profound sympathy with popular religion. Compared with agreement and difference on this point, agreement and difference on other points seem trifling. To believe that, whoever are ignorant that righteousness is salvation, "the Eternal shall have them in derision;" to believe, whatever may be the substitute offered for the righteousness of Jesus, a substitute however sparkling, that "whosoever drinketh of *this* water shall thirst again;" to desire truly "to have strength to escape all the things which shall come to pass, and to stand before the Son of Man," is the one authentic mark and seal of the household of faith. Those who share in this belief are fellow-citizens of the "city which hath foundations." He who shares it not, is a wanderer, as St. Augustine says, in "the waste places fertile in sorrow;" a wanderer "seeking rest and finding none." *In all things I sought rest; then the Creator of all things gave me commandment and said: Let thy dwelling be in Jacob, and thine inheritance in Israel. And so was I established in Sion; likewise in the beloved city he gave me rest, and in Jerusalem was my power.*

MATTHEW ARNOLD.



THE SONG OF BRUNANBURH.

THIS fine old English national war-ode is found in the chronicles, under the date 937. It celebrates the victory which was won at Brunanburh in Northumberland by King Athelstan and his brother Edmund over the allied Scots and Danes commanded by Constantine king of Scotland, Owen of Strathclyde, and the Danish Anlaf Sihtricsen.

* "Athelstan King, lord of earls, giver of costly gifts among barons, and his brother Edmund Atheling—life-long glory they gain'd in the strife by Brunanburh with the edges of their swords. They clove the wall of shields; they hew'd the battle-shields of linden-wood; with hammer'd brands' they hew'd them—these sons of Edward.

"This was their nobleness from those that went before them, that they, so often, in combat against every foeman, should guard their land, their hoards, and their homes.

"The spoilers cringed"; the Scottishmen crouch'd; and the ship-crews fell: they were doom'd to the death; the field flow'd with blood of warriors, from when the sun on high, the mighty star in the morning-tide, the bright lamp of God the everlasting Lord, glided over earth, even until this noble creature sank to his setting.

"There lay stricken down by the spear many warrior-men of the North,—shot over the shield; many a Scotsman also, full-wearied with war. All day long the West Saxons,—their chosen men in companies,—follow'd on the track the race of their loathing; quickly they hack'd at the fliers from behind—with swords sharpen'd by the grindstone. The Mercians stinted not their hard hand-play among those heroes, that along with Anlaf, over the weltering waves, in the bark's bosom, had made for the land. In fight they were doom'd to the death. There lay five young kings, sword-silenced on the war-field: there lay seven earls of Anlaf—and ravagers innumerable—sea-men and Scotsmen.

"The Norse leader was hunted away; needs must he fly to the stem of his ship,—few of his own were with him: the keel drave afloat; the king fled forth; on the fallow flood he saved his life. There came likewise in flight to his kith in the North the wary Constantinus, the hoary warrior.

"No need had he to boast of the welcome of swords; he was forlorn of his kin, he was forlorn of his friends, they were fell'd on that throng'd field, slain in the strife; and he left his son upon the place of slaughter, wounds had gash'd him into pieces, he was yet young in war.

"No need had he to vaunt of the carnage of axes, that white-hair'd Baron! that aged Traitor!—nor had he, nor any more had Anlaf, with the ruin of their armies, aught of reason for laughter, as though they were better in the works of war, in the struggle of standards on the battle-ground, in the meeting of men at the gathering of spears, in the wrestling of weapons, wherewithal they had play'd on the field of slaughter against the sons of Edward.

"Then past forth a red remnant of the javelins, the Northmen in their nailed barks, on the sounding sea, over the deep water, to make for Dyflen', for Ireland again—they were shamed in their souls. But the brothers, the king, and the Atheling, both together, sought their kith in the land of the West Saxon, rejoicing in battle.

"Many a carcase they left behind them, many a sallow skin for the swarthy raven with horny beak to tear; the livid corpse they left behind them for the ern with white tail to gorge as carrion, for the greedy war-hawk, and for that gray beast, the wolf of the weald.

"Never before in this island was a huger slaughter of men fell'd by the sword-edge (among those of which the books tell us, the ancient chroniclers)—never before—since

the Angles and Saxon came up hither from the East, and over the broad brine sought Britain ; when haughty war-smiths overcame the Welsh-men, and earls full of the lust of glory gat hold of the land."

HALLAM TENNYSON.

* The first lines of the original are quoted to show the alliteration, and the swing of the metre :—

" Æthelstán cyning : eorla drihten,
Beorna beáh-gifa : and his brothor eac,
Eadmund ætheling : ealdor-langne tir ;
Geslógon æt secce : sweorda ecgum,
Ymbe brunanburh," &c.

Mr. Skeat has kindly allowed me to publish the subjoined notes made by him on this translation of mine :—

1. The text has "hamora lafum," with the leavings of hammers. A sword is thus called ; it is what is left after the hammer has been at work. "Laf" is the Lowland Scottish *lave*.

2. "Crungun," cringed ; the same word. The verb was once a "strong" one.

3. "Cread," the past tense of *crowd*, to push. Margaret Paston speaks of a person being "*crowd* in a barwe," i.e. pushed along in a wheelbarrow.—*Paston Letters*, iii. 215. Observe the use of *crowdest* and *crowdyng* in Chaucer's "Man of Law's Tale," ll. 296, 299 :—


" O firste movyng cruel firmament,
With thi diurnal swough that crowdest ay,
And hurlest al fro est to occident
That naturally wold hold another way ;
Thyn crowdyng sette the heven in such array," &c.

4. "Se froda," the aged (literally) ; the prudent (metaphorically).

5. "Freonda gefylled," lit. deprived, by felling, of his friends ; an awkward expression, but the only literal translation which is strictly sanctioned by grammar. "Amicorum cæsorum" would have been "freonda gefylledra."

6. "Dreorig laf." Here "laf" is the Scottish *lave*, as before. "Dreorig" is the modern *dreary*, but the usual sense, in our oldest writings, is *dripping with gore*, from the substantive "dreor," gore.

7. Dublin.—In Barbour's "Bruce" it is spelt "Devilling."



A PLEA FOR METAPHYSIC.

I.

Culture and Anarchy. By MATTHEW ARNOLD, 1869.
St. Paul and Protestantism. By the same, 1870.
Literature and Dogma. By the same, 1871.
God and the Bible. By the same, 1875.
Published by Smith, Elder, and Co., London.

IN a review of the theological works of the late Friedrich Strauss,* some time ago, I abstained from discussing the truth or falsehood of the particular tenets which Strauss held during different periods of his life; and tried to confine myself to an appraisement of the various philosophical points of outset which he successively occupied, and of the methods which he successively used in operating and going forth from these standing points. I now propose to employ somewhat of the same purely formal method in the case of Mr. Matthew Arnold, who appears to me to be quite the most important constructive intellect, in the domain of politics and religion, that we have had in Europe since Strauss. Not that Mr. Arnold has the scientific equipment of Strauss, or anything like Strauss' familiarity with the historical course of human thought. He is a man of letters, not a strict thinker; he plumes himself, as is allowable in a man of letters, on not understanding what is meant by accurate thinking; and he congratulates himself not unfrequently, in his two later books, on the incoherence and inconsistency of his ideas, as on an Englishman's privilege. And thus his works, admirable, enjoyable, and important as they are, have still this one note of insularity—that, while he cheapens philosophy before the great public, by putting its enunciation dramatically into the mouths of

* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, July 1874.

absurd personages, he is himself nearly always under the influence of metaphysical ideas of one kind or another, and as he is unconscious that he is so, he uses them at haphazard: in his first two books, "Culture and Anarchy" and "St. Paul and Protestantism" (as it chanced), well and fruitfully; in his two later books, "Literature and Dogma" and "God and the Bible," blindly and without result.

I will now try to explain and justify this criticism, and it will be convenient to do so under the following heads:—

1. The standing point of Mr. Arnold's negative criticism of current ideas in politics and religion;
2. His assumptions and method when he leaves this standing point, and proceeds to the positive part of his theme;
3. His criticism of Descartes', and other philosophical ideas;
4. His new religious construction, "The eternal not-ourselves that makes for righteousness."

In the course of this inquiry, and by means of it, better perhaps than in any more systematic way, I shall try to show what modern metaphysic is, what are the facts with which it deals, what it has done, and what are the problems still outstanding which it may hope to grapple with successfully in the future.

And in conclusion I shall try to ascertain why it is that Mr. Arnold, beginning as he does to philosophise well, goes on to philosophise badly, and ends by not being able to manage and control his philosophical thinking at all.

1. The great merit of "Culture and Anarchy" is its having translated into the language of literature the metaphysical idea, "the notion, so familiar on the Continent and to antiquity, of the State,"* as the "organ of our collective best self."†

"We want an authority, and we find nothing but jealous classes, checks, and a deadlock; culture suggests *the idea of the State*. We find no basis for a firm State-power in our ordinary selves; culture suggests one to us in our own best self.‡ . . . By our every-day selves . . . we are separate, personal, at war; we are only safe from one another's tyranny when no one has any power; and this safety in its turn cannot save us from anarchy. . . . *But by our best self we are united, impersonal, at harmony.*"§

There is, we are told, a kind of philosophical theory, "a peculiarly British form of Atheism," current amongst us—

"that there is no such thing at all as a best self and a right reason having claim to paramount authority, or at any rate no such thing ascertainable and capable of being made use of; and that there is nothing but an infinite number of ideas and works of our ordinary selves."|| "But elsewhere this is certainly better understood."¶

Elsewhere, on the Continent for instance, this idea of the col-

* Culture and Anarchy, p. 51.

† Ibid. p. 83.

‡ Ibid. p. 81.

§ Ibid. p. 80.

|| Ibid. p. 116.

¶ Ibid. p. 124.

lective as distinguished from the individual reason, and standing above it, as conscience is distinguished from and stands above desire, has long been familiar, under the names of the *Ego* (*Ich*) or common consciousness (*Gemeingeist*, *Gemeinbewusstsein*); in our own Hobbes we had something like it in the "Great Leviathan;" but since the seventeenth century till now, with perhaps the single exception of Coleridge, this idea of the better self has been erased from English thought. Let us see how one of the greatest of American writers describes it:—

"We grant that human life is mean, but how did we find out that it was mean? What is the ground of this uneasiness of ours—of this old discontent? What is the universal sense of want and ignorance, but the fine innuendo by which the great soul makes its enormous claim?"

* * * * *

"In all conversation between two persons, tacit reference is made to a third party, to a common nature. And so in groups where debate is earnest, and especially on great questions of thought, the company become aware of their unity, and that the thought rises to an equal height in all bosoms, that all have a spiritual property in what was said as well as the sayer. It arches over them like a temple, this unity of thought, in which every heart beats with nobler sense of power and duty, and thinks and acts with unusual solemnity. All are conscious of attaining to a higher self-possession."

And again:—

"What we commonly call man, the eating, drinking, planting, counting man, does not as we know him represent himself, but misrepresents himself. Him we do not respect, but the soul whose organ he is, would he let it appear through his action, would make our knees bend. When it breathes through his intellect, it is genius; when it breathes through his will, it is virtue; when it flows through his affection, it is love. And the blindness of the intellect begins when it would be something of itself. The weakness of the will begins when the individual would be something of himself. All reform aims, in some one particular, to let the great soul have its way through us; in other words, to engage us to obey."*

This collective *ego*, this best self, this element of common consciousness in man as a member of society, standing behind and operating through the ordinary individual consciousness, is precisely, and from first to last, and nothing else than, the subject matter of Metaphysic as it has been understood since Kant. As Biology is the science conversant with life, its manifestations, its kinds, and changes, and formulates the laws of them, so Metaphysic is the science conversant with the collective consciousness of man as a member of society; it investigates the manifestations, the kinds, and the development of those ideas which, as Mr. Arnold says in another place, "gradually and on an immense scale discover themselves and become, instead of being ready-made in precise and reduced dimensions to suit the narrow mind

* Emerson's *Essays, Lectures, and Orations* (London: Orr, 1851), pp. 121 follg.

of the individual.”* And I have quoted these passages from Mr. Emerson at some length, because, in spite of their rhetorical character, they state accurately and with considerably more detail and distinctness than Mr. Arnold ever does, and, moreover, in perfectly intelligible language, what is meant by the collective consciousness, and how it acts upon and through the ordinary and undeniable experience of everybody.

Let us now see how a great French critic describes this common consciousness:—

“Le plus grand progrès de la physiologie moderne a été de montrer que la vie de la plante et celle de l’animal ne sont qu’une résultante d’autres vies, harmoniquement subordonnées et aboutissant à un concert unique. La vie du vertébré est la résultante centralisée de l’individualité de chaque vertèbre; un arbre est la consonnance de milliers de bourgeons. *La conscience est de même une résultante de millions d’autres consciences concordant à un même but.* La cellule est déjà une petite concentration personnelle: plusieurs cellules consonnant ensemble forment une conscience au second degré (homme ou animal). Les consciences au second degré, en se groupant, forment *des consciences au troisième degré*, consciences de villes, consciences d’Eglises, consciences de nations, produites par des millions d’individus vivant d’une même idée, ayant des sentiments communs. Pour le matérialisme, il n’y a que l’atome qui existe pleinement; mais pour le vrai philosophe, pour l’idéaliste, la cellule existe plus que l’atome, l’individu existe plus que la cellule; la nation, l’Eglise, la cité existent plus que l’individu, puisque l’individu se sacrifie pour ces entités, qu’un réalisme grossier regarde comme de pures abstractions.”†

That the common or social consciousness is more real than *existe plus que*, the individual and empirical consciousness, is a statement which to English modes of thought savours of the unmeaning; and it is into this “réalisme grossier” of English thinking that Mr. Arnold lapses at pp. 67 follg. of “God and the Bible,” when he tells us that to say, as Descartes says, that some things “have more objective reality,” “partake in more degrees of being,” “have more reality, more being,” than other things, is to use words which “have absolutely no force at all, we simply cannot follow their meaning” (p. 69). Yet in “Literature and Dogma” we find him never tired of saying, with as great distinctness as M. Renan, and with more iteration, that the “impersonal” self which we share with others (p. 264) is “real,” whereas the

* Literature and Dogma. Preface, xiv.

† Dialogues et Fragments Philosophiques (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1876), p. 90. Compare p. 164, where he speaks of this common consciousness, coeval with language, as “la constitution des groupes d’idées qui devenus le patrimoine de chaque race, dominant encore aujourd’hui la marche de l’humanité.” On what may be called the natural history of these groups Comparative Philology and Anthropology, and what is called in Germany “Völkerpsychologie,” the Psychology of Peoples and Races, are daily throwing important light. What metaphysic does in regard to these ideas, is not so much to describe the external circumstances of their origin, nor the modes of their manifestation, as to determine their typical forms, by comparing those of greater with those of less complexity: and by decomposing each into its constituent elements, to discover the relation they bear to one another, and the laws of their development. Metaphysic may be called the morphology, as distinguished from the natural history, of this “third degree of consciousness.”

individual self is "apparent" (pp. 63, 259, 359); that it is "true and permanent" (p. 88), whereas the ordinary and empirical self is "lower and transient" (p. 202). Well, this more permanent reality is what we are thinking of—this and nothing else is our subject-matter—when we speak of metaphysic; it is the higher self, the common consciousness, which culture extricates from the lower and individual self, and which, as having "claim to paramount authority," we are recommended by Mr. Arnold to organize and embody in the State.

But there is another aspect which Mr. Arnold seizes in this higher and impersonal self, as he proceeds. In "Culture and Anarchy" he is arguing against "the mere doing as one likes, affirming one's self and one's self just as it is,"* which we prize so much in this country, "the Englishman's heaven-born privilege of doing as he likes," marching where he likes, meeting where he likes, bawling what he likes, breaking what he likes;† and by confronting these individualist and anarchic claims with the claim to authority of the best self by which we are all impersonal and at harmony, he is naturally led to assign to the social consciousness an exclusively moral or practical operation, and not any authority or even importance in confronting the intellectual anarchy which we no less prize in this country, the heaven-born privilege of the English Protestant of *thinking as he likes*. Indeed he goes so far as to affirm positively in one place,‡ "Now thought and speculation is an individual matter;" and on the next page that "man philosophises best alone." I shall have to return to this admission hereafter, and to show how much of the unsoundness of Mr. Arnold's later speculations in "Literature and Dogma," and in "God and the Bible," is due to the fact that he sets himself to carry out this maxim. At present it is enough for my purpose to note that philosophising alone, is incompatible with Mr. Arnold's idea of culture as that which brings us into contact with "the best that is known and thought in the world," with the "main stream of man's advance . . . towards knowing himself and the world, things as they are;" and has been the fruitful parent of all the "stock notions" and intellectual "petrifications"§ which it is his aim in recommending culture to "bathe" and "float" with "a fresh stream of disinterested consciousness," and by this means to dissolve. It is obvious too that at this stage at least of his progress, he is using an *argumentum ad homines*; for the collective thought with which the individual philosophising is contrasted is not the collective thought of society or of the world, to which culture appeals, but the collective thought of the various sects of Protestant Dissenters. He says, "A free play of individual thought is at least as much impeded by

* Culture and Anarchy, p. 80.

† Ibid. p. 95.

‡ Ibid. pp. 185, 186.

§ Ibid. p. 184.

membership of a small congregation as by the membership of a great Church. . . . Thinking by batches of fifty is to the full as fatal to free thought as thinking by batches of thousands ;”* and he commends the utterance of the *Daily News* to the effect that “the common reason of society ought to check the aberrations of individual eccentricity,” adding that “this common reason of society looks very like our best self or right reason to which we want to give authority, by making the action of the State or nation, in its collective character, the expression of it.”† “Without society,” he adds afterwards emphatically, “there can be no human perfection ;”‡ and his constant objection to “the dissidence of Dissent” is that it cuts off Nonconformists from “the stream of the vital movement,” of the world’s thought ; so that we may be justified in supposing that when he contrasts thought with conduct, and suggests that the first is the proper function of the individual, while the latter depends, in order to be right, upon the recognition of the paramount authority of the “common reason of society,” he is confronting them, as he himself says when he confronts Hebraism and Hellenism, “with what I may call a rhetorical purpose,”§ and that the great aim of culture is not to make us follow the authority of the best self in matters of conduct only, but to bring us into relation with “the *whole* play of the universal order,”|| “with the *whole* intelligible law of things.”

But we are not long left in doubt as to Mr. Arnold’s real meaning. In “Culture and Anarchy” he is seeking a cure for rowdyism, “doing as one likes,” in practice ; in his next book, “St. Paul and Protestantism,” he is seeking a cure for the intellectual follies and narrowness of Dissent, and here he evidently feels that his maxim about “man’s philosophising best alone” must go to the wall, for it is in fact the very principle of private judgment upon which Protestant Dissent is founded.

In “St. Paul and Protestantism” he says, as he said in “Culture and Anarchy,” “The law of the moral order stretches beyond the private conscience ; is independent of it and absolute ;”¶ but not, it would appear from “Culture and Anarchy” at least, the law of the intellectual order beyond the eccentricities of private judgment. Yet as early as on page 12 of “St. Paul and Protestantism” we get, from the exigencies of the author’s polemic against Dissent, a new position taken up. The resistance of the Church to the one-sidedness of Puritanism was, we are told, “as favourable to the growth of thought and to sound philosophy as it was consonant to common sense.” It is, then, the national intelligence, and not the individual, which we must confront with the eccentricities of sec-

* Culture and Anarchy, p. 187.

† Ibid. p. 120.

‡ Ibid. p. 227.

§ Ibid. p. 130.

|| Ibid. pp. 181, 184.

¶ St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 117.

tarianism. Why—if it be true that thought and speculation is an individual matter? Let us hear what Mr. Arnold has to say in praise of the National Church and of its ministers:—

“And thus [*i.e.* by not separating for differences in opinion] they do homage to an ideal of Christianity which is *larger, higher, and better than either their notions* [he is speaking of the Dean of Ripon and Mr. Ryle] *or those of their opponents*, and in respect of which both their notions and those of their opponents are inadequate.”*

This “larger, higher, and better” intelligence which the nation has in its collective capacity, instead of tying itself to narrow and fixed ideas, as Puritanism does, is continually undergoing that law of transformation and development which obtains in a National Church.† We then have Dr. Newman’s “Essay on Development of Christian Doctrine” quoted to show how this transformation and development takes place. It takes place, as Mr. Arnold commends Dr. Newman for saying, not as “an effect of wishing or resolving, or of forced enthusiasm or of any mechanism of reasoning, or of any subtlety of intellect,” but “*of its own innate power of expansion* within the mind in its season, though with the use of reflection and argument and original thought, more or less as it may happen, with a dependence on the ethical growth of the mind itself, and with a reflex influence upon it.”‡ This example of Dr. Newman emboldens Mr. Arnold to say of the social consciousness in its intellectual aspect and operation, as standing above and having authority over the private reason, what he had hitherto only ventured to say of it in its moral and political aspect, as standing above the private conscience:—

“*Thought and science follow their own law of development; they are slowly elaborated in the growth and forward pressure of humanity, in what Shakspeare calls*

‘the prophetic soul
Of the wide world dreaming on things to come;’

their ripeness and unripeness, as Dr. Newman most truly says, are not an effect of our wishing and resolving; rather do they seem brought about by a power such as Goethe figures by the *Zeit-Geist* or Time-spirit, and St. Paul describes as a divine power *revealing* additions to what we possess already.”§

“But sects of men are apt to be shut up in sectarian ideas of their own, and to be less open to new general ideas than the main body of men;” and thus it was by maintaining the solidarity of the Christian consciousness that the Catholic Church followed, Mr. Arnold (apparently still on the track of Dr. Newman) tells us, a true

* St. Paul and Protestantism, Preface, vii.

† Ibid. viii.

‡ Ibid. p. 30.

§ Ibid. pp. 35, 36.

instinct; "but the right *philosophical* developments she vainly imagined herself to have the power to produce, and her attempts in this direction were at most a prophecy of this power, as alchemy is said to have been a prophecy of chemistry."*

This, so far as I am aware, is the first appearance in Mr. Arnold's theological writings of the *Zeit-Geist*, or Time-spirit, which plays so important a part in "Literature and Dogma;" and we see how he is driven upon the idea of it gradually, and away from his notion of thought and speculation being an individual matter, by the exigencies, as I have already noted, of his polemic against the eccentricities of Puritanism. Here, then, we have the counterpart in the sphere of science and intelligence of the "best self," which, as we have seen, in matters of conduct, has the *rôle* of regulating the insubordinate desires; and whose organization in the State would have the effect of harmonizing the conflicting classes and tendencies of society.

Shall we say that Mr. Arnold has here two principles or one? that he means to keep his "best self" in one pocket and his "Time-Spirit" in another, just as a psychologist of the Scottish school might put the "intellectual faculties" in one imaginary pigeon-hole of the mind, and the conscience and "moral faculties" in another equally imaginary pigeon-hole? He never, so far as I have seen, explicitly combines the "best self" and the *Zeit-Geist*; he never says in so many words, the "best self" is the common consciousness of social man in so far as it influences practice, and the *Zeit-Geist* is the common consciousness of social man in so far as it controls thought and speculation. But in speaking of the one-sided enthusiasm for ideas characterizing certain nations and notably the Greeks, which he calls Hellenism, and after contrasting it with the one-sided enthusiasm for practice characterizing certain other nations and notably the Jews, which he calls Hebraism, as if to obviate the inference that he is here dealing with two principles which are ultimately diverse, he says—

"And yet the lesson must perforce be learned that the human spirit is wider than the most priceless of the forces which bear it onward, and that to the whole development of man Hebraism itself is, like Hellenism, but a contribution."†

And just as he says elsewhere that "the law of the moral order stretches beyond the private conscience of the individual" and is independent of it and absolute;‡ so here he says, speaking of a specific question, that of immortality—

"Above and beyond the inadequate solution which Hebraism and Hellenism [here] attempt extends the immense and august problem itself, and the spirit which gave birth to it."§

* St. Paul and Protestantism, pp. 35, 36.

† Ibid. p. 142.

‡ Ibid. "§ Cult

This common consciousness which Mr. Arnold has thus brought so vividly before us as the "best self" and the "Zeit-Geist," and less felicitously perhaps, because more vaguely, as "the prophetic soul of the wide world dreaming on things to come," is, then, the fundamental principle of modern metaphysic since Kant. It is the "Ego" of Fichte and Schelling, and the "Absolute" of Hegel. And the transition from the standing point of individual thinking to the standing point of the common consciousness, which we have seen forced upon Mr. Arnold by the exigencies of his polemic against the Dissenters is compared by Kant, in an often-quoted passage* in the second supplement to the "Critique of Pure Reason," to the revolution in astronomy made by Copernicus.

"It is with us," Kant says, "as it was at first with the idea of Copernicus, who, dissatisfied with the theory of the heavens, on the assumption that the starry host revolved round the spectator, tried whether he could not succeed better, if he supposed the spectator to move and the stars to remain at rest."

This then is what I mean when I say that Mr. Matthew Arnold is differentiated from the main and characteristic body of English thinkers by having the metaphysical point of view, and that *he builds his negative criticism of current politics and religion on the same intellectual area as Strauss built his constructive edifice of doctrine upon*. Mr. Arnold has the true and fruitful standpoint in metaphysic, and (*exempli gratiâ*) the late Mr. Mill had the wrong and sterile one, in the same sense as Copernicus had the true and fruitful point of view in astronomy, and Ptolemy had the wrong and sterile one. And it is this elevation in his point of view, which forms the real justification of Mr. Arnold's comparison of the metaphysical developments of the medieval Church to alchemy:—

"The right *philosophical* developments she vainly imagined herself to have the power to produce, and her attempts in this direction were at most but a prophecy of this power, as alchemy is said to have been a prophecy of chemistry."†

It is because the medieval Church worked from the wrong metaphysical point of view, the point of view of the individual instead of that of the social consciousness, and not because its point of view was metaphysical at all, that justifies Mr. Arnold in saying—

"Every one who perceives and values the power contained in Christianity must be struck to see how, at the present moment, the progress of this power seems to depend upon its being able to *disengage itself from speculative accretions which encumber it*."‡

For "it was," he tells us, "inevitable that the speculative

* *Ibid.* p. 56.

metaphysics should come" * and develop the Biblical data, inasmuch as "the Bible raises many and great questions of philosophy and criticism;"† but "for the adequate development of Christian doctrine, so far as theology exhibits this metaphysically and scientifically," the Church, whether Ante-Nicene or Post-Nicene, "has never yet furnished a channel."‡ It is therefore "of capital importance" that the Church of England has "left her mind comparatively open . . . for the admission of philosophy and criticism as they slowly developed themselves outside the Church and filtered into her."§ It is of capital importance for two reasons—first, because "what essentially characterizes a religious teacher and gives him his permanent worth and vitality is, after all, just the scientific value of his teaching, its correspondence with important facts, and the light it throws on them;"|| and secondly, because "philosophy and criticism have become a great power in the world, and inevitably tend to alter and develop Church doctrine so far as this doctrine is, as to a great extent it is, philosophical and critical;" and whatever "hinders their filtering" into Church doctrine from the secular world without, "and becoming incorporated, hinders truth and the natural progress of things."¶ For the scientific sense in man, the sense "which seeks exact knowledge," "never asserted its claims so strongly" as at the present time; and "the propensity of religion to neglect those claims, and the peril and loss to it from neglecting them, never were so manifest."**

We see, then, from the foregoing pages, what is the basis of Mr. Arnold's negative criticism—we see the ground which his thought covers, and the place where he stands—first, when he confronts the social anarchy, the doing each as we like, which is so much prized in this country, with the "better self" by which we are at one and impersonal; and secondly, when he confronts the religious "Philistine," his private judgment and his "stock notions" with the *Zeit-Geist* or perpetually transforming influence of a larger social intelligence. We have seen that this "best self" and this *Zeit-Geist* are only two aspects of one and the same fact—namely, the common consciousness of social man; and that this common consciousness has been the specific subject-matter of metaphysic since the time of Kant. We have seen that the change from the point of view of the individual in philosophising to the point of view of the common consciousness is that which differentiates metaphysical inquiry since the reform of Kant from metaphysical inquiry before Kant. We have seen that this change is the specific characteristic of Mr. Arnold's procedure

* St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 39.

† Ibid. p. 36.

‡ Ibid. p. 35.

§ Ibid. p. 51.

|| Ibid. pp. 71, 72.

¶ Ibid. p. 35.

** Ibid. p. 72.

in assailing anarchy, whether in society or in opinion; that it is the change from the private spirit to "that universal order which the intellect feels after as a law and the heart feels after as a benefit;"* and that this change is one of the same importance and of the same kind as that which Copernicus made in the point of view of the old Ptolemaic astronomy. Let us now try to understand, with Mr. Arnold's help, something more about this common consciousness, what it does, and how it works.

And here it is very important to remember that we must beware of hypostatizing this common consciousness of society too much; of thinking of it as a thing which is kept in the House of Commons, or in the Archbishop's palace at Lambeth, or in the office of the Board of Works. It is safer not to hypostatise it at all, but to speak only of its operation. As Mr. Arnold says, when speaking of God, *what* God is we know not, we are simply aware of his operations; so indeed we may say of the individual man: *what* he is we don't know, but we know his thoughts and we know his works. Of these we can speak, and from them infer his character. Now what are the operations which this *Zeit-Geist*, this "best self," this common consciousness of society, performs? What are the organs through which it acts? Well, we are all its organs. "A man," says Emerson, "is the façade of a temple in which all wisdom and all good abide." It is when *we*, each of us, act and think in a particular manner that the common consciousness is acting and thinking through us. What, then, is this particular manner? "From within and from behind," to quote Emerson again, "a light shines through us upon things, and makes us aware that we are nothing, but the light is all." When does this happen? How is it to be distinguished from our manner of operating as individuals?

It will be convenient for the sake of clearness, if we confine ourselves to the thinking aspect of this common reason, and neglect, for the present at least, its acting aspect. And we shall not be thereby making again an arbitrary distinction between the two aspects, which we saw before that Mr. Arnold does *not* make, because, as we shall see presently, the ideas which the common reason has, are not, like the ideas which the individual reason has, *merely* theoretical, but are ideas which are themselves operative and influential in transforming practice and knowledge alike. They are what we sometimes call *principles*, meaning by principles, not merely something which is true or untrue, but something which lives and moves and operates. In speaking of the operations of the common consciousness as ideas, we mean, then, to present in one view both its acting aspect as the "best self" and its thinking aspect as the *Zeit-Geist*.

* St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 73.

What is an idea of the common consciousness of social man, or as we may call it shortly, a metaphysical idea? I say "metaphysical," because these ideas *are* metaphysical in the same sense as the "best self" and the *Zeit-Geist* are metaphysical—that is, not "non-natural" as Mr. Arnold says in his most recent work, "God and the Bible," but beyond the natural, in the sense in which conscience is beyond and above the natural desires, and society is beyond and above a "state of nature," and a conception scientifically adequate is beyond and above the "stock notion" of "the practical man," "who is apt to scrape the surface of things only."*

We are all familiar with the comparisons which have been instituted between society, or the "body politic" as it is generally called, in this connection, and the animal body. Both are organisms—*i.e.*, both are composed of parts which act upon, and are reacted upon by, the centre of the structure. In this simple and abstract sense of the word "organism," some thinkers have maintained that the solar system is also an organism. But this general similarity of the social and the animal structures, the recognition of which marked an important advance in social science, has tempted philosophers from Plato downwards to work out all sorts of minute resemblances between the two, which are often merely imaginary. We find Mr. Herbert Spencer, for example, after comparing the "currents of merchandise" flowing through the community to the blood, going on to compare the gold and silver coinage to the round discs or corpuscles in the blood.† More important to notice, perhaps, for our present purpose, are the false judgments of historical events which are founded on another comparison of a similar kind. I mean the assumption that the moral duties of a community are the same in kind as the moral duties of an individual. Governments representing free communities, for instance, are blamed for not acting towards one another, or towards the individual citizen, according to the same ethical principles as those which guide the actions of individual citizens towards one another. Machiavelli perceived the distinction between the two classes of actions clearly, though under the influence of the ideas of antiquity he perhaps expressed it paradoxically. The resort to force which belongs legitimately to communities both in their dealings with one another and with their own citizens, but not with the same latitude to citizens in dealing with one another, is an instance in point. One reason for this distinction would seem to be that the duties of individuals to one another are conditioned by their having a moral superior in the community to which they belong; whilst communities, whether

* St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 83.

† *Essays Scientific, Political, and Speculative*, vol. i. p. 414.

in relation to one another or in relation to their own citizens, have no such moral superior. However this may be, the distinction is one which is obvious to any one attending to the question, and has led thoughtful writers to speak of the "inherent immorality" of society as they speak of "the Machiavelism of nature:"—

"La nature," says M. Renan, "est d'une insensibilité absolue, d'une immoralité transcendante, si j'ose le dire. L'immoralité de l'histoire et l'iniquité inhérente aux sociétés humaines ne sont pas moindres. La société, quoi qu'on fasse, sera toujours dans l'impossibilité d'être juste."*

I should prefer to speak both in the one case and in the other in the spirit of the old Hebrew prophet representing the august centre of government in the community of Israel in His relation to the individual citizens: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts."† Indeed the comparison of the structure of society to the animal organism, with which we set out, instead of leading us to the superficial conclusion that the ethics of the community are *therefore* the same in kind as the ethics of the individual, might have led us, on closer examination, to an exactly opposite result. If society be an organism, it would seem to follow that its normal action would resemble the normal action of its unit, the individual, *as little* as the normal action of the animal organism resembles that of its unit, the cell of protoplasm.

These considerations, if they be at all near the truth, will have prepared us to find that ideas of the *Zeit-Geist* or common consciousness, what we have called metaphysical ideas, differ widely both in dimension and in structure from the ideas of the "ordinary self," *i.e.*, of the individual mind. And this is the case—

(a.) First as to dimension. We find Mr. Arnold saying of certain ideas that "they gradually and *on an immense scale* discover themselves and become," instead of being "ready-made in precise and reduced dimensions to suit the narrow mind of the individual."‡ The essential characteristic of a metaphysical idea, is that it is an idea of the *whole* of its object; of *all* its aspects and conditions, and not merely of some of them. Now what is the character of the ordinary notion which a man has of a thing? It is not the whole thing he has in his mind, but a bit of the thing, or in logical language "an abstraction" from the whole thing. It is a kind of mental picture or illustrative image of the thing as it looks from a particular point of view, covering a bundle of attributes the selection and grouping of which has been determined

* Renan: *Fragments Philosophiques*, pp. 13, 41, &c. Cf. Mr. Leslie Stephen's "Confessions of an Agnostic" in *Fortnightly Review*, for June, 1876, p. 852.

† Isa. lv. 8, 9.

‡ *Literature and Dogma*, Preface, xiv.

by the same particular point of view, and registered by a name. Comparative philology has shown how these particular points of view were reached. It has shown that words, such as we know them, are a secondary formation; that the first significant speech of man was not a word describing an isolated thing, but a composite utterance, in which many words were embedded together, describing a composite scene. Then disintegration begins (I am compressing still further Mr. Wallace's excellent account of this matter given in his *Prolegomena to the Logic of Hegel* *); and the elements of the composite utterance become independent words held together by the syntax of the sentence. These linguistic fragments then become fixed in speech as the names of the several objects which entered into the original scene; and represent the objects not as they are in themselves, but as they appeared from a particular point of view, viz., as parts of the scene. It is just as if we were to take the well-known figure of the kneeling acolyte in Domenichino's "Communion of St. Jerome" out of his surroundings in the picture, and mount him on a blank canvas by himself.

This is the kind of idea that constitutes the medium of exchange in ordinary intellectual commerce. The Germans call it a *Vorstellung* or illustrative image. Mr. Matthew Arnold himself calls it "a mere notion of the understanding," and he rightly contrasts with it a "religious idea,"† and elsewhere "a rational idea" which is not only a part but "a *chief* part of our experience."‡ This contrast in the dimension of the ideas employed is the chief point in his comparison of the Epistle to the Hebrews with the genuine work of St. Paul.

We have seen then what the ideas of the "ordinary self" of the individual are like: we have seen that they represent *fragments* of experience, and not the whole of experience, abstractions from and aspects of the object, and not the object in its totality, not the *ensemble* of its conditions. Let us now see how M. Renan describes the springing up of one of these large-scale ideas of the common consciousness which are called metaphysical:

"L'homme allait inattentif. Tout à coup un silence se fait, comme un temps d'arrêt, une lacune de la sensation: 'Oh! Dieu! se dit-il alors, que ma destinée est étrange! Est-il bien vrai que j'existe? Qu'est-ce que le monde? Ce soleil, est-ce moi? Rayonne-t-il de mon cœur? O père, je

* *Logic of Hegel*, Prol. p. lxxxvi. Mr. Sayce, the Deputy Professor of Comparative Philology at Oxford, has kindly supplied me with the following references which may be useful to those who desire to go more closely into this subject: CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, April, 1876; Sayce's "Principles of Comparative Philology," 2nd ed. (Trübner), pp. viii.—x. (xii., xiii.), 136, 144, 151, 152, 159, 217, 234, 243 (215, 226); also Waitz, "Anthropologie der Naturvölker," i. p. 272, &c. (English Translation, p. 241); also Sweet on "Grammar and Logic" in the last volume of the Proceedings of the London Philological Society. See further Gérard "On the Comparative Method of Learning Foreign Languages" (1876), Trumbull, Bergaigne, &c.

† *St. Paul and Protestantism*, p. 165.

‡ *Ibid.* p. 107.

te vois par delà les nuages !' Puis le bruit du monde extérieur recommence ; l'échappée se ferme ; mais à partir de ce moment, un être en apparence égoïste fera des actes inexplicables, agira contre son intérêt évident, se subordonnera à une fin qu'il ne connaît pas, éprouvera le besoin de s'incliner et d'adorer."*

Observe that M. Renan here describes the emergence of the social consciousness, the "better self," and *along with it and constituting it*, the most simple and primitive metaphysical idea. Divested of emotional language we have here a sense of aloofness, a certain posture taken up, a certain relation established ; we have what is called a *synthesis*, a putting together of two elements—on the one side the thinking and feeling man, and on the other an indeterminate and obscure but immense object of consciousness—the universe around him, and of which hitherto he had formed an unconscious part. This relation, in which the two correlatives merely confront one another for the first time—nothing more—is what is called in philosophy "Being." Mr. Arnold says in his later works that he doesn't understand what "Being" means. It means this detachment which M. Renan describes, mere "over-againstness" to consciousness, or as the Germans would say, "*das reine Gegenüber*." There is as yet no question as to *what* is over-against me, or *what* am I, or *what* is my relation to that which is over-against me, but merely the consciousness that I am over-against an immense indeterminate object, and that this immense indeterminate object is over-against me. It is merely "Est-il bien vrai que j'existe?" "Is it really true that I am standing aloof and alone over-against this immensity?" Experience is not yet born, this feeling of isolation is its birth-pang ; and the outline which I draw round the terms of this primitive relation, so as to include them both, becomes the rude mould into which all my subsequent experience is poured. And mere outline as it is, we can see at once that it is more concrete than the *Vorstellung* or ordinary notion of the understanding, which serves to do the intellectual business of life, because it is an outline inclosing the *whole* of experience, and not like the *Vorstellung*, a representative image covering a fragment of experience only. This larger idea, which emerges first at the birth of the social consciousness, is what is called in German philosophy a *Begriff*, which means what we have called "a synthesis."

Now we can see at once that this primitive synthesis of Being is not our synthesis ; it is not the mould into which we of this age pour *our* experience. It would be more true to say perhaps that the dominant conception with us, our synthesis, is the idea of development. It is the idea of development which has been framing and moulding more and more of our experience since

* Fragments Philos., pp. 40, 41.

the time of Lamarck. Thus we find Mr. Arnold, for instance, appealing to it against the Dissenters, with the same assurance as he appeals to the *Zeit-Geist*, to legitimate his assumption of the non-occurrence of miracles. To separate for opinions, we read, is worse than having, as we have in the Anglican "Articles of Religion," an inadequate and unsatisfactory synthesis, because it cuts the Dissenter off from the growth of the community; it leads him to give a finality and absoluteness to his doctrines which they have not; "it is to be false to the idea of development."*

To appeal to the *Zeit-Geist* of our age, and to appeal to the idea of development, are, with Mr. Arnold, the same thing. The formula of our *Zeit-Geist* is development. We have only to read George Eliot's last two novels, to see how every phase of many-sided thought, in our times, can be illuminated by this one idea. It has transformed, as we know, or is transforming, the whole field of knowledge; every science is being reconstituted by it; it has "turned its light" upon our old problems and shown us, not so much the answers to them, as the ineptitude of putting the great questions of life in the way we have hitherto put them; our old distinctions and oppositions fall away of themselves, and a wholly new order of questions has arisen. What a distance between this complex synthesis in which we stand, and the simple "O Dieu, est-ce bien vrai que j'existe?" with which human experience begins! What a distance from our synthesis even to the synthesis of "Substance and Accidents" which framed and moulded the experience of the men of the thirteenth century of our era! or again to the synthesis of expiation which occupied the mental field when the ancient societies were falling to pieces, and, as Mr. Arnold says, "the mind of the whole world was imbrued in the idea of blood."† How inadequate they seem! Yet, though inadequate now, they were once adequate, and in their own age they enveloped, as with a cloud, the whole horizon of thought.

(b.) So much, then, as to the dimensions of metaphysical ideas, of the syntheses of the *Zeit-Geist*, or consciousness of the community; they include, each in its turn and for the nonce, the *whole* of the experience of an age. Now, secondly, as to their structure. In saying "structure," I am trying to find a word for that element of resistance which we experience in thinking of all kinds. We can only move in certain directions; and just as we cannot scratch the lobe of our left ear with the toe of our left foot, whereas a dog can, because his physical structure is different from ours; so we cannot think anything or anyhow we please. Aristotle speaks of the reasoning process being "bound"—δέδεσται ἡ

* St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 24.

† Ibid. p. 173.

διάνοια. It is inclosed within the four walls, so to speak, of its thought; and this inclosure is due to structure. When, again, we get entangled in a paradox, and we find that thinking is for the moment stopped, what stops it? It is the resistance arising from the collision of structural elements in the ideas themselves, just as it is the interference of the structural elements in a skein of silk which stops our unwinding it. The structure of the *Vorstellung* or illustrative idea of ordinary thinking may be likened to that of a cone or convergent pencil of rays, having for its base the series of qualities in the object which are appreciable together from a single point of view, and for its apex the name combined with a representative image of the object so appreciated. And whatever qualities there may be in the object which refuse to lend themselves to this convergence on a single focus, simply disappear; or if they appear, they obliterate by their appearance those other qualities with which they conflict. This phenomenon we are familiar with in physics, under the name of "interference;" in the logic of the notion, it is thus expressed by Sir William Hamilton—"When an object is determined by the affirmation of a certain character, this object *cannot be thought* to be the same when such character is denied of it."* Such, for instance, is the structure of what Mr. Arnold calls "a mere notion of the understanding, and not a religious idea," in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where it is said that Christ's death was a perfect sacrifice which consummated the imperfect sacrifices of the Jewish law.† It is a fasciculus of that portion of the attributes of a great historical event, which can be grouped from a particular point of view, and from which all those qualities of the event which cannot be appreciated from, or which make against, this point of view, are excluded.

The structure of an idea of the *Zeit-Geist*, or common consciousness, as it is much more ample, is of necessity much more complex. It gets this greater complexity from two causes—from the nature of the common consciousness, and from the fact that it is the idea not of a part of the object, but of the whole of it. The consciousness of the community is not, like that of the individual, a single stream of thinking, but the convergence of many streams of thinking; just as society itself is a convergence and conflict of many opposite tendencies. These opposing tendencies correct each other, as we know, and give to society the means of developing, transforming, and improving itself, which the individual man has not. We may say of the community, as Aristotle said of Nature: it is "like a man who acts as his own physician."‡

* Lectures on Logic (Blackwood: 1860), vol. i. p. 81.

† St. Paul and Protestantism, pp. 164, 165.

‡ Phys. Ausc., B. 8. μάλιστα δὲ δῆλον, ὅταν τις ἰατρούη αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν · τούτῳ γὰρ ὁμοίει ἡ φύσις.

The onesidedness of one stream of thinking setting in a particular direction is corrected by meeting and mixing with another stream of thinking coming from the opposite direction ; and the *Zeit-Geist*, or spirit of any particular age, is the synthesis or mixture of these opposing streams. We get the same result if we contrast the view of one side or aspect of an object, such as we get in ordinary thought, with the claim which the mind of man makes to see the object *as it is*, in all its aspects, on all its sides, to see the whole of it. The object itself is the result of the equilibrium of opposing forces ; and *its process*, as we should now say in evolutionary language, is just the play of these forces, their conflict with one another. We cannot gather into a *Vorstellung*, or convergent pencil of attributes, this play of forces ; to ordinary thinking, the object is not a process, it can only be seized in one of its statical aspects, it must be *supposed at rest*. On the other hand, when it is said that metaphysic conceives the object as it really is in itself, we mean that it conceives the object, not supposed at rest, but, as it actually is, in process ; not as a fasciculus of attributes, but as the point in which conflicting forces meet and make reality.

The metaphysical idea or synthesis of the *Zeit-Geist* will thus contain, in its very constitution and structure, those seeds of internal conflict and disruption, which we find in all living things as distinguished from artificial products, bearing the mark of the workmanship and volition of the individual.

We shall see the nature of this synthesis of opposites best in a familiar example. Take the ordinary English or French notion of liberty. "What a Liberal means by liberty," says M. Renan, as Mr. Arnold quotes him, is "the non-intervention of the State." It means a vacuum created and jealously maintained round about the individual citizen by a system of checks and barriers against the interference of the community with his private affairs. This was Mr. Mill's notion of liberty ; it is Mr. Herbert Spencer's : it is the ideal of the great American Commonwealth. On the Continent this enthusiasm for "the heaven-born privilege of doing as one likes" has gone the length in Proudhon and his followers of what is called the "Abolition of the State."* This is a very natural ideal in old communities like France or England, where from historical causes the State is the embodiment of the power and authority of certain classes, and not of the power and authority of the whole people. But it is for this very reason an abstraction of a part of the conditions of national well-being as appreciated from a particular point of view ; it is not a synthesis of the whole of the conditions. Over against it and in antagonism to it we have another stream of thought, descending to us from the com-

* See a little book having this title by Dr. Engländer (Trübner, 1873).

munities of antiquity, in which the State was everything and the individual had no rights against it. We have Divine Right and the legal devolution of the supreme magistracy on the principles which regulate the inheritance of a private estate, and we have the theory of our Conservative party that the suffrage is a privilege to be bestowed from above and not a claim to be rightfully made from below. This too is an idea of the understanding, an abstraction of a part of the conditions of well-being made from a particular point of view. It leaves out of sight the undeniable fact of experience, that classes in possession of power habitually govern in their own interest and not in that of the people at large. But it is the historical theory as against the theory of the European revolution. It is the theory of the seventeenth century as against the theory of the eighteenth.

What then is the synthesis which shall hold together these conflicting abstractions? The Germans call it the *Begriff der Selbstbestimmung*; in English, the Synthesis of Self-determination. What is it that actually takes place in a community in which these counter-tendencies are operative? Mr. Arnold's view of the "best self" as extricated by culture and organized in the State will help us to an answer. What takes place is a process, a development, something like this. *The more* the State becomes the expression of the "best self" of an increasing number of its citizens, *the more* the highest liberty of the subject will consist in the application to his own individual life of an authority of which he is becoming in an increasing measure, and according to his culture, the author. As a citizen he is not at liberty "to do as he likes," any more than he is *in foro conscientiae*; but he is free in that he determines his own actions through the middle term of his "better self," as embodied in the community. The condition of self-determination is not, like that of liberty, detachment from but identification with, the community. His accession to it adds to its authority in the same measure as it adds to his liberty. The point to note about the synthesis of freedom or *self-determination through the community*, is that it is not, like the idea of liberty, the idea of a thing ready made, and done in a moment—

" Verterit hunc dominus, momento turbinis exit
Marcus Dama"—

but a gradual process of political and moral development, of which no two citizens can be said to partake at the same time in exactly the same degree. Freedom is not a ready-made thing, a *datum*; but, to use Mr. Arnold's expression, "it gradually and on an immense scale *becomes*."

This synthesis of self-determination I commend to the attention of the reader, as a fair and easily understood specimen

of what a metaphysical idea, an idea of the *Zeit-Geist*, of the common consciousness, is like. We see how its dynamical, its developmental character enables it to hold in solution two conflicting streams of thought which, taken apart, assume the form of immovable and sterile abstractions mutually exclusive of one another. We see too that whilst the abstractions of divine right on the one hand and of liberty on the other represent two *theories about* a part of the object, the synthesis represents a real process which is continually taking place in the object as a whole. This is what, I take it, is meant by saying, as philosophers say, that metaphysical ideas have an objective existence, as well as an existence in our thoughts. They are objective in so far as they are principles actually at work in transforming the world.

Have I outstripped Mr. Arnold in this exposition of the nature of the metaphysical synthesis? No: the elements are all there. There is the element of the paramount authority of the State as we have seen throughout: and there is the liberty of the individual *in vacuo*. Speaking of Wilhelm von Humboldt Mr. Arnold says, "He saw, of course, that in the end everything comes to this—that the individual must act for himself, and must be perfect in himself;" and then he seems for a moment to fall in with M. Renan's formula, and to maintain these two conflicting elements in their antagonism. "A Liberal believes in liberty"—he is here quoting Renan with approval—"and liberty means the non-intervention of the State. But such an ideal is still a long way off from us, and the very means to remove it to an indefinite distance would be precisely the State's withdrawing its action too soon."*

It would seem from this as if the ultimate aim is to be the eventual non-interference of the State. No: this is only Mr. Arnold's provisional solution: for he asks—and here we see the lineaments of the real synthesis forming themselves around the two conflicting abstractions—"whether we should not try to put into the action of the State as much as possible of right reason or our best self, which may, in this manner, *come back to us with new force and authority?*"† But although his mind, as we see, tends towards this metaphysical form of thought continually, and in this particular instance strikes upon it, yet he handles the synthesis faintly and infirmly ἀμυδρῶς μέντοι καὶ οὐδέν σαφῶς ἀλλ' οἷον ἐν ταῖς μάχαις οἱ ἀγύμναστοι ποιοῦσι.‡

I said at the outset that Mr. Arnold's negative criticism of political and religious anarchy covered the same metaphysical area as Dr. Strauss' positive construction of religious doctrine; and we have already seen that the element in which he moves, is the

* Culture and Anarchy, pp. 125, 127.

† Ibid. p. 120.

‡ Arist. Met. i. 4.

element of the consciousness of the community as distinguished from the element of individual consciousness. Now let us compare the synthesis of freedom, which we have just elaborated and made definite from Mr. Arnold's faint and disjointed sketch, with a synthesis expounded by Dr. Strauss. He is speaking of the relation between God and man :—

“Spiritual existence in its truth and reality is found neither in God by himself nor in man by himself, but in the union of God with man, neither in the infinity of the one nor in the finitude of the other, taken by themselves, but in that process of self-surrender and recovery taking place between the two factors, which from the Divine side is revelation, and from the human side is religion.”*

It will be seen that the structure of these two specimens of the metaphysical synthesis, although their subject-matter is different, is precisely, point for point, the same: and their fluid or developmental character is the same also.

(c.) This fluid and developmental character in the metaphysical synthesis brings us to another question. We have seen that internally, *i.e.*, in respect of its structure and of its contents, the synthesis is a process; and that its process is conditioned by the fact of its being the meeting point of opposite streams of thought. But what as to its genesis? In other words, what is the relation between the synthesis of one epoch, and that of the preceding epoch? We have seen what a distance there was from the primitive synthesis of “Being,” mere detachment from the *ensemble* and the thought of aloofness from it, with which experience began, and the synthesis of “Development” which is transforming our own thought. How did the social consciousness traverse this distance? how did it get from the one standing point to the other? how does the *Zeit-Geist* of one age pass over into the *Zeit-Geist* of the next? Does the new synthesis drop from the clouds, as an epoch in human history wears itself out and gives place to the next? as the different species of animals were supposed at one time—how long it seems ago and yet how short a time ago it really is!—to have been created separately and put into the world as they were wanted. Or shall we say that as our ancestor, the Ascidian, has become Man by minute and continuous processes of change, so the synthesis of Being has become the synthesis of Development by a series of growths similarly minute and continuous? We may perhaps with safety admit thus much upon the probable ground of the analogy of nature, now that we have such good reason to believe in the continuous evolution of species; without committing ourselves at present to the explanations which have been offered of the mode of the evolution.

* See this passage quoted in my former article on Strauss (CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, July, 1874, p. 244).

Mr. Arnold, for instance, says, of these syntheses, "they gradually and on an immense scale *discover themselves* and become." They form themselves "insensibly," they come "almost of themselves," and displace the previous syntheses "easily and without any turmoil of controversial reasonings." "We are not driven off our ground—our ground itself changes with us."* All this is a little characteristically *nonchalant* and vague: but it shows that Mr. Arnold holds that there is an evolution in ideas as in species, whatever the mode of it may be.

We have already had before us a passage from Dr. Newman's "Essay on Development," in which he speaks of an "innate power of expansion within the mind in its season," and at the same time states a conviction that the evolution is not an effect of "any mechanism of reasoning." What he means by expansion he tells us in the following words. He is speaking of what he calls a "living idea," *i.e.* an idea which has operation, as we saw that the metaphysical synthesis had:—

"Let one such idea get possession of the popular mind, or the mind of any set of persons, and it is not difficult to understand the effects which will ensue. There will be a general agitation of thought and an action of mind both upon itself and upon other minds. New lights will be brought to bear upon the original idea, aspects will multiply and judgments will accumulate. There will be a time of confusion when conceptions and misconceptions are in conflict; and it is uncertain whether anything is to come of the idea at all, or which view of it is to get the start of the others. After a while some definite form of doctrine emerges; and as time proceeds one view of it will be modified or expanded by another, and then combined with a third, till the idea in which they centre will be to each mind separately what at first it was only to all together."†

Dr. Newman adds further on:—

"Its development then is not like a mathematical theorem worked out on paper, in which each successive advance is a pure evolution from a foregoing, but it is carried on through individuals and bodies of men; it employs their minds as instruments and depends upon them while it uses them."‡

He ultimately arrives, and it is very remarkable that he should do so if we consider that the "Essay on Development" was written five-and-thirty years ago, at an explanation identical in its outlines with the hypothesis of Natural Selection:—

"It often happens, or generally, that various distinct and incompatible elements are found in the origin or infancy of polities, or indeed of philosophies, some of which must be ejected before any satisfactory developments can take place, if any. And they are commonly ejected by the *gradual growth of the stronger*."§

How thoughtful and serious is this endeavour of Dr. Newman's

* Literature and Dogma, Preface, xiv. See p. 8.

† An Essay on Development of Christian Doctrine (Toovey: 1845), p. 36.

‡ Ibid. p. 37.

§ Ibid. pp. 46, 47.

to unravel the problem as compared with Mr. Arnold's light and airy way of saying that the ideas "gradually discover themselves on an immense scale and become!" Then again there is the explanation which in substance I take to be Hegel's, which we may put thus. The social consciousness, as it expands and grows more complex with the onward progress of society, becomes at length too large for the mould into which it has hitherto been poured. New elements of experience arise which refuse to be included within the dimensions of the synthesis as it stands; they form themselves consequently into groups outside the lines of the synthesis, and thus become a standing protest against its sufficiency. In time they acquire a coherence of their own, and begin to take the form of a second synthesis, outside the first, and negative of it. We thus get a counter-synthesis, exclusive of the traditional and habitual one. What follows? The traditional synthesis no longer includes the whole, it has become an aspect only of the totality, of experience; it has become an abstraction conditioned from a particular point of view, the point of view of the epoch which is exhausting itself and just passing away. Instead of being any longer a metaphysical idea, it has sunk to a *Vorstellung*, "a mere idea of the understanding," as Mr. Arnold would say. And the counter-synthesis which has arisen over against it is in like manner an abstraction conditioned from the particular point of view of the new epoch, of the new social forces which are beginning to emerge and assert themselves, and not the whole of the fact; it is an idea of the understanding, negative and exclusive of its predecessor in possession. Thus we are brought back to the formal position from which we started. We have again two antagonistic streams of thinking, coming from opposite sides, and meeting and mixing. Then a third synthesis, in whose process both can be harmonized, again emerges. The formula of this development may be thus expressed: *position* (the traditional synthesis in possession), *opposition* (the counter-synthesis), and, lastly, *composition* (the new synthesis, erasing the conflict by means of a richer and more widely-working principle).

Hegel has named this perfectly intelligible mode of development (as it seems to me with needless paradox) the process of "absolute negativity." "Absolute negativity" means negativity which is itself negated, and thus results in an affirmation: the existing synthesis is "negated" by the counter-synthesis growing up outside it,—excluding it and excluded by it, until the new and riper synthesis arising from the meeting of the two streams of thought "negatives" in its turn the opposition between them by absorbing them both into a larger and more complex process of its own.

As a hypothesis explaining the mode of evolution of social

ideas, and standing upon the same footing as the hypothesis of Natural Selection explaining the mode of evolution of species, I conceive that this "absolute negativity" of Hegel's, in spite of its repellent terminology, is like Dr. Newman's principle of the survival of the stronger, worthy of attentive and respectful consideration. The question with the one as with the other is—does it cover all the facts? But it is a mistake to say that modern metaphysic must stand or fall with this attempt on the part of Hegel to explain the evolution of the social consciousness. We can see that there are a number of subsidiary hypotheses which may complete or modify this formula of the "absolute negativity." There is the view, for instance, that there is a latent syllogistic process intervening between each stage of the evolution; the view dismissed apparently by Dr. Newman. Further, there is the view that a synthesis must be exhausted in its operation by growing into an extreme and impossible form, before a counter-synthesis can arise. An illustration of this may be found in the way in which what Mr. Arnold called Hellenism, the enthusiasm for perfection, wore itself down to the exiguous and at the same time the extreme and extravagant form of a crowd of spectators collected to see Phryne coming up out of the sea in the person of Venus Anadyomene. And in the exhaustion of Hellenism, the counter-principle of Hebraism, the consciousness of sin, rises into importance. "This obstacle to perfection," says Mr. Arnold, "fills the whole scene, and perfection appears remote and rising away from earth in the background."*

Once more, there is the subsidiary hypothesis that evolution in social ideas is sometimes brought about by the synthesis of one community, at a particular time, coming across the path of the synthesis of another contemporary community at a lower or a higher stage of development. The intercourse of nations would thus bring about the opposition of a counter-synthesis, and give rise to the effort to reabsorb the conflicting elements in a larger, more complex process.

But whatever be the value of these various hypotheses to *explain the mode* of evolution; the important qualities in a modern metaphysician are the recognition of the existence of such a thing as a social consciousness at all, a "better self" which is above the individual; and the recognition of the fact that this social consciousness, like all other living things, is in a condition not statical and fixed, but dynamical and perpetually developing. These two essential qualities of the metaphysician, we have seen that Mr. Arnold possesses. He has, too, the flexibility and delicacy of touch which are required in dealing with a moving

* St. Paul and Protestantism, p. 137.

object like thought without interrupting or obscuring its movement. He has moreover an indispensable pre-requisite of the metaphysician, which Plato had to perfection, and that is *humour*; the gift "of imaginatively acknowledging the multi-form aspects of the problem of life, and of thus getting itself unfixed from its over-certainty, of smiling at its over-tenacity,"* the gift which makes a man shrink from treating any idea "as too serious a thing and giving it too much power."† *Humour*, in this sense, is indispensable to the metaphysician because he has to deal with thoughts which occupy at one time the whole field of consciousness and determine for the nonce all our mental operations, and then grow old and effete, and have to be frankly given up, as a new synthesis looms into view. It is to be lamented that Hegel had not this gift of humour: few Germans have: they are too serious; they think the results they get far too final; and it is a quality conspicuously absent from Hegel's followers.

But there is a not less indispensable habit of the metaphysician which Mr. Arnold has not, and that is strictness: sureness of touch in handling his ideas, what Aristotle calls *σοφία*. In the preface to his latest work, Mr. Arnold makes himself merry at the expense of the German critics for their "vigour and rigour;"‡ and no doubt Germans have not that gift of imaginative detachment from their ideas which is required in a critic. They make too much of them, and carry them out to ridiculous extremes. But still, somewhat of this rigour is wanted if we would find our way through the maze of metaphysical ideas prevalent at any given period of the world, if we would not be "manacled and hoodwinked" by them, as I shall try to show in the sequel that Mr. Arnold frequently is. Metaphysic, Aristotle tells us, is the strictest—*ἀκριβεστάτη*—of all the sciences, and the habit which shall give us this power of accuracy is *σοφία*, the habit which we praise when we say of Pheidias that he was *λιθουργὸς σοφός*, a *finished* sculptor.§ It is the *Fertigkeit*, the complete mastery of means, which gives the sureness and freedom of handling characteristic of the true artist. That Mr. Arnold has not this sureness and freedom in the handling of ideas of the social consciousness, and that these ideas consequently play fast and loose with him, and while keeping him in a state of irritable watchfulness, lead him treacherously into all sorts of quagmires, I shall show in a subsequent paper.


C. E. APPLETON.

* Culture and Anarchy. p. 147.

† Ibid. p. 229.

‡ God and the Bible, Preface. p. viii.

§ Arist. Eth. vi. 7.



BUNSEN AND HIS WIFE.

THE death of the Baronne de Bunsen, aged eighty-five, which has lately taken place at Carlsruhe, should revive the interest in her memoir of her husband, which will long be remembered as one of the very best books of its kind.

Hers was the appreciative, not the original mind, and she almost carried out the ideal in "The Princess,"

*"She set herself to man,
As perfect music unto noble words."*

She was one with her husband in thought and feeling, tastes and actions; she enabled him to carry out his objects by her sympathy and by her active co-operation; she took upon herself the vexing petty cares of life, and left him free to follow out his political and literary career. Yet she was no "housewife," but shared all the best part of his mind upon all occasions. How much individual intellectual power, good sense, and insight into character she possessed, may be seen in the two large, thick volumes, wherein, with a tender reverence for her husband, in whose life her own was so completely merged, she made his character known to a circle far wider than even that in which he moved during his lifetime.

The book is peculiarly interesting to us as the story of one who, though a stranger in the land, and preserving his own individuality quite unbroken, yet identified himself with the best of English

life in a manner which no other foreigner has ever done before or since.

Our pride of race, the supercilious habit of looking down on all other nations, as our inferiors in religion and politics, our shyness, exclusiveness, and insularity—our want of facility in other languages—combine to make a barrier into real English society which hardly any outsider from other lands finds it possible to pass. And although this must be the case more or less in every country, so that of the thousands who traverse Europe to and fro, the number of men and women in each generation might almost be counted on one's fingers who have become really intimate with the French, German, or Italian upper class, yet in England the difficulty created by the want of a common language makes the bar far greater than elsewhere. As Lord Houghton once said in a paper upon education, scarcely any English *man* speaks even French sufficiently well to enjoy talking it, and other tongues are still stranger to his lips. It was the accident of Baron Bunsen having married an Englishwoman, and using her speech as fluently as his own, which first opened the door for him into that jealously-kept sanctuary of English social life, which his sympathy with the nation improved to the utmost. It is this which makes the book so valuable—to see ourselves as others see us; not through the eyes of what we might call “an insolent Frenchman” or “a dogmatic German,” whom we could comfortably put aside with the feeling that “he does not understand us,” but by one who touched all things as if he loved us, with a gentle sympathetic reverence for all that was good, and a very kind tenderness even for our faults, which make his strictures tell home.

Bunsen's was a curious life of failure in the objects upon which he had set his heart. The gods shaped his ends to entirely contrary courses to those which he had rough-hewn for himself. He abhorred diplomacy, and his life was to be spent in little else. He preferred the learned leisure of a literary and artistic career, and he was condemned to the rush of London society as part of the duties of his position. He had a tender affection for his own country, yet during his lifetime he was almost singularly without influence in Germany, except through the personal friendship of the King, while he caused Prussia to be respected among nations in a manner which none of her internal arrangements before Sadowa and Sedan could have effected. He was not a great diplomatist, yet no ambassador ever took such a position before in England. He was anything but a great writer, yet he had more influence on his generation than many who were both, by sheer force of straightforward honesty in thought and action, true love of God and man, and sympathy with what was highest in thought and feeling wherever he went. It is to the honour of

the world that he should have been so successful, for he had none of the adjuncts which generally raise men to fortune—nothing but excellence, talent, and enormous industry.

He belonged, and prided himself on the fact, “to the kernel of the German nation, the cultivated and cultivating class of society;” and the record of the self-denial exercised by him and his parents in their poverty, and the sacrifices required to obtain the education which was like bread and meat to him, are exceedingly touching. At length, however, he obtained work at the Göttingen University, which enabled him to live independently while he pursued his own studies without interruption.

The “statement of his plan of intellectual work,” laid before Niebuhr when he was only twenty-four, takes one’s breath away by its extent and the enormous labour which it contemplated as possible. He “determines to combine three forms of contemplation, in order to interpret the problems of human knowledge, *i.e.*, philology, to arrange and treat individual historical facts; history, to discover their connection from their earliest development; and philosophy, to establish the principles by which philology and history investigate facts and laws of development, and mediate between fact and ideal conception,” whatever this last may mean.

He wishes to “acquire the whole treasure of language in order to complete his favourite linguistic theories,” to show the historical connection of German and Scandinavian heathenism with the East (“a study especially interesting as showing the history of nations”), and desires “to bring the language and spirit of the solemn East into communion with the European mind.”

To accomplish this gigantic plan he went to Paris to study Persian, intending to follow it up with Sanskrit; while in order to acquire the more modern languages of India, he proposed to spend three years at Calcutta. The material part of his scheme he hoped to carry out by joining an “Oriental journey of linguistic research,” which he trusted, under the auspices of Niebuhr, would be sent out by the Prussian Government. Meantime he earned money to support himself by teaching; undertook to accompany a young American on his travels, and even went as far as Florence with a young Englishman; but both plans dropped through, and at length he set forth on his own resources to meet Niebuhr, the ambassador at Rome, and his old friend Brandis, secretary of legation, through whom he hoped to obtain some opening for work. His enjoyment of the new life is delightful even to read of. The art, the antiquities, the climate, the exquisite beauty, the leisure for study (for teaching evidently bored him infinitely), the congenial society, all filled him with rapture. “There is but one Rome and one Niebuhr,” says he. He plunges into a whole polyglot of reading: Plato, Firdusi, the Koran, Dante, Isaiah, the Eddas, all

in their own tongues. A different influence, however, was at hand, more charming than Firdusi, more interesting even than the Eddas. He falls in with an English family with three daughters; and very soon declares how he had "always thought that his old love, his plan of study and travel, would have prevented the devoting of his whole heart and being to another and human bride." Woman, however, was stronger than learning and carried the day.

The courtship was short, but they had ample means of becoming really acquainted with each other's characters and tastes, in the easy, pleasant intercourse of Rome, and during their visits to all the great objects of interest, where the learned young German was an invaluable companion. The natural objections against a marriage where the bridegroom was absolutely penniless were great, but Niebuhr promised his assistance, and declared that Bunsen was certain to succeed in life; and the young couple were married in June, 1817.

Then comes a paradisiacal interlude at an "exquisite villa at Frascati," "the terrace of which looks down over vineyards, fields of maize, olives, fig-trees, and a long avenue of cypresses and pines." From the balcony of his room they "can see the Mediterranean in the distance, the beautiful Sabine mountains to the right, forming a semicircle round that end of the plain, and Rome in the centre. Springing fountains rise out of marble basins in the garden, most refreshing in this hot weather (July), pots of myrtles and flowers, blue skies," "all fair sights and sounds" are about them. Here he added to his other interests a study of the Bible with his wife, but felt a little uneasy in the midst of his happiness at the thought of what his friends would say to his giving up India; still after all, he reflects, "it was only a means to an end," and he "hopes without misgiving to accomplish what is necessary" in other ways. In October they returned to Rome, and established themselves in a suite of great, bare, half-furnished rooms in the Palazzo Caffarelli, on the Tarpeian rock; where once Charles V. was said to have been lodged. "The prospect has not its equal for beauty and interest, extending all over the city of Rome; the Forum on one side, the Capitol behind; but it is little known, as the Romans are too lazy to climb the hill on which it stands."

Here they passed the next twenty-two years—a delightful life, combining more elements of a rational and useful career with the satisfaction of both their tastes, for art and beauty and knowledge, than often falls to the lot of men. In this prosaic world, however, food and clothing must somehow be supplied, and, in spite of his extreme reluctance, he was gradually drawn by this necessity into the diplomatic career. During the illness of Brandis he undertook the post of secretary of legation, "but I would on no

account remain in the diplomatic career," he still says. "I detest that course of life too much, and only look on it as a means of becoming independent. The commonplace life of public business is so pitiful compared to a course of philosophical and literary labours." He "wishes to be a professor," he writes again and again. It was another curious instance of how his own plans for life were overthrown. Step by step he became entangled in diplomatic business, the charm of the society of the chief, Niebuhr, seeming to have had a great share in determining his final resolution, as he constantly alludes in his letters to the kindness of the great man, and his delightful intercourse with him. He continued to read and write on every conceivable subject, and soon undertook to prepare a joint description of Rome with Niebuhr, "he for the ancient, I for the modern part, especially an essay on ancient Christian churches," as the history of the Basilicas was peculiarly interesting to him; while he found time for trifles, such as the "Athenian law of inheritance."

The wealth of antiquarian interest in Rome, ever new, ever suggestive, was to him a never-failing delight. "I have hardly known a day ever since we have lived here when something has not been discovered, or some curious question cleared up," he once said. The labour, however, of preparing his share of the Roman work was great, from his extreme conscientiousness and desire for accuracy, while the time had to be taken from his short intervals of rest from diplomatic work.

There follows a visit to Niebuhr at Tivoli, where he and his wife remained for some time, "the happiest in his life." He rejoices that "Fanny should really become intimate with the simplicity of greatness and inexhaustible animation of their host, his interest in all that is good, true, learned, and wise; the richness and charm of his conversation, which commanded every subject, and the high-minded absence of everything trivial." "His great personal kindness to Fanny and me" is continually alluded to.

Then follows a whole encyclopædia of subjects which they discussed together. They had been talking of the Athenian orators.

"I begin to understand the justness of Niebuhr's democratic tendency with respect to Athens, which formerly seemed to me to do wrong to Plato and others. When one becomes better acquainted with the insolence and cruelty of the aristocracy of Athens, there seems to have been no alternative between a democracy such as Demosthenes desired and the acceptance of Alcibiades as *tyrannos*."

"Niebuhr has given me authentic data showing how little Malthus' facts concerning the proportionate increase of population and production really prove. Neither Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, nor France are nearly so populous now as in the middle ages, some parts of Germany not even so much so as before the Thirty Years' War. This is caused by the prevalence of epidemical disorders even more than by wars. Another

series of facts regards the rates of increase of population to extent of country and the moral state of society at the time."

He winds up with finding out that the deeper he goes into history and politics the more he feels that he must go to England to inquire, investigate, and observe.

He begins to put aside the study of language for a time: "all separation between knowledge and action is unsound and enfeebling; one must learn what exists, what may be done, how best by system and principle this can be carried out; and then, each according to his ability, to strive to accomplish it;" and this may truly be said to have been his aim through life—to strive by every means in his power to find out what was true, and then earnestly attempt to put it in practice. "Later," he says, "comes a life and time for contemplation, and the inquiry into the past returns with new force."

His life gave him one great advantage: by dwelling so much in foreign lands, and with men of such various nationalities, he was freed from that "belief in conventionalities," that "pedantry in raising things external to the rank of duties," that "almost religious strictness in the observation of forms," which men, and still more often women, who live in a set, so often fall into, and which sometimes vexed his soul, particularly among the English.

"We live," he writes to his sister, "almost entirely out of what is called the world. Sunday and Monday evenings we read the Bible with the Prussian chaplain, on Thursday Niebuhr receives, Monday we meet for singing of old church music."

His interest in music continued to be strong throughout his life; at first he only cared for it when accompanied by words. Art, indeed, at this time was interesting to him only as expressing thoughts and feelings, the technical part was of little worth to him, and his shortsightedness prevented much of the pleasure afforded by pictures and architecture. But later on he has found out that "music possesses the high privilege of showing how much there is, intensely affecting the human soul, that thought cannot grasp nor language utter." A palimpsest MS. on music, which had been found at Pompeii, sets him on studying the whole subject in ancient and modern times with a special view to the reformation of hymns in Germany "as the first step to a revival of Christian worship." He was much assisted in these studies by the Papal choir, whom, as a very rare favour, he persuaded to come and sing at his house, chiefly selections from Palestrina for four voices.

"The 'canto fermo' or plain chant was imposed by a special law of the Council of Trent on the private chapel of the Pope as the only style suitable to the solemnity of the Papal presence. This was the basis of the

music of Palestrina and Allegri, and was founded on the scanty fragments of the musical system of the ancient Greeks, which have been handed down to us."

He was delighted with a litany to the Virgin, sung on the eve of her festivals by the Roman peasants in the Piazza Madama, and dating from the tenth century, the only one remaining of a class of popular devotional musical exercises which had been broken up by the French occupation at the time of the Revolution.

He then undertook the examination of above 2,000 hymns, and selected 150 "as a step towards a common form of Christian worship," "a plan which Luther had pointed out, but did not execute." In his comparison of different liturgies, he says—

"The English is constructed from a grand point of view, adapted with much wisdom to the wants of the people at the period it was put together, and represents Christian worship far more thoroughly than anything I have seen in Germany, Holland, or Denmark."

He wished to "make the historical treatment of the conception of the Lord's Supper the principal work of his life in future years:" "the spiritual priesthood of all Christians, the true idea of self-sacrifice, the continuous spiritual giving of thanks which became afterwards the sacrifice of the mass." One of the great pleasures of this period (1821) to Bunsen and his wife "consisted in the study of the creations of Thorwaldsen's genius;" they found him one day in the act of finishing the statue of Mercury, and he told how a sitting figure in perfect repose, but on the point of action, had occurred to him as admirable, and that he had just hit upon a subject to furnish it with meaning, "Mercury having lulled Argus to sleep, and grasping his sword, about to strike him, watching lest the hundred eyes should open again." He had lately finished his colossal statue of Christ for Copenhagen, and said he feared he must have reached his best and be about to decline, for "I have never before been satisfied with any of my works; I *am* satisfied with this, so I must be on the road to decay."

A fatal Roman fever broke in on the happy family life: they lost their eldest little girl at Albano, and there is a touching account of Niebuhr's extreme tenderness for them in their grief; both father and mother caught the disorder, and Bunsen suffered long and acutely.

In the winter of 1822 the King of Prussia and his two sons arrived in Rome, and Bunsen was deputed by Niebuhr to "explain Rome" to them. This was his first acquaintance with the prince, who returned alone in the following year, and whose friendship with Bunsen continued unbroken to the end of his life.

Through the great rooms of the Palazzo Caffarelli now passed all who were worth knowing of every nationality, and the catalogue itself is almost a history of the time. Dr. Arnold, Stein ("who"

he felt to be his king"), Lord Sandon, Lord Dudley Stuart, Pusey, the Chevalier Neukomm, nominally *maître de chapelle* to Talleyrand, who hated music but liked his company; the Duc de Luynes, with his knowledge of antiquities; Thirlwall, and later, Gladstone—men who had no time at home to enjoy themselves, but were only too happy to study Rome in company with one so willing and able to communicate knowledge pleasantly as Bunsen.

"Lord Colchester has arrived in a most disconsolate state of mind, declaring that the English constitution would not last sixty years longer;" "indeed the times we live in," says Bunsen himself, in a letter of 1821, "are most unsatisfactory; men's minds are unfixed, lost in self-interest, sentimentality, and self-contemplation." Niebuhr, as he grew older, had lost his love of republics, unless at the distance of 2,000 years. He had become more conservative and French in his ideas, while Bunsen was gradually drawing nearer to England, which he now hoped to visit. Instead of this, when at length Niebuhr threw up his post as Minister in 1823, Bunsen, much against his own wishes, agreed to remain till a new Minister arrived, "but only till then. What can I expect here but splendid poverty? receiving thousands only to expend the money on outward appearances and honour." "I have ambition, but it must be satisfied in the honour of my own choice. A man should so love his profession as to accept with indifference all events proceeding from it."

The burning of the magnificent church of San Paolo fuori le Mura, with its mosaics of the ninth century, which Bunsen had greatly delighted in—"its beams of cedar of Lebanon above a thousand years old, and the columns of violet marble taken from the mausoleum of Hadrian"—"was an event even in the eventful year 1823." The old Pope, Pius VII., was dying at the time, and a strange account is given of the funeral, "according to long fixed custom," showing the sort of sentiment which had been inspired by the Pontiffs beforetime among their people:—

"His remains lay in state, first at the Quirinal, and then at St. Peter's, where they were taken by night, not with chanting and a great attendance of clergy, but with troops, pieces of artillery and ammunition-waggon, and no light but straggling torches in the narrow streets, where the moonlight could not penetrate—these precautions dating from the times when they were necessary to defend the corpse of the pope from being attacked by the populace. At the funeral of Paul IV., a Caraffa, a band of the people, having failed in their attempt to attack the remains, knocked off the head of one of his statues, and after parading it about the streets, threw it into the Tiber."

Then follows the election of the new Pope, the cardinals walking in procession to the conclave in the Palace of the Quirinal, preceded by the attendants who were to be shut in with them, and the singers performing the "Veni, Creator Spiritus." The

votes of the cardinals were collected by ballot twice a day, and burned at once, till the requisite majority was obtained. The small thread of smoke was carefully watched by a crowd of idlers, to know whether the end was come. The pasquinades, the rumours "containing an acrid venom which caused it to be supposed they were concocted chiefly by the lower clergy," are mentioned, with many curious details which we may see repeated any day—the nominees of the three Catholic Powers being at last all quietly put aside by the Italian majority of cardinals, and an Italian bishop, Leo XII., selected.

The new Pope was carried with the accustomed state to St. Peter's, "and actually seated on the high altar, to be adored," the literal expression used. The Russian Minister was much scandalized, and said, "Je suis schismatique, et je n'ai pas le droit de juger des affaires Catholiques, mais ce qui me paraît étrange c'est que le Pape ait posé le séant là où l'on place le Seigneur."

Not long after this period Bunsen was made Prussian Minister, a post which he accepted with many qualms, and the fatigue of which was much increased by having for some time no one to help him but his wife in the clerical work of the legation. He much felt, too, the want of the rest of Sunday, "an institution which does not exist at Rome."

His position seems to have been complicated by the jealousy of him and his influence over the King felt at Berlin; his trusty Fanny complaining of the "misapprehension of that truly German heart in his own country." He admits however, himself, after one of his visits to Germany, that "the conception of one's own country becomes more and more ideal in absence, and finally untrue to fact." He was shortly after summoned to Berlin, where his visit was, nevertheless, a success. The King was very gracious, showed much interest in the antiquarian discoveries made at Rome, and discussed at great length, and after Bunsen's own heart, "the best kind of public worship and the right ideal of a Christian State." He remained away six months, and the honour done to him in his own land rejoiced his wife's inmost heart, when he returned to his post evidently much refreshed. His affection for Rome was deep—"It would indeed be hard to me to leave the metropolis of the world; and all other towns are villages and *parvenues* compared with this queen of the earth." There are a page or two at this point which evidently intimate a great deal of inconvenience and even suffering to Madame de Bunsen herself, very gently hinted at. Bunsen brought his sister from Germany to live with them. She was thoroughly uncongenial in every way, and the seven and a-half weary years that she spent with the family were indeed "one long mistake."

Again comes the record of the hosts of interesting people from

all countries who appeared in his *salons*: "Lord and Lady Hastings, returning from their regal position in India; Champollion and his hieroglyphics; Madame Recamier, with the old charm lingering about her; Count Montmorenci, one of the most constant of her adorers; Cardinal Cappacini, then a Minister of the Pope's," a pleasant, lively old man, who was fond of telling how he had been sent to England at the time of the peace, and had positively given the Pope's health at a public dinner, which was received very well, such was the general good humour. "Everything," he said, "was charming in England, except those black birds that fly about the high trees"—the rooks. Mendelssohn, then only a lad of twenty, is described as one of the "most amiable and attaching of human beings," deep at that time in the study of chorale music. "The rare charm of his mind and character is shown in his letters," and Bunsen's feeling towards "one so bright and pure was as to a son."

Each winter has its glimpses of pleasant society—in 1828, Thirlwall, St. Aulaire, Dr. Arnold. Chateaubriand had just arrived as French Ambassador, and Bunsen complains of his "uneasy vanity, wrapped up in himself and in the desire of producing an effect." "One evening in his own house, and in a room full of guests, he stood for some time, rapt, with his eyes fixed on the ceiling."

It was perhaps with some of the same feeling that he once observed to Bunsen (it was at the funeral of Leo XII.) "that as regarded Catholic emancipation in England, although he rejoiced at it for the sake of human nature, he regretted it as a Catholic, since it would do harm to the Church."

The times were full of anxiety to Bunsen :

"This age," he says, "is one of relaxation and lukewarmness, and yet what great things are demanded of it. The events are great and the men are small, the fermentation of change goes on—prejudice on one side, narrow-mindedness on the other; one striving to stave up the crumbling past with unsound props, the other to build anew without foundations."

"You think," he writes to Dr. Arnold on the Reform agitation in England, "that the principle of power, according to the majority of a population, is fraught with evil."

The French Revolution of 1830 had a strange effect upon Niebuhr. He was in a fever of alarm, and seems to have thought that all Europe would shortly be in flames. He was furious with England for entertaining friendly relations with France, and talked of "the alliance of the Tiger and the Shark." He died the following year, having almost received his death-blow from his extreme agitation.

The household at Palazzo Caffarelli was to him, however, to the last a source of great pleasure. In a long and affectionate letter to him, Bunsen says:—

"My position is all that I could wish, more advantageous than I ever could have expected. To remain in the Capitol is essential to my happiness. . . . Our happy condition is owing to you, and our thoughts turn naturally to you as its author."

"Nothing can replace Niebuhr to me," he declares fervently after his death. In 1833 Walter Scott is mentioned among their guests; Augustus and Julius Hare, Tourgueneff, and the Grande Duchesse Stephanie, daughter of Hortense Beauharnais, one of the few relics then left of the Napoleonic dynasties.

In the same year he made an expedition with his wife and children to see the Etruscan tombs near Veui, which had just been discovered, and which interested him extremely. On one occasion at Corneto when an opening was made in the brickwork, the first who looked in "saw for a moment a figure in full armour, lying on a bier; but as the outward air entered, it vanished with a cracking noise, and nothing remained but a heap of oxidized metal round the bones."

He strove, and successfully, to keep up all his old interests, but "life is an art; to carry on public business without giving up study." "Power is one among the means of success, but only the use of the right means has a blessing on it."

In 1834 he is receiving Lord Ashley, and hearing much of schools, and is reading Newman's "Arians." "Oh heavens! what a book!" he ejaculates, and even then complains of "the dreadful hankering after papism" of the great convert of the future.

Very tedious negotiations were going on at this time between Prussia and Rome on the subject of mixed marriages and the forced attendance of Catholic soldiers at Protestant worship, a piece of intolerance which Bunsen only persuaded the King to give up by a *coup de main*.

Towards the end of the following year the cholera broke out at Rome, and Madame de Bunsen's description of the utter disorganization of society under the terror of it, the extreme barbarism of the "chosen people," their ignorance and cruelty amounting to barbarity, and the low state of feeling at the heart of Christendom, is extremely curious. There was almost an insurrection to prevent hospitals from being established. Every one, as long as he was not attacked himself, "considered every cholera patient as an excommunicated being," of whom it mattered not what becomes. Twelve thousand people died of it. The rumours of poisoning were as rife as in the middle ages, and wretched people accused of the crime were assassinated in the streets. An English teacher was pursued and killed after receiving eleven stabs from poniards, while the Pope shut himself up in the Quirinal, and refused to allow his own physician to attend any cholera patients for fear of infection to himself.

In 1837 a visit to England was arranged, and Bunsen's enthusiasm at the idea is pleasant to read. "I can scarcely master the storm of feeling in thinking I am on the direct road to my Ithaca, my island fatherland, the bulwark of religion and of civil liberty."

His time with us was a great success; he was received at once as an old friend, and at once entered into the enjoyment of all that was best among us as by right. It is curious to mark the level to which the tide of thought had then reached. Arnold's interpretation of prophecy, "that the writer is not a mechanical instrument in the hands of the Spirit," seems to have created much opposition. Pritchard's book upon races was another bone of contention.

One of Madame de Bunsen's sisters was married to Lord Llanover in Wales, and to their house Bunsen, in company with Lepsius, went down to give the prize for the best Welsh essay at a grand Eistedfodd, then a novelty and an event.

He saw a great deal of Gladstone at this time (1838), and calls him "the first man in England as to intellectual power. He has heard higher tones than any one else in this island. His book" (which he does not much like) "is far above his party and his time, but he walks sadly in the trammels of his Oxford friends in some points." Amidst his other changes of thought, it may probably still be said how much his Oxford training clings to Gladstone, whether for good or evil.

In the busiest seasons Bunsen never gave up the thread of his family life, and shared his day's work as much as possible with them. His daily Scripture reading, ushered in by one of his beloved hymns, always began the day, and one of his many touching tributes to his wife as to her share in their past and present was written in this year. "The load of our earthly toil has increased upon us, and its principal weight is thrown upon your shoulders." "You are turning singly and alone the heavy wheel of life's daily work, while I have been refreshed by nature, art, and the study of human nature." But when working with and for him no load seemed heavy to her.

He was much struck with the power of the elevating and buoyant atmosphere of English domestic and public life, although "the deficiency of the method of handling ideas in this blessed island" is sad in his eyes.

"The great national existence, such as the English people alone have at this present time, is grand and elevating of itself. The power of thought belongs to us (the Germans) in this day of the world's history. . . ." There is a regret in the ring of the passage for the political state of his own country. He attended the opening of Parliament, and was "more and more struck by

the great position of a Minister in England. I heard Lord John Russell speak," and felt "that here man was in his highest place, defending the interests of humanity with the wonderful power of speech." "Had I been born in England, I had rather be dead than not sit and speak among them!" He breakfasts at Sir Robert Inglis's, meeting Sandon (Lord Harrowby) "with the old good face," Arnold, and Lord Mahon, and another day Gladstone. "This man's humility and modesty make me ashamed," he adds. The little touches of character are very interesting. At a breakfast at Mr. Hallam's he sits between the host and Macaulay, "who was evidently writing the article in the *Edinburgh* on Gladstone's book; he spoke with all the power of his mind (or rather *esprit*) on the subject. He is the Demosthenes and Cicero of the Whigs." Lord Mahon, Kemble, Empson, and Philip Pusey were there, the conversation very lively and instructive. They said that O'Connell cannot be eloquent unless greeted by cheers from the opposite side; he is heard now in silence, and becomes weary and tiresome. Then comes a literary breakfast at "Milnes'," another at Bishop Stanley's, and a lecture of Carlyle's. He goes from a meeting at Crosby Hall, where he sees "his favourite saint, Mrs. Fry," to a dinner, where he meets Dr. Pusey, "whose feeling against the Low Church and Calvinism is almost passion."

A sermon from Maurice at Gray's Inn impresses him exceedingly. "He does not read the prayers, but prays them with an intensity of seriousness which would make it hard not to pray with him." The remembrance of a bit of what now may be called almost fossil bigotry is revived when he relates how "Buckland is persecuted for asserting that fossil beasts and reptiles were pre-Adamite. 'What open infidelity! Did not death come into the world on account of Adam's sin?'"

His delight in the great oratorios at Exeter Hall is extreme. "Only in England is the Handelian tradition in real existence."

He was amused and interested by the scene at Oxford, when he received an honorary degree, and met many of his friends, Arnold among others, whose health gave him much uneasiness. "He will sink, I fear, under his work; he ought to be given a deanery; there are no such professorships where he could take refuge as in Germany." But Arnold's day of recognition did not really come until after his death, and when his life had been explained to the world by his younger friend, in that singularly beautiful memoir which has already become almost a classic in English literature.

Bunsen's brilliant visit, however, to England soon came to an end, and in 1840 he was sent as envoy to Switzerland.

He passed through Paris on his way, "an intellectual oasis in

that Gallic desert," as he calls it; saw Bournouf, and had much talk on Egypt, and was afterwards occupied in his retreat at Berne with "trying to reconcile Egyptian, Babylonish, and Judaic chronology."

Again he visited Berlin, and found the King most friendly, but his clear-sighted wife observes "how Bunsen's sanguine nature hoped for different results from him than were possible indeed from kings."

"Be not chilled by the coldness of those about you," he says, in a letter written at this time; "the perseverance of love and patience together" brings about great results.

A visit to Falk of Weimar, who had adopted a number of orphans deserted in the great war, interested him much. The widespread misery of that period struck him even so long after it was over as 1840.

At length he was sent on the mission to England, and the pleasure of their return there to remain permanently was great to both husband and wife. He immediately assumed a place among us which no other ambassador had ever here obtained, living habitually with the best minds which England at the time possessed. His sympathies were singularly catholic; there were so many sides to his mind, that he had points of contact with the greatest possible variety of men, while he saw the best side of all. Perhaps Arnold, Julius Hare, and Whately might be said to be those with whom, however, he most truly fraternized; indeed the four were sometimes accused of living too much "in a mutual admiration society."

It almost takes one's breath away only to read the list of occupations which had to be crowded into every day,—the letters, the politics, the receptions, the diplomatic work, the social engagements, the philanthropic interests in which he joined,—and amidst all this the constancy with which he always contrived to steal time for his literary pursuits,—the amount of his daily reading, and the intercourse with literary men, to which, as to his old love, he always returned with unfailing zest. To the end of his life he was ever essentially a learner, with a youthful interest in knowledge, a power of acquiring, undaunted and unslacked by the pressure of work which sometimes became too heavy for even his strength.

He enjoyed to the utmost that full tide of life—social, political, scientific, and literary—which can only be found to perfection in London or Paris, and which he missed acutely afterwards in "the slack water" of Heidelberg and Bonn. Occasionally, however, he speaks bitterly of "the conflicting currents, disturbances, and interruptions of his outward calling and the convictions of the inner man."

"I seek to preserve peace and unity and remove dissatisfaction here, and then I learn daily much in this country of life itself. Therein consists English greatness. In art and science we, the Germans, have the advantage, the true poetry and philosophy of England is in life, and not in the abstract consciousness of that life."

His interest turned ever towards theological subjects, "the period between Origen and Luther," when the hierarchical system was established. The "new birth" which he expects "is slow and difficult, the new Reformation which the world wants everywhere. We Germans alone can give the formula of the new consciousness of Christianity:" "a universal priesthood, instead of an exclusive order, is what we may hope for in the future; works of love instead of professions of faith, a belief in a God within us, i.e., Christ, with such awe and humility as can alone preserve him to our souls."

As time went on he was painfully struck with "the religious state of England, the inward disease, fearful hollowness, spiritual death of the philosophical and theological forms of the nation;" the manner in which the "outward forms no longer expressed the inward emotion."

"The German nation has neglected and sacrificed all political, individual existence and common freedom, to pursue in faith the search after truth. In England the political life has eaten out the other."

"Plato says, that seven years of silent inquiry are needful for a man to know the truth, but fourteen in order to learn how to make it known to his fellow man,"—a proportion he does not find observed!

"The direction of the Church of England since 1843," seemed to him "to have been erroneous, the hierarchical tendency now prevailing cannot hold. I more and more feel it to be an axiom, that Christology, as taught by the Churches, cannot be brought into union with the right interpretation of Scripture, the historical views, speculative thought, and moral consciousness of the time we live in."

"Why should we be impeded by the falsely so-called Apostles' Creed, or the pre-eminence given in it to the mythical deposit of the deep impression produced by the divine revelation in Christ, which has become predominant in the Churches? . . . Why should not faith in the divine revelation be true and vigorous, when it assumes that man is the highest exponent of that divine revelation which is given to us mortals?"

"To attribute infallibility to Ezra's synagogue and the Maccabæan successors is worse than to ask it for the Pope, it is sheer Rabbinism or prejudice."

"In England everything except the moral principle in the form of the fear of God is deathlike. Thought itself is crudely rationalistic here, public worship in general lifeless, and the vivifying spirit startles like a spectre when it appears."

"The rising generation" appeared to him to be "partly infidel and partly bigoted."

These are a few of the scattered notices of his thoughts during the next twelve years that he spent amongst us. A curious sketch might be worked out from the "life" of the changes and phases of religious opinion which he witnessed.

He believed cordially in the mission of his own nation. "We are still," he says, "the chosen people of God, the Christian Hellenes, but the intellectual life in my native country wants interpretation."

The idealizing, sentimental German manner of looking at politics which characterized him, clung to him throughout his diplomatic career, and made the hard-headed common sense of such statesmen as Lord Palmerston sovereignly antipathetic, particularly on such questions as the establishment of a joint bishopric at Jerusalem by England and Prussia, and the woes of Schleswig-Holstein, so soon to be absorbed entire by her chivalrous protector.

But politics had never the absorbing interest for him which literature possessed, and he falls back gladly upon his Oriental and philological studies, carried out by Max Müller in a way which he heartily admired and almost envied—on Lepsius and Egypt, and Rawlinson's "unspeakably instructive Babylonian inscriptions"—in a tone of longing which is almost pathetic.

The account given by Madame de Bunsen of their visits to Windsor and Osborne, and of Bunsen's conversations with Prince Albert, show what congenial minds they found in each other.

At one time they were "discussing the relative position of the three nationalities of England, France, and Germany, to each other and the world. . . . France forms the medium between the practical English and the theoretic German. They have always understood how to coin the gold of intelligence and bring it into circulation, but their influence is diminishing. The Prince observed one day that the danger of the French nation was in licentiousness, the Englishman's besetting sin was selfishness, that of the German self-conceit; every German knows all and everything better than all other folk."

"My life is one of great and varied interest," Bunsen writes at this time. "I am to find the old Duke at Windsor, whom the Queen has often caused me to meet, and who is always peculiarly communicative to me." On the eve of the 10th of April, when thrones and constitutions were shaking all over Europe, and fears were expressed for the stability of England, he met the Duke again, at Lady Palmerston's. "'Your Grace will take us all in charge?' 'Yes, but not a soldier shall be seen unless in actual need; if the force of law is overpowered, then is their time; it is not fair on either side to call them in to do the work of police—the military must not be confounded with the police, nor merged in the police'—grand maxims of political wisdom."

His intercourse, indeed, with the Queen and Prince Albert was singularly interesting and free. The fact of his being a German and an ambassador seems to have enabled them to admit him to a

kind of intellectual intimacy which they did not allow themselves elsewhere. Prince Albert, a man of original thought, and with the healthy desire to put that thought into action which a clever benevolent man must feel, was yet denied the smallest loophole for its exercise except vicariously. Bunsen talks of "the absurd jealousy of the English, who refused in his case to acknowledge their own favourite dogma that the wife is, and ought to be, under the influence of her husband." The Queen's touching account of the manner in which Albert accepted this most difficult and trying position, and how much he was able to accomplish under such trammels, is confirmed again and again in Bunsen's letters. And the testimony which he bears to the character of the Queen, and her virtues, is one which any person in any class of life might well be proud of.

"A pleasant evening at Osborne" he describes once:—

"It is here that the Queen feels herself most at home; she here enjoys her domestic life and family happiness to her heart's content, walks in her beautiful gardens and grounds with the Prince and her children. The prospect of the sea and of the proud men-of-war of Great Britain in the midst of a quiet rural population is very striking."

Madame de Bunsen particularly mentions "the truth and reality of the Queen's expression, which so strongly distinguishes her countenance from the fixed mask only too common in the royal rank of society."

The Great Exhibition had just been started on one of these visits, and the Prince was full of hopes as to the good which it might be expected to bring in its train. "No one could conduct the undertaking but the Prince, from his great versatility of knowledge and his impartiality. I suggested a mixed jury."

Whether staying at Windsor or Osborne, he repeatedly alludes to the amount of hard work which the Queen has to perform and her conscientious mode of doing it.

"To-day," he says, "pacing up and down the corridor at Windsor, looking out on the towers and turrets, I was meditating on the happiness which dwells within these walls, founded on reason, integrity, and love. It is a pattern of the well-ordered, inwardly vigorous, and flourishing life which spreads all around, even to the extremities of this great island."

The whole account is a great testimony both to the Queen and her husband; and, remembering how near was the catastrophe of their separation, the description of the happiness of the Queen is most pathetic.

He is, of course, in communication with all the ministers and statesmen of the day, and little hints as to their idiosyncrasies crop up. "Met Palmerston to-day, sweet as honey;" and he gives instances of his kindly nature. "A letter from Gladstone of twenty-four pages; he is beset with scruples, his heart is with us,

but his mind is entangled in a narrow system. He is by far the first intellectual power on that side." "We dined at the American Minister's, and heard Macaulay talk almost the whole dinner through," &c., &c.

But most interesting of all are the notices, as beforesaid, of the phases of religious and political thought in England which he witnessed, the extraordinary changes in freedom of opinion which have taken place, the stir on all manner of social questions which has marked the last thirty or forty years; these all pass before us in Madame de Bunsen's book, just touched on, noted without passion, not fought over, but looked at with no party view either political or religious, in a way which would be quite impossible for a native Englishman however impartial—with a candour which requires the distance attained only by time or by a different nationality—a perspective which no soldier engaged in the *mêlée* could ever even hope to reach.

The abortive Hampden discussion, which risked so much for one who so little merited the trouble he caused;—the Gorham controversy, which threatened a sort of Free-Church secession of the Evangelical party, implying the extraordinary question whether it pleases God to damn little unbaptized babies eternally or not—"the judgment was one of the most remarkable pronounced since the Reformation and Civil Wars, on a point of faith; proving that the Liturgy was intended to soften and relax doctrine, not to make the Articles more strict;"—the great High Church movement of Newman, Pusey, and Keble; the reaction against the narrowness and ugliness, the want of Catholic sympathies and æsthetic taste alike of the Low Church party,—which yet had been doing such admirable service in its time against the dead, cold rationalism of the eighteenth century;—the almost forgotten struggles of Arnold for freedom of thought and action, which are now merged in his fame as the first of our time who took the large view of English education, for which one must otherwise go back to Dean Colet and Milton;—the storms in a tea-cup over the rejection of Mr. Maurice from his professorship at King's College, for doubting the eternity of damnation and hoping for the final salvation of the race;—the curious bit of diluted mediævalism, the heretical book luckily taking the place of the heretic himself, when Sewell gravely burned the "Nemesis of Faith" in the quadrangle of Exeter,—a solemn farce almost incredible in these days:—all these in succession are alluded to with a singular equality of unruffled interest. He was amongst us, and yet not of us.

At length, and somewhat suddenly, in 1854, the time of repose for which he had so often sighed was at hand. The political interest opposed to his own triumphed at Berlin, and he was dismissed, although with very kind expressions of private regard from the

King, yet somewhat painfully after such long service. Thenceforth his life was one of literary retirement.

“I have at last come to the point which I have been striving after since 1817,—the Life of Christ,—although I must begin by clearing the porch and entrance-hall of the Temple, obstructed by the theologians, still more than by the philosophers.”

Many of his ten sons and daughters were now married, and he and the remainder of his family established themselves for a time in a *château* near Heidelberg, with a beautiful view of the Neckar and the hills, where they remained for several years, he writing and reading incessantly as usual, and seeing a number of friends on their way to and from the south. The situation proved, however, in winter to be both cold and solitary, and he missed the command of the best society, to which he had been accustomed all his life,—the more so as he grew older and weaker.

The family then retired to Bonn, and continued there (with a short flight to Cannes) until his death, aged sixty-nine, in 1860, when he sank away with that full faith in God's presence in, and action on the world, both here and hereafter, which had characterized his whole life. “It is sweet to die,” he repeated; “with all weakness and imperfection I have ever lived, striven after, and willed the best and noblest only. But the best and highest is to have known Jesus Christ.” His “Life of Jesus” had been one of the great interests of his declining years, carried on to the last in spite of much pain and feebleness. “A life in the first place of only two years out of thirty-two, and since that of 1800 more”—of One so truly indeed living to him for ever.

Turning to his wife he said, “We shall meet again before God: if I have walked towards Him, it was by your help.” He spoke of old friends and old times in Rome by her side, the agitation with which he had left the Capitol, and how they “had constructed a new Capitol in free England which they had enjoyed for twelve and a-half years.” “How graciously had God conducted him!”

His mind was essentially pious, in the beautiful sense of the old word; God was to him a reality to whom he referred all his thoughts and actions, and to Him he passed tranquilly away as a son into the bosom of his Father.

Very few men have methodized their convictions or their ideas; the different parts of their minds have grown at different times and in different associations, and often do not harmonize. Bunsen's mind was like some great mediæval structure, some *hôtel de ville* or cathedral in an old Flemish town, where a bit of *renaissance* is built on to a severe round Roman tower, or the capital of a semi-Italian period is added to an “early English” window, but neither can be pulled to pieces without destroying the whole, and they

must go down together to the end. Accordingly words of belief in mesmerism and its cognates strangely contrast with the destructive historic theories which he shared with Niebuhr, and his fearless investigations into Biblical history and chronology.

His powers of acquisition were altogether out of proportion to his power of digestion, and the inchoate volumes full of invaluable learning remind one of a builder's yard: the carved work, the lintels, the pieces of cornice, are all there, but who will put together the great building which they ought to subserve?

In the division of good things allotted to each nation in many myths, the advantages of form were certainly not given to the German. He does the raw thinking for the human race, which must be moulded by a more artistic type of mind, worked up into a shape readable by ordinary humanity; the synthetic power is wanting with most Germans, whose books are often *mémoires pour servir*, storehouses which the rest of the world pillage mercilessly without acknowledgment. A German is so utterly careless of the outside which his thought has taken, that other nations, sorely needing the materials thus conscientiously collected, pick the brains of their books, instead of translating them, and pass on. There is little pleasure generally in the act of reading their prose works. Surely no people with a sense of the art of words would have adopted a mode of writing where sentences a page in length are ended by the verb.

In France the respect for the medium is overpowering. That a thing should be *bien dit*, is much more important than that it should be true or worth saying. That the male and the female rhymes should come in the right places seems more necessary in a great French poem than the stuff of which it is made; which must be almost fatal to any fire of inspiration.

It was said of an old Greek "that his thoughts were so clearly expressed through his words that the reader was unconscious of the words used,"—they were completely transparent. With a German the meaning seems to be entangled in the words: "you cannot see the wood for the trees." With a Frenchman the words themselves are the principal object.

Bunsen's enormous power of work misled him in his undertakings. He was always collecting, and when his mind was full, it overflowed promiscuously into what he called a book, without apparently any idea of the necessity of co-ordinating his materials into a whole. Whatever he happened to be occupied with cropped up anyhow, anywhere. One winter he found that he required a knowledge of Chinese to carry out some philological inquiry. He set to work and learned it. Immediately an elaborate review of "Chinese particles" drifted into the "Philosophy of History."

There is no perspective in his books, and the tenses of the tongues of the South Sea islanders take up seventy pages of a history where Descartes and Spinoza are despatched in two.

But in England it was the man, and not the books, which seemed important and interesting. Even his opinions, heterodox as they often seemed, were not much regarded. "Allowances" were made for him; he had the "misfortune" to be a foreigner, and therefore was to be "pitied" more than condemned for those "aberrations" which were discovered in his writings by the few who could read them. Moreover, he was in a great position, and the English mind is truly sensible of the right of such to think as they please. A Dean of family may be allowed a degree of latitude which in "the inferior clergy" must be punished by law-suits and deprivation. For "that in the captain's but a choleric word, which in the soldier is flat blasphemy;" and an ambassador with a grand house, who gave delightful parties where Princes of the blood and Royal Highnesses of all nations, big and little, were to be met with familiarly, was visited and received cordially by men and women, who, meeting the same opinions without the protection of a star, would have pronounced their possessor "not a Christian," and have declared with horror, "The book of Daniel a history, not a prophecy! Why, the man is an atheist." Bunsen was singularly tolerant, however, of the intolerant. His large-hearted charity took in all sides of opinion and shades of doctrine, and under its shadow all parties agreed to meet in peace. The extremes of High and Low Church, large-minded religious men, rationalists, fine ladies, men of science, dissenters, brilliant men of letters, dingy professors, politicians, artists, philanthropists, dowdy old working women, might all be seen collected in the great drawing-rooms of Carlton House Terrace. It was like the valley of Jehoshaphat—there the small and great met together,—the oppressor and the oppressed, the man who had been deprived of his salary or his living for holding to what he believed to be the truth, and the conscientious bigot who had tried to ruin him for righteousness' sake; and each found that the other was not as bad as he expected.

The help of one such centre of communication to real liberality of intercourse was almost incalculable. There was something in the genial temper of the house, the simple, true-hearted belief in goodness, which went far to neutralize the acrimony which ignorance of each other often brings with it. London is splitting more and more into coterics; the distances are such that, for instance, the Regent's Park has little more to do with South Kensington than with Richmond. It is the place where the best of the nation, of every kind, are congregated for five months in every year,—where more of real interest on every topic under

the sun is to be heard than anywhere else under the sun, yet it is strange how separate the political, scientific, and artistic streams keep from one another; and the loss of a house where all might mingle and be at ease was indeed very great.

Bunsen's large volumes on "God in History," which it was the real object of his life to discover, may be but little read by the world, but the more difficult problem which he and his wife solved, of showing how to live in the world socially and politically, which they enjoyed so wisely and so well, and yet not to be *of* the world, should continue to be studied in their Memoirs.

The last place where the real account of Madame de Bunsen's share in the important social influence of the house can be discovered is in her own estimate of it; but on her depended the inner wheels within wheels, which rendered the harmonious working of the great machine practicable. To a sympathy for all forms of excellence, in whatsoever coats and gowns of thought they were clothed, which loving intercourse with her husband had rendered as wide as his own, she added a common sense greater than his, and a knowledge of life and character often invaluable to him.

She was his true helpmate in all the passages of his life, the true partner of every thought and every feeling he possessed.

In whatsoever things were true, whatsoever things were lovely, honest, and of good report, she was one with him, to a degree which has hardly ever been surpassed; and the intelligent and appreciative record she has left of their life, with such tender reverence for his memory and such complete forgetfulness of self, will prove the most fitting memorial of her also which could possibly have been devised.

F. P. VERNEY.



THE CHRISTIAN SUBJECTS OF THE PORTE.

THE Eastern Question has taken one of those strides in advance which, in the evolution of political events, cannot be retraced. Whatever else may issue out of the present political imbroglio, it is as certain as anything future can be that the yoke of the Turk can never again be imposed on the Christians of the revolted provinces in European Turkey. Autonomy, real, practical autonomy, they must have in some shape or another. It need not follow from this that there should be a single Turk the fewer in the provinces in question. But the Turk must no longer have the upper hand, and the instruments of his oppression must "clear out, bag and baggage." Nothing short of this will satisfy either the exigencies of the case, or the forces which are arrayed against the Sublime Porte, and whose action will no longer be arrested by futile programmes of paper reforms.

But what part is England to play in the drama? The nation has answered that question in tones which cannot be mistaken, and which the Prime Minister himself does not affect to misunderstand. It is impossible to doubt that if England were polled to-morrow it would pronounce in favour of autonomy for Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria. Lord Derby, on the other hand, has declared that the policy on which the nation has set its heart "is outside the range of practical politics;" and it is evident that if he do not actively oppose it, he will do nothing to help it forward. His face is in one direction; that of the nation in another.

He sticks to the old policy, while the nation has pronounced unmistakably in favour of a new. He still believes in the possibility of reforms initiated by the Turkish Government and executed by Turkish officials. The nation regards all such plans as "outside the range of practical politics." And the nation is right, as I shall now endeavour to show.

Six months ago the mass of Englishmen and Englishwomen had the vaguest possible idea of the real condition of the Christian subjects of the Porte. They now know that they are grievously oppressed, and exposed occasionally to unspeakable atrocities. But very few people in England even now have any idea of the nature of the oppression under which the Christian Rayah groans, or of the absolute hopelessness of any remedy short of autonomy. I am no apologist for Russian atrocities, or any other atrocities. But to compare the doings of Russia in Turkistan, granting the absolute truth of every detail, to the doings of Turkey in her Christian provinces, is to misunderstand the whole question at issue.

"Is it right or wise," asks a vigorous writer in the new number of the *Quarterly Review*, "to cut off a whole family of mankind from our sympathy in order to sympathize the more with the victims of their crimes? Shall we apply the rule only on the slopes of the Balkan, and not to the wilds of Circassia and Glencoe? to the valley of the Hebrus, and not to the Ganges, nor to the plains of Poland, or Hungary, or Turkistan? to Scio, and not to Jamaica? The terrible name even of *Batak* has a suspicious likeness to *Badajoz*."

Let us grant, for the sake of argument, that the crimes heaped together in this passage are all of the same moral hue, and that there is not much to choose between them; still the fact would be nothing to the purpose. What the Turkish atrocities have revealed and brought home to multitudes who never realized the fact before, is not that human nature, be it Turkish, Russian, or English, is capable in certain emergencies of doing frightful things, but that there is in the midst of us an organized political Power of such a character that crimes against human nature are a necessary and a normal outcome of its existence. Russian troops may commit atrocities on the plains of Poland or the wilds of Turkistan. British troops may massacre men, women, and children in the streets of Badajoz or in the village and pass of Glencoe. But these crimes are violations of the moral code professed and ordinarily acted on by Russia and Great Britain. They are things which have to be explained, apologized for, and excused on the plea of extenuating circumstances, such as accident, misunderstanding, or dire necessity. They are never defended as right in themselves, never acknowledged as other than evil. The very doers of them would admit that they were ugly blots on a system to which they were essentially

foreign. But the atrocities of Batak are not foreign to the Turkish code of morals; they are part of it. They grow out of it as naturally as thorns out of a bramble-bush. The Turk does not think them morally wrong, and when he condemns them it is not because they are wicked, but because they have been found out. The atrocities in Bulgaria are not one of those abnormal outbreaks of human nature which all nations have to lament; they are, on the contrary, nothing more than a grand representation *en tableau* of what goes on all the year round in detail over the whole area of the non-Mussulman population of Turkey. To say of any civilized State that its normal policy is Machiavellian is to say that its normal policy is thoroughly bad and immoral. Yet there would be some hope of regeneration for Turkey if its political morality were only Machiavellian.

"Cruelty," says Machiavelli, "may be well or ill applied. It may be called well applied (if indeed we may use the term 'well' of that which is essentially evil) when it is only exercised once in a way under the necessity of self-preservation, and afterwards converted as much as possible to the benefit of the class who have suffered from it. It is ill applied when it shows a tendency to repeat itself, and to increase rather than diminish with time. The proceedings of the former class are of the nature of a remedy, and have been suffered to prosper both by God and man. A State which practises the latter cannot continue to live."—*Il Principe*, c. viii.

To quote then, if it were possible, from the history of England or of Russia examples of atrocities as great and hideous as those of Batak would be nothing to the purpose of the present argument. Those who indulge in that style of reasoning are but beating the air; they do not touch the essence of the question even with the tips of their fingers. The case against Turkey is not simply that its administration is bad, but that it cannot be good; not merely that it errs, but that it errs on principle; not merely that it practises iniquity, but that it makes of iniquity a virtue and an article of faith. This is the indictment which I bring against the Government of the Porte, and now I shall endeavour to prove it.

In the middle of September last year the insurgents in the Herzegovina drew up a list of their grievances in a long document which they presented to the representatives of the Great Powers, with a most pathetic appeal which, as it is short, may be reprinted here :—

"In order to get out of this misery," they say, "to put an end to such sufferings, to free the Christians from the rule of the Turks and from continual oppression, to remove the fuel of the raging insurrection, and to ensure a durable peace, we find no other means than one of the following resolutions :—

"1. The Christians are resolved to die rather than suffer such slavery; therefore they should be left to seek their liberation by arms, and if they are not assisted they have at least a right to have no obstacles put in the

way of their enterprise, and to expect that no aid should be given to the oppressor.

“2. Or we are forced to beg some Christian Power to grant us a corner of land, so that we may all emigrate to it, and abandon this unhappy country so cursed with misfortunes.

“3. Or if the Powers should prevail on the Sultan to let an autonomous State be formed of Bosnia and Herzegovina, tributary to the Sultan, with some Christian prince from elsewhere, but never from here.

“4. Or finally (the minimum), let the Powers agree at once to put a strong body of troops from some neighbouring State into the principal cities of the province, and let the representatives of the Powers enter the principal Midjlis as judges until things are put in order, and the lives, honour, and property of the Christians are rendered secure, with equality of civil and religious rights.”—*Parliamentary Papers*, No. ii., pp. 30—40.

The list of grievances in this document would occupy more space than I can reasonably claim for the whole of this article. I must therefore content myself with specifying some of them; premising that they can all be substantially proved by the evidence of Consular reports, and many of them by the subsequent admissions of the Porte itself.

Let us, first, take the case of the various imposts which are levied by the Porte, and let us begin with the tithes. This is an old tax, and is chargeable on all the produce of the ground, such as cereals of all kinds, tobacco, vegetables, fruit, grapes, and hay. The method of collecting tithes is as follows. They are sold by Government to the highest bidder, and so keen is the competition, in ordinary times, that the successful bidder not seldom pays more than the tithes will yield. In England this of course would mean that he would be a loser to the extent of the difference between the price he gave and the tithe of the year's produce. Unfortunately for the poor Rayah, however, Turkey is not England, and the Turkish tithe-farmers manage matters in a different way. Having bought the tithes, these speculators visit the villages, which are thus legally delivered over to their rapacity, in order to assess the year's tithes. They bring with them a retinue of followers and horses, and live on the villagers at free quarters during their pleasure. They take whatever they have a fancy to, and they pay for nothing; and so expensive are these visits that the poor villagers are often obliged to borrow, at a ruinous interest, from these unwelcome guests the very means with which to provide for their luxurious requirements. Unfortunately it sometimes happens that their requirements include the wife, or daughter, or sister of the host, as the case may be; and then, like the monarch of old, he has his choice of three alternatives, but all from the hand of man: resistance, a bribe, submission. As to the first, he has no arms, and is quite helpless in the presence of the tithe-farmer and his armed retainers. Resistance is therefore out of the question, unless he flies to the mountains and joins or

gets up a band of brigands or insurgents. Submission is abhorrent to him, and he gives the bribe—possibly borrowed at exorbitant interest from his oppressor. But is there no remedy? Are there no tribunals of justice to appeal to? Oh yes, certainly—on paper. But of that anon.

By law the “Spahi” or tithe-farmers ought to see the thrashing of the grain, and when it is measured to fix the proper tithes. But this legal obligation they rarely fulfil. Too indolent to discharge the duty themselves, and too suspicious to trust subordinates, they assess the tithes at an arbitrary valuation, which of course is very much in excess of the real value. Again, the poor Rayah has no redress. Theoretically he may appeal to Government officials; but these officials are in league with the tithe-farmer, who is frequently nothing but the dummy, behind which some influential member of the Government robs and harasses the Christian peasant. Again, it may not suit the convenience or *dolce far niente* disposition of the farmer to carry away his grain after it has been duly assessed; so he leaves it in the field or under cover of some shed, and if any damage ensues the village has to make it good; or the grain is left in expectation of a rise in price, or in the hope that the peasant, in his need, may be tempted to consume it, in which case he is liable to be charged double price. Hay, potatoes, and all sorts of garden produce are not taken in kind. The price is arbitrarily fixed, and ready money must be paid down. An appeal to the Government authorities is quite useless, for they invariably decide in favour of the tithe-farmer.

But suppose the poor villager has not money enough at hand to meet these exactions. In that case “misery upon misery,” to quote the pathetic language of the poor Herzegovina insurgents:—

“His house will be occupied at his expense until he has paid the whole. He is bound to maintain and serve those who are quartered upon him at their imperious pleasure, and his expenses in so doing go for nothing in the account. By way of example: if a person owes 20 piastres and spends 100 in the maintenance of these people, it is not taken into consideration. At last an arrangement is made; the peasant acknowledges his debt with double interest; or an animal is taken for 50 piastres, though it may be worth 100 or more. Many cause the poor people of the villages to be put in prison, where they suffer from hunger, cold, flogging, and other ill-treatments. Sometimes false receipts are given, and the amount of the debt has to be paid again.”

I have been using the conventional designation of “tithe-farmer;” but in point of fact there are no longer any tithe-farmers in Turkey. The men are there, but it is not of tithes that they are any longer the farmers. When Sultan Abdul Aziz travelled in Europe in state, an extraordinary impost was laid upon all the produce previously named, to bear the cost of his journey. This tax raised the tithe to an eighth part of the produce, and though

it was imposed as an extraordinary charge for a temporary purpose, it has never been removed, and is now an ordinary tax. It is an eighth, therefore, and not a tithe, that the Rayah pays; and when all the extortions are taken into account it may be put down as a sixth or seventh.

I have mentioned, however, but a fraction of the imposts which crush the spirit and paralyze the energies of these subjects of the Porte. Turkey is a great tobacco-grower, and the so-called tithes of this also are farmed out by Government. Before the farmers go their rounds, with a goodly company, to value the tobacco crop, some of their agents are sent to examine the quantity of tobacco still growing on the stalk. These "go in procession from house to house and from plantation to plantation, and prolong the time as they please, in order to feed gratuitously." On the pretext of having possibly put down too little, this inquisitorial visit is repeated generally three times, and, after all, the farmers themselves go their rounds, the poor Rayah being obliged to provide for them all, however long they may choose to stay. They act, in fact, as masters on his property. They order what they like, and there is nothing for him but humbly to obey.

The oppression involved in all this may be imagined when it is remembered that everything which the peasant can call his own is subject to taxation. All spirits are taxed; herbs used for dyeing are taxed; there is a land-tax, and a house-tax, and a grass-tax; there is a tax of fifteen to twenty piastres on every head of large cattle, and a tax of two piastres on every head of small cattle. This latter tax affords peculiar opportunities and temptations for extortion. The animals are numbered in the month of March, a short time before the greatest mortality in the flocks takes place; and the peasant has to pay, not on the average number of the animals which remain to him, but on the maximum which are alive at any one time.

From two to four piastres have to be paid annually for every bee-hive. Then there is the horse-service, by which the Rayah is obliged to act as the drudge of the military, and is sometimes taken several days' journey from home; and all this without the slightest remuneration, and without any compensation for the horses, which may perish, as many do, in this service.

Another grinding tax from which the Christian subject of the Porte suffers grievously, is the duty of working on the public roads. No member of the family who can work—and there are sometimes as many as ten in a family who are thus liable—is exempted from this duty. The place where the work has to be done may be miles away from the Rayah's home, and it may be at a critical season of the year, when all hands are required at home. **That matters not; he must obey the summons, and leave his**

fields and flocks to take their chance. This happens about a fortnight in each year, and though it costs the peasant not less than 100 piastres a day, he does not get so much as a morsel of bread in return ; he gets kicks and insults instead.

Another monstrous tax is the "Rad" or labour-tax. We have seen how thoroughly the Rayah's time is taken up in looking after his flocks and fields, and rendering compulsory service to the Government. But the Turk thinks that he has still leisure enough on his hands to earn, by daily labour, from 500 to 1,500 piastres, and on the presumption of these imaginary earnings every Christian is made to pay the fortieth piastre to the Government, that is, 25 piastres in the 1,000. The Christian's word is not taken for the amount of his earnings, it is fixed for him ; and though he may be laid on a bed of sickness, or otherwise disabled, the tax must be paid.

The last tax that I shall mention is the poll-tax. Every male Christian, from birth to death, must pay the poll-tax for exemption from the military conscription. It amounts to 30 piastres a head, and every male Christian is bound to pay it, from the new-born babe to the decrepid beggar. It is supposed to be a fine paid for exemption from military service. But, in the first place, the Christians do not wish to be exempt from military service ; on the contrary, they object to any such exemption, and the Hatt-i-Humayoun, of 1856, promised the abolition of the exemption—a promise which, it need not be said, has never been fulfilled. But, in the second place, children, and the old and feeble, are not liable to military service under any Government, even that of Turkey. How then can they be liable to the fine which is supposed to free them ? But it is absurd to appeal to the elementary rules of equity in the case of such a Government as Turkey. The result is that, children and beggars not being able to pay for themselves, their respective villages have to pay for them. In this way a Rayah of average means pays in taxation somewhat less than 3,000 piastres annually.

But his grievances do not end here. In Herzegovina or Bosnia he rents his land from the Aga, or Turkish proprietor. In many cases the land was originally his own, but he has been dispossessed of it under the operation of "the good old rule, the simple plan." Let that pass, however, and let us see how it fares with him in the relation of tenant and landlord. It is a feudal relationship in theory ; in practice it is nothing but a cruel and degrading serfdom. The following are exactions which the landlord extorts from his Christian tenant :—A fourth part of the various produce obtained from the ground ; one animal yearly, as well as a certain quantity of butter and cheese ; to carry a certain number of loads of wood, and materials for any house which the landlord may chance to be

building; to work for the landlord gratuitously whenever he may require it; to make a plantation of tobacco, and cultivate it until it is lodged in the master's house; to plough and sow so many acres of land, and look after the crop till it is safely lodged in the landlord's barn—and all this gratuitously. As a rule, the produce thus cultivated for the landlord exceeds the produce of the land farmed by the tenant for himself.

All this, be it remembered, is in addition to the fleecing which the Rayah has undergone at the hands of the Government and the tithe-farmers. Yet here is the way in which his condition is described in a book which has lately been commended as supplying trustworthy information on the condition of the Christian population of Bulgaria:—

“To those who have studied the Rayah question deeply, seriously, and impartially, a very grave social question presents itself: Is it right to give too much to a man?—too much time, too much liberty, too much land, too much of everything? And especially is this right when such a man abuses the gift and employs the resources confided to him merely to keep himself in idleness?”*

And this is said of a people oppressed in the way I have described, and who are admitted by all who know anything of the subject to be about the most industrious population in Europe.

But the reader may ask, Are there no courts of justice in Turkey? Yes; but as far as the Christian is concerned these courts are literally legalized instruments of oppression and torture. Theoretically the Turkish courts of justice are divided into civil and criminal; but, in point of fact, the Government of Turkey is theocratic; the law of the Koran, with its multitudinous developments, dominates all the tribunals. The civil and criminal courts have each two of their members Christian—one to represent the

* Residence in Bulgaria, p. 159. I have read a good many books in the course of my life, but I do not remember to have ever come across so audacious an experiment on the credulity of reasoning beings as this volume. I am sorry to observe that a periodical of the weight and reputation of the *Quarterly Review*, has been misled to recommend it as “full of matter most instructive at the present crisis,” and I regret especially that it has given its *imprimatur* to a story of “more than 2,000 old men, women, and children,” “burned alive in the village of Akdere alone by the *Bulgarians*, whilst a *Russian corps d'armée* looked on.” This is said to have happened in 1827, some years, I believe, before either of the two authors of the book was born. They give no authority and no reference of any kind, and my confidence in their accuracy is not such as to induce me to place implicit faith in statements of this sort. It is curious how some people estimate the value of evidence according as their prejudices are for or against the conclusion sought to be established. An influential portion of the London press has sought to discredit Dr. Liddon's and my own account of impalements in Bosnia, by denouncing it as “gossip” and “hearsay evidence.” Yet these very papers accept without inquiry Mr. Schuyler's report of a Russian massacre in Turkistan, though it is based on “hearsay evidence” of a much feebler description than that which we have adduced. Ours is hearsay evidence of the strongest possible character, corroborated by the evidence of our own eyesight. I do not say that Mr. Schuyler's story ought to be rejected because it is founded on hearsay; but I do say that those who accept it, while rejecting much stronger evidence for impalements in Bosnia, demonstrate the strength of their prejudices rather than of their logic or fairness.

Orthodox, the other the Catholics. But these are always a minority, and are invariably intimidated into agreement with the majority. Their only use, in fact, is to enable the Turkish Government to parade its pseudo-liberality and religious tolerance before a credulous Christendom. Theoretically the evidence of a Christian is admissible, except before the "Sheri," or religious tribunals; practically it is inadmissible in any court. If the Christian is so foolhardy as to insist on his legal right to give or produce evidence, it is easily got rid of in some such way as this. The judge browbeats him, and makes him repeat his evidence. If he alters a word in the repetition, his testimony is rejected as untrustworthy. Or if other means fail, the case is adjourned, and the Christian witness goes home. He is followed and denounced on some trumpery charge, and the next time he appears in court he is contemptuously put aside as a person of notoriously bad character. Another device is to get him imprisoned—it may be only for an hour—on some false charge. This is enough; for a Christian once imprisoned, however innocently, is rejected as a witness. On the other hand, the Mussulman prosecutor or defendant has no difficulty at all to get any amount of evidence against a Christian. The only chance the latter has is that, if he happens to be sufficiently rich, he may bribe the judge. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that there is not a judge in Turkey who will not sell justice for a bribe. The only conscience he has in the matter is that he is likely to sell his award to the follower of the Prophet for a smaller bribe than he will receive from the hated and despised Giaour. This universal corruption of justice in Turkey is admitted even by those who are ordinarily the most strenuous to defend the Turk against his Western critics:—

"The absence of all effective control," says Mr. Gifford Palgrave, "in a country where not only orderly and official superintendence, but even the restraint of public opinion, so powerful in Europe by means of the newspapers and intercommunication, is wanting, facilitates any amount of corruption; and if opportunity makes thieves, few Mahometan Kadees are likely long to remain honest. . . . A judge dependent on favour and independent of reputation is much more likely, as human nature goes, to prove a Kirke than a 'Daniel.'"—*Essays on Eastern Questions*, p. 85.

The Christian, moreover, is shut out from the possibility of buying land. A Christian now and then, more simple and confiding than his fellows, has within the last twenty years bought land in Turkey, presuming on the explicit guarantee of the Hatt-i-Humayoun; but the result has almost invariably been that he has been robbed of his purchase. Either the man of whom he purchased it, or some neighbouring Ahab, covets and quietly takes possession of the poor man's dearly-bought field or vineyard. The Christian appeals to the law, but no evidence that he can produce

is admissible. He loses his land without getting back his purchase-money, and he may thank his stars if he does not get the bastinado into the bargain for bringing a false accusation against a True Believer.

I have already mentioned the most cruel torture of all to which the Rayah of Turkey is exposed—I mean the peril to which the chastity of his female relations is daily exposed. It is stated in the *Daily News* of October 23, that Mr. Baring and Mr. Calvert, who were then in Bulgaria, had compelled the arrest of “a Turk who demanded a Christian girl from her father for his harem. When the latter refused he cut at him with a sabre, wounding his hand.” In a debate on the Cretan insurrection in the House of Lords on March 8, 1867, the late Lord Derby bestowed high praise on Colonel Longworth, then Consul-General at Belgrade; and certainly Colonel Longworth was a vigorous philo-Turk. His evidence therefore is above suspicion when he says that “the forcible abduction of Christian girls is an abuse which calls urgently for correction.”* But to talk of a remedy for the Christian while the Turk rules over him is, in plain language, to talk nonsense. “A custom prevails here,” says Mr. Consul Abbott, “to exempt from military conscription a Mussulman young man who elopes with a Christian girl, and whom he converts to his faith. This being a meritorious act for his religion, it entitles him, as a reward, to be freed from military service.”†

Now let the reader consider what this means. It means that the Turkish Government puts a premium on the violation of Christian female chastity. That Government to which Christian States accredit Christian ambassadors tempts the Mussulman ravisher of Christian maidens with a substantial reward in the life that now is, and with the promise of Paradise hereafter. And every Rayah family in Turkey is exposed to this outrage. And they are helpless, for they are not allowed to possess arms, and they have no other arbitrament to appeal to but the God who hears in secret, and gathers up the tears of the afflicted.

When we reflect on these things we can appreciate the touching

* Consular Reports on Condition of Christians in Turkey in 1860, p. 121. My first introduction to the Consular Reports of 1860 I owe to Mr. Denton's able and instructive pamphlet on “The Christians in Turkey.” Though the pamphlet was published in 1863, I am sorry to say I never read it till after my return from Servia this year. The Parliamentary papers of 1867 and 1876 have been published some years after the publication of Mr. Denton's pamphlet, and they certainly throw a lurid light on his arguments and conclusions.

† Consular Reports on Condition of Christians in Turkey in 1860, p. 7. Let no one be deceived by such terms as “elopes” or “converts to his faith.” Elopement means what Mr. Consul Longworth calls “forcible abduction;” and as to conversion to the Mahometan faith, the victim of Turkish lust has no choice. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred she has no means to bring her case before the tribunals; and if she does, her evidence as a Christian is not received. If, in the frenzy of her despair, she proclaims herself a Mahometan, in order to get a hearing, her ravisher is praised and rewarded for having converted her, and she remains his lawful prey.

pathos of the appeal of the Herzegovina insurgents to the Great Powers :—

“Surely the poor people here are entitled to compassion from those who have feelings of humanity, and to some effort to assist them in their deplorable state—in their opprobrious servitude; where the cry is continually heard, ‘O Lord, send us our death!’”—*Parliamentary Papers*, No. ii., p. 34.

Now let it be remembered that all the charges which I have made thus far against the Turkish Government can be established by the evidence of Parliamentary papers, and of independent testimony like that of Mr. Nassau Senior’s “Journal kept in Turkey and Greece.” But more than that, the Turkish Government admits that the insurrection is traceable “to the unseemly conduct” of its own “functionaries,” and that the insurgents have substantial causes of complaint.*

Moreover, the Andrassy Note asserts that the Rayahs of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bulgaria was not then on the *tapis*) are “oppressed under the yoke of a real servitude,” which reduces them in fact to the condition of “slaves;” that the Porte has habitually broken its most solemn promises, so that it can no longer be trusted; and therefore that “it is absolutely necessary that the Powers should be in a position to appeal to acts, in one word, that their action may be grounded on facts and not on programmes.”† Yet with all these facts before him Lord Beaconsfield finds a full and satisfactory explanation of insurrections in European Turkey in the dark machinations of secret societies! For my part, I wish God speed to all societies, be they secret or open, who will help to break the yoke of the most cruel and debasing tyranny that has ever been allowed by an inscrutable Providence to make millions of human beings unspeakably wretched. Mr. Forster’s speech has been much praised for its moderation and fairness. But Mr. Forster confirms in substance all that I have said.

“We want no Russian intrigues,” he says, “no Servian ambition, to account for the attempted insurrection in Bulgaria or for the insurrections in Bosnia or Herzegovina. Such is the Turkish rule, that these insurrections must be expected. They have happened time after time, and so long as that rule lasts they will happen again. Nine years ago I was a short time in Turkey—in Asia Minor—and the impression I got there was that such was the government of Turks by Turks in the most Turkish part of their dominions in Asia Minor, that I felt that the people looked upon the Government as their natural enemies, and did so on good grounds. Such is the oppression with which the taxes are gathered, the mode in which they are farmed, the amount that ~~is~~ ~~Government itself~~ ~~the far larger amounts taken by~~ ~~corruption that exists among all the officials with~~ giving of justice or the exacting of taxes. The

* *Parliamentary Papers*, No. i.

† *Ibid.* pp. 80—83.

weighs upon Moslem and upon Christian alike; but when you come to those provinces in which there is a large number of Christians you have that aggravated by this fact—that not merely is the Central Government unjust, but that the Christian population is ill-treated by their Moslem neighbours, and is not protected by the Government from that ill-treatment. Their evidence, as you know, is not fairly admitted in courts of justice. They are not allowed to arm, the Moslems are allowed to arm; the Moslems have their friends at Constantinople, the officials are Moslems, and what is the result? It is that property is not safe. The industrious Bulgarians have excited the envy of their neighbours by their industry, and the fruits of their industry are not safe; and, what is far more important, life is not safe, nor is the honour of women safe from constant outrages. I have known in this hall the people of Bradford collected together to sympathize with men who have risen as patriots to win liberty and freedom for themselves. We have sympathized with the Italians in their efforts to free themselves from the dominion of Austria, but you cannot for a moment compare the cases. We do not talk of political rights in this matter. It is a question of personal security from day to day, of being able to walk about in peace and safety, for a woman to be able to return to her house without being carried away and subjected to insult or worse than insult. It is a question of property being despoiled without the slightest chance of redress, and it does surprise me that when we know these things are constantly happening, when even the Turkish Government does not deny them, but only says that it hopes at some future time to crush them, I am somewhat surprised to see Mr. Baring vent so much wrath on the ‘foreign instigators’ or to be so much convinced that they were the instigators of this insurrection.”

Mr. Forster went on to add that if he were one of the people whose miserable lot he described, he too would be an insurgent and a member of “what Lord Beaconsfield called the secret societies.” And I have no doubt that he is within the mark when he expresses his conviction “that nine-tenths of those English writers who inveigh against them would be in the same position.”

It is commonly supposed that the members of the Orthodox Church are the only victims of Mussulman misrule. Russian intrigue and Slavonic Societies are believed to be always brewing mischief and stirring up insurrection among the Orthodox population. All this tends to rouse the fanaticism of their Mussulman neighbours, and hence the injustice and cruelty of which we read. The members of the Roman Church, on the other hand, are loyal and peaceable, and are consequently not molested by the Mussulman authorities or populace.

This account of the matter is purely ideal. Intrigue and chronic outbursts of insurrection are the necessary concomitants of Turkish misrule; and if the Roman Catholics do not so often revolt, it is because, being fewer in number, and having no Great Power to sympathize with them, their spirits are crushed, and they have ~~not the courage~~ to rise against their oppressors. To this must be fact, which I deeply lament, that jealousy of ~~which~~ has induced the Vatican to sacrifice the supposed interest of the Roman Curia.

Cardinal Manning is just now a vehement preacher of peace, and an indignant censor of those who would imperil its reign; and he and Sir George Bowyer consider it a flagrant breach of international law that Russian volunteers should be allowed to fight in Servia, and a monstrous iniquity that Russia should meditate a possible intervention on behalf of its co-religionists and kindred who are groaning under the yoke of a worse than Egyptian bondage. But I never heard that either Cardinal Manning or Sir George Bowyer objected to the enrolment of Irish and Canadian volunteers in the Papal army, or that either of them protested against the intervention of a French army to protect the territory of the Pope against the invasion of an Italian army; and I do not suppose that the League of St. Sebastian would be laid under the ban of the Church if it took up arms, on a fitting occasion, to restore the Temporal Power.

But, however that may be, the result of the Vatican policy is undoubtedly that the Roman Catholics in European Turkey are less prone to take part in insurrections than the Orthodox Christians. Many of their teachers and leaders are Italians, who prefer the rule of the Turk, with all its cruelties and abominations, to the rule of any power professing the Orthodox religion. This, however, is not the feeling of the Roman Catholic population of South-eastern Europe, except in so far as it has been instilled into them by Italian emissaries. In Bosnia the Roman Catholics would rejoice as sincerely as their Orthodox neighbours at the substitution of any rule, Orthodox or otherwise, for that of the Turk. A sham address to the Porte from the Catholics of Bosnia was got up some time ago by the Turkish authorities, in the way and by the methods usually employed on such occasions. Bishop Strossmayer, in whose diocese Bosnia is, told Dr. Liddon and myself all about this address, which was paraded at the time in the English newspapers; and the truth is that the Roman Catholics of Bosnia were no more represented by it than were the Orthodox Christians of Constantinople by that famous band of warriors, swept from the slums of Stamboul, who marched out of Constantinople under "a flag on which the Crescent and the Cross were displayed side by side" to fight "against the Servian aggression." We all remember the lively emotion which this union of the Crescent and the Cross against Christian freedom excited in the breasts of Sir Henry Elliot and Mr. Disraeli.* But alas, for the vanity of human hopes and the frustration of potential achievements! The ragamuffins who bore the "banner with a strange device," did not live to drive back "the Servian aggression." The Bashi-Bazouks, more simple and logical than Sir

* Parliamentary Papers, No. iii., p. 573. Mr. Disraeli's speech in the House of Commons, July 17.

Henry Elliot and Mr. Disraeli, could not understand this union of the Crescent and the Cross at all. It was a scandal and an offence in the eyes of a True Believer; and so the Bashi-Bazouks fell upon the "Christian Volunteers," and having slaughtered most of them, dispersed the rest and captured the "banner with a strange device."

On the occasion of the so-called Roman Catholic address from Bosnia the real representatives of the Roman Catholics acted as they are said by the correspondent of the *Daily News* to have acted the other day : *—

"Vali Pacha Effendi, the civil governor of the province, gathered the Greek and Catholic notables of Serajevo together, and requested them to sign a petition to the Porte protesting against any autonomy or other change in the government of the province. They replied that, being rayahs, they had no right to meddle in politics, and therefore refused their signatures to the petition. The insurrection continues spreading in Bosnia."

And no class of men more ardently desire the spread and final success of the insurrection than the Roman Catholics of Bosnia. They would be delighted at the idea of passing under the political rule of Orthodox Servia; for they know, as their bishop assured us, that Servia would secure to them not only justice, but perfect religious freedom—a blessing which they certainly do not enjoy under the Ottoman Government. The massacres of the Lebanon are a specimen of the toleration granted to the Roman Catholics in the Turkish empire. The simple truth is that the Mussulman has no idea of what toleration means in the case of non-Mussulmans; and if he sometimes oppresses one class of non-Mussulmans somewhat less than another, it is because his hatred and scorn are not so much whetted by cupidity, or jealousy, or fear. The *Temps* is a paper which has taken the side of Turkey throughout this business, and its testimony may therefore be accepted as unprejudiced. It has a correspondent travelling in the provinces of Turkey, and reporting on the condition of the population, and the relations of the various races and creeds to each other; and what he says is that the Mussulmans draw no distinction, but treat Orthodox and Catholic alike with impartial and indiscriminate barbarity.†

* July 23.

† The following extract is a specimen. It is from a letter written from Albania on the 20th of last September :—

"Un des premiers actes des bachi-bouzouks qui arrivent ici et qu'anime, il faut bien s'en rendre compte, le véritable esprit des populations musulmanes, est d'insulter et de piller les églises chrétiennes. Ils l'ont fait et à différentes reprises : à Dulcigno, à Antivari, à Scutari et à Podgoritza ; puis les troupes régulières se sont mises de la partie et un bataillon d'infanterie, débarqué à l'embouchure de la Boïana, à San Nicolo, a débuté par s'attaquer à l'église catholique de ce petit bourg, par y briser les croix et y voler tout ce qu'elle contenait. Tout y a passé, depuis un calice et un ostensor en vermeil, présents de feu l'archiduc, plus tard empereur du Mexique, jusqu'aux vases, aux flambeaux et à tous les vêtements ecclésiastiques du pauvre curé qui, n'ayant pu obtenir protection ni justice de la part du chef de la troupe, est accouru à Scutari

Nor is it the Christian subjects of the Porte alone who are thus dealt with. The Jews fare but slightly better; and this slight amelioration in their condition they owe to their comparative paucity and political unimportance. They are not cultivators of the soil. They are engaged for the most part in trade, and that fact alone relieves them from numberless cruelties and hardships to which the Rayah is daily exposed. Mr. Glückstein, himself a Jew, resident in England, has lately published a pamphlet, in which he proves that the Turkish authorities, when the occasion offers, treat the Jews in much the same way in which they are accustomed to treat the Christians. Mr. Glückstein is therefore naturally surprised at the "Judaic sympathies" which the Turkish cause has evoked both here and on the Continent; yet all sorts of insinuations have been made against Mr. Gladstone because, in courteously acknowledging a letter from Mr. Glückstein, he ventured to say that he shared Mr. Glückstein's regret.

But surely, it may be urged, the Hatt-i-Humayoun which the Sultan published at the close of the Crimean war changed all this. Yes, as many other Hatts had done before it—on paper. But the Hatt-i-Humayoun has never been proclaimed to this day through the Turkish Empire. Within a certain narrow radius from Constantinople some of its provisions are feebly and fitfully carried out. But in the provinces it has remained a dead letter. It is probable that most of the judges have never heard of it; but certainly there never has been any attempt to enforce any one of its provisions. And, next to the incurable perfidy of the Ottoman Government, the person, no longer amenable to human praise or censure, who must be held chiefly responsible for this lame and impotent conclusion to the Crimean war, is the late Lord Palmerston. It was proposed in the Congress of Paris that the provisions of the Hatt-i-Humayoun of 1856 should be incorporated into the Treaty. The Turkish Minister, however, objected, and pleaded that the Congress should spare the dignity of the Porte and trust to the honour of the Sultan. The Government of Lord Palmerston supported the Turkish Minister, and the eight millions of Christians in Turkey, to say nothing of the blood and treasure spent in the Crimean war, were sacrificed by a stroke of the pen in order not

implorer son archevêque et le consul général d'Autriche, cette puissance étant ici chargée, comme la France l'est dans presque tout le reste de l'empire ottoman, de la protection du culte catholique.

"A Podgoritzza, les fameux zeybeks de Smyrne n'ont laissé que les murs nus de l'église grecque. C'étaient les mêmes gens qui avaient, peu de jours auparavant, brisé les croix et souillé les murs des églises grecques et catholiques d'un faubourg de Scutari. . . . Et savez-vous comment la généralité de la population musulmane accueille ces excès? Elle les admire et les trouve conformes à la tradition de l'islam.

"Ces chrétiens, disent-ils, devraient-ils avoir le droit d'élever de si belles églises (celle de Scutari est fort grande et se voit de loin), et de sonner les cloches!' Cette sonnerie des cloches est particulièrement odieuse aux bons musulmans. Vous le voyez, le vieil esprit d'hostilité, de domination, se réveille à la première circonstance, aussi entier, aussi vivace qu'aux jours mêmes de la conquête."

to wound the delicate susceptibilities of the Sultan and his Ministers. The latter, however, were thinking of something more substantial than honour, and all the relief the poor Christians of Turkey reaped from the war was some magniloquent compliments to the generosity, benevolence, and "constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects," for which the Sultan of Turkey was so conspicuously distinguished! This is the cant in which the diplomats of Europe thought it decent to indulge. They sowed the wind, and they are now reaping the whirlwind. Russia was then beaten and humbled. The purblind policy of her conquerors has now given her a magnificent revenge. The Christian populations, who might have been gradually erected into a sure barrier against Russian aggression, but whom a cynical and short-sighted diplomacy delivered over to their old oppressor, are now the lever-power of Russian intervention in South-eastern Europe.

And now let me give my reasons for the distinction which I have drawn between Turkish and other atrocities. The distinction is this: that other Governments may forsake their evil ways, and "rise on stepping-stones of their dead selves to higher things," but that the Turkish Government cannot. And for the following reason.

It has already been stated that the Government of Turkey is strictly theocratic, and its Magna Charta is the Koran. Certainly the precepts of the Koran are, many of them, immoral and cruel enough. A conquered people, for example, cease to have any rights whatever. The women and children become slaves in the most absolute sense, and all the male adult population incur the penalty of death, and may be disposed of in any manner which the capricious will of the victor may dictate. This means that if the Turks could conquer Servia they could reduce all the women and children to slavery, and kill all the men, or deal with them in any other way they pleased. Of course they would not act in this manner, for they know that Europe would not allow it. But no feeling of conscience would restrain them, for they would simply be obeying one of the fundamental precepts of their religion.

It is idle to compare, as Sale and others have done, these brutal and ferocious doctrines to the rules imposed on the Israelites for the conquest of Canaan. These were provisional and for a limited purpose, and were never intended, as precepts of the Koran are intended, to govern the relation of the Jews to all the Gentile world. Besides, to say nothing of the supersession of Judaic morality by the Gospel, it must not be forgotten that alongside of the Pentateuch there grew up a school of teachers sent by the God of Israel to proclaim and inculcate truth, and justice, and mercy, not as between Jew and Jew merely, but as between man

and man. The essential unity of those whom the common Father

of all had "made of one flesh" was a truth preached by a long line of prophets, mitigating the severity of the old law, and growing in brightness till it received its highest expression in Him in whom Law and Prophets were fulfilled.

Alongside of the Koran, too, there has grown up a multitudinous array of expositors whose dicta are held sacred. There are four great schools, but each of these has thrown off a swarm of traditional precepts and maxims which are law to the True Believer. Of these four schools the Arabs and other Semitic and African races have adopted three among them. The Turks, on their conversion to Islam, adopted the fourth, or Hanefee School, whose precepts and principles happen to be the most cruel and immoral. The result has been to develop in the Turk a character of exceptional sensuality and cruelty. It is Mr. Palgrave, I think, who on this account characterizes the Turk as the "Cameronian of Mahometans"—a compliment which the Cameronian would decline.

It is not, then, on the Koran simply that the character of the Turk is moulded and his administration of justice based, but on text-books founded on the Koran, but compared with which the Koran itself, bad as it is, is a code of purity and mercy. Mr. Palgrave, speaking of the occasional attempts of the Western Powers to modify the rampant iniquity of the Turkish courts of justice, says—

"To use a technical phrase, the establishment of non-denominational tribunals seemed no less inevitable than that of non-denominational schools; and it was precisely the having recourse to such that the Moslems could not stomach. In Islam, and Islam alone, they lived, and moved, and had their being; and Islam, and no other, should or could be, they hold, their arbiter and judge."—*Essays on Eastern Questions*, p. 137.

Now the received and most authoritative text-book of Mahometan law in Turkey, that from which no judge or advocate ever dreams of appealing, contains, among others, the following precepts:—

"And the tributary* is to be distinguished in the beast he rides, and in his saddle; and he is not to ride a horse; he is not to work at his work with arms on; he shall not ride on a saddle like a pillion; nor shall he ride even on a saddle except as a matter of necessity, and even then he shall dismount in places of public resort; he shall not wear clothes worn by men of learning, piety, and nobility. His women shall be distinguished in the street and at the baths, and he shall place in his house a sign and mark so that people may not pray for him or salute him. And the street shall be narrowed for him, and he shall pay his tribute standing, the receiver being seated, and he shall be seized by the collar and shall be shaken, and it shall be said to him, 'Pay the tribute, O tributary! O thou enemy of God.'"

This is the moral atmosphere in which, according to Mr. Palgrave, the Turk "lives, and moves, and
g." This

* Tributaries are people who accept the yoke any resistance they lose all the ri^a

is the teaching which the Softa, before he is fit to be a full-blown teacher or judge, is, according to Mr. Palgrave, obliged to digest for fifteen laborious years. Need we wonder that the Mussulman is what he is—brutal, sensual, savage, deceitful at the core of his nature, though possibly with an outward varnish of Parisian polish? Need we wonder that he cannot recognize in his non-Mussulman fellow-subject a being who has any rights at all—not even that of life except at the discretion of his Mahometan neighbour? The following extracts illustrate in a vivid manner the Mussulman's habitual frame of mind towards the Rayah. The first is from an occasional correspondent of the *Times* in Bosnia,* the second from the correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*† at the head-quarters of the Turkish Army in Servia:—

“What Dr. Kohut, with whom, and a cavalry escort, I travelled along this road from Belina to Ratcha and back, told me he had himself seen will illustrate the feelings of the Bashi-Bazouks of these parts towards all with whom they cannot exchange the brotherly ‘Salâam aleiboum.’ On this road one day lately Dr. Kohut saw a Bashi-Bazouk fire on a Christian. The fellow missed, and the Christian, though armed, did not return the fire, but came forward and on his knees begged his life. Scarcely deigning to listen to him, the Bashi-Bazouk took him by the throat, and stabbed him to the heart. The doctor coming up remonstrated. ‘But why,’ said the Bashi-Bazouk, ‘should I have spared him? He is one of those who have brought all this disturbance and misery on the country. After this, when I had him in my power, he begs his life; and, think you, I should have granted it? No, by Allah!’”

“It may perhaps be asked why, if little or no animosity exists between Moslem and Giaour, the country of the Turk is in such perpetual disorder? The answer is a simple one. All the troubles of the nation are the result not of the mixture of different peoples of different religions, but of the perpetual system of misrule which has diligently and persistently proclaimed that the Moslem is a superior being to the Christian, and that if he treat him on the principle of equality it is an immense condescension. The idea is inbred even in the best of the lower orders. I will take as an instance a zaptieh who accompanied me in many of my wanderings. Here was a man whose nature was kind and gentle beyond a doubt. My daily experience of him extended over some months, and I constantly had evidence of his goodness of heart. I watched him closely and frequently, and saw many a kindly act of his while he was with me; yet it never appeared to occur to him that it was wrong to plunder a Bulgarian when an opportunity offered. The bare idea of a Christian peasant having a right to property never seemed to possess him for a moment. Had the Chelleby Effendi (meaning myself) expressed a wish for a melon? When presently we chanced to meet a Bulgarian who happened to have one, the zaptieh would cheerfully ride up and demand the fruit as a matter of course. In vain I endeavoured, by invariably making him pay for the article in question, to show him that it was as much a theft to take the Christian's property as it would have been to plunder a Mussulman. He would hand the melon to the Giaour, smile pityingly, as though moved to compassion at my misfortune, and ride on in silence for a mile or so, wondering what could be to have any regard for the feelings of a Bulgar. Early, after a long and dusty ride, we found ourselves

on the top of a hill in Turkey, the sides of which were vineyards full of fruit. I had not observed the vines, and was sitting on the ground resting for a while when I found that my zaptieh and both our horses had disappeared. In vain I called; there was no response for some minutes. At length he returned and beckoned me to follow him. To my amazement, he had turned the horses loose among the little vines, had picked thirty or forty great bunches of grapes, which he was carefully stowing away in his saddle-bags, having reserved the most tempting for me, and was now preparing to ascend a peach-tree with a view to stripping that also. My dragoman being absent, I had considerable difficulty in speaking, but at last contrived to ask whether he knew to whom the vineyard belonged. He did. The owner was a Bulgarian. Upon which I refused to eat the grapes, and told him I should pay for the damage he had done. With a look of amazement which I never shall forget, he held up the raisins I had refused, gazed at them for a minute, then calmly putting them in his saddle-bag, mounted in silence and rode down the hill. It was nearly an hour before he spoke again, and when at length he did open his mouth, it was to express his conviction that the Chelleby Effendi's fever had affected his head. 'For,' added he, 'if the Chelleby Effendi would hire a cart to-morrow, we might go to that vineyard and take away as many grapes as would sell for £2.' And he sighed as he thought of the loss which my strange infatuation had caused. He could not understand such a Chelleby Effendi at all. Now, this man was one of the best of his class. I never once saw him lift his hand to strike any one; he was as gentle as he was brave, but his education, such as it was, had taught him that what belonged to the Bulgarian was his as a Moslem, while what belonged to him was strictly his own. And this idea had been assiduously fostered in him by all that he had seen around him. As a Turk, he knew well that no Bulgarian could meet him on equal terms in a court of justice, and that alone conveyed to his mind a powerful moral."

A Zaptieh, be it remembered, is a Turkish policeman, a man therefore whose duty it was to protect the property of the man whom he coolly proposed to rob of all the fruit of his hard toil. But the instructive part of the story is that the Zaptieh, "one of the best of his class," did not think that he was doing anything wrong, but thought that the Englishman must be crazy for thinking differently. Had the Bulgarian Rayah resisted the plunder of his goods, this "kind and gentle" policeman would have slain him without compunction, and would consider any man a fool or a madman who suggested that he had committed a crime.

Nor is it in life alone that the intolerance of the Turk is shown: it pursues the Rayah into the grave. Dr. Humphrey Sandwith* has published the form of burial certificate which is given when a Christian dies, and here it is:—

"We certify to the priest of the Church of Mary that the impure, putrid, stinking carcase of Sardeh, damned this day, may be concealed under ground.

"(Sealed) EL SAID MEHEMED FAIZI.

"A.H. 1271, Rejib 11 (March 29, 1855)."

* Siege of Kars, p. 173.


So much as to the principles which are instilled into the mind of the Turk, and woven into the very texture of his being, with regard to the life and property of his non-Mussulman neighbour. As to the teaching which he receives in respect to the relation of the sexes, there is no space to discuss it, and it would be scarcely possible to do so if there were. The Softa revels through many volumes of what Sir W. Muir calls "a mass of corruption, poisoning the mind and the morals of every Mahometan student."* The result is that the Mahometan Turks, smitten by the withering poison of unspeakable vices, are dying out at a rate which, if nothing intervene to arrest the decay, will clear them out of Europe in about fifty years.

Am I not right, then, in saying that there is a generic difference between Turkish atrocities and atrocities committed by other nations, whether Russian or English? What constituted the peculiar horror of the abominations of the Canaanites of old was that they "did them unto their gods;" so that there was no hope of amendment, morality being corrupt at the fountain-head, without a pure stream anywhere in reserve to draw from. And what made the case of the tribes of Canaan hopeless makes the case of the Turks hopeless too. What is the use of programmes which, however excellent on paper, have to be executed by human beings whose minds and souls are saturated with principles of morals such as I have described? When men can gather grapes of thorns, and figs of thistles, then, and not before, may we expect the Ottoman Government to do justice to its non-Mussulman population. Politicians may say, as indeed Lord Derby has said, that the right and truly British policy is to turn a deaf ear to the cries of the oppressed in Turkey, and advise the Turkish Government "that they had better follow the policy which they thought most consistent with their own interests."† "The policy which they thought most consistent with their own interests" in Bulgaria this year was to outrage and massacre some thousands of innocent human beings. Achmed Agha and the rest, infamous as they are, are not quite so bad as the Government which first sent them on their errand of slaughter, and then decorated them for their various achievements. It is hardly fair that Achmed Agha should be even tardily arrested, while his employer Midhat Pasha goes free. Let us support this policy if England wills it so; but let us do it honestly, and in the face of day. It will be quite as beneficial to the Christians of Turkey as any scheme of reform short of real autonomy, and it will not add the additional sting of mockery to their disappointment.

MALCOLM MACCOLL.

* Sir W. Muir's *Life of Mahomet*, iii. p. 302.

† *Parliamentary Papers*, No. iii. p. 193; cf. p. 236.



THE PROPHETIC ELEMENT IN THE GOSPELS.

THE paper from the pen of Mr. Hutton which appeared in the July No. of this REVIEW was in my judgment at once so frank and candid in its admissions, so fair and so bold in the ground on which it placed the argument involved, and so original and striking in the line of reasoning pursued, as to be refreshingly rare in the field of theological controversy, and to merit the gravest consideration and the most respectful treatment at the hands of all of us, even though we cannot unreservedly concede his premisses, and must demur to the most important of his inferences. It cannot fail to have much weight with those who are still pausing on the middle ground between Scepticism and Conviction, and will probably appear absolutely conclusive to settled believers. A first perusal, I confess, somewhat shook the confidence I had placed in one or two of my previous opinions, but a second began to show the weak places in Mr. Hutton's argument, and when I had read the paper a third time I felt satisfied that it need not have staggered me at all. It is to these weak places and inadmissible assumptions that I now propose, with all deference and moderation, to direct attention; and if in the course of my remarks his readers and mine should be inclined to object that I am occasionally myself arguing on assumptions not yet proved or generally recognized in their completeness, and which would require a whole volume thoroughly to establish, I can only ask that they be accepted simply as *provisional bases for*

the inferences I draw from them. If they be deemed unsound, of course my conclusions will be *pro tanto* invalidated. But their correctness I am myself satisfied of, and hope some day to demonstrate.

The article may be conveniently regarded as divisible into two sections :

1. Reasons for believing in the actual resurrection of Jesus, notwithstanding the irreconcilable contradictions and other admitted difficulties in the narratives of that event transmitted to us in the four Gospels.

2. Thesis, that the various predictions of Christ, scattered *throughout his career*, as recorded in the Gospels, are distinctly indicative of supernatural knowledge or foresight, and taken together with their fulfilment are only explicable on the supposition of his being what he professed to be, the inspired Son of God.

I.

The remarkable and suggestive discrepancies in the various accounts of the four Gospels Mr. Hutton, *with one important omission*, states fully and recognizes freely. The genuine Gospel according to Mark (which ends, as is now admitted, with the eighth verse of the sixteenth chapter) says nothing of any appearance of Jesus to any one, but merely records that the women found the sepulchre empty, and a young man who gave them a message to the disciples that they should see him in Galilee, whither he was gone before them ; adding that they were afraid and *told no man*. Matthew narrates the same message about Galilee, adding a legendary earthquake, and turning Mark's "young man" into an "angel," but says that the women at once ran to tell the disciples, to whom Jesus then in person appeared and repeated the injunction to meet him in Galilee—which they did—though, when they did, it is said "some doubted." If these accounts stood alone, they would of course be generally felt to be both inconclusive and inadequate, not to say quite invalid. But the Third Gospel describes the sitters at the empty sepulchre (who have now ceased to be angels, but instead of one young man, have become two), who inform the women, who in their turn tell the apostles, but are received by them as bearers of "idle tales," and disbelieved accordingly. Several appearances of Jesus himself, however, follow, *but all in or near Jerusalem*,—ending with an ascension into heaven from Bethany, apparently on the fourth day after the crucifixion, the command to go into Galilee being not only ignored, but distinctly (Acts i. 4, Luke xxiv. 49) contradicted or reversed. The Fourth Gospel has special discrepancies of its own : the "young man" of Mark, the "angel" of Matthew, the "two men" of Luke have grown into "two angels;" the risen Lord

appears first to Mary Magdalene, and then three times to the disciples, one of which was in Galilee. Mr. Hutton winds up his summary of these inconsistencies and contradictions fairly enough thus :—

“ I think every candid person will admit that this condition of the merely external evidence is not of the kind which any one would wish for the purpose of establishing by direct testimony a very marvellous and unprecedented event.”

But Mr. Hutton has omitted to mention what seems to me about the most significant and suggestive of the details in these varying narratives—the indications namely, and even the distinct statements that so many of the disciples who saw our Lord in the first instance “ *did not recognize him,*”* that doubts existed in the minds of those whose convictions and testimony one would have expected to be most positive and certain, and in some minds these doubts continued to the end, long after the resurrection of Jesus had been established as the fundamental creed of his followers.†

“ Matthew relates two appearances, in very general terms. Of the second he says, ‘ but some doubted.’ Mark (the genuine portion) says nothing of any appearances ; but the spurious portion repeats twice that those who asserted that they had seen him were disbelieved, and that Christ, when he appeared himself to the eleven, ‘ upbraided them with their unbelief.’ Luke narrates two appearances, and incidentally mentions that ‘ the eleven’ reported a third, to Simon. With reference to the first, he says of the two disciples, Cleophas and a friend, who walked, talked, and ate with Jesus at Emmaus for several hours, ‘ their eyes were holden that they should not know him.’ With reference to the second appearance (that to the eleven) it is said, first, that ‘ they were affrighted, thinking they had seen a spirit,’ and shortly afterwards that they ‘ yet believed not for joy, and wondered.’ But it is in the fourth Gospel that the non-recognition feature becomes most marked. . Mary Magdalene, after Jesus had spoken to her and she had turned to look at him, still ‘ supposed him to be the gardener.’ His most intimate disciples, when they saw him in Galilee, ‘ knew not that it was Jesus,’ even though he spoke to them ; even John himself only *inferred* the presence of his master in consequence of the miraculous draught of fishes, and Peter only accepted the inference on John’s authority. ‘ *Therefore,*’ the narrative says, ‘ that disciple whom Jesus loved saith unto Peter. It is the Lord. Now when Simon Peter *heard that it was the Lord,* he girt on his fisher’s coat, and did cast himself into the sea.’ ”—*Introduction to the Creed of Christendom*, p. 33.

However, I am not disposed to press this curious oversight at present, because my dissent from Mr. Hutton’s argument begins at a later point, and because I am glad to find that his view of the character of these narratives appears to be nearly the same as my

* “ Those who had lived with him for years and parted from him on the Friday did not know him again on the Sunday. If, then, he was so changed—so entirely *not* his former self—that they did not recognize him, how could they, or how can we, know that the person assumed to be Jesus was actually their risen Lord ? ”

† 1 Cor. xv. 12 : “ Now if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, *how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead ?* ”

own. After admitting the unsatisfactory nature of the Gospel narratives as positive and direct testimony, he proceeds—

“ But I think every candid person will also admit that it is just the sort of evidence we might expect if there had been no attempt to take records at the time, a good number of accounts (narrated by different persons) of different appearances in different places, a certain amount of local prepossession in favour of Galilee as the appropriate place for Christ’s renewed intercourse with his disciples, and a complete conviction that Christ after his resurrection had been so often seen, and by so many persons, that there was no real dispute about the matter. . . . In fact, with an event not supernatural, it would be evidently far the simplest and most natural explanation of the testimony to assume that the fact happened, *though under circumstances rendered very doubtful by the discrepancies in the narratives.*”

I think I am not pressing an inference too far if I assume that Mr. Hutton conceives the accounts in question to be a collection of the recollections, traditions, and convictions prevalent in the early Church at the time when the Gospels were drawn up, but that the details of those chapters are historical in no other sense. In fact it appears to me next to impossible to arrive at any other estimate when we remember what very questionable matter the chapters contain. We are thus relieved of the grievous difficulties of having to accept as historical the command of Christ to his disciples to employ a formula of baptism * that was not in vogue till a far later period, when the views of the early Church had been congealed into a dogmatic system;—the statement that Christ there and then conferred upon the twelve (whose infirmity and faithlessness had been so lately made manifest) the authority of determining the future fate of their fellow-men, by the retention or remission of their sins ; †—and, finally, the fact of their Lord’s visible ascension into the sky, ‡ involving, besides the startling miracle itself, the further inadmissible conclusion that a human body (whose distinct materiality had just been proved by the demand for food §) went up as it was into that heaven which, as we are told by Paul, “ flesh and blood cannot inherit.” ||

Mr. Hutton, there can be no doubt, is perfectly right in placing at the head of the evidences for the resurrection of Jesus, not the

* Matthew xxviii. 19.

† Mark xvi. 16; John xx. 23.

‡ Luke xxiv. 50; Acts i. 9—11; Mark xvi. 19.

§ Luke xxiv. 30, 39, 43; John xxi. 5, 12, 13.

|| “ One more difficulty—a very grave one—raised by the traditional accounts transmitted to us in the Gospels, must be indicated, but needs nothing beyond indication. These accounts all insist in the strongest manner upon the detailed demonstration that it was Jesus in bodily shape, in the same actual form, with the same hands and feet, the same digestive organs and human needs, whom they had seen nailed to the cross three days before, who now came again among them and conversed with them. Jesus himself is made to assure them that he was not a spirit, but flesh and bones that could be handled. In this well-known presence, with these bodily organs and this earthly frame, he is said to have been seen to ascend into heaven. Can flesh and blood inhabit the spiritual kingdom? or where was the body dropped? and when was the transmutation carried out?”—*Introduction to the Third Edition of the Creed of Christendom*, p. xxxv.

narrations in the Gospels which vary so strangely and whose date and authorship are, and must remain, conjectural, but the unquestioned historical fact which Paul records, and as to which no essential doubt need be entertained, *viz.*, that within fourteen to twenty years after the crucifixion, the belief in the resurrection and reappearance of our Lord was established as the enthusiastic creed of the Christian Church ; and further, that (according to the Acts*) within a very few weeks of that occurrence which had at first so dismayed and scattered the Twelve and other followers of Jesus, they had sprung from the depths of despair to the height of confidence, and began thenceforth to preach and proclaim the resurrection and Messiahship of Christ with a courage and devotion with which no doubt or discouragement ever again mingled ; that, in fact, their whole character seemed changed, and their whole career was thenceforward inspired by their absolute conviction that they had seen and spoken with him after he had risen from the grave. And Mr. Hutton then, pertinently and triumphantly, asks—

“Can this result be accounted for on any principle nearly so simple as that the facts which produced those transformations really took place? With such hopes as the apostles had entertained so suddenly blasted by the disappearance of the one person in whom they centred, does it seem possible that they would as suddenly have revived without some great substantial, and even *physical* stimulus?”

This is the great, essential, difficult question, on which we think Mr. Hutton and believers generally are wise in resting the whole issue. Is it probable, is it even rationally conceivable, that such absolute inspiring conviction as that of the apostles, could have taken possession of their souls without some unmistakable fact which they had, or were convinced that they had, witnessed? Must not the apostles have seen their risen Lord *actually* and (sinking all discrepant details) substantially as was believed and handed down among the early Christians?

The argument thus stated we agree with Mr. Hutton in deeming enormously strong—and resistible only because irrelevant. *The mistake—the weak place in the logical chain—is in assuming that the miracle of the Resurrection is either a necessary or a natural or a permissible inference from the acceptance of the premisses.* On the contrary, I cannot but regard this as a *leap*, and an unwarrantable one. Doubtless it was one which the disciples—excitable, untrained to inquiry, uninured to doubt, ignorant, and impressible to all religious emotions as we know them to have been—made instantly. Their beloved Master appeared in the midst of them, and they naturally and almost of course (with the exception

* It must, however, be a matter of surprise that Mr. Hutton should treat the details of this narrative so confidently as historical, when the date of the book, as is now believed, cannot be placed earlier than from A.D. 95—110, and its reliability is not unquestioned.

of the half-logical Thomas) *jumped* to the conclusion that he had been raised by his Father from the dead. The only strictly legitimate and cogent inference was that he had risen from the grave. Even, therefore, if we agree with Mr. Hutton in the basis of fact which he regards as necessary to account for the sudden and vivifying conviction of the enthusiastic Apostles, we hold that that basis ought not to have satisfied them,—and we take leave to maintain that it would not have satisfied him.

The whole strength of the argument, as he puts it, obviously rests upon the assumption that Jesus had actually and definitively died upon the Cross. This assumption he makes no attempt to prove—he does not even indicate that he has ever heard it doubted. Yet I can scarcely be contradicted when I urge that the facts as he has enumerated them are as satisfactorily, and more simply, explained by assuming that Christ had recovered from a state of syncope, as by assuming that he had been miraculously re-animated after actual and conclusive death. The problem to be solved, be it remembered—that is, the circumstance to be accounted for—is the confident conviction of the Apostles, amounting to certainty, that they saw Jesus and spoke with him after *they had seen him nailed to the cross, and knew that he had been laid in the grave.** The *fact* of his re-appearance to them suffices to account for their conviction equally, whatever were the correct details of its antecedents. They never dreamed—never could have dreamed, being the men they were—of asking whether his death on the cross had been real or only apparent. The doubt would not occur to them; but that is no reason why it should not be considered by us. And few now will dispute the recognized philosophical axiom that between a natural and a supernatural explanation of a given occurrence, the former, if maintainable and not improbable, is to be preferred.

I do not desire definitively to adopt the conclusion that Jesus did not die upon the cross:—but I distinctly say that the difficulties attending this conclusion appear to me slighter than those which attend any other;—and the supposition is not without corroborative indications in the sole materials we have for reconstructing the actual occurrence—these materials, we must not forget, being four discrepant collections of the traditions current among the early Christians from forty to ninety years after the event, put together we do not know by whom, and not without the strongest signs of subsequent interpolations and legendary accretions. I do not intend here to discuss these indications in detail. I would merely remind my readers that it does not clearly appear that Jesus

* I omit the verses as to Jesus "giving up the ghost," because we are agreed in admitting that the details in the Gospel accounts cannot be regarded as reliable.

remained more than five or six hours upon the cross;—that death in so short a space of time was most unusual in the case of crucifixion—a mode of punishment which left all vital organs untouched;—that Pilate marvelled when he heard that Jesus had died so soon;—and that the two criminals crucified at the same time were still alive when taken down. It must be borne in mind further, that we have no intimation whatever of the length of time Jesus remained in the grave. It may only have been an hour or two. He may have revived almost immediately after his body had been delivered to Joseph of Arimathea.

I am, of course, aware of the ordinary objection to the supposition I suggest—*viz.*, that those who adopt it have to account for the subsequent disappearance of the risen Jesus from the scene of action. But, in the first place, I entirely repudiate this obligation, and decline the unsatisfactory task of conceiving imaginary explanations. In the next place I would remind those who urge the objection in question that precisely an equal obligation lies upon those who, like Mr. Hutton, accept the miraculous resurrection from the dead;—for I cannot conceive for a moment that he will put forward or rest in the explanation given in the Gospels and the Acts of a visible ascension into heaven—*i.e.*, into the clouds of that sky beyond which in popular fancy heaven was believed to lie.

II.

Mr. Hutton argues with much earnestness that the various predictions which Christ is said to have uttered in the course of his preaching, coupled with their precision, their complete fulfilment, and the *primâ facie* unlikelihood of that fulfilment, display an amount and character of foreknowledge which could only have been superhuman. Let us examine this argument in two or three of the more significant and weighty instances specified, and see how far his confidence and his inference are justified.

First. Take Christ's alleged prophecies of his own resurrection. Mr. Hutton accepts all these as genuine, and thinks that even rationalistic critics are disposed to regard them as such.* My impression had always been just the reverse,—*viz.*, that the difficulties connected with these prophecies were so grave and obvious as to render the notion of their having really proceeded from the

* "The more frankly we admit that the second Gospel has no ending at all, the first a very abrupt and hurried one, not at all in keeping with the later tradition, and both the third and fourth most fragmentary accounts of the evidence of the resurrection—the less can it be maintained that the Gospels were afterwards so retouched as to make the prophecies accord with the subsequent faith of the Church. I do not think that anything could be weightier testimony to the early preparation and complete freedom from dogmatic purpose of the first and second Gospels than the absence from them of even those details as to the resurrection which had become already for the Church of St. Paul's time the very alphabet of the Christian faith."—CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, p. 224.

mouth of Christ inadmissible by any who do not hold the doctrine of the verbal inspiration of the Gospels. These, of course, maintain that all their statements must be absolutely correct, and that there must exist an explanation of every difficulty, irreconcilability, and contradiction, however apparently insurmountable. But Mr. Hutton is not one of these.

The first point that has to be noticed with regard to our Lord's predictions of his resurrection is that, though repeated more than once in each of the Synoptical Gospels,* they simply record the anticipated fact in the most cursory way and without the slightest detail—"and the third day he shall rise again;"—whereas the prophecy of his crucifixion with which those words are mixed up, *though an incomparably less important and astonishing occurrence*, contains the minutest particulars. It is difficult for this peculiarity not to suggest the inference that the words we have quoted were made either by tradition or by the Evangelist, as seemingly appropriate, and needed in order to complete an account which, at the period when the Church was organized and the record committed to paper, might appear unfinished without them. This, however, is merely a surmise—though one not easy to avoid.

The second point is that in the only recorded prediction of the Resurrection, in which details are condescended to—viz., that in Matt. xii. 40—the details are incorrect, and the prophecy was *not* fulfilled;—inasmuch as Christ was not "three days and three nights in the earth," but only one day and two nights. The prediction, therefore, if really uttered by our Lord, would be an instance of error, not of foreknowledge. But as it stands, and as the analogy of Jonah is purely fanciful, critics have had no hesitation in pronouncing the passage in question to be clearly ungentine; and I apprehend that Mr. Hutton would make no scruple in agreeing with them. Indeed, a reference to Luke xi. 29—32, showing what is almost certainly the true version of Christ's discourse on the occasion in question, seems to make the critic's conclusion quite irresistible.

But the third point, which Mr. Hutton does not even allude to, but which appears to my mind decisive against the genuineness of the predictions in question (at least in any thing like the precision and definite form in which they are recorded†), is the indisputable fact *that they were wholly unknown to the disciples*. Those who are said to have heard them repeatedly, and on whom they must have made a most startling, and one would imagine, indelible impression, either never did hear them, or heard them absolutely

* Matthew xvi. 21; xx. 18, 19; Mark viii. 31; ix. 50; x. 34; Luke xviii. 32—34.

† I can quite understand that Jesus must often have spoken of his approaching end and may have had intimations enough that it would probably be a violent one, even without preternatural foresight,—and this Mr. Hutton seems to admit,—but scarcely that he could have specified the particular details.

without notice or attention, or entirely disbelieved and disregarded them, or forgot them totally and at once. If one conclusion from the records be more certain than another it is that Christ's most intimate friends and disciples, even the Twelve, looked upon his crucifixion as the termination of his career, the prostration and crushing of all their hopes, the end of all things, as far as their faith and future were concerned. They not only had no expectation of their Lord's resurrection: they had plainly never dreamed of such a thing, the bare idea of it appears never to have crossed their minds, the rumour of the occurrence, when reported to them, "seemed to them as idle tales;" nay, they had the greatest difficulty in realizing the fact even when Jesus appeared to them. Now, is it credible—is it even conceivable—that this should have been their state of mind if the resurrection had been repeatedly foretold to them by their beloved Master—and *specifically as the sequel of the crucifixion*? Could the previous announcement of so astounding an event have failed to create the most intense excitement at the time, and the most vivid expectation after the crucifixion had already three days previously so impressively recalled those (alleged) predictions of his sufferings and death, with which the prophecy of his rising from the dead was, according to the Evangelists, so inextricably mingled? I confess it appears to me simply inconceivable.* If Christ did so utter himself, wishing thereby to prepare the minds of his disciples, the least that can be said is that he entirely failed in his purpose.†

It is needless to treat of the prophecy of the crucifixion in its details, nor of that as to the treachery of Judas, nor of the universal publication of the deed of the woman who anointed Jesus with the alabaster-box of ointment; because Mr. Hutton, though obviously himself much impressed, declines to lay great stress upon them, admitting that it is at least arguable that the latter may have caused its own fulfilment, and the two first may not fairly be attributed to a reasonable amount of ordinary insight and foresight, coupled with the added speciality of detail which the disciples or the Evangelists would not unnaturally have given to the remembered utterances of Christ, when tradition had unconsciously mingled them with the actual events. Nor, even if we admit that the solemn and pathetic language of Jesus, when, at the last festival of which he was to partake with his disciples, he instituted the Lord's Supper as a memorial of his mission and his end, is probably recorded with essential accuracy,—can we

* The incongruity appears to have struck two at least of the Evangelists, if we may trust to their attempts at an explanation. See Luke xviii. 34, and Mark ix. 32.

† See "Creed of Christendom," ch. viii. I must apologize for referring to my own writings; but I know not where the whole argument can be found so concisely stated, and not overstated.

avoid regarding the view as excessive, to say the least, which led Mr. Hutton to maintain that

“The clear and steady vision of death which led our Lord to treat the bread he broke as his body, and the wine he was pouring out as his blood given for the world, is as clear a case of supernatural knowledge as history could produce of natural knowledge,” . . . and “the rite thus instituted is in fact the most durable of historical monuments of a steady and lucid prevision of the future, implying a knowledge far deeper than that of men.”

Let us proceed to the predictions of the destruction of Jerusalem. These predictions, as is well known, in all the Gospel narratives (which, by the way, are singularly consentaneous, implying that all the Evangelists drew from one consolidated tradition) are inextricably mixed up with prophecies of the second coming of Christ and the end of the world—a confusion which Mr. Hutton fully admits. The portion relating to the destruction of the city is singularly definite, and corresponds very closely with the actual event. The other portion, on the contrary, is vague and grandiloquent, and refers chiefly to natural phenomena and catastrophes. From the precision of the one portion most critics infer that the Gospels were compiled after or during the siege and conquest of Jerusalem. From the confusion of the two portions Mr. Hutton draws the opposite inference—namely, that the prediction existed in the present recorded form before that event. It is in the greatest degree improbable, he argues, that if Jerusalem had fallen and the other signs of Christ’s coming showed no indication of following, the writers should not have recognized and disentangled the confusion, and corrected their records to bring them into harmony with what it was then beginning to be seen might be the real meaning of Christ or the actual truth of history. We confess we fail to recognize the cogency of the argument, but we give it as he puts it.

But the real perplexity lies here. The prediction, as we have it makes Christ distinctly affirm that his second coming shall follow “immediately,” “in those days,” after the destruction of Jerusalem, and that “this generation (the generation he addressed) should not pass away till all these things are fulfilled.” Mr. Hutton believes that these last words were intended by Christ to apply only to the destruction of the Holy City. He is entitled to his opinion; and in itself it is not an improbable solution. But it is, under the circumstances, a somewhat forced construction. For it must be remembered, first, that it is rendered necessary only by the assumption which Mr. Hutton is maintaining—namely, that the prophetic powers of Jesus could not be at fault; secondly, it assumes or implies that the Gospel narratives of the utterances of Jesus are to be relied upon, even though in these especial

predictions he admits them to be essentially confused; and, thirdly (what we think he ought not to have overlooked), the sentence he quotes is by no means the only one indicating that Jesus himself held the conviction, *which he undoubtedly communicated to his followers*, that his second coming to judge the world would take place at a very early date. Not only was it to take place "*immediately*" after the destruction of the city (Matt. xxiv. 29), but it would be witnessed by many of those who heard him. And *these* predictions are in no way mixed up with those of the destruction of Jerusalem. "There be some standing here that shall not taste of death till they see the Son of Man coming in his kingdom" (xvi. 28), "Verily I say unto you, Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel till the Son of Man be come" (x. 23); "If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?" (John xxi. 23); and the corresponding passages in the other Synoptics.

If, therefore, Jesus did not say these things, the Gospels must be strangely inaccurate. If he did, his prophetic faculty cannot have been what Mr. Hutton conceives it to have been. That his disciples all confidently entertained this erroneous expectation, and entertained it on the supposed authority of their Master, there can be no doubt whatever. (See 1 Cor. x. 11, xv. 51; Phil. iv. 5; 1 Thess. iv. 15; James v. 8; 1 Peter iv. 7; 1 John ii. 18; Rev. i. 13; xxii. 7, 10, 12.) Indeed Mr. Hutton recognizes this at least as frankly and fully as we have stated it.

The last instance of Christ's supernatural knowledge of the future which we propose to examine is perhaps that on which Mr. Hutton rests with the greatest confidence. We refer to our Lord's repeated predictions of the success of the kingdom he and his disciples were to establish by their preaching in defiance of all opposition, without the aid of force or political alliances, and by instruments apparently the most inadequate and unpromising; and to the fact that this kingdom *was* established and rules to this day over the mightiest though not the widest portion of the earth.

"I never hear," says Mr. Hutton, "without the thrill of a new surprise, that calm, strange, and unique prophecy, addressed at the very outset of his short career to a dozen peasants, 'Fear not, little flock, it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom,' when I remember that a kingdom has really been given them, though not a kingdom of this world. *Nor is this a case of what has often happened—trust in the eventual ascendancy over men of great ideas.* It is a case of the selection of special instruments, and of building up a human organization explicitly designed for work of a most laborious and difficult kind. 'Follow me,' Christ says to one or two couples of fishermen on the shores of the Lake of Galilee, 'and I will make you fishers of men.' And they *were* made fishers of men, and made such solely by him who thus chose them from a calling apparently so little

qualified to fit them for the hopeless task. It is remarkable enough that by far the greatest of the apostles—he in whom human insight might have discerned the elements of marvellous force and moral influence—was not chosen for his work during Christ's earthly life. 'The little flock' to whom our Lord announces so early and so peremptorily that 'they are not to fear, because it is their Father's good pleasure to give them the kingdom,' are such a little flock as no one before ever proposed to make the founders of a new world."—P. 227.

The argument is a weighty one, and Mr. Hutton puts it with much force. We will not attempt to impugn it by reminding our readers that he relies perhaps too much on special phrases which those who hold our joint views of the traditional origin of the Gospels cannot feel confident were uttered precisely as we now have them, because we do not doubt that Jesus entertained an enthusiastic conviction of the spread of his doctrine and the coming of the Christian era and the spiritual kingdom which he preached. We recognize, too, as fully as the writer we are criticizing, the unsuitable and almost hopeless character of the human elements by whose agency he proposed to found it. Nevertheless we cannot accept Mr. Hutton's conclusion, and we think the flaw in his method of reasoning will be made manifest by duly pondering the following scarcely disputable considerations.

I. The first weak place seems to us to lie in the sentence of the above quotation, which we have printed in italics. We think, on the contrary, that there has seldom in all history been a clearer or more instructive instance of confiding and warranted "trust in the eventual ascendancy over men of great ideas." The splendid and lofty conceptions, the touching and tender sympathies, the noble precepts of self-proving and inspiring morality, and the elevating tone of spiritual religion which filled his mind and breathed through all his utterances, our Lord might not unreasonably trust to as fitted to revolutionize the sentiments and ethics of the world—to live by their inherent vitality, to stand and conquer by their native strength—independently of earthly learning or of worldly power. In fact, it is these elements that have through all ages remained as the salt of Christianity, though often concealed and crusted over, and by no means the main or sole direct causes of its diffusion. It is these that have helped it to survive in spite of the errors and accretions with which human passions have so often stained, disgraced, and overlaid it. It is these which, age after age, have drawn back to allegiance and admiration the finest natures who have been compelled to reject and protest against the errors and accretions we refer to. It is these which recalled John Mill, and have recalled thousands like him, to the feet of Christ, whence the Christianity taught in his name had driven them in righteous and irrepressible repugnance. Such at

least is our explanation of the success of the faith which Jesus preached and exemplified, wherever it can be truly said to have made its way and established its supremacy.

II. But the point to which we would specially crave attention is this:—Does Mr. Hutton really mean to assert that *the* kingdom which Christ came to preach and found is in any sense the one *which has been established*? Is the Christianity in whose spread and conquest and prevailing sway he sees the literal and miraculous fulfilment of our Lord's prediction, *the* kingdom which Jesus of Nazareth designed, desired, or prophesied?—a kingdom not of this world—a kingdom, to use the writer's own expressions, “of which a little child is the true type, a kingdom in which it is the ‘meek’ who are to inherit the earth, and of which the ‘poor in spirit’ are to be the rulers?” Will he maintain, or does he for a moment fancy, that the kingdom of heaven which Jesus intended and foresaw, and trusted to his unlettered fishermen to bring about, bore even a recognizable resemblance to the proud, cruel, crushing, darkening, oppressive despotism which has for ages held sway in his name from the chambers of the Vatican? * or even to the mitigated and modified travesties which reign or have reigned at Lambeth, Geneva, or Byzantium? Has not the mockery of likeness which the “successors of the apostles” present to those prototypes whom Jesus consecrated to his work passed into a proverb? How then can it be argued, with the slightest approach to sound reasoning, that the Church, the organization, the kingdom, *which now exists*, is that which Jesus prophesied and for which he toiled and died?

III. But further. Waiving this consideration, can it be said with truth that the Christianity which has prevailed—or even that primitive faith which spread so rapidly in the first two or three centuries—*was* established by those chosen disciples whose selection by Christ to establish it, being the unpromising instruments they were, Mr. Hutton regards as a miracle, and whose success in establishing it he points to as so clear and triumphant an instance of prophecy fulfilled? Is it not, on the contrary, as so many theologians conclude, more than probable—nay, is it not, judging by the light of reason, almost certain—that if it had been left in their hands alone, the teaching of their Master would have created merely an amended and purified sect of Judaism, instead of being the tiny mustard-seed which has grown into a tree overshadowing the whole earth. Did not Jesus himself design it to have been this? saying to the twelve whom he sent forth, “Go not into the way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter

* Of all the prophecies really uttered by Jesus, it is curious that Mr. Hutton does not even allude to the one which has been most undeniably and literally fulfilled—“Think not that I am come to send peace on earth. I am not come to send peace, but a sword.”

ye not, but go rather to the lost sheep of the House of Israel ;” and to the Syrophenician woman who besought his aid as a miraculous prophet—“ *I am not sent* but to the lost sheep of the House of Israel ;” adding in seemingly uncourteous phrase, that his gifts were the special and exclusive privilege of the chosen race. Is it not undeniable and admitted—a known fact of history—that this religion became what it has been, did what it has done, conquered nations, converted the armed and crowned warriors and monarchs who spread it by imperial decree, through the instrumentality of that mighty unforeseen apostle, whose existence and conversion Jesus assuredly never predicted, and gave not the faintest indication of having foreseen? Was not the preaching of Christianity to the Gentiles, to which we owe its character, its conquests, and its actual supremacy (and which would appear to have been unintended and discouraged by its Founder, and originally at least objected to by his representatives), distinctively and mainly the work, not of the ignorant and unlettered followers to whom our Lord entrusted it, but of the subtle and cultivated Paul, of whose ardent and singular career apparently He never even dreamed? Nay, may we not, must we not, go further, and urge (what few but the most rigidly orthodox theologians can deny to be at least plausible, and what to us seems almost self-evident) that Paul’s success in the wider field to which his labours were extended, and in fact, the attractions and the spreading triumph of the Christianity he promulgated, were due not to its inherent essence as it came from its Founder,—not to the spirit of love, of filial devotion, of saintly virtue, which breathed from the lips and life of Jesus,—but peculiarly and in preponderating measure to dogmas which Jesus never taught, and to assertions and accretions which he would have repudiated and denounced? Is it too much to say that the wonderful expansion and empire of what we know as Christianity is mainly traceable to the preaching of Paul; and that to speak broadly, the Christianity Paul preached was not that which Jesus taught, and the speedy supremacy of which he foretold with so sublime a confidence? *


Now, weighing calmly and dispassionately these several considerations—which I put forward assuredly in no spirit of disrespect, but desiring only that our reverence for Christ shall not be based on any crumbling foundation—is not this the logical result?—that, of all the instances which Mr. Hutton has most boldly relied upon as indisputable proofs of Christ’s supernatural foreknowledge, one prediction was almost certainly never uttered at all; a second was

* We cannot of course enter here upon so wide a field as the maintenance of this thesis would require. To do so would need almost a volume. I would, however, suggest a reference to an article entitled “Primitive Christianity,” by F. W. Newman, in *Fraser’s Magazine* for August, 1875, and a study of Rénan’s “St. Paul.”

not properly a prophecy; a third has suspicious features of subsequent specialization; a fourth, about the most frequently repeated, and the most universally received among his disciples, admittedly implies the most thorough misconception; while those prophesying the coming of his kingdom and the supremacy of his religion, when read with candour and without prepossession, must be held to have been falsified rather than realized by the event.

Of our Lord's enthusiastic and inspiring conviction that the noble faith, ethics, and temper which it was his mission to announce, had within them the vital force to convert the world, and in time to transmute its aspect, we should agree with Mr. Hutton in most he says, except in regarding it as indicative of superhuman knowledge. In his firm impression of the exceptional grandeur of his mission, and of his nature (or at least characteristic features) being apart and different from those of ordinary men, and of the significance of that impression, we think with Mr. Hutton that no reasonable doubt can be entertained. And that Jesus had one of those gifted natures, rarely met with, and never in equal perfection, the purity and absolute harmony of whose mental and moral elements confer a clearness of vision wherein insight readily ripens into foresight, and almost rises to the quality of prophecy, is an opinion I am little disposed to controvert. And that this should have stamped itself so deeply on the popular mind as to have become, in some sense, to the world "an evidence of Christianity," is not surprising; and the inference should be signalized perhaps as rather untenable than essentially unsound.

W. R. GREG.



PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT ASSUMPTIONS

Philosophy without Assumptions. By THOMAS
PERTINOTON KIRKMAN, M.A., F.R.S.,
Rector of Croft, &c. Longmans, 1876.

MR. KIRKMAN, who was already well known as a mathematician, and as a vigorous assailant of modern Materialism, has, in a recent work on "Philosophy without Assumptions," fairly entered the lists, and hung up his shield against all comers. As yet no lance has made it ring; nor is there any answer to his challenge. A few critics in anonymous articles, the squires in philosophy, have made a show of answering, but no champion from the ranks of the Materialist philosophers, whom Mr. Kirkman has with no little *outré* defiance, has accepted the combat. And yet assuredly it is not for want of provocation; for Mr. Kirkman, I will not say has "cursed them by all his gods," but he has bantered them with a Socratic irony, and mocked them with an irreverence which reads like the Clouds of Aristophanes.

With what success the skirmishers have attacked this book may be judged from one fact. Two of the chief critics begin with saying, "Mr. Kirkman sets out from the dictum of Descartes, *Cogito ergo sum*;" which is like saying, "Lord Bacon bases his *Novum Organum* upon the syllogism of Aristotle." Mr. Kirkman begins by exposing the dictum of Descartes as a vicious circle. We are before we think; and our consciousness of our own existence is not an inference, but a certainty anterior to all reasoning.

Mr. Kirkman's book has a twofold purpose. First, he has endeavoured to construct a philosophy on primary certainties which each man of sound mind may "find for himself, and show others how to find." He therefore assumes nothing, takes nothing for granted, and uses no postulates. So far it is synthetical and positive. And, secondly, he has undertaken to destroy the modern Materialistic philosophers by analyzing their methods, which he contends are based on unproved assumptions and arbitrary assertions. He further denies *in toto* our knowledge of *what* matter is, in which some place "all the potency of terrestrial life." So far his book is destructive. The destructive part of the book is so much more profuse than the constructive, though the constructive lines do indeed run through it, that the reader more easily follows the polemical than the positive part of the work. At first this leaves an indefinite conception of Mr. Kirkman's affirmative system on the reader's mind; but upon further examination this impression will be for the most part removed. In fact, the primary certainties and truths of philosophy in the order of natural reason are few; but the applications of them to error are manifold. There can only be one straight line, but curves may be almost without number.

We will endeavour (1) first, to get at a synopsis of Mr. Kirkman's positions; (2) secondly, to note what seems to be insufficiently worked out; (3) thirdly, to draw out the scholastic philosophy upon the same points; and (4) lastly, to apply what has been said to the modern theories of Materialism.

The following summary of Mr. Kirkman's "Philosophy without Assumptions" is given in his own words. Lest I should misstate him, he shall speak for himself: I will therefore insert here an abstract of his book written by his own hand.

STATEMENT OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS.

I. Mr. Kirkman begins by stating first what he declines to investigate. He will not inquire either What is? or What must be? The first question, What is?—*i.e.* What is, *per se*?—he considers to be beyond the reach of his human powers. For the second, What must be? as distinct from What must logically follow? he expresses a profound contempt. Thus we seem to have one novelty at least in philosophy—the exclusion of the *per-se-ity* and *must-be-ity*, which cut such a figure in what goes for metaphysics. He says—

"The question that I propose to myself at the beginning of philosophy is this: What do I find for myself without making unproved assumptions,

and with demonstrations that I can write down, so that another thinker, if there be another who understands me, can find it, and demonstrate for himself without unproved assumptions? ”* “This rule of demanding proof, whenever proof may without evident absurdity be required, reduces my stock of propositions at the start of my philosophy to the fundamental one of Descartes, which I write thus : ‘I am, and know that I am, thinking.’† I shall often write ‘I am’ for the full proposition of Descartes.”‡

He defines assumption thus:—

“An *assumption* is the acceptance, without proof, of the truth of a proposition, of which truth proof may, without a flat contradiction or a glaring absurdity, be demanded.”§

He defines demonstrated truth thus:—

“First, the testimony of my present consciousness clear of all assumptions : or, secondly, it is truth verifiable by me, the thinker, by facts in my consciousness, which I can repeat at my pleasure again and again without making any assumptions, or by logical inference from such facts.”||

Mr. Kirkman does not start from the *cogito, ergo sum*, of Descartes. The *ergo* is a mistake.

“I am making no assumption, nor taking anything for granted, when I affirm that I am, and that I know that I am, thinking. For if I am really making an assumption, I can scientifically affirm that I am making it, that is, that I am thinking either right or wrong ; and if I am affirming scientifically that I think, I am not making any assumption under that affirmation. Nor can any man inform me that I am assuming my ‘I am’ without conceding and affirming my being and thinking.”¶

Under *thinking* he includes all that Descartes comprised in his definition of *cogitatio*, “every state or change of consciousness, every sensation, every volition, every will-effort of which I may be conscious, so that ‘I am thinking’ includes ‘I will,’ when will is in conscious act.”** But “it is never a metaphysical proposition about being.” Nor does it include any affirmation “about my body or other bodies or other thinkers.”

In Chapter II. he proposes his “first clear question :”—

“Can I find, without assumption and with demonstration, any other thing or being besides my thinking self?”

“Let me classify as well as I can the facts of my consciousness. They appear to fall into three compartments. The *first compartment* is that of my remembered *listless indolence*.”††

This state can be both remembered and verified at pleasure.

“Its marked feature by which it is clearly known to me, is the total inaction of my will.” “From what I can recall of such a state, nothing can be logically affirmed but my changing self.” “The *second compartment* of ‘I remember’ I call that of my *ill-recorded will-effort*. [The will is here active, but only with trains of thought.] There is no conscious relation to a not-me-the-thinker, nor any conflict but with pure difficulties of

* Philosophy without Assumptions, p. 4.

† P. 5.

‡ P. 6.

§ P. 4.

|| P. 7.

¶ P. 11.

** P. 6.

†† P. 21.

thought. Because these difficulties occur and are overcome, at more or less mental cost, I call the found and remembered state *effort*. . . . I call it will-effort or will-force, because I know by ten thousand experiences that it depends upon my will. . . . I call it my ill-recorded will-force, because I find in memory no exact measures or comparisons of it." "I will not undertake to find in this second compartment any more than in the first, the demonstration sought of finite being not my own."*

In Chapter III., entitled "The Solving Relation," the writer says—

"In my 'I am' *I will* is given; that is, my will-force—when will is making effort."†

It is given in that second compartment, no not-self being posited or conceived in such will-effort.

"I am still in quest of being not myself. I think I remember once moving all my fingers at once, or fancying that I did it. I think I am doing it now. Yet it is certain that the desire to do it, and the idea of the apparent movement, do form one of the sequences of nature. But stop—how is this? I cannot do it now. The will-effort is clear enough, but there is bafflement. Do they call this a sequence? I affirm that it is a steady permanence in consciousness. My state is at one moment both active and passive. I am sure that this is a relation evident and abiding of my conscious will-force to a contemporaneous correlative. Neither of the terms of this relation is before or after the other. From this found measurable and abiding relation, and from the nature of a real measurable relation, which must in logic have two congruous terms, I infer that the contemporaneous correlative to my acting will-force is another acting force not my own. From this logical law of a relation given I have demonstrated an external world of force, and I can verify every step of the demonstration at any moment. Thus my first question is answered."‡

What is the use of the demonstration?

"To refute the teachers who maintain that no truth at all can be shown to follow from the mere facts of consciousness; from which, if it were true, it would follow that it is impossible to have a philosophy without assumptions, and that we ought to leave the learned who know so much about matter and law, to make the right ones for us all."§

How do we know that the resistance which we infer from the relation found in consciousness, is not purely ideal and imaginary?

"The reply is easy: from the law of a real relation, that both its terms are real, or both imaginary. My will-force I know to be as real as my own 'I am.'|| I call my *related* will-force *well-recorded*, because it is well-measured and graduated in memory of repeated experiments, and in accurate consciousness of present power.¶ Go talk of your eternal conservation, invariabilities, and indestructibilities! I can confute you, and spoil them all, within a certain sphere, whenever I please. For this I can give you all the proof that reason can require; by prediction and fulfilment: fulfilment that no other prophet nor philosopher can foretell; prediction that no other finite agent can accomplish."**

* P. 24.
† P. 36.

‡ P. 44.
§ P. 44.

|| P. 49.
¶ P. 55.

** P. 55.

In the fourth chapter, entitled "Dynamical Foundations," the author establishes the three following propositions:—

"1. The only force which is directly given and immediately known to me, is my own will-force; and all my knowledge of other forces acting in the Cosmos is mediate, and found by me by logical inference.*

"2. My will-force is my only force-finder.†

"3. In my every train of reasoned thought about any force or forces found in action in the Cosmos, the fundamental proposition, out of which all my other propositions flow, and on the certainty of which their truth to me depends, is this: in finding force, I will in act, and I know that I will; so that if all the steps of the reasoning be written down without omission in their order, this proposition must stand written at the head of all—In first finding force in this inquiry, I willed in act, and I know that I willed."‡

• By these theories Mr. Kirkman easily reduces to a vicious circle the pretences of Materialist biology and psychology to deduce will as a resultant of other forces in action in the Cosmos.

In Chapter V., "On the Evidence of the Presence of so-called *Matter* in the Cosmos," the author propounds his second question:

"Where and how can I find what they call *matter* without assumption and with demonstration, so that I can show others, if there be others, how to find it?

"I believe with Boscovich that the smallest locus of force is a point without parts, and I agree with the thinkers who foretell that dynamical science will eventually begin where Geometry long ago began. The starting conceptions will perhaps be stated thus—in Geometry from points which have unchanging positions and no parts; in Dynamics, from points which have changing positions and no parts. In the definition that dynamical points change their positions (the changes being referred to an adequate cause which works at the positions by laws of action depending on the number and the distances of related points, and being for all finite observation and computation continuous changes), all that we mean by force and inertia is logically included, and would be stated in definition or axioms following."§

In Chapter VI., "Something about Boscovich, Berkeley, and Kant," the author pursues his inquiry about matter, concluding with an attack on Kant's definitions, at the opening of his "Kritik," of the matter and form of a phenomenon.

Chapter VII. is entitled—"Continuation of the Search for so-called Matter, with the help of its Assertors." He here points out how unsatisfactory and inconsistent are the notions, so far as they are expounded by leading teachers, of Materialistic philosophy concerning matter and ether.

In Chapter VIII., "On Maxima and Minima," he propounds his third question—Can we find or affirm the existence of a minimum finite body or force-locus?

In Chapter IX., "The Maximum Brain and Mr. Matthew Arnold," he handles a fourth question concerning a highest finite intelligence.

* P. 59.

† P. 61.

‡ P. 70.

§ P. 77.

"It is the craftsmen of atheism, not we, who are the grovelling, self-magnifying anthropomorphists. Do they deny that they affirm this highest finite intelligence above which there is absolutely none in being? I will compel them to confess it. They deny that there is an Infinite Mind; wherefore it must follow, and it does follow even to them, that there is somewhere either one supreme finite intelligence, absolutely above all, or else a round table of them, all of equal brain-power, unsurpassed in all existence."* "The conclusions from the train of thought in this and the preceding chapters, which to my faculties appear inevitable, are these. First, by the absurdities inherent in the dogma of an absolutely minimum body existing in space, called *atom*, the stuff spoken of as *matter* is exploded, and disappears to scientific thought. Secondly, by the absurdities in the atheistic dogma of a finite maximum intellect now supreme in the Cosmos, the Being of God Omniscient and Almighty is confirmed. I say not, is demonstrated; for the demonstrations of logic concerning the infinite are of little value, and my belief in God rests on foundations in my soul, which are deeper and nobler than those of logic."†

In Chapter X. Mr. Kirkman propounds his fifth definite question—

"Can I find and demonstrate, without assumptions unproved, the existence of any finite conscious thinker besides myself? How can I prove thou art a thinker?"

A says of B, This B is a group of indications of intelligence, thought, and will; and draws the conclusion, *ergo* B is an intelligent thinker. But two propositions cannot build a demonstration. A major is wanted, which Mr. Kirkman endeavours to assign from his certain knowledge of the conclusion. He finds it in nothing less than the general theorem—All continued and consistent phenomenal indications to me of invisible consciousness, intelligence, and will, are verily to me demonstrations of the unseen verities indicated.

"If next I am required to prove this most general theorem, I answer boldly that it is a fundamental truth of reason, the denial of which is utterly absurd. Beyond that point I shall not pretend to debate. I leave it there; for, wherever it is left, the appeal must be to the consciousness of rational thinkers. I do not here claim any formal logical triumph in this difficult topic over the men who consider this old inference from intelligent design and work to a conscious designer and worker as unphilosophical. I am familiar with the style in which they contrive to amuse themselves at my expense."‡

It is here evident that the author expected to hear from hostile critics exactly what they have uttered. Most of them have displayed their cleverness on the shortest of his chapters, leaving all the rest untouched. In the face of the writer's disclaimer of logical triumph, one says, "He just postulates 'a fundamental truth of reason,' which assumes the whole thing to be proved, and thereupon triumphantly constructs his perfect syllogism." Another

* P. 161.

† P. 175.

‡ P. 182.

remarks, "The major premiss of his syllogism is as neat a *petitio principii* as we ever saw."

The question on the proof of "Thou art" has this peculiarity—that while it is not irrational for A, thinking alone, to ask of himself a demonstration that B is a conscious thinker, or to charge himself with an assumption, if he has never demanded such proof, it is a flagrant absurdity for B to charge A with such assumption in serious debate. Mr. Kirkman's object is legitimate and useful. He says, "It would be a useful exercise of scientific thought if they would try to construct a demonstration of this 'Thou art,' which will satisfy an exigent scepticism like that which they are elsewhere so forward to display."

Mr. Kirkman might have remarked that *social instinct* gives the desire of fellowship, but it does not demonstrate it. It is easily cheated. We know one who, when in childhood he visited Madame Tussaud's exhibition, was led by his social instinct to ask a question of an old lady in a chair, the waxen double of her whom he had just seen below.

Mr. Kirkman takes the pains to inform us exactly what he means by an assumption, and has tried to do good service in insisting on the exclusion of assumptions from philosophy. To some of his critics this is an intolerable demand. They have diligently read the title-page. Some of them are evidently unable to make a distinction between an assumption and a truth, of which, from its simplicity, the demonstration cannot be written down. Such writers victoriously treat "I am thinking" as an assumption, which makes Mr. Kirkman's title ridiculous. Others may be pardoned for fancying that he starts from the Cartesian *Cogito ergo sum*. It surprised him, probably, to see it laid down:—

"Correct and modify the Cartesian formula as we please, we never can vamp it up, as Mr. Kirkman seeks to do, into a true philosophic starting-point. It is an arbitrary assumption for an orthodox system of metaphysics or theology."*

And again—

"Philosophy, rightly considered, is nothing else than the science of rejecting wrong assumptions and replacing them with right."†

Then philosophy is impossible, where there are no wrong assumptions!

One of the most useful and provoking of the theorems laid down in this book is this very simple one, that "I am," being the starting-point of every train of reasoned thought, can never be the conclusion of any one, for it can only complete a vicious circle. With this argument from the vicious circle the author

* *Literary World*, April 28.

† *Ibid*.

makes havoc with the logic of the evolutionists and biologists. To his onslaughts on these philosophers none of the adverse critics have made any reply except one, whose courage is very commendable. His words are:—

“He proceeds to demonstrate the absurdity of conceiving the individual consciousness as a result of material evolution. The argument is exceedingly curious. . . . Its principal step is as follows:—In the order of knowledge or thought, my own existence as thinker is the starting-point—*ergo*, in the temporal order of objective existence, I cannot follow as an effect from processes outside my consciousness.”*

This critic, in a distinguished weekly journal, agrees with our author that “*I am*” is the starting-point; also that “*I am*” cannot follow in the order of knowledge or thought, because that would be a vicious circle beginning and ending with “*I am*.” “But,” says he, “‘*I am*’ may follow and does follow in another order—namely, in the order of temporal objective existence, thus closing correctly the train of thought beginning with ‘*I am*.’” The critic is talking of course about what he quite understands; but unfortunately he does not inform us at what point of his sequence of propositions and train of thought he steps out of the order of knowledge into that of objective existence, nor how he manages to get hold of the “*I*” in this latter order, which is quite different from that of thought and knowledge. Well may our philosophical ladies and gentlemen glory in that noble instrument of philosophy, *objective*! What is there that you cannot accomplish with it? This critic goes on to say:—

“It is hardly possible to give the reader an adequate conception of the philosophic ignorance, incompetence in argument, &c., which constitute Mr. Kirkman’s ‘refutation’ of modern philosophy and science. His competence for philosophical discussion may perhaps be judged by the fact that he cannot distinguish Mill’s ‘unconditionality’ in causation, which is as much known from experience as sequence itself, from the ‘necessity’ of the ontologist.”†

This is in reference to our author’s criticism (p. 209) on the following words of J. S. Mill on causation:—

“This is what writers mean when they say that the notion of a cause involves the idea of necessity. If there be any meaning which confessedly belongs to the term necessity, it is *unconditionality*.”‡

From these words of Mill, it is to be feared that he also could not distinguish, and must come, like Mr. Kirkman, under the critic’s lash. There are many people who know sequence in the past from experience, and some who think they know it certainly for the future; but a very choice few only can know with this

* *Examiner*, June 3.

† *Ibid.*

‡ *Logic*, Book iii. c. 5, § 5.

deep critic unconditionalness either in the past or in the future, from experience alone.

Such is Mr. Kirkman's abbreviation of his own Book.

II. No one who has read anything either of the Scholastic or the modern metaphysics will fail to see that he has thought for himself. His method of philosophy is a vigorous creation of his own mind, upon the lines which natural reason or the light of nature has traced upon us. It may be called the philosophy of common sense; for common sense is the witness of the human reason in its normal state, as it is found in the race of mankind, save only in abnormal cases, which are exceptions, like the imperfect ear of wheat in a harvest field.

1. First, it must not be supposed that Mr. Kirkman lays down his method as the way by which all men arrive at the knowledge of themselves or of others. His method is the way in which *we may prove the certainty of the truths which come to us by inheritance*. He does not suppose that we all have need to start like Peter the wild boy, in isolation from society and exiled from the common sense of mankind. He means, if I understand him rightly, "that the intellectual system of the world may be verified and found by individuals for themselves, and shown to others by the method he has indicated." Mr. Kirkman certainly does not mean that we all are required to attain the knowledge of our own existence, thought, will, and body, by dividing our consciousness into three compartments, or that we find out the existence of others by the resistance of force-points, or the cumulus of indications of intelligence and will. In this way the greater part of men would be doomed to idiocy. Our knowledge of our existence, thought, will, conscience, right and wrong, duty, moral relations to God and to man, comes to us as an heirloom. We inherit it, not as an assumption, though it be unproved by us, nor as a postulate, for we never ask it, but as a truth, or rather as an intellectual system of truths, known without discovery, needing no demonstration though capable of proof, learned with our mother-tongue from human society, which, as the mother and teacher of its children, guides the spontaneous processes of our intelligence *ex vi suâ* in the apprehension of truth.

Nevertheless, Mr. Kirkman's method is of great value. It exists in the nature of things. To some individuals at all times, and to some nations at certain periods, it becomes a necessity. When men or nations have been disinherited of the truths of the natural order, it is the *δεύτερος πλοῦς*: if we cannot sail, we must row. It is the *tabula post naufragium*, like the sacrament of penance after the loss of baptismal innocence. In these last centuries men have thought, under Luther's guidance, to perfect their religion by breaking with the traditions of the Christian faith, and

they have landed in rationalism. They have thought also, under the guidance of Descartes, to perfect their mental philosophy by departing from the intellectual system of the world, and they have ended in scepticism. We are now in a period of return and of verification: men are forced to find "a reason for the faith that is in them," not only in the order of faith, but in the order of intellect.

By the intellectual system of the world, I mean the unbroken tradition and lineage of truth which from the beginning has descended as the inheritance of mankind. In this inheritance are included the existence and moral character of God, the existence and immortality of the soul, the eternal distinction of good and evil, right and wrong; the conscience and responsibility of man to a moral Lawgiver and Judge in this life and after death. This group of truths has resided universally in the reason of man, varying in degree of clearness and completeness from its whole outline down to the verge of extinction in races and individuals: but in the lowest intellectual state it has everywhere been implicitly found. There has always been a notion of God to debase. Fetishism bears witness to natural theology. No one can read the Ethics of Aristotle, or the Tusculan Disputations of Cicero, without perceiving the outlines of this intellectual order. What they held by inheritance, with a kind of sceptical uncertainty as to the higher truths, we inherit with the confirmation and certainty of revelation. Nevertheless, for them the logical analysis and demonstration was possible, and it is also possible to us. They who at this day have lapsed into Pyrrhonism and scepticism are bound to show cause why they reject the first lights of nature, and it is for them that Mr. Kirkman writes.

2. It is a reasonable and healthy exercise of the intellect to analyze and to verify its own convictions. There is no rationalism in a reflex examination of what we believe. It is well for us to find the limits and the outline of our natural reason, and to ask, "What can I find or prove for myself of that group of truths which I have inherited from society and tradition?"

Now, of my existence I have no need of logical proof. It is a consciousness antecedent to all other certainties. I know that I am; I know that I am myself; I know that I am the same identical being who has passed through a succession of times and states. I know that I am thinking, and I know that (putting out my will) I will or am willing. All these are facts of my internal consciousness, of a *sensus intinuis* which, as even Hume declared, never deceives.* I do not infer my existence from my thoughts or from my will. "Cogito ergo sum" is a "therefore" outside of logic. There is no illation. One and the same consciousness at

* Kirkman, p. 46.

the same moment knows both. And yet my being and my thought are not one and the same. I cannot say, "Ego sum cogitatio mea." All that is in God is God, for God is His own being, His own intelligence, and His own will. But in man neither intelligence nor will are the soul, but faculties and powers of the soul. To affect to doubt whether I am thinking or willing is not reason, but unreason : it is not philosophy, but folly. There is no proof of my own existence higher than my consciousness of my own existence, and no proof of the facts of my intimate consciousness higher than the *sensus intimus* itself. St. Paul was philosophizing in the order of nature when he said, "What man knoweth the things of a man but the spirit of a man that is in him?"* If this consciousness be not sufficient to convince any man of his own intellectual and moral nature, no logical argument *ab extra* will suffice. Such scepticism is a paralysis of the reason itself; and such appears to me to be the diagnosis of the scepticism which either denies the existence of the soul or professes Agnosticism about the existence of the soul, or, lastly and much more peremptorily, which affirms that we have no immaterial part in our composite nature, and therefore that matter thinks. I have no will to give offence; but I must say that this philosophy seems to be the result of an ossification of the highest parts of our human nature, or a loss of perception in the nerves of internal sense. If any man's intimate consciousness does not assure him of somewhat within him more subtil and lifeful than matter, a whole battery of reasons from without can hardly awaken it.

3. And here I am afraid I must part company with Mr. Kirkman, unless upon explanation we can find a solution of a difficulty he has raised in the following passage :—"Substance, substratum, matter, or *catter*, supposed finite realities to man distinct from found force arising in found locus, appear to be fictions of ignorance."†

Mr. Kirkman does not deny the existence of *being*, and he affirms *being* to be *real*, but he rejects the notion of matter or stuff, and of substance in the sense of stuff or matter.

And yet he says that he does not deny the existence of matter, but he denies only that we can reach to the cognizance of matter, or that we can declare what it is.

Now, from what has been said, it would appear that we have a consciousness of our own existence distinct from our thought, and from our will. Thinking and willing are actions of *Me-the-Thinker* and of *Me-the-Willer*, as Mr. Kirkman has it. That is, *I am* before *I think*, or *I will*. And the *I* is distinct from both *thought* and *will*.

S. Thomas teaches that the soul is known to itself only through

* 1 Cor. ii. 11.

† P. 75.

its own operations. But that does not say that the operations of the soul are the soul, or that the soul is only the *cumulus* of its own operations. It is the *radix* of all vital operations. And the soul bears them, not they it.

In this, then, we have the idea or notion of being as distinct from operations.

What I find in myself I predicate of others. By the grasp of a man's hand I know that I am in the presence of another having power, will, and intelligence like myself. The cumulus of intelligent and moral phenomena prove to me the presence of a nature like my own. But these phenomena are no more the being who is before me than the facts of my own internal consciousness are my own being.

I am compelled to predicate will, thought, and being of the other who is so far ascertainably like myself. All these are facts of immediate consciousness in myself: in another they are mediately and logically inferred. Cicero anticipated the argument of Bishop Berkeley in his *Alciphron* when he said, *Nos non sumus corpora nostra, nec hoc dico corpori tuo sed tibi.*

Now, I am willing with Mr. Kirkman to say that this *tibi* is not *matter*, nor *catter*, nor *stuff*; but I cannot admit that it is not *being*, and I affirm that this being is *substance*. I am not unwilling to admit that it is not an object of sense, but only of the reason, and that except by knowing what it is not, that is, *per viam remotionis*, I cannot say what it is. I can indeed say that it is neither *matter* nor *stuff*, for the soul is immaterial. Yet it is real being. But this Mr. Kirkman does not deny.

Let us go further. If I grasp not the hand of a man but the horn of an ox, I am soon conscious both of power and action, and if not of thought, or will, at least of a purpose to get rid of me bodily. Now the cumulus of these phenomena will not warrant my predicating either an intellectual or a moral nature. But they certainly prove a living being with spontaneous agency and self-originated motion, and a fixed purpose. What this agent is I do not know, but I agree with Mr. Kirkman that it is not mere matter or stuff, and yet I cannot affirm that it is a being like myself. Nevertheless, the phenomena prove that something more lifeful than matter with spontaneous agency and definite purpose is demanded by our reason to account for their manifestation.

But still further. Next time I grasp not the horn of an ox, but the bars of an iron gate. A strength greater than my own resists me. I cannot predicate thought, will, or spontaneity, but assuredly I must predicate the existence of something which hinders my advance. If you tell me that this is a cumulus of atoms or an array of force-points, I answer I have just as much and just as

little conception of your atoms or your force-points as I have of matter or substance. Matter and substance have just as much meaning to me as force-points and atoms. We are all alike in the dark, and neither a more elaborate nor a more modern theory has yet rent the veil which hangs between my reason and the nature of substance or matter. If you tell me it is resistance, I answer, that resistance is the sensible effect upon me. But what resists me? You say you do not know, but you cannot deny the existence of a cause or a reason of that resistance. I call that cause substance. My reason demands it. After all it may be your atoms or force-points, or it may be *catter* or *stuff*; but resistance is an action of something, and thing and being are one and the same.

And here I must confess that between *οὐσία* and *essentia* and *being* in the abstract I can find no difference; and that between *something* and *nothing* I can find no intermediate *except potentia*, which does not mean force, but *possibility*. Mr. Kirkman freely admits *reality*; but he hesitates at *substance*. And yet if the action of the ox or the resistance of the iron gate are not mere phenomena, they have each a *ὑποκείμενον*, or a substance which is the *radix actionis*, as our will is the cause of our actions, but our being is the *radix* of all our operations. This analogy seems to me to be a strict process of reason—but if wrong I shall be happy to be corrected.

Mr. Kirkman does not believe the external world to be merely phenomenal. He affirms it to be real. But if the real is not an object of sense, it is "objectum rationis" by a necessity of reason.

I must acknowledge that I do not feel the difficulty which Mr. Kirkman seems to find. No one has better proved than he has that our first and surest knowledge is anterior to the reports of sense, and independent of them, inasmuch as they are the facts of our internal consciousness. But when the reports of sense are received, the reason at once predicates of them. The sense and the reason act simultaneously in the judgments of a normal intelligence. No one supposes that we *find* substance by "an inquiring touch." But we find the phenomena, on which the reason is taught by its own internal consciousness of being as distinct from operations, to predicate of external objects in like manner being as distinct from their operations.

I do not, however, suppose that Mr. Kirkman would deny this. All he seems to say is that he does not know *what* it is, and that he cannot affirm it. And yet it appears to me that in affirming "forces," "loci," "repulsions," "attractions," "equilibriums," "films of indefinite tenuity," &c., he is affirming much more about their unknown "being" or "reality" than any Scholastic would venture to assert. If Mr. Kirkman plays the sceptic to the Materialist, I must play the sceptic to him in turn. I will not here take upon

me to deny that the theory of Dynamism may be true, but it is far more profuse in its assertions about the unknown and the conjectural than the Scholastic philosophy which contents itself with affirming without analysis chemical or dynamical that substance and matter exist.

Thus far I have endeavoured to point out where Mr. Kirkman's philosophy seems to me to be insufficient on its positive side; but on its destructive side as against Materialism, it appears to be decisive.

1. First, it restores to its rightful place in philosophy the reason and its consciousness. When the philosophers of sense affirmed as the first axiom of human knowledge, "Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu," Leibnitz truly added, "Nisi ipse intellectus." These words are few; but they bring in a whole intellectual world with them. They contain all that Mr. Kirkman has affirmed of our consciousness of being, thought, and will, of our *sensus intimus* and all its operations and facts, which are antecedent to and independent of the reports of sense. If a Materialist tells me that this "intellect" is only a function of matter, I would ask, how do you know that? You acknowledge that you do not know what matter is; you tell me that Berkeley has shown that matter does not exist beyond the phenomena; how then is intellect a function of matter? If you mean that it is only one of the phenomena of matter, I answer that if matter does not exist, it can have no phenomena. But, again, the phenomena of intellect and the phenomena of matter are as widely distinct as the phenomena of earth and the phenomena of light. It is a phenomenon and a function of earth to crush me. It is a phenomenon of light to touch all things with an imponderable agency. It is a phenomenon of matter to be inert. It is a phenomenon or function of intellect to create the Iliad. Will you tell me that these two groups of phenomena or functions point to the same reality, or being, or entity, or that they have no entity or *radix operationum* whatsoever to which they are related?

There are harder things in this philosophy than in all the Schoolmen. This makes demand on my belief which passes my credulity. "Incredulus odi."

2. Next, it seems to me that Mr. Kirkman has vindicated the existence and power of an immaterial order of being and agency against the philosophy which would resolve all being and agency into "matter and stuff." He has turned Agnosticism against Materialism; and has shown that both they who deny the existence of an immaterial being which we call the soul, and they also who ascribe to matter the functions and agencies which we ascribe to the soul or immaterial being, are more positive and confident in their unproved assertions and their assumed knowledge, than any

who believe and speak in the language of ordinary men. If matter does not exist, how does it think? Even if it exist, why should thought be one of its functions? The existence of matter, if proved, does not disprove the existence of an immaterial being distinct from matter, which works in or by a material organization. A musician is not a harp; take away the harp, the music ceases to be heard, but the musician does not cease to exist. The whole world of music which is in him is there still, and he can hear it with all its harmonies in his inward ear and write it with all its chords, though, like Beethoven, his ear of sense be deprived of hearing. I must acknowledge that this Materialistic philosophy has always appeared to me to be at best raw thought with ragged edges, indistinct, incomplete, and inconsecutive. Mr. Kirkman, throws unanswerably upon the Materialist the burden, I will not say of disproving, but even of doubting reasonably, the existence and the immortality of the immaterial being we call soul.

3. The eleventh chapter on the will is one of the ablest in the book. The author affirms—

“As a *scientific thinker* I know that I am, within certain limits of choice and action, absolutely free from all compulsion of the forces, vital, social, or dynamical, which I find at work in the Cosmos. As a *moral being* I know that I am justly accountable within a sphere about whose limits I am sufficiently informed for my general duty and peace to my Cause, and Preserver (of whom more in the next chapter) for my use of my faculties of thought and action. The proof of all this I have in my verifications of ‘I can,’ ‘I will,’ and ‘I ought;’ verifications from *consciousness and conscience*.” “This ‘I am’ and ‘I will,’ from which my only possible philosophy at every moment begins, is no quibble. It is a *fact* and a *force* of the Cosmos, the *first* of all given to me, and that with a *certainty transcending all deductions from it*.”

The italics are mine. Here is nothing more than the *sensus intimus* which is the source of our first knowledge, and a primary certainty of the highest kind. Modern metaphysicians or psychologists despise these simple elements of knowledge and certainty. They account for what we call the will by theories of which the terms appear to me to have no corresponding intellectual equivalents. When Mr. Kirkman says, “My free volition can never be known or imagined by me either as an effect without a cause, or a fact without a reason. I there and then am both the *cause* and the *reason* of it,” I understand him at once, and my consciousness responds to and confirms his assertion. My will is the cause of my own action, and my determinate thought is the reason why I so will. But when I am told by Mr. Herbert Spencer that my will is “a group of psychical states,” and that I am led into error if I suppose that there is something distinct from the “impulse” given by these “psychical states” which determines my action—when I say Mr. Herbert Spencer tells me this, I confess that I do not understand

him. And I believe that I do not understand him through no fault of mine, but because no intellectual equivalent can be found for his terms. Are these "psychical states" the desires or dispositions antecedent to my action? They are not myself; and I am conscious of sometimes going against them by a deliberate antagonism of my free will. Do they contain the *finis intentus* or the final cause of my actions; how does this necessitate my will if the end of my action is freely chosen? Am I deceived in thinking that my choice is free? The consciousness that I have a power to go against my strongest desires, and, under the dictate of my reason, that is, of my conscience, to select the end which is the least attractive, or rather the most repulsive to my desire or appetite, remains both a primary and an ultimate consciousness which cannot be denied nor explained away, nor squared with "the impulse of psychical states." In the action of the will the strongest appetites are freely but absolutely under control of the reason. I have the strongest repugnance to pain, but I willingly go to the rack rather than turn Mussulman. Why? because my reason tells me that pain is to be chosen rather than apostacy. The will is accurately defined to be *appetitus rationalis*. Our desires pass under the cognizance of the reason, and by the guidance of the reason the end most opposed to natural appetite is often freely chosen. Such was the will of the martyrs; such is the risking of life by fire or water to save the life of another of whom we know nothing but his peril. Such was the will of the prisoner condemned to death who, to escape hanging, starved himself in prison. It is no answer to say these were their dominant appetites. They were not so *as appetites* but as deliberate decisions of reason controlling the appetite by an act of the will. That there is a power of determination which is not a "psychical state" but a deliberate choice followed by a decisive action, is as certain as my consciousness of existence. "I am" and "I will" are certainties of which I have an immediate knowledge in myself. If Mr. Spencer includes all this in the "psychical state," why not say so? To tell me that "I myself am only a group of psychical states which are always changing," is contradicted by my immanent and permanent consciousness of my own identity. To tell me that my own identity is an illusion, and is only a psychical state, or a group of such states, and then to tell me that such states are always changing, while my consciousness of personal identity never changes but is always permanent, is to me not philosophy, but a contradiction in terms. If I break my leg I have a group of psychical states arising from the pain and terror of the accident; they may pass, or vary, or return, but my consciousness that I am the *ego* who broke his leg remains always without variation. To tell me that I am a group of variable psychical states is to tell me

that I have no permanent or conscious identity or *ego*; and to tell me this, is, I think to try to talk me blind. I can hardly believe that any metaphysician has ever intended to hold or to say this. But to me they seem to say it, whatever they may hold. This is the only meaning I could attach to Mr. Buckle's words on personal identity and free will in his first volume on "Civilization," and the only sense I can attach to Mr. Herbert Spencer's words now. If this be not his meaning, I can find no intellectual equivalent to his terms. But I shall rejoice to find that I am mistaken.

4. From this we may next proceed to Cause. It is certain that I am here, and that I did not cause my own existence. How came I here? It is no answer to say that I am a consequent upon an antecedent or a group of antecedents, which only went before, but did not cause me to be here. This is to beg the question, and to dogmatize in the most arbitrary tone. If I merely follow on antecedents which are not causes, then I am uncaused. Then the whole race of man is uncaused. All existence, the whole Cosmos, is uncaused. That is, either the whole Cosmos follows after antecedents that have no productive power or efficient relation to its existence, or the Cosmos is self-existing—that is, self-caused. What we call cause Mr. Mill is pleased to call invariable sequence. This seems to me to be like changing a name to conceal identity. It is an *alias* in philosophy to hide an equivocation. Now I can conceive no antecedent to my existence, thought, and will, but an *I am, I think, I will*, adequate to go before my I am, I think, I will. In the world around me I find others like myself in these three things; but none of them, nor all of them together, will account to me for my being here, and for my being what I am. I am certainly not eternal, nor self-caused, nor uncaused. The conclusion is inevitable by a necessity of reason, and my reason is a spontaneous act of my consciousness, which in this primary certainty cannot err. Mr. Kirkman says, "I live, I think, I know, I work, I love: and there is a cause out of which all this springs." Mr. Martineau, in an article on "Modern Materialism," has shown with peremptory reasoning that materialistic agnosticism either deifies man, or compels the belief of an intelligence and will transcending all intelligence and will of man, which is in one word God. Mr. Kirkman appears to me to expand this argument with great amplitude and force of reason:—

"Through the Infinite I cannot think; but upwards, still upwards, towards it my soul can soar, scorning the finite. That Infinite *scientifically* I cannot know; but the Infinite is my cause. Believing and adoring, I affirm Him with a boldness and a conviction surpassing all that I can feel or utter on my themes of finite science. My Cause lives—the infinite Life, My Cause thinks, knows, and works—the infinite intuition, counsel, and energy works in the full harmony of victorious science in every point and

line of force, in every throb of consciousness—never absent, nor forgetting, never pausing, nor weary. And my Cause loves—the Infinite Love.”*

Mr. Kirkman expands this proof of the existence of God “*per eaque facta sunt*”—that is, by the Cosmos around—in the following passage, which, to be appreciated, must be read entire:—

“*B.* Let me ask you one question more. Have you formed any clear notion what these *forces*, of whose constant presence and action you are convinced, really are in themselves?

“*A.* Your inquiry is to me a very solemn one. What these dread forces are, I know not for certain. But I will confess to you what, every moment that I live under their untiring, unchanging, and beneficent teaching, they more and more appear to me to be. I meet them not, I have never met them, nor have been able to conceive them, but under one form, as equivalents or multiples of my own will-force. These forces never clearly speak to me, nor verify themselves to my intellect, but at the challenge of my wakeful, active will. If I had never put forth the question of my will, I should never have been able to conceive of their action as either real or possible. They play with the sportive child; they wrestle, like the veiled Seraph of Peniel, with the strenuous man; but by neither are they observed or remembered as acting, except as equivalents of will; yet every encounter of the will of either with them leaves him richer in the lore of exquisite science, and gifted with a bolder prophetic power. Now, if the child, when he becomes a man, should ask himself, ‘What are those wondrous workings?’ may he not be pardoned if, despising the dogmas of mock science, and reasoning only from what he knows, he compares these energies with the only force of which he is master—his own will-force? If this balances them here, overcomes them there, and wherever it yields to them, in lessons that are safe and profitable, can measure them on its own scale with unerring accuracy, and predict them from its own experience, and, what is more, combine itself with them in ways innumerable into one homogeneous and foretold result, is he to be blamed for superstition and unphilosophical spirit if he says, ‘What can balance will but will? What can be measured by will but will? What can combine and harmonize with will but will? What can have equivalence and real relation in thought and act to will but will?’ When a man has dared to doubt, and, doubting, to think boldly up to this point, you might as well beseech this stone, falling freely, not to rush towards the earth’s centre, as try to prevent that soul from bursting out, like the smitten unbeliever in Bethel—‘Surely God is in this place, and I knew it not!’ I glory in believing that all these forces are manifestations of the conscious present working will of the God in whom I live, and move, and have my being. F-O-R-C-E spells WILL.”†

He adds:—

“And if you try to tell them the inspiring truth, the atheist cries out, ‘Anthropomorphism;’ whereupon a number of knowing ones reply, ‘Ha! ha! Anthropomorphism!’ and, pleased with that long word, they find themselves philosophers.

“*A.* Yes, truly; anthropomorphism is next akin to anthropophagy. It is unscientific to anthropomorphize. We are forbidden to imagine behind the mysterious veil of phenomena the presence and action of what has kindred with our own consciousness. And yet it is perfectly philosophical—nay, it is my bounden duty—when that queer bundle of phenomena which I call Atheist is before me, to conceive that I am verily in the presence of

* P. 262.

† Kirkman, pp. 262, 263.

an invisible thinker, of a mind very like my own, but differing from mine by its superior wisdom. But in the name of all proportion and modesty have I not ten thousand million times more pregnant evidence, in this daily course of life and mercy, and in all these convincing voices within and without me, that the living God is here in the plenitude of love and wisdom, than I have that, inside that incongruous heap and patchwork of appearances, yclept Atheist, there is a mind and conscience like my own?" *

I do not see what modern Materialism or Agnosticism has to say in reply to all this. Polemically and destructively, it seems to be complete. It is certainly the most formidable assault that has been delivered of late along the whole line of sceptical and materialistic philosophy. I only hope that the authorities so unrelentingly summoned to combat will not decline the passage of arms because of the jaunty defiance of Mr. Kirkman's trumpet. His gibes go at times undeniably as far as the courtesy of chivalry admits; but his blows are knightly, and cannot be declined without loss of victory and of honour.

III. I have thus far endeavoured to give an outline of the results of "Philosophy without Assumptions," and to show its destructive force as against the sceptical and materialistic philosophy of this day. It would be out of place to attempt here a constructive statement of Mr. Kirkman's system, or to point out where it is incomplete. In a Catholic philosophy we should desiderate not a few points, and a more positive and confident tone on others.

1. The first certain truth in human knowledge is that of our own existence.† It is not a conclusion but a consciousness, which Rothenfluc calls "*Spontanetas supra proprias suas operationes quasi replicata.*"‡ This spontaneous reflex action perceives simultaneously our thought, will, and existence. But this is not a perception of the essence of the soul but of its operations, or of the internal facts of our intelligence and will by the *sensus intimus*, the action of which is not logical but intuitive, and independent of all external sense. S. Thomas says:—

"As to our first knowledge (of the existence of the soul) we must distinguish, because any thing may be known by a *habit* or by an *act*. As to *actual* knowledge, by which a man knows that he has a soul, I say that the soul is known by its acts. For in this he perceives that he has a soul, that he lives, and that he is, because he perceives that he feels, and understands, and exercises other vital operations of this kind, as Aristotle says (Ethics t. i., ix. c. 9), 'We perceive that we perceive, and know that we know; and because we perceive and know this, we know that we are.' But as for the *habitual* knowledge I say that the soul sees itself, by its own essence, that is, because its essence is present to itself." "For this the essence of the soul alone, which is present in the mind, is sufficient: for out of it proceed the acts by which it is actually perceived." §

* Kirkman, pp. 266, 267.

† Maurus, tom. iii. p. 282.

‡ Psychologia Empirica, tom. i. p. 1.

§ Kleutgen, La Philosophie Scholastique, tom. i. pp. 211, 215.

2. From this flows the knowledge of the phenomena of an interior world so continuous, multitudinous, and self-evident, that the Materialistic philosophy has always seemed to me to be the result of a privation of inward sight. They who believe thought to be a function of matter, for the most part reject metaphysics as an intellectual illusion, and ethics as a conventional superstition. Nor is this unnatural; for the laws of the intellect and the laws of morals are phenomena of the soul, which is an intelligent and moral nature. The objects of our reason and conscience are truth and falsehood, right and wrong, and these are the subject matter of action and of responsibility. Matter is not responsible unless it be an intelligent and moral nature. If any man would affirm it to be moral and intellectual, he is denying, not the existence of the soul, but the immateriality of the soul. Nevertheless, this denial is fraught with consequences destructive of the intellectual and moral order of the world.

3. Mr. Kirkman has seemed in one place to make a concession, which I am sure he does not intend. After arguing with great force for the existence of God from the idea of will and cause, he adds, "The answer cannot be scientific."* But the answer is at least certain and excludes all doubt.

An objector might take advantage of this, and say that he removes the proof of the existence of God from the sphere of intellect to the region of faith or of religious feeling. No doubt he meant to say that the proof of the existence of God is by the whole soul in all its intellectual, moral, spiritual powers and faculties, and is corroborated and consolidated by all the affections, aspirations, and instincts, of love and experience. This is most true; but it is of vital necessity to maintain that the existence of God is a truth which may be proved by reasoning within the sphere of intellect. If this were not so, then they who know not God would not be, as the Apostle declares, "inexcusable."† The Sovereign Pontiff, in 1840, defined—"Ratiocinatio Dei existentiam cum certitudine probare valet;"‡ and the Vatican Council in 1870, decreed—that the existence of God "can with certainty be known by the natural light of human reason through the things that are made."§

The Scholastic philosophy teaches with a rigorous logic which has never been answered, that the existence of God may be demonstrated—first, under the conception of the First Cause; secondly, under the conception of the First Power of Motion, itself immovable; thirdly, under the conception of a Necessary Existence; and lastly, that this First Cause, First Mover, and First

* P. 262.

† Rom. i.

‡ Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, p. 441.

§ Prima Constitutio, De Fide Cath. Canones, 11.

Necessary Existence, is an Intelligence separate from all creation.*

The ethical arguments, and the testimony of common sense and of mankind, are distinct from this intellectual demonstration. I do not doubt that the author of "Philosophy without Assumptions" was fully conscious of this, and it is to be wished that he would complete his argument in another volume of clearness and power like that now before us.

I will endeavour to draw out very briefly what the Scholastic philosophy holds and hands down on the much-disputed but indisputable reality of matter.

As to the existence of matter, I am glad to repeat that Mr. Kirkman does not deny that it exists; as to its physical nature, or *what* it is, all philosophers are more or less in the same plight.

As to its existence, I can hardly understand how any man can deny or doubt that in the metaphysical or hyper-physical order the existence of matter or substance is present to our mind by a necessity of the reason. Whether a man believe in its existence or not, this is certain, that in the physical order, if he fall upon its phenomena, he is broken; and if its phenomena fall upon him, they grind him to powder. If he be pleased to say that he was pulverized by phenomena which had no substratum, or by forces which were points having position and no parts, I will not contend with him. It was a refined mode of extinction, worthy of heroes and philosophers—a worthy scientific euthanasia. When the Scholastics describe substance or matter as *ens rationis tantum*, they intend only that it is beyond the jurisdiction of sense. They affirm it to be *ens reale*, though not cognizant by sense. When the author of "Philosophy without Assumptions" says that he "cannot find it nor show any one else how to find it," he seems to have slipped from the order of reason into the order of sense; for though matter eludes the sense, it is present by an intellectual necessity to the reason.

It would seem, also, that in our modern controversies the distinction between metaphysical and physical matter has been for the most part overlooked. The existence of matter belongs primarily to metaphysics. Reason affirms that matter exists. The question what it belongs to Physics.

We are told that physically it consists of atoms or of forces. Such are the theories of Atomists and Dynamists. The Atomic theory, besides other intrinsic difficulties, gives no sufficient account of the unity, cohesion, specification, and action of bodies; nevertheless Atomism affirms the existence of matter. The Dynamical

* S. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, lib. i. c. 13. Maurus, *Quæst. Philosophiæ*, tom. iii. pp. 29—33.

theory gives an account of the action of bodies, but no reason why the force-points should aggregate themselves into species. It either reduces all things to phenomenal forces without specific laws or forms, or it supposes the Will of God to be the Force present in all forces. Nevertheless Dynamism acknowledges the presence of an active principle.

The Scholastic philosophy combines both the active principle of Dynamism in the *form* and the passive principle of Atomism in the *matter* which unite in the specific existence of all things.

I hardly know where to class those who tell us that matter thinks, or those who find in it all the promise and potency of life. But the length of this article warns me to make an end, and I cannot better do so than by adding a brief statement of the Scholastic philosophy on the points we have been treating.

The following will be, I believe, a correct statement of the Scholastic teaching:—

1. By strict process of reason we demonstrate a First Existence, a First Cause, a First Mover; and that this Existence, Cause, and Mover is Intelligence and Power.

2. This Power is eternal, and from all eternity has been in its fullest amplitude; nothing in it is latent, dormant, or in germ: but its whole existence is *in actu*, that is, in actual perfection, and in complete expansion or actuality. In other words God is *Actus Purus*, in whose being nothing is potential, *in potentiâ*, but in Him all things potentially exist.

3. In the power of God, therefore, exists the original matter (*prima materia*) of all things; but that *prima materia* is *pura potentia*, a *nihilo distincta*, a mere potentiality or possibility; nevertheless, it is not a nothing, but a possible existence. When it is said that the *prima materia* of all things exists in the power of God, it does not mean that it is of the existence of God, which would involve Pantheism, but that its actual existence is possible.

4. Of things possible by the power of God, some come into actual existence, and their existence is determined by the impression of a *form* upon this *materia prima*. The form is the first act which determines the existence and the species of each, and this act is wrought by the will and power of God. By this union of form with the *materia prima*, the *materia secunda* or the *materia signata* is constituted.

5. This form is called *forma substantialis* because it determines the being of each existence, and is the root of all its properties, and the cause of all its operations.

6. And yet the *materia prima* has no actual existence before the form is impressed. They come into existence simultaneously;*

* Kleutgen, p. 294, note.

as the voice and articulation, to use St. Augustine's illustration, are simultaneous in speech.

7. In all existing things there are, therefore, two principles; the one active, which is the form—the other passive, which is the matter; but when united, they have an unity which determines the existence of the species. The form is that by which each is what it is.

8. It is the form that gives to each its unity of cohesion, its law, and its specific nature.*

When, therefore, we are asked whether matter exists or no, we answer, It is as certain that matter exists as that form exists; but all the phenomena which fall under sense prove the existence of the unity, cohesion, species, that is, of the form of each, and this is a proof that what was once in mere possibility is now in actual existence. It is, and that is both form and matter.

When we are further asked *what* is matter, we answer readily, It is not God, nor the substance of God; nor the presence of God arrayed in phenomena; nor the uncreated will of God veiled in a world of illusions, deluding us with shadows into the belief of substance: much less is it *catter*, and still less is it *nothing*. It is a reality, the physical kind or nature of which is as unknown in its *quiddity* or *quality* as its existence is certainly known to the reason of man.

This may be the place to show in what way the Scholastic philosophy rejects both the Atomic and the Dynamic theories of matter as inadequate to explain the phenomena cognizable by

* The following quotations will show the definitions of S. Thomas as to Matter, Existence, Act, Potentia, Form, substantial and accidental:—

"Genuina notio materiæ primæ, eam scilicet esse quidem quidpiam reale et positivum, non esse tamen actu substantiam sed solum potentiam realem in omnium substantiarum species, quæ generatione fieri possunt."—*Goudin, Philosophia Divi. Thomæ*, tom. ii. p. 45.

"Concludamus igitur cum D. Thoma, 2 Contra Gentes, cap. 45, in rebus tres gradus reperiri. Invenitur enim aliqua res quæ est Actus tantum, scilicet Deus Optimus Maximus: et alia res quæ est potentia tantum, scilicet *materia prima*: et demum alia res, quæ miscetur ex actis et potentiâ, cujus modî sunt omnes creaturæ inter Deum et materiam primam positæ."—*Ibid.* p. 82.

"Existentia est extra nihilum et causas sistentia Quia vero res censetur sisti extra causas et nihilum, cum nihil ei deesse requisitum ad rationem entis, ideo metaphysici definiunt existentiam, *ultimam entis actualitatem*."—*Ibid.* p. 89.

"Secunda sententia materiæ omnem prorsus existentiam propriam abnegat, eamque censet meram potentiam realem et positivam existentie capacem. Ita Thomistæ omnes plerique alii."—*Ibid.* p. 89.

"Conclusio. Materia prima nullam ex se habet existentiam, sed existit per existentiam totius compositi quo illi competit per formam."—*Ibid.*

"Forma substantialis recte definitur *Actus primus materiæ*. Dicitur in primis *Actus* ad differentiam materiæ, quæ est pura potentia. Dicitur *primus* ad differentiam existentie, quæ est *actus ultimus entis*: et ad differentiam formarum accidentalium, quæ sunt solum *actus secundarii*, præsupponentes *actum substantialem*. Additur *materiæ* ad differentiam formarum per se subsistentium, quales sunt angeli, quæ sunt actus sed non recipiuntur in materiâ."—*Ibid.* p. 112.

"Forma informans dividitur in substantialem, et accidentalem. Substantialis est quæ dat esse simpliciter Sic *anima rationalis* est forma substantialis, quia dat esse humanum: at vero *scientia* est forma accidentalis quia dat solum esse secundarium et additum esse humano." That is to say, the rational soul constitutes man: science a learned man. But the former is the substance of humanity, the latter an accidental excellence.

sense, and at the same time combines both these theories in a larger and more adequate conception. I will draw out the treatment of this subject by Kleutgen in his "*Philosophie Scholastique*," and Sanseverino in his "*Philosophia Speculativa*."

Kleutgen, after stating the doctrines of Atomism and Dynamism, points out that neither can give any adequate account of the phenomena of matter determined in forms or species. He then compares these two systems with the Scholastic philosophy as follows:—

"De nouvelles difficultés viennent s'ajouter à ces arguments, si l'on considère l'essence des corps; c'est que, si l'atomisme n'explique pas mais présuppose la matière comme une substance étendue, le dynamisme cherche bien à en trouver l'explication, mais il s'entortille en tant de difficultés qu'il menace de faire disparaître la réalité de la substance même aussi bien que celle de l'extension."—*La Philosophie Scholastique*, tom. iii. p. 335.

"Dans la Philosophie panthéistique, les êtres individuels de la nature ne sont plus que des phénomènes de la substance qui est tout, tandis que dans le système des atomes ou de monades il ne sont plus que des phénomènes de ces éléments."—*Ibid.* p. 337.

"Si maintenant nous dirigeons notre regard sur la théorie de la Scholastique nous avons à remarquer avant tout que, soutenant l'unité substantielle, et la substance propre des êtres individuels qui compose la nature, elle rejette aussi bien la multiplicité infinie de substances élémentaires (atomes ou monades) que la substance unique qui se fractionne elle-même pour se recueillir ou se rassembler de nouveau telle que l'admettent les Panthéistes."—*Ibid.*

"Il prétend (dynamisme) qu'en définissant l'essence du corps on ne doit pas se contenter d'admettre simplement l'extension, ou la masse étendue, mais qu'il faut chercher à concevoir cette masse et son étendue, comme dérivant d'un principe actif. Or, qu'est-ce que la forme dont parlent les Scholastiques, si ce n'est un principe sans lequel la matière n'aurait ni quantité ni extension? Toutefois, si certains Dynamistes font consister toute l'essence du corps dans les forces élémentaires aussi exclusivement que les Atomistes la cherchent dans la masse inerte, les Scholastiques la découvrent dans l'union de la matière et de la forme."—*Ibid.* p. 338.

"L'atomisme purement mécanique considérerait le corps comme une masse étendue, sans aucune force immanente et par conséquent sans aucune activité propre tandis que, au contraire, le dynamisme extrême ne découvrirait l'essence du corps que dans la seule force, excluant ainsi de la substance du corps la matière comme étant un simple phénomène.

"Mais comment devons-nous concevoir la relation qui existe dans le corps entre la force et la matière?

"Nous aurions ainsi à faire consister le sujet des forces dans la matière déterminée par la forme à être une essence propre, spécifique. Or, voilà ce qui forme précisément la doctrine de l'antiquité. Suivant cette doctrine, il est vrai ce n'est pas la matière mais le corps qui est ce dont les parties sont dans l'espace les unes dehors des autres, et ce n'est pas la forme, mais bien le corps qui est doué de force; toutefois le corps est étendu parcequ'il est matériel et il possède la force, et l'activité en vertu de sa forme."—*Ibid.* p. 339.

Kleutgen sums up his argument in these words:—

"Si nous parvenions, dans cette étude, à prouver suffisamment la vérité de la théorie scholastique, il nous serait permis de dire, qu'elle réunissait en

elle ce que l'atomisme, et le dynamisme contiennent de vrai, mais en évitant également les erreurs et les exagérations de l'un et de l'autre système."—*Ibid.* p. 343.

Sanseverino states very tersely in the following passage the inadequacy both of Atomism and of Dynamism:—

"I dinamici dimostrano che la materia per esistere ha bisogno di un vero principio di unità e di azione, senza del quale le parti si disgregherebbero, e l'individualità e la sostanza stessa dello essere svanirebbero. Gli atomisti poi oppongono, che il principio di unità e di azione per se solo non basta per dare origine ad un esteso, che sia una vera realtà, e non una ingannevole apparenza. Adunque per cansare gli assurdi dei primi e dei secondi è giocoforza ammettere che i corpi costano di un principio passivo e di un principio attivo, del multiplo e del uno, del determinabile e del determinante; in altri termini della materia e della forma."—*Philos. Specul.* vol. ii. pp. 214, 215.

Mr. Kirkman repeats again and again in his book his rejection of matter as "stuff filling space." But the Scholastic philosophy does not speak of *matter as filling space*. It teaches that *bodies having extension fill space*. But it affirms that bodies consist of form and matter, and that neither can the form exist without matter, nor the matter without form; and therefore neither matter nor form as such or separately can fill space. S. Thomas teaches that it is impossible even to the Omnipotence of God that matter should even exist without form, much more that it should fill space. But when united they compose a body which has extension, and an extended body fills space, and yet so that extension is not a *constituent part of the essence* of a body, but a *necessary consequence of its existence*. But extension is a phenomenon cognizable and measurable by sense, and is therefore no assumption.*

IV. Let us turn now for a moment to modern philosophies, which teach either that matter does not exist or that we cannot know its existence. If they said only that we do not know *what* it is, we should have no contention with them. But to deny its existence is to contradict a law of our reason: to doubt of its existence is to doubt of the certainty of our reason.

But I fear the cause lies deeper. We have already seen that the Scholastic philosophy passes at once from the immediate certainty of our own existence to the intellectual and logical certainty of the existence of God, and from that beginning it descends through all orders of existences. The modern philosophies not only invert this method, which might be legitimately done, but they fail or refuse to ascend to the First Existence and the First Cause. They begin their work by sense in the midst of phenomena. All beyond this veil, to them has no cognizable

* Kloutgen says:—"L'étendue, à la vérité, est essentielle au corps en ce sens qu'il est de sa nature d'être étendu: mais nous ne pouvons pas dire pour cela qu'elle appartienne à l'essence même du corps: car elle en est une conséquence nécessaire mais non une partie constitutive."—*La Philosophie Scholastique*, tom. iii. p. 315.

existence. Is not this an abdication of reason in its highest prerogatives? Is it not a suppression of one-half of the knowledge which sense and reason, acting simultaneously, convey to us? When the sense reports from without, the reason pronounces within. We are not sense only nor reason only; both act together in every normal process of our rational nature. When the senses report phenomena the reason predicates existence, and in that existence substance, or matter, or *catter*, or *stuff*, or what you will, a being and a reality are there of which the sense can only report the apparel and the appearance. And yet the physical sciences, by anatomy and analysis and chemistry, report a great deal more than appearances. They test and superinduce changes and corruptions and transformations—of what, and into what? Of phenomena only, or atoms, or force-loci, or points having position and no parts? My sceptical mind finds this hard of digestion. When I am told that atoms or force-points by cohesion, or attraction, or repulsion, or equilibrium, can account for all diversities of species and kinds and proportions, and operations and qualities, and extensions, and dimensions, in all the unities which we call bodies, my reason demands a mind and cause, a law and a plastic power, in which all second causes are enveloped, and from which they all come. Unless the Atomists and Dynamists ascend to the Creator, and see Him in all atoms and forces and points as the sole intelligible reason of the Cosmos, they speak but half truths, which the reason rejects as inadequate.

Mr. Kirkman, as a champion of Dynamism, has challenged single-handed all Atomists and Materialists, and the victory is decisively with him in so far as neither Atomism nor Materialism can give any rational account of the unity of every several existence, nor of their action, power, or force, nor of their life and vital operations of will and thought. When they deny the freedom and power of the will they sign their own sentence of death. Not to be able to account for the will is ruin to a philosophy; to deny the self-determining power of the will is to commit a philosophical suicide. The freedom of the will is a fact of consciousness, and consciousness, as Hume affirms, never errs. In this he was still restrained by the old Philosophy, and by common sense. Sanseverino treating of consciousness, says—

“L'uomo non solo ha le conoscenze sensitive ed intellettive ma *sa* ed *avverte* ancora di averle. Questa consapevolezza che l'anima ha degli atti suoi e dai filosofi odierni detta *sensu intimo* ovvero coscienza. Noi preferiamo la seconda denominazione.”—*Philosophia Speculativa*, vol. i. 248.

He further defines this consciousness, “l'avvertenza che l'anima ha degli atti suoi.”*

* *Philosophia Speculativa*, vol. i. 250.

“Evidens est, quod homo est animal rationale, sentiens nimirum et intelligens: unusquisque enim experitur se sentire, videre, audire, intelligere, velle, &c.*

Deny this, and you really deny that man is a rational being; deny the certainty of this inward consciousness, and there is no certainty left even for sceptics to affirm that we can be certain of nothing.

One of Mr. Kirkman's critics says, “It has been long ago seen that to assume the fact of consciousness—a highly complex one, and the result of a mixed state of sense-perception and inward reflection—as the starting-point of all philosophy, is to begin at the wrong end. It is to make the goal our starting-point. The man who has reached consciousness—in other words, who knows that he knows—has made a very great advance.” The primordial fact of human nature is not “I know,” but “I want.” But who wants? Here, even in the infant crying for food, are all the elements of consciousness in full action. The infant wants food, and knows whence to derive it. It knows when it obtains it, and when its want is satisfied. To say that this is only sense would not be true even of a calf. Instinct and sense are there together. In the child the “I” is sentient, and the sentient “I” is intelligent in the measure of infancy. It is not a reflective act, but a direct act. So also is consciousness. Its first intuitions precede all acts of reflection upon ourselves. There may be consciousness without reflection, but there cannot be reflection without consciousness. Consciousness knows the personal self, reflection knows that it knows. I am conscious that I am awake without reflection. To pinch myself to prove that I am awake, would indeed be a reflex act. But consciousness precedes all such needless torments.

The author of “Philosophy without Assumptions,” trusting too implicitly to Boscovich, too confidently adopts the Dynamical Philosophy, which in the last analysis can be resolved only into one of two theories—either that all existences are only forces, activities without an agent; or that the agent behind them all is God, which may be verbally but cannot be logically distinguished from Pantheism. Mr. Kirkman affirms the existence of God, and does not deny the existence of matter; but in page 277 he, with less than his usual precision of thought, makes light of the word and idea of person as applicable to God. But an impersonal God sustaining the activities of the world is hardly to be distinguished from the *Anima Mundi*, or from a cultured Pantheism. I am sure that nothing was further from Mr. Kirkman's mind, and that he would promptly show that I have not fully understood him.

* Mauri Quæst. Philosophiæ, tom. iii. p. 282.

I cannot close this hasty treatment of the largest subject except Theology without expressing my sorrow to see minds so great and varied and subtil and fertile as those Mr. Kirkman has criticized, describing almost every imaginable curve and deviation from the traditional philosophy and the intellectual system of the world. These are bold words, but I believe them to be true. I ascribe this lamentable waste of great gifts and powers to the complete forgetfulness and desuetude into which the old philosophies and their scientific terminology have fallen. If they had been known it would have been impossible for any mind of far less subtilty than Professor Tyndall's to have uttered the words—

“By an intellectual necessity I cross the boundary of experience and discern in that matter which we in our ignorance of its latent powers, and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have hitherto covered with opprobrium, the promise and potency of all terrestrial life.”*


If the meaning of this proposition be that all things are potentially in the *materia prima* of the Schoolmen, it is true enough but inadequate: if it be not this, it seems to be either a deification of matter, or an inaccurate and inadequate expression of the agency of second causes; or, if it be none of these, it is, I believe, a phrase without an intellectual equivalent.

HENRY EDWARD,
Cardinal Archbishop.

* Address at Belfast, p. 55. Longmans: 1874.







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